Interpreting Religion
The Phenomenological Approaches of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye, W. Brede Kristensen, and Gerardus van der Leeuw

George Alfred James
INTERPRETING RELIGION
George Alfred James

INTERPRETING RELIGION

The Phenomenological Approaches of
Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye,
W. Brede Kristensen, and
Gerardus van der Leeuw

The Catholic University of America Press
Washington, D.C.
To Ileana Marculesco,
teacher and friend
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolegomenon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. The Problem</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. The Archeology of the Term</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c. Familial Traits of Phenomenological Approaches to Religion</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART I. The Phenomenology of Religion of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The A-Historical Trait in the Phenomenology of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Phenomenology of Chantepie as a Systematic Study of Religion / 63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Phenomenology of Chantepie as a Non-Developmental Study of Religion / 73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Phenomenology of Chantepie as an Anti-Historicist Study of Religion / 84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The A-Theological Trait in the Phenomenology of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theology in Holland at the Advent of the Phenomenology of Religion / 86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Object of Theology as a Science and the Object of the Science of Religion / 92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Theological Attitude and the Attitude of the Science of Religion / 99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Theological Perspective and the Perspective of the Phenomenology of Religion / 102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Phenomenological Perspective through the Evasion of the Theological / 106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

3. The Anti-Reductive Trait in the Phenomenology of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye
   Reductionism and the Science of Religion / 113
   The Measure of the Object of Chantepie's Inquiry / 119
   The Distinctive Quality of the Object of Chantepie's Inquiry / 123
   Phenomenology and "Scientific" Studies of Religion / 126

PART II. The Phenomenological Approach to Religion of W. Brede Kristensen

4. The A-Historical Trait in the Phenomenology of W. Brede Kristensen
   The Phenomenology of Kristensen as a Systematic Study / 144
   The Phenomenology of Kristensen as a Non-Developmental Study / 148
   The Phenomenology of Kristensen as an Anti-Historicist Study / 152

5. The A-Theological Trait in the Phenomenology of W. Brede Kristensen
   The Object of Kristensen’s Phenomenology and the Science of Theology / 157
   The A-Theological Attitude and the Phenomenological Task / 162
   The A-Theological Perspective and the Method of Surrender / 166

6. The Anti-Reductive Trait in the Phenomenology of W. Brede Kristensen
   Reductionism and the Mystical Background of Existence / 175
   Reductionism and the Nature of Rational Theoretical Explanation / 180
   Kristensen's View of the Sui Generis Nature of Religion / 191

PART III. The Phenomenology of Religion of Gerardus van der Leeuw

7. The A-Historical Trait in the Phenomenology of Gerardus van der Leeuw
   The Phenomenology of van der Leeuw as a Systematic Study / 205
   The Phenomenology of van der Leeuw as a Non-Developmental Study / 210
   The Phenomenology of van der Leeuw as an Anti-Historicist Study / 214
Contents

8. The A-Theological Trait in the Phenomenology of Gerardus van der Leeuw
   The Object of Theology and the Study of What Appears / 218
   The Theological Attitude and the Attitude of Self-Surrendering Love / 224
   Religious Phenomena in the Perspective of the Epoche / 230

9. The Anti-Reductive Trait in the Phenomenology of Gerardus van der Leeuw
   The Comprehension of Alien Types of Religion / 241
   Explanation in the Service of Understanding / 249
   The Irreducible in the Phenomenology of van der Leeuw / 254

Conclusion 267

Bibliography 279

Index 295
In recent decades there has been confusion surrounding the term *phenomenology of religion*. The present work attempts to clarify this subject through an exploration of the self-understanding of three of its key exponents. We begin with a survey of the ways the term has been understood in recent literature in the field, and following this survey, we attempt to reconstruct the development of the term from its first occurrence in the history of ideas. Much of the confusion has arisen from the fact that the term has had different meanings within two different philosophical traditions, one in Britain, the other on the continent, and when the term first appeared in the study of religion, its meaning was closer to the British than the continental use of the term. Owing to the gradual obsolescence of the term with its original meaning in English, misunderstandings arose. In response to these misunderstandings, more complex developments followed.

One of the difficulties in understanding the phenomenology of religion is the absence of any foundational creed to which all exponents were willing to adhere. The earliest exponents of the phenomenology of religion differed widely from one another on many critical issues. Nevertheless there is no difficulty in identifying those who self-consciously employed the term, and it is evident that its earliest, self-avowed advocates used the term to distinguish their approach from other known approaches. Thus even if we are unable to define the phenomenology of religion in terms of positive characteristics, it need not follow that we are unable to find it. Granting the differences among the various exponents, it is appropriate to acknowledge the phenomenology of religion not as one but as a group of approaches. But acknowledging the common disavowal of other available approaches, it is appropriate to recognize their kinship.
knowledging both their affinities and their differences, we propose to discuss one group of phenomenologies of religion as a family of approaches in which we may discern certain common resemblances or traits while still recognizing the integrity of the particular approach of each individual member.

Selection of representatives of this family to discuss raises a variety of issues. We chose to include Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Sausse, the first to use the term phenomenology in the title of a study of religion; W. Brede Kristensen, one of the most influential early exponents of a phenomenology of religion; and Gerardus van der Leeuw, perhaps one of the best known representatives of a phenomenological approach. The selection of representatives was also based upon the criterion that discussion of each exponent should illuminate the characteristic traits of the family as a whole. In the following study, we consider the manner in which, and the degree to which, these representatives see their own efforts as at once a-historical, a-theological, and anti-reductive. In the successive contributions of each of these exponents, these traits become more developed, more explicit, and more replete with methodological self-awareness. Widespread confusion about the nature of phenomenological approaches to religion has unfortunately obscured the importance of this family of approaches in which there is a wealth of insight that has much to contribute to the academic study of religion today. My hope is that the present study will contribute to a reconsideration of the possibilities inherent in phenomenological approaches to religion.

The number of people who have contributed to my efforts to understand the phenomenology of religion are too numerous to mention. Professor J. A. Martin, Jr. (retired), of Columbia University was the first to acknowledge the possible contribution of a work of this nature and provided many helpful suggestions when the project was still only a thought in my mind. Professors Joseph Blau, Robert C. Cumming, and Wayne Proudfoot provided me with helpful and exacting comments. I wish to thank Professor Kenneth L. Schmitz of Trinity College, The University of Toronto, and Professor...
Louis Dupré of Yale University for examining the entire manuscript in an earlier form and for their many helpful suggestions. I thank Dr. David J. McGonagle of The Catholic University of America Press for his interest in the manuscript and for his encouragement during the period of preparation for press.
INTERPRETING RELIGION
Introduction

The significance of what has been called phenomenology for such areas of study as psychology, sociology, history, law, political science, art, etc. is far from established. Yet among scholars within each of these disciplines, there is agreement that the phenomenological analysis has a bearing upon their work and that its significance is to be found through ever more rigorous reflection upon the works and method of Edmund Husserl, his followers, and their critics as the ideas and materials traditional to these domains of discourse are re-examined in light of the insight they have to offer. Such is not the case in the academic study of religion. The general problem of the application of the phenomenological method to any of the social or human sciences applies, without doubt, to the application of this method to the study of religion. But a look at the use made of so-called phenomenology within the field of religion suggests that the phenomenology of religion, or the phenomenological approach to religion, entails a level of confusion that exceeds that of other fields, a confusion of another order. Within the field of religion, the term is employed in a sense that does not square with its meaning for Husserl, and it has accrued connotations it could not possibly have had for him, or any of his followers. Moreover, these connotations are far from unequivocal. Few terms in the academic study of religion are used with more ambiguity. Is the phenomenological approach to religion a “method” among others that might be deployed in the study of religious data? Is it an enquiry into the “essence” of religion?

1. An earlier version of the present Introduction and Prolegomenon was published in Journal of Religion 65, no. 3 (June 1985): 311-35 under the title “Phenomenology and the Study of Religion: The Archaeology of an Approach,” © 1985 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
Introduction

Is the phenomenology of religion merely the systematic as opposed to the historical study of religious phenomena? Within the academic study of religion there is little, if any, consensus.

The widespread confusion concerning the term is not simply about the merits, but rather the nature of the phenomenology of religion. In approaching this topic, it is necessary to impose limits upon our discussion. We cannot hope to consider all the literature that could be called phenomenological in which the subject of religion appears, nor can we discuss all of the studies of religion in which the term phenomenology appears. Our focus will be upon approaches more or less clearly designated by the expression phenomenology of religion. This refers, in particular, to the work of a number of European specialists in religion dating from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries who self-consciously distinguished certain of their studies of religion, or certain parts of their studies of religion, by the expression phenomenology of religion. The nature of phenomenology of religion has been the subject of controversy within the academic study of religion since the early fifties. Contention about the significance or viability of phenomenology in the study of religion derives largely from a confusion about the purposes, procedures, and perspectives of this group of scholars. Our intention, then, is not to establish the manner in which the term should be used in the study of religion but rather to clarify the nature of what has been denoted in the field of religion by this expression phenomenology of religion. In this we hope to contribute to an appreciation of its continuing importance for the academic study of religion.

Our treatment begins with a report of some of the ways in which the phenomenology of religion has been understood in recent literature within the field of religion. We will not attempt to adjudicate these dissonant views, but we will try to place the controversy within a larger context of meaning by elaborating a variety of ways in which the term phenomenology itself was employed before it appeared in the field of religion. We will undertake this by means of an archeology of the term. We propose to examine the term phenomenology as a linguistic artifact that has appeared in a variety of historical
Introduction

situations. From evidence found in the context of its appearance, we hope to ascertain its use and function, that is, the meanings with which the term has been employed. From this we hope to discern the connotations of the term that were intended when it first appeared in the academic study of religion and to understand how this relates to and differs from other more recent occurrences of the term.

In order to understand the nature of the studies of religion denoted by the term phenomenology of religion, it will be appropriate to utilize a modified case study approach. If it is impossible strictly to define the phenomenology of religion, it is possible nevertheless to identify studies of religion in which this term has been self-consciously employed. The chief difficulty of the case study approach is that the selection of cases affects the general conception of the approach under consideration. We propose, therefore, to select three differing samples of phenomenology of religion that can reasonably be regarded as foundational to this approach and therefore representative of phenomenology of religion as a type of study.

In the selection of foundational cases of phenomenological studies of religion, it will be useful to restrict our attention to studies that appeared before the early fifties when the larger controversies over the nature of these approaches to religion arose. Beyond this our choices will be determined by a kind of natural history of our sources. As we will see below, there is simply no exponent of a phenomenology of religion whose influence has been more widely felt or who is more often referred to in efforts to adjudicate the nature of this approach than Gerardus van der Leeuw. In selecting his work for discussion, we do not take it as the criterion but only as one widely, perhaps the most widely, acknowledged specimen of a phenomenology of religion. In discussing the work of van der Leeuw, our attention will be on his famous study, Phänomenologie der Religion, published in 1933, in which his own understanding of this approach to religion is most fully developed.  

2. Gerardus van der Leeuw, Phänomenologie der Religion (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1933). The authority of the English translation of this work Gerardus van
In his conception of the phenomenology of religion, van der Leeuw was influenced greatly, though not exclusively, by his teacher in the history of religions, W. Brede Kristensen who held the chair in History and Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Leiden from 1901 to 1937. During his lifetime, Kristensen was not widely known outside of Holland and the Scandinavian countries. Yet for his originality and penetration into the nature of religion, he was regarded by many as an authoritative exponent of what was widely known there as the phenomenological approach. The esteem in which he has been held affords reasonable grounds for considering his work as a key example of the phenomenology of religion along with the work of the more famous van der Leeuw. In discussing the case of Kristensen, our principal resource will be his lectures on the phenomenology of religion which were given at Leiden and were collected and published posthumously in English. These lectures, which were translated and edited by John Carman, have woven the results of all of Kristensen's detailed studies into the fabric of a work that constitutes Kristensen's most comprehensive treatment of religion. It is an especially appropriate work to treat as a case study in the phenomenology of religion because it was published in the hope that it would contribute to the international discussion of the nature of phenomenological approaches to religion that was in progress at the time.\(^3\)

If the influence of Kristensen can be seen in the phenomenology of van der Leeuw, then the influence of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye can be seen even more clearly in the works of both Kristensen and van der Leeuw. Sufficient justification for the selection of Chantepie's phenomenology of religion for discussion as the third case is the fact that he was the first to use the term phenomenology

in the context of the so-called scientific study of religion. It is significant that he used this term to denote a particular approach of studying religion and that he employed it to distinguish this sort of study from others. He is regarded by almost all exponents of the phenomenology of religion as the first to undertake this type of study. In his work the term phenomenology of religion refers to the first of three sections of his Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte. This work will be our principal resource for exploring his thought.4

Although these examples of the phenomenology of religion display cumulative influence, each also possesses a definitive independence of character. Much of the controversy surrounding the phenomenology of religion has arisen from the ways the phenomenology of van der Leeuw differs, for instance, from that of Chantepie. In addition to individual differences in intellectual interest and concern, the works of van der Leeuw and Chantepie also represent differing levels of methodological self-awareness with which this approach has been undertaken. In their relation to each other, these three cases represent three generations of scholars who used the term phenomenology to describe their work; three generations, we might say, in which certain family traits of the phenomenology of religion were becoming gradually more pronounced. Our selection of case studies presents foundational examples both of the unity and diversity of the conceptual understanding of the term phenomenology of religion. These representations are key members of a rather extended, and not always tranquil, family.

4. Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte (Freiburg i Br: J. C. Mohr, 1887). Pierre Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, Manual of the Science of Religion, trans. Beatrice S. Colyer-Fergusson (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1891). When the English translation of this work was undertaken by Beatrice S. Colyer-Fergusson (née Müller), the author made available to the translator both his own notes and his corrections of the German text and personally revised each page of the translation. The result is that the English edition can be read as a second edition of the original work. Because later editions of this work in Dutch and in French employed a different editor, the English edition presents the most thoroughly developed version of the approach to religion which Chantepie denoted by this term. References in the present work will be to this English edition of the work. It will be cited hereinafter as Chantepie.
Introduction

In discussing the phenomenology of Chantepie, Kristensen, and van der Leeuw, we do not propose to deal with them simply as discrete figures. Other studies have attempted characterizations of one or another of these persons, but because each represents a distinctive conception of the purpose and task implied in the term, the results have not contributed greatly to an overall understanding of phenomenology of religion. Our purpose, on the other hand, is to achieve a reliable characterization of the phenomenology of religion as a family of approaches. To do this we will need to examine each of the cases we have selected in terms of certain familial traits. In his effort to indicate the nature of his own approach to religion, van der Leeuw employs one of the most illuminating strategies by discussing what the phenomenology of religion, as he understands the expression, is not. In doing so he distinguishes his approach from a variety of other contemporary approaches. Some more recent exponents have taken a similar tack. Because the expression phenomenology of religion can be employed to distinguish as well as to describe an approach, we propose to discuss the phenomenology of religion chiefly in terms of negative characteristics.

The thesis of the present study is that phenomenological approaches to religion, as illustrated in the case studies we wish to consider, are in ways yet to be specified a-historical, a-theological, anti-reductive studies of religion. That their phenomenological approaches are a-historical and a-theological are claims that the three scholars have made of themselves, although not precisely using these terms. That they are anti-reductive is not a claim they have specifically made of themselves, but it is one that is implicit, as we will see, throughout the fabric of their works. This is not to say that all phenomenological approaches to religion are a-historical, a-theological, and anti-reductive to the same extent, in precisely the same way, or with the same response to the philosophical and methodological problems involved therein. It is to say that they share these characteristics as something like family traits. The notion of family traits is a fitting analogy because family traits, like the characteristics of the phenomenology of religion, can be slight or pro-
nounced, and they are accommodated differently within the whole personality of each family member.

Following a brief summary of the discussion that has surrounded the question of the nature of the phenomenology of religion, we will undertake an archeology of the term. Next we will clarify further each of the traits under which we will examine each of the exponents we discuss. We will then examine each of the “familial” traits, a-historical, a-theological, anti-reductive, as we find them within the works of each of three “family” members, Chantepie, Kristensen, van der Leeuw.

This study will contribute to scholarship in the academic study of religion on two levels. First, through a deeper examination of the historical roots of the phenomenology of religion, our knowledge of what phenomenology has meant within the study of religion and elsewhere will be expanded. As a study of the phenomenological approaches of Chantepie, Kristensen, and van der Leeuw, it will contribute to our knowledge of three important and foundational exponents of a phenomenological approach to religion. In these ways this discussion will shed light upon a chapter in the history of the academic study of religion not widely understood. Secondly, by structuring a group of representative examples of the phenomenology of religion so that their common traits are displayed, and by undertaking a close examination of the varying responses of these philosophers to the principal methodological issues they have faced, this study will contribute to a clarification of the relevance of these approaches to the future of the academic study of religion.
Prolegomenon
The Problem

It will be useful to begin the present study with an account of some of the ways the term phenomenology has been understood in the field of religion and to describe the impasse to which the dialogue concerning its meaning has come. The area of greatest contention concerning the meaning of a phenomenology of religion is probably that surrounding the relationship of phenomenology of religion to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and his followers. Some recent exponents of the phenomenology of religion have tried to resolve this problem simply by declaring the independence of their own works from that of Husserl and his followers and by pronouncing Gerardus van der Leeuw the founder of their movement. This solution, however, is unacceptable on several counts. First, van der Leeuw himself employed the term not simply as a label but with considerable knowledge of its historicity. In his writing, he sees his approach as deriving from earlier studies of religion that he also describes as phenomenological. He is evidently aware of Husserl's thought and of the famous *epoche*, which he also employs on some level. Further, the practitioners who follow van der Leeuw disagree profoundly in their understanding of the approach he employed and its implications. These difficulties are reflected in many recent efforts to clarify the nature of the phenomenology of religion. We pre-

1. Van der Leeuw refers to the *epoche* of Husserl, but he refers also and more often to the insights of Heidegger, as well as Jaspers, Binswanger, and others. For him, however, the phenomenology of religion had its origin in the work of Chantepie de la Saussaye whose work precedes any of these and was anticipated by even earlier figures in the study of religion. (Van der Leeuw, pp. 646 n., 675 ff., 690 ff.)
sent some of these efforts here without discussing, for the moment, either the accuracy of their understanding of Husserl's ideas or what might generally be accepted as phenomenology within the history of ideas.

In an essay published in 1954, C. J. Bleeker attempted to clarify the meaning of the phenomenology of religion by stating that while it differs totally from the philosophy of Husserl, the latter still has a service it can render to this approach. Phenomenology of religion, Bleeker stated, is "an investigation into the structure and the significance of facts drawn from a vast field of the history of religion and arranged in systematic order." When studying the history of religions, the scholar soon begins comparing one religion with another, one sacrifice with another, prayer in one tradition with prayer in another. Finally the scholar is no longer considering the significance of sacrifice or prayer in any particular historical context but prayer or sacrifice as such. At this point, according to Bleeker, one has embarked upon a phenomenological study. Because the phenomenology of religion draws its material from all ages and geographic areas, it faces the risk of grouping together such diverse material as would endanger the scientific character of the study. This may be avoided, in Bleeker's view, through the application of the *epoche* and the *eidetic vision* of Husserl's pure phenomenology. According to Bleeker, the *epoche* involves assuming the position of a listener who withholds judgements that arise from preconceived notions. "Phenomenology must begin by accepting as proper objects of study all phenomena that are professed to be religious; subsequently may come the attempt to distinguish what is genuinely religious from what is spurious." The *eidetic vision*, according to Bleeker, contributes to the concern for the *eidos*, the essentials of religious phenomena in question. From his discussion it is not clear just how the *epoche* or the *eidetic vision* prevent grouping together data so diverse that the

3. Ibid., p. 148.
scientific quality of the study is endangered. Nevertheless, on these matters Bleeker sees all students of the phenomenology of religion to be in essential agreement. He sees the differences to lie in the content given to these procedures. For Bleeker, then, the word phenomenology can be taken in two different ways. It is a method or procedure in the study of religion. It is also a specific effort in the form of a handbook or monograph to apply such a method, "to assess the significance of religious phenomena." Bleeker further explains that his own phenomenological efforts are occupied with the theoria and the logos of religion. The theoria is an unbiased and direct way of studying religious phenomena, of seeking "the religious implication of various conceptions of the divine, of various types of anthropology, of prayer, sacrifice, and other elements of cult, etc." The logos of religion is the "strict spiritual laws" which Bleeker interprets as underlying the constitution of every historical religion.4

The same year this explanation was published, Raffaele Pettazzoni offered a similar explanation which differed from Bleeker's view in its account of the concern from which phenomenology of religion arose and in admitting no place at all to the pure phenomenology of Husserl. In Pettazzoni's view, phenomenology of religion arose not from the comparative study of religion but in response to problems involved in the examination of religious data under the hegemony of other disciplines. However important may be the results of researches into religious data by philology, archaeology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, etc., to the extent that they study religious data in the spirit of these sciences, they systematically evade the specific and essential nature of these data that is religious. This specific and essential nature gives these data the right to become the subject of a special science which "seeks to coordinate religious data with one another, to establish relations and to group the facts according to those relations."5 These relations may be of various sorts: of chronology, of structure, of type. For Pettazzoni this is the science of

4. Ibid., pp. 149f.
religion in the proper sense of the words. Phenomenology of religion, as he conceives of it, is a sub-section of this general discipline.

The history of religion is pursued, according to Pettazzoni, when the relation to be established by the science of religion is not merely one of chronology but of correspondence to a certain "internal development." To pursue this relation, research must first establish the history of the various religions. In the effort to reconstruct the history of the various religious traditions, the scholar is necessarily concerned with the development of religious traditions within particular environments and with their relation to other non-religious factors of the environment—poetry, art, speculative thought, social structure, and so on. This raises the question whether a more systematic study of the religious data in their relation to other specifically religious data and apart from their contact with the non-religious world would stand a better chance of achieving an understanding of religion. "It is not enough to know precisely what happened and how the facts came to be; what we want above all to know is the meaning of what happened."6 This deeper understanding cannot be expected merely from a reconstruction of the history of religions. It springs, in Pettazzoni's view, from another branch of the science of religion which is phenomenology. Phenomenology's task is the factoring out of the distinctively religious structures from the multiplicity of religious phenomena from which their meaning can be discerned. In this it stands out as a branch of study quite different from the history of religion. Pettazzoni sees it as an innovation in the study of religion unsurpassed in the past half-century.

The structure and it alone, can help us to find out the meaning of the religious phenomena, independently of their position in time and space and of their attachment to a given cultural environment. Thus the phenomenology of religion reaches a universality which of necessity escapes a history of religion devoted to the study of particular religions, and for that very reason liable to the inevitable splitting up of specialization.7

Up to this point Pettazzoni's discussion of phenomenology of religion has been descriptive rather than normative. His departure

6. Ibid., p. 217.

7. Ibid.
from Bleeker comes into focus with his recommendations concerning the procedures of the phenomenology of religion. Pettazzoni is not satisfied with the accomplishments of the science of religion, and he attributes his dissatisfaction to the arbitrary nature of the separation of the work of the phenomenology from the history of religion. It is a fracture he would like to repair. Noting the view of van der Leeuw that phenomenology and history of religion are quite different, that "phenomenology knows nothing of any historical development of religion," Pettazzoni contends that for all of phenomenology's superiority over purely historical, purely ethnological, purely philosophical researches which systematically evade the peculiar nature of religious data, it does not follow that the history of religion, as Pettazzoni conceives it, has nothing to contribute to an inquiry into the meaning of religious phenomena. Historical development can hardly be considered negligible to the interpretation of historical religious phenomena, even when these data are systematically arranged. Alluding again to van der Leeuw, Pettazzoni states that the confessed limitations of the phenomenology of religion require it to apply constantly to history by whose progress the conclusions of phenomenology must continually be informed.\(^8\) Thus while Bleeker relies upon the epoche and the eidetic vision of Husserl to avoid bringing together such heterogeneous facts and drawing such hurried conclusions as would resign the scientific integrity of his study to the night that makes all cats grey, Pettazzoni endorses a close alliance between the history and the phenomenology of religion and leaves the phenomenology of Husserl quite out of the picture.

It is perhaps in Bleeker's response to these insights of Pettazzoni that his own vision of the phenomenology of religion stands out most clearly from those of other practitioners of a phenomenological approach. Bleeker too refers to the phenomenology of van der Leeuw in this connection which he sees Pettazzoni as having misunderstood. He argues that the nature of phenomenology is too complicated and its activities too varied to characterize it by the single aspect Pettazzoni has brought out. He concedes that in pointing out

the neglect by phenomenology of religion of the development of religions, Pettazzoni "put the finger on the weak point" of many phenomenological efforts. He concurs, moreover, that the history and phenomenology of religion should cooperate.9 Yet he maintains that the phenomenological method is capable of handling the problem of the development of religion on its own terms. While he understands that phenomenology is generally occupied with the discussion of various distinctive religious phenomena, he contends that phenomenology can also proceed to the question of the entelecheia of religious phenomena: During the past five thousand years of history, is it possible to discern a course of events in which an essence is realized by its manifestations? Because of its familiarity with the entire field of religious phenomena, Bleeker finds phenomenology uniquely equipped to deal with this question.10

This response by Bleeker to Pettazzoni, however, has itself raised objections from other exponents of the phenomenological approach. And here again the argument appeals to the authority of van der Leeuw. In his exploration of the question of an entelecheia of religious phenomena, Bleeker finds certain evidence of an "historical logic" within the history of religions. He argues that while the founders of the great world religions utilized the religious content of earlier times, they also made innovations in the history of religion. In his view, such men as Zarathustra, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Mohammed discovered a decisive religious truth by revelation or by enlightenment and established the pattern of the religion to which adherents are bound. "By their work," says Bleeker, "religion suddenly reached a higher level of self realization."11 He finds further grounds for this entelecheia in the regenerative function of the periodic reformations characteristic of the great religious traditions that recall them to their original purpose. He argues, furthermore, that

11. Ibid., p. 20.
modern man “has a clearer view of what is genuinely religious, is more able to distinguish the religious from the secular, and makes higher demands as to the quality of religion.” He concludes by arguing for discernable traces of an entelecheia of religion which proceeds according to Toynbee’s law of challenge and response: “Each relapse seems to evoke in religious people strong desire for and an attempt of restoring religion.”

Bleeker’s argument for an entelecheia of religion provoked a very vigorous “phenomenological” critique. Geo Widengren, for instance, suggested that while certain scholars are known to have been influenced by their own Christian ideas, it is remarkable that such encroachments should imbue the insights of an expert on phenomenology such as Bleeker, who, more than most scholars, has considered the questions of method. Widengren believes that in affirming the entelecheia of religion, Bleeker has executed judgements which the phenomenological epoche cannot abide. Bleeker’s reference to certain religions as having reached a “higher level of self-realization,” in Widengren’s view, is an example of the imperfect practice of the epoche by a scholar who claims to adhere to it. Says Widengren:

I feel bound to declare it absolutely impossible for the phenomenology of religion to pass such judgements of value, purely subjective as they are. . . . In a manifest way, such judgements transgress the borders of objective scholarly work. Here . . . is surely called for a very strong epoche.13

In light of the ambiguity with which the term phenomenology has been used in this context, the attacks it has evoked from without the study of religion take us hardly by surprise. The litany of charges against the phenomenology of religion is a long one. Those maintained by the Dutch philosopher J. A. Oosterbaan will serve as a sampling of the accusations most often heard. He contends that (1) the phenomenology of religion uses the principles of the epoche and the eidetic vision in an illicit and unjust way; (2) while it declares

itself to be unprejudiced, it takes a positive position in regard to the question of the truth of religion; and (3) it wrongly pretends to be a science of the essence of religion. He sees the phenomenology of religion as having transgressed the borders of its proper domain, the systematic description of religious phenomena as part of historical studies, and as having infringed upon the field of the philosophy of religion.  

The phenomenological approach is not without opponents within the academic study of religion as well. Raymond Panikkar has suggested that the application of a philosophical *epoche* to the realm of one's ultimate religious convictions, an operation that would presumably disengage these convictions for the duration of a study of religion, would be grossly inappropriate in any effort towards a genuine inter-religious encounter. While he thinks an *epoche* might be useful in an introductory description of particular manifestations of religious life, he contends that in the inter-religious dialogue it would be psychologically impracticable, phenomenologically inappropriate, philosophically defective, theologically weak, and religiously barren.  

Among others, C. J. Bleeker has responded to some of these charges. It could be argued, however, that in his response to these charges, he is inconsistent with some of his own statements. To Oosterbaan's first objection, Bleeker replies that the phenomenology of religion uses the principles of the *epoche* and the *eidetic vision* in a "figurative sense," that some scholars apply these principles without using any of Husserl's terms. He states that in his own opinion "phenomenology of religion is an empirical science without philosophical aspirations." Yet in the same discussion, he points out that it is impossible to understand a phenomenology of religion like that of van der Leeuw without realizing how strongly Husserlian princi-

17. Ibid., p. 7.
The Problem

pies have influenced his thought. He argues secondly against Oosterbaan that phenomenology does not pass judgement upon the truth of religion but demands only that all religion be understood as "a serious testimony of religious people that they possess a knowledge of God." He claims to reject the idea that there can be only one true religion, yet it is evident that his own religion provides the criterion by means of which he perceives an entelecheia in the history of religions. He argues thirdly against Oosterbaan that phenomenology of religion never pretended to be a science of the essence of religion, that its only pretension has been to detect the structure of a greater or smaller complex of religious phenomena. Elsewhere, however, he states that the phenomenology of religion offers a method of study "which enables us to penetrate into the core and the essence of the phenomena." Widengren sees van der Leeuw's preoccupation with the eidos of religion as a concern for the essentials of the religious phenomena. Yet he himself expresses skepticism about the influential view of van der Leeuw that this eidos is available to the exploration of what appears. "Very often we must try to search behind the phenomenon," he says, "in order to find the essentials. Here attention must be paid to the context of the phenomenon." In works identified as phenomenological, the meaning of such terms as the "nature," "structure," and "essence" of religion, and the distinction between them, is very far from clear.

For his own part, Bleeker recognizes the prevalence of some of these problems. He admits a certain lack of clarity in the working procedures of the phenomenology of religion and suggests scholars "should work out a more precise method" and "sharply delimit the field of its activity." One, however, searches in vain through the literature of the phenomenology of religion for the precise working out of the method of the phenomenology of religion for which he calls. It is his own opinion that phenomenology of religion "should

20. Ibid.
keep at a clear distance from the philosophical phenomenology so that its character stands out indisputably.\textsuperscript{23} He thinks it should be prudent by using as little as possible of the terminology of a certain philosophy or psychology "for fear of being forced to accept the theoretical implications of these concepts.\textsuperscript{24} This solution, however, has met with neither unanimous nor even general approval among self-avowed exponents of the phenomenology of religion.

In more recent years conceptions of the phenomenology of religion have been of two general types. The term is taken either so broadly as to include almost any treatment of religion according to its "nature," "structure," or "meaning," or so narrowly as to exclude any treatment of religion that does not take the philosophical insights of Husserl as the starting point. An example of the first alternative is a book of readings edited by J.D. Bettis which includes selections from such diverse figures as Feuerbach, Maritain, Buber, Tillich, Schleiermacher, and Malinowksi. This book \textit{Phenomenology of Religion} has the subtitle: "Eight Modern Descriptions of the Essence of Religion.\textsuperscript{25} The second alternative is illustrated by an article by Hans Penner in which he insists that phenomenology is neither a neutral method for exploring religious phenomena nor a method of pure description, but a transcendental philosophy. It is Penner's view that because none of the better known exponents of the phenomenology of religion proceed from an adequate understanding of Husserl's philosophical works, a phenomenology of religion worthy of the name remains to be written. If and when this appears, he thinks, it will be neither a mere description of historical religious data nor an uncritical "intuitionism" of religious essences. Among other things, it will have the following characteristics: It will have eliminated or radically modified the category of 'the sacred' which apparently imbues the phenomenology of religion as Penner finds it. It will not hold all metaphysical and theological assertions in suspense, but it will examine them as correlates of conscious re-

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
The Problem

reflection. It will attempt to overcome “the paradox of final agnosticism” in which, as we describe a religious cult or belief, we come inevitably to admit that we do not know its meaning. This paradox forces us to the recognition that our subject has finally escaped our method. It will include an analysis of myth and ritual as religious phenomena that will be built upon the foundation of Husserl’s reflections upon expression, significance, object, and symbol. The phenomenology of religion, in other words, will be squarely based upon the dominant insights of Husserl, who according to Penner, has always remained the point of departure.26

Because of these conditions, it is difficult to use the term phenomenology in the study of religion without stipulating the special meaning to be attached to the word. If this is done, then the term practically has to be divorced from its own use in history. It is our position that neither of the above possibilities is promising. If phenomenology can mean almost anything, then it means almost nothing. Yet to make Husserl’s thought the criterion for any phenomenology of religion is procrustean. In fact Husserl has not always been the point of departure for phenomenological studies of religion. The term phenomenology had been employed in the study of religion almost twenty years before it was ever used by Husserl. And it was used in this context in a very different way. The most reasonable way to understand how the phenomenology of religion is “phenomenological” is to separate the different meanings that have been accorded the term phenomenology in the course of its history. From this we can hope, at least, to discover the meaning or meanings that were intended when the term came to be employed in the phenomenological study of religion.

B

The Archeology of the Term

In his famous Lectures on the Science of Language (1863), Max Müller makes an observation that applies to the effort to understand almost any philosophical term. It is especially instructive in the effort to clarify the expression the phenomenology of religion. He states:

It is extraordinary to observe how variable is the meaning of words, how it changes from century to century, nay, how it varies slightly in the mouth of almost every speaker. . . . Terms . . . are tossed about in the wars of words as if everybody used them in exactly the same sense; whereas most people . . . pick up these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest conceptions, adding to them from time to time, perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors, but never taking stock, never either inquiring into the history of the terms which they handle so freely, or realizing the fullness of their meaning. . . . It has been frequently said that most controversies are about words. This is true; but it implies much more than it seems to imply. Verbal differences are not what they are sometimes supposed to be—merely formal, outward, slight, accidental differences, that might be removed by a simple explanation, or by reference to "Johnson's Dictionary." They are differences arising from the more or less perfect, from the more or less full and correct conceptions attached to words.¹

Undoubtedly there are those who would argue that we can be done with the history of the term. So long as we stipulate the meaning we attach to it, we can use the word in whatever way we choose. On the other hand there is much to be learned from the history of

words. In the case of the phenomenology of religion, an understanding of the history of the word can shed new light on the problems and possibilities of such an approach. Moreover, unless we presume that the academic study of religion has reasons to employ terms to which it assigns arbitrary and ambiguous meanings, it would seem that the controversies about the phenomenology of religion must have some historical root. Until now no one has attempted to uncover the source of the problem. Unless we can hope to understand the reasons we use terms the way we use them, we are condemned to a dialogue conducted on shifting ground. Following Müller's admonition, we wish to take stock of the meanings with which this term has been endowed. We do this by digging up occurrences of the term that appear prior to its use in the study of religion. By observing the various uses of the term we can draw conclusions about the kind of intellectual activities the word was used to describe. In undertaking this kind of archeology, we defend the legitimacy of neither the earliest nor the most widespread of its meanings. Our purpose is to differentiate and understand the various ways in which the term has been used; to realize, as Müller said, the fullness of its meaning. Having done this, we will not have solved all the problems inherent in a phenomenology of religion, but we hope to have cleared one obstacle from the path.

There is little doubt that the first occurrence of the term phenomenology was in the work of Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777), a little-known correspondent of Kant. It was employed by Lambert as the title of the last of four sections of his New Organon (1764), “Phenomenology or Doctrine of Appearance.” He claimed to have derived this phenomenology from the already developed science of a particular kind of phenomena and to have extended it, making it at once, as he says, more general and manifold. His motivating insight came from optics, the science of visual appearances or visual phenomena. It is well known, he observes, that things appear smaller and more vague at a distance than when situated close at hand, that things appear different when viewed from different sides, that the color of objects vary according to the light shed upon them, that a circle appears elliptical at a certain angle, and that an
ellipse can appear circular. What Lambert considers the contribution of his phenomenology is the insight that this distinction applies not only to the realm of visual phenomena but to all areas of human knowledge. He also observes that by apprehending the principles of optics (the principles that determine the appearance of spatial objects), we can proceed from appearances toward the things as they are in themselves. He notes that by apprehending and applying the principles of optics, astronomers have been able to proceed from the manifest shape of the heavens toward conclusions about the true structure of the universe. He believed that in just this way, by apprehending the principles of appearances of all sorts, it is possible to proceed beyond the manifest shape of things as they appear in all intellectual regions—whether psychological, moral, idealistic, or whatever—to the way they are in themselves. He calls this phenomenology a transcendental optics.

On November 13, 1765, Lambert expressed some of these ideas in a letter to Immanuel Kant calling his attention to what he saw as the similarity of their views and proposing a joint philosophical project directed toward the “improvement of metaphysics” through the perfection of a new philosophical method. To this, Kant responded in a letter of December 31, 1765, accepting Lambert’s proposal in which he expressed considerable interest. Lambert wrote again to Kant on February 3, 1766, articulating in a preliminary way a number of key propositions. In this communication he states that philosophy must be concerned with material and not merely with formal truth, and that if philosophy is to make progress, it will be through recourse to the simplest elements of knowledge. In this letter he also raises the question whether, and if so how far, knowledge of form leads to knowledge of matter. It was not until September 2, 1770, that Kant

responded to these thoughts. With this response he sent Lambert a copy of his inaugural dissertation concerning the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world. In this correspondence we find Kant’s own use of the word phenomenology, the second historical occurrence of the term:

It seems that a quite special, if merely negative science (*Phaenomenologia generalis*) must precede Metaphysics, wherein the principles of sensuality, their validity and their limitations, must be determined, in order that they do not confuse judgements of objects of pure reason, which has nearly always happened in the past. . . . It occurs to me also . . . that such a propaedeutic discipline . . . could be brought to a state of useful elaboration and evidence through our relatively modest efforts.\(^5\)

Lambert, as we said, had derived his phenomenology from the science of visual phenomena (optics) which he had conceptually extended to all regions of human knowledge, making it more *general* and *manifold*. Addressing Lambert, Kant here speaks of the negative science that would determine the principles of sensuality, as well as their validity and limitations, as a *general* phenomenology (*phaenomenologia generalis*). He states in this letter to Lambert that he had now arrived at a philosophical point of view which he thinks he should never be required to abandon, a position from which all metaphysical questions could be tested and, insofar as they are answerable, could be answered. It is necessary only, he states, that this position be *extended*.

Owing to Lambert’s death in 1777, the cooperative undertaking never materialized. Kant, however, did not abandon the ideas. In February 21, 1772, Kant wrote to Marcus Hertz concerning a projected work on “the limits of sensuality and reason” which was to be divided into theoretical and practical parts. The first of these was again to be divided into two parts: (1) a *General Phenomenology* (“*Die Phänomenologie überhaupt*”) and (2) a Metaphysics (“according to its nature and method”). He refers to his work in this letter for the first time as a “critique of pure reason.”\(^6\) We could not conclude from


this evidence that the phenomenology of Kant can be reduced to that of Lambert or that there are not important differences between the two. What is evident is that each understood the other’s use of the term, that it had a common meaning between them. It would not seem too much to say that by becoming more general and manifold, the phenomenology that began with Lambert received one developed form in the transcendental doctrine of elements of Kant’s first critique.

That the term phenomenology appears first in the work of Lambert and that it was used by Kant as well is acknowledged by some historians of ideas who have tried to chronicle the phenomenological method in philosophy. What is less widely known is the occurrence of the term in English, and less known yet is the significance for phenomenology of religion of this English use of the term. Whatsoever affinities this first occurrence of the term may share with the later, pure phenomenology of Husserl, the first occurrence of the term in English stands for something quite different. Appearing in “Philosophy” by John Robison (1739–1805) in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1798), the term denotes the first of three distinctive phases of the philosophical enterprise. Philosophy here is a philosophy of nature based on Francis Bacon’s conception of the subject. The term philosophy is understood to stand for “the study of the phenomena of the universe, with a view to discover the general laws which indicate the powers of natural substances, to explain subordinate phenomena, and to improve art.” Philosophy is understood to be threefold, involving respectively the work of description, arrangement, and reference of events or phenomena. The first of these, phenomenology, here also termed “philosophical history,” involves the “complete or

7. In the “Editor’s Preface” to Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), pp. vii–xvi, Johannes Hoffmeister traces the derivation of Hegel’s use of the term to Lambert. Herbert Spiegelberg mentions this occurrence as well as its use by Robison and others. He discusses both of these occurrences of the term under the rubric of “pseudo-phenomenologies.” In any case his objective is not to determine the meaning of phenomenological approaches to religion. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: An Historical Introduction, 2d ed., vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 7 ff.
The Archeology of the Term

copious enumeration of facts, properly selected, cleared of all unnecessary or extraneous circumstances, and accurately narrated." This first operation of philosophy, which obtains the *materials* of philosophy, leads directly to the second, also called *investigation*. This operation puts the selected facts into compendious and perspicuous form based upon observed resemblances "so that a general knowledge of the universe may be easily acquired and firmly retained." This leads to the third operation, called *aetiology*, which relates the perceived uniformity of events to some natural bond between them.  

In light of Lambert's phenomenology, Robison's prime example of the first of these operations is interesting. Since the inception of the science of astronomy, he says, astronomers have been at pains to detect the true motions of the heavenly bodies. These have now been described with such accuracy that the *history* may be considered nearly complete. The tables of astronomy contain such an accurate and synoptical account of the movement of these bodies that it is now possible to determine at what point in the heavens any particular body may be seen at any time. Sir Isaac Newton's *optics*, in Robison's opinion, is "another perfect model of philosophical history as far as it goes." Phenomenology, in Robison's view, is this part of philosophy.  

During the nineteenth century, the use of the term phenomenology in English reflects an understanding of the term that generally accords with that in Robison's article. In his *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* (1836–7), Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) argued that philosophy, the whole of which is concerned with the mind, is occupied with three great questions: (1) What are the *facts* to be observed? (2) What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which these phenomena appear? And (3) what are the real results, not immediately manifested, which these facts or phenomena warrant us in drawing? To these three questions correspond three general divisions of philosophy of which "Phenomenology of mind" is the first. Hamilton equated this first division with empirical psychology.

9. Ibid., p. 588.
or the inductive philosophy of mind. This phenomenology, which considers the mind "merely with the view of observing and generalizing the various phenomena it reveals," is followed, in Hamilton's scheme, by a nomology of mind or nomological psychology. Nomological psychology is concerned with the laws by which our faculties are governed. This is followed finally by ontology or metaphysics which is concerned with the character of that "unknown substance" of which phenomena are the manifestations. This final division includes such subjects as the being of God, the immortality of the soul, and so on. According to William Whewell (1794–1866) in the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, phenomenology is the first of three branches of the "palaetiological sciences," the sciences which attempt "to trace back the history and discover the origin of the present state of things." Its task is the gathering and classifying of data into their natural groupings. Whewell speaks in this context of a phenomenological geography of plants and animals; a phenomenological uranology which is the description and classification of celestial phenomena; and a phenomenological glossology, the arrangement and classification of languages. This branch of science is to be followed by an aetiology, the inquiry into the causes of correspondence among observed phenomena, and then a theory which attempts on the grounds of this organized data to develop a general accounting for the phenomena.

Examining the evidence above we find two different venues in which this term was employed. It seems that in its early history the term "phenomenology" was used in two different ways and, although they were by no means exclusive, they denoted two quite different types of intellectual activity. The term was used differently, we might say, by two different communities of discourse. These communities of discourse correspond, in general, to the use of the term in German and in English respectively. As used by Lambert and Kant, it stood for an exploration of the laws that determine appearances in all in-


The Archeology of the Term

tellectual regions. In that community of discourse, it eventually denoted an exploration of the a priori subjective conditions of knowledge as such. As used by Robison and others, the term denoted an operation concerned with description and classification of empirically accessible data according to observable resemblances. The science of religion has apparently equivocated between these differing meanings. When Bleeker argues that phenomenology transforms the chaotic field of the history of religion into a "harmonious panorama," that it undertakes "a typological survey," and that it is "an empirical science without philosophical aspirations," he seems to be using the term within the English community of discourse. When he is occupied with the logos of religion, the spiritual laws which underlie the constitution of every historical religion, when he seeks the essence of the religious phenomena, his concern may be closer to the phenomenology of Lambert and Kant. This equivocation would seem, at least in part, to account for the failure of the phenomenology of religion to come to agreement about its own scope and purpose.

The present exploration becomes more complicated with the evidence of a third venue in which the term was employed prior to its first appearance in the academic study of religion. Although we cannot account for all the changes of meaning that led to this result, we observe that the term was used by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) as the title of the part of his Wissenschaftslehre (1804) which undertook the deduction of appearance (Erscheinung) or the world of consciousness from the Absolute.12 We can also observe that following Fichte's work, the term came to stand for the philosophical effort of Georg Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) to demonstrate that the time had arrived for the elevation of philosophy to the level of science, to furnish the individual with the ladder to the absolute standpoint, and to show him that standpoint within himself. It could perhaps be argued that although they differ in their views of phenomenology, both Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and Hegel's Phenome-

nology of Spirit bear a resemblance, however remote, to Robinson's understanding of phenomenology inasmuch as each constitutes a perspicuous description and arrangement of the data in question, constituting in Robison's sense, a copious history of the subject. Neither Fichte's nor Hegel's arrangement phenomenology, however, is based upon empirically observable resemblances. For Hegel, sense-certainty is the most empty and abstract of all the levels of development of the universalized individual mind. Nor is this description and arrangement to be followed by the inference of natural laws. It could be argued that in these respects the meaning of phenomenology in the works of Fichte and Hegel come closer to the meaning intended by Lambert and Kant.

Lambert's phenomenology, as we have said, advanced the insight that appearance imbues all regions of human knowledge. He argued that through an apprehension of the principles that determine the appearance of things, we can proceed towards a knowledge of things as they are in themselves. The term was used by Kant to denote his own efforts along this line that led finally to his famous first critique. The transcendental doctrine of elements, which constitutes the first part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, centers upon the a priori conditions under which our knowledge of sensuous objects occurs. His analysis reveals that such knowledge occurs, first of all, only as sensation is ordered through the "pure forms of intuition" which are time and space. The knowledge of objects occurs, secondly, only through the application of the "pure concepts" or "categories of the understanding." Finally, knowledge of objects occurs only as such ordered representations are presented to a single unified consciousness.13

Having uncovered this "transcendental unity of consciousness" as the final condition for our knowledge of objects, the philosophy of Kant eventually became the object of criticism for its insistence upon the doctrine of a "thing-in-itself." If the world in which we live and act, the only world to which we have access, is the world "for con-

The Archeology of the Term

sciousness,” what is the purpose of assuming the reality of a thing-in-itself as the cause of our knowledge of objects? For Fichte, the thing-in-itself is thus but a function of consciousness, the objectivity which the ego gives its own creations in perception. This critique of Kant is reflected in the Fichte’s use of the term phenomenology. For him, phenomenology is no longer the pursuit of the principles or the a priori conditions that determine the appearance of things. For Fichte, phenomenology is the derivation of the actual world from the transcendental ego, now conceived as the first principle of science.

In the thought of Hegel, an analogous development occurs. Hegel’s phenomenology does not seek to derive the world of appearance from transcendental consciousness. Yet with him, as first with Kant and then Fichte, subjectivity or consciousness and its activity is the subject matter and starting point of philosophy. The subject of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*, his “science of the experience of consciousness” as the subtitle of the first edition reads, is the pure activity of mind, perfecting itself through its own development.14 His is not a phenomenology merely in Robison’s sense of a copious history of the subject, nor precisely in the sense, initiated by Lambert and Kant, of an exploration of the laws or conditions that underlie the appearance of things. It could be argued that Hegel’s use of the term phenomenology combines aspects of the meaning of the term

---

as used by Robison and by Lambert, Kant, and Fichte. Yet to all of these, something distinctive and significant is added. This feature becomes especially important when the term appears in the study of religion. As the ladder to the absolute standpoint, Hegel's phenomenology describes in detail each of the stages or moments through which the universalized individual has passed in the course of its becoming and through which the particular individual must pass in order to attain the absolute standpoint. This is not merely a perspicuous arrangement or copious history of subjectivity but an arrangement of the stages or moments in the order of increasing conceptuality through which the developing mind must pass in the ascent to absolute knowledge. And it is from this absolute standpoint that this order can be perceived. To the earlier conceptions of phenomenology, Hegel's use of the term adds the sense of a hierarchy of forms of spirit or knowledge in which an end is presupposed in its beginning or an essence is realized in the moments of its development.

The use of the term phenomenology in German philosophy following Hegel bears some resemblance to its use in English as well as to its earlier meaning in German and in Hegel's thought. This includes its appearance in the thought of Alexander Pfänder and the Munich school of phenomenology and in the ethical theory of Nicolai Hartmann. Although we find no reference to Pfänder in any of the principal phenomenological studies of religion under examination, it could, in fact, be argued that there is some resemblance between the meaning of phenomenology in the work of Pfänder who was interested in religion as a subject of philosophical inquiry and the phenomenological approaches to religion with which we are occupied in the present study. For the purpose at hand, the critical

15. Alexander Pfänder, Phänomenologie des Wollens, in Gesammelte Schriften (Johannes Ambrosius Barth and Max Niemeyer, 1963). Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921). It is also interesting that in Eduard von Hartmann's Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (1878), the term phenomenology stands for "an inventory as complete as possible of the empirically given territory of moral consciousness, together with a critical elucidation of these internal data and of their mutual relations, and with speculative development of the principles holding them together." Cf. Spiegelberg, Phenomenological Movement, 1:15.
point is the difference between the earliest use of the term in English where it denoted an empirical study of observable data classified into perspicuous order, and its early use in German where it first referred to a critical analysis of consciousness, and the fact that it continued to be used with related meanings before the emergence of the movement in philosophy that bears this name. Nevertheless any effort to understand the meanings with which this term has been employed would be conspicuously incomplete without some indication of its meaning in the work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the name perhaps most widely associated with the term.

When Husserl first uses the word, it appears in a footnote in the first edition of his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, Volume I of his *Logical Investigations* (1900). In this footnote he speaks of a “descriptive phenomenology of inner experience,” which he sees here as the foundation for both empirical psychology and epistemology. The term appears again in the same year in an abstract of this work in which Husserl explains its intended meaning.

16. From Husserl's familiarity with Ernst Mach's use of the term, Joseph Kockelmanns has argued that Husserl initially used the term phenomenology in the sense intended by Mach. In 1894 Mach had spoken of a "general physical phenomenology" (unfassende physikalische phänomenologie) which he took to comprise all the areas of physics, and whose work it was to form the most abstract concepts of physical research, starting from mere description and proceeding by way of comparisons among the phenomena in the various branches of physics. Cf. Ernst Mach "Über das Prinzip der Vergleichung in der Physik," in *Populär-Wissenschaftliche Vorlesungen* (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1896). Husserl's familiarity with this use of the term is evident from his review of this address in his "Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik aus dem Jahr 1894" in *Archiv für Systematische Philosophie*, 3 (1897). Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmanns, *A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967), p. 1 ff. Cf. Spiegelberg, *Phenomenological Movement*, 1:9f, 103f. Kockelmanns' reasons for arguing this point, however, seem only to be Husserl's acquaintance with this occurrence of the term. Husserl's knowledge of Mach's use of the term, even his approval upon the meaning it has in this context, however, would seem hardly grounds for holding that Husserl himself employs the term in precisely this sense. The meaning it has for Mach, in this context, is clearly related to the earlier occurrences of the term. Moreover, however close it comes to Husserl's first use of the term, what Husserl means by the term changes rather significantly from this point.
[The Prolegomena] attempts to show that the exclusively psychological grounding of logic to which our age ascribes so great a value, rests upon a confusion of essentially distinct classes of problems, on presuppositions erroneous in principle concerning the character and the goals of the two sciences which are involved here—empirical psychology and pure logic.\textsuperscript{17}

It seeks to revive the idea of a “pure logic” and, at the same time, to give it a new shape. Husserl conceives of the relation of this to the common conception of logic (the science of correct thinking) as something like the relationship of pure geometry to surveying. The Prolegomena, in his view, represents a restoration, and a revision, of the pure logic of the Kantian and Herbartian schools. Husserl saw them as lacking in clarity because they vacillated between the practical and the theoretical, between psychological and purely ideal goals. For Husserl, pure logic must be consistent. In his view, it is

the scientific system of ideal laws and theories which are purely grounded in the sense [Sinn] of the ideal categories of meaning [Bedeutung]; that is, in the fundamental concepts which are common to all sciences because they determine in the most universal way what makes sciences objectively sciences at all: namely unity of theory.\textsuperscript{18}

Phenomenology, as Husserl first conceives of it, plays a critical role in this foundational science. An adequate clarification of this pure logic, he says, “demands very radical phenomenological (that is, purely descriptive psychological and not genetic-psychological) and epistemological investigations.”\textsuperscript{19} He promises that in the second volume of the Logical Investigations such phenomenological and epistemological studies will be carried out.

In the development of his second volume, the phenomenological investigations that were promised in the first begin to assume the aspects of a new philosophical undertaking. In an abstract (1901) of this volume, Husserl states that it was not originally intended for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
publication in the form it finally took. Rather, it was intended “to serve the author as the basis for a more systematic grounding of epistemology or rather as the epistemological clarification of pure logic.” In the course of these investigations, Husserl sought to achieve “the analytical elaboration of the phenomenological distinctions in which the most primitive logical distinctions find their origin.” In the last of the investigations, in fact, he believed he had discovered “the foundation and corner stone” of every future theory of knowledge. In a draft of a preface to the Logical Investigations (1913), Husserl states that he was dissatisfied with the investigations of 1901 from the moment they were published. This dissatisfaction resulted, among other things, in a change in his use of the term. He states, “I either fell back repeatedly into the old habits of thought or was incapable of carrying through everywhere the distinctions I had already recognized in one context as necessary.” Of the relationship between descriptive psychology and phenomenology, Husserl thinks this is particularly true. The fact that these investigations were analyses of what Husserl called essences, or a priori structures of consciousness, and that they had, therefore, to be based upon apodictic evidence rather than data available to “inner experience” was not, as he says, everywhere equally clear. Husserl puts it this way: “I did not want to concede to myself that what I for many years had looked upon as far as psychology was concerned as derived from ‘adequate perception’ should now all be a priori, or, be comprehensible as such.” There was, according to Husserl, “an insufficient emphasis on the exclusion of all empirically reality-oriented (and in the normal sense, psychological) anticipations and existential postulations.”

After this work was published, Husserl continued to work on the problems it opened and gradually attempted “to give a fuller account of the meaning, the method, and the philosophical scope of phe-

22. Ibid., p. 9.
24. Ibid., p. 51.
nomenology.” In these developments the term was endowed with
a more precise meaning than Husserl had given it before. Husserl
himself claims that these developments were evident already in a
statement he made in the annual report on logic in the Archiv für
systematische Philosophie (1903) wherein he addressed “the misleading
and (if understood naturally) completely incorrect characterization
of phenomenology as descriptive psychology.” In this report
he explicitly excluded from phenomenology all recourse to “psychologi-
cal apperception,” that is “all conceptualization of experiences
as conditions of real mental beings,” placing explicit emphasis upon
“intuitive abstraction.”

This new conception was made fully manifest, according to Hus-
serl, in his Göttingen lectures of 1907. Those lectures made it clear,
in his view, that “all phenomenological analyses of any kind, where-
ever they make general observations (on perception in general, on
memory, on imagination in general, or on psychological perception
in general, etc.) have the character of a priori analyses in the only
valuable sense of analyses that subject ideas given in pure intuition
(i.e., self-given in genuinely original intuitive experience) to a pure
description of their essential content.” Here, Husserl speaks of phe-
nomenology as a science, as “a system of scientific disciplines,” and
also as a “method.” It is also here that he first mentions what he
calls the “phenomenological reduction,” an operation that would
remain at the center of his phenomenology as it develops from this
time on. It is interesting, in light of the use of the term by Lambert
and Kant, that Husserl refers in these lectures to his method as a
“critique of cognition,” and even, as they were originally given in
public, as a “critique of pure reason.”

27. Ibid., p. 52. 28. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 18. Joseph Kockelmans, A First Introduction to Husserl’s Phenom-
above, Husserl states that his *Ideas* of 1913 presents the method of this new conception of phenomenology "on a considerably higher level of insight and with thoroughly researched horizons" than had been at his disposal when the treatise *Logical Investigations* was begun.31

Because the phenomenological method has been of such interest to the study of religion, it is appropriate to take note of its principal features as first discussed by Husserl himself. It is Husserl's observation that our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imaging, judging, feeling, willing, "from the natural standpoint."32 In these terms I, as a human being, am aware of a world spread out endlessly before me in time and space. I am aware of it as there for me and for others whom I see as a part of it as well. I am also aware of myself as a part of this world which is not changed by my being aware of it. This world includes not only that of which I am presently aware but also a "co-present" world present to me by means of memory and anticipation that extends from the here and now to a limitless beyond where it is "hedged about" with a fringe of uncertainty that I can penetrate with my attention with only limited success. This is a world not only of material "facts" but of cognitive systems, of numbers, logical relations, and values that I also confront as given. In short, it is the world that is presupposed by all my spontaneous activities of consciousness and all my theoretical projects. It is the world in which I perform my duties, meet my friend for lunch, and count my change. It is the world in which I live even when I am preoccupied with numbers or other ideal entities that do not exist in the world of nature and are hedged about by their own fringe of uncertainty.

This natural disposition towards the world, according to Husserl, can be expressed (though it rarely is) in the form of a proposition. The proposition could be called the "thesis of the natural standpoint." In all projects directed toward certainty in the world, this "thesis" is presupposed. All doubting and rejection of inadequate

evidence, all rejection from this world of "hallucination" and "illusion" leaves the thesis intact. All certainty that is achieved concerning the world stands upon it. In our freedom we can scrutinize this thesis as we can scrutinize any other. This, according to Husserl, is what Descartes was doing when, in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, he attempted to establish an indubitable sphere of being. Like Descartes, Husserl wishes to scrutinize the thesis of the natural standpoint but he does so with a very different purpose in mind. Rather than doubt the validity of the thesis, he wishes to place it within brackets. When he does this, he does not deny the reality of the world as though he were a sophist nor does he doubt that it is "there" as though he were a skeptic. The thesis of the natural standpoint is not turned into its antithesis. On the other hand, what Husserl here undertakes is no mere supposal that would leave the thesis in operation. The world remains but it remains precisely as the bracketed within the brackets.

From the natural standpoint, according to Husserl, we can subject the sphere of consciousness to only a partial analysis. What is lacking in this standpoint, in Husserl's view, is a general insight into the essence of consciousness through which the "natural" world comes to be known. When the thesis of the natural standpoint is placed within brackets, it becomes evident "that Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnexion" (emphasis deleted). 33 This renders "pure consciousness" accessible to our examination. As "phenomenological residuum" it remains as a unique region of being and becomes the subject matter of a new science which is phenomenology. Within this essence of consciousness, which for Husserl is the foundation of the world as experienced, reflection or what Husserl calls the "eidetic intuition," reveals an aggregate of further essences. These are not Platonic essences, but fundamental forms of the activity of consciousness: willing, perceiving, enumerating, anticipating, and so on, through which the world

33. Ibid., p. 102.
The Archeology of the Term

as given becomes present, and which eidetic intuition is able to distinguish, examine, and describe.\textsuperscript{34}

Husserl refers to the operation through which this goal is accomplished as the "phenomenological epoche." He also states that for "important motives that have their ground in epistemological requirements" he will also refer to this as the "transcendental" epoche, and the realm of being it reveals as "transcendental consciousness." He states further, however, that "on grounds of method" the operation will be split up into different steps of "disconnection" or "bracketing" which gives the method the character of a graded reduction. For the same reasons he also speaks of a number of stages of the transcendental reduction and thus of reductions in the plural. But he also insists that they constitute an integrated whole which also justifies the singular term. The final statement he offers in this work concerning his philosophical vocabulary is interesting. It reveals unambiguously the stipulative nature of the meaning he assigns to these terms: "these and all our terms must be understood exclusively in accordance with the sense which our presentations indicate for them, but not in any other one which history or the terminological habits of the reader may favour."\textsuperscript{35}

If we can distinguish between two different venues within which the term phenomenology was first employed, it is not difficult to determine the one to which the work of Husserl is most closely allied. While we would not want to make him a Kantian or minimize the enormous differences between the two, it is significant that when Husserl first defined the term, he used Kantian vocabulary to do so. It is also significant that in his last work he characterizes the transcendental philosophy of Kant, which he regarded as opposing the naturalism of empirical psychology and the natural sciences, as a prodigious effort in the direction of his own philosophical goal.\textsuperscript{36}

While we would not want to controvert the influence upon Husserl's

thought of the British empirical tradition, especially in his effort to enumerate and classify the essences which eidetic intuition reveals, it is evident that his use of the word phenomenology is rooted not here but in the tradition of discourse to which Lambert and Kant belong and to which Hegel later added other dimensions of meaning. At the same time, the specific and exclusive meaning which Husserl brings to his use of this term cannot and must not be denied.

In Husserl's view, Kant's principal failure was in neglecting rigorously to carry out the implications of a truly universal transcendental philosophy. This transcendental motif, according to Husserl, still animated the early systems of German idealism. Husserl, however, regarded Hegel's thought as lacking a sufficiently thorough critique of reason to be considered fully scientific. He thinks it finally acted to weaken the impulse toward the rigorous philosophic science to which his own phenomenology aspired.\(^{37}\) Despite Husserl's evident indifference to its history, the background of meaning presupposed in Husserl's use of this term, a meaning to which of course he adds considerable precision and depth, is apparent. Likewise, among his successors, the meaning varies slightly, as Max Müller put it, "in the mouth of almost every speaker." Yet it is clearly from Husserl and not from the British conception of phenomenology that these meanings of the term are derived. With Husserl, we might say, the transcendental efforts of Lambert and Kant were extended further yet, making them once again more manifold and general.

The application of Husserl's method to religious studies, can be seen as early as in the work of Jean Hering, one of Husserl's early French disciples, whose research both augments Husserl's analysis of essences and applies this to the study of religion.\(^{38}\) Although Max Scheler's understanding of the phenomenological reduction differs

---


rather significantly from that of Husserl, his study of religion, especially as developed in his famous work On the Eternal in Man, can be seen as a kind of phenomenological study that departs from Husserl with innovations that enable him to apply such a method to the subject matter of religion. In this respect it is not insignificant that Scheler's insights also exerted an influence upon van der Leeuw.39 More recently Henry Duméry has undertaken significant research in a similar vein. While he believed that Husserl's method would not finally prove adequate for theology, he concluded that it nevertheless furnished the appropriate foundation. While he works explicitly from within the Christian tradition, his phenomenological description both of Judaism and Christianity invites comparison with van der Leeuw's discussions of historical types of religion.40

Our focus upon that phenomenology of religion that begins with Chantepie and gradually develops in the works of Kristensen and van der Leeuw does not minimize the importance of those who have attempted to develop phenomenological approaches to religion taking Husserl's phenomenology as their guide or their point of departure. In particular, it is not to minimize the insight of those who, proceeding from the framework of Husserl's thought, have incorporated insights of van der Leeuw and others within their philosophical or theological explorations of religious consciousness. Nevertheless, the present study is not about this tradition of scholarship but those studies of religion that first distinguished themselves by the term phe-


Prolegomenon

nomology of religion. These studies developed in Holland at the end of the nineteenth century in the context of what was known as the scientific study of religion. The origin of these studies differs completely from those whose point of departure is Husserl.

The confusion that pervades contemporary scholarship about the relationship of the phenomenology that began with Husserl and the phenomenology of religion that began with Chantepie de la Saussaye persists largely because contemporary efforts to clarify the phenomenology of religion have proceeded, as Müller precisely put it, without taking stock, without inquiring into the history of the terms they handle so freely, and without realizing the fullness of their meaning. On the basis of the present archeology of the term, we can now begin to appreciate the meaning the term expressed as it was first employed in the study of religion. It first appears in this context, in the title of the first of three sections of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* (1887). In this work it has a meaning very different from that later intended by Husserl or any of his successors. The science of religion, as Chantepie conceived of it, had only recently emerged as an independent and autonomous discipline. In his view it is comprised of two parts which treat religion respectively according to its essence and its manifestations: the philosophy and the history of religion. Chantepie saw the philosophy of religion as divided again between the psychology and the metaphysics of religion that treat the essence of religion according to its subjective and its objective sides. Chantepie's *Lehrbuch*, however, does not include the philosophy of religion. The purpose of his *Lehrbuch* is to introduce the most important results of studies of religion, avoiding the question of the idea or essence of religion and the analysis of doctrine or religious consciousness. With this restriction, Chantepie, however, found it necessary to provide some outline of the most important of religious phenomena. His exploration of the history of religion, which is divided between an ethnographic section (which yields information concerning peoples without written records) and a historical section (which provides us with facts concerning the development of historical religions), is thus preceded by a “phenomenology.” This phenomenology, as far as Chantepie is
aware, is “the first more comprehensive attempt to arrange the principal groups of religious conceptions in such a way that the most important sides and aspects should appear conspicuously from out the other material.”

These initial observations may be sufficient in themselves to begin to reveal the conception of phenomenology that underlies Chantepie's use of the term. While the notion of the essence and manifestations of religion may reflect the influence of Hegel's thought upon Chantepie's understanding of the science of religion, this influence is not indicated in Chantepie's understanding of phenomenology. While Chantepie's phenomenology is not to be followed by an aetiology, nor by a theory of the phenomena, nor again by the inference of natural laws, it most certainly involves a perspicuous description and arrangement of data. Chantepie refers to it repeatedly as a collection, a grouping, an arrangement, and a classifying of the principal groups of religious conceptions, of the most important ethnographic and historical material connected with religion. The kind of phenomena he selects and the character of their arrangement support this interpretation. Chantepie begins his phenomenological section with a discussion of idolatry, in the specific sense of the worship of figurative representations of divine beings or the veneration of the putative material dwelling of a divine power. He proceeds to consider such topics as sacred stones, trees and animals, the worship of men, divination, sacrifice, sacred places, sacred times, and so on. Specifically rejecting efforts toward classifications that betray the influence of a Hegelian phenomenology that arrange the forms of religion in the order of ascending conceptuality, comprehension, or universality, Chantepie deals with the most important sides of cult and forms of doctrine “without attempting a strictly systematic order or a theoretic division which does not correspond to actual facts.”

Moreover, while Chantepie's theoretical point of departure involves a rejection of naturalistic explanations that might be seen to parallel some of the concerns of Husserl's phenomenology, Chantepie deliberately relegates questions pertaining to consciousness to the philosophical part of the science.

41. Chantepie, p. vi. 42. Ibid., pp. 50–1, 68.
The conception of phenomenology that underlies Chantepie's use of the term is not precisely the conception of phenomenology that governs its use by those who have developed, following his lead, some of the most impressive of phenomenological studies of religion, even when they acknowledge the work of Chantepie as the first among such efforts. Van der Leeuw, for instance, understands phenomenological studies of religion as having begun with the researches of Chantepie. Yet he also sees such efforts as having been anticipated by such earlier works as the Allgemeine Kritische Geschichte der Religionen (1807) of Christoph Meiners. He includes Meiners in this category not merely because he attempted a classification of religious phenomena "in which fetishism, worship of the dead, of stars and images, sacrifice, purification, fasts, prayer, festivals, mourning customs, etc., are discussed in an orderly manner," but because his entire attitude, as van der Leeuw puts it, was phenomenological "in principle." What impresses van der Leeuw is that Meiners sought the "essential factors" of the elements of religion. As van der Leeuw sees it, Meiners compared religions seeking a harmony, seeking their "structural order." Even in his reference to Chantepie, it is not so much the classification of religious phenomena that interests van der Leeuw but Chantepie's effort "to comprehend the objective appearances of religion in light of subjective processes," an effort to which Chantepie, to judge from his own remarks, was hardly committed.

Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion certainly involves the classification of religious phenomena. Yet its purpose is not, as in the case of Chantepie, to provide an introductory outline of religious data. In the phenomenology of van der Leeuw, the voice of Hegel, as well as others, can also be heard. It was Chantepie's view that one of the conditions for the advent of the science of religion was the emergence of religion as a subject for philosophical reflection. In Chantepie's view, Hegel's discovery of the harmony between the idea and realization or essence and manifestation of religion provided

44. van der Leeuw, p. 694.
an aim and object to the science of religion. Chantepie's phenomenology, however, belongs neither to the history nor the philosophy of religion as Hegel envisioned them. In van der Leeuw's view, Hegel's thought not only furnished the aim and object of the science of religion but, in its effort to comprehend the historical diversity of religion within the eternal dialectic of the spirit, anticipated his own phenomenological effort. While Chantepie's phenomenology stands between branches of a science which treats religion according to its essence and its manifestations, the phenomenology of van der Leeuw is an attempt to comprehend the Hegelian essence of religion in its manifestations. Thus, while Chantepie's phenomenology avoids the treatment of religion according to its subjective or its objective aspects (psychology or metaphysics), the data of van der Leeuw's phenomenology are arrayed and discussed under rubrics which include (1) the object of religion (sacred stones, trees, the mighty dead, the savior, etc.), (2) the subject of religion (the sacred man, the sacred community, the soul, etc.), and (3) the object and subject of religion in their reciprocal operation, including outward action (conduct, celebration, purification, sacrifice, service, etc.) and inward action (religious experience, covenant, mysticism). Van der Leeuw, however, distinguishes his phenomenology from philosophy, to the extent that the latter is concerned with judgements of truth, and from psychology, in so far as psychology is seen as a strictly empirical science.

While the phenomenology of van der Leeuw is seen by some as the first authoritative example of a thoroughly developed phenomenological study of religion, it is seen by others as a hiatus in the development of this approach. It is now evident that van der Leeuw's phenomenology, like that of Chantepie, is "phenomenological" in a way that accords with particular historical meanings of the term, while at the same time it differs from others. It seems that the science of religion is in the peculiar position of having used a term to distinguish an approach to religion which itself contains

more connotations than any particular exponent of such an approach could have desired. Because it had already been used in a variety of ways, it was easily applied by different individuals in the study of religion to quite different kinds of activities. This variety of connotations and applications prevails to the point that it is now almost impossible to find broad agreement among the exponents about the nature of a study designated by the term. From the present observations, we can conclude that phenomenologies of religion will be adequately understood only as we appreciate the variety of meanings which antecede the appearance of this term in the field of religion, and that they will be better understood the better the intended meanings of any occurrence of the term can be known. By coming to understand the sense in which particular works are phenomenological, it will be possible to interpret these efforts in a way more faithful to their varying concerns.
Familial Traits of Phenomenological Approaches to Religion

Because the term phenomenology has stood for a such a variety of activities which have had their place within such widely differing conceptual frameworks, it is understandable that confusion might arise when the term came to be employed in the study of religion. In light of this background, we should not be surprised to find an attack upon one phenomenological study of religion for its alleged psychologism or historicism, or the censure of another for its commitment to a special philosophical standpoint. Questions as to whether the phenomenology of religion is a philosophical or an empirical science, whether it is a science of the essence of religion, whether it is an inductive or deductive enterprise lose their force when we understand that as far as the academic study of religion is concerned, there is no particular and pervasive conception of phenomenology that can be linked by historical contiguity to a single genesis. Such questions are answered in particular phenomenological studies according to the historical meaning of the term they employ. This conclusion raises the question whether so-called phenomenological approaches to religion have anything more in common than a name. Indeed, it has been argued by some that, like any other word, the term phenomenology can mean anything we want it to mean so long as we specify the meaning we intend and so long as we use it consistently. But while this advice might be prudent for those who would use the term today, to dismiss the problem with such counsel would bypass a significant opening to understand the intentions of those who first employed the term in the academic study of
Prolegomenon

religion, and the significance of their initial intentions. However widely the early exponents of phenomenological approaches to religion differed in their understanding of the nature of a phenomenological approach, they nevertheless generally employed this term to distinguish their approach as much as to define it. As it came to be employed in the study of religion, it was used by persons who were drawn into association by a number of common concerns. The thesis that underlies the present study is that a meaningful understanding of phenomenological approaches to religion will emerge not from an analysis of the specific views of phenomenology they held but through an examination of the exponents' understanding of what distinguishes their approach. If we wish to know not merely what particular exponents intended by the term but the nature of that group of approaches to religion which the term represents, we may stand to gain more from an understanding of what they wished to be distinguished from—and why they wished to be so distinguished—than from a knowledge of how they or others positively defined their individual efforts. Clearly the ambiguities of the term prevent any characterization of the phenomenology of religion as a school. Yet if we acknowledge the efforts of exponents of phenomenological studies of religion to distinguish their approaches from others and take this as a clue to their alliance, it would seem reasonable to speak of the phenomenology of religion as a family of approaches to religion, among whom certain family traits can be observed, examined, and discussed. It is in this effort, we think, that their true fraternity can best be seen.

As it appears in the work of those exponents who occupy our attention in the present study, the term is used to distinguish an approach to religion from that of the history of religions, from that of theology, and from that of a variety of contemporary social scientific approaches to the subject. This raises three important questions. (1) What was it in the history of religions, in theology, in social scientific studies of religion that the adherents of phenomenological approaches to religion found wanting? (2) From what specific features of the history of religion, from what kinds of theology, from what specific conceptions of the social sciences did the phenome-
nological approaches to religion wish to be distinguished? (3) To what extent did exponents of the phenomenology of religion succeed in distinguishing their approach from others and in developing a viable alternative? To these questions we can add a fourth that reflects the final objective of the present study. What does this movement teach us about the history of the academic study of religion and what insight does it offer the study of religion today?

We propose to address these questions in the context of a discussion of three pervasive characteristics of phenomenological approaches to religion that are suggested by the interest of the exponents in distinguishing their efforts from the history of religion, from theology, and from certain social scientific approaches. With our focus upon perhaps the three most influential and historically significant exponents of this family of approaches, we will consider each of what we are calling three familial traits, the a-historical, the a-theological, and the anti-reductionistic trait, of this family of approaches. The purpose of the present study is not to yield a final definition of the phenomenology of religion but to shed a light upon the character of these approaches.

If our discussion of the familial traits of the phenomenology of religion is to illuminate the data at hand, it is necessary to be clear about the nature of each of the traits we find. The claim that exponents of phenomenological approaches to religion regarded their approaches as a-historical can be clear only if we understand the meaning of the word historical which the word a-historical here negates. In common speech and in philosophical literature, the word "historical" is used in a variety of ways. These meanings include among others: (1) of or concerning the past, (2) of or concerning that branch of knowledge occupied with the temporal and the past in particular (the historical method), (3) providing evidence for the establishment of knowledge concerning the past (a historical document), (4) showing the development or evolution of a thing in proper chronological order (a historical account), (5) contingent upon and productive of change through time.

In light of this variety of meanings, it is appropriate to state first what the term a-historical does not mean in the present study. In
using this term, (1) we do not mean that the exponents of phenomenological approaches to religion regard their subject matter to be something other than "historical" data, i.e., data apprehended and provided by that branch of knowledge that deals with the temporal, and particularly with the past. We do not deny that exponents of the phenomenology of religion attempt to produce an account of some kind of "historical" data. (2) As such, exponents of phenomenology of religion does not deny that each of the data they seek to discuss stands in a context of becoming in time, or that the data are available for examination only because they are presented in time and because they have been "handed down" from the past. Exponents of phenomenological approaches to religion do not deny that the data they explore are "historical" in the sense that both in their original context and in the present time, through an intricate, changing, and contingent network of relationships, their data are related to the world. And (3) exponents of phenomenological approaches do not deny that the scholar himself is so related to the world when he looks at such data. As we find it in the key exponents we explore, the phenomenology of religion does not claim to have achieved a privileged, transtemporal, or, in that sense, an a-historical perspective upon the data it explores.

In stating that phenomenological approaches to religion are a-historical, we affirm in the first place that the exponents treat the data systematically rather than historically. While they study materials that are made available by the science of history, their purpose is not to establish the chronology of these data in the light of historical evidence but to study the data precisely as phenomena. Phenomenological studies of religion abstract from history certain groups of phenomena which are examined as classes. The principal procedure, then, is not "historical" but systematic. It is this facet of the a-historical trait that Åke Hultkrantz apparently had in mind when, on the basis of a survey of phenomenological studies of religion, he suggested that phenomenology of religion could safely be understood as "that part of religious research which classifies, and systematically investigates religious conceptions, rites, and myth-traditions from comparative morphological-typological points of view." He speaks
of it as "the systematic, not the historical," study of such phenomena. Another way to express the same thought is to say that the phenomenological approach to the study of religion is not diachronic but synchronic in nature, if the word synchronic is taken in its broadest sense. Phenomenology of religion, then, does not study the data in terms of its relation to antecedent and subsequent phenomena in its temporal sequence but in terms of its relation to phenomena of a similar appearance occurring elsewhere in space and time. It studies the phenomena not in terms of a chronological but in terms of a typological order.

In stating that these approaches are a-historical we affirm, in the second place, that while the exponents undertake studies of classes of religious phenomena which are "historical" in the sense that they provide knowledge of the past, the exponents do not purport to show the development or evolution of the phenomena. They do not attempt to construct a history of the principal classes of religious phenomena on the basis of an understanding of the order in which the classes necessarily occur. They do not acknowledge, or establish, a telos to which the phenomena necessarily incline or, under the light of which alone, their appearance can be comprehended. Phenomenological approaches to religion are a-historical in the sense that they are non-developmental studies of religion.

In stating that phenomenological approaches to religion are a-historical, we affirm, in the third place, that while the exponents acknowledge the "historical" nature of the data they study, their contingency in time and space, their historicity as it is sometimes called, the exponents do not examine these phenomena as "purely historical," that is, merely as the consequence of historical forces antecedent to them. The purpose of phenomenological study is not merely to uncover the historical conditions necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of certain data, thereby reducing them to history. In addition to being systematic and non-developmental, phenomenological approaches to religion are also a-historical in the sense of being opposed to the reduction of the phenomena under study to

mere contingencies and vicissitudes of history. In this sense it stands opposed to one of the pervasive features of the movement in nineteenth century scholarship known as historicism. To express it as a single word, the phenomenology of religion is a-historical in the sense of being anti-historicist.

Phenomenological approaches to religion distinguish themselves not only from historical approaches but also from theology. As with the a-historical trait, the nature of the a-theological trait can be clear only if we understand the meaning of the word theology which the word a-theological negates. To clarify the claim that phenomenological approaches share an a-historical trait, we specified a variety of meanings of the word historical. The meanings reflected in the etymology and usage of the word theology, however, present such a range of possibilities that this approach can hardly serve our purpose in the present case. At one extreme, Aristotle understood theology both as the investigation of things divine and the knowledge of such things, and Augustine points out that the Greek poets were called theologians “because they made hymns to the gods.” At the other extreme, the Church Fathers Athanasius, Photius, and others employed the term to refer to the mystery of the nature of God, and, in particular, to the Trinity. At the one extreme the term is taken in a sense so broad that the claim by a study concerned with phenomena associated with religion that it is not theology could hardly be taken seriously. Taken in a sense at the other extreme, the claim that the phenomenology of religion is not an expression of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is so obvious as to be empty of significance. To understand what exponents of the phenomenology of religion intended in the claim that their efforts were not theology, it is necessary to understand the nature of the theology that was prevalent in the context in which the term phenomenology came to be associated with the academic study of religion. It is only in the light of such knowledge that we can raise the further question of the degree to which such efforts resulted in approaches that were distinct from theology in any meaningful way.

In the country in which phenomenological approaches to religion first took root there was, since the Protestant Reformation, no religious creed that exerted a deeper or more sustained influence than Calvinism. Indeed, as compared with Holland, there is perhaps no country in all of Europe that has stood under a more constant influence of John Calvin's theology. It was under the rallying creed of a Calvinist revolt that Holland asserted her independence from Spain. And it was in the interest of Calvinism that she established the University of Leiden in 1594. For two hundred years following the Synod of Dordrecht, which convened from 1618 to 1619 precisely to deal with the Arminian controversy, Calvinism was the nation's official creed.

In the nineteenth century the influence of Calvinism in social and political life was mitigated by a number of liberalizing and secularizing tendencies both in theology and in government. By the middle of the century, a new historical consciousness, increasing awareness of other forms of religion, the development of critical methods for the study of scripture, and the emerging prestige of the natural sciences presented a challenge to Holland's historical religious traditions. In 1857 religious instruction in public schools was eliminated, and in 1876 faculties of theology in state universities were officially converted to what came to be known as "faculties of comparative religion," or "faculties of the science of religion."

We have drawn attention already to the fact that Chantepie understood himself to be standing at the inception of a new and independent science of religion. This new science was emerging, in his view, in consequence of the confluence of three significant conditions: (1) Under the influence of Hegel, religion had become a subject for philosophical study. (2) A new vision of the study of history had begun to include the psychology of nations, their social systems and material development. (3) The discoveries of archaeology and philology, and the reports of travelers and missionaries in distant parts of the world dramatically expanded the store of information concerning religious life available for study. The first of these conditions was in many respects the foremost. In Holland religion had occupied a place of interest in a theological tradition which be-
gan in the Reformation, and had been perpetuated in a continuous tradition into Chantepie's day. It was explored within the theological arena under the rubric of natural theology. Although there was little interest in non-Christian traditions among the Protestant reformers, they nevertheless expressed strong views concerning beliefs and practices beyond the pale of Christian faith. In the last half of the nineteenth century, such expressions of religious life were attracting increasing attention both within theology and without.

The kind of theology from which Chantepie and his successors seek and claim independence is a theology developed at these cross-currents of thought. Prior to his venture into the science of religion, Chantepie was himself, in fact, a theologian and the son of a theologian in the reform tradition. It could perhaps be suggested that when the term phenomenology first appears in the context of the study of religion, it is in the work of a theologian in this tradition undertaking a study of religious phenomena independent of what he understands to be the constraints of theological inquiry. By claiming independence from theology, exponents of a phenomenology of religion claimed independence not from any and every sort of speculation about the gods and spiritual things but from a theology of a distinctive temper, with a particular historical character.

After discussing the nature of such theology, we argue in the chapters that follow that from the inception of phenomenological approaches to religion, exponents of these approaches attempted to distinguish their efforts from this kind of enterprise. They did so in three important ways. First, the exponents in question held that theology and the phenomenology of religion have differing objects of study in view. They acknowledge that, in the entire course of its inquiry, theology is directed to a singular and distinctive object. As Thomas is supposed to have put it, "Theology is taught by God, teaches of God, and leads to God."3 Phenomenology of religion, in

the view of these exponents, is not centered upon this object. It claims no access to knowledge of this object. It seeks the knowledge of another. From this it follows that the object, in the sense of the purpose or intention, of the phenomenology of religion differs from theology as well. From the time of Calvin, a prominent conviction of reformation theology was that the objective of theological inquiry is not simply to know the object it seeks but, in knowing this object, to edify the Church. Exponents of the phenomenology of religion acknowledge that theology is a function of the Church and that outside of the Church, it is as meaningless as it is impossible. As such, the phenomenology of religion is not a function of the Church. It is not responsible to the Church. And as such, it does not have the edification of the Church as its avowed purpose.

In the second place, phenomenological approaches claim to differ from theological approaches in attitude. Within the reform tradition it is widely held that the attitude of the theologian towards the object of study is not the attitude of an observer in control, as it were, of the object of inquiry. The attitude of the theologian reflects a concrete commitment towards the object of study that, as theologian, he is unable to compromise. The theologian is unable to handle the object of this inquiry as the object is handled in other fields of study. The theologian Paul Tillich expresses this notion when he states that the attitude of the theologian as one of "ultimate concern." With varying degrees of sophistication, exponents of the phenomenology of religion acknowledge that, for the theologian, the object of religious regard is a matter of ultimate significance. They claim, however, that in the nature of the investigation, it is not and cannot be a matter of such significance for the practitioner of phenomenological research.

Phenomenological approaches to religion claim, thirdly, to differ from theological approaches in perspective. The commitment of the theologian to the object of study affects not only one's attitude towards the object of study but one's perspective upon that object and upon the world. The commitment of the theologian to the object of theological study cannot be withheld while he views the rest of the world and the religious life of humankind as an aspect of that
world. The concern of phenomenology of religion with the perspective of theology raises special problems in the case of the practitioner of the phenomenology of religion who is also religiously committed. Whether or not this exponent is a theologian by profession, the religious commitments of such an investigator inform his perspective upon the world and upon his understanding of the expressions of the religious life of humankind. The problem comes into especially clear focus when the religious phenomena one encounters within the world invite comparison with the content of one's own religious tradition. How does one who is committed to the Christian tradition deal phenomenologically with the eucharist or with the incarnation? If the theologian is qualified by a commitment, to what extent can that commitment be mitigated for the purpose of the study? In varying degrees phenomenological approaches to religion acknowledge these problems, and in differing ways they have undertaken strategies to achieve a perspective upon the phenomena in which a theological agenda does not inappropriately encroach. The strategy differs from one exponent to the next so that no single device is characteristic of phenomenological approaches as such. The effect, however, is always to separate the work of the phenomenology of religion from the judgements of theological investigation. As we find it among the exponents of the phenomenology of religion, the a-theological trait displays two predominant features. On the one hand, the a-theological trait is expressed in an acknowledgment that, as such, the inquiry does not and cannot meet the qualifications of a genuine theological inquiry. On the other hand, it is expressed in the effort to preserve the integrity of the study of the object from the encroachment of a theological agenda.

We have stated that exponents of the phenomenology of religion developed approaches to the study of religion that are at once a-historical and a-theological. It is clear, however, that many studies and approaches to religion that are a-historical and a-theological in the terms suggested here are not phenomenological approaches to religion. This could be said of many exponents of the "science of religion" that had begun to emerge when Chantepie was writing. It is significant, then, that among phenomenological approaches we
find an additional trait that distinguishes them from other exponents of the science of religion. As a family of approaches, the phenomenology of religion should be distinguished from those analyses that reduce the data pertaining to their inquiry to something other than religion, and that distinguishing feature is an anti-reductive trait.

To say that phenomenological approaches to religion are anti-reductive, or anti-reductionistic, is a more problematic claim than those we have made above. In the first place, the term reductionism is at least as difficult to define as the terms history and theology. The term is used in epistemology, psychology, sociology, biology, physics where it can have a very broad or a very narrow meaning. Thus the definitions that are usually offered are less than illuminating outside the field from which they came. If reductionism is a doctrine that claims to express the apparently more sophisticated and complex in clearer, more accessible terms, there is scarcely an intellectual endeavor that would want to avoid it. If it is the belief that human behavior should be interpreted in terms of the behavior of lower animals, it is hardly relevant to the present discussion. In definitions offered in dictionaries of philosophy, it is never clear whether reductionism is an ideology, doctrine, or theory that is self-consciously and critically avowed, or a tendency subversive of legitimate scholarship and always to be avoided. As we define it here, reductionism is the tendency to treat the subject matter of the study of religion in such a way as to deny it the status of a distinctive object of inquiry.

In the second place, the relation of the anti-reductive to the a-theological trait is not immediately clear. We have stated that the phenomenology of religion aspires to be a-theological. Yet theology would certainly be opposed to reductionism in the sense in which we are using the word, and we have stated that the phenomenology of religion is not theology. Clearly the theology of the reform tradition recognized the object of its inquiry as something unique and irreducible, and would fiercely reject any treatment of that object that failed to so acknowledge it. Just as there are approaches to religion apart from the phenomenological that undertake studies of religion that are a-historical, there are approaches to religion apart from the phenomenological that are unmistakably anti-reductive.
The fact that they are anti-reductive does not preclude that phenomenological approaches to religion are so as well. To say that apples are non-peaches is not to say that they cannot be sweet.

The third problem in this claim concerns the fact that while the exponents of the phenomenology of religion self-consciously distinguish their studies of religion from the work of theology and the history of religions, they do not explicitly attack reductionism by name. Reductionism does not appear in their works as a developed ideology or theory against which they undertake a sustained polemic. Nevertheless, if we understand reductionism as a tendency that we can observe among exponents of the science of religion that was emerging at the time of Chantepie, we are justified in identifying their opposition to this tendency as an anti-reductive tendency, and as observed in a variety of related exponents, as an anti-reductive trait, whether or not they specifically identify the tendency by the name. Even if they didn't use it explicitly, reductionism seems an appropriate term to identify a tendency within the science of religion which the exponents of the phenomenology of religion consistently oppose. This trait is expressed in two significant ways. It is expressed in a negative way in their objection to approaches in which this tendency is observed. It is expressed in a positive way in their development of a conception of the object of their research for which such approaches cannot but seem inadequate.

The conception of reductionism we are suggesting here has three important implications. In the first place, reductionism as we understand it here is not restricted to studies of religion founded upon the so-called positive sciences. If reductionism is the treatment of a body of data that denies it the status of a distinctive object of inquiry, it is clear that an interpretation of religion erected upon a theological foundation could also be reductionistic. An interpretation or theory of religion that treats religious data exclusively within the frame of reference of a theological enterprise and which denies the standing of the religious phenomena as the possible subject of independent inquiry, we could call theological reductionism. In this connection it is interesting, for instance, that Chantepie resists the use of theological ideas to explain facts or relations among the phenomena he
Familial Traits

observes. The resistance of phenomenological approaches to theological reductionism follows naturally from the fact that his phenomenology of religion is a-theological in object, attitude, and perspective. For this reason the particular kind of reductionism that might be associated with theology need not occupy our discussion of the exponents of the phenomenology of religion in terms of their anti-reductive trait.

Secondly, if theology can be reductive it is easy to see that as an academic enterprise history could be reductive in a similar way. If theological reductionism is characteristic of a theological explanation that denies phenomena the status of a distinctive object of inquiry, then a historical explanation that similarly denies the status of the data as the independent subject of research could be called historical reductionism. When Chantepie, for instance, rejects the explanation of litholatry as arising from purely historical causes when he is unwilling to acknowledge cult merely as the effect of historical causes, he rejects the tendency toward historical reductionism. Chantepie's very interest in an outline or classification of the most important forms of religious cult and custom reflects the concern that they may contain something that is likely to be lost in a purely historical presentation. To say the phenomenology of Chantepie and others is resistant to historical reductionism, however, is only to say that these exponents are resistant to historicism, as we discussed this term above, in the sense that they take the phenomena to embrace features inaccessible to purely historical research. For this reason, the resistance of phenomenological approaches to religion to what we are calling historical reductionism need not occupy our discussion of the anti-reductive trait as we find it among these exponents. It remains clear, nevertheless, that reductionism includes more than merely theological and historical reductionism. And for this reason the topic merits independent treatment.

The third important implication is that because reductionism, as we understand it, is a tendency, it can be present in varying degrees. To be reductive, a study of religion need not deal with its data in terms completely outside the domain of religion. To study religion as purely economic behavior or as psychosis would clearly be reduct-
tive. Yet it would also be reductive to discuss and explain all religion in terms of the worship of stones, or the worship of the sky, or the sun, or the dead. Such a study might recognize in religion one or another distinctive element. Yet it reduces religion to a single narrow manifestation of the religious life. The same would be done by a study that restricts religion to a single doctrine or belief. While such studies do not reduce religion to something “else,” like economic or psychological reductionism, they nevertheless deny the integrity of the data in question as an object of independent inquiry.

The present discussion raises the question of the degree to which the phenomenology of religion not only claimed but succeeded in developing approaches that were independent of the history of religions, genuinely free from theological interpretations, and distinct from reductionistic explanations. The extent to which exponents of the phenomenology of religion embody these traits, the ways in which they exemplify them, and the degree to which it has become with them a developed and cultivated feature of their character varies considerably among individuals. To understand the significance of these traits among exponents of a phenomenology of religion, it is necessary to observe these traits in a number of specific cases. For this reason we will examine these traits in the thought of Chantepie, Kristensen, and van der Leeuw successively in the following three parts of the present study. A final answer to the question must be left to the conclusions of the present study. It is appropriate here, however, to express the claim that the following chapters will support. Although we do not maintain that the phenomenology of religion achieves complete independence from historical conceptions, theological categories, or reductive explanations, we seek to show through these case studies that the phenomenology of religion becomes gradually more developed, self-conscious, and refined. The insights achieved in the development and refinement of these traits, we would argue, represent valuable and neglected resources for the interpretation of religion.
PART I

The Phenomenology of Religion of
Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye
The A-Historical Trait in the Phenomenology of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye

The Phenomenology of Chantepie as a Systematic Study of Religion

In the earliest case of a phenomenology of religion, all three facets of the a-historical trait can be found in the plan and procedure of the study, in the questions that are asked of the data, and in the kind of conclusions that are drawn. The phenomenology of Chantepie is a systematic study of religious phenomena that is also non-developmental in its approach and anti-historicist in its view of its subject matter. Of these facets of the a-historical trait the systematic facet is especially clear. The study is, as we have said, "the first more comprehensive attempt to arrange the principal groups of religious conceptions in such a way that the most important sides and aspects should appear conspicuously from out the other material." While this facet of the a-historical trait is not yet a developed methodological procedure, it signals a departure from other prevalent approaches to the study of religion.

In an inquiry of this nature, according to Chantepie, it is not enough to put together whatever is near in time and space. He observes that "in customs and opinions, habits, and superstition, fables and metaphors, there are strong analogies between many nations, in all stages of civilization." He believes that in comparing such parallels it is not necessary to limit our view to the boundaries of historically related cultures: "Ideas and customs apparently most casual,

1. Chantepie, pp. vi, 8. 2. Ibid., p. 51.
as for instance the bridge of death, the fountain of youth, the lame devil, the evil eye, the cure by suction, the couvade, etc., form a possession common to the most distant nations and races." While other scholars were propelled by such coincidences to speculations concerning an original unity of mankind, Chantepie found in such analogies a wealth of information for the exploration of these data as phenomena, their nature and their meaning.

In undertaking a study of this nature, Chantepie believes it is appropriate to begin with a consideration of the various objects of belief and worship. But he finds that here already certain difficulties arise. What is it, for instance, that constitutes the real object of religious worship? With regard to the worship of nature, is the object to be described the material object, the spirit believed to in-dwell the object, or the divine power which the object presumably reveals? According to Chantepie, no simple answer applies to all cases. He also finds it impossible to devise anything more than a provisional division between many of the objects of worship. These and other difficulties give a tentative cast to much of Chantepie's research. To understand the systematic nature of Chantepie's research, it will be useful to observe some of the classes of phenomena that constitute the groupings he explores, and take account of the information he derives from the data.

The richest material for the phenomenology of religion, in Chantepie's view, is supplied by religious acts, cult, and customs. In the case of many nations and periods, they are, he says, the only indication of the religious ideas and sentiments. The designation under which data of such a nature are most commonly discussed is idolatry. For Chantepie this is sufficient reason to make idolatry the first grouping of his classification. Recognizing that the word is used in common parlance to refer to the worship of idols in opposition to true religion, Chantepie specifies that by this term he means no more than simply "the worship of idols." He defines the idol in a way that conforms to his objective. It combines features of two definitions current in contemporary research, viz. (1) the figurative represen-

3. Ibid., p. 23. 4. Ibid., p. 69.
A-Historical Trait

tation in a more or less perfect human shape of a divine being, and (2) the material dwelling of a divine power. It is best distinguished from a fetish, he says, "by its being shaped, however little, by the hand of man, and by a more accurate and more individual indication of the god or spirit embodied in the image." Under this classification he includes: (1) roughly hewn stones in which the form of man or animal, the head, and other members are indicated only; (2) statues representing the perfect human form; (3) images in which the animal and human are mixed; and (4) images in which a large number of attributes and symbols have been "grotesquely heaped up." What he thinks is common among these is that they are worshipped as symbols and images in which the divine power is active.

In his treatment of this classification, he briefly describes the phenomenon as it appears among the native peoples of Haiti, New Zealand, the Polynesian Islands, China, Africa, and America, as well as in ancient Rome, Egypt, Greece, India, Persia, and so on. He observes among other things that a sacred image on a castle is often understood to protect a town. He notes that this was the case with the Palladium of Troy which Aeneas carried to Rome. He notes that a besieged city secured the protection of a deity by putting fetters on the image, that a native of the Congo drives a nail into the idol in order to bring his prayer near to it, and that dipping an idol into a river or into the sea was said to cause rain. He observes that idolatry is not to be found among the Bushman of Africa, the Patagonians, the Esquimaux, the Andaman Islanders, or the Australians, and that the educated among the Hindus, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans looked upon idols not as endowed with divine power but as mere symbols of the divine. He observes, in fact, "that the same idol, which the more highly educated look upon as a mere symbol and reminder of the deity, seems to contain to a ruder mind the divine itself." He observes that both the great gods and the more subordinate powers live and act in these images, and he thinks that the notion of the embodiment of the divine being in the material object

5. Ibid., p. 76. 6. Ibid., p. 77.
7. Ibid., pp. 78 f. 8. Ibid., p. 76.
accounts for the historical importance of idol worship. He also notes that a thoroughgoing opposition to the worship of idols began only with Judaism and was then carried forward by Christianity and Islam. From these cross-cultural and trans-historical descriptions, he concludes that idolatry belongs neither to the most general nor to the most primitive facts of religion, that it is absent at the lowest "stage of civilization," that it is "spread in all parts of the world among tribes beyond the stage of savages," and that at a certain stage of civilization it is no longer able to persist.  

The second of Chantepie's groupings includes sacred stones, trees, and animals. Here, perhaps because the phenomena are easier to define, the systematic nature of Chantepie's approach seems more assured. Chantepie finds litholatry (the worship of stones) spread among nations from antiquity to the present day. He finds it among the South Sea Islanders, the peoples of Central Asia, the Finns, the Laps, and the peoples of Africa and ancient America. He finds it in India as well as in ancient Greece and Rome. He finds it in the Old Testament and in Islam. He briefly describes the kinds of stones that receive worship and the nature of the worship itself:  

The worship consists in making requests of the stones and offering gifts, also in washing them, and still oftener in anointing them, or covering them with oil or butter, as did the superstitious Greek described by Theophrastus, and the Israelites in the days of the Prophets.  

While he finds it easy to cite examples of the worship of stones that bear a strong resemblance to one another, he finds the explanations that purport to account for the phenomena as a whole to be less than satisfactory. In his discussion of sacred trees and plants, he uses a smaller profusion of examples. The manner in which trees were worshipped, he says, was various:  

The roots were sprinkled with sacrificial blood; food and other gifts were placed under the tree or were hung on its branches; there were rag-trees

9. Ibid., pp. 76-83.  
10. Ibid., p. 86. He supports his claim concerning Ancient Israel by reference to Isaiah 57:5-6.
hung with all sorts of shreds and threads. People also addressed trees for oracles, and imagined they heard them in the sighing of the tree-tops.\textsuperscript{11}

As with his judgement concerning the explanations of sacred stones, he finds those that treat dendrolatry (the worship of trees) as derived from the worship of ancestors who bore the names of plants, or from the intoxicating effect of certain plants, or which again connect them with phallic worship, to be unsatisfactory. Chantepie observes that the worship of trees is not only as widely spread as litholatry but has been less displaced in the "higher stages of civilization." Even Buddhism did not prevent its growth. He also observes that not all so-called sacred trees were objects of worship, that some only mark the place where a divine presence was felt.

Concerning animal-worship, Chantepie states that there is perhaps no more many-sided aspect of religious conceptions. He notes that a list of animals included among objects of religious worship would embrace all kinds: wild and domestic, dangerous and useful, dreaded and beloved. He notes that among the Germans honor was paid to goats, bulls, and horses as oracular animals and that among the northern races of Europe, Asia, and America the bear stands out in prominence. He notes that animals are often regarded as ancestors of families, races, and tribes and are included in myths of the founding of certain cities. Chantepie thinks the snake is perhaps the most widespread of animals either religiously worshipped or feared and that next to snakes are birds.\textsuperscript{12} He states that the most various sentiments and ideas can be traced in the worship of animals on different stages of civilization, and he holds it "utterly wrong to accept a common origin and a single explanation as regards the whole."\textsuperscript{13} Generally it is more reasonable to allow differing explanations for the various groups of phenomena, but he also notes that the impression man received from the creatures nearest him were especially deep. He suggests that both man and animal share a common principle of life and that the consciousness of such a common principle explains

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 93. \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 98–102. \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 94.
the sympathy as well as the antipathy which man has felt towards them.\textsuperscript{14}

Chantepie organizes the topic of the worship of nature in general according to the classical divisions of the elements: earth, air, fire, and water. He holds that the worship of nature, while it “belongs to the most primitive and most general forms of worship,” is a distinctive form of religion, not to be subsumed under the heading of animism or fetishism or confused with mythological polytheism.\textsuperscript{15} While he understands that Zeus is widely understood to represent the heavens, he thinks it would be incorrect to treat the worship of Zeus as a case of the worship of the material sky, which received veneration in its own right and independent of natural phenomena, such as the sun, moon, and stars associated with it.\textsuperscript{16} Likewise in acts involving the worship of a river, a lake, or a sea, of which Chantepie gives several examples, he believes it is the real waters and not the beings associated with them that are religiously meant. He also thinks that the use of fire in worship is not to be confused with acts directed to the fire as such. The worship of the visible flame in the veneration of the Indian Agni is unmistakable, and in Mazdeism, fire is invoked with prayers. The worship of the wind, although it is quite rare, is to be differentiated in a similar way, as when flour is offered to the wind and is blown away in order to pacify the storm. Normally it is the god or the sky who acts in the wind or storm. Chantepie suggests that in most cultures the wind or storm itself was too lacking in material consistency to be the object of veneration. By contrast, “the sacred earth herself is worshipped as the nourishing mother from whose fertile lap all life springs forth.” Libations are poured on the material earth, prayers are addressed to it, and it is often invoked at the taking of an oath. To this group also belongs sacred hills which are regarded with awe as places of worship or seats of the deity and are themselves religiously revered.\textsuperscript{17}

Under the following rubric, the worship of men, Chantepie includes the worship of the dead and the ancestors, the worship of

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 95. \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 102f. \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 103. \textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 108f.
heros, of saints, and of living human beings. In this discussion, Chantepie is concerned to differentiate between these types of phenomena. Thus he invokes evidence to show that the dead and the gods must be distinguished, and that while the dead are venerated, the worship they receive is different from that of the gods.\textsuperscript{18} He notes that the dead, either a person who has recently died and whose memory is still alive, or the dead in general, are frequently seen as dangerous, and that it is widely believed necessary to appease the angry spirit. The dead are also seen to have powers over the individual, over families and estates, and are thus implored and given gifts. Of the duties to the dead, burial, where it is practiced, is the first and most sacred. Beyond this it must often be assured that the dead are without any want. “Food and drink are placed for him, arms and ornaments are buried with him, the warrior is accompanied by his war-horse, and the husband by his faithful wife.”\textsuperscript{19}

The ancestor, according to Chantepie, is also a dead person to whom what he says concerning the dead applies as well. But Chantepie also thinks there is something that distinguishes the worship of the dead from the worship of ancestors. He finds justification for this distinction in evidence from China where different words are used for each.\textsuperscript{20} From these phenomena, Chantepie thinks it is a short step to the worship of heroes of a town, a district, or a guild who have obtained divine honor by battle and conquest. The transition, he thinks, is produced by the worship of the first ancestor as the progenitor of the family and by the extension of the private into a public cult.\textsuperscript{21} A saint, by contrast, is a religious hero who participates in divine honor and is thus able to guard and bless his worshippers but whose veneration is also carefully distinguished from that belonging to God.\textsuperscript{22}

Chantepie turns to the topic of the gods as the last in his list of the objects of religion. He acknowledges that numerous creatures occupy a position between God and man, but these can be left out of discussion because they are hardly, or not at all, the object of any

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 113.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 114.  
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 116.  
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 119.  
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 120f.
cult. For the same reason, he leaves aside the various ideas of the infinite that more or less approach the notion of godhead but occupy no place in religious worship. He also leaves out any general definition of the nature or attributes of the gods which he thinks are appropriately addressed in his historical description of each religion. And the content of the idea of God, he leaves to the philosophy of religion and to dogmatic theology. In this section he is occupied, he says, “with a few fundamental ideas and general distinctions only.”

He observes that there is a great variety in the degree of personification we find among the gods. In some, the names are mere appellatives and sex is no more than grammatical gender. Among others, the sexual character of the god or goddess is apparent. Nevertheless, among such beings, significant differences can be seen. He distinguishes first the divine powers, or *numina*, taking the name from Roman religion in which they are largely represented. These are beings whose character is exhausted by their functions and actions. Such gods, he says, possess a fixed sphere of work and are entirely absorbed within it. Beside them he places the more personal gods who, under certain circumstances, may be addressed as *numina* but who usually appear independently. These are most manifest among the ancient Greeks with whom the personification of the gods attains its greatest height. He observes further that numerous gods are associated with nature. These, he thinks, must be distinguished both from the *numina* and from those properties of nature which are themselves the objects of worship. Although such gods are related to natural phenomena, they are always connected with more than one phenomenon and exercise functions independent of nature. From these, then, he distinguishes those gods not originally connected with nature who in many cases are the chief gods of civilized peoples, the gods of localities, nations, and tribes. Chantepie rejects explanations that attempt to derive the character of these gods from the former by a process of mere historical development because they appeal to a period of history to which we have no reliable access. Chantepie, however, accepts the view that in the

23. Ibid., pp. 123.  
24. Ibid., pp. 123 f.
emergence of these gods, the development of families of gods that arose from the fusion of different cults and the emergence of a single head within such families was a significant factor. He also accepts the view that as plastic art began to represent the gods, it became easier for man to connect their service with certain moral blessings. Finally, he accepts the view that thought strives always after the more general and abstract idea of the divine, putting the individuality of the god into the background. Chantepie suggests that this factor has the greatest influence on the conception of the idea of a single and supreme God. But he adds that cult "follows unwillingly, or not at all, this work of thought."  

Chantepie's phenomenology of religion does not end with the objects of religion. He goes on to discuss magic and divination, sacrifice and prayer, sacred places, religious times, religious communities, sacred writings, and so on. Nevertheless, the information we have gathered here is sufficient to provide the basis for some conclusions. Reading through Chantepie's phenomenology, one is immediately impressed with the sheer expanse of the material from which his classification is drawn. This includes ethnographic data from diverse and distant societies, textual material from Biblical, Ancient Near Eastern, Chinese and Indian sources, material from European mythology, and classical antiquity, historical data from Herodotus, Pliny, Tacitus, Theophrastus, Cicero, Plutarch, and others. By treating these phenomena systematically, taking them out of their historical context and discussing them as phenomena, Chantepie is undertaking something different from what he considers to be the usual practice of the historian—different from what he himself as historian does in the historical part of his handbook that follows. Given its date and the breadth of its resources, Chantepie's phenomenology is a remarkable specimen of what has been called "the systematic, not the historical," study of such phenomena. A second notable feature of his scholarship is the care with which Chantepie differentiates those phenomena that belong to one particular

25. Ibid., pp. 126 f.
type from those that do not. He is meticulous, for instance, in differen-
tiating between the use of fire in worship from the actual wor-
ship of fire and the worship of the dead from that of the gods with
whom the dead are associated. He justifies the types he distinguishes
in light of the evident data, and the conclusions he draws concern
the character of the phenomena taken as a whole. He is interested
in seeing how widely they are distributed in terms of certain "stages
of civilization," the various geographic regions of the world, and the
great religious traditions. He is also interested in seeing the different
ways in which the same phenomenon can appear, both in differing
religious traditions and within the setting of differing cultures. The
same idol which the educated look upon merely as the symbol of the
deity may contain, in the view of others, the deity itself.

What distinguishes the work of Chantepie from other phenomen-
enological approaches to religion is that the theoretical function of
his typology is less defined than in other, especially more recent,
works of this nature. Among others, the typology stands within an
explicit design of research. In some, it is used in support of particular
interpretations of the data. In others, it functions to provide support
for an understanding of their meaning in a more embracive way. By
his stated purpose, Chantepie's intention seems to be exhausted in
the goal that the most important sides and aspects of the phenomena
should appear clearly in the midst of the other material.

Chantepie, in fact, was not the first to undertake a classification
of religious phenomena of this nature. We observed earlier that
Chantepie's effort along this line was antecedent by a classification
of religious phenomena by Christoph Meiners. What was first with
Chantepie was that his effort was a classification undertaken delib-
erately as such, and that he used the term phenomenology as a des-
ignation for this undertaking. In light of the role of phenomenology
as classification in nineteenth century philosophy of science, espe-
cially in the thought of Hamilton and Whewell, it would not seem
too much to suggest that simple accuracy of classification would, for
Chantepie, have been a fundamental component of the measure of

27. Van der Leeuw, p. 690.
A-Historical Trait

science without which aetiology and theory cannot help but founder. In any case the regard for detail in Chantepie's effort reflects the view that if a classification is sufficiently meticulous, it has the merit of a scientific undertaking and may, for him, have been sufficient grounds to justify its place within the emerging science of religion. By means of such attention to accuracy, the misconceptions, inappropriate connections, and hasty generalizations that have encumbered the discussion of such phenomena can be dismissed and, on the basis of accurate scientific descriptions, reliable conclusions can be drawn. In themselves and in the light of more recent research, Chantepie's conclusions are not spectacular. Their significance, however, is to be found not so much in the profundity of their insight as in the reliability of the basis they provide for further investigations and their rejection of conclusions that are drawn upon insufficient observation.

In the course of his discussion, Chantepie highlights the types he develops as much to dispel as to support any theory that would explain the phenomenon as a whole. He makes no mention of the famous distinction of Wilhelm Dilthey between explanation and understanding. Yet when he does offer an explanation, it generally concerns the idea or sentiment behind the phenomenon, rather than a causal relation between the phenomenon and some condition exterior to it. His discussion contains no phenomenological *epoche*, no exploration of the religions consciousness, no intuition of the essence of religion. The clearest meaning of the term phenomenology that coheres with his use of the term is evident from the fact that his effort is a purely descriptive classification of phenomena that can be distinguished and associated on the basis of their evident characteristics. Chantepie's classification is a phenomenology in a sense consistent with what Robison found in Newton's classification of the phenomena of the heavens.

The Phenomenology of Chantepie as a Non-Developmental Study of Religion

In his discussion of the objects of religion, the systematic nature of Chantepie's study stands out as perhaps the clearest facet of the
a-historical trait. Focusing upon data that repeat themselves in different traditions and cultures, he selects key religious phenomena, and then he attempts to outline the characteristics of each as a class, to discern sub-classes within some general groups, and to offer a description of each. We wish to argue further that Chantepie’s phenomenology of religion is also a-historical in the sense that his approach to the data is, or attempts to be, non-developmental. Chantepie attempts to distance his approach to the data from studies that presuppose particular conceptions of the history of religious phenomena.

In the present discussion, we have already uncovered a number of features of Chantepie’s thought that, on the face of it, would seem to stand against this thesis. We have noted that Chantepie accepts the view that, in the emergence of the gods, the development of divine families that arose from the fusion of different cults and the emergence of a single head within such families was a significant factor. He accepts the view that as plastic art began to represent the gods, it became easier for man to connect service to these gods with certain moral blessings. And he accepts the view that thought strives always after the more general and abstract idea of the divine, putting the individuality of the god into the background. Chantepie thinks this factor has the greatest influence on the conception of a single and supreme God, although he acknowledges that cult follows reluctantly, if at all, such cognitive developments.

To acknowledge that the emergence of phenomena depends upon conditions of various kinds, even to acknowledge that thought presses always towards the more abstract conceptions is not, however, to hold that such conditions are sufficient in themselves to explain the phenomena or that the phenomena follow one another by means of an inherent historical necessity. It certainly does not imply that any phenomenon is privileged over another within an embracive historical scheme. On the basis of the types he develops, Chantepie seeks, in fact, to discredit prevalent views of how one phenomenon necessarily overtakes another historically. We stated earlier that Chantepie recognized in Hegel’s thought one of the most important factors that have led to the emergence of the science of
religion as an independent discipline. He acknowledges that it was Hegel who first raised the subject of religion as an issue for philosophical reflection. He thinks, in fact, that because of Hegel’s contribution which supplied both the aim and object of the science of religion, we can excuse the errors of Hegel’s famous lectures on the philosophy of religion from 1821 to 1831. By this acknowledgement, Chantepie does not accept Hegel’s view of the development of religion. His difficulty is with Hegel’s famous classification of religions which claims to contain “the fundamental outlines which form both the stages of the development of the idea and at the same time of its concrete manifestation.”

Chantepie understands this to mean that Hegel’s classification claims to give an analysis of the concept of religion that exhibits its true nature in its unity and many-sidedness and that the parts of his classification form the actual steps of this development so that the history of religion is constituted of a progress of development from the lowest to the highest forms. Chantepie notes here that many contemporary efforts towards a classification of religious phenomena betray, even in their form, the influence of Hegel’s view. He believes that however important the issues raised by Hegel’s classification, they can no longer be taken seriously.

Chantepie further rejects conceptions of the history of religions derived from the idea of “natural history” or from natural science. He notes that since Hume’s effort towards a “natural history of religion,” the influence of the natural sciences, the mechanical theory of the universe, and especially the theory of evolution have placed the question of the development of religion in a new light. “Philosophers, psychologists, ethnologists and historians wish to treat their studies according to the method of natural science, and to explain history as a psychological mechanism.” They wish to treat human civilization and customs like any other subject of natural science and thus uncover the laws of their development. Chantepie thinks that it is in the work of Herbert Spencer that these influences are most consistently developed. Spencer’s approach stands upon the single

28. Chantepie, p. 51. 29. Ibid., p. 11.
fundamental principle, *Natura non facit saltus*. For him the simple forms always precede the more complicated forms from which they have developed. This applies to human civilization as well as to nature. When religion is considered within this context, according to Chantepie, importance is laid upon such external factors as environment and climate or upon the inward elements of natural disposition and racial or popular character, in connection with the concept of general development. Chantepie's dissatisfaction with this kind of approach arises from the fact that in such studies, "all supernatural explanations that recognize the influence of the free will of God or of man on the general development, are excluded."

Chantepie was convinced that great importance must be given to the theory of evolution and that this must not be restricted to any narrow field. Yet he held "that the merely natural explanation of many phenomena is one-sided."

The extent to which Chantepie's phenomenology remains independent of particular conceptions of history is suggested by the character of his own classification. It is interesting that Chantepie begins his phenomenology with the same topic that Hume begins his *Natural History of Religion*. Yet unlike Hume, Chantepie does not equate idolatry with "polytheism," nor does he regard it as having been the first form of religion to appear in human history. "All origins," he says, "are still hidden from our eyes." His reason for beginning with idolatry is his view that the phenomenology of religion must begin with a consideration of the objects of belief and worship. His concern with the religious object seems no more subtle than that among all religious phenomena they are among the most pervasive and accessible to observe. Because he is concerned in the first place with the objects of religion, he first undertakes to discuss those forms of religion wherein the religious object stands out in most conspicuous relief—those forms of religion wherein worship is directed to the material likeness of a god or the material locus of a divine power.

Chantepie's phenomenology, however, does not end with his discussion of the gods, the last in his list of objects of religion. Chantepie recognizes that however clear the bond which unites belief and worship with one another and each to their object, some of the most important of religious ideas are without manifestation in ostensive acts and certain religious acts reveal no relation to any object.

Not only in the practice of magic, but also on many a higher stage, the object of religion has often been thrown in the background by the ritual act and the religious practice. This is really the case whenever the ritual act is considered as an essential condition, as the productive force of religious benefits, in fact as opus operatum.34

While Chantepie rejects Hegel's effort towards a classification of religion, when we look at Chantepie's typology as a whole, we find an orderly structure to the journey he takes through the material he explores. The nature of this journey reveals that it is motivated by no conception of the history of the phenomena in question. From his discussion of the objects of religion, the vista of Chantepie's research gradually recedes to consider those phenomena in which the object is no longer the focal point. His view recedes, we might say, from one in which the object is the center of attention towards one in which the subject of religion, or the religious subject, occupies the center of the field. While Chantepie's work antecedes the researches of Husserl by several decades, it would not seem wrong to suggest that he recedes in his view of the data from the noema towards the noesis of the religious phenomena. To see this we need only observe the phenomena he describes onward from his discussions of the gods. An overview of some of Chantepie's specific categories will also provide a clear idea of the distance he maintains from any developmental theory.

From the gods he thus turns to magic and divination, sacrifice and prayer, sacred times and places, sacred persons and communities and to the efflux of the religious life in sacred writings. As his center of attention recedes from the object of religion, Chantepie observes first a number of features of witchcraft or magic which he links to-

34. Ibid., pp. 73f.
gether on the basis of observable features. He defines magic as the clumsy, unsuccessful attempt to govern nature. He thinks it "belongs to the most general phenomenon of the life of man, in all parts of the world and in all stages of civilization." This he distinguishes from the practice of divination or mantic which he understands as the effort to discover and produce good omens, favorable circumstances, and the means to avert misfortune.

Turning further towards the subject in the religious phenomenon, Chantepie discusses sacrifice and prayer which he regards as the two chief elements of cult. He holds that their function is to maintain the relationship between man and God and to reinstate it when it has become clouded. He states that at a "lower stage," cult is performed because man feels that he needs the favor of the gods. It is performed at the "higher stage" because he desires communion with them. Among other religious acts which eclipse the object to which religious veneration is directed, Chantepie mentions only what he takes to be the most important. He notes that music and dancing almost everywhere occupy a central place in cult and are frequently associated with processions which are also ubiquitous. Ceremonies and performances of various kinds, he says, extend over a great area, having various meanings. He mentions three rites, however, that have an almost universal meaning: (1) Fasting, wherever it occurs, is intended either to arouse or to subdue sensuality. (2) Purification presupposes the religious idea that man, at least under certain conditions, is unfit for communion with the gods and that certain objects are unfit for use. (3) Consecration is the act by which certain persons and things appropriately prepared and set apart, are dedicated to the gods.

With his discussion of sacred places and times, Chantepie moves his focus from the religious object and act to examine the character of the arena in which religious acts take place and thus to those

35. Ibid., p. 131. It is interesting that Chantepie rejects J. Grimm's distinction between magic and witchcraft because his characterization of witchcraft rests upon an ethical judgement.
36. Ibid., p. 133.
37. Ibid., p. 142.
phenomena in which the structure of this arena is most apparent. He observes that temples are often carefully oriented and that their building arrangements and ornamentation have symbolical meanings. He notes that the divisions of the church separates the priests from the laity, the initiated from the profane. He notes that the building arrangement in some sacred places reflects the structure of the world and that such sites are places of pilgrimage and asylum where under a sacred peace feuds may be left aside and a fugitive can place himself under the protection of the god. He also observes that these places are the locus of ceremonies which take place at special times. It is in the festivals, the days especially dedicated to the services of the god, that the cult culminates, and these occur most often at particular changes of the season. On such occasions, all public and private business stops. Often social barriers are removed for a time and theatrical plays are performed which represent a portion of the history of the gods. Athletic games here also often obtain great importance.39

With his discussion of sacred persons, Chantepie's field of interest has receded completely from the object to focus upon the subject of religious phenomena. Again it is not their subjective testimony or the structure of their experience that is of interest to Chantepie but simply the historical appearance and character of such persons. He does not attempt to penetrate to the foundation of the institution that confers such significance upon persons but prefers "to survey without preconceived opinion, the various facts as we find them among different people."40 Accordingly, he observes that among savages, certain designated persons are regarded as divine or as receptacles of the divine; that they perform all kinds of mantic, but especially those forms that depend upon ecstatic experience; that they discover secrets, cause victory, bring blessing, bring rain; and that they are physicians, counsellors, and sages, but not distinguished as a caste from other parts of the society. He notes that in "civilized societies," priesthood has a definitive constitution, as well as certain privileges, duties, and revenues and that it is accorded a

39. Ibid., pp. 161-75. 40. Ibid., p. 175.
position limited by other classes. In a similar way he considers the principal features of the prophet, ascetic, hermit, anchorite, and the monk. 41

Chantepie distinguishes his ordering of religious data from that ordering proposed by Hegel and those who follow him as well as from models of the development of religion derived either from natural history or natural science. Nevertheless there remains a feature evident throughout his research that tends to discredit his evident intention to present the data he explores in a manner independent of any developmental scheme. While he is able clearly to perceive the influence of Hegel among many contemporary treatments of religion, Chantepie refers repeatedly to "lower stages" and "higher stages" of civilization, "savages," "primitive peoples" or "primitive races of mankind," "civilized societies," and "highly developed nations." Moreover, he uses these terms with every assurance that they legitimately refer to objective historical realities. His use of such terms raises the question whether he is not committed in language to the very conceptions he opposes in thought. It seems that in language of this nature, we have uncovered a subtext of Chantepie's research. However he might wish to deny it, it seems that he is implicated in a developmental view of civilization and therefore of the history of religions.

On the other hand, there is a great difference between distinguishing certain "stages" of civilization, observing the distribution

41. Ibid., p. 175–187. In the remainder of his phenomenology, Chantepie undertakes a discussion of some of the products of the religious life of man. Under the rubric of "sacred writings," he includes documents that might be called the "Bibles of mankind" as well as magic formulas, liturgical texts, ritual treatises, ceremonial laws, pontifical documents, historical and mythological literature, symbolical and ecclesiastical writings, and books of devotion which for one reason or another have come to possess religious authority. Here he treats the principle forms of religious doctrine under two topics: (1) those determined by imagination, i.e. the symbolical and mythical forms and (2) those in which thought preponderates, i.e. the dogmas and philosophies. His concern here is not with the content of these materials, but with the principle characteristics of the prevalent classes of philosophies, myths, doctrines, and texts. He closes with an effort to distinguish the boarders between religion, morality, and art.
of phenomena among these stages, and holding that certain phenomena are necessarily associated with certain of these types and therefore must necessarily succeed one another in a given order in time. His actual observations support the opposite view. It is perhaps unquestionable that Chantepie tacitly maintained that certain kinds of civilizations, in ways unspecified, were more developed than others. And it may be as true that his use of such terms as "primitives," "savages," and "civilized peoples," reveal this tacit assumption of his research. What is more important, however, is his resistance to those interpretations of the data that this subtext tended to impose upon him, even if this resistance in not completely effective. As he employs the terms "primitive," "savage," and "civilized," they seem intended only to distinguish certain types of civilization in which pervasive religious phenomena appear in various ways. His own discussion of this material indicates that no developmental theory of religion is entailed. He proceeds systematically from the religious object to the religious subject without reference to any inherent chronology or advancement among the phenomena.

The Phenomenology of Chantepie as an Anti-Historicist Study of Religion

Phenomenological approaches to religion, we maintain, are a-historical in approach. As such they are systematic in their treatment of the data they explore, and they differ from studies that order the data in terms of development. They are non-developmental studies of religion. A third important facet of this a-historical trait is also evident in the work of Chantepie. We stated in our general remarks about the a-historical trait that phenomenology of religion does not deny that the data it studies stand in a context of becoming in time. It does not claim to study timeless essences, and it does not claim a timeless perspective upon the data. On the other hand, it opposes the general view that these data are nothing but the effects of history narrowly conceived. If we take the term "historicism" to stand for the treatment of the effluence of the religious life of humankind solely within the context of historical change, it becomes clear that phenomenological approaches to religion stand against this kind of
treatment of the data. To put it in a single word, we might say that phenomenological studies of religion share an "anti-historicist" concern. In the case of Chantepie, this aspect of the a-historical trait is neither thoroughly developed nor predominant. Yet given the position of Chantepie in the development of the phenomenology of religion, it is significant.

Chantepie's opposition to an historicist approach to religious data is sometimes apparent in discussions in which historicism is not specifically addressed. In the "preliminary remarks" to his phenomenological survey, he makes the point that "the external phenomena of religious life" have their efficient causes and forces in certain religious states and sentiments. While he does not deny that these states and sentiments are "historical" in one important sense of the word, he thinks they represent dimensions of reality with which history, narrowly conceived of, as the sciences that establish the antecedent conditions for the occurrence of historical events, is not competent to deal. The anti-historicist facet of Chantepie's thought can perhaps most clearly be seen in his recognition of the complexity of the relation of religion to history. We mentioned earlier that for Chantepie the emergence of the philosophy of religion under the influence of Hegel was one of the conditions necessary for the emergence of the science of religion. Another of those conditions was the emergence at the end of the nineteenth century of the philosophy of history. This philosophy, Chantepie says, "tries to realize the life of mankind as a whole, and not merely to study the concatenation of outward events." He observes that beside political history there has recently emerged a history of civilization which not only recounts the stories of nations but examines as well their social systems, their material advancement, the development of arts and


43. Chantepie, p. 4.
A-Historical Trait

sciences, and the history of opinions. He considers this to be essential to the study of religion because it reveals the connection of religion with other sides of life.

Chantepie's anti-historicist concern can also be seen in his concern for what we might simply call the interior of religious phenomena. "Religious acts, ideas, and sentiments," he says, "are not distinguished from non-religious acts, ideas, and sentiments by any outward mark, but only by a certain inward relation." The outward forms of religion, he says, "can only be explained from inward processes."44 Religious data, in Chantepie's view, present something whose meaning cannot be exhausted by a kind historical research that explains historical phenomena merely by establishing their external material and ideological conditions.

The same concern is evident in some of Chantepie's remarks concerning the theory of evolution. Chantepie wishes to distinguish his work from any ordering of phenomena which presupposes a particular conception of the historical process. Yet for him the theory of evolution is also wanting in another important way. This weakness, in fact, might be found in any attempt to discuss religious phenomena merely as the product of history. In discussing the limitations of the theory of evolution as a model for the study of religious data, Chantepie employs three pregnant turns of phrase to suggest qualities of religious data which he finds the theory of evolution unable to discern. Strict evolutionary principles, he states, admit in the phenomena no "real substance" (reeller Inhalt), no "ontological reason" (ontologischer Grund), and no "teleological destination" (teleologische Bestimmung).45 Many of his criticisms of historical theories of religion center upon this point. He rejects the theory that religious cult is

44. Ibid., p. 67.
45. Chantepie, p. 12. Cf. Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, vol. 1 (Freiberg i Br: J. C. Mohr, 1887), p. 9. Although Chantepie approved of the translation of these terms as they are rendered in the English edition, the more inclusive connotations of the German words and their Dutch cognates are worthy of note. The German and Dutch terms for "real substance," includes "real content," or "real meaning." The term for "ontological reason" also suggests "ontological foundation," or "ontological grounding." And the term for "teleological destination" includes "teleological determination."
merely the invention of priests or that it sprang from the organization of society, and he dismisses out of hand the interpretation of litholatry as arising from such causes as the worship of phallic stones, the mystique of meteoric stones, or the constraining social function of stones employed to indicate boundaries.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 86-88.}

The importance Chantepie finds in this “real substance,” “ontological foundation,” or “teleological destination” of phenomena is underlined by the kind of information Chantepie derives from the data he explores. Although many of the conclusions he draws are of an historical nature as in his observation of the pervasiveness of such phenomena as idolatry, dendrolatry, litholatry, etc., or his hypothesis that temples were first the repositories of religious artifacts, others of his conclusions are about the substance or meaning of the phenomena. At the outset of his phenomenology, he states that his purpose is to classify the principal groups of religious acts, cult, and customs, but at the same time to discuss the meaning (Bedeutung) of the most important classes of religious phenomena.\footnote{Ibid., p. 67. Cf. Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, 1:48.} He finds, for instance, that what is common among idols wherever they are found is that they are worshipped as symbols and images in which the divine power is active, that the object of cult is “to maintain the relationship between man and God and to reinstate it when it has become clouded,” that the rites of purification indicate that man finds himself at times unfit for communion with the gods.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 78, 142, 158.}

Chantepie does not express his opposition to historicism in any theoretically-reasoned attack. Nor does he advance an alternative interpretation of the data by specific arguments. While he thinks that the religious phenomena can be distinguished only by a certain inward relation, he does not attempt to describe it. Nor does he advance philosophical arguments to establish the “real substance,” “ontological reason,” or “teleological destination” which he rejects other approaches for their failure to see. When he seeks the meaning of religious phenomena, the kind of meaning he seeks is sometimes far from clear, as is his method for finding it and for authenticating
these findings. Chantepie's anti-historicist cause does not consist in arguments for certain religious irreducibles, but sometimes simply in a stand against those approaches in which the possibility of recognizing such irreducibles is rejected out of hand. The problem of actually discerning the essence of religion Chantepie leaves to the philosophical side of the science of religion.

We have stated that the phenomenology of religion of Chantepie, which represents the first historical example of this approach to religion, is a-historical. It is so in the sense of being systematic, of being non-developmental or theoretically independent of particular conceptions of history of religious phenomena, and in the sense of being anti-historicist. The extent to which Chantepie embodies this trait and the full significance of this trait as it appears in Chantepie for later exponents of this approach will be fully clear only when we see this trait in the context of other phenomenological approaches to religion, especially that of Kristensen and van der Leeuw.
The A-Theological Trait in the Phenomenology of
Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye

*Theology in Holland at the Advent of the Phenomenology of Religion*

The second of the familial traits of phenomenological approaches to religion is the a-theological trait. The exponents of the phenomenology of religion with whom we are dealing all explicitly distinguished their efforts from theology. In order to grasp the significance of this claim by the exponents of the phenomenology of religion, especially in the case of its earliest representative, it is necessary to understand the conception of theology from which they wished their efforts distinguished. To do this, it is necessary to comprehend some of the currents of theology in Holland contemporary with the advent of the phenomenology of religion.

1. It is Chantepie's view that theology and the science of religion, of which his phenomenology of religion is a part, must use different "forms of treatment." Kristensen explicitly rejects efforts towards phenomenological research in which he finds the encroachment of theological judgements. Van der Leeuw claims unequivocally that theology and the phenomenology of religion are different things. (Chantepie, p. 9; Kristensen, p. 10; Van der Leeuw, p. 687.)

2. For a fuller discussion of nineteenth century theology in Holland, the reader is directed to Eldred C. Vanderlaan, *Protestant Modernism in Holland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) and James Hutton Mackay, *Religious Thought in Holland in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911) upon which the present discussion depends. See also Chantepie de La Saussaye, *La crise religieuse en Hollande, Souvenirs et impressions* (Leiden: De Breuk and Smits, 1860), and Herman Bavinck, "Recent Dogmatic Thought in the Netherlands" in *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* 3, no. 10 (April 1892): 209 ff.
About the middle of the nineteenth century, protestant theology in Holland was briefly dominated by what became known as modernism, or "old modernism," to distinguish it from later developments. In this period, as one historian has put it, modernism was in its first flush of confidence. "It rejoiced in the possession of a definite theology, which was believed to be the successful harmonization of Christianity with the modern view of the world."\(^3\) The modern world-view was that determined by natural science. It was a system of continuous and all-pervading natural laws, above all the law of cause and effect. It precluded belief in any event the grounds for which might lie outside the domain of finite causes. This picture of the world was reconciled with religious faith through an identification of the system of natural causation with the activity of a personal God, so that without this system of natural laws, God simply does not act. Here, as the same historian has said, religion accepted the verdict of science but instead of drawing the conclusion that God does not exist, it arrived at "a non-supernaturalistic, monistic theism." With this there followed an optimistic, and evolutionistic view of man, and a Christology reduced to the life and teachings of Jesus the man. Evil was but an inevitable although temporary element in the evolution of the world. The most influential theological achievements of the movement include the empiricism of C. W. Opzoomer, which found no place in nature for the knowledge of God or for miracles of any kind, and the monistic theology of Jan Hendrik Scholten.\(^4\)

In Calvinist Holland, modernism was quickly opposed. Challenges arose, in fact, even from within its own ranks. For a significant part of his career, Allard Pierson was a follower of Opzoomer, but later as pastor, he began to see inconsistencies between modernist thought, and Christian doctrine as affirmed in the life of the Church. He attacked Scholten’s theology as pantheistic and as denying the righteousness and holiness of God. Later, in a pamphlet, "God’s Miraculous Power and our Spiritual Life," he directed a charge against

---

4. Ibid., pp. 24 f.
modernism in general, arguing that it is only by means of an inconsistency that the modernist who will not pray for the lifting of an epidemic of cholera, prays, nevertheless, for purity of heart. In a similar vein, the churchman J. Cramer declared that modern theology provided no ground for the hope of immortality, gave no place to petitionary prayer, made an anomaly of contrition, and paralysed the struggle of the believer against sin.  

Responding to the charge that modernism had failed to acknowledge the ethical dimension of religious life, a new development in theology followed the modernist movement. It drew a sharp distinction between the system of nature and the reality of God. For what came to be called Ethical Modernism, it was in the heart of man, in his religious aspirations, in the encounter through conscience with the moral imperative, and not in the regularity of nature, that the God of religion was to be found. Ethical modernism assumed a variety of forms which historians have classified in differing ways. The view of one figure associated with this movement is that in his inner being the human person understands himself as a morally responsible agent. For the empirical world of science, he is but the object of natural forces, of a blind and indifferent necessity. Because the human being affirms the reality within, he appropriately postulates what Sytze Hoekstra calls a supersensible world, a spiritual world within, of which the mechanism of nature is but a part. For Hoekstra, religion is not the abstract concept of Deity but the awareness of the interior dimension of the human person. “All faith in a supersensible world,” he says, “rests upon faith in the truth of our own inner being.” This reality, in Hoekstra’s view, is the legitimate object of theological science.  

Other exponents of the ethical school proceeded far beyond Hoek-

---

7. Ibid., p. 59.
stra view. For Hoekstra, religious faith is a need in the human person that drives one towards God. It pertains to human life in its essence. It is the work of God within us. For others, like van Hamel, neither God nor the gods are real beings but only objectifications of the ethical impulse. Similarly, A. Bruining tried to show that Ethical Modernism was the legitimate end of a process to which historical religion had always been proceeding. He argued that the gods of differing peoples correspond to the ethical ideals of their adherents. In the earliest stages, the gods are approached for the satisfaction of personal wishes. Later, they are sought for the needs of the group. Lastly, they are the object of purely ethical aspirations. Here, the supernatural gods disappear, and religion expresses itself in its essence. Religion, in the view of Bruining, is morality touched with emotion.\(^{10}\)

Another movement of thought that responded to the weaknesses of modernism in its older form took an approach different from that of the ethical moderns. While it recognized the significance of the ethical dimension of religious life which the old moderns had neglected, it concentrated religious thought upon divine revelation, especially the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ. This development which came to be known as Ethical Orthodoxy is of interest to the present study because it was with this movement that Chantepie was associated in his career as theologian. The movement can actually be traced to Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye, the father of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de La Saussaye known widely in the literature simply as La Saussaye, or Chantepie the elder, to distinguish his work from that of his son. Along with Scholten, La Saussaye is widely recognized as among the most important thinkers of Holland in the nineteenth century, and he is numbered among those who turned the minds of the intellectuals of Holland to the study of ethical problems.\(^{11}\)

While Chantepie the elder left behind him no system of theology and founded no school, he produced suggestive thoughts on almost

\(^{10}\) Vanderlaan, pp. 72–5.

\(^{11}\) James Hutton MacKay, Religious Thought in Holland, pp. 79, 85.
every Christian doctrine, and he gave to religious thought in Holland a distinctive *richting* or trend which has influenced it profoundly. In 1863 the Synod of the Dutch Church described this trend as Ethical-Mystical, a designation he willingly accepted. He stated that because we are rooted in God, it is appropriate to regard a kind of mysticism as our ground. He stated further, however, that what might be found objectionable in the word mystical “as if we were given over to visions and ecstasies,” is corrected by the word ethical, “which expresses the fixed laws to which the religious life is bound.” He held that the task of theology was to find intellectual form in which to express the faith and life of the Church. In particular, it was to relate the insights of the Protestant Reformation to the life of the Reformed Church in Holland in his time. Among his leading thoughts are the views (1) that the Church is a living body, and that the theology of the Church must therefore be a progressive science, (2) that the Church is bound to the revelation of God in certain facts of history in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and in the history of the people of Israel, not merely from the point of view of historical development but in the light of the principle of the Christian life, and (3) that the ethical principle is the fundamental principle of the life of the Church.

Ethical Orthodoxy can be distinguished from Ethical Modernism most clearly by its unequivocal acceptance of the Reformed doctrine of revelation, the affirmation that the Word of God is revealed to the Church from without or from above, and that this revelation is absolutely authoritative and sovereign. For Ethical Orthodoxy, theology must acknowledge faith as ultimately the gift of God; therefore it must begin from the Divine giver and not from the abstract ideas of speculative philosophy. This movement was criticized by many for the perceived incompatibility of its Christocentric theology with its critical views concerning the Gospel accounts. If, concerning the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ, we have no more

12. Ibid., p. 124.  
13. Ibid., pp. 86ff, 111.  
15. Ibid., pp. 220ff.  
16. Ibid., pp. 216f.
than popular tales, the sources of which are unknown, it is difficult to understand how we can affirm on the basis of such accounts that Jesus is Savior and Christ.\textsuperscript{17} This movement was also criticized for its emphasis on the personal element of religion and for its lack of conclusiveness in putting forth its position in doctrinal terms. None of the followers of the elder Chantepie produced a systematic theology. It is not unlikely, in fact, that a lack of conclusiveness on the part of Ethical Orthodoxy contributed significantly to the revival of strict Calvinism, especially as represented in the thought of Abraham Kuyper, that followed Ethical Orthodoxy and that came to dominate Dutch theology at the end of the century. Because of his response to the perceived weakness of Ethical Orthodoxy, because of the manner in which he incorporates the most influential features in the thought of Chantepie the elder, and because of the impact of his thought upon the life of the Church, the theology of Kuyper represents, perhaps more than any other theologian of the time, the theological climate that forms the background of the first effort towards a phenomenological approach to religion.

When Chantepie the younger declares that his effort is not theology, he disavows any claim that his undertaking is an effort to reconcile the Christian faith with the modern world-view, especially with modern knowledge of the religious life of humankind. It is not a modernist theology. It is not a representative of the ethical theology that opposed it or any of the theological ventures that sought to mediate the two. In particular it is not an effort, like the ethical theology of van Hamel or Bruining, to order the religious conceptions of humankind within a modernist or ethical theological framework. And it is not a representative of the revival of Calvinism that eventually overtook these movements. When Chantepie declares that his effort is not theology, he maintains that it is not a theological undertaking of any prevalent kind. It differs from theology in the object it studies, in its attitude towards this object, and in its perspective upon this object.

\textsuperscript{17. Ibid., pp. 218f.}
The Object of Theology as a Science and the Object of the Science of Religion

In order to distinguish between the object of theological inquiry and the object of Chantepie's phenomenology of religion, it is appropriate to focus attention upon a singular theological undertaking. The theology of Abraham Kuyper is relevant not simply because his theology gave systematic expression to that recovery of reformation thought to which the theology of Holland was proceeding, but because of the widespread influence of Kuyper's thought. Kuyper was not only a theologian, but the leader of a political party, the editor of that party's daily newspaper, founder of The Free University of Amsterdam, and a teacher of both lay people and theological students through a weekly religious journal. Writing in 1898, Benjamin Warfield refers to him as perhaps "the most considerable figure both in political and ecclesiastical Holland." From 1874, he had served as member of the lower house of parliament, and from 1901 to 1905, he was the nation's prime minister. 18 It is widely acknowledged that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the history of The Netherlands can hardly be written without the mention of Kuyper's name on almost every page. 19

Abraham Kuyper was schooled in the thought of Scholten and other moderns and later found both them and the mediating views of the Ethical Moderns and Ethical Orthodoxy to be wanting. Instead it was in the depth, the earnestness, and the beauty of the Reformed Confession, especially as he found it in the simple faith of the country folk of his first parish, that he found "that fullness of spiritual life" that satisfied his soul and later directed his thought. Reflecting upon this encounter, he says, "I discovered that Holy Scripture does not only cause us to find justification by faith, but also

discloses the foundation of all human life, the holy ordinances which must govern all human existence in Society and State." In terms of scope and methodology, Kuyper's theology is perhaps the most developed of all theological efforts of this period.

In light of Chantepie's concern to place the phenomenology of religion within the design of the general science of religion, it is significant that for Kuyper, too, theology was a scientific undertaking. It is fundamentally the knowledge of God. He argues that the essence of this science was present in the thought of Aquinas and that the same conception was implicit in Augustine who, though he used the word to refer to pagan rather than Christian conceptions of the divine, nevertheless understood what came appropriately to be called theology under his rubric of *Doctrina de Deo* or Christian Doctrine. For Kuyper, theology qualifies as science because it stands within the effort of human consciousness towards knowledge in the most embracive sense. The root idea of science is the impulse to know. The object of science is the entire realm of existing things as far human consciousness has discovered them. For Kuyper, science is "the pure and complete reflection of the cosmos in the Human consciousness." It is a comprehensive and organic whole, the parts of which are related one to another as the members of one body. In Kuyper's view, in fact, theology constitutes one of the principal members that comprise the organism of science. As a subject who understands himself in relation to God, thinking man distinguishes between that which relates to his inner or psychical, and outward or somatical, existence. He then distinguishes between his personal existence and his social life with others. In light of this division, five independent and yet organically connected objects present themselves to his thought: (1) his God, (2) his psychical existence, (3) his somatical existence, (4) his existence as a member of humanity, and (5) nature outside the community of human beings.

20. Ibid., p. vi.
22. Ibid., p. 237.
23. Ibid., pp. 63, 83, 211 ff.
24. Ibid., p. 39.
25. Ibid., pp. 211 ff.
26. Ibid., pp. 212 f.
This division corresponds, in Kuyper's view, to the five faculties which comprise the organism of science: the theological, the philosophical, the medical, the juridical, and the faculty of natural philosophy.

According to Chantepie, the conditions necessary for the advent of the science of religion emerged only within the recent past. In this light, it is significant that for Kuyper as well theology as an organic whole related to other members of the organism of science was born only in the nineteenth century. Constrained by its exceptional position as the science pertaining to God and by the hostility of the other sciences towards its claims, theology, he says, was the first to give itself an account of its place within the organon of science. Prior to this time, human consciousness had never felt the need for such an interpretation of theology's place and significance. Before this time, in fact, such a science was not even possible. The organic structure of theology and of its relation to the other sciences is not given with the knowledge of God as such but only as the knowledge of God is placed in relation to other members of the organism of science.27

As a science and as a branch of the organon of science in general, theology aims at as complete and accurate a knowledge of its object as it can achieve. Like other sciences, it is "born from the thirst after insight and clearness, and cannot rest so long as there is still a possibility of making the insight into its object more clear."28 Kuyper, in fact, is very critical of contemporary efforts towards theology that have compromised their commitment to the knowledge of God as the object of their inquiry and have substituted another. He thinks they have abandoned the scientific integrity of their study.29 Kuyper thinks that a compromise of this nature was made when in 1876 the faculties of theology in Dutch universities were converted to faculties of the so-called science of religion. He argues that from this time forward, scholars in this enterprise were no longer engaged with God but only with the phenomenon, religion.

27. Ibid., pp. 293 ff. 28. Ibid., p. 330. 29. Ibid., p. 213.
A-Theological Trait

With reference to the eternal Being everything had become problematic; the religious phenomenon was the only certain thing. There revealed itself in human nature and in history a mighty factor, which was known by the name of religion. It was possible to trace and to study the historic and ethnologic development of this factor; psychologically, also, an explanation of this religious phenomenon could be sought; and in this perhaps at length sufficient ground could be found to assume a general agent as cause of this phenomenon; but no venture could be made outside of this phenomenal circle.30

For Kuyper, the abandonment by such faculties of the term theology, and the substitution of the name, the science of religion, was only the consequence of the point of view which by then had been widely adopted. He regarded this viewpoint as atheistic because it was a refusal any longer "to recognize the living God, who has made Himself known to us as God." Resistance to the change in nomenclature, in his view, was simply the result of (1) the inherent conservatism of institutions that wished to call theology what has ceased to be Theology, (2) the widespread impression of the relative merit of the Christian religion, and (3) the continuing need to prepare students for ministry in the Christian Church.31

For Kuyper, religion and the knowledge of God are not the same, and it is in the knowledge of God alone that theology finds its object. "Religion can be interpreted as a sense, a service, or an obligation, but in none of these is it identical with the 'knowledge of God.'"32 He argues that the failure to grasp this fundamental difference accounts for the fact that, in the science of theology, religion had been put in the place of the original object.

Though still called by the name of theology, the entire subsequent development of theological study has actually substituted an utterly different object, has cut the historic tie that binds it to original theology, and has accomplished little else than the union of the sub-divisions of psychology and of historic ethnology into a new department of science, which does not

30. Ibid., p. 315. 31. Ibid., pp. 315 ff. 32. Ibid., p. 300.
lead to the knowledge of God, but aims at the knowledge of religion as a phenomenon in the life of humanity.33

Like other members of the organism of science, theology is regulated by a fundamental and distinctive principium. The principium of knowledge is the agent from which knowledge necessarily flows. In the case of theology, this principium is not Holy Scripture as such. It is the self-revelation of God to the sinner. From this principium, the data come forth in the Holy Scriptures, and from this alone, theology is developed. In Kuyper's view, it is unscientific to speak of theology even as more or less conservative circles do, as a "science of the Christian religion." He observes that there is no separate science of Parseeism, of Buddhism, of Israelitism, or of Islam. The investigator who takes one of these phenomena as such as the object of research cannot take it outside its relation to correlated phenomena. A religion observed in this manner can be the object of science only in a science that embraces these correlated phenomena as a whole. He states further that if I confess a revelation that admits of no correlates, a phenomenon of an entirely singular kind, that revelation might very well be the object of an independent science. But if I view the Christian religion as one among several religions, even though it is taken to be the highest of all religious developments, I am as unable to create an independent science of the Christian religion as the botanist is unable to create a special science of the cedar. If, instead, we assert that the Christian religion is distinguished from all other religious phenomena by a special revelation, its distinguishing element is not to be found in the religion, but in the revelation in question. For Kuyper, it is revelation, and not religion, that qualifies theology as science.

When Chantepie distinguishes his phenomenology of religion from theology, he distinguishes it explicitly in terms of the object that it seeks. The object that theology pursues differs, in Chantepie's view, from the object that is sought in the science of religion and thus in the phenomenology of religion as a component part of that science. Chantepie's phenomenology of religion has neither the

33. Ibid., p. 319.
knowledge of God as its object nor the self revelation of God to the sinner as the source of its data. The first condition which he lists for the emergence of the science of religion is the fact that religion has itself become the object of philosophical study and of such a study \textit{without taking revelation into account}. While Chantepie understands that the science of religion treats religion both according to its essence and its manifestations, it is appropriate to be reminded that Chantepie leaves the discussion of the essence of religion to the metaphysical part of the science of religion and assigns the exploration of religious consciousness to the psychology of religion. The purpose of his \textit{Lehrbuch} is to introduce the most important results of studies of religion, avoiding the question of the idea or essence of religion and the analysis of doctrine or religious consciousness. With this restriction, Chantepie purports to offer an outline of the most important of religious phenomena. His object embraces, as Kuyper had put it, the correlated phenomena as a whole. What he seeks as object are religious conceptions, religious sentiments, religious acts, cult, and customs.

When Chantepie distinguished his work from that of theology, it is evident then that he did not want it confused with an intellectual effort that, under the name of theology, simply substituted religion for the knowledge of God as the object of its study. Kuyper argues appropriately that, from the standpoint of the science of religion, knowledge of God and of man as a being over against God is inherently problematic. It remains an incontestable truth, he says, that "the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God" (I Cor. 2:11). Man is known by means of his phenomenal manifestation. We can observe his behavior and, by means of comparisons of various kinds, we can appropriate clues concerning his nature. But when God is the object of knowledge, all of this forsakes us. In the view of Kuyper, it is not unreasonable that in the light of its naturalistic approach, science has not hesitated to cancel theology as a discipline, that for instance the Free University at Brussels, as well as many universities in America, have left theology completely out of its catalog of studies. He states that we can understand also how those theologians who have broken with Special Revelation have
declared that they cannot investigate God but only religion. Kuyper states that no fault could have been found in this, had they only faced the consequence of this metamorphosis of the object, and had they, after dismantling the Theological faculty, transferred their study of religion to the Philological faculty, the faculty that treats the human creature in terms of his psychic existence. Chantepie faces this consequence. His understanding of the relation of theology to the science of religion and to the phenomenology of religion as a part of this science is remarkably compatible with that of Kuyper. Chantepie observes that some scholars wish to assign the science of religion a subordinate place within the *Encyclopedia of Theology* making it function as an introduction to the historical or systematic branch of theology. Chantepie rejects this arrangement out of hand. He argues that such an assignment would lead either to a kind of *Theologia gentilis*, an introductory branch of theology that does not share its peculiar object or path, or else “a modification of its dogmatic Locus de Religione,” a denial of the decisive importance of theology’s peculiar principium. He notes that others have sought to reconcile the two by distinguishing the whole of the science of religion, reinterpreted as a science of false gods, from theology, which has for its object only true religion. He rejects this arrangement as well. This, in Chantepie’s view, would force the science of religion into the arena of theology but only at the cost of its own object, which is religion in general. He observes, finally, that it is possible to view Christian theology as a subdivision of the science of religion and thus to make theology accountable to this emerging enterprise. It is Chantepie’s view that the arrangement of these sciences which subsumes theology within the general science of religion is correct in form. Theology, as a function of the Church and therefore of the Christian religion, represents a possible object of inquiry for the independent science of religion. He recognizes, however, that as such theology cannot participate in such a plan. Chantepie’s words here remind us of the concern of Kuyper, which he seems to have understood very well. “It cannot surrender, without self-destruction,” says

34. Ibid., pp. 214 f.  
Chantepie, “the character of its Biblical and ecclesiastical teachings.” Theology cannot be accountable to a science of religion and to a phenomenology of religion functioning within the framework of such a science that proceeds without taking revelation into account. Theology and the science of religion, he argues, “must follow, therefore, separate paths, and have separate objects in view.”36 For Chantepie no less than for Kuyper, this does not imply that the work of theology and that of the science of religion are necessarily incompatible. He states, in fact, that “if his work helps to convince theologians of the importance of the results of the Science of Religion,” his efforts will be richly rewarded.37

The Theological Attitude and the Attitude of the Science of Religion

Chantepie’s phenomenology of religion differs from theology, however, not only in the object it studies but in its attitude towards this object. More precisely, because of the peculiarity of the object of theological study, the attitude of the investigator differs as well. In the present century, the theologian Paul Tillich expressed this notion with the observation that the theologian looks upon the object of his study not with detached objectivity but with passion, fear, and love. It is a matter of being or not being for that person, a matter of ultimate concern.38 Kuyper points out that in other human efforts towards knowledge, the investigator is in control of the subject matter and of the investigation, whereas in theology he is not.

If the idea of Theology lies in the knowledge of God, an entirely peculiar character follows from this for all theology, which distinguishes it from all other knowledge or investigations of science. For in all other investigations the investigating subject places himself above the object to be investigated, is the active agent in the investigation, and directs his course in obedience to his own free judgment. . . . When the thirst for knowledge directs itself to him to whom man and all creation owe their origin, existence, and consciousness, the circumstances are materially changed. Then man stands no

36. Ibid., p. 10. 37. Ibid., p. vi.
longer above, but beneath the object of his investigation, and over against this object he finds himself in a position of entire dependence.\textsuperscript{39}

It follows from this, in the view of Kuyper, that theological investigation cannot be undertaken by just anyone who chooses to pursue it. Because of the sacred nature of object of study, the investigation requires a peculiar qualification in the subject. The attitude which the object requires of the investigator is the correlate of a commitment in faith and obedience to the object theology seeks. This, in the view of Kuyper, is the sense of the affirmation that “the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him” (\textit{1 Cor. 2:14}). For Kuyper there is an unbridgeable chasm between those who, by “palingenesis” or regeneration, are qualified for theological research and those who are not.

No intellectual relation is possible in the domain of this science, between those to whom this theology is “foolishness,” and the others to whom it is the “wisdom of God.” They only, who by virtue of palingenesis are partakers of spiritual illumination, have their eyes opened to see the object to be investigated. The others do not see it, or see it wrongly.\textsuperscript{40}

Moreover, the field of knowledge disclosed in theology cannot logically be coordinated with the other fields that are investigated even by the qualified understanding. As soon as this is done, theology is already emptied of its peculiar character; it no longer stands above the investigator as a reality to which he relates in an attitude of utter dependence. It becomes the object of a study in which the investigator is in active control. Now it can be interpreted, according to Kuyper, only as a part of metaphysics or as a part of that science whose object of investigation is the empirical phenomenon of religion.\textsuperscript{41} If theology is a knowledge that, instead of dealing with created things, illumines our minds with respect to the Creator and the “origin and end of all things,” then it follows that this knowledge must be of a different nature, and it must come to us in another way. “The normae that are valid for our knowledge elsewhere have no use here; the way of knowledge must here be another one, and the

\textsuperscript{39} Kuyper, \textit{Principles of Sacred Theology}, p. 248.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 338.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 239.
character itself of this knowledge must differ from all other science." In stating that his effort and that of theology must follow separate paths, Chantepie disavows the claim that it entails any relation of such dependence to the object of study, any attitude that correlates with this dependence or that the insight he achieves requires any special avenue of knowledge. Just as the attitude of objectivity and control in which the investigator is the active agent is inappropriate for theology, it is Chantepie’s view that the attitude of ultimate dependence would be inappropriate for the science of religion and for the phenomenology of religion.

From the fact that palingenesis divides humanity in two, it follows, in the view of Kuyper, that there is not one but two kinds of science. There is a kind of science pursued by the natural man and there is another which is the work of those who, by palingenesis, have been born anew. The two proceed from different starting points and find a different end in the scientific vision. For Kuyper, however, it does not follow from this that the two kinds of science must be in conflict at every turn of the road. He affirms, rather, that while there are two kinds of science, there remains but one logic, and he observes that for the present dispensation, at least, palingenesis works no change in the senses or in the conception of visible things. In the view of Kuyper, the distinction between these two kinds of science, as decisive as it is, does not affect the pursuit of science so far as it is concerns the entire empirical investigation of things perceptible to our senses. Kuyper thus finds a broad realm of investigation both in the natural and in what he calls the spiritual sciences in which the difference between the two exerts no influence. Here, “a broad realm of study opens itself, the results of which are benefits to both groups of thinkers, and thus to the two kinds of science.” By restricting his investigation to phenomena observed in the realm of historical and ethnographic data and in terms of their standing as facts of human consciousness, Chantepie limits his study to this broad field. Chantepie’s phenomenology of religion is dis-
tnguished from theology not only by the fact that its subject matter, religious acts, cult, customs, and so on cannot stand in the place that in theology is occupied by the knowledge of God but by the fact that the objects of ethnographic and historical research are not realities to which the investigator stands in an attitude of dependence. By restricting his research to data so conceived and by repudiating any systematic ordering or theoretic division of these data which does not correspond to the facts, Chantepie limits his expertise for the purposes of the phenomenology of religion to matters of finite, factual, and, therefore, a-theological concern. In Kuyper's terms he limits his research to those realms of science beneath which palenogenesis exercises control.

The Theological Perspective and the Perspective of the Phenomenology of Religion

When he distinguishes his research from that of theology, Chantepie means more, however, than that he does not adorn his effort with the theological name. In stating that his effort is not theology, he not only acknowledges that his effort does not qualify as theological investigation but that he does not intend to examine the data in question from the viewpoint of a theological inquiry. Theology entails not only a special object and a special attitude towards that object; it also entails a distinctive perspective upon the object of investigation, upon the religious tradition through which that object is known, and ultimately upon the world. Kuyper states that if critical research into the self-revelation of the Eternal Being is the focus of theology, it does not follow that the scope of theological investigation is restricted to God and to his nature. Such investigation extends also to his attributes, activities, and creations. In the view of Kuyper, the science of theology includes the theological investigation of nature, of history, and of man as a being created after the image of God.46

Because theology includes the study of history and of man, it follows that the same phenomena that constitute the subject matter of

46. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p. 331.
the science of religion will also enter the purview of theological investigation. In this way theology examines both the Christian religion and other religious traditions. But it does so from a theological perspective. Kuyper observes that it is common in our time to seek the tie which unites the higher life of pagan nations to our own, in religion. It is presumed that religion in this general sense is present in almost all the nations. Affinities are observed among the differing religions, but also a gradual difference. It is thought that a process is perceptible and that by means of this many-sided process the Christian religion can be brought into relation to these presumably lower forms. To such currents of thought, Kuyper presents a frank reply: “We do not take this way, because religion and the knowledge of God are not the same, and it is in the latter that Theology finds its only point of departure.” His commitment to the knowledge of God as the subject matter of theology entails a specific approach to other religious traditions. For Kuyper, it is not in the phenomenon of religion that the link is to be found that relates Christianity to other forms of religion but in that branch of theology which reveals the origin of religion itself.

This compels us to seek the tie that binds us to pagan nations, not in the phenomenal side of their religious life-expressions, but, along with Scripture in natural Theology; which at the same time offers this advantage, not to be despised, that we need not confine ourselves to the national forms of ritual, but can also deal with the theology which, outside of these rituals, can be observed in their mysteries and in their poets and philosophers.47

Christian theology does not confine itself to the study of true religion. It must also deal with false theology in paganism. It does this, he says, not for the sake of making obvious the monstrosity of pagan representations but rather to show “that this paganism also is born of natural theology,” and to discover “the law which this false development has obeyed.”48 In Kuyper’s view it is true that “even the most repulsive idolatry stands in organic relation to the purest revelation.” The purest confession of truth, he says, ultimately has its origin in what Calvin calls the seed of religion (semen religionis),

47. Ibid., pp. 300f. 48. Ibid., p. 305.
which, thanks to common grace, is present still in the fallen sinner. He also states, as Calvin further taught, that there is no form of idolatry so low or so corrupted but it has sprung from this same source. “Without natural Theology there is no Abba, Father, conceivable, any more than a Moloch ritual.”

In saying this, Kuyper explicitly acknowledges that on the question of a relation of Christian religion to other forms of religious life, he is in agreement with the science of religion but that he differs from the science of religion “when it tries to fill in the interval between this Abba, Father, and the Moloch ritual with the undulations of a gradually advancing process.” Here he finds no transition or gradual development but only “an antithesis between the positive and the negative working of the same power.” In the light of natural theology as Kuyper interprets it, idolatry is not the outcome of the imagination nor of factors in the human consciousness that develop according to a gradual process. It is rather an “actuosa privatio of the natural knowledge of God.” In the idolater both the motive and the content of this natural theology are turned into their opposites. It is the same wheel as we find in Christian religion, turning itself on the same pivot, but turning now in an averse direction.

The Christian Religion and Paganism do not stand related to each other as the higher and lower forms of development of the same thing; but the Christian religion is the highest form of development natural theology was capable of along the positive line; while all paganism is a development of that selfsame natural theology in the negative direction. Christendom and Paganism stand to each other as the plus and minus forms of the same series.

It does not follow from this, however, that Kuyper finds no process of development whatever in the phenomena he observes. Natural theology does indeed perceive a developmental process in the religious life of man, only it is a twofold development.

From the times of Abraham the lines of true and false theology separate. . . . And from this point we have on the one hand a development of true theology, which reaches potentially its acme in Christ, and the other

49. Ibid., p. 301. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., p. 302.
hand also a deterioration of false theology, which in a negative sense must likewise run its course to the end.  

At the historical juncture where these traditions separate, a twofold process begins. The one leads to an even richer revelation of that which is holy, the other to an even more repulsive exhibition of the demonic in sin. Kuyper holds, however, that the condition of man and his world are not precisely what they would have been had sin completely accomplished its purpose. By the work of common grace, knowledge of God remains possible, either by way of tradition or as the result of personal insight. And Kuyper finds compelling examples of this in the midst of paganism, in its mysteries as well as among its philosophers and poets.

In the light of this perspective, Kuyper's natural theology generates interpretations both of the Christian religion and of other religious traditions that stand in stark contrast to those that are the objective of Chantepie's phenomenology of religion. He believes it is because of the special principium of the Christian religion, the self-revelation of God to sinners, that humanity has ascended to its present cultural standing and that where the Christian religion has withdrawn, human life has sunk back to a much lower level. He holds that the fellowship of believers which the Christian religion has engendered, and which must be distinguished from the institutional church, exhibits a universal character. It extends itself to all peoples and nations and continues its life in successive generations. Christ, he says, humanized his confession, breaking down every partitioning wall. Every effort towards such community outside of this principium has led, in his view, only to national forms of religion:

Even Buddhism—which, by the chameleon character of its pantheism, lent itself to stealthy invasions among many nations—remains in principle, nevertheless, an Indian world of thought. Islam alone—and this is worthy of notice—still exhibits, to a certain extent, an oecumenic character, which is attributable to the fact that Mohammedanism is grafted upon the special principium, such as it flourished, thanks to the Scripture of the Christian

52. Ibid., pp. 303 f. 53. Ibid., p. 302. 54. Ibid., pp. 394 f. 55. Ibid., pp. 394 ff.
life-circle. Even thus Islam has never taken root in the finer branches of the human tree. Islam is and remains Arabic, and outside of Arabia has gained an entrance only among those nations which either have taken no part in the general human development, or have stood at a much lower level. [1]56

Kuyper's appraisal of Islam is perhaps the most disturbing of all the interpretations he offers:

Islam is not merely pagan, nor is it merely heretical, but both together, and hence it occupies an entirely peculiar place among the deteriorations of true theology, in which it now stands alone, simply because Manichaeism, Gnosticism, etc., as religious societies, have passed away.57

He argues that when the antithesis between true and false theology is sharply seen, it becomes evident that the true must have preceded the false and that idolatry can be nothing other than deterioration of the true. He holds that if there is any merit in the Islamic tradition, it is because of elements of the original within it that still remain.

*The Phenomenological Perspective through the Evasion of the Theological*

In stating that theology and the science of religion must follow separate paths and have differing objects in view, Chantepie indicates that he considers the theological perspective inappropriate to the work of the science of religion and of the phenomenology of religion. It is a perspective which, for the purpose of this investigation, he wishes to avoid. To say this, however, is evidently not to say that Chantepie has no regard for the object of theological investigation or that he is himself without theological commitment. Chantepie, in fact, was a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church and spent most of his career on a theological faculty.58 This raises the question of how, in the case of an investigator who is committed to the Christian religion, an a-theological perspective upon the phe-

56. Ibid., p. 394.  
57. Ibid., p. 306.  
nomena can be maintained, whether in the final analysis it can be anything more than a pretense. In theology we assume, says Kuyper, "that the reality of sin is acknowledged, that the darkening of our knowledge of God by sin is confessed, so that without a special revelation no sufficient knowledge of God for the sinner is deemed obtainable." The principium that stands at the heart of theological investigation is apparently not an accessory that can be detached for the purpose of altering one's perspective. Chantepie has addressed an aspect of the problem by restricting his research to matters of observation where palingenesis has no direct affect. The question emerges again, however, when the phenomena under observation belong to the religion of the investigator himself. To what extent is it possible to restrict one's examination to matters of observation among visible things when the phenomena in question pertain to that upon which he stands in a relationship of ultimate dependence? How does one deal phenomenologically with data which are already integrated within a cognitive framework determined by one's ultimate concern? From the discussion above, it is clear how the science of theology, at least as Kuyper conceives of it, deals with the subject matter of the science of religion. The question then arises how within the purview of the phenomenology of religion, one who belongs to the Christian faith can hope to deal with it any differently and, in particular, can deal any differently with data arising from the Christian religion. The perspective upon the world that the religious commitment entails seems hardly to be one that could be left out of account when the phenomena one encounters among the historical data happens to pertain to religion or happens to express the content of one's own religious faith.

The question presents perhaps the most significant challenge that can be directed to a phenomenological approach to religion. One possible response to the problem is simply to argue that any formulation of theology is provisional and that the judgements, for instance, of Kuyper concerning other religious need not be taken as final. It could be argued theologically that they are subject to revi-

59. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p. 349.
ision. Chantepie, however, seems not to be concerned with any such revision of theology. Rather, he tacitly concedes such judgements to the arena of theological investigation. His claim is that theology and the science of religion must follow different forms of treatment altogether and have different objects in view.

In the strategy he deploys, Chantepie claims neither to compromise his theological commitments nor to revise the theological understanding of the religious behavior of man. He attempts rigorously to maintain a focus upon the observation of visible things among ethnographic and historical facts and upon nothing that does not arise from the facts. Chantepie rejects, for instance, the notion that the universality of bloody sacrifices proves the universality of a consciousness of sin among men, and he rejects the effort to derive the origin of religion historically from a primeval revelation of God. Yet in addition to this, his work reveals a further strategy that is consistently applied. He invariably excludes from his investigation the phenomenological description of data that are for him the vehicle of theological meaning. We will illustrate this by looking at his discussion of mantic as this pertains to the theological notion of Christian revelation and by looking at his discussion of sacrifice as this pertains to the theological rubric of the atonement of Christ.

This statement does not mean that Chantepie's phenomenology contains no discussion of any phenomena that can be observed within the Christian tradition. Obviously he finds examples of

60. Chantepie, pp. 147, 33f. It is interesting that in addressing this issue Chantepie invokes the view of Schelling that if religion were to be derived from a historical communication from God, man before that revelation can only be conceived as existing without religion. This raises the question of how man in an original state of atheism could have received such a revelation. Chantepie, however, does not find Schelling's views altogether satisfying. That religion must have arisen either from the nature of man or from an act of God presupposes that there are only two possibilities and that they are mutually exclusive. Chantepie's alternative at first appears theological, yet it is clear that it is an attempt to avoid either of these limiting interpretations: "To us, on the contrary, religion seems to spring from the very essence of man, but under influences and circumstances wherein the activity of God is manifest, even though we cannot determine the form and the conditions under which this activity showed itself."
magic, divination, priesthood, sacred stones, etc. in the history of Christianity just as he finds them elsewhere. And he recognizes that many popular customs at Christmas, Easter, and so on owe their origins to elements of pre-Christian religions.\textsuperscript{61} What he chooses to avoid is the discussion of data which for him are matters of theological significance. Chantepie observes, for instance, that mantic or divination is closely connected with magic. He observes that whenever magic flourishes, divination is also prevalent, although the reverse is not always so. Under the rubric of mantic, he includes such phenomena as tests of innocence or guilt by means of fire and water—rituals that not only are widely spread among “savage” nations but were employed in Christianity at the time of the witch trials. He includes such interpretations of signs as having an official place in the cult of several “civilized” nations. Rejecting Cicero’s distinction between “artificial” and “natural” mantic, Chantepie describes this phenomenon under the heading of “external” and “internal” types. External mantic, according to this distinction, is occupied with the reading of signs. It includes such phenomena as astrology the interpretation of the behavior and sounds of certain birds which are regarded as sacred, the examination of the entrails of sacrificial animals, the observation and interpretation of lightning, and soothsaying by means of small stones or dice or by the casual opening of a books such as, for example, the Bible. Internal mantic appears, according to Chantepie, “when a man himself, without any external signs that have to be interpreted, becomes the organ of a clairvoyant or prophetic spirit, by which he is possessed or inspired.”\textsuperscript{62} The phenomenon may be transitory (so that the man temporarily loses himself and his own consciousness) or permanent (in which case his own “spiritual organs” are intensified and sharpened by that spirit). Within this type of mantic, Chantepie includes the reading of dreams, the communication with the dead, and what for him cannot but be the “highest” form of divination to which he does not assign a name: “that by which the man himself becomes a seer, able to see what is hidden, to discover the divine, and to reveal

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 172.  \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 140.
the secret."\(^6^3\) He observes that this power is often ascribed to men at the hour of their death and is thought to be possessed by certain gifted persons or persons especially favored by the gods. For Chantepie, moreover, the "highest" manifestation of internal mantic is the Israelitic prophets in whom, in a sense, the internal mantic and the external mantic coincide. It is his understanding that in this case "the whole history of the world and the fates of their own nation are the signs which they interpret, because they comprehend them with the help of the divine spirit which inspires them."\(^6^4\)

With the Hebrew prophets, Chantepie is no longer describing accidental cases of divination that happen to appear, among other places, within the Judeo-Christian tradition. With this topic, he approaches a subject of crucial significance for Christian faith. The divination practiced in the witch trials of the Christian past are, for Chantepie, not matters of ultimate significance; the visions of the Hebrew prophets quite probably are. And this he can hardly treat with the same objectivity that he deals with other phenomena. Chantepie then draws a sharp distinction between any sort of mantic and what for him, however similar in form, is a category incomparable to any others. He ends his discussion of mantic with the cryptic statement that "where the concept of mantic touches that of revelation our survey must end."\(^6^5\)

Chantepie's discussion of sacrifice gives a lengthy and detailed account of the sorts of objects used in sacrifice in various parts of the world and at various periods of history. It discusses the times and seasons for sacrifice, the manner in which they are performed, and the possible motivations that stood behind such acts. In this discussion, Chantepie readily interprets the offering of flowers and incense found before images and relics in Buddhist communities as "a miserable remnant of sacrifice." And he compares the rite of circumcision practiced in Judaism today with the mutilations practiced in ancient times in the service of the goddess of Asia Minor, the practice of the sacrifice of a finger among the Arabs, and the bloody

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 141.  \(^{64}\) Ibid.  \(^{65}\) Ibid.
scourging received by youths in Sparta before the altar of Artemis. When it comes to the question of sacrifice in Christianity, however, Chantepie takes another tack. He recognizes that Christianity has often represented the redeeming death of Christ in sacrificial terms and that “in the Roman Catholic church the ceremony recalling this act, namely the mass, is therefore considered as a sacrificial act.” Chantepie, however, refuses to discuss this phenomenon as an example of sacrifice. He argues that in Christianity the term is taken in only a “symbolic” way, and in a sense “utterly different from that assigned to it by ancient religions.”

The a-theological trait in Chantepie’s phenomenology of religion expresses itself in the effort to distinguish the object of his inquiry from the object which is sought in theological researches like those of Kuyper. It is also expressed in the effort to distinguish the path upon which this knowledge is sought from the path of theological inquiry. The a-theological trait is further expressed in Chantepie’s effort to distinguish the theological disposition towards the object of its inquiry from the attitude that is deemed appropriate to phenomenological study. He guards against the encroachment of a theological agenda upon his research by restricting his observations to religious objects and thus to matters which, for him, are of specifically preliminary and, therefore, a-theological concern. He maintains an a-theological perspective upon these data by means of an evasion of those phenomena which, for him and for the Christian religion, carry a theological charge. The strategy is not altogether effective. While he evades such theological categories as revelation or the atonement, his theological commitments continue, nevertheless, to affect his view of other phenomena, especially those that in his descriptions anticipate the theological. It seems impossible for Chantepie to describe the visions of the Hebrew prophets as anything but the “highest form of mantic” and the sacrificial offerings to the Buddha as but “a miserable remnant.” The question also remains whether, in rejecting the theological explanation of the origin of religion, he has either revised or compromised, or whether he has

66. Ibid., p. 150.
simply neglected the fundamental commitments of reformation theology. Finally, the evasion of those phenomena that manifest theological meaning seems to place an uneven emphasis upon religious data that, from a theological standpoint, appear distant from the Christian tradition. His implementation of measures to maintain an a-theological perspective reveals an awareness of some of the methodological problems entailed in this approach to the study of religion. His effort toward a solution raises further questions which are left to such scholars as Kristensen and van der Leeuw to try to resolve.
The Anti-Reductive Trait in the Phenomenology
of Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye

Reductionism and the Science of Religion

In Chantepie's view, the phenomenology of religion stands within an emerging general science of religion. Yet it is a special part of this science with a special significance. It is perhaps in the response of the phenomenology of religion to other approaches that also claim a place within the science of religion that the self-awareness of the phenomenology of religion is most clearly seen. In particular, it is in the response to several other efforts toward scientific approaches to religion that the anti-reductionistic trait of phenomenological approaches to religion is evident. In order to understand the significance of this polemic by the phenomenology of religion, it is useful to examine the context in which the science of religion began to take shape.

According to Chantepie, the science of religion was founded by the pioneering work of Max Müller and the group of scholars by whom he was surrounded. Yet if Müller was the founder of this development, his effort along this line was evidently not the first. As early as 1789, G. E. Lessing had undertaken an ambitious study in which every religion of man was viewed as a form of revelation which had occurred in harmony with the period in which it had taken place. Likewise J. G. Herder, in his Ideas Concerning the Philosophy

of the History of Mankind (1784–91) and in The Earliest Documents of the Human Race (1774–76), had developed important ideas about the nature of religion and about what he believed were the appropriate methods of its study. For him, religion is the awareness of God's activity in creation. In order to understand religion, it was necessary to enter into the soul of those in whom this awareness was originally born. This interest led him to the study of nature wisdom among the Greeks, Phoenicians, and Indians in which he thought he saw an esoteric knowledge which rational concepts were inadequate to convey.  

These studies had been undertaken in the spirit of the Age of Romanticism, an age in which feeling, intuition, and imagination had become the pillars of intellectual life. For this way of thought, as Cassirer has put it, “there could be no sharp difference between myth and reality; just as little as there was any separation between poetry and truth.”  

What was new with Müller was an approach to religion and related subjects which departed radically from the Romantics.

It was in a spirit dominated by romantic ideas that Western Europe awoke to the world of Indian and Near Eastern antiquities. The first English translation of the Bhagavad Gita appeared in 1785, the Dharmaashastras in 1794. Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt had uncovered the Rosetta Stone in 1799, which by 1822 had been deciphered. In 1802 there appeared in Latin an edition of fifty Upanishads. The romantic spirit and the discovery of such new materials were a volatile combination. And the explosion of ideas that followed their meeting produced a profusion of theories about religion and mythology that often outreached the scholarship upon which they stood. In a work published in 1810, Georg Friedrick Creuzer found in the mytholog-

---


ical literature of the Greeks the mysterious “revelation” given to the parents of Western civilization. From Herodotus he had learned that the earliest Greeks knew none of the gods by their names. In his work, *The Symbolism and Mythology of the Ancient Peoples, Especially the Greeks*, he attempted to determine how the rich mythology of Homer and Hesiod could have been given shape by a culture so ignorant in matters religious. Creuzer’s theory was that between the earliest period of Greek history, a period of innocent and speechless veneration of nameless powers, and the age of its later mythological traditions, there intervened a time in which missionary priests from the Orient conveyed a profound wisdom and a monotheistic faith to the prehistoric people of Greece. Owing to the poverty of language and thought of the earliest Greeks, the message of the missionaries could be communicated only by indirect means, by means of sign and symbol. According to Creuzer, however, the means used by these priests of Oriental antiquity was not arbitrary; it was the divine reality itself that determined the symbols by which it was revealed—Goethe’s “poetic veil from the hand of truth.” Through the study of symbolism, according to Creuzer, not only do we come to understand the civilization of the ancients but we have access to expressions of divine reality. By tracing elements of the esoteric teaching that were communicated to the Greeks in ancient times, Creuzer hoped to apprehend the primeval wisdom that constitutes the spiritual unity of humankind.

For a number of his ideas, Creuzer was dependent upon the views of Schelling, whose lectures on myth, as Cassirer has put it, “was a synthesis of philosophy, history, myth, poetry, such as has never appeared before.” For Schelling, myth is neither fabrication nor the invention of priests. It is a reality of its own order which defines the inmost essence of the human spirit. It is the source of both art and philosophy. In the course of history, it merges with the rational process and culminates with it in intellectual intuition. According to

7. For a fuller discussion of Schelling’s view of religion, see: Paul Tillich, *The
him, Greek mythology in particular represents the perfect harmony of all the elements in the mythological process. The Greek gods, he says, "arise out of consciousness... as a class of blessed visions and apparitions." They represent "necessary, eternal and abiding, rather than merely transient moments." They are for art what ideas are for philosophy: the objects of natural intuition.

In some important respects Müller was a child of this tradition. He was the son of a romantic poet, and as a student in Berlin in 1844, it was with Schelling that he first studied mythology and became interested in India. But as the following statement suggests, he did not remain such a child:

The early history of the human race which in former centuries was written chiefly by poets or philosophers, has now been taken up in good earnest by men who care for the facts, and for facts only, and who, if they cannot reveal to us the very beginnings of human life and human thought, have succeeded at least in opening broad views into the distant past, hitherto impenetrable.

To the theories generated by the exposure of Romantic philosophy to the world of the "Aryan" past, Müller had a two-fold response. On the one hand he laid great emphasis upon the gathering and study of the original sources. To this, his labor of over twenty-five years on the Sacred Books of the East bears striking witness. On the other hand, he explicitly rejected the characteristic romantic vision


8. Quoted by Tillich, Ibid., p. 88.

9. Max Müller, Chips from a German Workshop, vol. 3. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), pp. 358 f. See also Max Müller, Contributions to the Science of Mythology (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1897), p. 2. The influence of the Romantics upon Müller can be seen in such things as his conviction that the ancient Greeks and Indians "form an integral part of the humanity to which we ourselves belong," that human language "forms an uninterrupted chain from the first dawn of history down to our own times," and in his view of earliest man who "rises before us noble and pure from the very beginning" endowed with "the gift of a sound and sober intellect." (Ibid., p. 67; see also Müller, Chips, 2:7.)

of mythology as an expression of the human spirit. This is expressed no more clearly than in his assessment of Schelling's *Philosophy of Mythology*, which had been published posthumously in 1854:

With all due respect for his great name, . . . we must say, as critics, that his facts and theories defy all rules of sound scholarship, and that his language is so diffuse and vague, as to be unworthy of the century we live in.¹¹

For the study of religion to be scientific, according to Müller, it must be erected upon the foundation of a positive science. He believed that such a foundation had been provided by the newly emerging science of comparative philology. As a student in Berlin, Müller had listened not only to the lectures of Schelling but also to those of Franz Bopp whose demonstration in 1816 of the correspondence between Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Persian, and Germanic languages had raised the hypothesis that these languages had all descended from an earlier mother tongue.¹² That these were related as French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese stand together as modern dialects of Latin, was for Müller, the discovery that opened the door to ancient times.¹³ Following his studies at Berlin, Müller also heard the lectures of Eugene Burnouf at the College de France where he was persuaded by “the ingenious combinations by which that eminent scholar arrived at his marvelous discoveries in comparing the myths of the Rig-Veda with those of the Avesta, showing by irresistible arguments the transition of mythological characters in these sacred books into the epic and pseudo-historical figures of the Shâhrâ-meh.”¹⁴ With these discoveries, he felt there could be built a science of mythology and a science of religion which would “rest on a foundation as sound and safe as that of any of the inductive sciences.”¹⁵

There is nothing inherently reductive, as we are using the term,

¹¹. Ibid., p. 144. Müller also states that Creuzer's work was inadequate because it was written before the principal Sanskrit sources had been discovered by European scholars. He further notes that Creuzer was not a Sanskrit scholar. (Ibid., 1:277.)


¹⁴. Ibid.

in the effort to study religion in a scientific way; yet Müller's preoccupation exclusively with the facts seems to be rooted in a disposition that greatly affects the questions with which he approaches the data. While for Schelling, the mythology of the Greeks presents "a class of blessed visions and apparitions," for Müller, the most outstanding feature of this body of material is its stark irrationality. Thus while Creuzer and his school seek, as Müller observes, to interpret a mysterious wisdom "veiled under the symbolic language of mythology," Müller seeks to know "how these so-called gods came to exist at all," how the mind of man could create things which it "could never have witnessed, nay which, without some provocation, no human brain could have conceived, even in Bedlam.\[\!\]\] While the Romantics sought to interpret such myth, Müller sought an explanation. His treatment of mythology represents a key example of reductionism as we are using the term. In the course of Müller's treatment, the content of mythology is relieved of the status of a distinctive object of inquiry. Mythology is but a "childhood disease," inevitable in the development of language. What it seems to portray is but the effect of language upon thought. In the light of his research, Müller hopes that "the mist of mythology will gradually clear away and enable us to discover behind the floating clouds of the dawn of thought and language, that real nature which mythology has so long veiled and disguised" (emphasis mine).\[\!\] With Müller we might say, mythology is "explained" in the literal sense of being made level. He thinks, in fact, that in recent work, "the very Hippokentaurs and the Cheimaera, the Gorgons and Pegasos, and other monstrous creatures, have apparently been set right."\[\!\] They are "masks without an actor,—the creation of man, not his creators; they are nomina, not numina; names without being, not beings without names."\[\!\] With this recent work, the monsters and their incestuous and adulterous behavior have been dispelled. (The literal meaning of the word "dispelled" is driven away). We might almost say they have been dis-

16. Müller, Contributions, pp. 67, 72.
17. Ibid., p. 53.
18. Ibid., p. 139. (The spelling is Müller's.)
19. Ibid., p. 76.
speaked. They no longer have a spell upon us. As opposed to this, the phenomenology of religion desires not to explain but to understand—literally to stand among those under that spell. It desires to see those beings through their eyes.

If Müller can be called the founder of the science of mythology and religion, he is that perhaps most clearly in his effort to erect a study of specific mythological and religious data upon the foundation of a presumably positive science. Surveying the history of the study of religion since Müller, it is clear that his effort did not prevail. Today one looks in vain for a self-consistent, integrated science of mythology or of religion (analogous, say, to any of the natural sciences) erected upon the foundation of comparative philology to which a cumulative tradition of scholarship has contributed its results. What followed the work of Müller was a succession of efforts, each attempting to erect a study of religion upon yet another putatively scientific foundation. The response of exponents of the phenomenology of religion not simply to Müller’s approach to mythology but to explanations of religious phenomena by Spencer, Tylor, Durkheim, Feuerbach, Freud, and others is the clear and consistent expression of an anti-reductive trait.

In the case of Chantepie, this trait, like the a-historical trait and the a-theological trait, is not yet fully developed. Nevertheless it is visible and significant. Although he does not develop this concern as a consistent and reasoned polemic, his response to various insights of the science of religion indicates that he is as opposed to reductionism as he is to developmental theories of religion and to the encroachment of a theological agenda upon his research.

**The Measure of the Object of Chantepie’s Inquiry**

The first place in which the term phenomenology appears in the context of the study of religion is not a treatise on the phenomenology of religion as such but a handbook (*Lehrbuch*) on the science of religion. The author’s purpose in this work was not to produce an encyclopedia of the subject but a “manual” which might present in readable shape the present state of the science of religion and distinguish between the safely established results of this science and
those questions which are as yet unsettled. Nevertheless what is regarded as established depends largely upon the viewpoint of the person observing the results. It is perhaps in his distinction between the established results and the yet unsettled questions that Chantepie's own sensitivity to reductionism is most often expressed. In this way the aspects of an anti-reductive concern appear in his discussion of almost every religious phenomenon he explores. Our present purpose in not to evaluate his complaint against each of the theories he mentions but to observe the pervasiveness within Chantepie's work of the concern which they express.

To begin with, Chantepie finds it difficult even to define the object of religion. In his exploration, he finds ritual acts which bear no relation to any kind of object and religious ideas, which are manifested by no actions of any kind. In many cases a religious object is the focus of ritual acts. In others the religious object is eclipsed by the ritual act and the religious practice. While belief in God or in some sort of divine being might appear central to religion of any kind, he knows of cases in which the success of prayers to the gods depends not upon them at all but upon the formulas recited and the acts performed. Chantepie continually rejects theories that fail to recognize the breadth of the phenomena with which they deal. He is critical of the theories that restrict their gaze to narrow aspects of the phenomena, contending that they explain only part of a larger whole.

When Chantepie discusses idolatry, he points out that to understand its nature it is necessary first to understand what an idol is. As we noted above, he observes that explanations of this phenomenon have been based either on the view that the idol represents a divine being or on the view that a divine power dwells within it. For Chantepie the whole truth is in neither position. He observes that for some peoples there is no distinction between the visible image (idol) and the reality it represents. For others the distinction is absolute. Each theory is based on information in which it finds support. For Chantepie the most apparent feature of idolatry is its manifold

nature. This requires that the opposing views be combined. In his discussion of litholatry, he observes that some scholars have derived the worship of stones from the respect paid to boundary stones; some others derive it from the resemblance of the stone to a mountain on which a god was worshipped. Some scholars relate it to the ability of some stones to produce fire or to the impressions and marks on stones which achieve symbolic significance, and still others derive it from the veneration of phallic stones and thus exclusively from fertility cults. It is Chantepie’s view that in each of these ideas a measure of truth can be found; yet a complete explanation can be found in none. Similarly, in discussing the worship of trees, he notes that explanations have been offered both by animistic and symbolic theories. For Chantepie the question whether trees and plants have been venerated as religious symbols of the creative power of God or as the actual seat of life presents the same problem. Each explanation, he thinks, “accords with certain phenomena for which the other could only account in a forced way.” In his discussion of animal worship, he acknowledges that an important step was taken toward the interpretation of animal worship among the Egyptians when De Brosses undertook to compare this phenomenon with the worship of animals among other peoples. Yet he also points out that the resulting “fetish theory” is unable to explain all aspects of this practice as it occurs in Egypt, and he thinks it is wrong to accept a common origin and a single explanation for all the forms of animal worship. He thinks the circumstances justify him in accepting “various explanations for the various groups of phenomena.”

The examples above suggest that, for Chantepie, religious phenomena are phenomena of more breadth and manifold character than the dominant theories allow. The same applies to a number of explanations for the origin of religion. When Chantepie rejects the view that religion might have sprung from the cunning deception of priests and rulers, he comments only that, if anything, it is more likely that religion made the priests. He dismisses without criticism

---

22. Ibid., p. 76. 23. Ibid., p. 88.
24. Ibid., p. 89. 25. Ibid., pp. 94f.
26. Ibid., pp. 31 f., 175.
the view that regards religion as a madness, "a pathological phe-
nomena, closely connected with neuroses and hysteria."27 Against
the opinion that it is the product of the state, Chantepie argues that
religion would seem more likely to be the cause of the state than the
effect, since the cult seems to be "the most important part of the
organization of human society."28 He is especially critical of psycho-
logical explanations which derive religion from a single faculty or
sentiment, whether this be in an essentially intellectual need like
the "pressure of causality" or in the simple emotion of fear. For
Chantepie no psychological explanation can suffice for the problem
as a whole, "for religion is impossible except for the simultaneous
working of subjective and objective elements."29

The same concern of Chantepie is expressed in his discussion of
the divisions of religion. Chantepie joins with Müller in a condem-
nation of a number of morphological classifications of religion which
he feels cannot do justice to the subject. While he thinks that "ge-
nealogical classifications" which are based upon the comparison of
languages have borne ample fruit, he finds "morphological classifi-
cations" to be based upon prejudiced judgements for determining the
religious sphere. The division of religion into true and false classes,
says Chantepie, "hardly deserves to be mentioned."30 The division
between natural and "revealed" religion is untenable "because a nat-
ural religion as an empty abstraction, without historic reality, and
because it is impossible to fix the boundaries between the sphere of
revelation and that of nature."31 The division into "grown" and
"founded" religions is unsatisfactory, in Chantepie's judgement, be-
cause we have no idea how many founders might have contributed
to the religions that grew up spontaneously and how much common
property of the people is reflected in the labors of the so-called found-
ers. Finally, the division into monotheistic and polytheistic types is
incomplete because it puts together what is heterogeneous and leaves
out enormous classes: the dualistic, the henotheistic, and the athe-
istic religions. Chantepie himself does not advance an effort toward

27. Ibid., p. 31.
28. Ibid., pp. 187f.
29. Ibid., p. 31.
30. Ibid., p. 53.
31. Ibid.
an adequate division of religion; but he believes that if and when it is to be formulated, "a really scientific classification must be based on essential characteristics of the religious process."  

The Distinctive Quality of the Object of Chantepie's Inquiry

Against the narrowing tendency of various theories, Chantepie continually emphasized the breadth and manifold character of religious phenomena and of religion. The concern which this emphasis suggests is further expressed in Chantepie's effort to differentiate religion from other intellectual and cultural activity. To say that a division of religion should be based on "essential characteristics" of the religious process is to suggest not simply that religious phenomena are broad or manifold but that they possess qualities or aspects that are in some way distinctive. This concern is especially clear in his discussion of the relation of philosophy and morality to religion.

Chantepie recognizes that the philosophical systems of individual thinkers often possess a religious character and that thinkers from Plato to Hegel claimed a religious significance for their work. He understands that the religion of civilized nations have all developed a didactic character and that at a certain stage religions have attempted to base and develop their doctrine philosophically. He knows that in many cases the division between theology and philosophy is difficult to draw, that many of the subjects that belong to philosophy—cosmology, psychology, ethics—are shared by religion, that religion often provides the material upon which philosophy reflects, and that in certain cases philosophy was even itself a means to salvation. Chantepie finds strong reasons to argue, however, that religion cannot be adequately understood when treated under the rubric of philosophy. While he believes that religious acts are preceded by some sort of thought, he does not equate this thought with philosophical endeavor. He observes, moreover, that many religious doctrines originate in the attempt to explain a religious act, and he thinks that both the religious act and the religious doctrine

32. Ibid., p. 51.
33. Ibid., p. 232.
34. Ibid., pp. 200f., 233.
are preceded by "religious impressions, sentiments, and states." He also observes that it is among nations standing on a "higher stage" of civilization, the "historical nations in the proper sense of the word," that doctrines mainly appear. Thus to reduce religion to doctrine is to eliminate phenomena that may be more original and which, among many nations, are the only mirror that reflects the principal religious ideas and sentiments. Chantepie thinks it mistaken to regard religion simply as popular philosophy, a popular explanation of the world. In religion he finds no common fund of dogma, and much of religious doctrine makes no attempt to explain the world. Religion, rather, "has to supply quite different demands to those of a theory of the world." Even if the desire to explain the world can be called a "religious" need, it is very far, in Chantepie's opinion, from "the inmost kernel of religious life."

We said that Chantepie finds it unmistakable that the religions of "civilized nations" have developed a didactic nature, yet he finds that even the didactic elements are not expressed in exclusively philosophical terms. Moreover, where religious doctrine develops, "concrete perception" and "abstract thought" are more or less combined. Often the concrete perception becomes the bearer of the abstract thought, and even the most abstract thought can never quite renounce the elements of picture and symbol. In certain cases didactic elements free themselves from the mythic form or develop even in opposition to it, as among the Greek philosophers and the Hebrew prophets. Yet even when it is opposed to the mythic formulation, the religious conception "can never completely assume the robe of pure thought, and abstract idea." At a certain "stage," religion certainly endeavors to base and develop its doctrine philosophically. In so doing, it may appropriate a philosophical framework to express itself. But for Chantepie, it does not thereby become philosophy. "An abstract idea, such as that of the absolute," he thinks, "can never occupy the place of a religious idea of God."

The distinctiveness of religion in Chantepie's work is evident also

35. Ibid., pp. 68 f. 36. Ibid., p. 232.
37. Ibid., p. 200. 38. Ibid., pp. 228 f.
in his discussion of the relation of religion to morality. Chantepie acknowledges that the effort to identify the origin or essence of religion with that of morality—the view that religion arises from the consciousness of duty or from a sense of reverence evoked by elders or chiefs—would place it on level higher than explanations which identify it, for instance, with madness or hysteria. For Chantepie, however, this view is no less a denial of religion as a domain of independent research.

Chantepie acknowledges that support for the identity of religion and morality has been drawn from a number of important facts. The order which the gods represent confronts man as a rule to which he must submit, a condition which "ought to be," and with the worship of gods, the fundamental idea of duty is sometimes explicitly present. Even in witchcraft a measure of self-denial and sacrifice has been observed. He concurs that as soon as the cult becomes more than a merely selfish act, it acquires a moral dimension. He also acknowledges that morality is often related to the doctrine of a life and a world beyond. Yet he holds that these facts taken together remain insufficient to justify an identification of morality with religion.

It is Chantepie's view that "the threads of religion and morality are intertwined." Morality looks for the sanction of religion and religion inculcates moral ideas. But he insists that this is not to say that they have sprung from the same source, that the gods owe their existence to moral ideas, or that the essence of religion is morality. "It is certain," says Chantepie, "that morality was as universal and primitive as religion." Between the two he sees an "essential connection." Yet he observes that the souls, the spirits, the gods of nature were not originally or necessarily guardians of any moral law. Nor were the benefits expected or the dangers feared from them universally connected with any moral conditions. In certain cases, belief in the gods which religion sanctioned even prevented the attainment of a high degree of morality. It is Chantepie's judgement that the theory of a common origin of morality and religion is

---

40. Ibid., pp. 236-8. 41. Ibid., p. 240.
42. Ibid., p. 49. 43. Ibid., p. 50.
44. Ibid., pp. 236 f.
without sufficient support. His view is that they are independent phenomena, that they were separate in their origin and became associated only in the course of time.\textsuperscript{45} He holds that religion presents a unity and that this unity is both the "specific and common property of all mankind."\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{Phenomenology and "Scientific" Studies of Religion}

To argue that religious phenomena are more broad and manifold than the dominant theories of the phenomena recognize, to argue that they are distinct from such other phenomena as philosophy and morality, to state that religion is both the specific and common property of all mankind is to express in a positive way an anti-reductive concern. In the case of Chantepie, this concern is also expressed in a negative way in his specific evaluation of a number of contemporary studies of religion. We mentioned earlier that Müller's effort to found a science of mythology and religion fell short of success. What followed him was but a succession of efforts to erect a science of religion, each upon yet another scientific foundation. In Chantepie's time there was not yet the array of social sciences that exist today, but a number of efforts to erect a study of religion on the foundation of a positive science had begun to appear. In Chantepie's work we find no general treatment of sociology, anthropology, or psychology as approaches to religion, but we do find occasional reference to "the anthropological school of Tylor," to Spencer's Sociology, and to Müller's school of "comparative mythology."\textsuperscript{47} Chantepie's comments on each of these studies conveys a pervading concern.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., pp. 235, 50. What Chantepie says here about the relation of religion to morality differs little from his view of the relation of religion to art. Both are independent phenomena which have contributed to each other in the course of history. Ibid., pp. 240ff.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pp. 9, 14.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp. 38, 213, 219. Chantepie occasionally speaks of psychology, but this is not for him an independent social science, not an "approach" to religion. Psychology, for Chantepie, is a branch of philosophy. As it applies to religion, its task is "to determine in what the religious character of a conception consists; it has to indicate the place which the religious conceptions occupy in the world of thought,
As Chantepie understands it, Edward B. Tylor's approach to religion begins with a careful effort toward a definition of the subject. For Tylor, neither belief in a supreme deity nor belief in the judgment of the dead, neither the adoration of idols nor the practice of sacrifice can constitute such a definition. In Tylor's view, these attempts have the fault "of identifying religion rather with particular developments than with the deeper motive which underlies them." He thinks a more basic definition is "the belief in spiritual beings," what he calls "animism." Tylor defends this definition because he believes it "embodies the very essence of Spiritualistic as opposed to Materialistic philosophy." It characterizes tribes "very low in the scale of humanity, and thence ascends, deeply modified in its transmission, but from first to last preserving an unbroken continuity into the midst of high modern culture." He believes that while on the face of it, it may afford "but a bare and meager definition of a minimum of religion," it is sufficient nevertheless, "for where the root is, the branches will generally be produced." For Tylor, animism begins with the doctrine of souls. Appearances of persons in dreams and in visions were sufficient to have convinced earliest man of the existence of the soul as distinct from the body, as an indwelling vital force. In Tylor's view, this understanding of the soul was later transferred to other objects so that animals, plants, and objects of nature were also presumed to possess a soul like the soul of man. The belief that nature is indwelt with life is "indissolubly connected" to this view, and from the same idea arises the doctrine of independent spirits.

It is Chantepie's observation that on the foundation of animism, Tylor has attempted not only to explain a number of religious phenomena, even on the higher strata of civilization, but its whole de-

49. Ibid., p. 425.
50. Ibid., p. 426.
51. Ibid.
velopment as well. Against this view he expresses a number of objections. Tylor appeals to animism as the rudimentary form of religion and as the starting point for the evolution of religious ideas because he thinks it is desirable, as he puts it, “to take our basis of enquiry in observation rather than from speculation.” Tylor thinks that a belief in spiritual beings appears “among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance.”

Chantepie’s first objection to Tylor is that his reasoning presupposes that the “savage races” who live today in a supposedly “prehistoric” condition give us a correct idea of the primitive state of man and thus of his religion. The “sages” are taken to be the least “developed” of peoples, and their life is taken to represent the foundation upon which the edifice of civilization has been built. Against this view, Chantepie argues that to identify the modern “savages” with primitive man is to assume that these modern races are not themselves tied to a vital past, that they are without a history, that they live, as it were, “in a today without a yesterday.” Chantepie thinks it is hasty to assume that because a people hand down no written history they are not therefore bound to a past. It is Chantepie’s observation that while their history does not live in written records, the savages look to a real past to which they are chained by “the continuity of manners,” and by “the power of customs.” Leaving aside the question whether the “savages” might really be a “deteriorated race,” Chantepie thinks that to treat them as the “childhood of mankind” is mistaken:

In considering the origin of civilization it is necessary to take account of the whole man, and of the whole of humanity in its course of development, and therefore not to omit the state of childhood and the savage races. The opinion, however, that a child and a savage represent exclusively, or even preeminently, the features of the first man has to be rejected.

Chantepie points out further that even if the “savage” could be taken to represent the first man on earth, it does not follow that

52. Chantepie, p. 38.
54. Chantepie, pp. 35f.
animism is the original form of religion nor that every form of religion must have sprung from this source. From the evidence of the life of "savages," the worship of nature seems no less primitive than the worship of souls. Moreover, while some traditions may show a transition from animism to other forms of religion, many "savage" peoples themselves distinguish the heavenly gods, on the one hand, from souls, mundane spirits, and fetishes, on the other. In the religious life of the "savages" the gods are individualized. They have a name and a form of their own which the spirits do not have. Moreover, the sentiments of the "savages" toward the gods differ entirely from their sentiments toward the spirits. In general, fear and egoistic calculation which prevail in their behavior toward the spirits are here replaced by more exalted sentiments and less selfish interests. Chantepie argues that these distinctions by the "savages" themselves militate strongly against the derivation of the whole of the belief and worship of gods from animism. They suggest how artificial must be the attempt to derive from animism, as Tylor does, the whole intellectual wealth of civilized nations.

Proceeding further in his discussion of Tylor, Chantepie points out that even if the savage could be taken for the primitive and even if the worship of souls could be taken as the principal form the first religion, what Tylor understands as animism could not even yet be the foundation of the history of religion. Besides other inadequacies, Tylor's approach is defective because it locates the origin of the whole development of the history of religion in a conception of spiritual beings presumed to be "borrowed from a coarse philosophy of nature." The animism that Tylor posits as the ground of the history of religions is "a primitive philosophy." The implication is that Tylor has derived the entire development of religion from a source that is not essentially religious. Chantepie holds that to define religion as belief in spiritual beings is incomplete and incorrect. Chantepie acknowledges that animism is a widespread phenomenon, yet he thinks it cannot be admitted "as the only or chief source of religion." In Chantepie's view, religion cannot be safely regarded

55. Ibid., p. 48. 56. Ibid., p. 37.
as anything less than a “belief in superhuman powers combined with their worship.”

The attention Chantepie devotes to Tylor’s views is an indication of the interest which Tylor’s work had evoked among contemporary scholars. Nevertheless Chantepie notes that in England it was the system of Herbert Spencer that, despite opposition, pervaded the intellectual scene. While Chantepie was critical of the work of Tylor at a number of crucial points, he believed nevertheless that it was superior to the interpretation of religion developed in Spencer’s system. He observes that while Spencer had access to a rich array of ethnographic data, he “remains the philosopher.” Forever seeking “unified knowledge” he derives the religion of the “primitive” not, like Tylor, from observation but from “psychological premises” he had philosophically deduced. The principal difference which Chantepie finds between Tylor and Spencer is Spencer’s tenacious insistence upon his single explanation for the phenomena pertaining to religion.

From his reading of Tylor and others, Spencer was aware of peoples wholly without ideas normally associated with religion or among whom these ideas were extremely vague. He believed that among these peoples, there was always, nevertheless, some notion, however wavering and inconsistent, of “a reviving other-self.” Spencer thinks that where this is not an explicit belief, the substance of such a belief is implicit in funeral rites and in the fear of the dead. Like Tylor, Spencer finds in the genesis of religious ideas the conception of souls. “The first traceable conception of a supernatural being is the conception of a ghost.” Spencer, however, departs from the view of Tylor that the primitive inferred from this a further belief in the existence of the souls of other objects, such as the objects of nature. It is perhaps in this departure from Tylor’s thought that the principle upon which Spencer’s system is grounded is most clearly expressed. It is Spencer’s argument against Tylor that since even the higher

57. Ibid., pp. 59, 71. 58. Ibid., p. 2.
59. Ibid., p. 38.
animals distinguish animate from inanimate objects, there is no reason to believe that primitive man who occupies, even in Tylor's view, a higher position on the evolutionary scale, would not be able to do the same. Against Tylor's ideas, he also argues that man nowhere ascribes to animals, to plants, or to natural phenomena a soul of their own but only projects upon them the soul of a man. To attribute to animals and plants a human soul requires a level of human development that could not have been the property of primitive man. He argues that man could have projected his own soul on inanimate objects only by means of what he calls an "indirect syllogism," and man could have done this only after he had begun to philosophize.

While Spencer, like Tylor, finds in the notion of the soul the earliest manifestation of the religious life, the reasoning that leads him to this hypothesis differs entirely from that of Tylor. For Spencer, it is a matter of great significance that belief in a "surviving duplicate" is produced both in settings where no similar ideas exist and again where similar ideas do appear. It illustrates in the realm of religious ideas the same principle that he thinks pervades suborganic, organic, and superorganic regions of reality. Spencer believes that in the course of their history, each of these divisions of reality exhibits an evolution from unity to diversity, from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from simplicity to complexity. He holds that "whatever is common to men's minds at all stages, must be deeper down in thought than whatever is peculiar to men's minds in higher stages." Spencer believes that the later products could only have been reached by a modification and expansion of the more simple and more common. Thus for him the entire history of religions amounts to a modification of the original notion of the soul which arose from an original worship of the dead:

We may infer, a priori, that in conformity with the law of Evolution, there will develop many unlike conceptions out of conceptions originally alike. The spirits of the dead, forming, in a primitive tribe, an ideal group the

62. Ibid.  
members of which are but little distinguished from one another, will grow more and more distinguished. As societies advance, and as traditions, local and general, accumulate and complicate, these once-similar human souls, acquiring in the popular mind differences of character and importance, will diverge; until their original community of nature becomes scarcely recognizable.64

It is Chantepie's opinion that Spencer's views on religion are as problematic as those of Tylor. Applying the principle of evolution, Spencer derives all of religion from the same source. While with Tylor the worship of the dead is but one important aspect of the original animism, with Spencer it has become "the one and all of religion."65 While with Tylor religion is reduced to animism, with Spencer it is reduced to the cult of the departed. For Spencer all of the gods were originally spirits, and all spirits were originally souls of the dead.66 In Spencer's words, "from the ghost once uniformly conceived, have arisen the variously conceived supernatural beings."67 In Chantepie's view, the cult of the dead may be as ancient as animism. Yet to call this the origin of religion is as arbitrary a choice as Tylor's preference for animism, and even less convincing. He acknowledges that "acts of worship of the dead appear in religions of the most various grades of civilization." Among savages, these acts assume a variety of forms; in the religion of civilized peoples, they form an integral part of private or public worship. Yet he also observes that among these religions the dead are "most emphatically distinguished from the gods." Although they are religiously worshipped, their worship is distinct from that of other beings.68 He notes, moreover, that in certain cases, living persons as well as the dead enjoy religious veneration. Chantepie thinks that Spencer's explanations amount to little more than a modern version of euhemerism, the theory that religion arises from the veneration of men, a theory which the scientific study of religion had presumably left

64. Ibid., p. 30.
65. Chantepie, pp. 39f.
66. Ibid., p. 112.
68. Chantepie, p. 113.
behind. He holds that when Spencer explains the gods in heaven as originating in a dread of chieftains who had their seat "above" in mountain strongholds, when he regards the mythical struggle of sunlight and storm as originating in a struggle between persons known by the names of "sun" and "storm," Spencer's explanations are as insipid as those of the euhemerist of ancient Greece. 69 His explanations, moreover, do little to explain the facts. The effort to explain the origin of the temple as originating in the graves of the departed, and thus in the worship of the ancestors, according to Chantepie, applies with certainty in only a few cases, and can hardly be considered a universal rule. He also believes that the effort to explain dendrolatry in these terms because the ancestors who were worshipped dwelt in woody regions or bore the names of plants is a completely unconvincing. 70

A final difficulty which Chantepie finds in Spencer approach to religion concerns his evolutionary theory. We noted earlier that under the influence of the natural sciences and a mechanical view of the universe, contemporaries of Chantepie were at pains to treat the history of civilization and customs according to the method of the natural sciences and to formulate the laws of its development. It is in the philosophy of Spencer, according to Chantepie, that this idea is most consistently worked out. 71 For Chantepie, Spencer is at fault not simply because the scheme he employs is developmental, but because he attempts to explain religion exclusively in terms of a single, supposedly natural, law. It is Chantepie's view that in dealing with the life of mankind, "it is quite right that one must take into account first beginnings, embryonic states, and lowest forms." 72 He believes, however, that the theory of evolution is "insufficient for a proper appreciation of the religious life of mankind." Behind this view lies the conviction of Chantepie that "the method of natural science does not suffice when we judge religious phenomena according to their inner worth" (emphases mine). 73 In Spencer's theory, according

69. Ibid., p. 40. 70. Ibid., p. 90.
71. Ibid., p. 11. 72. Ibid., p. 12.
73. Ibid. p. 13 The difference between a 'natural law' and an 'a priori principle'
to Chantepie, religion is but the manifestation of an independent process, a process found not through the investigation of the phenomena of religion but imposed upon religion from without. Within the purview of this approach, the autonomy of the religious phenomena is necessarily denied.

We spoke earlier of Müller's treatment of mythology as an example of what we mean by reductionism. Müller's view of mythology differs from his view of religion in a significant way. Chantepie's estimate of Müller's understanding of religion is an especially important expression of his anti-reductive concern. For Müller, that form of expression that "changes all beings into person, all relations into actions," that generates stories of the gods which no healthy mind could have conceived of, differs completely from that "perception of the infinite" that lies at the heart of religion. Mythology, according to Müller, "is neither philosophy, nor history, nor religion, nor ethics." To the principles of religion as well as those of thought and morality, it is frequently opposed. Religion, on the other hand, is "a mental faculty which independent of, nay in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and varying disguises." It arose, according to Müller, in the consciousness of the earliest Aryans in the impressions of the infinitely great and the infinitely small which they received from nature. Because Müller believes that comparative philology provides access to the state of thought and language in the period of time when Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and German were, as yet, one undivided language, he thinks that it also provides the starting point for a study of the growth of religion from this initial "perception" to the "apprehension of the infinite in faith."
Chantepie's response to Müller's treatment of religion is more complicated than his treatment of other theorists of religion. On the one hand, he defends Müller against the common charges that he had reduced religious faith to a form of sensuous intuition or that he had reduced it to a perception of the merely "indefinite." These, he claims, are misunderstandings of Müller's thought. He also appropriates Müller's view of the boundary which is drawn by thought and speech between man and the animal kingdom in his criticism of the reductionism of Spencer. On the other hand, Chantepie finds a great weakness in Müller's emphasis upon the cognitive capacities of man. In his conception of religion as an object of inquiry, Müller has laid stress, he says, exclusively upon belief. In Chantepie's view, the form of religious conceptions differs according to the role that is played either by imagination or thought. Under the preponderance of thought, the pervading form is philosophy and dogma; when imagination predominates the preponderating form is symbol and myth. By segregating mythology from the domain of religion, Müller has restricted religion to only one of its principal forms.

Against Müller, Chantepie argues first that mythology belongs to religion and that Müller's method of treatment offers an incomplete and therefore misleading understanding of the actual nature of myth. He observes that although they were not counted among the sacred

78. According to Chantepie, Müller "has never said that the sensuous perception alone could produce religious ideas." Müller's position, according to him, is that man, endowed with the intellectual capacities that are his common possession, cannot perceive nature without the awakening of a perception of the infinite within him. To the second objection, Chantepie replies that the infinite or divine can never be clearly defined. Yet this is not to make indefiniteness the criteria of the essence of religion. (Chantepie, pp. 43 f.)

79. Chantepie, p. 44.

80. Ibid., pp. 202 f. By relating symbol and myth to imagination, Chantepie makes it clear that he does not mean to assign to them an arbitrary character. He thinks that "even the apparently capricious influence of imagination may follow certain rules, and is at all events determined by experience and tradition." He also indicates that he does not claim that there is an absolute opposition between these forms. In history, he states, a variety of intermediate forms are displayed, and even the purest dogmas "have never entirely outgrown the symbolic language of mythology."
books of most of the ancient nations, mythological writings were nevertheless regarded with reverence and were thought of as containing an old and holy tradition. While the poetry of Homer and Hesiod was not exactly hieratic, it nevertheless provided the Greeks with their theogony. To Chantepie, this is enough to indicate that their authors must have been accorded at least a degree of religious authority. He notes also that in myths of the beginning of the world, the renewal of the world and the end of the world, a religious doctrine is often expressed. Chantepie believes that the Greek stories of Hades belong unquestionably to mythology, and yet he finds that these stories were the chief form in which the Greeks clothed their doctrine of what was to happen after death. He notes also that myth is often the medium that carries religious truth and that in many stages of religious development, the mythic form and the didactic character of religion even attract one another.

In the approach to mythology which Müller employs, Chantepie finds an inherent and fundamental weakness. He acknowledges that the origin of a myth, like the origin of a word, may very well provide an insight into its meaning. Yet he also thinks that the original meaning may differ entirely from that of its later development. He thinks, therefore, that in treating mythology, it is necessary to distinguish the “original substance of a myth” from its later development in literature, plastic art, or sacerdotal theology. Müller’s entire comparative mythology can function only to gather together what Chantepie calls “the mythic material,” and it succeeds in this function only in part. “A comparison of the mythologies of related

81. Ibid., p. 197. 82. Ibid., pp. 198, 228f.
83. While he considers the work of Schelling and Creuzer to be of chiefly historical interest, Chantepie thinks they possess merit because “they emphasized the philosophical as well as the religious conditions of mythological research.” He regards Schelling as the first scholar to see the myth forming process as a necessary one that is connected with the formation and development of the life of nations. He also credits Creuzer for his treatment of the “substance” and not only the ‘form’ of religious doctrine. (Ibid., pp. 209f.) Nevertheless he thinks it was only with Müller that the road to a comparative mythology was cleared, and he thinks that no one has greater claim than he to be called the founder of the science of religion. (Ibid., pp. 204, 6.)
people shows us what the undivided prehistoric race possessed in common." This prehistoric mythology, however, "must not be confounded with national mythology." Chantepie believes that what we know of prehistoric mythology from comparative research informs us about the meaning of the mythology of the ancient peoples in a very limited way:

Prehistoric mythology, as established by comparative studies, is very useful in disclosing to us the meaning of names and epithets, of mythic features, and ceremonial customs, by giving us in fact the traditional material, which has been transformed by nations in their historical development. But the Indian, Persian, Greek, Roman, and German mythologies have to show us what myths have been for each of these nations, how they have looked on them, what they have done with them, and how far their religious thoughts depended on, and are reflected by them.84

With this limitation comparative mythology cannot be the key that it was for Müller to unlock the meaning of myth. Chantepie recognizes that "digging in the mines of language" can be of great value. He cautions, however, that "it is dangerous for determining the substance of thoughts" (emphasis mine).85

For Chantepie, religion is a manifold phenomenon and one of greater breadth than is appreciated by most of the dominant theories and approaches to religion. It is his view that religion constitutes a subject matter different from other forms of behavior and thought. His criticism of efforts to erect a study of religion on the foundation of a positive science is that they fail to recognize in religion the dimensions that make it a distinctive subject of inquiry. While Chantepie does not use the term reductionism against his opponents, it is evident that an anti-reductionistic concern is woven into the fabric of his work.

84. Ibid., pp. 225f. 85. Ibid., p. 215.
PART II

The Phenomenological Approach to Religion of
W. Brede Kristensen
The A-Historical Trait in the Phenomenology of W. Brede Kristensen

Chantepie's attempt to write a phenomenology of religion in the sense of a classification of religious phenomena quickly drew international attention. His work was translated into English the year following its publication and was published again in German in two further editions in 1897 and 1905, edited by Chantepie in collaboration with other scholars. It was translated into French in 1904. In the years following its first publication, efforts of this nature gained considerable importance in the field of the study of religion. One indication of its recognition is the fact that when W. Brede Kristensen became professor at Leiden in 1901, succeeding C. P. Tiele, his appointment was in the History and Phenomenology of Religion. Tiele's appointment had been in History and Philosophy of Religion. Kristensen's lectures on the subject, moreover, present phenomenology as having begun to assume the character of a self-conscious and independent enterprise. While Kristensen's effort is more concerned with the correct practice than with the theory or definition of phenomenology, it adopts many of the features of Chantepie's grouping of religious phenomena. In Kristensen's research, some of these features become the principles of a distinctive approach to religion. This distinctiveness is emphasized by Kristensen himself.

1. It is noteworthy that in 1898 when Chantepie later became professor at the University of Leiden, he did not occupy a chair in the history or phenomenology of religion but in "Theological Encyclopedia; Doctrine of God and Ethics." (Jacques Waardenburg, "Religion Between Reality and Idea," Numen 19 (1972): 136f.)

It was Chantepie's conception of the science of religion that it divides itself into the philosophy and the history of religion, which treat religion respectively according to its essence and manifestations. He indicated that these two divisions are very closely connected. "The philosophy of religion would be useless and empty if, whilst defining the idea of religion, it disregarded the actual facts that lie before us; and the history of religion cannot prosper without the philosophy of religion. Not only the order and the criticism of religious phenomena, but even the determining whether such phenomena are of a religious nature, depends on some, if only a preliminary, definition of religion."

Phenomenology of religion forms, in Chantepie's view, a transition between these two sides. In Kristensen's phenomenology, this general scheme is repeated, but it is more thoroughly developed as the scope of the project has enlarged. "Phenomenology of Religion," says Kristensen, "is the systematic treatment of History of Religion. . . . Its task is to classify and group the numerous and widely divergent data in such a way that an over-all view can be obtained of their religious content and the religious values they contain."

Like Chantepie, Kristensen does not wish in his phenomenology of religion to undertake an inquiry into the essence of religion, yet he seems more conscious than Chantepie of the manner in which one's conception of the essence of religion necessarily affects the investigation. He states:

If we must group the phenomena according to characteristics which correspond as far as possible to the essential and typical elements of religion, how do we then determine which data typically illustrate men's religious disposition, and how do we determine what are the essential elements of religion? This question cannot be answered on the basis of the phenomena themselves.

 Essence, Kristensen explains, is a philosophical concept, and it is the task of philosophy of religion to formulate that essence. Yet it is

---

3. Chantepie, pp. 7f.
5. Ibid., p. 8.
a concept which the phenomenology of religion must continuously employ. On the other hand, anyone who seeks to know the essence of religious phenomena cannot do so without reference to actual types of religious acting and thinking, the material phenomenology provides; and it is the history of religion that provides the material of which phenomenology attempts a systematic view. Yet history itself cannot proceed without an idea, provided by phenomenology, of its subject. We might say that with Chantepie the history and philosophy of religion are understood to be closely related; each affects the other, and phenomenology, which stands between the two, is affected by both. Because Kristensen penetrates more deeply the methodological intricacies of such an approach, he sees the metaphor in a richer light. Here phenomenology is mutually interrelated both with the history and philosophy of religion. It is now the medium through which they affect one another. Says Kristensen:

The place which the research of phenomenology occupies between history and philosophy makes it extraordinarily interesting and important. The particular and the universal interpenetrate again and again; phenomenology is at once systematic history of religion and applied philosophy of religion.\(^6\)

In the phenomenology of Kristensen, Chantepie’s understanding of the science of religion, entailing philosophy, phenomenology, and history, is repeated, but it is also more thoroughly worked out. In much the same way, the purpose of Chantepie’s phenomenology is reaffirmed in that of Kristensen, and it too has become more defined. The purpose of Chantepie’s phenomenology is to highlight the most important types of religious acting and thinking so that they will stand out conspicuously in the ethnographic and historical surveys that follow it.\(^7\) With Kristensen, the purpose has become more ambitious: “Phenomenology of religion attempts to understand religious phenomena by classifying them into groups” (emphasis mine).\(^8\) Elsewhere he states: “Phenomenology has set itself the task of so grouping phenomena that they shed light upon one another and lead to a deeper insight into the essence of the whole group of similar phe-

---

W. Brede Kristensen

nomena." Chantepie also describes his phenomenology as an effort to discuss the meaning of the most important religious phenomena. But with Kristensen, the kind of meaning that phenomenology pursues is more clearly defined. The "meaning" it seeks is the meaning that the religious phenomena have for the believers themselves. The purpose of the phenomenologist, in Kristensen's view, is to "investigate what religious value the believers (Greeks, Babylonians, Egyptians, etc.) attached to their faith, what religion meant for them. It is their religion that we want to understand."10

The Phenomenology of Kristensen as a Systematic Study

As with Chantepie, the phenomenology of Kristensen is first of all an effort toward the systematic description of phenomena. As viewed by Kristensen, "Phenomenology has as its object to come as far as possible into contact with and to understand the extremely varied and divergent religious data making use of comparative methods."11 History of religion, Kristensen points out, leads to a consideration of the particular in religion. He observes, however, that the history of religion is replete with data that at least appear to correspond. "Completely unique phenomena hardly ever occur." Rather than attempting to compare religions with one another as entire systems of religious conceptions, phenomenology "takes out of their historical setting the similar facts and phenomena which it encounters in different religions, brings them together, and studies them in groups." It studies the phenomena, as Kristensen puts it, in their "ideal connection" in order "to become acquainted with the religious thought, idea or need which underlies the group of corresponding data."12

While Chantepie objects to treating the religious data merely as the effect of history, he makes no special effort to determine why such data seem to repeat themselves in nations that stand in no historical relation to each other. Referring to such relations as they appear in mythology, he obliquely states, "we must appeal to psy-

11. Ibid., p. 11. 12. Ibid., pp. 1 ff.
A-Historical Trait

chological unity and similarity of outward circumstances."\(^{13}\) For Kristensen these correspondences have a crucial significance. In some cases they are rooted in a religious intuition (Anschauung).\(^ {14}\) The fact that sacrifice occurs in almost all religions, although in different forms, points, he thinks, to "a religious need of a very universal nature."\(^ {15}\) To understand this need, it is necessary to study "sacrifice" as a corresponding category in the various religions, attempting to apprehend the common meaning of the sacrificial act. In the same way, to understand the religious significance of prayer, it is necessary to have a general view of the phenomena based on observation gathered from as many religions as possible. Especially in dealing with phenomena such as oracles, purifications, or divine kingship which are absent or all but absent from one's own culture, this comparative method is a principal tool. By means of this operation, a phenomenon such as divine kingship among the Greeks and Romans, which in its particularity is completely incomprehensible, gains a very deep meaning.\(^ {16}\)

It is not the case, however, that Kristensen seeks the general in religion to the exclusion of the particular. At the center of Kristensen's phenomenology is the conviction that "every religion ought to be understood from its own standpoint, for that is how it is understood by its own adherents."\(^ {17}\) Accordingly, he rejects the premature equation of the most important elements in religion with those shared by all.

There is a popular notion that which all religions have in common must be religion's core. If we but set aside all that is peculiar to a particular religion, what we have left are the common ideas, feelings, and practices, and they express what is essentially religious. This is a method which seems so simple

14. Kristensen, pp. 28, 30, 255, 276. When Kristensen refers to this term, he consistently employs the German term which he has evidently derived from Schleiermacher. Following this lead, we will refer to the German term hereafter.
15. Ibid., p. 3.
16. Ibid., pp. 5f.
17. Ibid., p. 6. Chantepie, on the other hand, seeks to characterize the most general phenomena in the religious life of humanity and hopes that this will illuminate the treatments in his historical and ethnographic sections.
as to be almost mechanical, but it is impractical. There are a great many elements which appear in all religions. Unessential and unimportant elements also occur in large numbers. On the other hand, none of all the facts which have been observed occurs in all religions.\textsuperscript{18} Kristensen continually refers to a common Anschauung des Universums, but he points out that this Anschauung differs in Egypt, India, Iran, and so on.\textsuperscript{19} He rejects as well the notion that if we but pay attention to the religious significance of certain common religious data, they can prove less than alien to us and to other believers, that "as soon as we learn to understand their essence, the alien element disappears, and they correspond to feelings and insights which are echoed in ourselves."\textsuperscript{20} He thinks that generalization by itself does not bring us deeper into the subject matter of religion.

Rather than seeking the general in religion as such, it is Kristensen's purpose to utilize what can be derived from comparative inquiry in the interpretation of the particular. "The comparative consideration of corresponding data often gives a deeper and more accurate insight than the consideration of each datum by itself, for considered as a group, the data shed light upon one another."\textsuperscript{21} The religious significance of a phenomenon like the Delphic Oracle was self-evident to the ancient adherents, and for that reason it was not expressed except in obscure hints that were immediately comprehensible to them but not sufficient for the investigator who approaches the data today. To understand it, we must turn to other cases of a similar kind: "Data from one religion can shed light on data from another because the meaning of the former happens to be clearer than that of the latter."\textsuperscript{22} Phenomenology of religion, "clarifies the meaning of that about which little is known with the help of that which is better known."\textsuperscript{23}

Within Kristensen's procedure, the criterion employed in the selection of data with which particular phenomena are compared is that of "clarity." If the clearer data are to be used to interpret the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 8. See also p. 417.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 29 ff.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 268.
\end{itemize}
more obscure, it follows that religions with written records that explain the phenomena will enjoy greater prominence in Kristensen's study than those without them. Generally he rejects the use of ethnographic data because they do not enable us to perceive any better the distinctive value bestowed upon that which is alien to our experience. Says Kristensen, "religion can indeed illuminate data from folklore and ethnography, but seldom vice versa." And as he puts it elsewhere, "the data from ethnography and folklore are countless but monotonous, because the nuances elude us. But that is not the case with the data from the literate religions."

While Kristensen's phenomenology investigates much of the same kind of data as Chantepie, his investigations are more elaborate both in terms of the level of meaning evoked from each group of phenomena and in terms of the general scheme in which the groups of phenomena are arranged. Of sky worship, for instance, Chantepie notes that in many cultures the sky is regarded not only as the abode of the gods but as a divine being in its own right. He cites the cases of China where the sky is regarded as the highest deity to whom imperial sacrifice is offered and the Persian worship of the vault of the sky as Zeus. But he notes that the worship of the vault of the sky "by no means excludes that of the single phenomena in it." In the case of Kristensen, it is clear that a deeper level of meaning is sought. "Why was the sky worshipped? How was the sky conceived, and what types of Anschauung do we encounter? How are the different conceptions worked out in detail?" In treating these questions, Kristensen pays attention first to those instances of sky worship in which the believers have formulated their conceptions. He applies his attention to the sacred writings or other documents of the literate religions, in which the subject is discussed. He is especially concerned to examine material of this nature that is capable of arousing our sympathetic interest. In such material, Kristensen discovers traits that are held in common and may correctly be considered characteristic. "They occur repeatedly, and they evidently concern

that which is essential in the midst of all the difference in formulation." From this investigation, he eventually infers that "in the all-embracing sky, the religious man saw an image of the highest and all-embracing principle of reality, the visible image of the cosmic order or law which brings unity to all variety."\textsuperscript{28}

We stated earlier that in Chantepie's phenomenology the groups of phenomena are arranged in an order of accessibility. Chantepie begins with the clearest groups of phenomena, the religious objects, and proceeds in the direction of the religious subject and the more subjective religious acts. While it follows something of the same order of topics, the arrangement of Kristensen's groups of phenomena is considerably more ambitious. Although he begins with phenomena similar to those at the beginning of Chantepie's phenomenology—the worship of nature, the heavens, the heavenly bodies, the earth, trees, water, and fire—in Kristensen's phenomenology, these topics constitute parts of the larger topic of religious cosmology, "the conceptions or doctrines which we find in the various religions about the world." This is followed by the two further embracive topics treating religious anthropology and religious cultus respectively, "the conceptions or doctrines which we find in the various religions about the world, about man, and about the practice of worship."\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{The Phenomenology of Kristensen as a Non-Developmental Study}

Our discussion of Chantepie revealed that his phenomenology was a-historical, not merely in the sense of presenting a systematic ordering of the religious data but also in the sense of remaining, or at least attempting to remain independent of particular developmental conceptions of the historical process. To what extent can this be said of the work of Kristensen? To answer the question, we should recall that for Kristensen, each religion is to be understood in light of its own point of view. For him, "there is no religious reality other than the faith of the believers."\textsuperscript{30} The task of the phenomenologist in the

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. p. 41.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 13.
view of Kristensen is not to formulate his own conception of the essence of the religious data, but the meaning it had for the people in question. It is about this that he seeks approximate knowledge. Kristensen goes so far, in fact, as to state that the effort to understand religious data from another standpoint amounts to a negation of this religious reality. From this position, there are two far-reaching implications. In the first place, any effort to determine the relative value of different religions or different types of religious phenomena stands outside the purview of what, for Kristensen, is the phenomenology of religion. He acknowledges that phenomenology tries to determine the religious value of the phenomena. But the word value here clearly carries the connotation of significance or meaning. The religious value, he emphatically declares, is "the value they have for the believers themselves." And this religious value, he says, has never been relative but is always absolute.31 Secondly, any effort to place the religious phenomena within a historical scheme by judging them "primitive" or "developed" negates the religious reality. Kristensen thinks that phenomenology differs in this way from the earlier "comparative religion." He points out that while phenomenology of religion is a comparative study of the history of religion, "evaluative comparison does not come within its domain." Phenomenology makes use of comparisons, "only in order to gain a deeper insight into the self-subsistent, not the relative, meaning of each of the historical data."32 It provides no criteria for determining, for example, the relative value of different forms of prayer or for a classification of the data according to such categories as "ethical" and "nature" religions.33 Such evaluations, in Kristensen's view, will inevitably be made on the basis of criteria derived consciously or not from one's own religion.

Believers have never conceived of their own religion as a link in a chain of development. . . . No believer considered his own faith to be somewhat

31. Ibid., pp. 2, 6. The terms 'religious value' and 'religious significance' are used interchangeably by Kristensen.
32. Ibid., p. 418.
33. Ibid., pp. 423, 267f, 270f.
primitive, and the moment we begin so to think of it, we have actually lost touch with it. We are then dealing only with our own ideas of religion, and we must not delude ourselves that we have also learned to know the ideas of others.\textsuperscript{14}

If a cultured Parsi priest wished to present an overall view of the history of religion, it would certainly be his own that would emerge as the crown of the historical development.\textsuperscript{15} Likewise, when a phenomenon like nature worship is viewed in the light of the Christian faith, it cannot be seen but as the worst imaginable degeneration of religious life.\textsuperscript{16} According to Kristensen, the concepts of “primitive” and “highly developed” forms of religion are fatal for phenomenological research.

We said that Chantepie rejected conceptions of history built upon either naturalistic or Hegelian models. Both of these models of religious development are subsumed under Kristensen’s critique of evaluative judgements upon religious phenomena. In his critique of such studies of religion, he refers specifically to evolutionary theories which he discusses under the heading of the historical and idealistic types. He understands historical evolutionism as the view that the cultural values achieved in each historical period are handed down to the following generation by whom they are further developed. Such values thus never disappear. According to Kristensen, the historian and philosopher of religion C. P. Tiele was the primary exponent of this view. According to idealistic evolutionism, the idea of humanity or the essence of religion is a reality in its own right that realizes itself by means of historical phenomena, “even by those beyond observable historical relations.” The idea “detaches itself more and more from the undeveloped reality which is clothed in primitive forms and comes to light in full clarity in the highest civilizations and the highest religions.”\textsuperscript{17} In Kristensen’s view, the Hegelian notion of the history of religion as the dialectical development of the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 35. (See, for example, Rom. 1:25.)
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 11f.
idea of religion is the model for this type of thinking. History, including religious history, is a process of growth governed and determined by Spirit. Phenomena like prayer proceed, according to this view, from "primitive" types characterized by demands for materials goods to the more "highly developed types," which express the desire for communion. Thus the later are considered to be the more mature, and the more genuinely pious. 38

A concrete example of the encroachment of this type of thinking upon comparative research, in Kristensen's view, is provided by the renowned theologian and historian of religion, Rudolf Otto, in his famous Das Heilige (The Idea of the Holy). 39 Because Otto is frequently grouped together with representatives of the phenomenology of religion, it is significant that Kristensen rejects Otto's approach to religion. A characteristic feature of Otto's thought, in the view of Kristensen, is his conviction that the germ of the phenomena is always contained in its essence, and that it is on the basis of the essence that the phenomena have to be understood. Kristensen holds that the unity of the psychological study which Otto exhibits is disturbed by the evolutionary pattern of the presentation. "The daimonion becomes theion; the numen (in the Roman sense) becomes deus; worship of natural objects becomes worship of spiritual beings." 40 Kristensen acknowledges that Otto's historical knowledge is more sophisticated than that of Hegel. Yet he finds that Otto "is no more able than Hegel to do complete justice to the characteristic feature of alien religious ideas." It is simply not the case, he replies, that deus follows historically upon numen, or that theion follows the daimonion. He observes that in cases where they are best known, "the daimonion continues to exist alongside the theon; the nature gods continue to exist alongside the spiritual gods." 41

38. Ibid., pp. 417 ff. It is worth noting that Kristensen's critique of this type of analysis extends to the analysis of prayer by Friedrich Heiler.


40. Kristensen, p. 16.

41. Ibid., pp. 17f.
consciousness, an evolutionary pattern is forced upon the data. We gain a very different conception of the holy, he says, when as our starting point we take the reality of the believers' own faith. Of the natural history models of the development of religion, Kristensen states simply that the idea of a growth in religious history that proceeds in a definite direction might be possible were human history actually comparable to natural history wherein the acorn becomes an oak. In fact, in human history, regular growth in a definite direction is absent. His judgement is thus that “all evolutionary views and theories mislead us from the start if we let them set the pattern for our research.”

The Phenomenology of Kristensen as an Anti-Historicist Study

A third facet of the a-historical trait as we found it in Chantepie was the fact that Chantepie was resistant to the treatment of religious data merely as the effect of historical causes. We referred to this as the anti-historicist facet of the a-historical trait. Three important features of Kristensen’s research reveal the same concern. In the first place, Kristensen’s justification for the use of a systematic approach to the data intimates a recognition of the inadequacy of approaches that study religions simply in terms of their chronology or simply in terms of the historical conditions necessary to explain them. It suggests that such approaches are inadequate to deal with what for Kristensen is central to the study of religion, that is, the religious apprehensions of the believers themselves, the “religious content” of the data, the “religious values they contain.” Kristensen holds that while the historical approach provides access to the particular, we must rely upon the systematic view to get at the religious thought, idea, or need which underlies the group of corresponding phenomena. He makes this clear with reference to one illuminating example:

In any given religion perhaps only one particular conception of sacrifice is expressed. We wish to know more: what religious need has caused men, in all times and places, to present offerings to the gods? To learn this, we must study the category “sacrifice” in the various religions; we must pay attention

42. Ibid., p. 23.  
43. Ibid., p. 13.
to that which in the actions and conceptions of the various peoples is common to the basic idea of sacrifice. . . . It is the common meaning of the sacrifice that is important, and that we must try to understand.  

Phenomenology considers the data not only in their historical context but in what Kristensen calls their “ideal connection.”

In the second place, while phenomenology has a certain advantage over the historical approach in the narrow sense, it cannot be denied that, if systematic in presentation, the phenomenology of religion is also a kind of historical research. The materials of phenomenological study are data which are the product of historical inquiry. Kristensen recognizes that phenomenology, too, encounters the limitation imposed by the subject upon historical research of every kind. In approaching the alien religion, he understands that only approximate knowledge is possible. By means of “empathy,” achieved through systematic comparative research, the phenomenologist attempts to grasp in his experience a situation strange to himself. Yet, however accurate his perception, it is not the perception of the believer. He recognizes that “the representation is always something else than the reality.”  

To acknowledge this limitation is to recognize that what for Kristensen is the only true object of the study of religion finally transcends his grasp. It is to recognize that religious phenomena cannot be reduced to the terms of historical research.

The fact that he takes the object of his study to be irreducible to contingent historical determinants is indicated finally by the language with which Kristensen refers to this object. He repeatedly refers to the religious apprehension of nature by the use of Schleiermacher’s term “the Anschauung des Universums,” and he refers sometimes to the religious Anschauung of the sky using Max Müller’s term, “the perception of the infinite.”  

In his introduction to Kristensen’s lectures on the phenomenology of religion, Hendrick Kraemer states that it was the conclusion of Kristensen’s research on the religions of the Ancient Near East that the ancients held in common “a few

44. Ibid., p. 3.  
45. Ibid., p. 7.  
46. Ibid., pp. 28, 30, 41.
all-pervading apprehensions." These common apprehensions, he says, were "their cosmic orientation, their 'religious sense of nature.'" By this latter term, according to Kraemer, Kristensen tried to denote "the direct, intuitive apprehension by the Ancients of Cosmos and Nature as a spiritual, divine reality." In Kristensen's view, the religious, as Kraemer later states, is something sovereign, "independent of all finite entities."47

Like the phenomenology of Chantepie, that of Kristensen exhibits the a-historical trait. In the research of Kristensen, we find facets that resemble those we find in Chantepie. It is a systematic treatment of the data that is non-developmental in its treatment of the phenomena, and it is also anti-historicist. The difference between the two is that in Kristensen's research this trait is much more thoroughly developed. With Chantepie the systematic procedure merely places together and classifies various groups of religious phenomena and attempts in a vague manner to discuss their meaning. With Kristensen this method of study has become a technique for exploring alien religious ideas in which the clearer data are used to shed a light upon the more obscure. With Chantepie, the non-developmental aspect of this trait is expressed in a rejection of groupings of the religious phenomena that are based upon a Hegelian model and a critique of applications of the theory of evolution to the field of religion. Nevertheless, Chantepie retains the use of such telling terms as "primitives," "savages," and "highly developed societies," although he rejects the implication that certain forms of religion represent higher forms of religion. In the research of Kristensen, such terms are rejected along with their implications. Chantepie, we might say, rejects some of the implications of the subtext of his research; Kristensen rejects the subtext altogether. The sophistication of Kristensen's research is further expressed in his explicit rejection from the purview of the phenomenology of religion of the notion of the essence of religion. For Kristensen the concept of the essence of religion is itself implicated in a developmental understanding of religious phenomena. With Chantepie an anti-historicist concern is expressed in a

47. Ibid., pp. xviii, xxii.
rejection of theories of religion that fail to recognize an unspecified “inward relation” that presumably distinguishes certain data as religious. With Kristensen the same concern is worked out in an argument that rejects historicism on much more solid grounds, as it pursues the “meaning” of the data in a quite specific sense of the term. In Kristensen’s view, there is no religious reality to study other than the religious perceptions of the adherents themselves. This the researcher can never know directly, for it is accessible finally only to those whose apprehension it is.
It was Chantepie's considered opinion that theology and the science of religion must employ differing forms of treatment and have different objects in view. Chantepie understands theology in the light of a tradition of religious thought that had found consistent expression in the religious life of Holland from the time of the Reformation. In Chantepie's time this tradition had undergone both a liberalizing tendency and a revival of interest in its Calvinist roots. Throughout these vicissitudes, the understanding of theology as the knowledge of God remained perhaps the archimedean point; in its more orthodox expressions, it was understood more especially as that knowledge of God that is given decisively in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Standing within the same historical tradition, Kristensen's understanding of theology is much the same. We have said that in the view of its exponents, the phenomenology of religion differs from theology in the object which it seeks, in its attitude towards this object, and in its perspective upon the world and upon this object in particular. Kristensen's phenomenology differs from theology in similar ways. Yet in Kristensen's phenomenology, the implications of such a separation are more thoroughly worked out.

By his own design, Chantepie proceeds without interpreting the data in explicitly theological terms. Accordingly, he rejects the theological interpretation of sacrifice as well as the origin of religion. It is clear, however, that Chantepie nevertheless views much

1. Chantepie, pp. 147, 33.
of the data through theological eyes. He is not quite able to see all the phenomena on equal terms. Although he does not regard differing forms of religion as necessarily associated with particular "stages of civilization" or as succeeding one another by some historical necessity, he does nevertheless see some as representing "higher" manifestations than others. We observed that he maintains an a-theological perspective upon the data that carry explicitly theological meaning simply by excluding them from his discussion. In this respect the a-theological trait as it appears in Kristensen's phenomenology of religion differs from that of Chantepie.

The Object of Kristensen's Phenomenology and the Science of Theology

For Dutch protestant theology at the close of the nineteenth century, and especially for the thought of Abraham Kuyper, the object of theological inquiry is very clear. It is that self-disclosure of God that is revealed from beyond the natural realm. For the science of religion the object of study is religion. For the phenomenology of Chantepie in particular, it is first of all those acts, customs, ideas, and sentiments that express the religious life. We said earlier, however, that Chantepie's classification reveals a concern not only for the exterior but for the interior of the religious phenomena. He is concerned not simply to arrange and classify but also to discuss the meaning of such phenomena. The difficulty is that the nature of the meaning he pursues is never clearly defined. He observes that idols are worshipped as symbols and images in which the divine power is active; he notes that the object of cult is to sustain a relationship with the divine and to restore it when it is clouded; he concludes about rites of purification that they reveal man as finding himself unfit for communion with the divine. When Chantepie makes such statements, it is far from clear whether he thinks he has apprehended the meaning of the phenomena for the participants or the meanings that are evoked in the mind of the investigator as he encounters them. It is also unclear whether Chantepie believes he has found the meaning of the phenomena in some more embracive sense. In the case of Kristensen, the phenomenology of religion pursues the
meaning of the phenomena in a sense that is definite and manifest. It is clear what he is looking for.

Kristensen seeks unequivocally the meaning of religious phenomena for the believers themselves. If Chantepie's phenomenology claims the status of science on the basis of the distinctive nature of its object, then by the precision of its definition of the object it seeks, the phenomenology of Kristensen makes a stronger claim to the title; and as a scientific undertaking more clearly defined, it stands out more clearly than that of Chantepie from that other human effort after knowledge which is theology. While theology inquires after the knowledge of God given by revelation, Kristensen inquires into the religious value the believers attach or have attached to their faith, what their religion meant for them.²

We stated earlier that for Chantepie, theology and the science of religion have not only different objects in view, but they undertake different forms of treatment. By defining the object of his study more clearly than Chantepie, Kristensen is also able to be more clear about the form of treatment he employs. He refers to this undertaking explicitly as a systematic science.³ In the last chapter we observed that Kristensen employs the same general scheme for the science of religion as divided between philosophical and historical sides, as we found in the phenomenology of Chantepie, but that Kristensen adds to this conception in light of his view of the field. While history provides the material of which phenomenology attempts a systematic view, philosophy provides the conceptions of religion with which phenomenology proceeds. The results of phenomenological research then inform the history and philosophy of religion. Thus the value and accuracy of the results of any one of these depends on the value and accuracy of the results of the other two. For Kristensen, this interdependence highlights the importance of phenomenology as a "province" or "subdivision" of the general science of religion.⁴

It is Kristensen's conviction that every religion ought to be appreciated in the light of its own religious standpoint. This view im-

². Kristensen, p. 13.  
³. Kristensen, p. 3.  
⁴. Ibid., p. 9.
poses a limitation upon every effort towards research in the field of religion, a limitation imposed, as he sees it, by the nature of the subject matter itself. He suggests that we can understand this limitation when we assume an outside position with respect to our own spiritual inheritance, when we try, for instance, to form a picture of our own national character. In this sort of transposition, we feel the shortcomings of the presentation, because we also know our national character from within. “Every believer looks upon his own religion as a unique autonomous and absolute reality.” In the eyes of the adherent, “[it is of absolute value and thus incomparable.” This viewpoint the phenomenologist can never completely share. “There is a distance between him and the object of the research, he cannot identify himself with it as the believer does. We cannot become Mohammedans when we try to understand Islam, and if we could, our study would be at an end: we should then directly experience the reality.” Thus even in the discernment of a certain religious Anschauung behind the corresponding data, it is always approximate knowledge that is sought. The historian attempts by means of “empathy” to relive what is alien, imaginatively to reexperience a situation strange to himself. Yet “the ‘existential’ nature of the religious datum is never disclosed by research.” To understand particular historical data, one utilizes the concepts and generalizations afforded by comparative research. These are indispensable in pointing the way to greater adequacy of interpretation of the data, but they are not infallible guides.

For Kristensen, the limitation inherent in phenomenological research in no way diminishes the scientific merit of its effort. “He who wants to know everything abandons science.” In the course of Kristensen’s researches, “concepts” and “essences” are continually invoked to illuminate the data in question. The sacredness of Greek and Roman kings are seen in the light of the ancient concept of kingship; particular sacrifices in the light of the religious essence of sacrifice. It is true, he says, that the ancient conception of kingship

5. Ibid., p. 6. 6. Ibid., p. 7. 7. Ibid., pp. 7f. 8. Ibid., p. 41.
and the religious essence of sacrifice are concepts and not historical realities; they were not formulated by the ancients themselves. He insists, nevertheless, that we cannot proceed without them. Research always anticipates the essence of the phenomenon, yet the essence remains also the goal of scientific research. In Kristensen's opinion, the limitation of a scientific endeavor, which is the consequence of using such concepts, is a phenomenon by no means unique to historical science. Such general formulations, he argues, are assumed in all of science, and in the natural sciences they appear again in the form of "natural laws." What he seeks is not mathematical certainty but the highest probability he can realistically hope to achieve.

In light of the approximate nature of the knowledge which Kristensen's phenomenology pursues, it is interesting that as Kuyper conceives of it, theology also pursues a kind of knowledge that is finite and limited. We noted earlier that for Chantepie the elder, the Church is a living body, and theology as a function of the Church must be a progressive science. For Kuyper as well, theology aims at knowledge of its object as completely and accurately as it can achieve. Yet it recognizes that this knowledge of God remains always only human knowledge. Like other sciences it therefore cannot rest so long as the possibility remains of making its insight into this object more clear. But because the object of Kristensen's study is ultimately concealed from view, and because theology is limited in a similar way, it does not follow that theology understands its object to be concealed in the same way or for the same reason as the object of Kristensen's study, or because the object of both efforts are ultimately hidden from view, that the object of theological study and the object of Kristensen's phenomenological inquiry are finally one and the same.

For Kuyper, it is a fundamental conviction of theological inquiry, that God alone knows Himself and that "there is no created being that can know ought of Him, except He himself reveals something

9. Ibid. pp. 7ff.  
10. Ibid., pp. 6ff.  
from His self-knowledge and self-consciousness in a form that falls within the comprehension of the creature.” The object of theological investigation is not the archetypal knowledge of God, the knowledge of God in his own being, but the ectypal knowledge of God, “an image of God, drawn by himself, such as He desires us to receive.” This knowledge or revelation, according to Kuyper, presents itself in a complex of data from which the theological investigator is obliged to draw conclusions. While he acknowledges that this complex is related to the religious life of a people and to a historical tradition, and that some of this data might coincide with data encountered in the scientific study of religion, he holds nevertheless that the complex of all that belongs to this revelation invites investigation in its own right. This revelation, says Kuyper, must be transposed by scientific effort into a form that shall satisfy the claims of our human consciousness. And the work of this transposition is the work of theology properly so called.

Inasmuch as both are concerned with knowledge that is subject to revision, theology’s knowledge is analogous to the knowledge that is pursued in the scientific study of religion. Because the object of their respective studies is something within the world, they both have this in common with any scientific undertaking. But the knowledge that phenomenology achieves is always only approximate because it is never possible to faithfully represent in an objective formulation the religious intuitions of another. For theology the difficulty is twofold. In the first place, the complex data that form the revelation of the ectypal knowledge of God requires ever new interpretation in the light of ever changing conditions. In the second place, no matter how accurate its formulation of the ectypal knowledge of God, it does not and cannot ever represent the knowledge of God in himself. If phenomenology of religion found no obstacle in the inscrutability of the believers’ own religious intuitions, it would then perceive the object that theology pursues, the ectypal knowledge of God. It could then examine this object in an approx-

imate manner just as theology does, but it would no longer be the phenomenology of religion. Beyond this, theological knowledge remains provisional because God remains unknowable in Himself; for theology, God's knowledge of Himself is concealed. For the phenomenology of religion, knowledge of the other human being, of his own religious intuitions, is ultimately unknowable as well. Kristensen acknowledges that his research relies, just as all science relies, upon data that lie beyond the territory of his knowledge. While he claims to work objectively, he feels that progress occurs finally "by the illumination of a Spirit who extends above and beyond our spirit." Yet he does not relate this illumination either to natural or special revelation. He speaks instead of "a feeling for the subjects" and to an "indefinable sympathy." Disclosing a certain frustration at the danger of misunderstanding, he offers the following suggestion: "Let us simply call it intuition—then at least no one will contradict us!" If theology achieves only approximate knowledge, it is approximate for reasons different from those that limit the knowledge that phenomenology achieves. While Kristensen attempts sympathetically to appreciate the meaning of the religious data for the believer, Kuyper's effort is that of the believer himself, actively engaged in the practice of his faith. When Kuyper seeks the religious conceptions behind the sayings of the apostles and prophets, he seeks an object which, as such, can never be apprehended by the investigator which Kristensen seeks to be.

The A-Theological Attitude and the Phenomenological Task

We said that Chantepie avoided dealing theologically with religious data by classifying and discussing them specifically as objects of historical and ethnographic interest. To express this attitude in Kuyper's terms, we might say that in the phenomenology of religion the investigating subject places himself above the object to be investigated. As the active agent in the investigation, he directs the inquiry in accordance with his own free judgement. It is Kuyper's view that in theology, the object of study is not something over

15. Ibid., p. 10.
which the investigator can exercise this kind of control. When the thirst for knowledge directs itself to that to whom all creation owes its existence, one stands no longer above the object of inquiry but beneath it, and over against this object, he finds himself in a relationship of utter dependence.\textsuperscript{16} In the case of Kristensen the same differentiation obtains. Here it is even more striking. While the adherent stands with respect to this object in a relationship of utter dependence, a distance necessarily separates the historian or phenomenologist from the object of his research. It removes the historian or phenomenologist from the domain of what Tillich calls the ultimacy concern. The knowledge of this relationship the phenomenologist of religion can never fully apprehend. Chantepie's formulation of the object of phenomenological inquiry, however, raises the question as to how the object of phenomenological inquiry is brought together as an object of investigation, how it is constituted as an object of research. What is it that determines the most important sides and aspects of religious phenomena to be classified? What determines what counts as religious phenomena? Chantepie appropriately answers that the history of religions cannot prosper without philosophy of religion since even the selective determining of phenomena depends on some, if only a preliminary, definition of religion.\textsuperscript{17} But the question can be pressed beyond this point. Whence does philosophy of religion derive its definition, however preliminary? Kristensen takes a step beyond Chantepie to answer this question.

While he insists that he does not speak from the standpoint of faith, Kristensen acknowledges that he deliberately makes use of data that stand outside the territory of his knowledge. Like Chantepie, he recognizes that philosophy provides the idea of religion with which phenomenology proceeds. Moving beyond Chantepie, however, he further admits that "we make use of our own religious experience in order to understand the experience of others." He acknowledges that we "should never be able to describe the essence of

\textsuperscript{16} Kuyper, \textit{Principles of Sacred Theology}, p. 248.

\textsuperscript{17} Chantepie, p. 8.
religion if we did not know from our own experience what religion is" (emphases mine).\textsuperscript{16} This position reminds us of the view expressed by Tillich that every creative philosopher is also a theologian. He is a theologian "in the degree to which his existential situation and his ultimate concern shape his philosophical vision."\textsuperscript{19} In the light of this recognition, how does Kristensen protect his phenomenological understanding of religion from the encroachments of theological interpretations? By what means does he hope and on what grounds can he claim to achieve an a-theological attitude towards the data he explores?

He attempts to achieve this attitude by means of a careful and self-conscious differentiation of the task of the philosopher of religion and theologian, on the one hand, from that of the historian and phenomenologist on the other. According to Kristensen, personal religious experience necessarily determines what falls under the heading of religion both for the philosopher of religion and for the phenomenologist and historian. The phenomenologist attempts to determine the meanings that the religious phenomena hold for the believers by using comparative methods. But he employs "guiding principles" in this research, which are provided by philosophy of religion. Kristensen does not attempt to derive the essence of religion from the most common elements encountered in phenomenological research. Moreover, he does not conjure up this essence by pure deduction. While he acknowledges that the task will be performed better the better he is acquainted with actual historical data, he insists that the formulation of the essence of religion is a philosophical task.\textsuperscript{20} Philosophy of religion attempts to describe the essence of religion by determining the relation of the religious to other spiritual realities—intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and so on.

Once the essence of religion is distinguished, it is unavoidable, in Kristensen's view, that certain religious phenomena, ideas of deity, formulations of belief, sacred rites, cultic acts observed in the historical data will prove to express this element better than others.

\textsuperscript{18} Kristensen, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{19} Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, \textit{1:25}.
\textsuperscript{20} Kristensen, p. 12.
Moreover, because it is religious *experience* that determines what religion *is* whose essence is being described, the most perfect expressions of the essence of religion will naturally emerge as those embodied in the religious tradition of the investigator's own religious experience. In this sense philosophy of religion cannot be divorced from the philosopher's "existential situation" and thus from his ultimate concern. Within this attitude the notion of the growth and development of religion through history quite automatically falls into place. Chantepie makes a serious effort to avoid structuring the data in terms of a developmental pattern. Nevertheless he is unable to avoid seeing certain phenomena as somehow more elevated than others. Proceeding beyond the thought of Chantepie, Kristensen accounts for this understanding of the data.

For Kristensen, the philosophical formulation of the essence of religion is the "indisputable right" of philosophy of religion. But when we so formulate the essence of religion, we must understand that we are dealing with our own ideas of religion. Thus "we must not delude ourselves that we have also learned to know the ideas of others." The essence of religion, Kristensen states, is "necessarily expressed for us in our own religion." Philosophy of religion, for Kristensen, is always at the same time religious philosophy. Thus, whatever formulation of the essence of religion philosophy of religion might produce, no transition is possible from this formulation to a faithful understanding of historical phenomena.

This insight of Kristensen is the foundation of his objection to certain developmental theories of religion. While Kuyper makes statements concerning both Buddhism and Islam that contemporary theological scholarship would probably judge to be irresponsible and preposterous, Kuyper has the merit of acknowledging that his critique of non-Christian forms of religious expression arises from his natural theology. Not all theologians did so. When Rudolf Otto discussed "the Holy" in terms of its primitive manifestations, its cruder phases, and so on, he apparently thought he was describing the history of religions. Kristensen's complaint against Otto is not simply

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 13.
that his views are mistaken, although he certainly believes they are, but that his research has crossed the boundary which separates theological and philosophical from historical and phenomenological research. Beginning with a definition of “the Holy” derived from his own religious experience, Otto proposes to formulate and elucidate this category in its historical manifestations. From Otto’s viewpoint, the expressions of “the Holy” that are the least familiar and the least meaningful can only be interpreted as anticipating the more familiar and more meaningful manifestations. These in turn can only be interpreted as anticipating the “highest,” the most perfect forms which Otto cannot help but find in his own tradition and from which, according to Kristensen, our conceptions of the essence of religion are always necessarily derived. It is Kristensen’s objection that, having elucidated the essence of the Holy, Otto assumes he has also arrived at a valid interpretation of history and an equally valid interpretation of the believers religious ideas. To this conclusion Kristensen strongly objects.23

The phenomenology of religion has to investigate what such various conceptions have meant for the religious persons concerned. And such persons, says Kristensen, have never conceived of their own religion as “a link in a chain of development.”24 In Kristensen’s opinion, the phenomenology of religion must be separated from the practice of religion.25 He has no objection to the work of the theologian. He argues only that the theologian as such has no authority in matters of historical or phenomenological research. As a theologian one is not a historian of the forms of religion nor an authority on the conceptions of those people whose religious behavior he tries to describe.

The A-Theological Perspective and the Method of Surrender

The phenomenology of Kristensen, like that of Chantepie, is a-theological in object and in attitude. In the case of Kristensen both of these facets of the a-theological trait are more refined and so-

23. Ibid., p. 17.  
25. Ibid., p. 423.
A-Theological Trait

phisticated than they are in Chantepie. The difference between the two displays the beginnings of a cumulative development. In the strategy by which Kristensen maintains an a-theological perspective upon the data he explores, the sophistication of his approach is even more apparent. We said that Chantepie maintains an a-theological perspective by means of the avoidance of objects about which he is unable to assume an a-theological attitude. He tries to deal with religious data without taking revelation into account, but he is unable so to deal with revelation itself. Like Chantepie, Kristensen seeks to maintain an a-theological perspective upon the data he explores. But he does this by means of a strategy different from that of Chantepie. Rather than simply exclude the discussion of data that for him are of ultimate significance, he argues that the historian and the practitioner of the phenomenology of religion must be able "to forget themselves," and "to surrender themselves to others."26 To give it a label we will refer to this strategy as the method of surrender.

It is Kristensen's view that every believer necessarily looks upon his own religion as a unique, autonomous, absolute, and therefore incomparable reality. He argues that this is the case, however, not only for the Christian but for the adherent of a non-Christian religion as well. And it is true not only for every religion as a whole but "for every part and every particular of religious belief."27 We cannot hope to see the phenomenon precisely from the perspective of the adherents themselves, yet as long as the would-be phenomenologist looks at the religious data exclusively from the perspective generated by his own religious viewpoint, he cannot hope to do justice to the interpretation of the alien ideas. If the phenomenologist deliberately employs conceptions derived from his own religion in the interpretation of others, it is his and nothing approximating their ideas that result. The method of surrender is the means by which he hopes to permit the alien ideas to speak their own language.

The surrender of which Kristensen speaks first renounces interpretive conceptions derived from one's own religious tradition and inappropriately applied the religious life of others. Such designations

27. Ibid., p. 6.
as "primitive" and "highly developed" forms of religion, of "savage" and "civilized nations," in his view, are quite out of place in phenomenological research. Secondly and more fundamentally, the surrender of which he speaks involves the renunciation of one's tacit commitment to the absolute incomparability of the contents of one's own religious tradition. Within the compass of this surrender, Kristensen achieves an a-theological perspective without calling for the avoidance of theological data. We observed that while Chantepie tried to achieve an a-theological interpretation of the data, the privileged status of data informed by his own religious commitments obstructed that goal. Adopting the method he does, it is not surprising that in the material he explores he finds nothing to which the term "revelation" would, even analogically, apply.\(^\text{28}\) For the theology of the tradition in which Chantepie stands, revelation is central to the Christian faith. Chantepie excludes revelation from his discussion of the meaning of the most important religious phenomena not simply because it is discussed appropriately in the domain of theology, but because belonging to this domain, it is essentially incomparable to anything encountered in the history of religions. When, on the other hand, the absolute incomparability of revelation is surrendered; when in this surrender, one seeks to understand the conceptions of the alien believers themselves, the religious data are viewed in another light. Phenomena for which ethnologists and historians have given only the most superficial explanations are recognized to embody a meaning for the adherent that is very deep and profound. We can illustrate this by comparing the treatment by Chantepie with that by Kristensen of the phenomenon of sacred places.

For Chantepie the sanctity of certain places consists in the fact that the gods dwell there or are worshipped there or both. The dwellings of the gods, he can only observe, appear among the most un-

\(^{28}\) Discussing the objects of worship, Chantepie states that it is difficult to determine whether worship is directed to the material object, the spirit indwelling it, or the power therein revealed. (Chantepie, p. 72). Yet there is no indication in this passage that this term is related to what Chantepie means by 'revelation' in the Christian theological sense of the term. In any case, he leaves the question unanswered.
approachable places on earth: desert caves, clefts in rocks, and most frequently, woods and mountains. He observes, however, that even when they are not conceived specifically as the dwellings of the gods, mountains are themselves often regarded with religious awe.\textsuperscript{29} In the light of the method of surrender, Kristensen more fully understands the connection between the mountain and the dwelling of the deity, as well as the religious awe that the ancients accorded the mountain itself. Among many ancient traditions, the notion of the hill of creation is related to the sacredness of mountains where life arose “in the beginning.” The day of creation is referred to in the Egyptian Book of the Dead (1:19) as “the day of the elevation of the earth.” The earth’s height, which came up out of the primeval waters (the hillock that appears in the receding waters of the Nile), was the place where the earth began to live. “There life arose and from there it spread.”\textsuperscript{30} The height is the place where the life of the earth reveals itself in vegetation. Babylonian texts often speak of fertility in connection with mountains, and in the Avesta, the sacred mountain of the East, the place of blessedness and divine wisdom is called “the fertile mountain.” The earth reveals the mystery of life where it is high. For this reason, the heights (bamoth) among the Semites and Canaanites are the sites of temples or altars, and in Egypt the height is the dwelling of Osiris. Kristensen further observes that the Egyptian word for high land (ma-at) is also the word for the divine order of life in the universal sense.\textsuperscript{31} The life of the earth, in this conception, is also the life of the cosmic order. While for Chantepie the sacred significance of the mountain is largely a matter of contingent fact, for Kristensen the height or hill is the place where, for ancient man, the mystery of the earth’s life is manifest; it is “the place of divine revelation in general” (emphasis mine). Here altars were built because they represented the dwelling of God—altars which themselves are the image or likeness of the high places in which divine life is revealed.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{29} Chantepie, p. 162. \textsuperscript{30} Kristensen, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{31} Elsewhere Kristensen compares the word ma-at to the Hindu term rta and to the Chinese term tao.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 106–8.
In Kristensen’s interpretation, the incomparability of revelation has been surrendered. Thus the notion of revelation is able to illuminate the data in a new and refreshing way. This hill of creation, as Kristensen further notes, is represented among many ancient peoples as the navel of the earth; it is situated at the center. At Delphi the omphalos is depicted as a hill-shaped stone where Apollo resides as god of the oracle. Here we can come to know the life of the earth and of the cosmos since it is here on the height that life—divine life—arises. In Kristensen’s view, Olympus is the home of the god not as some scholars have conjectured because it “sticks into heaven;” the small Olympoi are also homes of the gods, nor is it because it indicates the exalted nature of divine beings. This mountain, like the omphalos, is the place where the earth lives and therefore also where the cosmos lives. “When the earth came up out of the waters of chaos as the hill of Creation, the life of the world began.”

The gods dwell upon the mountain because it is the locus of divine renascent life. For Kristensen it is not by accident that the Babylonian-Assyrian word that stands for cosmic mountain (e-kur), the mountain of fertility, also means “temple” and “god.” “How could God better be depicted than by means of the mountain, that part of the world in which His activity and life is most visible?”

When revelation is rendered comparable, we recognize the revelatory character that religious phenomena possess for their adherents. The theological concept of revelation, we might say, enables us to perceive revelations among the phenomena. And the recognition of such revelations illuminates the religious data. Chantepie ob-

33. Ibid., p. 108.
34. Ibid., p. 109. A clear example of the kind of explanation of religious phenomena that Kristensen rejects is the view of Herbert Spencer that temples were originally graves. This accords with Spencer’s general theory of the origin of religion in the worship of the dead. Spencer, Principles of Sociology. While Chantepie finds this theory unsatisfactory, his critique is less developed than Kristensen’s. His response to Spencer’s theory is that the connection between the temple and the grave “holds good in certain cases only.” (Chantepie, p. 162.) In the light of insights derived from the believers themselves, Kristensen finds that burial is a sacrament which bestows the life of the earth upon the dead man. The grave hill is not the origin of the temple; it is an image of the earth hill, the center of the world.
serves that the building, arrangement, and ornamentation of temples in Greece, Babylon, Egypt, and elsewhere seem to display a symbolic meaning. Yet he finds the meaning of these symbols very difficult to explain: "Sometimes it seems to refer to the structure of the world, sometimes to the religious relationship of man to the gods." In Kristensen's perspective, the character of temples can be understood in a deeper way. He observes that the temple of ancient Rome was not a place arbitrarily chosen for public religious functions. The word temenos, from which temple is derived, was originally a particular section of the sky within which the god reveals himself in the flight of birds or in lightning flashes. The earthly templum is the image or likeness of the celestial one and thus the place where the Augurs observe the celestial signs and perform their sacred rites. Because the temple is the image of the celestial templum, it is an appropriate place to receive divine insight by means of omens and to actualize divine life by means of sacrifice. For Kristensen, "the templum is a cosmic locality, a sacred place; in the full sense of the term God is at work here." In a similar way, he observes that the most impressive aspect of the Babylonian temple complex, the majestic Ziggurat with its tower of five or seven terraces, represents the cosmic mountain. It is understood to extend to the heavens where, at its pinnacle, God is thought to reside. Kristensen observes that the architectural plan of these temples was not understood to have been devised by human skill, it was revealed by God. "Man by himself did not know the dwelling place of God." The document of this revelation, the plan of the building with its measurements and design, was inscribed on a stone that, once set within the foundation, was the cornerstone of the temple. Even if the structure was later enlarged it had to conform to this plan.

When the commitment to the incomparability of revelation is surrendered, we not only recognize the revelatory character of ancient religious conceptions, we discover that the idea of revelation actually has broader application for the ancients than it usually does for us.

From this perspective, Kristensen finds not only that the location and character of sacred places but also the structure of civilization itself is related, in the ancient conception, to a revelation of the divine. The myths of Babylonia, Rome, and Egypt about the origin of human civilization explain existing laws, institutions, and arts as having been given by Ea, Saturn, or Osiris "in the beginning." According to Kristensen, "[a]n irreducible factor was sensed in the existing civilization and was conceived as the constitutive law of society (the basis of its life)." Laws and institutions of this sort are not understood to be mere products of human insight. The foundations of life which they express are regarded as divine realities that men can only confront. Says Kristensen, "[t]he existing civilization is felt to be a divine reality, and therefore the origin of the civilization has been ascribed to a divine revelation."

Much knowledge which appears to the modern mind to be the result of purely rational insight was seen by the Ancients, in Kristensen's view, to be revealed. The techniques of agriculture are regarded as a mystery which has been communicated to man by the gods of the earth or the underworld: Ea, Osiris, Triptolemus, or Saturn-Kronos. Looking at these conceptions in terms of revelation, Kristensen recognizes that in the life of the ancients, the fertility of the earth is not a process of which man is in control. "How could men by their own power have obtained power over the earth's life in plowing, sowing, or harvesting?" Likewise, the ancients regarded the methods of medical science which aim at healing—itself a resurrection of life from death—not as discovered by human research but as revealed by the gods of the underworld; for in healing the mystery of divine life is revealed. "Ancient science," according to Kristensen, "was a mystical knowledge and a magical capacity, not only religious but also divine, just as is 'sancta theologia.'"

For the theology from which the phenomenology of religion wished to be distinguished, the revelation that is attested in sacred scripture cannot be taken as something alongside of which there

40. Ibid., p. 234.
might be others. For the project in which Kuyper is engaged, it is of little or no interest that the adherents of what he knows as natural theology might understand that to which their religious behavior is directed in terms analogous to revelation. The point for him is that they are wrong, that their religious life is but the degeneration of the inherent human capacity for religion that God created within us. Kuyper does understand that "even the most repulsive idolatry stands in organic relation to the purest revelation," and he does unequivocally acknowledge the importance, even the temporal priority, of natural over special revelation. He even speaks of the natural knowledge of God as the canvas upon which the special revelation is embroidered. Yet for Kuyper, it does not follow that what ancient or primitive man, what human imagination outside of the Christian tradition, makes of this self-disclosure is in any way comparable to the obedient response to God in Christian faith. With Calvin, Kuyper holds that without enrichment by special revelation, the natural knowledge of God is even less than useless. When the natural breathing of air is obstructed by the croup, the heroic operation that makes a new opening in the throat for air to pass to the lungs is like the special revelation through which alone the natural capacity for religion can be of any use.41

In Chantepie's phenomenology, the essential incomparability of that to which theology points is still assumed. He therefore handles the question of revelation a-theologically, by not dealing with revelation at all. For this reason the meanings that he finds in religious phenomena are largely structural in nature. By contrast, the meanings that Kristensen finds are semantic. While Kristensen's perspective is a-theological, it does not negate the essential incomparability of that to which theology points. It does not dispute the claim of theology that the revelation to which it is witness is unique, final, and incomparable. Far from it! What it surrenders is the notion that the claim to uniqueness is itself unique. It proposes that the commitment to an incomparable revelation is not itself incomparable. In the "surrender of himself to others," we might say, the phenom-
enologist confesses that the revelation to which he is committed is by its nature incomparable. Yet he also confesses that in making the claim to an incomparable revelation, he is not unique. To put it another way, Kristensen's surrender of himself to others is not the surrender of the incomparability of the content of revelation, but his surrender of the claim that the idea of revelation is unique.

The theological status of other claims to a unique and absolute revelation is a question which Kristensen leaves to theology to answer for itself. The phenomenological evaluation can only be that on their own terms they are correct. If we apply the phenomenological method, says Kristensen, "we come to know the absolute." We come to know, that is, "what is absolute for the believer." And what is absolute for the believer, as he says, "is never just relatively absolute!" For reformation theology from the time of Calvin, revelation comes to man, as it were, from above or beyond the natural realm. By being revealed, it does not come to be known in the natural sense of the words. It is Kristensen's observation that for ancient man as well revelation is "communication from the outside." The Deity gives no explanation for his commands. The basic principles by which he works remain unknown. And, as in reformation theology, that which to ancient man is revealed remains concealed in its essential being. "The essence—the divine will—remains impenetrable, for no man penetrates the council of God."

42. Kristensen, p. 18. 43. Ibid., p. 280.
The Anti-Reductive Trait in the Phenomenology 
of W. Brede Kristensen

In our discussion of the a-historical trait and the a-theological trait, we have noticed that as they appear in the thought of Kristensen these traits are more developed than they were in the phenomenology of Chantepie. Turning to the anti-reductive trait in the thought of Kristensen, we find a similar advance. For Chantepie religious phenomena are larger and more manifold than the dominant theories of religion acknowledge. He believes there are qualities in religious phenomena that distinguish them from those associated either with philosophy or morality. The weakness he finds in such theories is evident in his discussion of Tylor, Spencer, and Müller. In two important ways, Chantepie's anti-reductive concern suggests the features of a distinctive approach to religion: (1) In his assessment of the work of certain influential theorists, Chantepie sometimes appeals to the views of the peoples who hold the religious conceptions in question, and (2) he regards the religious conceptions of these peoples as referring to an order of experience that is the specific and common property of mankind. Becoming more self-conscious and more intentional, these suggestions of Chantepie's phenomenology become explicit and self-conscious features of Kristensen's approach to religion.

Reductionism and the Mystical Background of Existence

Among the reasons for Chantepie's rejection of Tylor's view of primitive animism was his observation that the "savages" themselves distinguish the souls which they worship from the heavenly gods,
from mundane spirits, and from fetishes. In his discussion of Spencer's view of the earliest form of religion, he observes that the nations who worship them distinguish the dead from the gods, and that among certain peoples, the living as well as the dead receive veneration. Against Müller's view, he includes mythology under the rubric of religion because the mythological literature was regarded with reverence by the ancient peoples as containing an old and holy tradition. Moreover, Chantepie ascribes importance not only to the original meaning of a myth, but to the particular meaning it received in the life of the individual nations involved. Following Chantepie, Kristensen makes these beliefs and perceptions the centerpiece of an entire approach to religion. In a phenomenon like ritual purification, it is the person alone who performs or undergoes the rite who really knows its religious meaning. From this the modern scholar is very far removed. Kristensen believes, in fact, that the distance that separates the modern European from the religious conceptions of any of the ancient nations is far greater than the distance that separates these nations from one another. This is evident, he says, from the congruence among their most basic religious ideas, notwithstanding the different ways in which they are expressed. The distance is not simply one of time, for between the different peoples of antiquity, there was often a greater separation in time than that between us and them. The distance involved, he thinks, is the distance between two very different “types of civilization.”

The effort to distinguish these two differing “types of civilization” may not be the most persuasive feature of Kristensen's thought. It certainly relies upon generalizations that are sweeping and sometimes uncertain. Yet its purpose points to a significant feature of his whole approach to religion in the light of which we might tolerate the generalizations in which he sometimes indulges. He denotes these respectively as the “modern type” represented by European civilization and especially by modern Christianity, and the “ancient type” that is represented by all the “nations of antiquity” as well as

those “civilizations” that are “foreign” to our own. The “modern type” of civilization, according to Kristensen, made its first appearance in Greek history in the “classical enlightenment,” appearing prominently in Aristotle’s thought. Its principal manifestation was the idea of the dominating activity of the human mind in subjecting nature to itself. This mentality became prominent in the later history of Greece and Rome without replacing the ancient type of civilization which continued to exist alongside of it. This way of thinking was pushed into the background by ancient Christianity and remained in the background until the thirteenth century. Eventually with the Renaissance it became the dominating cultural feature of a new age. Since that time, according to Kristensen, the same essential type of civilization has characterized modern Europe. Our scientific and ethical orientation, in his view, is an extension of this type of civilization, which remains predominantly Aristotelian in nature.

2. Those civilizations foreign to our own presumably refers to present day tribal societies as well as to modern day India and East Asia.

3. Ibid., p. 20.

4. Ibid., p. 20. Considered from the perspective of present day scholarship, Kristensen’s effort to distinguish the “ancient” from “modern” types of civilization is among the most problematic of his ideas. Certainly no one today would try to speak collectively of “antiquity” or “ancient peoples” or even perhaps in this case of “nations.” Likewise it seems inappropriate to speak collectively as he does of “modern man” or to characterize him as Aristotelian. The intellectual history of the West which he elaborates is also hardly credible. Nevertheless, the attempt of Kristensen in this maneuver to recognize the distance that separates him from those whose religion he wants to study is an important step in the development of phenomenological approaches to religion, and his designation of these civilizations as “types” is significant. While we cannot pursue it here, it invites comparison with some works of the same period which attempt a distinction of a similar kind. It is interesting in this respect that Levy-Bruhl distinguished the mentalité primitive from that of “modern man” as a “type,” and that it was in the same terms that Tönnies drew his famous distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Lucien Levy-Bruhl says, “What I am attempting here, by way of introduction, is a preliminary study of the most general laws to which collective representations in inferior races are subjected, and more especially those of the most primitive peoples of which we know anything. I
The differences in orientation of these two "types of civilization," according to Kristensen, make it very difficult for the modern scholar to understand the religious conceptions of the ancients. Characteristic of the ancient type of civilization is a vivid awareness of the involvement and cooperation between "finite and the infinite factors" in all phenomena pertaining to the "essentials of life." In the person of antiquity, there was a profound sense of the mystery that surrounded him, "a feeling of spontaneous forces and energies" whose meaning he could understand only by means of myth. Ancient man was also acquainted with relations of causality. But for him the non-rational factor in experience was the more important. For the ancients, "another world invades the world we know, and this other world is an incalculable world which makes all the calculations of ordinary life quite insignificant." It is in this other world, in Kristensen's view, that the life of the ancients is based. For the man of modern civilization there may indeed be incalculable factors in life, but the pervading modern conviction is that the incalculable


5. Kristensen, p. 20.
factors in life are simply those unknown, and that the unknown forces that affect us are becoming more and more limited and will eventually be explained in terms no different in essence from those that are already known. Thus while a phenomenon like an eclipse of the sun or the moon might evoke in modern man an emotional response, he nevertheless thinks of the phenomenon as something that can be explained, "as completely explained as the shadow which a tree casts on the ground." It is on this conviction that his everyday life is based. Modern man is aware that all he knows is based finally upon such unknown realities as "force" and "energy" and that notions like "gravity" and "centrifugal force" can, perhaps in one sense, be called mythological ideas. But he is inclined to structure his life in terms of the kind of experience that can be explained and to employ these ideas in that effort. It is Kristensen's view that modern civilization's sense of its ability to subject nature to itself has been won at the cost of "the awareness of the mystical background of existence."

In Kristensen's view, the modern type of civilization differs from the ancient type also in the manner in which it conceives of the ultimate mystery that finally surrounds its life. When modern man reflects upon the mystery that surrounds him, when he tries to conceive of the ultimate principles upon which his existence depends, he tends to conceive of this as pointing towards unity of conception. If he reflects upon this mystery in religious terms, he tends to regard it as the work of a single and all-powerful God who is understood as the ultimate cause. For the ancients, according to Kristensen, the mystery that lies behind the occurrence of one phenomenon differs from that behind another as much as the phenomena themselves differ. The force that works in the sprouting of the seed is different from the one that works in the stem that bears the leaf. And in the life of the human being, in growth and reproduction, in the creative power of body and mind, the ancients saw autonomous powers at work. Such autonomous powers according to Kristensen, "cannot be reduced to one and the same principle." This understanding of ex-

6. Ibid., pp. 22f. 7. Ibid., p. 20.
perience is the background of what has commonly been called poly-
theism. In reality, it is “the conception of the divine which corre-
sponds to the infinite variety in the mystery of being.”

It is Kristensen’s conviction that the autonomous divine powers
that the ancients met in particular objects and events are not as such
would induce us to worship. The modern scholar sees nothing of the
infinite in this sense in any of these phenomena. This implies not
only that the religious conceptions of the ancients will be difficult
to understand, it implies also that any explanation that fails to rec-
ognize the distance that separates ancient from modern civilization
will tend to reduce the ancient to modern categories of thought. If
the only religious reality is the perceptions of the believers them-

Reductionism and the Nature of Rational
Theoretical Explanation

The difficulty that modern scholars have in understanding the
religious conceptions of the ancients is evident, according to Kris-
tensen, in mistaken interpretations that, despite the progress of phil-
ological and archeological research, have persisted into the present
century. Kristensen’s appraisal of these views proceeds along lines
similar to Chantepie's case against some social scientific approaches to religion. His criticism, however, is more specific and focused. With Chantepie, Kristensen rejects attempts to explain all religious phenomena by means of a single key. "Sweeping explanations of religious data," he says, "are always more or less superficial and frequently are even misleading." Kristensen however lays emphasis upon the problematic character of "rational explanation" as such. As an expression of modern ways of thought, it tries to account for the deviation of the ancients from modern ways of thought without recognizing the distinctive religious significance of the phenomena for the life of the adherents.

It is Kristensen's view that "rational analysis" looks upon events of nature as capable of being dissolved into elements. By such analysis these elements are related to each other so that they can be understood in terms of cause and effect. The event as it occurs in experience is broken into parts. "The unity of its essential being, which is inaccessible to rational analysis, is set aside." For the ancients, on the other hand, it is the unity of the phenomena as such that is the focus of religious attention. This, for them, is the "revelation of a self-subsistent life." The modern rational analysis of religious phenomena that occur in the life of the ancients attributes motives familiar to modern civilization to the ideas and practices of the ancients. The apparent irrationality of the ancient views, their deviation from modern ways of thought, is then explained in terms of an inadequate or mistaken knowledge of nature which modern civilization has corrected.

A key example of such explanation is what Kristensen calls the "ethnographic theory of sacrifice," advanced by Edward B. Tylor. For Tylor, the most reasonable way to interpret sacrifice is to discover its original motivation and to determine how this has been modified in the course of time. From his analysis of a wide range of ethnographic material, Tylor believed he had comprehended its original significance. He attempted to show how sacrifice has developed as a modification of this original meaning into the forms it assumes in

11. Ibid., p. 22. 12. Ibid., p. 36.
the major religious traditions. The influence of Tylor’s theory, according to Kristensen, is the result of the “clarity of his presentation and the simplicity of his explanation.” He observes that a people of the West coast of Africa offer to the sea a jar of palm oil, a bag of rice and corn, a piece of painted cotton cloth, a bottle of brandy, and several other objects. They do these things, according to Tylor, so that the sea will be calm the following day. Taking account of the primitive’s knowledge of the processes of nature, Tylor thinks this whole procedure can be understood as an exchange of goods for service. Leaving aside the question whether ethnographic data inform us about the primitive meaning of sacrifice at all, Kristensen objects to Tylor’s assumption that the data to which he refers are nearly so easy to understand. The people of West Africa, he says, “see with different eyes than we.” For them the sea to which they offer these objects is a “different reality than it is for us.” He further observes that in much of the data to which Tylor refers, the gods to whom sacrifice is made are said to take from the sacrifice only the “soul,” the “life,” the “essence,” or the “fragrance” of the object that is given. For Kristensen this is a clear indication that the sacrifice is quite unlike a simple and rational transaction between persons. “What man,” he asks, “takes over the soul of a gift?” The relation that exists between man and deity, he says, is always a relation of a “mystical kind.”

By interpreting sacrifice in modern, rational terms, Tylor has accounted in a rational way for the deviation between the behavior of the people he explores and that of the modern world. Kristensen's complaint is that in so doing, he has failed to see the element in sacrifice that makes it distinctive. For the adherent, according to

13. Ibid., p. 458.
16. Kristensen, p. 460. Kristensen further states that even when the believers offer rational explanations, these are often given simply to satisfy the person asking the question. He also notes that in Christianity as well, the believers sometimes give rational explanations of their ideas and rites which are plainly unfaithful to their religious attitude.
Kristensen, the entire act of a sacrifice is "a participation in divine life." The sacrifice is "a religio-magical or mystical act which takes place outside the finite realm." In this act the sacrificer as well as the priest "leaves the finite world." Interpreting this act in the light of textual sources from India, he states in the words of the Satapatha Brahmana, "he steps out of the world of man and into the world of the gods."\(^7\)

Kristensen's view of the inadequacy of theoretical explanation is also reflected both in his critique of Tylor's theory of primitive animism and of the alternative to this theory that was proposed by Herbert Spencer. Kristensen acknowledges that prior to Tylor's lectures before the Royal Society in London in 1867, the word "fetishism" had been applied to "all especially strange forms of worship and every expression of 'primitive' religion or cultus." He thinks that against this background, "animism" should be seen as an important discovery. As Kristensen understands it, the term refers to "the childlike conception of the animation of all of nature" and the belief in "countless spiritual beings who are at work in the whole process of nature." According to Kristensen, this term correctly includes the veneration of the spirits of the dead, the spirits of natural phenomena, of rain, wind, sea, and the spirits of sicknesses, as well as "evil spirits" unrelated to any natural phenomenon, "who can exercise a fatal influence at critical moments in life."\(^18\) Such data, he says, have been described with more or less accuracy in travelogues and missionary correspondence. According to Kristensen, a belief in countless spiritual beings among the peoples of ancient civilizations is undeniable. Like Chantepie, however, Kristensen denies that this form of religion is exclusively "primitive." Since Tylor's discovery of animism, other forms of religion have been found among such peoples in which a "spirit," in the same sense of "an individual, personal being with a definite will, confronting man as a friend or a foe," is entirely absent. Kristensen notes that as early as 1878, "manifestations of power" and "dynamistic ideas" which involve no specific animating spirit were reported by Codrington to Max Müller who

17. Ibid., pp. 461, 486.  
18. Ibid., pp. 173f.
set forth this type of data as a form of religion distinctive from the belief in spiritual beings. According to Kristensen, such manifestations of power are known in Melanesia as _mana_, among the Bataks as _tondi_, and among various North American Indian peoples as _orenda_, _manitu_, and _wakanda_.

Like Chantepie, Kristensen also holds that even if animism could be called primitive, it is very different from anything resembling a “primitive natural philosophy.” The ancient “belief” in spirits or spiritual beings does not involve the distinction between nature and spirit that is presupposed by philosophical inquiry. For the ancients, the phenomena of nature themselves are “spiritually determined.” Kristensen argues that Tylor is mistaken in his opinion that so-called primitive peoples, conceive of objects in general “animistically.” Only those objects can be so conceived that are experienced as possessing a self-subsistent energy upon which man is dependent. Such spontaneous power is located in such things as foodstuffs and materials which are fashioned into tools. Peoples of ancient civilizations conceive of objects of this nature not as means to be used nor as objects under their control. They are not “understood” in the modern sense of the term; rather they possess an energy that man encounters and by which he finds his life determined. For Kristensen the distinction between animistic and what have been called dynamistic ideas is a fluid one. Often a general power becomes worshipped as a specific spirit. Yet both of these ways of thinking are very different from philosophical ways of thought. Kristensen argues that because these data are not theoretical explanations of nature such as are given by natural philosophy, they cannot be explained simply on the basis of a mistaken or deficient, which is to say a “primitive,” view of nature. Behind them, according to Kristensen, “there are certain positive religious needs.” What is involved here is not a defective view of nature but an affective awareness of the “spiritual character” of the natural phenomena upon which man is dependent.19

As we observed, Herbert Spencer also argues against the view that

19. Ibid., pp. 175f.
animism is the original form of religion. The basis of his claim was that even the higher animals distinguish the living from lifeless objects. He argues that what has been called animism could only have been the result of intellectual misconceptions that could only have developed subsequent to primitive man. Kristensen does not defend the view that animism is primitive, but he specifically opposes the view that it arises from later mistaken intellectual ideas. With Albert Réville, Kristensen points out that while animals do not mistake the living for the lifeless, it is the privilege of man to do so. “Animal instinct includes no hesitation and no freedom for interpretation,” and the impersonal accurate apprehension, which is important for the animal, is not always so for him.\(^{20}\) When animistic or dynamistic ideas are formulated in terms of cause and effect relations, the result appears to modern man as something like the formulation of a natural law, a formulation that is plainly false. As natural laws, the idea in Indonesia that feeding the rice soul causes the growth of rice and the idea among the Dayaks of Borneo that eating deer meat will cause them to be timid, are certainly incorrect. But according to Kristensen, ideas of this nature cannot be adjudicated by such standards. As “natural laws” they are false, but as “laws of the spirit,” they are correct. The non-rational act corresponds to the non-rational character of the process involved. Says Kristensen: “The Ancients were often mistaken regarding the material course of events, but with respect to the spiritual side of events, they often saw more deeply than we.”\(^{21}\) It is Chantepie’s opinion that the method of the natural sciences does not suffice when we judge religious phenomena according to their “inner worth.”\(^{22}\) Here, Kristensen offers specific reasons for believing this is so. The method of the natural sciences is inappropriate for a consideration of religion according to its inner worth because what is involved in the inner life of the religious adherent is other than a “lawful” relation. In Kristensen’s view, the concept of ‘natural law’ has no place among these ideas. It is either wholly unknown or understood to relate only

\(^{20}\) Ibid., pp. 177f.  
\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 379.  
\(^{22}\) Chantepie, p. 13.
to the external and unessential side of natural life. Judged in terms of the ways of thinking of modern civilization, animism is a mistake. Yet for Kristensen, “its mistake is full of promise.”

Kristensen’s concern with the limitations of rational explanations, however, also applies to attempts to understand religious data in terms other than those of natural law. In fact he finds other efforts of this nature in the ancient world itself. In Kristensen’s view, the famous allegorical interpretation by Philo of the creation story in Genesis can be read as an endeavor to interpret the religious conceptions of the ancients in rational terms. For Philo, Adam and Eve are “the two sided manifestation of spiritual being.” Adam is spirit in its aspect of intellect; Eve signifies the activity arising from the intellect. The “Rib” is “the force which slumbers in the spiritual activity and is already potentially present.” For Philo, God does not accomplish his will by instrumental acts which could have only material results. As spirit, God is identical with absolute reason, beauty, and goodness. He actualizes his essential being in a spiritual way. For Philo creation is a purely spiritual event. It is Kristensen’s view that this interpretation, like modern explanations that rely upon natural law, denies the essential meaning which the phenomena held for the ancient believers. What for Philo, as a child of the Greek enlightenment, was a “metaphor” for something else, something he could

23. Kristensen, pp. 270, 178. Kristensen does not precisely hold that there is no concept of natural law of any kind among the ancients. In fact he finds among the ancients an absolute order or ‘law of the universe’ and of society. He refers to it also as an ‘absolute law of life’. But he thinks that conceptions of this nature (expressed in ancient languages in such terms as rta, ash, ma-at, and tao) are very different from the kind of lawfulness we find in the idea of natural law in modern thought. He suggests that these concepts can be called ‘speculations.’ He states, however, that they are “not empty speculations or lifeless abstractions.” From them comes a power which can only come from religion. Kristensen thinks they are “what Schleiermacher calls ‘Anschauung des Universums’ wherein the world is conceived as a spiritual unity,” as opposed to ‘theories’ which try to explain the world. (Ibid., p. 30, 33 ff.) In this connection it is interesting that in the ancient Anschauung of the sky as the place of divine wisdom, we become acquainted with what Max Müller calls the ‘perception of the infinite’. Kristensen, however, does not follow Müller in his view of myth. For Kristensen, myths are “not empty or false inventions, but expressions of religious belief in the form of visible images.” (Ibid., p. 62.)
“understand” on his own terms, creative spiritual activity was for the believers not a metaphor at all, but reality.²⁴

In a similar way, Plutarch, a follower of Philo, thought he could remove from the God of the ancient religions all that he found to be “ethically unworthy.” He believed that it must be more pious to believe that there are no gods at all than to believe that God is anything like an un dependable, irritable, vindictive, and narrow minded person.²⁵ At the same time, Plutarch was deeply impressed with the wisdom of the ancient traditions in myth and cultic rites. In the gods of ancient Greece and other ancient peoples, he thought he saw symbols of a providence which governed all things. For him, “polytheism,” especially that of ancient Egypt, was but a means to represent in a visible way certain eternal truths which were valid both for him and for all right-thinking men.²⁶ As Kristensen puts it, Plutarch wanted to share the Egyptian gods even though he did not live on the Nile. He held that “the essence of the gods is a divine essence, which is not foreign to any believer.” For Kristensen, on the other hand, what is ethically worthy for the ancient world cannot be determined by the standards of the Greek enlightenment. The aspects of the ancient religion which Plutarch thinks he shares are not the religious realities of the ancients. For Plutarch, nature as worshiped by the Egyptians was a manifestation of “Spirit.” For the Egyptians, on the other hand, “Spirit is perceptible nature.” For them, according to Kristensen, the Nile was not an accidental “symbol” of Osiris. It was his “image,” his “revealed essence.” From this way of thinking the ideas of Plutarch are very far removed.²⁷

²⁴. Ibid., pp. 249ff.
²⁵. Ibid., p. 250.
²⁶. Ibid., p. 405.
²⁷. Ibid., pp. 400ff., 38f. For Kristensen, the ‘symbol’ is generally more loosely connected with its original than is the ‘image’. The “symbol,” he says, “is a more or less conscious sign, sometimes rather arbitrarily chosen or invented, of a spiritual reality.” Thus what the observer calls a ‘symbol’ will not be so called by the believer. Kristensen notes that Protestants refer to the Cross and the Crucifix as “Christian Symbols,” while Roman Catholic believers usually use terms which bring out the sacred nature of these objects. For them, these are not symbols but images of divine reality. For the ancient believers, the symbols of the ancient gods, the lightning of
For Kristensen the strongest argument against a symbolic interpretation of the religious ideas of the ancients is that the concept of a symbol, as Plutarch employs it, is totally absent from their own way of thinking. In his exploration of the ancient texts, Kristensen finds no equivalent to the word "symbol" as it appears in Plutarch and in the modern world. "Nowhere is it indicated that myths, sacred rites, or sacred objects have a deeper meaning than the obvious one, that they have a symbolic meaning." The believer does not speak of his religious "myths" as stories with a deeper meaning than is immediately manifest; he speaks simply of his sacred reality.28

Kristensen observes that his argument here develops the same point that the school of comparative philology raised against the work of Friedrich Creuzer. For Kristensen, however, the alternative to Creuzer's approach proposed by comparative philology created only further problems. He notes that since the work of Creuzer, it has become the fashion to treat the ancients texts as literally as possible. For Kristensen, this can lead only to formulations that are impossible to believe or to understand. For us, it makes no sense to hear that the earth is a bull or that bread or water is life. For Kristensen the ideas of an alien religion are like the words of a foreign language. They are difficult to interpret, first because they are foreign, but secondly because in our own language there is often no equivalent for Zeus, the owl or the snake of Athena, were not symbols, but "the actual images of these gods, images of their divine essence and activity." (Ibid., p. 400.)

28. Ibid., p. 401. For Kristensen, the inadequacy of symbolic interpretations of religious ideas is evident even in attempts to understand modern forms of religion. For the Christian, the view that Jesus Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of a virgin, was crucified dead and buried, that he descended into hell, arose from the dead, and ascended into heaven, is "not a myth, but the adequate formulation of divine reality." (Ibid., p. 406.) Kristensen would apparently consider a de-mythologized form of Christianity illegitimate, and would apparently reject the Tillich's notion of a 'broken myth'. This raises the questions of the status of modern interpretations of other religious traditions, including perhaps those that modern believers accept. Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and Myth, ed. H. W. Bartsch (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) and Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
the foreign term. To insist upon a literal interpretation is to insist upon the use of incomprehensible terms.

Kristensen believes, nevertheless, that despite its limitations a well supported symbolic interpretation of the data is perhaps the closest a modern scholar can come to a valid appreciation of the religious ideas of the ancients. Such an interpretation can be admissible, however, only if it is understood that what for the observer is a "symbol" is for the ancient "the only accurate and completely adequate expression of the reality which is meant."29 A symbolic interpretation is adequate only to the extent that it recognizes that the interpretation falls short of the ancients' perceptions, that this perception remains autonomous and irreducible to our terms. Kristensen in fact acknowledges that Plutarch's approach is profound. "He has stated the principle whereby we can at least approximately understand the alien gods and their worship." Rather than attempting to explain the religious views of the ancients in terms of rational, i.e. non-religious behavior, Plutarch "has pointed to the side of our understanding which is closest to the Egyptian view."30 Plutarch's principal weakness is that he fails to see that the "deeper meaning," the "essential element" which he finds in the religion of Ancient Egypt, is his own religion and not the religion of the Ancient Egyptians.31 Likewise, Kristensen thinks that by means of his symbolic interpretation, Creuzer sometimes saw "with the eye of genius." Yet he was wrong in ascribing his own ideas of myth and other religious conceptions to the Ancients and wrong as well in his theory of the origin of Greek mythology.32

It is Kristensen's view that although the ancients never spoke of a symbolic meaning of their religious ideas and rites, it is legitimate and necessary for the modern scholar to do so. Two examples will illustrate how this is so. In ancient texts, a familiar term for "eternal life" or "absolute life" is the "bread of life." According to Kristensen, it can be said with certainty that among the ancient peoples this

29. Ibid., p. 404.
30. Ibid., p. 38.
31. Ibid., p. 405.
32. Ibid., p. 403.
phrase had a non-symbolic meaning. For them, bread, and food in general, were not "symbols," but divine beings, the "typical representatives and bearers of observable divine life." About this meaning certain texts are especially clear. The Egyptian word for "food" also stands for "the commanding word," the word of the creator. In bread and in foodstuffs, the Egyptians saw the divine word which created the world, and whereby it lives. In Kristensen's view, it is quite impossible for us to conceive of bread in this manner as anything more than a metaphor or "symbol" of life. Even in the Christian Eucharist, we find no equivalent for this ancient idea. On the contrary, the ritual consecration of the bread of the eucharist reveals that the bread does not work by its own power, but is made sacred for the purpose. In Kristensen's view, "we cannot approach the Ancient conception of the 'food of life' more closely than by calling food a symbol of divine life." The use of the concept of "symbol" is an aid which we employ in order even partially to understand the ancients. "But for the Ancients the head of grain in the Eleusinian Mysteries is not a symbol, and neither is the cultivation of the Rarian Plain."

In the same way, the "living water," which appears among numerous ancient texts, can have no more than a symbolic or metaphorical meaning for modern ways of thought. The evidence, however, is that the ancients saw this as a divine reality in its own right. Ancient water baptism was not a symbolic act representing regeneration, but "a religio-magical means to actualize regeneration." Kristensen notes with interest that some Christian churches go as far as to say that in baptism in water the Spirit creates new life. But he also observes that for the ancients no Spirit was necessary. In that ancient world, the water worked by its own power. "What they beheld as the reality of water is no longer a reality for us, because we think and perceive in the enlightened Greek way, not in the Ancient way." In a metaphorical sense we can agree with John 4:10 that water creates life. Yet if we believed this the way that the Ancients did, we should worship the water rather than the one who created it. It is Kristensen's view that it must suffice for us to say that the Ancient

33. Ibid., p. 407.
peoples saw symbols of an inexpressible divine reality in water and in food; but he also acknowledges that this interpretation of ours is not completely correct. When it is carried out in this manner, a symbolic interpretation does not permit us to forget the distance that separates the Ancients from ourselves.34

Kristensen’s View of the Sui Generis Nature of Religion

In his discussion of certain theories of religion, Chantepie appeals almost intuitively to the evident conceptions of the religious adherents. In the thought of Kristensen, the appeal to those conceptions becomes a deliberate procedure, a central feature of Kristensen’s anti-reductive concern. Another feature of Chantepie’s anti-reductive concern is expressed in his view that the religious acts, cult, and customs of the believers refer to an order of experience that is a specific and common property of humanity. This aspect of Chantepie’s phenomenology also becomes a key expression of the anti-reductive trait as we find it in Kristensen’s thought. For both Kristensen and van der Leeuw, in fact, religion is a specific and common property of humankind. In the work of Kristensen, the emphasis falls upon the word specific. In the work of van der Leeuw, the word common receives the weight of accent. The research of Kristensen highlights the integrity of religion as an object of inquiry, its distinctive character; the work of van der Leeuw lays stress upon the veritable pervasiveness of religion among human beings and the seemingly natural capacity in the human person for religious behavior.

For Kristensen the religious conceptions of the ancients are irreducible, on the one hand, because they are inaccessible to modern ways of thought. The merit of a symbolic interpretation is that it achieves at least approximate understanding of the data. Yet that merit is valid only so long as it does not reduce the data to this interpretation. These conceptions, however, are irreducible also for another important reason. In the effort to interpret these data, Kristensen himself employs such Christian notions as revelation, bap-

34. Ibid., pp. 408f.
tism, and sacrifice. While he sees an enormous distance between the civilization of ancient and modern humanity, he nevertheless assumes that there is a feature of the religious experience of the ancients that he is able to share. It is a presupposition of Kristensen’s research, as he puts it, “that holiness is also a reality for us.”

In Kristensen’s view, there is something to which the modern investigator can relate wherever religion occurs. While he acknowledges that there is much to separate modern humanity from ancient ways of thinking, he also believes that “sacrifice,” “purification,” and the like are “universal terms common to all religion,” and that “it is on the basis of a fairly complete knowledge of their application that they are to be understood.” In light of the common factor that connects the religious conceptions of the humanity of ancient and modern times, Kristensen believes he is able to see a deep profundity in their ideas, even though he is unable to apprehend these ideas in an immediate way. In the various forms of the worship of the sky, he believes the ancients saw “an image of the highest and all-embracing principle of reality.” In this image, he thinks they saw not a material but a spiritual meaning: “the sense of sanctity appears in all the instances in which the phenomena arouse the awareness of spontaneous factors which are infinite and absolute.” It is by virtue of his affirmation of this irreducible factor in his own experience that the religious life of the ancients acquire the meaning he is able to find among them.

It is perhaps in his critique of Feuerbach’s view of religion that his commitment to this idea is most clearly expressed. Like Philo and Plutarch, Feuerbach rejects the anthropomorphic character of religious ideas. But unlike them, he identifies this with the essence of religion. For Feuerbach, religion is the invention of man, the result of a “theogonic principle.” What man extols and glorifies is a god for him, and what he rejects is demonic power. In Feuerbach’s view, the gods are wish beings (Wünschwesen) which man transforms in his thinking into real agents. Religion is the objectivizing of man’s

35. Ibid., p. 18. 36. Ibid., p. 4. 37. Ibid., p. 41. 38. Ibid., pp. 22, 391 f.
Anti-Reductive Trait

own essence; it is a worthless illusion. Kristensen finds fault with these views at a number of critical points. Feuerbach, he says, fails to indicate what it is that leads man to represent his wish as a fulfilled wish, how he is able to feel dependent upon a god who is merely the projection of his wish, and why it is that he should require such an illusion in order to live. He also questions Feuerbach as to the criteria for illusion and who it is that decides what is and what is not an illusion. His principal objection, however, is not unlike his objection to Philo and Plutarch. It is that Feuerbach has failed adequately to consider what, for Kristensen, is the only religious reality, the religious conceptions of the believers themselves. Kristensen acknowledges that when the ancients express their religious intuition in terms of causal relations the formulations that result is unacceptable to modern ways of thought. But he points out that it does not follow from this that such formulations are the projection of a wish. Feuerbach’s thesis, he says, is “a remarkable example of a psychological explanation which is extraordinarily unpsychological, and of theorizing which is in flat contradiction to all experience.”

The problem, he says, is to understand the ancient ways of thought. The adherents did not believe that they had created the spirits and powers that determine their life, and we are wrong to say that this is all they have done. Kristensen does not deny that psychological principles are involved in the religious process, but he states that “it is wrong to pay attention exclusively to subjective factors in this mental attitude.” For the ancient, the rice mother is not a creation of the mind, but “an objective existence.” And the same is the case with all the powers that the ancient puts to his service.

In his critique of Feuerbach, Kristensen clearly believes that he stands with the adherents. It is undeniable, according to Kristensen, that ancient man represents his gods, especially in myth, in human likeness. Yet he believes that what was recited and what the ancients heard was very different from what would have prevailed if the story were told about mortals. It is not the human idea but the idea of

39. Ibid., pp. 426, 246. 40. Ibid., p. 246.
41. Ibid., p. 180.
deity that dominates the narrative. Myth, he says, moves freely in ideas borrowed from human life. But for the ancient, the gods who are represented in myth stand categorically above him. “The element of transcendence is essential.” Kristensen agrees with Feuerbach that every idea of deity “represents the divine essence according to a human model.” Yet he thinks that the gods were so represented because in certain human qualities the ancients saw something of an order totally other:

In the human qualities uncomprehended factors are revealed. In love and hate, in growth, and in the chance happenings of life, spontaneous forces are active. In the generation of life, in triumphing over enemies, in the founding of cities, and even in the most commonplace events such as the consumption of food, and sleeping and waking—in all these things the human element proves to be not simply human finitude. And when the gods fight among themselves or against their enemies, or marry and generate children, or eat and drink, all these activities are for the Ancient man who recounts them as much divine as they are human, because even that which is human is an uncomprehended reality, a revelation of self-subsistent energy, and as such it is divine.

While the modern scholar is inclined to see in these tales only the finite capacities of limited men, the ancient religious believer perceived something irreducible that is unfamiliar to modern ways of thought. He took it as a matter of course that he did not derive all that he is and has from himself, but “draws on an infinite and divine reality.” He insists that the human character of deity lies in the religious sphere. This he says is what Feuerbach overlooked, and whence has come his negative judgement about religion.

Because he believes he shares with the ancients something essential to the understanding of religion, Kristensen makes evident use of his own theological understanding in his interpretation of the ancients. A good example of this is his own understanding of prayer. Just as he argues that the mythical gods cannot be compared to men, he argues that the prayer directed to the ancient gods cannot be

42. Ibid., p. 247. 43. Ibid., p. 181.
44. Ibid., p. 247. 45. Ibid., p. 248.
46. Ibid., p. 249.
Anti-Reductive Trait

compared to requests which human beings make of one another.\textsuperscript{47} He argues that no psychology or philosophy can penetrate what occurs within man in prayer, for what he is involved in is “an inexpressible reality.”\textsuperscript{48} In genuine prayer, the probability of the fulfillment of a petition is not calculated. Rather, what is prayed for is “conceived in its infinite determination.” It supports the person who prays with a power that “enables him to be indifferent as to whether the calm sea or good harvest for which he prays actually results or fails to materialize.”\textsuperscript{49} In both cases, the crucial point is the divine decision. Kristensen interprets prayer as “the infinite and not the finite determination of the event.” In it, ancient man was conscious of something infinite and irreducible, “the essential element in the religious relationship.” In this, he “engages in his highest spiritual activity,” and “realizes his infinite being.”\textsuperscript{50}

It is interesting that in reply to Feuerbach, Kristensen argues that for the ancients themselves the gods have an objective existence and that in their gods and in their religious behavior the ancients were conscious of something irreducible. Yet it is by means of something he finds to be irreducible in his own experience that Kristensen is able so to interpret these data. To affirm that the ancients were conscious of something irreducible is tacitly to affirm that this factor is a genuinely irreducible element of experience. In the case of Kristensen this affirmation is more than tacit. When he refers to this element in the experience of the ancients, and when he refers to the element in his own experience that permits at least limited access to their religious world, he refers to it as something \textit{sui generis}, as a \textit{sui generis} element of experience. What is \textit{sui generis} constitutes a class alone. It is unique. It is irreducible to other terms. In these interpretations, Kristensen affirms not only the element of holiness in the life of the ancients. He affirms that this element is a reality \textit{sui generis} in nature. And that it is so, he says, is an a priori assumption of his research.\textsuperscript{51}

In evaluating the phenomenology of Kristensen, the question

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp. 418f.  \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 422.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 420.  \textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 18.
arises whether his anti-reductive commitment is really anything more than the encroachment of theological categories upon what he claims to be an a-theological interpretation of religious phenomena. At first blush his interpretations would seem to be in violation of the separation which he makes between theology and philosophy of religion, on the one hand, and the history and phenomenology of religion, on the other. If this is the case, it is precisely the kind of violation for which he reproaches the efforts of Rudolf Otto as well as Plutarch and Philo. It could perhaps be argued that even his qualified esteem for Plutarch’s interpretations is implicated in this problem. With Kristensen’s attempt towards the surrender of himself to others, phenomena which Chantepie registers simply as contingent historical facts, acquire profound meaning. When the uniqueness of the Christian claim to an incomparable revelation is surrendered, Kristensen begins to recognize the revelatory significance that religious phenomena in various traditions embody for their own adherents. While we cannot but be impressed with the genuine spirit of Kristensen’s surrender to others and with the depth of meaning he finds in phenomena which for him and for others were hitherto opaque, it remains a question whether the meanings which these phenomena now acquire are the most probable meaning of the phenomena for their adherents, or whether, given his own religious commitments, they are simply the meaning most intellectually satisfying to Kristensen himself. When he describes the meaning of prayer among the Ancients, the question arises whether he has described the meaning that from his own surrender to the phenomena he believes it ought to have had, or whether he has actually articulated the meaning that any of the ancients found. He acknowledges that the historian and the phenomenologist are always once removed from the standpoint of the believer. Yet he claims to achieve an approximate understanding of the believers’ “religious apprehensions,” and he understands that, for them, just as for him, such apprehensions are never of relative but always of absolute value.

To address this question, it is useful to inquire about the means by which Kristensen comes to know what he claims to know about the “religious apperceptions” of the Ancients. If in his research the
phenomena acquire a profound meaning, by what operations does this meaning come into focus? We said that with the surrender of the incomparability of the Christian claim to a unique and incomparable revelation, the revelatory character of other religious phenomena is uncovered. Methodologically, this statement could perhaps be rendered to say that the surrender of the incomparability of the Christian claim to a unique and incomparable revelation provides the means for the interpretation of alien human phenomena on the analogy of Christian revelation. That an image enacted in the form of a ritual makes conscious the spiritual significance of an original event and thus repeats it in a “spiritual sense” is not a conclusion that Kristensen draws from his exploration of the *dromenon* or *mimesis* of ancient Greece alone and which he afterwards objectively compares with Christian liturgy. That the Christian Eucharist is the repetition of an original reality that makes conscious its spiritual significance is something that Kristensen knows already. When this liturgical image is rendered comparable to phenomena in other traditions, new light is shed upon them. Kristensen observes that when believers have described the significance of purifications, the positive sacramental significance of the rite is accentuated over the apotropaeic. Yet Kristensen knows the positive sacramental significance of purification by means of water already from his own religious tradition. Kristensen thinks that the early Christian view of baptism is entirely in the spirit of the ancient conception, but it is the Christian conception with which he is first and most intimately acquainted. When the Christian eucharist and when Christian baptism is rendered comparable, other liturgies and other purification rites acquire a new depth of meaning because they can now be analogically understood.

For Chantepie the representation of the redeeming death of Christ in sacrificial terms is incomparable to any phenomenon that could be encountered in the ancient religions. For Chantepie these phenomena remain profane. With Kristensen sacrifice as it occurs in Christianity is available for the interpretation of sacrifice as it appears elsewhere in the history of religions. It is by means of this that Kristensen understands the “religious element,” the “nature of
holiness,” in sacrifice “that causes it to be recognized by the ancients as different from any profane act.” It would seem that for Chantepie it was precisely the “nature of holiness” in the redeeming death of Christ that rendered it incomparable. In the case of Kristensen, it was just this element that rendered the sacrificial death of Christ capable of illuminating other such phenomena. Yet with Kristensen as with Chantepie, this element of holiness associated with sacrifice is recognized first in the Christian faith. In light of the subjectivity with which Kristensen’s work is laden, one wonders whether his simple distinction of the role of historian and phenomenologist from that of the philosopher and theologian have effectively secured the interpretations of the data by this phenomenologist from the influence of his ultimate concern. In the light of this question, it is hardly insignificant that, even for Kristensen, the concept of religious ethics is illustrated most clearly “in all its mystical purport” neither in the decalogue nor in the eight-fold path but in the sermon on the mount.52

There are several important considerations that ought to be explored in formulating a reply to these questions. In the first place, for many of his insights into the phenomena he explores, Kristensen offers persuasive linguistic and textual support. Mountains in which the gods are thought to dwell or mountains that receive religious veneration are often called the “hill of creation.” In a variety of ancient languages, the word for “high place” also denotes a “holy place,” so that the word for temple is etymologically related to a celestial region which has ritual importance. On the other hand, he rejects the interpretation of the Egyptian deity, Osiris, as “god of the water” because the expression occurs nowhere in the Egyptian texts.53 Kristensen is generally critical of interpretations of religious phenomena for which there is no specific textual support. At the same time, it is clear that Kristensen invokes no ancient text which states that the image and the original are connected in a “spiritual sense,” that the image “serves to make conscious the spiritual essence of that which is imaged,” that the image is the only means to

52. Ibid., p. 302. 53. Kristensen, pp. 37f, 408.
express the self-subsistent divine life, or that because an "irreducible factor" was felt in the existing civilization its origins were ascribed to divine revelation.

In reply to points of this nature, it should be stated that there is a significant difference between the use of theological categories in the interpretation of other religious phenomena and the evaluation of religious phenomena in terms of those theological categories. There is a difference, we might say, between interpreting the data in the light of theological ideas and interpreting them in terms of such ideas. Kristensen does not pass theological judgement upon the phenomena nor does he try, as Rudolf Otto does, to construct a history of religious phenomena according to their forms. Moreover, Kristensen does not claim to see the phenomena precisely as the adherents saw them. His purpose is only to formulate as accurate as humanly possible a conception of this alien reality and, as far as possible, to understand this reality from within. In his discussion of prayer among the Ancients, he reminds us, in fact, that the terms in which we express the mystery of the religious relationship can never be adequate and that it is only as long as we keep this in mind that we are also justified in stating that in prayer humanity possesses divine strength and even supernatural power. "Everything, we read, which rises from man to God, prayers, thoughts and deeds, have a divine origin; it is not the human self but the divine in man which prays." Moreover, it is not the case that in undertaking such interpretations Kristensen is inadvertently exercising his own religious perceptions without any awareness of what he is doing. For Kristensen there can be no doubt that the depth of one's interpretation depends upon the nature and breadth of one's own religious apperceptions. Such study, he says himself, "does not take place outside our personality." He also acknowledges that the kind of study he undertakes exerts a profound influence upon the investigator as well. "There is simply no doubt," he says, "that we grow during our scientific work; when religion is the subject, we grow religiously." If there are imperfections

54. Ibid., p. 23. 55. Ibid., pp. 420f. 56. Ibid., p. 10.
in the application of one's own religious knowledge to the interpretation of alien religious phenomena, it does not follow that the contravening thesis would be without defects of greater proportions. If one's own religious experience does not illuminate all of the data and if the interpretations it offers cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not follow that any insight it has to offer should be rejected out of hand. Finally, if difficulties remain in the thought of Kristensen, it does not follow that his effort is the final word on the subject. While the phenomenology of Kristensen represents an effort toward a phenomenological approach to religion more ambitious and more sophisticated than that of Chantepie, Kristensen also leaves methodological difficulties behind which fall to van der Leeuw and other successors to address. In the phenomenology of van der Leeuw, difficulties that Kristensen's phenomenology raises appear again in a slightly differing light, and here they are illuminated and examined again.
What Kristensen understood as a special approach to religion began in the thought of Chantepie simply as an effort to give an ordered account of the findings of the study of religion and, outside the theological arena, to discuss the meaning of the most important manifestations associated with it. Chantepie seems to have found that the effort was especially well served by discussing the phenomena in groups according to the principal rubrics that emerge in the study of these data and examining the principal theories of religion in the light of this arrangement. Kristensen appropriates the most outstanding features of this strategy of Chantepie and brings them together as a special approach to the subject and as a sub-discipline of the science of religion that has its own method of research and its own justification. Kristensen's phenomenology of religion, however, raises important methodological issues which invite further discussion. We said that Kristensen tries to manage a separation between theology and the phenomenology of religion by means of a distinction between the task of the theologian and philosopher of religion, on the one hand, and the historian and phenomenologist of religion, on the other. Is it then the case that the theologian and the phe-
nomenologist have differing credentials so that they are simply unqualified to tread upon one another's territory, or can the theologian and the phenomenologist be one and the same person performing differing functions according to the requirements of that office? If the latter is the case, it would seem to justify a peculiar kind of schizophrenia in which the investigator at one moment is good for his theological commitments and a moment later prepared to lay them aside for the purposes of the science of religion. If the former is the case, it is hard to understand how Kristensen can justify such extensive use of his own theological understanding in the interpretation of the religion of others. Because Kristensen thinks religion is a *sui generis* reality, he believes that his own religious experience will provide the closest possible access to an understanding of this object. But the idea that the object of his study is a reality *sui generis* is itself something he understands by means of his experience of his own religious tradition. The use he makes of his own religious experience raises the question whether such an approach can ever be independent of theology in a way that is methodologically significant.

The present study, however, concerns not simply the phenomenology of Chantepie or Kristensen, but phenomenological approaches to religion as such. Before drawing conclusions concerning the methodological merit of Kristensen's effort and of the phenomenology of religion in general, it is appropriate to examine the thought of yet another figure associated with this kind of approach. The phenomenological approach of van der Leeuw is an appropriate final case to examine because his effort displays a depth of methodological sophistication that is commensurate with the kind of methodological problems the phenomenology of religion presents.
The A-Historical Trait in the Phenomenology of Gerardus van der Leeuw

In the phenomenology of religion of van der Leeuw, the facets of the a-historical trait we observed in Chantepie and Kristensen become the tenets of a deliberate and self-conscious approach. Van der Leeuw's phenomenology, like that of Chantepie and Kristensen, is systematic, non-developmental, and anti-historicist. Unlike the phenomenology of Chantepie and Kristensen, however, that of van der Leeuw proceeds from an explicit philosophical viewpoint concerning not only religion but the nature of experience as such. His writing displays the direct or indirect influence of such figures as Dilthey, Heidegger, Scheler, Jaspers, and Weber. Because of the importance of his philosophical standpoint to his approach to religion, we will repeatedly return to certain features of his philosophical views. To understand the way in which his phenomenology of religion is systematic, non-developmental, and anti-historicist, it will be useful to have some of the most important features of this philosophical standpoint before us in outline.

Central to van der Leeuw's philosophical thought is his view concerning the nature of phenomena. The phenomenon is what appears. This reflects a fundamental conception in his view of experience; experience for van der Leeuw is by nature relational. Phenomena (what appears) do not exist and then become experienced. The phenomenon as such is related to the person to whom it appears. It is, as van der Leeuw puts it, "an object related to a subject, and a subject related to an object." 1 A second fundamental feature of his

1. Van der Leeuw, p. 671.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

thought is the notion that no human life is directly accessible to thought or to discussion. Since it stands outside the realm of present experience, no life of any person living in any place or time is accessible to us directly. The knowledge we have of such a life must be constructed at second hand. This applies not only to persons in the past but in the present as well. And it applies to one's own life, one's own past direct experiences. In van der Leeuw's view, one is as far removed from parts of his own past as from any historical figure. "The 'primal experience' upon which our experiences are grounded, has always passed irrevocably away by the time our attention is directed to it." One apprehends a "life," one's own or that of another, he says, by a process of "reconstruction," by "the sketching of an outline within the chaotic maze of so-called 'reality.'" This process imposes a structure through which what appears becomes gradually understood, such that the meaning of the phenomenon and the meaning imposed upon it are identified. Finally, for van der Leeuw, understanding, so understood, is not an ancillary activity of the investigator which he can take up or put down at will. It is the essence of his life as lived. And it constitutes, when consciously carried out, the central activity of phenomenology.

A third feature of van der Leeuw's philosophical standpoint is a consequence of the other two. Just as one's own "life" is accessible only by reconstruction and interpretation, so the life of persons in the past are comprehensible indirectly and by these means. The significance of this view is that nothing essentially human stands outside the realm of possible understanding. "The essentially human always remains essentially human, and is, as such, comprehensible." One must exercise sympathy to understand an experience other than one's own, yet one must exercise sympathy just as certainly to understand one's own experience of yesterday that has already become strange. To the attack of historical skepticism, van der Leeuw replies that precisely speaking we can know nothing of remote times and we can understand very little. Yet to understand the Egyp-

2. Ibid., pp. 671 f.  3. Ibid., pp. 461, n. 5, 674.
4. Ibid., p. 675.
tian of the first dynasty is not, in itself, more difficult than to understand my nearest neighbor. "Certainly the monuments of the first dynasty are intelligible only with great difficulty, but as an expression, as a human statement, they are no harder than my colleague's letters." 5

The Phenomenology of van der Leeuw as a Systematic Study

Like Kristensen, van der Leeuw acknowledges that religion entails an experience that evades our examination. With van der Leeuw this is even more explicit. It is not only religious experience that finally evades our observation but direct experience of any kind and of any person. Like Kristensen, moreover, van der Leeuw consciously appeals to his understanding of his own religious tradition to understand that of others. Religion involves, he says, a revelation which in its very essence remains concealed. In van der Leeuw's view, the unique nature of religion permits it to be dealt with in two differing ways: "We can try to understand religion from a flat plain, from ourselves as the centre; and we can also understand how the essence of religion is to be grasped only from above, beginning with God." This means that we can observe religion as a phenomenon just as we do other phenomena that present themselves to our view and about which we seek understanding, or we can understand religion as something the essence of which cannot by nature be comprehended on our terms. The first is religion understood on a horizontal plane; the second is religion understood in terms of a vertical encounter.

In the vertical encounter, the object is not the human phenomenon that we can seek to interpret but an incomprehensible revelation that we can understand only as originating with God. Here what we confront is not human behavior, and from this perspective, religion is not an experience in the usual sense. It is not something comprehensible on intellectual terms. Its object is directly encountered but never completely experienced, never within our cognitive grasp. On the horizontal plane, on the other hand, we begin with ourselves and seek understanding of what appears on the basis of

5. Ibid., p. 677.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

analogies we understand. Here, according to van der Leeuw, religion can be viewed as the extension of life to its uttermost limit. Man does not accept life simply as given but seeks to find its meaning. "From the stone, he makes himself an image, from the instinct a commandment, from the wilderness a tilled field; and thus he develops power." But his quest for meaning does not end here. Man searches for ever deeper and wider meanings and apprehends finally the religious significance of things "that on which no wider or deeper meaning whatever can follow." While revelation itself cannot be apprehended, its reflection in man's experience is accessible to our observation. "We can never understand God's utterances by means of any purely intellectual capacity." What we can hope indirectly to understand, according to van der Leeuw, is the human response. It is not the vertical encounter but the horizontal plane that van der Leeuw proposes to explore.\(^6\)

The phenomenology of Chantepie, we said, is systematic in the sense that it is a classification or a grouping together of the most important sides and aspects of the principal forms of religious acting and thinking. Similarly, Kristensen's phenomenology is systematic in the sense that it extracts the principal religious phenomena from their historical context and studies them in groups such that the more evident of meanings can shed light upon the more obscure. For van der Leeuw, the phenomenology of religion is systematic in the same way that any reasoned and deliberate effort towards understanding is systematic. Classification, for van der Leeuw, is a natural step in the process in which the unfamiliar and alien comes gradually to be understood.

The process by which a structure is imposed upon the chaotic field of experience involves the emergence of what van der Leeuw calls "structural relations." A phenomenon is experienced as related to other phenomena by certain "perceptible connections." Van der Leeuw frequently refers to these structural relations as types. The objective of van der Leeuw's study is to understand the meaning of such types. The principal types that appear in the history of religions

---

6. Ibid., pp. 679 ff.
is the object of his inquiry. As van der Leeuw understands it, a type is not a reality in its own right. By itself it "has no reality; nor is it a photograph of reality." It need not actually occur in history at all. On the other hand, it does possess its own life. In van der Leeuw's view, it has its own significance, "its own law." Its nature may be clarified in light of an example he gives. "The soul" nowhere appears in history. Nevertheless, in our field of research, we frequently find that persons believe in some sort of soul, even though we find concerning it no two identical ideas. The soul, for van der Leeuw, is a type.7 We can supplement van der Leeuw's example with others that are common in modern life. As such, the scientist, the comedian, the musician do not actually exist in history. It is not the representation of any actual person in the history of science, or theater, or music. Yet it is perceived as a type of person about which something can be known, such that his or her behavior is actually emulated by others. Van der Leeuw's phenomenology is systematic in its exploration of the principal types which emerge in the study of religion. He refers, in fact, to phenomenology as "the systematic study of what appears."8 In the study of the history of religions, numerous types appear. Phenomenology begins the process of understanding them by organizing them, by arranging them in groups, and by assigning them names. In giving names, he says, we separate phenomena and associate others; we classify. "We include or reject: this we call a 'sacrifice' and that a 'purification.'"9 As with Chantepie and Kristensen, the phenomena in question are taken out of their historical context and studied in a systematic rather than historical fashion.

With van der Leeuw as with Chantepie and Kristensen, moreover, this systematic enterprise forms a transition between the historical and philosophical sides of the science of religion, "the bridge between the special sciences concerned with the history of religion and philosophical contemplation."10 For Chantepie the history and philosophy of religion would be empty if, while defining the idea of religion, it neglected the historical facts, while the history of religion

7. Ibid., pp. 673f. 8. Ibid., p. 683.
9. Ibid., p. 674. 10. Ibid., p. 687.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

can only proceed with some, if only a provisional, idea of what religion is. In Chantepie's view, the phenomenology of religion stands between these two sides of the science. As Kristensen understands it, the phenomenology of religion as the systematic treatment of the history of religion stands in mutual interrelation with both the philosophy and the history of religion. In his approach, van der Leeuw endorses and adopts Chantepie's conception of the science of religion as comprised of sides which treat the subject according to its essence and manifestations. And like him, he understands the phenomenology as an enterprise standing, as it were, between the two. According to van der Leeuw, history can utter not a word without adopting "some phenomenological viewpoint," since even the editing of a text or a translation involves interpretation of some sort. Yet the phenomenologist cannot but work with historical material. He must know what documents are available and what their character is in order adequately to undertake their interpretation. On the other side, whoever wishes to philosophize about religion must know the historical material provided by the phenomenology of religion. To this understanding of the subject, van der Leeuw adds only the notion that the phenomenology of religion itself raises problems of a philosophical and metaphysical character with which it is not empowered to deal and for which it must defer continually to the philosophy of religion.\textsuperscript{11}

We observed that Chantepie's phenomenology began with the most accessible religious phenomena, the objects of worship. It then proceeded gradually to the less accessible, the more subjective, religious phenomena. While Kristensen's phenomenology began with the same sorts of subject matter, the topics were discussed under the larger headings of religious cosmology, religious anthropology, and cultus. Its purpose was finally to determine the meaning of such phenomena for the adherents themselves. While van der Leeuw begins his study with the same kinds of phenomena, he arranges them according to yet another scheme in pursuit of yet another kind of meaning. Phenomena like sacred stones, trees, water, fire, the savior,
demons, angels, etc. are discussed under the rubric of the object of religion. This is followed by groups that constitute, for him, the subject of religion, the sacred man, the sacred community, and the sacred within man. A third general rubric subsumes several classes of phenomena under the heading of the object and the subject of religion in their reciprocal operation: conduct, celebration, purification, sacrifice, religious experience, and so on.

We observed earlier that when Chantepie proceeded to arrange the phenomena into groups he also discussed their meaning. The difficulty was that the meaning he was pursuing was never very clear. In the case of Kristensen, the meaning in question was unequivocal and definite. Although he could hope to achieve only approximate knowledge of the subject, his purpose was to understand the meaning of the phenomena for the adherents themselves. When van der Leeuw seeks the meaning of what appears, the meaning is also very definite, but it differs rather significantly from the meaning which Kristensen pursues. He seeks to "comprehend" the phenomena. As van der Leeuw conceives of it, phenomenological interpretation is directed towards "genuine understanding" in which what appears becomes itself "a manifestation" or "a revelation" and the object becomes "living speech." A single example will suffice to illustrate the systematic character of van der Leeuw strategy and the kind of understanding he seeks.

In his discussion of the object of religion, van der Leeuw notes that for the religious person the active agent is frequently very different from what we understand as God. Often, for the person who confronts it, this object is simply "a highly exceptional and extremely impressive 'Other.'" To this his attitude is first of all astonishment and, in extreme cases, fear. Van der Leeuw finds a manifestation of this object and a typical human response in the notion of Mana which the missionary R. H. Codrington found among the Melanesians. This, according to van der Leeuw is a "power or influence, not physical, and in a way supernatural" which "manifests itself in

12. Ibid., p. 676. 13. Ibid., p. 23.
physical form." He notes that Mana, connotes such ideas as influence, strength, fame, majesty, intelligence, authority, capability, and deity. The warriors mana is demonstrated by his continuous success in combat. The creation of the earth is the effect of the divine mana. Looking further for analogous phenomena, van der Leeuw finds that this impressively "other" power, and a similar response, is expressed in the term orenda as it occurs among the Iroquois, the term wakanda among the Sioux, the notion of manitu of the Algonquins, petara among the Dayaks of Borneo, haminaja (luck) among the ancient Germans, and the word baraka among the Arabians.

Discussing the subject further, van der Leeuw argues that when it becomes incorporated with certain cultural conditions, this "Other" becomes transformed into the concept of an impersonal Power, envisioned either as a superpersonal soul or as the divine agency activating the universe. With this, the changes and processes of the universe are no longer the arbitrary effects of distinctive powers but manifestations of a unitary world-order. Such ordered world systems which possess mana-like character, he says, are reflected in the term Tao in China, Rta in India, Asha in Iran, Ma'at among the ancient Egyptians, Dike in Greece. In the Greek-Christian world, he says, the ideas of Power becomes transformed into that of a single power by means of the concept of pneuma that, in St. Paul as well as in Gnosticism, penetrates man from without and transforms him, though with St. Paul it is identified with Christ. Lastly in India, there is completed the equalization that is the final word in the theory of Power, the union of human and cosmic Power, such that the "substance of the self and the substance of the All are one and the same."\(^{15}\)

The Phenomenology of van der Leeuw as a Non-Developmental Study

Like that of Chantepie and Kristensen, the phenomenology of van der Leeuw is a-historical not only in approaching the data in a systematic way but also in its opposition to developmental conceptions.

15. Ibid., p. 36.
of the history of religions and of religious phenomena. While he undertakes to discuss various types of religious phenomena, van der Leeuw seeks to avoid an arrangement of these types in terms of their apparent development. As with the systematic facet of this trait, the non-developmental facet is more sophisticated and more thoroughly developed than it is in the thought of Chantepie and Kristensen. Like Chantepie and Kristensen, van der Leeuw is critical of the use of a Hegelian model of history in the study of religious phenomena and of models naively appropriated from the theory of evolution. Like Kristensen, he is also conscious of the role played by one's own religious tradition when one applies such labels as "primitive" and "highly developed" to alien religious conceptions. Van der Leeuw expresses this concern in a detailed critique of the history of the study of religion, parts of which appear in various places in his work.

Van der Leeuw observes that in general the history of the study of religion has been dominated by a very narrow range of formative ideas and has seldom achieved any "profound historical comprehension." He notes that students of the History of Religions have often looked down upon the contribution of Hegel, "while they themselves have done naively and badly what they reproach Hegel for doing." He argues that the greatest weakness of the Hegelian conception was taken over by the "shallow evolutionism" that became dominant in the nineteenth century. In this as in Hegel's view, the concept of God that has been held in the recent past was regarded as the climax of a long development from very crude beginnings and "every ancient or primitive idea of God was estimated by the standard of this ultimate achievement."

This tendency held sway, according to van der Leeuw, until the discovery of a belief among so-called primitives of what Andrew Lang called the "high god." According to Lang, this conception could not have been derived by any process of evolution or any historical development from animism, or fetishism, or any other "early form" of religion. Lang argues that this god was understood to be the creator and sustainer of the Universe and the guardian of morality.

16. Ibid., p. 159.
He is the eternal, primal, invisible, omniscient, and benevolent Father of all. From these discoveries Lang drew the conclusion that primitive man, who had the benefit of neither theology nor philosophy, believed in a god who did not love sacrifice, who was not a vengeful Spirit like the Yahweh of the Old Covenant but who is the Lord of the heavens celebrated by the prophets, the loving Father who was preached by Jesus. From this he also concluded that other forms of religion associated with primitives, such as animism, fetishism, the worship of the dead, and so on, must have been later degraded forms of religion by which the primitives had been led astray, as had the children of Israel by a golden calf. For their part, the evolutionary theorists could not accept the conclusion that what they had taken to be the end of a long evolutionary process could have subsisted from the beginning. They advanced the argument that the worship of a supreme being among “primitives” could only have been the result of the influence of earlier Christian missions. Van der Leeuw did not take sides in this debate. Rather, he found the same objection in both positions. Like the evolutionary theory, and like the Hegelian model that preceded it, the so-called anti-evolutionary theory inverted the developmental model leaving the criterion for determining the degree of development intact. It placed the God of the enlightenment and of the nineteenth century at the beginning of human history but also at the summit of value “and derived everything else from this beginning by way of degeneration.” Both views, he says, “are completely unanimous in holding that ‘God’ can be applied only to what a modern Western European, descended from the Christianity of the age of the ‘Enlightenment,’ is accustomed to designate by this name.” The evolutionary and the anti-evolutionary theory are based upon the same misconception.

As more evidence concerning the worship of a “high god” was uncovered, it gradually became clear that belief in a supreme being was original and autochthonous in a significant number of cultures. Appropriating this evidence for their argument, the anti-evolutionists

17. Ibid., pp. 159f.
18. Ibid., p. 160.
19. Ibid., p. 158.
attempted to revive their theory by showing that other forms of the religion associated with the life of "savages" were the mere product of "mythical luxuriance and animistic degeneration." From his examination of the available ethnographic materials, van der Leeuw draws the conclusion that wherever belief in a supreme being is found, it is always amalgamated with animistic and dynamistic views and that a monotheism as we know it in modern Christianity has nowhere yet been found in the cultures of the so-called primitives. The constructions that have been offered to explain the appearance of "high gods" among "primitive peoples" are important to van der Leeuw because they reveal the influence of three significant errors that have imbued the study of religion for a considerable period of time. They are: (1) that the "oldest" form of religion is the most important to study, (2) that a "God" as he is generally depicted in Christian terms pervades in some way the human religious experience, and (3) that there is a "natural" religion "which contains the genuine belief in God and was originally common to all men."\(^{20}\)

Van der Leeuw acknowledges that there does appear among so-called savages the worship of a being "which can be interpreted neither as Power nor as Will, and which possesses a remarkable similarity to the God of the 'proverbial plain man' so important to Andrew Lang."\(^{21}\) He suggests that if we can free ourselves of the errors that have dominated the history of the study of religion, this phenomenon can be interpreted in other more reasonable terms. Phenomenology, says van der Leeuw, "knows nothing of any historical 'development' of religion, still less of an 'origin' of religion."\(^{22}\) Rather the presence of the "supreme being" in the religious experience of peoples widely separated in space and time constitutes the basis for distinguishing one of the great variety of significant types of religion which van der Leeuw seeks to explore. And the resemblance of this phenomenon among the "primitives" to that of the enlightenment or of the "proverbial plain man" of modern Europe indicates only that the god of the enlightenment also belongs to this particular

22. Ibid., p. 688.
type. The specific structure of this type, in van der Leeuw's opinion, is sufficient to assign it a name. He calls it the "God in the background." This being is most certainly the guardian of morality, but he "does not become a living actuality in history." One refers to this god in everyday conversation and names him in the proverbs that provide guidance in ordinary life. But one does not bring him down from Heaven, and he does not voluntarily come forth. Says van der Leeuw:

The God in whom, to his astonishment, man had now discovered his own enlightened ideas, and whom he again jubilantly greeted as the sole God of primal revelation, but whom, he could more easily have found in eighteenth century Deism—this God is a God in the background, and his sublimity and remoteness from the world are those of a passive pre-existent being who is taken into consideration only occasionally.

It is van der Leeuw's objective not to exonerate or to dismiss this type, and it is least of all to assign this type to a place in the history of religion. His objective is to come to understand it.

The Phenomenology of van der Leeuw as an Anti-Historicist Study

In van der Leeuw's approach, the a-historical trait that is evident in the thought of Chantepie and more developed in Kristensen has now become fully self-conscious. It is no more fully expressed than in van der Leeuw's concern with historicism that has now almost become a polemic. Van der Leeuw includes the history of religion among a variety of human sciences which he finds to be deficient for similar reasons. In his view, the history of religion is a "harsh mistress who would fain compel her servants to pass beneath the yoke which she has prepared." The phenomenology of religion, he says, desires not only to distinguish itself from such sciences "but also, if possible, to teach them to restrain themselves!"

Although he refers specifically in this discussion neither to Chantepie nor Kristensen, the anti-historicist element in van der Leeuw's thought is grounded in

23. Ibid., p. 166.
24. Ibid., pp. 164f.
25. Ibid., p. 685.
arguments that parallel the insights of Chantepie and Kristensen as well. It was Kristensen’s insight that the historian is always one step removed from the experience of the religious adherent. This limitation, he claims, is imposed by the nature of the subject matter itself. For van der Leeuw as well, the individual is always one step removed from the experience of the person he hopes to understand. It is true that van der Leeuw thinks he is removed from his own past and from the past of contemporary persons in precisely the same way. But this in no way alters the distance. By its very nature, understanding is “reconstruction.”

Another aspect of van der Leeuw’s anti-historicist concern follows more closely the lines suggested in the researches of Chantepie and Kristensen. Chantepie had rejected evolutionary treatments of the history of religions because they knew nothing of any “real substance,” “ontological reason,” or “teleological destination” of the religious phenomena. In Kristensen’s view, the substance of religion is a sui generis reality which is also a reality for him. Van der Leeuw holds that religion is an “ultimate experience” that finally evades our observation. As a vertical encounter, as revelation, there is no object that “appears.” Properly speaking, it is and remains concealed. What van der Leeuw believes he can study is the reflection of this event in human experience. What he studies, he regards as the reflection, the appearance or phenomenon in that sense, of an event beyond the reach of historical research.

While van der Leeuw’s anti-historicist concern resembles insights expressed by Chantepie and Kristensen, he also integrates such insights within a philosophical viewpoint that takes him considerably beyond either one. We observed that when Chantepie spoke of religious states and sentiments as distinguished by a certain “inward relation,” he made no effort to describe this peculiar relation. We noted also that he offered no philosophical justification for his affirmation of the “ontological reason,” “real substance,” or “teleological destination” of religious phenomena. Kristensen’s anti-historicist

26. Ibid., p. 672.
27. Ibid., p. 683.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

concern is expressed in arguments which point to the inherent limitations of historical investigation as an instrument for the study of religion. In taking this position, he rejects the view that religious data can be dealt with merely as the product of historical factors. Yet in this argument he offers no more positive justification than Chantepie for belief in the uniqueness of the "inward relation" or the "real substance" of religious phenomena. Approaching the data in a more methodologically sophisticated manner, van der Leeuw offers a thoughtful grounding for the justification of these views. Kristensen makes the point that the research of the phenomenology of religion is guided by a spirit that transcends us. To avoid a discussion of this subject he calls it intuition. In van der Leeuw's thought, a similar theme is present. As with Kristensen, when van der Leeuw researches the meaning of the phenomena, what he seeks is never a matter of merely historical fact. He argues that phenomenological inquiry involves the investigator in a dynamic interpretative process in which the phenomenon becomes ever more transparent as ever deeper levels of insight are achieved. According to van der Leeuw, "the more deeply comprehension penetrates any event, and the better it 'understands' it, the clearer it becomes to the understanding mind that the ultimate ground of understanding lies not within itself."28

28. Ibid., pp. 683f.
The A-Theological Trait in the Phenomenology of Gerardus van der Leeuw

The phenomenology of Chantepie raises a number of methodological issues with which his successors deal. Succeeding Chantepie, Kristensen understands some of these problems and attempts to resolve them in a new effort towards a phenomenology of religion. In doing so, he raises further issues for the phenomenology of religion to resolve. Kristensen acknowledges that the religious experience of the investigator plays a significant role in the phenomenological study of religion. For van der Leeuw, the religious horizon of the investigator is the problem with which the phenomenology of religion must begin. By means of empathy, Kristensen seeks to relive in his own experience that which is "alien." He acknowledges that such imaginative reliving of a situation is an approximation and not the reality itself. In the phenomenology of van der Leeuw, life itself is a reliving and a representation. Van der Leeuw's approach to such methodological problems generates a phenomenology that differs significantly from those of Chantepie or Kristensen. Yet in dealing with these issues, van der Leeuw's phenomenology claims like theirs to be something other than theology. Like theirs, his effort seeks to remain a-theological in the object of knowledge which his inquiry pursues, in the attitude he takes with respect to this object, and in the perspective he maintains even when the data in question are the vehicles of his ultimate concern.

The Object of Theology and the Study of What Appears

It is significant that like Kuyper, van der Leeuw understands that the word theology can have either a broad or narrow connotation. Kuyper acknowledges that as it occurs in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and several of the Church Fathers, it has a meaning very different from the meaning it has for him. For them it was frequently simply a knowledge of or a speaking about the gods or of things divine. In this sense the Ancient Greek poets could be called theologians because they made hymns about the gods. In a similar way, van der Leeuw notes that Plutarch refers to the Delphic Hosioi as theologians, because they translated the utterances of the enraptured prophets into smooth hexameters. These, in his view, were theologians in the broadest sense. Yet when van der Leeuw states that the phenomenology of religion is not theology, it is not a theology like that of the Delphic Hosioi, or the Greek poets, but a theology like that of Kuyper himself which van der Leeuw has in mind.

Van der Leeuw's understanding of theology in the narrower sense is remarkably compatible with that of Kuyper. This is perhaps no more clear than in their respective discussions of the object of theological investigation. It is the view both of Kuyper and of van der Leeuw that the object of theological investigation does not appear. It is rather, says Kuyper, as though a total stranger about whom nothing is known should fall into the hands of the police and steadfastly refuse to utter a single word about himself. The police are here entirely dependent upon the will of that stranger to reveal the knowledge of himself. According to Kuyper, the theologian stands with respect to God in such a relation in an absolute sense. “He cannot investigate God. There is nothing to analyze. There are no phenomena from which to draw conclusions. Only when that wondrous God will speak, can he listen.” According the Kuyper, it was just this sense of dependence that the medieval theologians expressed when they asserted that all their knowledge of God is only ectypal

2. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p. 231.
theology, in absolute dependence upon the self-knowledge of God. Accordingly, they taught that we can never achieve the archetypal knowledge which God possesses of himself. We cannot presume to enter into the holy place of the Lord, to examine it and gather knowledge concerning it. Rather, we must "take our stand on this side of the veil," and wait for what God Himself will communicate "from behind this veil." The view which van der Leeuw develops concerning the difference between the theological object and the object of phenomenological investigation presents itself almost as an echo of Kuyper's view:

God is neither subject nor object; to be either of these He would have to be a phenomenon—that is, He would have to appear. But He does not appear: at least not so that we can comprehend and speak about Him. If He does appear He does so in a totally different manner, which results not in intelligible utterance, but in proclamation. Van der Leeuw holds that while philosophers follow a path from their own experience to the theoretical domination of the world, theologians "follow the path of obedience." They proceed not from the world but from revelation. Their labor is an activated experience: "They have heard the call of the Church, to which they now give its historical form." For van der Leeuw, what is imparted by revelation is accessible by no mode of knowledge at all. It is no "making known" in the normal sense of the words.

The appearance of the phenomenon which is the subject matter of the phenomenology of religion is utterly different, according to van der Leeuw, from "that Self-disclosure of God with which revelation is concerned." In this sense, the essence of the Church evades phenomenology for it escapes comprehension. It is also significant that with Kuyper, as with van der Leeuw, there is no "appearance," strictly speaking, even of the faith that receives the self-revelation

5. Van der Leeuw, p. 688.
6. Ibid., pp. 661 f.
7. Ibid., pp. 565. See also pp. 649, 699.
8. Ibid., p. 266.
of God. Despite his affirmation of the unity of science, Kuyper argues that there are two kinds of science corresponding to the two kinds of people into which humanity is divided. From the perspective of that science that proceeds without the regeneration or palingenesis which God has brought about in those who have been redeemed by faith, religious faith cannot but appear as a deviation from the scientific mode of investigation, as the victim of imagination and presumption. Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, p. 153.

Likewise for van der Leeuw, "[f]aith, itself and as such does not 'appear,' nor become visible." What appears is rather a person who testifies to something that has appeared to him. Thus while nothing is revealed to the investigator of the revelation which this person has received, the investigator nevertheless confronts a person and the testimony of this person concerning something he has encountered, and of this he must make sense.

We stated earlier that van der Leeuw distinguishes two different ways in which religion can be viewed. We can seek to understand it on a horizontal plane, or we can concede it to the realm of incomprehensible revelation and begin our study with God. From this analogy it is clear enough that in van der Leeuw's view, theology is concerned not simply with the horizontal plane but with the reality revealed in the vertical encounter. While restricted to ectypal theology the theologian speaks at last of God. As van der Leeuw understands him, the phenomenologist finds the object if his investigation exclusively on the horizontal plane. "Phenomenology seeks the phenomenon as such." Van der Leeuw also states, however, that what appears is the testimony of humanity to what has been revealed. This phenomenon, he says, is man's response to revelation. And this response he elsewhere refers to as faith. We stated earlier that the object of van der Leeuw's inquiry is a variety of "types" that appear among the religions data. He treats these in a systematic and non-developmental manner. What the phenomenologist of religion can observe, in van der Leeuw's terms, is not the revelation, nor even the response of faith, but the assertion of man concerning what has

11. Ibid., p. 671.
been revealed and the behavior of man that springs from that encounter. The phenomenologist cannot "see" the faith, but if he has mastered the appropriate languages, he can read the hymn of praise and appreciate the work of art. In this precise and explicit sense, he is able to examine the reflection of revelation in human experience.¹²

Nevertheless, to speak of certain activities and artifacts of human beings as their reply to revelation, as their "assertion about what has been revealed," presupposes a number of tacit claims. Van der Leeuw presupposes that the response of man in question is not simply the product of a preposterous imagination, that it is not pure sophistry and illusion. More specifically, he assumes that revelation is a reality. He assumes, that is to say, a certain knowledge of God or of the divine, namely that God exists and reveals himself, in such a way that man can respond, or as scripture has put it: "that he is, and that he is a rewarde of them that diligently seek him."(Heb 11: 6)

Whence came this knowledge?

Although van der Leeuw does not offer these insights in the context of natural theology, it is hard to deny that behind them lies a theological frame of reference. On the other hand, it is also evident that this theological frame of reference is significantly less restrictive than that of Kuyper or of reformation theology in general. It affirms that the reply of man to revelation, of which the data in question are presumably the manifestation, occurs outside of the Church, outside of the Church's knowledge of God which is the subject matter of theology, and outside of any reference to the special principium upon which Kuyper understands all Christian theology to depend. While Kuyper can find in such manifestations only the motive and the content of the natural theology turned into their opposites, van der Leeuw finds among these phenomena something eminently profound. Moreover, van der Leeuw's interpretation of these phenomena implies that the reply to revelation is also to be found even outside of the language of humankind about what we normally think of as God. "We must realize," he says, "that 'God' is frequently an

¹². Ibid., pp 538 f.
extremely indefinite concept which does not completely coincide with what we ourselves usually understand by it.” And therefore, “we can speak of ‘God’ in a merely figurative sense.” The phenomenologist, he says, “can only discuss what is reported to him; he can listen for the authentic sounds, and describe the objects wherein, according to the believer’s own statements, revelation has for him, been affected.” This reply includes the language, in the broadest sense, of the history of religions. “We must regard as valid revelation,” he says, “whatever presents itself as such.”

Nevertheless, the view that the behavior and the works of peoples remote from the phenomenology of religion is their response to “revelation” is unlikely to be stated explicitly or even understood in the vocabulary of the adherents themselves, however quickly their own language might lead an investigator like van der Leeuw to such a conclusion. However compelling the meanings he finds within these phenomena, it is evident that the persons in whose behavior he finds such depth of meaning would hardly describe their own behavior in such terms. The question then arises not simply of what it is that appears in van der Leeuw’s phenomenology but how this phenomenon appears, how it is constituted in this investigator’s research. Clearly this involves his encounter with the behavior of the peoples in question, with their texts, their rituals, their works of art, and so on. But it also involves a tacit knowledge of his own which provides the cognitive framework through which these things are encountered. Strictly speaking, the object of van der Leeuw’s study is not simply the reply of the religious person to revelation. The object of his inquiry is rather what-appears-to-him-to-be-the-reply of such persons to what-seem-to-him, in their own context, to be revelation. It is the assertion of such persons to what seems to van der Leeuw to have been “revealed.” It is the activity of human beings, with reference to what van der Leeuw takes from his encounter with them, to be a “highly exceptional” and “extremely impressive Other,” such as is expressed in the word Mana in the case of the

13. Ibid., p. 23.  
Melanesians, the word *Wakanda* among the Sioux, the word *Petara* among the Dayaks of Borneo, and the word "God" among Christians, Moslems, and Jews.

The object of his study is what he takes to be the reply of human beings to something he finds presented to them as a departure from all that is usual, familiar, and mundane, by reason of the *Power* that it generates. This "totally other" *Power* may be authenticated in an object or a person from which it emanates. It may be the *Power* that animates the universe (*Rta, Tao, Ma-at*), or it may form the basis of religion without even being assigned a name. It may be purely dynamic, or it may take on ethical and "spiritual" dimensions. It may also achieve will and be expressed in the form of such "types" as the *Mother, the Son,* or the *Absolutely Powerful.* To this *Power,* according to van der Leeuw, man's reaction is astonishment, wonder, awe, and fear. Objects and persons with such potency have, for those who confront them, "that essential nature of their own which we call 'sacred'" (emphasis mine).\(^ {15}\) It is the observable reply of man to this that is the object of van der Leeuw's study.

The object of van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion is constituted in an encounter with certain historical and ethnographic data that is informed by theological understanding. As this object enters the discussion, the data is emptied of its specifically theological significance and released from strictly theological principles of interpretation. With this alteration, it is self-consciously interpreted in the light of what is now a genre of phenomena that are taken to express the religious life of humankind. While it displays an unmistakably theological derivation, the modification which it undergoes in the course of van der Leeuw's inquiry makes this, at least when we compare it to the object of theological study we find in a theologian like Kuyper, something other than a theological object. As van der Leeuw conceives of it, "Phenomenology describes how man conducts himself in his relation to *Power.*"\(^ {16}\) What it is that appears to van der Leeuw's inquiry is human life as it appears to be seized upon by *Power* and as that life directs itself towards it.

\(^ {15}\) Ibid., p. 28. 
\(^ {16}\) Ibid., p. 191.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

The Theological Attitude and the Attitude of Self-Surrendering Love

For some, the role of theological categories in van der Leeuw’s interpretation, in the very appearance of these phenomena, would be sufficient to discredit the claim that his phenomenology of religion is something other than theology. On the other hand, it is very clear that van der Leeuw’s approach to such data differs significantly from what we find, for instance, under the rubric of the natural theology of Kuyper. While he acknowledges with Kuyper that all these phenomena stand in organic relation to the purest revelation, and while he rejects with Kuyper the view that they are related to one another by the undulations of any gradually advancing process, he nevertheless departs from Kuyper’s conclusion that the two represent the antithesis between the positive and the negative working of the natural knowledge of God. For van der Leeuw, the kind of religious knowledge that is associated with theological understanding is necessary for the phenomena to appear at all. Apart from the existential attitude, he says, “we could never know anything of either religion or faith.” In the attitude of complete restraint, there is simply no knowledge of religion. And if what appears is understood at all, it is understood by means of tacit if not explicit analogies with something the investigator has encountered by means of his experience within his own religious tradition. At bottom, he says, it is “utterly impossible contemplatively to confront an event which, on the one hand, is an ultimate experience, and on the other manifests itself in profound emotional agitation, in the attitude of such pure intellectual restraint.”

The difficulty is that it is just the theological perspective upon the data that prevents them from being interpreted on their own terms. For Kuyper, the attitude of the theologian toward the object of his inquiry differs from that of any other inquiry in the pursuit of science.

17. Ibid., p. 683. While van der Leeuw acknowledges the duplex ordo, the parallel paths of faith and rational contemplation acknowledged by the Catholic Church, he finds this distinction to be of no relevance to the understanding of religion as such.
The theologian does not stand above the object to be explored and examine it under the authority of his own free will. He stands, as we observed, beneath it, and over against this object he remains in a relation of utter dependence.  

Van der Leeuw acknowledges this peculiarity of the theological attitude and the difficulty it presents. The attitude of infinite passion, fear, and love which is always imbedded in a particular religious tradition can never do justice to the alien religious ideas, "crude prejudice can so easily force its way." 

He observes that the contribution which theologians have given to the spiritual life of humankind has sprung from "the high emotional tension of their experiences, and their boldness in applying it to the whole world." In van der Leeuw's view, this attitude obtains in the religious encounter wherever it is found. He believes that what the sciences concerned with religion regard as the object of religion is, for the religious person, the active and primary agent in the relation and could therefore be better called the subject. "The religious man perceives that with which his religion deals as primal, as originative or casual; and only to reflective thought does this become the Object of the experience that is contemplated." In the same way, what is normally called the subject of religion could better be understood as the object. The sciences that deal with religion see a person who practices religion, who sacrifices, who prays. For the person so involved, these acts are evoked by a power outside of himself that first has affected him. In this, according to van der Leeuw, all believers agree, "from the primitive man who experiences the nearness of Power and calls out 'Tabu!', to the apostle who exhorts us to love God because He 'first loves us.'" 

To this dilemma, van der Leeuw's response is neither complete intellectual restraint nor the attitude which can perceive outside of Christianity only "spurious religion and degeneration." While he thinks that nothing can be known of religion in the attitude of complete intellectual restraint, he holds that there is another kind of

20. Ibid., p. 660.
21. Ibid., p. 23.
22. Ibid., p. 191.
23. Ibid., p. 645.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

restraint which is the condition for any act of understanding. This, he says, is "never the attitude of the cold-blooded spectator," but rather "the loving gaze of the lover upon the beloved object." It is both the Platonic and the Christian experience, he says, that to him who does not love, nothing whatever is manifested. Over against the passionate gaze of the theologian or the attitude of objective indifference, van der Leeuw proposes the attitude of "self-surrendering love."  

The role of self-surrender in van der Leeuw's approach to the data invites comparison with the method of Kristensen. While van der Leeuw's purpose is not specifically to determine the meaning which the phenomena hold for the religious adherent themselves, his approach is compatible with that of Kristensen in its recognition that the phenomenon in question is a person who is seized by Power and who directs himself towards it. What he seeks to understand is "an object related to a subject and a subject related to an object." To put it differently, the object of his inquiry is a person who "knows quite definitely that something meets him on the road."  It is not the case, however, that van der Leeuw seeks to know simply the meaning of the phenomena for the adherents themselves. The understanding he hopes to achieve is more embracive than this. Like the attitude of Kristensen, that of van der Leeuw involves the surrender of the incomparability of the Christian claim to a unique and incomparable revelation; it involves a surrender to the "spiritual traces of vanished time."  In his discussions, the epiphany of Christ submits to comparisons with that of Apollo and Dionysus; Christian Baptism submits to comparison with rites of purification in other religious traditions; and the death and resurrection of Christ are compared with that of Adonis, Attis, Osiris and others.  

24. Ibid., p. 684.  
25. Ibid., pp. 671, 681.  
26. Ibid., p. 675. This phrase, which van der Leeuw appropriates from Usener, applies as much to the inaccessible present as to the distant past.  
27. Ibid., pp. 343 ff, 38, 109 ff.
they become, for van der Leeuw, the avenue through which, in a larger sense, their meaning is revealed.

There is perhaps no better illustration of the kind of meaning that van der Leeuw derives from his investigations of the phenomena than his exploration of revelation itself. Van der Leeuw begins this discussion with what appears to be a theological claim. He observes, following Tillich, that what is imparted by revelation is accessible by no mode of knowledge whatever: “In revelation something is disclosed to me that no eye has ever seen—not even mine! I hear something that no ear has ever heard—not even mine! Something is prepared for me which has entered no human heart—not even my own heart.” In its being revealed, revelation does not cease to remain wholly withdrawn from our view. For van der Leeuw, no insight, however clear, sudden, or coercive, can qualify as a revelation. At best it must still be the appearance of some phenomenon. And to speak of an experience of knowledge as disclosed “like a revelation,” in his view, can only be a metaphor, and “a bad one at that.”

Van der Leeuw applies this theological understanding of revelation to what appears. While he believes with Kristensen that the phenomenologist must regard as valid revelation whatever presents itself as such, his theological understanding of revelation plays a significant role both in the selection and the interpretation of what presents itself as such. Revelation, he observes, is consummated in an object. Yet just as revelation becomes no less a mystery by being revealed, so when it is revealed in an object the object becomes no less a mystery by being the medium of revelation. In the object which is sacred, be it a thing, a place, a time, or a person, “some Power reveals itself.” Yet it never fully displays itself because in its essence it remains concealed as something “Wholly Other.” He believes that the so-called primitive experiences Power in objects. These become Mana or Tabu by virtue of their character as the medium of revelation. When the relation of an object to revelation is permanent, the object is a fetish. In other cases a special locality has proven itself to be sacred; here oracles are consulted. Man now must journey

28. Ibid., p. 565.
29. Ibid., pp. 565 ff.
Gerardus van der Leeuw
to a place set apart by its status as a locus of revelation. In these and other types, van der Leeuw finds “a steadily expanding theorizing tendency” that underlines the exceptional character of revelation as man attempts to regulate it in celebration, sacrament, and sermon.

In van der Leeuw’s treatment, as in that of Kristensen, the incomparability of the Christian claim to a unique revelation is certainly surrendered. And in that surrender, it is revelation, the theological concept, that makes possible the understanding of what appears. We observed that with the surrender of the incomparability of the Christian claim to a unique and incomparable revelation, Kristensen thinks he gains an insight into the revelatory significance of the phenomena for the religious adherents whose religion he explores. Reflecting upon this procedure, we observed that what Kristensen takes to be the meaning of the phenomena for the adherents themselves, he understands by means of analogy with phenomena that he first has encountered in his own religious tradition. He acknowledges that our study does not take place outside of our own personality but that in our interpretation of the data we make use of our own religious experience. In van der Leeuw’s phenomenology of religion, the same circularity is evident. Yet van der Leeuw is prepared to defend his procedure on philosophical grounds.

For Kristensen, we said, there is an unbroachable distance between the phenomenologist of religion and the object of his research. By means of empathy and systematic, comparative research, he attempts to relive in his own experience, that which is alien. This imaginative reexperiencing, as Kristensen is fully aware, is not the reality in question. It is only a representation of it. Nevertheless it does provide, in his view, approximate knowledge of the religious perceptions of the believers. For van der Leeuw on the other hand, our separation from the reality of the religious encounter is unqualified. All understanding is reconstruction. “The intangible experience in itself cannot be apprehended nor mastered.” Yet for van der Leeuw it is also nevertheless the case that something appears among the data and undeniably calls for our understanding. It says something; “it manifests something to us.” In the effort to understand this, van der Leeuw, like Kristensen, advocates the serious exercise
of "sympathy," and a loving restraint that abjures dogmatic theological judgments.\(^3\) Yet he also thinks that no real understanding occurs before the interpreter takes the phenomenon into his own life and interprets it on his own terms.\(^3\) While van der Leeuw believes that the object of his study is "indefinitely remote," he also believes that if we approach what appears in this encounter with the conviction that there is something in it that accords with our own experience, then we have at least the possibility of a "more comprehending glance" and of achieving a "living representation." He acknowledges that strictly speaking, "it can never be asserted with any certainty what is my own understanding, and what is the intelligibility of that which is understood."\(^3\) In the loving gaze upon the phenomenon, a meaning "dawns upon us." And what "dawns upon us" is an interpretation of what appears. But it is not as though we could lay aside the work of interpretation to examine the source of the appearance. It is not as though we might once somehow reach beyond the interpretation to verify it. Interpretation, for van der Leeuw, is the essence of life as lived.

It is Kristensen’s view that when a person deliberately begins using alien ideas to learn something from them for himself, he probably gains some wisdom. But at the same time, according to Kristensen, "he has shattered the alien conception."\(^3\) Such a person may think he respects the alien ideas; in reality he is concerned with himself. Another kind of respect would acknowledge the irrevocable distance between them. For van der Leeuw no one who seriously undertakes the interpretation of the phenomena does other than interpret the phenomena for himself. "Reality," he says, is always my reality; "history" is always my history. Van der Leeuw thus insists that what appears must be experienced deliberately, systematically, and consciously. And while experiencing the phenomenon, it must be understood that what appears "does not submit itself to us directly

30. Ibid., p. 676.
31. Van der Leeuw, p. 674. The term he uses to denote this interpretive assimilation of what appears is the term "interpolation" (Einschaltung).
32. Ibid., p. 672.
33. Kristensen, p. 405; cf. 15 ff.
and immediately, but only as a symbol of some meaning to be interpreted by us, as something that offers itself to us for interpretation.”34 Thus in the restraint of self-surrendering love, we find that “chords within ourselves, gradually becoming sympathetic, can harmoniously vibrate and resound, and we discover in our own consciousness the strands linking together old and new.”35 Van der Leeuw acknowledges the limitation imposed upon his approach by the circuitous nature of this method. His response is that a limitation does not disqualify an approach nor negate the contribution it nevertheless has to make. “To see face to face is denied us. But much can be observed even in a mirror; and it is possible to speak about things seen.”36

Religious Phenomena in the Perspective of the Epoche

While van der Leeuw’s approach adds considerable sophistication to the work of Kristensen, and that to the insights of Chantepie, in the phenomenology of van der Leeuw, as we have described it so far, certain difficulties remain. His view that much can be observed “even in a mirror” is an analogy that seems appropriate on more levels than one. The allusion is clearly to the words of St. Paul, “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known” (1 Cor. 13:12). In light of van der Leeuw’s discussion of the process of understanding, we can see the significance of two nuances to this reference. In the first van der Leeuw acknowledges that we do not see the phenomena directly. Our knowledge of what appears occurs by means of a construction once removed. We see it darkly, not clearly. It is mediated, not direct. Thus the meaning we generate is never perfect. The other nuance becomes clear when we realize that the glass about which Paul is speaking is not a lens but a mirror. And what one sees in a mirror is not the world but the reflection of one’s own face. For van der Leeuw this is not the liability but the pro-

34. Van der Leeuw, p. 674.
36. Ibid., p. 678.
fundity of phenomenological study. In the understanding of others, we understand ourselves. The appearance in a mirror is an appearance after all, and as an appearance it calls for understanding and perhaps all the more, if it comes down to self-understanding at last.

The view that in others we see ourselves seems hardly, however, to solve the problem of the dependence of van der Leeuw’s interpretation upon his theology. It seems rather to restate it. The question that remains is how effective this attitude is in avoiding the interpretation of the phenomena not just in the light of but also in the terms of Christian theology. If van der Leeuw’s interpretations can never claim to be anything more than his own and if his interpretations cannot but express his own theological commitments, how can he realistically hope to avoid a theological perspective upon the data he attempts to understand. How effective is this self-surrendering love in maintaining an a-theological perspective upon data which, for him, already hold a theological charge?

It is significant that van der Leeuw’s attitude of self-surrendering love is not implemented simply by good intentions but by means of a deliberate operation. The strategy by which van der Leeuw seeks to avoid the effect of a theological agenda upon the data he explores is called the epoche. There is probably nothing in van der Leeuw’s writing that has caused more confusion than his use of this term. The confusion stems largely from the fact that the term was employed before van der Leeuw in the philosophical project of Edmund Husserl in which the word phenomenology is also used. Looking at van der Leeuw’s use of this term, many readers have drawn the conclusion that van der Leeuw’s work was a phenomenological effort in the legacy of Husserl and applied to religion as a special region of consciousness. They have often concluded that it was an effort in this direction rather badly performed. We argued earlier that the phenomenology of Chantepie, Kristensen, and van der Leeuw, has a provenance quite different from that of Husserl. His use of the term the epoche, has likewise little to do with its meaning in Husserl’s thought. Considering the importance that has been attached to the epoche in the literature interpreting van der Leeuw’s thought, it is remarkable how limited his use of this term really is. He refers to
Husserl in only two places in his phenomenology of religion, one of which is in a quotation from a work of Scheler.\textsuperscript{37} In these passages, we find a reasonably clear indication of the significance which van der Leeuw assigns to the term.

The term \textit{epoche} is a technical expression employed in current Phenomenology by Husserl and other philosophers. It implies that no judgement is expressed concerning the objective world, which is thus placed 'between brackets,' as it were. All phenomena, therefore, are considered solely as they are presented to the mind, without any further aspects such as their real existence, or their value, being taken into account; in this way the observer restricts himself to pure description systematically pursued, himself adopting the attitude of complete intellectual suspense, or of abstention from all judgements, regarding these controversial topics.\textsuperscript{38} While the passage suggests a rather casual interpretation of Husserl's \textit{epoche}, the application of the procedure to his own research is nevertheless quite definite. Phenomenology, he says, "observes restraint (the \textit{epoche}), and its understanding of events depends on its employing 'brackets.'"\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37} He refers repeatedly, however, to Jaspers, Binswanger, Heidegger, and others; some of whom acknowledge the influence of Husserl. (Ibid., pp. 675 f.) Restraint, says van der Leeuw, "implies no mere methodological device, no cautious procedure, but the distinctive characteristic of man's whole attitude to reality. Scheler has very well expressed this situation: 'To be human means to hurl a forcible "No!" at this sort of reality. Buddha realized this when he said how magnificent it is to \\textit{contemplate} everything, and how terrible it is to be: Plato, too, in connecting the contemplation of ideas to a diverting of the soul from the sensuous content of objects, and to the diving at [sic] the soul into its depths, in order to find the "origins" of things. Husserl, also, implies nothing different than this when he links the knowledge of ideas with "phenomenological reduction"—that is a "crossing through" or "bracketing" of (the accidental) co-efficient of the existence of objects in the world in order to obtain their "\textit{essentia}."' This course involves no preference of some 'idealism' or other to some kind of 'realism.' On the contrary: It is simply maintained that man can be positive only in turning away from things, as they are given to him chaotically and formlessly, and by first assigning them form and meaning." The meaning the \textit{epoche} receives in this passage and its further interpretation by van der Leeuw clearly separates it from the explicit meaning it receives in Husserl's own thought. This quotation of van der Leeuw is from Max Scheler, \textit{Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos} (Darmstadt: Reichl, 1926), p. 63. It is evident from the passage that Scheler here has Husserl's eidetic and phenomenological reductions confused.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 646 n.\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 675.
While much of the significance of Husserl's *epoche* is absent from the thought of van der Leeuw, an important feature he retains is the image of brackets, the brackets that function prominently in mathematics and in other fields. By the use of brackets, certain terms are designated to be left out of account or treated specifically as that within the brackets. In van der Leeuw's thought, the significance is precisely one of intellectual restraint. For van der Leeuw, as we have said, it is impossible to know anything of religion or faith in the state of complete intellectual restraint. Yet without a measure of intellectual restraint, no understanding of what appears is possible.

To understand van der Leeuw's use of this image it is appropriate to ask what precisely is placed within the brackets and what is left without. In the first place, van der Leeuw clearly brackets the question of the reality behind the phenomenon. He claims no access to anything that might be concealed behind the appearing of the appearance, nor to the actual relation of the subject to the object of religion. This, he thinks, can never be apprehended or mastered. Van der Leeuw is concerned not with what might lie behind the phenomenon but precisely with what appears. Phenomenology, he says, "aims not at things, still less at their mutual relations, and least of all at the 'thing in itself.'" In the second place, he brackets the question of history. He does not deny the historicity of what appears but the types he describes are abstracted from their historical context. The types he explores need not actually exist in history. Van der Leeuw thus also brackets evolution and development. He describes what appears not in terms of what it came from and what it leads to historically but in terms of the meaning it evokes in its appearance. Thirdly, he brackets such theological judgements as can see in the alien religious phenomena only spurious religion and degeneration. Van der Leeuw advocates no dogmatic treatment of the phenomenon. He is careful, for instance, to avoid the application of specifically Christian conceptions of God to other religious traditions.

40. Ibid., p. 677.
41. Ibid., pp. 645f, 104f, 156f, 159ff.
What van der Leeuw seems unable to place within brackets, to leave out of account, is the theological knowledge through which he interprets the phenomena and by means of which they appear. The effect is that, while he advocates no dogmatic treatment of the phenomenon, his theological knowledge informs his interpretation. While he achieves a deeper appreciation of the alien phenomena, he nevertheless cannot help but find certain features of his own tradition to be distinctive in the light of the types and structures with which they are compared. And it seems impossible for him to avoid placing superlative value upon them. While he submits Christ to comparison with Osiris, while he regards each as a savior in the full sense of the word, it appears to van der Leeuw that Christ “bestows salvation in its most comprehensive sense.”

His “deed of salvation” stands out from other such deeds, for while all savior religions proclaim life from death, the gospel of the cross nevertheless preaches salvation in death: “Here complete impotence becomes the utmost development of Power: absolute disaster becomes salvation.” In the Christian experience, “Death annihilates death.” Similarly while the salvation afforded by Amitabha Buddha is only a preparatory goal for true salvation, a gateway to Nirvana, “Christ is Himself salvation.” For van der Leeuw, neither the Buddhist monastic community nor the community of Judaism or Islam can merit the title of Church. It appears to him that in the Christian Church, “covenant and community are fused together and elevated to a higher unity.”

In the light of the distinctive features of his own religious tradition, van der Leeuw, it seems, cannot help but see those of other traditions in comparative and therefore relative terms. And sometimes the place he assigns them is striking. The interpretations he offers seem unavoidably to reflect their distance from his own. Human life made sacred and endowed with Power, he says, can also be stifled by it. For van der Leeuw Buddhism is the religion of the negative wherein human life has become a vacuum. In the artistic ex-

42. Ibid., p. 108.
43. Ibid., p. 112.
44. Ibid., p. 666.
45. Ibid., p. 265.
pression of the earliest period of Buddhism, the form of Power has disappeared, and in its teachings, the will is annihilated as well. 46

He acknowledges the depth of the compassion of Buddhism and its insight into the universality of suffering, but he also asserts that the compassion of Buddhism is not the same as the Christian’s love. 47

Finally, in the attempt to understand what appears, it seems that van der Leeuw cannot help but perceive a succession of manifestations among the phenomena. “The indefinite and nameless multitude of Powers assumes Form in a plurality of personalities which, each endowed with a name and a sphere of activity of its own, are interconnected by organic relationships. Polydemonism becomes Polytheism.” These, he says, “unite under one name and a single form” when the appropriate conditions arise. 48

In his effort to comprehend the phenomena, however, van der Leeuw’s effort remains different from developmental studies and such theological studies as can see in the phenomena only spurious religion and degeneration. In discussing these types, he is careful to indicate that they are “not periods in the evolution of belief in God which in due sequence succeed each other.” They are “in no case settled stages on the highway of mankind.” His interest is not in the development of religion, but in the “texture or constitution of the religious spirit” that has dominated various periods and cultures. For van der Leeuw these are simply discrete structures of religion which merit designation by separate terms. 49 He acknowledges that they often subsist within the same period and even within the same culture. 50 Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that van der Leeuw’s treatment of religion displays an ordering of types and structures that seem to find its fulfillment in “what appears” to him in the Christian tradition. Of this a clear illustration can be found in van der Leeuw’s discussion of that end to which he believes all religion aims. For van der Leeuw that end is salvation. 51 Because he takes it to be the goal of all religion, he finds a valence toward salvation in all of the types and structures he tries to comprehend. The object or animal that is

46. Ibid., p. 631.
47. Ibid., p. 634.
48. Ibid., p. 169.
49. Ibid., pp. 169, 27f.
50. Ibid., pp. 159 ff.
51. Ibid., p. 536.
mana is salvation. The sacred tree or mountain is salvation. In Egypt, salvation was seen in the fertilizing water of the Nile. The savior was first the phallus that brings fertility or its female counterpart, the earth. Subsequently various powerful entities emerge. In a succeeding phase, the human form emerges on all sides from a hitherto amorphous power. The salvation form expands most profusely, he thinks, in the representations depicting the annual renewal of growth, the salvation which is spring. It is not nature alone, however, but culture as well that brings salvation. Thus everywhere van der Leeuw finds prehistoric forms that taught men to plough or to mine or gave them laws. These too are bringers of salvation, as is the son who preserves the potency of family and tribe. Salvation, according to van der Leeuw, is not connected only with racial or cultural continuance nor merely with the eternal repetition of nature: "it lives too in the inestimable boon, bestowed once for all, which is linked by memory to some historic individual," to an Osiris, a Demeter, a Triptolemus, a Christ.\(^52\) But while Christ belongs to the category of the savior, he also stands apart. In van der Leeuw's view, Christ's whole existence is a "means," a "movement of man towards God and of God towards man."\(^53\) As an ideal type, Christ, "the mediator," is finally in a class by himself.

This kind of ordering of types is evident not only in van der Leeuw's discussion of the object of religion but in his view of the response to Power as well. The human response to Power, he says, is first of all astonishment or awe and, in extreme cases, fear. But where the fearful desert-will of Yahweh becomes the God of history, he thinks something colossal has taken place in the life of man: faith has been born. "Power now becomes believed in as Will."\(^54\) With this the salvation at which all religion aims is no longer to be won but is the free gift of grace, and "thus, indeed, it first becomes salvation in any actual sense."\(^55\) Van der Leeuw suggests that in the light of this colossal moment in man's religious life, it is possible to

\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 108.  \(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 666.  \(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 638.  \(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 536.
understand the Christian preaching which expounds that salvation through faith that one encounters in the Christian context in the forgiveness of guilt and the atonement for sin. Faith, as van der Leeuw puts it, is not a human sentiment, not a human deed. It is not a feeling or volition but the state of being elected. From the very beginning “out of His own free and incalculable grace God has chosen the believer.”56 This election, for van der Leeuw, is the movement of Power towards the world. “Mankind’s love of God is the reflection of the divine love for man.”57 It is hard to deny that in this religion, van der Leeuw finds the telos of man’s response to Power. In this faith of man, the dread which van der Leeuw has elsewhere encountered “finds its end in God from Whom it emanated,” wherein perfect love casteth out fear.58 In the attempt to understand what appears, van der Leeuw finally concludes that in man’s religious experience, a strange “Wholly Other” Power obtrudes into life. The human response to this is “first of all astonishment, and ultimately faith.”59

It is van der Leeuw’s claim that this approach is defensible, notwithstanding the problems it inevitably entails. The existential standpoint from which he observes what appears simply cannot be placed within brackets. He notes that in treating historical problems, especially in the field of religion, it has long been the fashion “to set one’s own religion as scrupulously as possible in the background and to create the impression that, with reference to religion, one was wholly free from prejudice.” Van der Leeuw believes, however, that man exists in the world in some quite definite way and that a completely unprejudiced treatment of religion is impossible. To relinquish one’s standpoint is tantamount to jumping over one’s shadow. In the case of one who claims to abstain from all partisanship and who therefore believes he is unprejudiced it is far more likely that his treatment is “governed throughout by a religious attitude which

56. Ibid., p. 537.
57. Ibid., p. 646.
58. Ibid., p. 471.
59. Ibid., p. 681.
Gerardus van der Leeuw has not been scientifically clarified, and which is therefore exempt from all criticism and discussion. Van der Leeuw's answer is not an attempt to renounce or escape one's standpoint but to become fully aware of it, of its inevitability and of its impact.

For van der Leeuw himself, then, it is from the standpoint of Christianity alone that a study of religion is possible, and from this standpoint, Christianity cannot but be regarded as the central form of historical religions. When we study religion on the horizontal plane, we being with ourselves as center. Surveying the realm of religious phenomena from this standpoint, van der Leeuw quite naturally finds in the Gospel of Christ the fulfillment of religion in general. He insists that in this acknowledgment, he advocates no dogmatic treatment, for he recognizes that genuine restraint can be exercised only in the light of one's own experience and that this can never be divorced from its "religious determinativeness."

Van der Leeuw, however, does not precisely declare through all of this the de facto superiority of Christianity to everything encountered in the history of religions. The restraint which van der Leeuw claims to exercise is expressed most profoundly in his recognition that the understanding he achieves, the phenomenology he develops, cannot do complete justice to the religious conceptions of the persons whose religion he describes. In recognizing that he necessarily sets out from his own religion, van der Leeuw also acknowledges that the phenomenology of religion could also be set out by another person from another standpoint and that in this phenomenology of religion, this other religious position would emerge as the crown of the history of religion. This is especially significant in the light of van der Leeuw's reflections upon Buddhism. In itself, he says, it would be quite possible, "for a Buddhist to set out the phenomenology of religion, with his own as the starting point; and then he would naturally discover the culmination of religion in Buddhism."

He acknowledges, moreover, that having recognized this possibility,

60. Ibid., p. 645.
61. Ibid., p. 679.
62. Ibid., pp. 645f.
he cannot adjudicate which phenomenology of religion would be the more correct. Whether the Buddhist view or the Christian view is ultimately the more valid is not a question that pertains to what appears. It is not a problem for the phenomenology of religion to resolve.\footnote{Ibid., p. 646. The work of Keiji Nishitani, recently published in English as \textit{Religion and Nothingness}, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), is an exploration of religion from a non-Christian standpoint that invites examination in the light of van der Leeuw's suggestion.}
The Anti-Reductive Trait in the Phenomenology of Gerardus van der Leeuw

In Kristensen's phenomenology, the anti-reductive trait is expressed in a preoccupation with the religious adherents' own conceptions. He believes that to interpret these as symbols of something religiously familiar to himself is the closest he can come to a valid appreciation of the religious conceptions of the ancients. The approach of van der Leeuw is similar to that of Kristensen. Van der Leeuw's concern is with the phenomenon, with what appears. Yet what appears differs according to the attitude of the person who observes. The attitude with which van der Leeuw observes differs as much from the gaze of the cold-blooded spectator as it does from the passionate gaze of the theologian. Kristensen observed that what appeared to the view of Tylor and Spencer was something that deviates from the modern conception of nature, a difference that could be explained in terms of deficient or mistaken knowledge. To Kristensen's empathetic view, what appears among the ancients is a "sense of sanctity," the formulation of a "mystical relation." What van der Leeuw is concerned with is what appears in the attitude of the self-surrendering love. To this attitude what appears is a subject related to an object which at the same time is an object related to a subject. It is "a human statement" concerning something "totally other." ¹

Like Kristensen's concern with the conceptions of the adherents themselves, van der Leeuw's concern with what appears is an anti-reductive concern. Nevertheless, in the development of this con-

cern, his phenomenology differs from that of Kristensen in a number of important ways. While Kristensen discusses the phenomena in terms of ancient and modern types, van der Leeuw recognizes an indefinite variety of types of religion and of religious phenomena that span a continuum from the so-called primitive to that represented by modern Christianity, all of which differ significantly from the ways of thinking of modern "non-religious" humanity. Secondly, while van der Leeuw certainly makes use of his own religious experience in the interpretation of others he is less dependent than Kristensen upon insight from this source alone. In addition to insight derived from his own religious tradition, he derives much insight into the meaning of the religious phenomena from sources other than particularly religious material. Thirdly, because he is able to admit insight into the religious phenomena that are derived from resources outside of his own religious experience, he differs from Kristensen in his evaluation of the principal theories of religion.

The Comprehension of Alien Types of Religion

For Kristensen, we said, a principal weakness of many theories of religion, that of Tylor, Spencer, Feuerbach, etc., was their failure to recognize the distance that separates them from the ways of thinking of ancient civilization. For van der Leeuw as well, modern ways of thought lack the viewpoint that provide access to these conceptions. In his discussion of what has been labeled "fetishism," van der Leeuw notes that "we moderns have accustomed ourselves to regard things as mere dead objects with which we deal exactly as we please." He also agrees with Kristensen that the loss of a consciousness of power in things began with the emergence of the concept of Spirit as opposed to mere nature among the ancient Greeks. In a way that resembles Kristensen's view, van der Leeuw opposes the modern viewpoint to that of "primitive man." For him, the primitive mind "lacked that unquestioning acceptance of the regularity of natural processes which our own intellectual outlook regards as axiomatic." To primitive man, he says, "life is Power, not law." It reveals itself

2. Ibid., pp. 37, 73.
"spontaneously."³ While modern man thinks of events in terms of single causes, the primitive understands his life as "a broad current of mighty powers whose existence we do not specifically observe, but which occasionally makes itself conspicuous by either the damming or the flooding of its waters."⁴ While to us the sun is the center of the regularity of a solar "system," the primitive regards the celestial events in a different way. "He is by no means certain about the return of the heavenly light, and the fear that the sun may some day fail in its course is to him in no way a mere phantom of the brain."⁵ Even to speak of the events of nature as man's "environment" presupposes the attitude of an observer separated from the context in which he lives. For the "primitive" the rise and fall of the river, the daily return of the sun, the growth of vegetation are not the surrounding milieu of his life but the realities upon which his life is centered. And far from a mere summation of the events that affect him, they constitute "a unity that is experienced as such."⁶

Van der Leeuw's conception of primitive man does not precisely correspond to Kristensen's view of ancient civilization. It was Kristensen's observation that the distance that separates the modern nations from the nations of antiquity is greater than that which separates the ancient nations from one another. While he acknowledges that the typical groups of religious phenomena are indefinite in number, he prefers to restrict his study to the "larger and more clearly outlined groups." Kristensen feels justified thus in speaking "very roughly" of two "types of civilizations" which correspond to "two types of religious orientation."⁷ Despite the strengths of Kristensen's typology, there are weaknesses in his structuring of the data which van der Leeuw's alternative seeks to avoid. It seems hard to deny that the religious views of the so-called primitives, which are certainly foreign to modern man, are also vastly different from the religious systems developed in ancient India or Persia; and while modern ways of thinking may display the influence of the Greek enlightenment, it is hard to deny that Greek thought also developed

³. Ibid., p. 56. ⁴. Ibid., p. 43. ⁵. Ibid., p. 65. ⁶. Ibid., pp. 59, 98. ⁷. Kristensen, pp. 18 ff.
religious ideas that differ significantly from those of the modern era. While van der Leeuw joins with Kristensen in distinguishing the modern from other ways of thought, his effort to distinguish between modern and alien forms of religion involves a differentiation of types of greater variety than the typology which Kristensen allows.

In the work of van der Leeuw, the term type has actually more meanings than one. It refers principally to the general groups of analogous religious phenomena the meaning of which he seeks. The type in these terms includes such phenomena as "the savior," "the mother," "the mediator," "the mighty dead," etc. The word type, however, also refers to groupings of religious phenomena of larger dimensions. Because he seeks what appears, van der Leeuw believes that religion can be found only in "religions," in the religious lives of persons and communities. He understands this to mean that, strictly speaking, each community within each religious tradition represents something discrete, and that in the final analysis, the religion of each individual is distinct. He argues, nevertheless, that as in the field of art, there are reasonable ways in which this variety can be structured. While each artist has his own style and each individual has his own taste in artistic appreciation, it is possible to speak meaningfully of a "style," or of "a consciousness," characteristic of a particular period. The religious individual, too, has his own distinctive "style" of religion. Yet this style is also one specification of a larger, often vast, historical form.\(^8\) Van der Leeuw also refers to these "styles" and "forms," as types of religion. For van der Leeuw, then, "primitive religion" is not simply all that is other than the modern. It is neither pre-historic religion of which, as van der Leeuw says, very little is known, nor the "primeval ground of religion," which in principle is concealed, nor is it the form of religion from which all others have developed.

For van der Leeuw "primitive religion" is that "type of religion" that has been successively discussed under such rubrics as fetishism, animism, dynamism, totemism, etc.\(^9\) It is the religion of peoples of a variety of cultures that need not be historically related—the Cora

---

8. Van der Leeuw, p. 593.  
9. Ibid., pp. 27f, 592 ff.
Indians, the Ewe tribesmen of West Africa, the Dayak people of Borneo, the Estonian peasant. In discussing this type, he also refers occasionally to the religion of ancient Egypt, which he sometimes describes as "semi-primitive," as well as the religion of ancient Greece and the Ancient Near East. What distinguishes "primitive religion" as a type is not the particular period nor the geographic region in which it is found, nor the putative stage of its development, but the particular manner in which Power appears to the person to whom it appears and the particular response it evokes. To the "primitive mind," Power appears neither as God nor as what moderns might call the supernatural. For them, the "naturalness of nature" has yet to be established. It appears as something "highly unusual" that at the same time is somehow "foreign." Its most distinctive feature is that Power is here authenticated purely empirically "by one occurrence after another." It shows itself in physical force, or in the human being, in the kind of power or excellence which the person is known to possess. Here, Power has no inherent moral value. It can be of differing kinds which can work for good or evil, and it can be conveyed in almost anything. From this type of religion the slightest degree of generalization about Power is still very remote. About it the primitive has no theoretical interest. His response is a purely practical one—to get this Power for himself or to get it used for his benefit. If this type of religion can be called faith, it is very different from what moderns would mean by the term.

In van der Leeuw's typology, there appears beside the religion of the "primitives" a number of other typical groupings which he refers to as "historical types," the religion of remoteness and flight, the religion of struggle, of repose, of unrest, and several others. While developing an elaborate typology, van der Leeuw is conscious of a limitation to which all such efforts are subject. They are "generalizations in definite guise of the data provided by the phenomenology of religion;" they do not constitute a phenomenology of the existing historical traditions. Van der Leeuw regards his elaboration of "his-

10. Ibid., pp. 23f., 27.
12. Ibid., p. 596.
Anti-Reductive Trait

M. H. van der Leeuw regards the work of creating "historical types" as an effort to apprehend the "living forms" of certain types of religious phenomena. Yet he recognizes that the great religious traditions can scarcely be characterized by any single term. The amalgamation, transposition, and assimilation of phenomena that constitute the history of the great traditions would make the delimitation of their contours possible only by means of a vast number of intersecting lines. 13

On the other hand, surveying the field of religion van der Leeuw finds it hard to deny the prevalence of historic traditions that have the character of organized systems. Often they possess "a sharply outlined historic form" which distinguishes them one from another. 14 Thus while he acknowledges that their characteristics are neither fixed nor rigid, he observes that such forms of religion as the Zarathustrian, Hebraic, Islamic, and Christian have a character of exclusiveness that distinguishes them from all others. In order to characterize these historical traditions while recognizing their unique historical nature, van der Leeuw proceeds by taking a "cross-section" of these phenomena, which, "while traversing the line that indicates the essential nature of a religion," does not pretend to define this nature but only to pertain to that nature in some significant way. 15

Van der Leeuw regards this work as analogous to the work of the Romans when they laid out a camp. Like them he first decides upon the cardo, the main road from North to South, and then upon the decumanus, its intersection East and West. 16 In his discussions, cardo refers to the way in which Power appears to man and decumanus refers to the response of man to this appearance of Power. Developing this arrangement of "historical types" from his own perspective, van der

---

13. Ibid., p. 618. For van der Leeuw amalgamation is the process by which the phenomena of a variety of local cults are incorporated into a unified religious system. Transposition is the process by which the meaning of a particular religious phenomena is changed through the course of history, or by being taken over by another community, while its form remains the same. Assimilation is the process by which alien phenomena are accommodated to the meanings already inherent within an existing tradition. Van der Leeuw's interest in these issues is an important, though neglected, part of his thought.


15. Ibid., pp. 618, 698.

16. Ibid., p. 618.
Leeuw employs two key terms to characterize the great religious traditions. In the first tradition which he treats, he identifies the cardo as *strain*, and the decumanus as *form*. For him the religion of strain and form is the religion of ancient Greece. In the same way, he discusses the religion of *infinity* and of *asceticism*, which is the religion of India; the religion of *nothingness* and of *compassion*, that of Buddhism; the religion of *will* and of *obedience*, that of ancient Israel; and the religion of *majesty* and of *humility*, which is Islam. When van der Leeuw approaches Christianity, however, he employs a single term to designate both the *cardo* and the *decumanus*. And here the word is love. This, he explains, is justified because "in Christianity, God's activity and the reciprocal activity of man are essentially the same: the movement of Power towards the world is love, while that of the world towards God is reciprocal love; no other word is available."17

Just as van der Leeuw's conception of religious types differs from that of Kristensen, his understanding of the comprehension of these types differs as well. Just as the types of religion in van der Leeuw's phenomenology represent a broader variety than they do for Kristensen, so with van der Leeuw do the ways in which insight is gained into the meaning of the principal types of religion. Kristensen's insight into the alien religious phenomena is acquired chiefly by means of analogy with what is religiously familiar to himself. Because a symbolic interpretation points to the aspect of our understanding that comes closest to the ancient religious ideas, it provides insight into the profundity of these conceptions. Yet if this procedure provides insight into the religious life of the ancients, the depth of that insight is also limited by Kristensen's own religious experience. In his discussion of the interpretive task, van der Leeuw highlights both the potential and the limitation of this kind of procedure. For him, as we have said, nothing whatever appears to us directly and immediately but "only as a symbol of some meaning to be interpreted by us, as something which offers itself to us for interpretation."18 For van der Leeuw interpretation certainly requires the surrender of one-

17. Ibid., p. 646.  
18. Ibid., p. 674.
self to others, the surrender of the incomparability of the symbols of one’s ultimate concern. And for him as well, there is something within his own experience that accords with the experience of the alien. Yet he conceives of the entry way to the alien religious conceptions in broader terms. For van der Leeuw the key is not simply whether the phenomenon can be interpreted in the light of familiar religious symbols, but whether it points to a meaning within the range of our human experience as such.

Van der Leeuw makes extensive use of his own religious experience in his interpretation of what appears. To understand the ascription of potency to water in ancient purification rites, we gain much, he thinks, by considering the belief in the power of baptism as it appears in our own tradition. But his means for interpreting the alien religious phenomena are not limited to such specific resources. For van der Leeuw, a phenomenon like animism can be interpreted finally because “we too are animists, though we do our best to forget it!”

Among the most important of van der Leeuw’s resources for interpretation of the phenomena is the insight provided by poets and by children. In his interpretations, he refers to Goethe, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Chesterton, Rilke, and Stephen George as often as he does to any theologian, psychologist, or historian of religion. He believes that what is described as animism is based upon an essentially human experience and that the primitive awareness of power never quite departs from the life of modern man. Benumbed awe, which now expresses itself only in “observation,” can at any moment be revived. And today, he says, “we still become ‘primitive’ as soon as we feel ourselves among the mass of living humanity.” To this, he believes, every war and every revolution bears witness. To emotions such as this, van der Leeuw finds the life of the child and that of the poet remarkably well attuned. They are sensitive to the meaning of religious phenomena not because they are the victim of maladies or deficiency of mind but because they are “human beings whose emotional life casts off certain artificial constraints.” Poets and children, he believes, “are accustomed to look more deeply into

19. Ibid., p. 87.  
20. Ibid., p. 243.
Gerardus van der Leeuw

reality than anthropologists and historians!”21 Thus against the modern man who sees things as objects devoid of life, van der Leeuw finds in the poetry of Rilke, and the desire of the child to ascribe life and will to a lifeless and soulless toy, a sensitivity to the profound vitality of things.22 And against that “law of gravity” that determines the conscious life of modern man, van der Leeuw finds in the poetry of Chesterton “that mad and quickening rush by which all earth’s creatures fly back to her heart when released.”23

We said earlier that while Kristensen thinks his method achieves important insight into the religious conceptions of the ancients, he recognizes that even a symbolic interpretation finally falls short of the ancient conceptions. They cannot be “reduced” to a symbolic interpretation. For van der Leeuw there is a sense in which all that appears is a symbol. It is a symbol in the sense that it points to a meaning to be interpreted by him. At the same time, however, he recognizes that for the person who is confronted by Power, the religious “phenomenon” is other than a symbol in the usual modern sense of the term. For van der Leeuw the phenomenon cannot properly even be called the object of religion. It is “by no means something quite inessential, as our loose modern mode of expression seems to imply.” To the mind of the religious person, the image does not “represent” something else in an arbitrary way; rather as with Kristensen, “the image is what is represents, and that which signifies is what is signified.” Between the sacred and its form, “there exists community of essence.” When he calls a thing a symbol, he means that it participates in the sacrality of that to which it points.24

Through the exercise of intense sympathy, the phenomenologist becomes aware of connections and structural relations among the phenomena. At the same time, he recognizes the boundary of the

21. Ibid., pp. 87 ff.
22. Ibid., p. 37.
23. Ibid., p. 414.
24. Ibid., pp. 447 ff. Van der Leeuw's view of the nature of religious symbols invites comparison with the views Paul Tillich. For Tillich, as for van der Leeuw, symbols function in this way both in religious traditions and in cultural life at large. Cf. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 44 ff.
sympathetic experience. "He never reaches the ultimate limit." The results of phenomenological research must always be prepared for confrontation with material facts. It must submit to "perpetual correction by the most conscientious philological and archeological research." It must continually confront the chaos of the given.\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{Explanation in the Service of Understanding}

We have stated that the anti-reductive concern of van der Leeuw differs from that of Kristensen in its understanding of the principal types of religion and in the manner in which these types of religion are explored. It differs from Kristensen further in the disposition it takes toward the principal theoretical attempts to achieve an \textit{explanation} of religion. In Kristensen's view, it is possible to look at religious data in terms of causal relations to be understood in a rational way, or in terms of their meaning (the most likely meaning) for the adherents. Just as Kristensen's distinction between the ancient and modern types of religion becomes, in the thought of van der Leeuw, an indefinite variety of types of religion, so the effort to understand what appears becomes, in the thought of van der Leeuw, a continuum of possibilities.

For van der Leeuw there is not just one but a variety of conditions for the achievement of genuine understanding. These include the classification of types, the interpolation of what is classified into the theater of one's own religious experience, the observation of restraint, the clarification of what is actually observed, the support or correction of insight by corroborating or other information, and so on.\textsuperscript{26} These conditions can be fulfilled in varying degrees. Thus while the phenomenon presents itself always as the symbol of a meaning to be interpreted, there are for van der Leeuw a variety of levels of interpretation and depths of meaning that interpretation can achieve.\textsuperscript{27} The approach of van der Leeuw, like that of Kristensen,

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 677, 688. \textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp. 674 ff. \textsuperscript{27} Ibid., pp. 671 f. Van der Leeuw states that in its relation to the person to whom it appears, the phenomenon "has three levels of phenomenality: (1) its
is anti-reductive inasmuch as it tries to understand rather than explain what appears. Van der Leeuw's conception of interpretation, however, permits him to employ a variety of attempts toward the explanation of the phenomena in the service of understanding, while Kristensen tends to reject such explanations out of hand. For Kristensen, as we said, the modern mind regards an eclipse of the sun as being as explicable as the shadow which the tree casts upon the ground. For van der Leeuw, even to look at the eclipse as the familiar shadow is to endow it with an interpretation. And any interpretation is a step, however small, in the understanding process. Likewise, he thinks that a scholar who explains the conversion of the emperor Constantine in terms of purely political calculation has interpreted the event in an "ideal-typical manner" just as certainly as his opponent who attributes this conversion to solely religious motives.28

Van der Leeuw's ability to accommodate self-conscious efforts toward explanation to his purpose is perhaps nowhere so clear as in his treatment of the theory of primitive animism. It is van der Leeuw's
view that if we but release the facts from which this theory begins from the doctrine that arose from those facts, it is possible to see something of the meaning of the type of religion that has been dealt with under this heading. In the theory of animism, van der Leeuw finds a "hint" of the process by which the environment that is replete with power acquires a "will." If we can remove the developmental conceptions from the analogy between primitive man and the child, we can start afresh with the child who endows his toys with life, and we can begin there to identify with the human emotion under the influence of which this endowment with life is performed. With this, the question as to why the primitive and the child see the world in terms of personal life begins to give way to a deeper question why we ever lose "this natural mode of observation, so that we can restore it only by artificial means?"

Van der Leeuw's use of Tylor's animistic theory is similar to his approach to other efforts to explain religion. In the use of the term "fetishism," which was once applied to the religious behavior of primitive man in general, van der Leeuw finds an aspect of a type of religion characterized by that reckoning with power which subsists in the veneration of certain objects that are set aside for their sacred potency (such sacred objects as the Australian Churinga), a type of religion which van der Leeuw finds extremely profound. Against Spencer's objections to Tylor, van der Leeuw, like Kristensen, points out that the primitive mind does not concur with the modern distinction between the organic and the inorganic in nature. Yet in the cult of the dead, so important to Spencer, he finds another important aspect of the actual experience of the so-called primitive with which the modern man is still able to identify in some intuitive way. In van der Leeuw's view, the "pre-animistic" theory is as weak as the theory of primitive animism. Like its alternative, it attempts to es-

29. Ibid., 1:86. It is worth noting that van der Leeuw treats Tylor's theory of sacrifice in a way similar to the way in which he treats Tylor's theory of animism. While Kristensen rejects Tylor's theory which sees sacrifice as a transaction between equals, van der Leeuw believes that even an exchange of gifts between equals often has, though often unnoticed, spiritual dimensions. (Ibid., p. 85 ff.)

30. Ibid., pp. 128 f.
tablish the genesis of religion in history and thus to account for its existence. Nevertheless, in the data which refute the priority of animism, van der Leeuw finds further insight into the “primitive” religious experience. He rejects the notion that religion could have originated from the personification of the powers of nature either by means of primitive man’s reflection on the cause of natural phenomena or by means of what Müller has called the “disease of language.” For van der Leeuw religion cannot have arisen from the worship of nature because nature is “neither the sole nor even the principal feature in religion.” Moreover, the term nature as it is commonly understood, is of relatively recent origin, having been distinguished from human culture only since Rousseau and the Romantics. At the same time, van der Leeuw believes that what we naively call nature plays a prominent role in the religions of man. He cautions only that “it is neither Nature, nor natural phenomena as such, that are ever worshipped, but always the Power within or behind.”31 For him, the antithesis between sacred and secular, between the powerful and the impotent, is a more comprehensive distinction than that between nature and culture. Similarly, van der Leeuw rejects both the view of Müller that mana is the Melanesian word for the infinite and the effort of Müller to reduce the history of religion to a pattern of development in which this perception of the infinite unfolds. Yet he thinks that as originally discussed by Codrington, the term Mana represents an important resource for our understanding.32

Van der Leeuw finds important resources for the understanding of religion in such conceptions as fetishism, animism, pre-animism, and ancestor worship. Yet there is always a great distance between his evaluation of the theory as an explanation of what appears and his interest in the data upon which the theory is based. In his treatment of totemism, this distance is especially clear. Along with other theories, van der Leeuw rejects the idea that “totemism” is the “primitive,” i.e. the first, religion. Yet he concedes the importance of the widely recognized features of the phenomena: (1) that the well-being of certain communities is felt to be irrevocably bound up

31. Ibid., pp. 52 f. 32. Ibid., p. 24.
with the totem; and (2) that the relation of the group to the totem involves sundry tabus. He argues, however, that we can achieve a "genuine understanding" of totemism "only if we duly consider its religious basis." At the heart of this phenomenon, he finds a "submersion within the power of some animal." In this context, the totem animal is "a sort of reservoir of the potency of the tribe or clan." For van der Leeuw the strength of the totem theory is its recognition that for many peoples religion is very different from a private affair and that for the so-called primitives, the group has a significance which is very different from what is constituted by the modern social contract. Nevertheless he believes that the element of the sacred in the social makes it impossible for the sacred and the social to be merged. For him, "the sacred common element is not sacred because it is common, but common because it is sacred." He believes that in the sociological school of Durkheim, the "vital nerve of sacredness is lacking."

In a similar way, van der Leeuw finds that as an interpretation of religion the theory of Freud like other theories has significant insight to offer. He believes that the importance which Freud attaches to human sexuality is especially important. Yet he is reluctant to acknowledge that this approach is original with Freud or that his views are sufficient to supplant all others. Says van der Leeuw, "Long before Freud compelled them to admit it, wise men knew that human potency, which man directs upon his environment as its power, has its roots to no mean extent in sex life; and now many of them can give their attention to nothing else!" Among the views of Freud, the significance he attaches to the intimate relation of man to his parents, both his mother and father, is of particular interest. He is also interested in Freud's analysis of the religious prohibition or Tabu in which Freud finds the basis of the religious command. It is Freud's understanding that religion involves a dread awe that requires of man his cautious attention, and he holds that if a man lives in spite of

33. Ibid., p. 79. 34. Ibid., p. 269.
35. Ibid., p. 230.
36. Ibid., pp. 91 ff, 177 ff. In his discussion of the form of the Mother, van der Leeuw also finds the insight of J. J. Bachoffen of particular importance.
his conscience, this dread can torment him even when he is uncon- 
sscious of any fault. Van der Leeuw finds support for his own inter-
pretation of much religious data in the famous observation of Freud 
that “psychoanalysis confirms what the pious were wont to say, that 
we are all miserable sinners.” This confirmation, though arriving late 
in the day, says van der Leeuw, “should nevertheless be welcome.”
Against the views of Freud, van der Leeuw urges only that, however 
much of man’s practical religious conduct may be affected by trans-
missible tabus, the “profound awe” and “awful potency” with which 
they are associated must not have been the invention of the great 
hones of the earth, but must have subsisted to begin with.

The Irreducible in the Phenomenology of van der Leeuw

We stated that both Kristensen and van der Leeuw develop the 
notion of Chantepie that religious acts, cult, and customs refer to a 
unity that is the specific and common property of mankind. In the 
thought of Kristensen the emphasis falls on the word specific. Kris-
tensen is preoccupied with the peculiar nature of religion as a subject 
of research. For him, the religious conceptions of the ancients are 
irreducible first because they are finally inaccessible to modern ways 
of thinking, and secondly because the understanding he acquires of 
the conceptions of the ancients he achieves by virtue of an aspect 
of his own experience. This he understands from his own religious 
experience to be irreducible in itself. He believes that this approach 
provides approximate knowledge of the religious intuition of the an-
cients, “the intuitive grasping of divine reality and activity in the 
world and in man.”

In the phenomenology of van der Leeuw, it is not the word specific, 
but the word common that receives the weight of emphasis. While 
Kristensen emphasizes the specific nature of the religious intuition, 
vander Leeuw places emphasis upon the common nature of human-

37. Ibid., pp. 467 ff.
38. Ibid., p. 468; Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. A. A. Brill (New 
39. Ibid., p. 50
40. Kristensen, p. 255.
Anti-Reducive Trait

kind that enables him to achieve understanding of what appears. With van der Leeuw the irreducible in religion pertains to the nature of humanity as a fundamentally religious species. Like Kristensen, van der Leeuw acknowledges that it is impossible ever to gain the "uttermost limit" in the process of understanding. And the way he achieves even relative understanding depends upon a "living vision of reality" that is more usually the possession of poets and children than historians and anthropologists. In many groups of religious phenomena van der Leeuw finds a dread which he thinks is aroused by "the unlimited possibility lying at the base of all religions without exception." This experience is other than merely unpleasant feelings or slavish fear. And it is different again from the reasonable alarm that results from any concrete danger. It is not based on any rational set of conditions but "exists prior to every experience."41 Elsewhere he states:

It is not that our so-called reality is there first, and only subsequently the sacred which this symbolizes: it is rather the sacred that first and solely exists, and our secular entities possess value and permanence only because they are capable, in any given instance, of symbolizing the sacred and cooperating with it.42

In the confrontation with this potency, a person finds himself in the presence of some quality with which he was never previously familiar, something that "cannot be evoked from anything else but which, sui generis and sui juris, can be designated only by religious terms such as 'sacred' and 'numinous.'"43

In his interpretation of alien religious conceptions, van der Leeuw is not restricted, however, to the resources of theology. In addition to these, he gains much from the insight of a number of philosophers who have made man's temporal being the object of their philosophical research. He observes that long before Freud or the psychology of the unconscious, Kierkegaard had dealt profoundly with a kind of "dread" which seems to be the possession of human beings as such.

42. Ibid., p. 448.
43. Ibid., p. 47 f.
This, he thinks, is not the rational fear say of being attacked in the forest but the feeling of the forest's uncanniness that would almost cause one to greet the appearance of robbers with joy. Van der Leeuw implements this “concept of dread” in the service of understanding. It illuminates the child's dread of the dog about which it knows nothing, the dread of nothingness that appears among youth around puberty, the dread that appears in neuroses of various kinds, and the dread that appears in Chesterton's reflection upon the tree as “a top-heavy monster with a hundred arms, a thousand tongues, and only one leg.” He states that so long as the tree remains a tree, it does not frighten us. When it looks like a man, our knees knock beneath us. “And when the whole universe looks like a man, we fall on our faces.”

It is van der Leeuw's conviction that inasmuch as religions are tied up with fear, it is this kind of fear to which they pertain. To say that religion begins in this way, however, is not to find the origin of religion in a special feeling. This dread-experience lies at the base of the religious life, in van der Leeuw's view, because it lies at the base of human life as lived. Wherever he looks, van der Leeuw finds in the human condition a dread that is not grounded upon any rational set of conditions. It is "a mode of the very state in which

44. Ibid., pp. 90, 464 ff.

45. It is significant that van der Leeuw explicitly rejects the idea of an a priori religious intuition as the foundation of religion. For van der Leeuw the 'primal ground' of religion is in principle concealed. His exclusive concern is with the phenomenon whose entire essence is given in its appearance, and its appearance to someone. (Ibid., p. 671.) He suggests that if within the variety in the history of religion, there may be some distinctive religious feeling, "we seldom receive even a weak sign of its existence." (Ibid., p. 698.) His dissatisfaction with this idea clearly reflects his own religious tradition. For van der Leeuw, it is revelation and not the religious a priori that stands at the heart of religion. And it is by means of such categories as revelation, prayer, sacrament, and faith, among others, that he understands the religion of others. In his view, revelation can be derived neither from a religious a priori nor from "some religious fundamental principle." (Ibid., pp. 565 ff.) For van der Leeuw, Schleiermacher is important for his rejection of the derivation of religion from metaphysical or moral interests and his rejection of the enlightenment concept of a 'natural religion,' but not for his introduction of a distinctive religious category. (Ibid., p. 692.)
one subsists.” What engenders this dread is simply one’s being in the world.46

As van der Leeuw understands it, this “dread awe,” moreover, does not have a merely negative connotation. It imbues the entire field of religion because man “loves his dread and becomes fascinated by it.” It may be almost completely resolved into terror in which a considerable proportion of the fear of demons and spirits persists, but it may also traverse the entire range of human feeling, “from terror through horror, awe, reverence and the sense of distance, to trust and love; and in love there is always something of horror, in horror always some degree of love.”47 Van der Leeuw is aware that in dealing with the feeling of dread that occurs in religion, he is treating only part of a larger phenomenon. Experience, he insists, cannot be reduced to feelings and feelings cannot be separated from life in its totality and from the functions of reason and will.48 According to van der Leeuw, an experience can be regarded in two different ways. Our attention may be directed more specifically toward the expression, the behavior that “makes itself manifest,” or toward the impression, “those inward emotions that have occasioned the expression.” In directing our gaze to one of these, the other is never out of sight.49 He thus rejects the view “that feeling is everything and the external action only a form which contains no meaning.”50 And because the inner and the outer are inherently related, he believes it is impossible to separate them for the purpose of study.

The notion of the irreducible in religion is certainly among the most controversial of ideas associated with phenomenological approaches to religion. It is suggested by some that by means of a broadly theological interpretation of religious phenomena, phenomenological approaches have simply fabricated a subject of inquiry, which under the banner of an anti-reductive concern, they have insulated from intellectual scrutiny. We observed earlier that Kris-

47. Ibid., p. 465.
48. Ibid., pp. 461 ff.
49. Ibid., p. 460.
50. Ibid., p. 698.
tensen is candid about the use he makes of his own religious conceptions in his interpretation of the religious experience of others. In the light of van der Leeuw's support for this view, the question arises whether the insight of Kristensen or van der Leeuw into the phenomena in question can have any force for one who does not share such religious experience. To illustrate the problem, we might do well to try to imagine a Christian theologian living in a modern European or American city. For this theologian, there is something irreducible at the center of his own religious faith. He calls it revelation. Let us now imagine that this theologian makes a journey to a foreign country where he observes the religious life of a so-called primitive culture. Let us imagine that he becomes interested enough in what he observes to attempt to understand it. By means of sympathy, he sees that for these people there is something irreducible, something "totally other" in their worship just as there is for him in his own religious faith. He begins to understand them. And as he understands them, he sees as well that he will never fully appreciate these alien religious conceptions, but he understands them in an approximate way. Let us now imagine that this theologian returns to his own country and that some time afterwards he undergoes psychoanalysis. Years later, let us say, he views his own religious experience in a very different way. The aspect of his experience that he regarded as irreducible, he now sees as the product of transference and projection. What he held to be irreducible, he no longer holds to be so. Does it follow that his interpretations of the so-called primitives, interpretations which were made upon a now-rejected assumption, need also be rejected? Or do they remain viable interpretations even for the person who does not now accept the reality of the irreducible in light of which it was interpreted? If it is rejected that there is something irreducible in the religious life of our theologian, need the interpretation be rejected that there is something irreducible in the religious life of the so-called primitives?

If upon the foundation of the irreducible in his own experience, Kristensen or van der Leeuw had attempted to erect a superstructure of truths or theoretical proofs for specific religious doctrines, it is clear that such proofs would fail with the loss of the assumption upon
which they stand. Upon this assumption, however, Kristensen has not established any truths. Rather, he has used the conviction that there is something irreducible in his own experience as a device for interpreting the religions of others. If our hypothetical theologian were to consult Kristensen or van der Leeuw about the validity of his interpretation, we can imagine what the reply might be. There is no good reason to presume that “the primitives” had psychoanalysis as we think of it or metaphors like “transference” or “projection,” as devices for interpreting their experience. On the contrary, there is good reason to presume that at the center of their religion, there is something irreducible just as there once was for our theologian. The viability of his interpretation depends not upon whether the irreducible in his experience can stand up to intellectual scrutiny in the context of the modern world but upon its ability to illuminate the data in the context in which he finds it. Its viability as an interpretive device is to be judged by the illumination of the data which it provides.

It is perhaps in Kristensen's analogy with the translation of the words of a foreign language that the real assumptions of his thought are most clearly displayed. In the work of interpretation, one is attempting to come as close as possible to the meanings of signs (phenomena) for which in one's own language (tradition) one finds no precise equivalent. The assumptions of this approach seem to be three in number: (1) that the principal groups of religious phenomena have a meaning (or meanings), (2) that these phenomena are religiously intended, (3) that because of these things, they are susceptible to interpretation in religious terms. While this approach unquestionably depends upon the religious experience of the investigator, in itself this dependency does not compromise the merit of the interpretation. In precisely the same manner, the translator of any text makes use of his own experience.

We stated that the resources van der Leeuw employs in the interpretation of what appears are less limited than those of Kristensen. The resources which van der Leeuw deploys are not limited to the irreducible features of his own religious understanding. For him, all dimensions of human experience that are capable of being discussed
and especially those that are repressed by the strictures of modern civilization are relevant to the interpretation of what appears. To the task of interpretation the experience of poets and children, the analysis of human existence by philosophers and psychologists, and even the explanatory theories of sociology and psychoanalysis, have a contribution to make. In the case of Kristensen, the analogy of a foreign language suggested three foundational assumptions. In the case of van der Leeuw, these assumptions are reduced to one. Beneath all else, the approach which van der Leeuw endorses presupposes simply that what appears in what we call religion is related to human beings who exist in the world essentially as we do, that their statements are to be understood in human terms. In the course of his inquiry, van der Leeuw discerns that what appears touches him in some fundamental way. The assumption is that the way in which it touches him points to the meaning of what appears—that the response of humankind to what it is that “meets him on the road” is in some essential way his own response. He assumes that in the religious life of man there is something that he can share.

We stated that the viability of Kristensen’s interpretations depend finally not upon whether the irreducible in his own experience can stand up to intellectual scrutiny in the modern world but upon the capability of this experience to illuminate the data he seeks to understand. For his interpretations, van der Leeuw depends finally upon the breadth of his own human experience and the human experiences available to his understanding. While Kristensen’s approach suggests an analogy with the translation of a text, the interpretation undertaken by van der Leeuw differs very little from the kinds of interpretation that occur in every other aspect of human life. In the encounter with a document in a foreign language, a novel, a poem, a piece of music, a work of art, the adequacy of one’s interpretation depends finally upon the breadth and depth of human experience that the investigator brings to what appears. In the view of van der Leeuw, the interpretation of the psychotherapist will likewise be more or less adequate, the more or less able he is to find within himself dimensions of the experience of his subject. Thus while the works of an Egyptian scribe of the first dynasty might be susceptible
to translation with only the greatest difficulty, if we approach it with
the assumption that it is finally a human statement, that it is the
work of a human mind, then it falls within the compass of possible
human understanding.

Nevertheless, the view of van der Leeuw that what we know as
religion is related to human beings who exist in the world as we do
involves a fundamental assumption about the nature of the human
being. In our discussion of the a-theological trait as we find it in van
der Leeuw, we observed that while van der Leeuw begins from the
perspective of the Christian faith in which he cannot help but see
the culmination of the history of religion, he nevertheless acknowl-
edges that a phenomenology of religion might also be undertaken by
another person from the perspective of another religious tradition.
He acknowledges that from the perspective of such another religious
tradition, that other religion would inevitably emerge as the fulfill-
ment of religion in general. If a Buddhist were to set out the phe-
nomenology of religion, we should expect him to discover the
culmination of religion in Buddhism. Van der Leeuw believes he
exercises restraint in arguing that the question of which phenome-
nology of religion would be the more correct is not a question for
the phenomenology of religion to address.

The view expressed here raises the question whether the phe-
nomenology of religion could be set out by a third type of person
who is committed neither to Christianity nor to Buddhism nor to
any other religious tradition. This question evokes what is perhaps
the most basic assumption of van der Leeuw's research. For van der
Leeuw the very existence of man is religious. Whether or not he
acknowledges a commitment to a specific religious tradition, man as
he exists in the world is homo religiosus. The effort towards a non-
partisan treatment of religion would be disastrous not only because
it can never be more than a pretense but also because it renders the
investigator's own religious perceptions inoperative. And it is essen-
tially, though not exclusively, in light of these that the religion of
others is to be understood. If we could imagine what van der Leeuw
would acknowledge to be a genuinely non-religious person, we would
find this person quite unable to set out the phenomenology of reli-
geration at all, for without an “existential attitude” with respect to religion it is impossible to know anything of either religion or faith.

There remains here, however, one further crucial implication of van der Leeuw’s anti-reductive concern. What Kristensen regards as irreducible in his own experience, we said, provides for him not only the means for the interpretation of other cultures but the inspiration and guiding principle of his research. The interpretation that results from his research is inspired, he says, by the illumination of a spirit that stands above us. To avoid argument, he calls it “intuition.”

Much less concerned to avoid such an argument, van der Leeuw displays a similar conviction. He does not speak specifically of a spirit that stands above us. Yet for him, there is, a profound sense in which all comprehension comes finally from “beyond.” The religious significance of things according to van der Leeuw is “that upon which no wider nor deeper meaning whatever can follow.” Yet at the same time, this final meaning can never be spoken. It is “a secret which reveals itself repeatedly, only nevertheless to remain eternally concealed.” For van der Leeuw all understanding, whatever its object, has a religious orientation: “all significance sooner or later leads to ultimate significance.” Whether in explicitly religious behavior or in the investigation of what appears, homo religiosus betakes himself upon the road to complete understanding and to ultimate meaning. “He perpetually seeks new superiorities: until at last he stands at the very frontier and perceives the ultimate superiority he will never attain, but that reaches him in an incomprehensible and mysterious way.” The path of homo religiosus, according to van der Leeuw, resembles the way of St. Christopher “who seeks his master and at last finds him too.”

For van der Leeuw all understanding “reaches the limit where it loses its own proper name and can only be called ‘becoming understood.’” Thus, what is true of understanding in general applies profoundly to the understanding of religion.

The more deeply comprehension penetrates any event, and the better it ‘understands’ it, the clearer it becomes to the understanding mind that the

51. Kristensen, p. 10.  
52. Van der Leeuw, p. 68o.
ultimate ground of understanding lies not within itself, but in some 'other' by which it is comprehended from beyond the frontier.53

The phenomenology of religion is at home on earth. Yet at the same time, it is "sustained by love of the beyond."54 In the course of understanding, what first appears as vague, chaotic, and obstinate becomes eventually a "revelation."55

The resemblance of van der Leeuw's conception of understanding to his conception of Christianity as an historical type is striking. His paradigm for understanding is clearly dependent upon self-surrendering love, but self-surrendering love is possible only because "he first loved us." In the final analysis, in van der Leeuw's view, "we understand each other in God." The dependence of this conception of understanding upon a religious conception of knowledge has not eluded van der Leeuw's attention. For him, not even a conception of understanding can be developed independently of one's being in the world and apart from its religious determinateness. He insists, however, that to say this is not to say that the basis of the phenomenology of religion and the basis of theology are precisely one and the same. Although he believes that understanding can be performed only within the religiously determined perspective of the performer, the insights of phenomenology must be justified on the basis of what appears. The insights of theology rely finally upon the authority of that which by its nature does not.56 While the subject of van der Leeuw's inquiry might ultimately be understood in the light of revelatory encounter, there is much to be explored before he can expect to approach that limit. For van der Leeuw phenomenology of religion can therefore provide no more than a preparation for the revelation upon which theology stands.

53. Ibid., pp. 683 ff. 54. Ibid., p. 688. 55. Ibid., p. 676. 56. Ibid., pp. 684 ff.
Conclusion
Conclusion

The present study began with the observation that within the field of religion there has been considerable confusion about the nature and meaning of what has been called the phenomenology of religion. In an effort to understand this controversy, we observed that prior to its appearance either within the study of religion or in the philosophical tradition that began with Husserl, the term phenomenology was used in two quite different ways in two independent settings. In England in the eighteenth century and following, the term carried the connotation of a classification of phenomena. In Germany, from the Kant/Lambert correspondence onward, it stood for a study or analysis of consciousness. We observed that when the term came to be used in the study of religion, some twenty years prior to its appearance in Husserl's work, it was the English sense of the term that was evidently intended. From this we may conclude that the phenomenology of religion cannot be adequately understood as a mere aberration of research derived from the phenomenology of Husserl and superficially applied to the study of religion. If the term had meanings that antedate the tradition that began with Husserl, the Husserlian tradition of scholarship cannot legitimately claim magisterial rights to the term. In setting out the meaning he attached to this term, Husserl himself tacitly acknowledged antecedent meanings which he did not intend.

Viewing phenomenological approaches to religion as a family, we can see how in each of the exponents we have discussed the traits of this family have become successively more explicit, developed, and replete with methodological reflection. In the case of Chante-pie, the a-historical trait is expressed in the effort to classify the principal forms of religious acts, cult, and customs in a scheme that attempts to determine neither the cause nor the origin of these data.
Conclusion

nor to reconstruct their history. In Kristensen, this classification becomes an exploration of the principal groups of religious phenomena consciously removed from their original historical settings and studied in groups. The results of this exploration are employed to discover the meaning such phenomena hold or held for religious believers who exist or have existed in civilizations quite different from our own. With van der Leeuw, this classification becomes an exploration of the phenomena, of what appears, in the field of religion. It stands apart from those explorations, including theological studies and inquiries into the origin of religion, concerned with what does not appear. He argues that the origin of religion remains always hidden from our view, as does the revelation and the faith with which theology is concerned. Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion is an ambitious effort to comprehend an enormous variety of types of religion and types and structures of religious phenomena.

According to Chantepie, the classification of the principal forms of religion is different from theological study. It belongs to a science of religion which proceeds without taking revelation into account. He believes that a study cannot qualify as theology if it does not stand upon this foundation. In the research of Kristensen, the same trait is expressed in the claim that the work of phenomenology of religion and that of theology are different, and that the separation of these two must be ensured by an explicit recognition of the role and purpose of each. While Chantepie's a-theological perspective is preserved by an evasion of data which are, for him, of theological concern, it is Kristensen's procedure so to surrender himself to others that his own religious tradition becomes the avenue through which the religions of others reveal to him a depth of meaning not otherwise accessible. In the case of van der Leeuw, the methodological presuppositions and implications of a surrender of this nature are explored, developed, and defended. While van der Leeuw distinguishes theology from the phenomenology of religion, he also recognizes that the meanings he discerns in the data are acquired from a religiously determined perspective. Yet he also recognizes that other religiously determined perspectives on the data are possible. And as phenomenologist, he is not concerned to determine which
In recognizing the religiously determinate nature of his perspective, he also acknowledges that through which these data become accessible to be that same "self-surrendering love" which features in his own religious experience. Van der Leeuw finds justification for this view of interpretation in the recognition that no other perspective is ever within our human reach.

In the expression of the anti-reductive trait, we can observe a similar progression among the exponents whose works we have discussed. The anti-reductive trait of the phenomenology of religion is expressed in a number of related ways and with varying degrees of methodological self-awareness. With Chantepie, this concern is expressed in a negative way in the rejection of theories of religion that attempt to explain all the facts by means of a single generalizing idea. Chantepie is critical of theories of religious phenomena that fail, in his view, to see the breadth and manifold character of religion or recognize its distinctive nature. The anti-reductive trait is expressed in a positive way in Chantepie's vision of the nature and unity of religion which he believes to be the specific and common property of humankind. For Kristensen, it is the experience of this *sui generis* unity that provides the means by which the nature of alien religious traditions becomes accessible even to approximate understanding. Kristensen's anti-reductive concern takes form in the distinction he makes between the effort sympathetically to relive the phenomenon in order to understand its meaning for the ancients and the effort to account for the phenomena by means of a causal explanation. He rejects the latter as a method of research because he believes it is determined by the mode of thinking characteristic of a civilization that is alien to the type of civilization we are trying to understand.

It is in the cause of understanding that Kristensen rejects explanations of the data in terms familiar to modern Western civilization. Yet he acknowledges that his notion of the *sui generis* nature of religion, through which he understands the ancients, is the presupposition and not the conclusion of phenomenological research. Van der Leeuw's thought supports Kristensen's implementation of this assumption on the grounds of his conception of the nature of human understanding itself. For van der Leeuw, a variety of procedures of
research can be seen as stages on a continuum of interpretation in which what appears is reconstructed and the meaning of what appears is placed within a larger frame of reference and gradually understood. In this scheme not even causal explanations are rejected out of hand. Rather, along with the data upon which they are built, they are accommodated within the larger project of understanding, the final goal of which is to testify to what has been made manifest.

To conclude the present study, it is appropriate to return to a question we had to postpone at the outset. To what degree did the phenomenology of religion actually produce studies that were truly non-developmental, that were genuinely independent of theology, and that were also anti-reductive in their approach? This raises the further question of the extent to which any approach of this nature can hope to produce studies that can be characterized in this way. The degree to which the self-understanding of these exponents is confirmed by the studies they produced varies considerably with the trait in question and with the particular exponent involved. In attempting such an assessment, one must distinguish carefully between weaknesses inherent in this family of approaches and weaknesses that are evident in one or more family members but perhaps subsequently corrected by others. It might be argued, for instance, that because Chantepie was unable to see the prophets of Israel except as the highest form of mantic, he had failed effectively to maintain his resolution to follow an a-theological path. Yet this weakness of Chantepie's phenomenology is evidently corrected to some extent in the works of Kristensen and further discussed, corrected, and clarified in the thought of van der Leeuw. It could likewise be argued that in the expression of an anti-reductive concern, the works of Chantepie and Kristensen exploit a confusion between the descriptive identification of a phenomenon as it is understood by the adherent and the explanation of the phenomenon that is offered by such persons as Spencer, Tylor, Feuerbach, Durkheim, or Freud. Yet such explanatory theories are treated very differently by later ex-

---

ponents and especially by van der Leeuw. This is not to say that van der Leeuw has spoken the final word or that there are not additional problems with him. It is to suggest that the phenomenology of religion was not an ideology but a movement of thought about religion in which methodological problems were gradually being clarified. It is to suggest that some of the ways the phenomenology of religion has addressed these methodological issues may be worthy of new attention.

Of these three traits, the first is perhaps the easiest to understand and to defend. So long as we acknowledge that the term phenomenology has differing origins, there is little difficulty in recognizing that the phenomenology of religion legitimately employs classification as the most visible feature of its approach. It can be clearly described, as it often is, as the systematic as opposed to the historical study of religion. That the exponents are non-developmentl in their approach is more problematic. They certainly intend to distinguish their efforts from developmental approaches patterned either upon a Hegelian or an evolutionary model. The difficulty is that phenomena less familiar and less comprehensible tend, nevertheless, to be viewed as less sophisticated forms of the religion in terms of which the phenomena is understood. The problem is magnified in the case of Chantepie because although he does not purport to discuss the origin or the development of religion, he accepts the view, nevertheless, that different kinds of civilization represent differing levels of advancement. While he tries to place all religious phenomena on the same level, he accepts that there are higher and lower forms of civilization. This, however, represents not so much a weakness in the phenomenological approach, as a weakness in the thought of one early effort.

The anti-reductive trait of the phenomenology of religion is also somewhat controversial. It is easy enough to see the difference between the efforts of the exponents of the phenomenology of religion and those who seek to explain religion in causal terms. The anti-reductive concern of phenomenological approaches, however, is closely related to that of theology with which they seem to share a common cause. The difficulty is that the appeal to something sui
generis in the religious experience and the appeal to the nature of humanity as homo religious is derived from the very theological understanding of religious phenomena from which the phenomenology of religion wished to be distinguished. In this sense we could say that the question of the relation of the phenomenology of religion to theology is perhaps the most crucial of all these traits; it is the center of the problem. It would seem, in fact, that the validity of the phenomenological study of religion as a distinctive approach is to be demonstrated finally in the case it can make for the distinction between its own work of understanding, and the work of understanding entailed in theology.

The object of study which Chantepie defends against the reductive tendencies of a variety of scientific studies of religion has, with Kristensen, become the focus of a reasoned procedure of study. This object of study is not now merely the broad and manifold unity the dimensions of which the dominant theories of religion have failed to see; it is an alien reality, the religious experience of peoples whose perception of life differs vastly from our own. Modern rational explanations of such religious phenomena are inadequate not simply because they fail to see the inner nature of the object of study and therefore deny it the status of a distinctive object of inquiry, but because by attempting to explain it, they cannot but judge it by an inappropriate standard. Providing an explanation, they leave the distinctive nature of the object out of account. We observed that in reply to Feuerbach, Kristensen argues that for the ancients themselves the gods have an objective existence. In the gods, they were aware of something irreducible to other terms. We noticed, however, that it was only by means of something he acknowledges to be irreducible in his own experience that Kristensen is able so to interpret these data. For Kristensen, this correlate of the ancients' consciousness is not the effect of some sickness of the imagination. It is something analogous to what for him is genuinely unique and has veritable ontological standing. In his interpretation of ancient prayer, he finds that, like the prayer of which he has personal religious acquaintance, it imparts an inexpressible power that no psychology can
Conclusion

penetrate, such that the calm sea or the good harvest is no longer the issue. The interpretation he offers depends upon theological knowledge.

Reflecting upon this method, we questioned earlier whether a theologian, who once acknowledged something irreducible in his own religious life and then later, in light of psychoanalysis, rejected the irreducibility of that phenomenon, discredits thereby the category of the irreducible as an interpretive device. We said that because psychoanalysis is quite foreign to the ancients, there is no reason why the notion of the irreducible should not remain a viable category for interpreting their religion. The phenomena remain as irreducible in the minds of the ancients as they were in the mind of the theologian before he underwent psychoanalysis. This solution invites a further reflection. The question remains whether, because the causal categories of psychoanalysis are foreign to the ancients, the category of the irreducible is any less so. One attractive response to the question is the argument that it really does not matter whether the ancients were familiar with the notion of the irreducible or the sui generis nature of religion. Kristensen explicitly acknowledges using interpretive categories that would not have been known by the ancients. The fact that the ancients would not be familiar with the notion of something sui generis about their religion does not make it an inappropriate devise for interpreting their religious life. Yet it was precisely because they are foreign to the life of the ancients that Kristensen rejected causal explanations. Another attractive response is that for the purpose of explanation, for the purpose of accounting for what appears, explanatory models are more or less appropriate. But for the purpose of understanding, the purpose of standing among the believers and of seeing what appears along with them, categories derived from one's own religious life are more illuminating and appropriate. Yet Kristensen explicitly claims that when we examine the religion of the ancients, ideas that have come from our own religious life are more appropriate than causal theoretical explanation. And while van der Leeuw regards explanation as a stage towards comprehensive understanding, he sees it at best as a preliminary stage.
The phenomenology of religion, it seems, must assume the burden to demonstrate the superiority of the notion of the irreducible as an interpretive device, and it must do so on a-theological grounds.

The same problem emerges in a slightly different light in the thought of van der Leeuw. Examining religion even on the horizontal plane, his interpretation is evidently affected by his theological understanding of the subject. He takes it for granted that the religious meaning of an event is that upon which no deeper or higher meaning can follow. Van der Leeuw affirms, moreover, that there is simply no knowledge of religion in an attitude of pure intellectual restraint. The difficulty is that the attitude of religious engagement obstructs an unprejudiced encounter with the alien phenomena. He addresses the problem with the attitude of self-surrendering love and with the exercise of restraint expressed in the epoche. We said that the final and perhaps the most striking expression of the restraint of van der Leeuw's approach is his recognition that another phenomenology of religion could be undertaken from another religious perspective and in the light of the religious determinateness of that perspective. He acknowledges that the phenomenology could be written from the standpoint of the Buddhist, and that for him, Buddhism would emerge as the crown of the history of religions. His restraint is expressed in the view that it is not the role of the phenomenology of religion to determine which perspective is ultimately the more correct.

Reflecting upon this possibility, we questioned whether a phenomenology of religion might be undertaken from the perspective of no religion at all, whether it could be undertaken by a person with no religious commitment. Van der Leeuw had already stated that nothing concerning religion or faith can be known without existential engagement. Yet he is saved from considering such a person by his claim that in one way or another one's perspective is always religiously determined because the human person is homo religiosus. As with the case of Kristensen's appeal to the sui generis feature of religion, the difficulty here is the evident origin of the notion of humanity as homo religiosus in a theological doctrine of man. It is indeed hard to disguise its derivation from Calvin's famous doctrine of the
sense of divinity, the seed of religion, that is present in all human beings and which is reaffirmed in Kuyper's assertion that "the purest confession of truth finds ultimately its starting-point in the seed of religion (semen religionis), which, thanks to common grace, is still present in the fallen sinner," and that "there is no form of idolatry so low, or so corrupted, but has sprung from this same semen religionis."  

The question the phenomenology of religion leaves to present scholarship is whether the notion of humanity as homo religiosus, and whether the notion of the sui generis element in religion are peculiar to the present religious perspective and, therefore, unessential, or whether they have genuine analogies in other religious traditions. If the phenomenology of religion were undertaken from the standpoint of the Buddhist religion, would the Buddhist scholar recognize anything analogous to the notion of a sui generis element in religion in his own religious tradition? Would such a scholar find in his own tradition a basis for regarding humanity as religious by nature? If such an element is found to obtain in other religious traditions, the question then arises whether such an element might be inherent to religious perspectives as such. If the notion of the religious a priori, if the notion of the sui generis element of religion, and if the notion of humanity as homo religiosus have significance and validity apart from the religious tradition from which they have emerged in the present case, they would seem to have a profound significance for the interpretation of something that might legitimately be called religious phenomena. And such an interpretive device might have a valid claim to legitimacy quite independent of the influence of theology. While we do not propose to solve this problem in the present work, it is worth noting that while the phenomenology of religion may have derived the notion of man as homo religiosus and the notion of the sui generis element of religion from Protestant natural theology, the notion did not begin here. A similar notion is to be found in the thought of Cicero and others in the Western tradition. The question

as to whether anything analogous to these categories is to be found in the Buddhist tradition might be profitably considered in the light of the thought of Keiji Nishitani and other contemporary Buddhist thinkers who have taken an active interest in contemporary religious thought in the West.\(^3\)

Nevertheless there remains one feature of the anti-reductive concern of phenomenological approaches to religion that is evidently not dependent upon theology in any way and that is methodologically significant. This is expressed in the fundamental conviction both of Kristensen and van der Leeuw, and less explicitly of Chantepie, that however accurate and meaningful the insights that arise from our interpretations, they remain interpretations of the phenomena and not the reality itself. For Kristensen, an explanation is inadequate, not only if it accounts for the phenomenon in causal or rational terms but even if it explains the phenomenon as a symbol. He thinks that at best his own interpretations are only the closest he can hope to come to an authentic understanding of the adherent. His interpretations do not exhaust the object of his study. Because Kristensen thinks religion is a \textit{sui generis} reality, he thinks that our own religious experience will provide the closest access to an understanding of our object. Yet he also believes that even when this is applied, the object remains aloof. And for Kristensen, it is only in recognizing this distance that an understanding of this reality is possible at all. For van der Leeuw, all understanding is a construction at second hand. What appears, the person who is conscious of this “wholly other” power, is and remains alien and finally beyond our grasp. The primal experience eludes us. In the final analysis, we know nothing and we understand very little; reality outstrips our comprehension. For Kristensen, the irreducible element is found not simply in the notion of the \textit{sui generis} element of religion or in the doctrine of human nature as \textit{homo religiosus} but finally in his recognition of the distance that separates him from the religious adherent,

the recognition in other words of the integrity of the object of his study. In the case of van der Leeuw, the irreducible feature is expressed finally in the affirmation that in all understanding we find ourselves finally at the frontier beyond which we cannot pass. It is expressed in the recognition that at this frontier we begin to find ourselves gradually becoming understood from beyond the frontier.

The vogue the phenomenology of religion enjoyed when it first appeared is indicated by the acclaim with which Chantepie's *Lehrbuch* was first received and the fact that within the first two years of its publication, it was translated into English in response to a flourish of interest. This vogue continued for several decades in which additional editions of this work, and other efforts of this nature were produced. The manner in which such efforts expanded to take into account an ever-broadening body of data and the manner in which certain methodological problems raised in earlier efforts were handled in later more sophisticated treatments suggest the continuity of a cohering tradition. Today, owing perhaps to an enduring interest in the nature of religion and the possible relevance for the study of religion of the originally separate philosophical project of the followers of Edmund Husserl, the phenomenology of religion remains a lively topic of discussion. Yet it has been a considerable period of time since the appearance of phenomenological studies of religion the magnitude of that of van der Leeuw. And such efforts as have recently been produced have not had the same kind of broad impact upon the field.

There seem to be two important reasons for this condition. In the first place, the perpetual expansion of materials in the study of religion have been accruing in a continuous manner since Chantepie's pioneering work. Nevertheless there is nothing


5. An important and interesting recent work of this nature has been by Ninian Smart, *The Phenomenon of Religion* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1973). It is interesting that this work has also raised questions from the field about the author's understanding of the meaning of phenomenology. See Charles Courtney, "Phenomenology and Ninian Smart's Philosophy of Religion," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 9 (1978): 41–52.

6. While Chantepie was able in 135 pages to provide an outline of the most
in a phenomenological approach to religion which requires that all
the available material pertaining to religion must be presented. It
would seem, in fact, that with the expansion of available material,
more care might be given to the more precise exploration of partic-
ular types of phenomena in more limited and focused studies.

The second cause of this condition is of more importance for our
present reflections. We began the present study by recounting a de-
bate in which a number of important scholars attempted to clarify
the meaning and purpose of the phenomenological approach to re-
ligion, particularly as it relates to the philosophical work of Husserl
and his followers. We believe that the confusion of purpose and
method that has beset this family of approaches has prevented it from
continuing to contribute as richly as it once did to the academic
study of religion. It has also obscured the significance for the study
of religion of the insights of important representatives of this tra-
dition. Having discussed the self-understanding of three founda-
tional exponents of a phenomenology of religion, we hope to have
cleared one obstacle from the path toward a recognition of the im-
portance of this kind of research for the contemporary study of re-
ligion.

important forms of religious acts, cult, and customs, Kristensen's "Lectures on the
Phenomenology of Religion" filled a work of over 500 pages; and van der Leeuw
regarded his effort of over 700 pages as falling far short of an adequate treatment of
all the available material (van der Leeuw, p. v.).
Bibliography

A. Books, Monographs, and Collections

Bibliography


———. *Tijd en Eeuwigheid* [Time and Eternity]. Haarlem: F. Bohn, 1908.


———. *Vier schetsen uit de godsdienstgeschiedenis* [Four Sketches from the History of Religion]. Utrecht: Breyer, 1883.

Chesterton, G. K. *Heretics.* New York: John Lane, 1905.


Bibliography


Bibliography

—. Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der antieke godsdiensten [Collected Contributions to Knowledge of the Ancient Religions]. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche, 1947.
Bibliography

Müller, F. Max. Chips from a German Workshop. 5 vols. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons and Co., 1891.


———. *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.* Darmstadt: Reichl, 1926.


Bibliography


B. Articles and Correspondence


Bibliography


Bibliography


—. “Tro eller overtro” [Faith or Superstition]. Oslo, 1946; Dutch trans-
Bibliography


Bibliography


—. "Towards a Definition of the Phenomenology of Religion." *Milla wa-Milla* 16: 8–22.


Index

Abba Father, 104. See also God
Abraham, 104
Absolute, the, 24, 29, 124, 174
Absolutely Powerful, the, 223
academic study of religion, 2, 29, 47-48, 278
Adam and Eve, 185
adherents, 145, 155, 159, 167, 172, 181-82, 193, 196, 199, 209, 215, 222, 240, 248, 249, 276-77
Adonis, 226
Aeneas, 65
aetiology, 27, 28, 43, 73
Agni, 68
a-historical: 52, 81, 85; defined, 49-52; perspective, 50; trait, 6-7, 49, 52, 74, 82, 148, 152, 154, 175, 203, 210, 267
altar(s), 169
amalgamation of phenomena, 245, 245n
Amitabha Buddha, 234
ancestors, 67, 133. See also worship of the dead
anchorite, 80
Ancient Near East, 71, 153, 244
ancestors, the, 154, 166, 172, 176, 177n, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 185, 187, 188-89, 190-91, 193-94, 196, 199, 240, 242, 246, 254, 269, 272, 273
angels, 209
animals, sacred, 43, 66
animism, 68, 185-86, 211-12, 213; theory of primitive, 121, 127-30, 132, 175, 183, 184, 243, 247, 250-51, 252
Anschauung, 145, 146, 147, 153, 159, 186n. See also religious intuition
anthropologists, 248, 255
anthropology, 13, 126; religious, 148, 208
anti-evolutionary theory, 212-13
anti-historicist: defined, 51-52; 63, 81-82, 83, 85, 152, 154-55, 203, 214-15
anti-reductive trait, 6-7, 49, 57, 58, 59, 113, 119, 120, 126, 134, 137, 175, 191, 196, 240, 249, 257, 262, 269, 270, 271, 276
a priori, 256, 256n, 275
Apollo, 170, 226
apperception(s), 190, 272
apprehension(s), 154, 155, 196. See also Anschauung
Aquinas, 54, 93
Arabia (Arabs), 106, 110, 210
archeology, 7, 22, 23, 53, 180, 249
archetypal knowledge of God, 161, 219
Aristotle, 52, 177, 177n, 218
Arminianism, 53
art, 1, 221, 243
Artemis, 111
artifacts, religious, 84
Aryans, 116, 134
ascetic, 80
Asha, 186n, 210
assimilation of phenomena, 245, 245n
astrology, 109
astronomy, 27
asylum, 79
Athena, 188
trait, 6-7, 49, 52, 56, 57, 59, 86, 101, 111, 157, 175, 261, 270;
Attis, 226
atonement, the, 108, 111, 237
attitude: of the phenomenology of religion, 55, 59; of theology, 55, 111
Augurs, 171
Augustine, 52, 93
Australia, 251
Avesta, 117, 169

295
Index

Constantine, 250, 25on
contrition, 88
Cora Indians, 243-44
core of religion, 145
cosmic mountain. See mountains
cosmic order, 148, 169
cosmology, 123; religious, 148, 208
Cosmos, as divine reality, 154
covenant, 45, 234
counsellors, 79
Cramer, J., 88
Creator, 100
Creuzer, Georg Friedrich, 114–15, 118, 188–89
cross-section of phenomena, 245
crucifix, 187n
cult(s), 13, 43, 59, 63, 70, 71, 74, 78, 79, 83, 84, 97, 102, 121, 122, 125, 132, 183, 157, 191, 254, 267, 278
cultus, 148, 183, 187, 208
custom(s), 59, 63, 84, 97, 102, 128, 157, 191, 254, 267, 278
daimonion, 151
dancing, 78
Dayaks, 185, 210, 223, 244
decumanus. See cardo and decumanus
degeneration of religion, 150, 172, 212, 233
deism, 214
Delphi, 170, 218
Demeter, 236
demonic, the, 105
demons, 209, 257
demythologizing, 188n
dendrolatry, 66–67, 84, 121, 133
descartes, Rene, 38
description, 29, 43
deuS, 151
developed forms of religion, 168
development, 49, 51, 53, 70, 75, 77, 81, 103, 104, 127–28, 136, 149, 150, 166, 210–11; of phenomenological approaches to religion, 167; of religion, 16, 80, 95, 129, 133, 150–52, 233. See also evolution
developmental conceptions of religion, 148, 154, 165, 212, 252, 271
Dharmashastras, 114
didactic feature of religion, 123–24, 136
Dike, 210
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 73, 203
Dionysus, 226
divination. See mantic
divine kingship, 145, 159
divine order, 169
divine power, 65
divisions of religion, 122
doctrines, 43, 123–24, 136, 258
dogma, 124, 135
Dordrecht, Synod of, 53
dread, 237, 253–54, 255–57
dromenon, 197
dualism, 122
Dumery, Henry, 41
duplex ordo, 244n
Durkheim, Emile, 119, 253, 270
Dutch Reformed Church. See Reformed Church in Holland
duty, 125
dwelling of the gods, 168–69, 170
dynamism, 183, 184, 185, 213, 243
dea, 172
earth, 68, 169
East Asia, 177
Easter, 109
eclipse, 179
economic behavior, 59
ectypal knowledge of God, 161, 218–19, 220
ecclesi, 79
Egypt, 114, 121, 169, 171–72, 187, 198, 236, 244
Egyptian(s), 189, 204–5, 260
eidetic intuition, 38–39, 40
eidetic vision, 12, 17, 18
eidos, 12, 19
eight-fold path, 198
election, 237
Eliade, Mircea, 178n
empathy, 152, 159, 217, 228. See also sympathy
England, 28, 32, 33, 267
enlightenment, 212
entelecheia, 16, 17
environment, 76, 242
epiphany, 226
epistemology, 33, 34
essence(s), 16, 19, 29, 35, 38, 40, 81, 89, 115, 146, 149, 151, 159, 166, 182,
essence(s) (continued)
187, 204, 205, 219, 229, 232n
essence of religion, 1–2, 19, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 73, 85, 97, 125, 142, 150, 154, 163–64, 165, 208, 248
essence of science, 93
essential factors, 44
Estonian peasants, 244
Ethical Modernism. See Modernism, Ethical
Ethical Orthodoxy, 89–90, 91, 92
ethics, 123
ethnographic data, 42, 43, 108, 147
ethnologists, 168
ethnology, 95–96, 102
epoche, 11, 12, 17, 18, 39, 73, 231–33, 232n, 284
eucharist, 56, 190, 197
euhemerism, 132–33
evaluative judgements, 150, 198
Ewe people, 244
existential attitude, 262
explanation, 43, 73, 76, 118, 181, 183, 249, 250, 252, 270, 272, 276
fear, 209
faith, 134, 148, 152, 173, 219, 220, 221, 236, 237, 244, 256
families of gods, 71, 74
fests, 44, 78
fellowship, 105
fertility, 169
festivals, 44, 45, 79
fetish(es), 64, 121, 129, 175, 227
fetishism, 44, 68, 183, 211–12, 241, 243, 251, 252
Feuerbach, Ludwig, 20, 119, 192–94, 270, 272
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 29–30, 31, 32
fire: sacred, 208, use in worship, 68, 71.
See also worship of fire
founders, 122
Freud, Sigmund, 119, 253–54, 255, 270
games, athletic, 79
Genesis, 186
George, Stephen, 247
Germany, 28, 32, 33, 40, 117, 134
ghost(s), 132
glossology, 28
Gnosticism, 105, 210
goats, 67
God in the background, 214
godhead, 70
gods, 70, 74, 76, 77, 78, 98, 115, 116, 125, 129, 152, 170, 171, 175, 182, 183, 189, 192–93, 194, 218; high gods, 211–12
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 115
Gospel, 90, 234, 238
grace, 236–37
graves, 170n
Greece, 171, 177, 187, 197, 244, 246
Greek language, 117, 134
Greek thought, 190, 242
Greeks, 70, 114, 115–16, 124, 136, 189, 218
Hades, 136
Hamel, van, 89, 91
Hamilton, Sir William, 27, 72
hamingja, 210
Hartmann, Nicolai, 32
Hebraic form of religion, 245
Hegel, George Friedrich, 26n, 29–30, 31, 32, 40, 44, 45, 53, 74–75, 77, 80, 123, 150–51, 154, 211, 271
Heidegger, Martin, 11, 203, 232, 250n, 257
henotheism, 122
Herder, J. G., 113
Hering, Jean, 40
Herodotus, 115
Herodotus, 71, 115
hermit(s), 80
Hertz, Marcus, 25
Hesiod, 115, 136
hierarchy, 32
hills, sacred, 68, 169, 170, 170n, 198.
See also mountains
historian(s), 164, 167, 168, 196, 201, 215, 248, 255
historic forms of religion, 245
historical: defined, 49; reductionism, See reductionism, historical; research, 101,
Index

153, 166; skepticism, 204; study of religion. See history of religion(s)
historical data, 50, 108
historical types, 244-46, 263
historicism, 47, 52, 59, 81, 82, 84, 155
history, 49, 53, 59, 71, 82, 196, 233;
philosophical, 26, 27; natural, 152
history of religion(s), 4, 42, 48, 60, 131, 144, 150, 158, 197, 199, 206-07, 211, 222, 270
Hoekstra, Sytze, 88-89
holiness, 192
Holland, 53, 86-87, 92, 156
Homer, 115, 136
Homo religiosus, 261, 262, 272, 274, 275, 276
horizontal plane, 205, 206, 220, 238, 274
horses, 67
hosiōi, 218
Hultkrantz, Ake, 50
Hume, David, 75
Husserl, Edmund, 1, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 26, 33-40, 77, 231, 232, 232n, 267, 277, 278; Logical Investigations, 33, 34, 35, 37
hymn, 221
hysteria, 122
ideal connection of phenomena, 144
ideal types. See type(s)
idealism, 232n
ideas, religious, 64, 83, 120, 124, 157
idol(s), 64, 65, 72, 120, 157
idolatry, 43, 44, 64-66, 76, 84, 104, 120, 173
illusion, religion as, 193
image(s), 65, 169, 170n, 171, 186n, 187, 187n, 206, 248
incarnation, 56
incomparability, 168, 170
India, 71, 105, 116, 177n, 183, 210, 242, 246
Indians, 114
Indonesia, 185
infinite, the, 70, 134
insight, 94
interpolation (Einschaltung), 229n, 249
interpretation, 146, 194, 199-200, 208, 229, 234, 250, 259
intuition, 162, 216, 254, 262
investigation, 27
irreducibles, 85
irreducible, the, 191, 194-95, 199, 255, 257, 258, 272, 273
Islam, 66, 96, 105-06, 159, 234
Islamic form of religion, 245-46
Israel, 66, 90, 96, 212, 246, 270. See also Judaism
Jaspers, Karl, 11, 203, 232n
Jesus, 16, 87, 89, 90, 212
Jews, 223
Judaism, 66, 110, 234
justification by faith, 92
Kant, Immanuel, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 39, 40, 267; Critique of Pure Reason, 25, 30, 36; thing-in-itself, 30, 233
Kierkegaard, Soren, 255
Kockelmanns, Joseph J., 33n
Kraemer, Hendrick, 153-54
Kuyper, Abraham, 91, 92-97, 98, 100, 103-5, 107, 157, 160-61, 165, 173, 218, 221, 224, 275, 275n
lake(s), 68
Lambert, Johann Heinrich, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 40, 267
Lang, Andrew, 211-12, 213
Latin (language), 117, 134
law(s), 27, 28, 29, 43, 87, 148, 172; natural, 160, 185-86, 186n
Leiden, 4, 53, 141
Lessing, G. E., 113
Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, 177n-178n
libations, 68
lightning, 109
linguistics. See philology
litholatry (the worship of stones), 59, 60, 66, 67, 84, 121
liturgy, 197
logic, 34, 35, 36
logos, 13, 29
love, 246, 257
Ma-at, 186n, 210, 223
Mach, Ernst, 33n
magic, 71, 77-78, 109, 172, 183, 190
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 20
mana, 184, 209-10, 222, 227, 236, 252
man. See persons
Manichaeism, 106
manifestation, 209
manifestations of power, 183–84
manifestations of religion, 16, 43, 44, 45, 97, 142, 166, 208
manitou, 184, 210
Maritain, Jacques, 20
Mass, the, 111
Mazdeism, 68
meaning of religion (of religious phenomena), 149, 155, 157, 176, 196, 227
Mediator, the, 236, 243
Meiners, Christoph, 44, 72
Melanesia, 184, 209, 223, 252
metaphor, 186–87, 190
metaphysics, 24, 25, 27, 42, 97, 100
meteoric stones, 84
methodology, 143
mighty dead, the, 243
mimesis, 197
mirror, 230–31
missionaries, 53
Modernism, 87, 88; Ethical, 88–89, 92
Mohammed, 16
Mohammedans. See Islam
Moloch, 104
monk(s), 80
monotheism, 115, 122, 213
monsters, 118
morality, 125, 175
Moses, 16
Moslems, 223. See also Islam
Mother, the, 223, 243
mother, earth as, 68, 236
mountains, 169, 170, 171, 198, 236
mourning, 44
Müller, Max, 22, 40, 42, 113–14, 117, 118, 119, 126, 134–37, 153, 175, 176, 183, 186n, 252
music, 78
mystery(ies), 172, 178, 180, 199; Eleusinian, 190
mythical background of existence, 175–80
mythical knowledge, 172
mythical relation, 240
mythicism, 45
myth(s), 50, 124, 135, 136, 176, 187, 188, 194
mythic element of religion. See myth
mythology, 116, 118, 119, 134, 135, 136; science of, 117, 126, 136, 176
mythology, 116, 118, 119, 134, 135, 136; science of, 117, 126, 136, 176
mysteries, 104
Napoleon, 114
narrative, 194
national character, 159
nature, 154, 252
nature, gods associated with, 70
natural history, 3, 75, 80
natural knowledge of God, 104, 173, 224
natural philosophy, 94, 184
natural religion, 122, 256
natural science(s), 75, 80, 87, 185
natural standpoint, 37, 38
navel of the earth, 170
necromancy, 109
neurosis, 122, 256
Newton, Sir Isaac, 27, 73
Nile, 169, 187, 236
Nirvana, 234
Nishitani, Keiji, 237n, 276, 276n
nomina, 118
nomology, 28
noesis and noema, 77
non-developmental feature of the a-historical trait, 51, 63, 73–74, 81, 85, 154, 203, 210–11, 220, 270, 271
nothingness, 256
numen, 151
numina, 70, 118
numinous, 255
oath(s), 68
object(s): sacred, 78, 188; of worship, 208. See also idolatry, fetish(es)
Olympus, 170
omen(s), 171
omphalos, 170
ontological reason, 83–84, 215
ontology. See metaphysics
Oosterbaan, J. A., 17, 18–19
optics, 23, 24, 27; transcendental, 24
Opzoomer, C. W., 87
oracle(s) 67, 145, 146, 170, 227
orenda, 184, 210
Orient, 115
origin of civilization, 172. See also primitives
origin of religion, 76, 108, 121, 125, 156
Osiris, 169, 172, 187, 198, 226, 234, 236
Other, the (wholly other), 209–10, 222, 223, 227, 237, 240, 258, 276
Otto, Rudolf, 151, 165–66, 196
Index

paganism, 103, 104. See also idolatry
palaetiological sciences, 28
palingenesis, 100, 102, 107, 220
Palladium of Troy, 65
Panikkar, Raymond, 18
pantheism, 87, 105
Parseeism, 95, 150
Paul, Saint, 210, 230
Penner, Hans, 20-21
petara, 210, 223
Persia, 117, 147, 242
personification, 70, 252
persons, sacred, 45, 77, 79, 209
Pettazzoni, Raffaele, 13-15
Pfander, Alexander, 32
phaenomenologia generalis, 25
phallic stones, 84, 120
phallus, 67, 236
Phänomenologie überhaupt, 25
phenomenological circle, 95
phenomenological efforts, 13, 16, 271
phenomenological method, 1, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20-21; in England, 26-28; in Germany before Husserl, 29-33; in Husserl, 33-41; in Lambert and Kant, 24-26, 28-29; in phenomenological approaches to religion, 42-46
phenomenological epoché. See epoche
phenomenological inquiry: object of, 160, 162-63
phenomenological reduction, 232n
phenomenologist, 164, 167, 173-74, 196, 198, 201-2, 208, 220
phenomenology: of Chantepie, 42-43; of Hegel, 43; of Husserl, 43
phenomenology of religion: defined, 49
phenomenon, the, 203, 249
Pierson, Allard, 97
Philo, 186, 187, 191, 193, 196
philology, 53, 98, 117, 134, 180, 188, 198, 249
philosophers, 219, 260
philosopher of religion, 164, 201
philosophy, 123, 124, 135, 175, 184, 194, 203; of history, 82; of nature, 129; of religion, 42, 45, 70, 141-42, 158, 164, 165, 196, 207
Phoenicians, 114
Photius, 52
physicians, 79
pilgrimage(s), 79
places, sacred, 43, 68, 71, 77, 78, 79, 168-72
plants. See trees and plants, sacred
Plato, 123, 218, 226, 232n
Pliny, 71
Plutarch, 71, 187, 189, 192, 193, 196, 218
pneuma, 210
poets, 247-48, 255, 260
political science, 1
Polymorphism, 235
polytheism, 68, 76, 122, 180, 187, 235
potency, 255
power, divine, 76, 84, 120, 157, 210
pre-Christian religions, 109
prayer, 12, 13, 44, 68, 71, 77, 78, 88, 120, 145, 149, 194-95, 199, 225, 256, 272
pre-animism, 251, 252
priest(s) (priesthood), 79, 84, 109, 115, 121
primitives, 80, 81, 128, 149, 150, 177, 184, 241, 242, 250, 251, 258-59
primitive forms of religion, 168, 183, 252
principium of theology, 96, 98, 105, 107, 221
processions, 78
profane, 79
projection, 258-59
propaedeutic, 25
prophet(s), 66, 80, 218; Hebrew, 110, 111, 124, 270
Protestants, 187
pseudo-phenomenologies, 26n
psychoanalysis, 260, 273. See also Freud, Sigmund
psychological factors, 75, 193
psychological unity of humanity, 144-45
psychological explanations of religion. See psychology of religion
psychologist(s), 260
psychology: 1, 53, 95, 98, 123, 195, 272-73; descriptive, 34-35, 36; empirical, 27, 33, 34; nomological, 28; of religion, 42, 45, 95, 97, 122, 126, 151, 193
psychosis, 59
psychotherapist, 260
purification(s), 44, 45, 78, 84, 145, 157, 176, 180, 191, 197, 207, 209, 226, 247
real substance, 83–84, 215–16
realism, 232n
reconstruction, 204, 215
reduction: phenomenological, 36–39
reductionism, 51–52, 57, 58–60, 113, 118, 134–35, 137, 248, 270n; defined, 57; economic, 60; historical, 59; psychological, 60; theological, 58–59
Rarian Plain, 190
Reformation, Protestant, 53, 54, 156
Reformed Church in Holland, 90, 106
Reformed Confession, 92
religion, nature of, 19, 20, 114; object of, 69, 73, 76, 77, 78, 120, 148, 209, 233, 248
religious acts. See rites, rituals
religious communities. See communities, sacred
religious conceptions, 97
religious consciousness, 42, 73
religious experience, 45, 164, 165–66, 209, 272
religious intuition, 161, 162, 193. See also Anschauung
religious subject. See subject of religion
religious times. See time(s), sacred
restraint, 224, 225, 230, 232, 232n, 238, 249, 261, 274
resurrection, 172
revealed religion, 122
revelations, 170–71, 191, 197, 205, 215, 228, 263
Réville, Albert, 185
rice mother, 193
Rig-Veda, 117
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 247
rites, 50, 187, 188, 197. See also ritual(s)
ritual(s), 77, 78, 79, 83, 84, 97, 102, 103, 109, 120, 157, 176, 180, 191, 254, 267, 278n
river(s), 68
Robison, John, 26, 29, 31, 32, 73
Roman Catholics, 187n
Romans, 245
Romanticism, 114, 116–17, 118, 252
Rome, 65, 171–72, 177
Rousseau, 252
Rosetta Stone, 114
reformations, 16
Sa, 186n, 210, 223
sacrament, 170n, 197, 256
Sacred, the, 20, 209, 223, 248, 252–53, 255. See also Other, the
sages, 79
salvation, 123, 234, 235–36, 235–36
sancta theologla, 172. See also theology
Sanskrit, 117, 134
Satapatha Brahmana, 183
Saturn (Saturn-Kronos), 172
savages, 66, 79, 80, 81, 109, 128, 129, 168, 175, 213
savior, 45, 208, 236, 243
schizophrenia, 202
Scheler, Max, 40, 203, 232, 232n
Schelling, Friedrich W. J., 115, 116, 118
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 20, 153, 256
Scholten, Jan Hendrik, 87, 89, 92
science: empirical, 47; natural, theology as, 93–94, 96, 107; as organism, 94; two kinds of, 101, 220; spiritual science, 101; positive, 117, 119; inductive, 117
scientific study of religion. See science of religion
Scripture, 92, 96, 103, 105, 172
sea(s), 68
self-surrendering love, 224, 226, 230, 231, 240, 263, 269, 274
semen religionis, 275
Semites, 169
sentiments, 124
Sermon on the Mount, 198
sex, 70, 253
sentiments, religious, 64, 83, 97, 124, 157
Sháhnáme, 117
Shakespeare, 247
Sioux, 223
sin, 86, 104, 107, 108
sinner(s), 96, 97, 104, 105, 107
snake, 67
social sciences, 48
sociology, 126, 260; of religion, 126
Son, the, 223
soothsaying, 109
soul(s), 45, 127, 207, 210
space. See places, sacred
Spain, 53
Sparta, 111
Spencer, Herbert, 75, 119, 126, 131-34, 135, 170n, 175, 176, 183, 184, 240, 251, 270
Spiegelberg, Herbert, 26n, 31n, 33n
Spirit, 187
spirits, 183, 184, 257
stages of civilization, 72, 78, 80
State, 93
states, religious, 124
stones, sacred, 43, 45, 66, 109, 208. See also litholatry
structure(s), 13, 14, 19, 20, 44, 204, 206, 234, 268
subject of religion, 77, 78, 79, 148, 209, 233
sui generis, religious phenomena as, 191, 195, 202, 215, 255, 269, 271-72, 273, 274, 275, 276
supernatural, 244
supreme being, 213
surrender, method of, 167, 169, 171-72, 196-97, 228, 246-47, 268. See also self-surrendering love
syllogism, 131
symbol(s), 240
symbolic interpretation, 188-91, 246, 248
sympathy, 147, 162, 229, 230, 248-48
synchronic, 51
systematic study of religion, 50 63, 71, 73, 81, 85, 142-43, 144, 152, 153, 154, 203, 205, 207, 220, 228, 271
Tabu, 227, 253
Taeo, 186n, 210, 223
temples, 79, 169, 170-71, 170n, 198
Tillich, Paul, 20, 55, 99, 163-64, 188n, 227
teleological destination, 83-84, 215
telos, 51
theon, 151
theogony, 136
Theologia gentilis, 98
theological judgment, 233
theological understanding, 194, 272
theologian(s), 164, 166, 201, 218, 258-95
theology, 48, 52, 53, 54, 60, 86, 88, 96, 99, 100, 103, 106, 136, 156, 157, 158, 161, 172, 173, 174, 196, 199, 202, 217-18, 220, 231, 263, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276; as anti-reductive, 57; as knowledge of God, 94-95, 97, 102, 156, 160; as science, 93, 95; as science of the Christian religion, 96; attitude of, 55, 99-101, 111, 224; dogmatic, 70, 98, 234; faculties of, 94-95, 98, 106; historical, 98; natural, 54, 103, 104, 105, 173, 221, 223, 224, 275; object of, 54-55, 59, 92, 95, 106, 108, 111, 157, 160, 162-63, 205, 217, 219; of history, 102; of nature, 102; perspective of, 55-56, 59, 102, 106, 111; reformation, 112, 174, 221; systematic, 98; true and false, 103-6
Theophrastus, 66, 71
theoria, 13
theory, 28, 43, 73
Thomas, Saint. See Aquinas
Tiele, C. P., 141, 150
time(s), sacred, 43, 71, 77, 78
tondi, 184
Tonnies, Ferdinand, 177n
totemism, 243, 252
Toynbee, Arnold, 17
traits: family, 5, 6-7, 47, 48, 49, 86
transcendence, 194
transcendental ego, 31
transcendental consciousness, 39
transference, 258-59
translation, 259, 260
transposition of phenomena, 245, 245n
trees and plants, sacred, 43, 45, 66, 208, 236. See also dendrolatry
Trinity, the, 52
Triptolemus, 172, 236
Tylor, Edward B., 119, 126, 127-32,
Tylor, Edward B. (continued)
  175, 181–82, 183, 184, 240, 251, 251n, 270
typology, 29, 50, 51, 71, 77, 142, 243, 244

ultimate concern, 55, 99, 163, 165, 198, 217
understanding, 73, 119, 204, 209, 236–37, 249, 250, 252–53, 256, 260–61, 263, 269, 270, 272
Upanishads, 114
uranology, 28
Usener, Hermann, 230

values: religious, 149, 151, 158
Veda, 117
vegetation, 169
vertical encounter, 205, 206, 215, 220

wakanda, 184, 209, 223
water, sacred, 208; primeval, 169

Weber, Max, 178n, 203
Whewell, William, 28, 72
Widengren, Geo, 17
wind, 68
wish beings (Wünschweisen), 192
witch trials, 109, 110
witchcraft, 77, 125

Word of God, 90
worship, 64, 77; of the dead, 44, 45, 60, 67, 68, 69, 131–32, 170n, 176, 183, 212, 251, 252; of animals, 67, 121; of the earth, 68; of fire, 68, 71; of gods, 69, 71, 129; of heros, 69; of idols, see idolatry; of men, 43, 68–69, 43; of nature, 68, 69, 129, 148, 150; of trees and plants, see dendrolatry; of saints, 69; of souls, 129, 175; of stars, 44; of stones, see litholatry; of the sky, 60, 147–48, 192; of the sun, 60
writings, sacred, 71, 77, 147. See also books, sacred

Yahweh, 212, 236

Zarathustra, 16
Zarathustrian form of religion, 245
Zeus, 68, 188n
Ziggurat, 171