How to Hide Secrets from Operating System: Architecture Level Support for Dynamic Address Trace Obfuscation

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Description

This technical report addresses how to hide secrets from an operating system. The authors provide a detailed design for the VM blackbox and some microarchitecture level simulation derived performance data. They also describe a compiler directed prefetch scheme that uses both instruction and data prefetches to obfuscate the address traces on the address bus between on-chip L2 cache and memory.

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10 p.

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Gomathisankaran, Mahadevan & Tyagi, Akhilesh 2004.

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This report is part of the collection entitled: UNT Scholarly Works and was provided by UNT College of Engineering to Digital Library, a digital repository hosted by the UNT Libraries. It has been viewed 128 times . More information about this report can be viewed below.

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This technical report addresses how to hide secrets from an operating system. The authors provide a detailed design for the VM blackbox and some microarchitecture level simulation derived performance data. They also describe a compiler directed prefetch scheme that uses both instruction and data prefetches to obfuscate the address traces on the address bus between on-chip L2 cache and memory.

Physical Description

10 p.

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Abstract: The adversary model for digital rights management is much more powerful than for the traditional security scenarios. The adversary has complete control of the computing node - supervisory privileges, physical as well as architectural object observational capabilities. In essence, this makes the operating system (or any other layer around the architecture) itself the adversary. The repercussions of this observation are severe. It creates a need to "keep secrets" from the operating system. We argue for the need to keep secrets from the OS in hardware. This concept is demonstrated through architectural support for the obfuscation of dynamic address traces on the memory bus. The objective is to leak as little information about the executed program sequence as possible. This is done by handing over many of the virtual memory management responsibilities from the operating system to an architecturally isolated hardware black-box (VM black-box). The authors provide a detailed design for the VM blackbox and some microarchitecture level simulation derived performance data. We also describe a compiler directed prefetch scheme that uses both instruction and data prefetches to obfuscate the address traces on the address bus between on-chip L2 cache and memory.

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UNT Scholarly Works

The Scholarly Works Collection is home to materials from the University of North Texas community's research, creative, and scholarly activities and serves as UNT's Open Access Repository. It brings together articles, papers, artwork, music, research data, reports, presentations, and other scholarly and creative products representing the expertise in our university community. Access to some items in this collection may be restricted.

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  • 2004

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  • July 31, 2012, 11:22 a.m.

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  • July 22, 2013, 12:49 p.m.

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Gomathisankaran, Mahadevan & Tyagi, Akhilesh. How to Hide Secrets from Operating System: Architecture Level Support for Dynamic Address Trace Obfuscation, report, 2004; (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc94282/: accessed May 28, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT College of Engineering.