



# Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress

**Nina M. Serafino**

Specialist in International Security Affairs

**Catherine Dale**

Specialist in International Security

**Pat Towell**

Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget

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## Summary

Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full advantage. For the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These proposals also provide context for current legislation, including the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314), the Global Security Contingency Fund contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, as sent by Congress to the President on December 21, 2011), as well as in the House's FY2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Section 924, H.R. 2583. The FY2012 NDAA, as sent to the President, requires the President to submit to Congress a "whole-of-government" implementation plan (Section 1072, H.R. 1540).

Despite a growing perception during the 1990s that reforms were needed to foster interagency cooperation in missions abroad, it was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, during the presidency of George W. Bush, and subsequent U.S. military interventions that the need became urgent enough to result in significant changes. The earlier first steps of the Clinton Administration toward interagency reform were in short order embraced and then expanded by the Bush Administration, which also implemented reforms of its own. The Barack H. Obama Administration has endorsed these changes and undertaken some of its own.

Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These are: (1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies; (2) a variety of structural deficiencies in the U.S. government for conducting missions abroad that lead to a tendency for "stove-piping" responses, with each agency operating independently and to civilian agencies' reluctance to divert scarce resources, including personnel, from their core missions to interagency missions; and (3) personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.

This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting; to improve institutional authorities, structures and arrangements; and, to create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms.

As the breadth and variety of the recommendations indicate, there is no consensus on how to fix the perceived problems. Nor is there agreement among policymakers on a number of overarching questions: whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of Congressional organization or procedures must accompany other national security reform measures.

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## Introduction

Some U.S. policymakers share widespread concern that the United States cannot conduct “whole of government” missions and activities abroad efficiently and effectively. For the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, various proposals to reform interagency authorities, organizations, processes, and personnel dedicated to foreign missions may be of interest, especially as it considers ways to maintain U.S. power and influence as it reduces expenditures. Proponents argue that reforms to rationalize interagency collaboration on foreign missions will not only enhance performance, but also save money by streamlining processes, facilitating cooperation, and reducing duplication. Some reform proposals are relevant to legislation currently before Congress, in particular the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, which provides for interagency rotations by U.S. government personnel in national security agencies,<sup>1</sup> and the legislative proposal for a Global Security Contingency Fund, which would provide an integrated State Department-Department of Defense budget for certain types of security assistance.<sup>2</sup> The FY2012 NDAA, as sent to the President, requires the President to submit to specified Congressional committees within 270 of enactment “an implementation plan for achieving the “whole-of-government” integration vision prescribed in the President’s National Security Strategy of May 2010.” (See the section on “The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform,” below.)

For nearly two decades, policymakers have pondered many questions regarding “interagency” missions and activities abroad—including stabilization and reconstruction, security assistance, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency—in a search to improve them. A primary question is the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies, particularly the State Department, in conducting these missions and activities. Other questions concern the recommended changes in authorities, processes, organization, structures, and personnel resources to optimize their use. As policymakers and analysts contemplate the range of probable near and medium term future threats—particularly the potential spillover effects of state instability and intrastate conflict, and the growth of terrorist and organized criminal activity—a consensus has grown that major challenges to U.S. national security over the next decades will require interagency responses.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, despite a

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<sup>1</sup> Identical bills for The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 were introduced in 2011: S. 1268, introduced by Senator Lieberman and H.R. 2314, introduced by Representatives Davis and Tierney. S. 1268 was passed by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on October 20, 2011. For details on these bills, see CRS Report RL34565, *National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress*, by Catherine Dale.

<sup>2</sup> Identical versions of legislation to create a Global Security Contingency Fund were contained in Section 1204, H.R. 1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as passed by the House on May 26, 2011, and Section 924, H.R. 2583, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2012, as passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 21, 2011. A different version was reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 22, 2011, as Section 1207, S. 1253, FY2012 NDAA. Congress passed a third version as Section 1207 of H.R. 1540, the FY2012 NDAA as sent to the President on December 21, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, the September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), issued just two weeks after the terrorist attacks on the United States known as 9/11, featured two emergent elements in the U.S. security environment. These were: (1) increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states, and (2) the diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. In the September 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush Administration emphasized the need to “transform America’s national security institution,” stating that the “major institutions of American security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.” By the time the Bush Administration issued its 2006 QDR, the need for interagency reform had become a central tenant of U.S. thinking about national security. “The Department of Defense cannot meet today’s complex challenges alone,” that QDR stated. “Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. (continued...)”

growing sense of a need for interagency reform to address multiple systemic problems, there is little agreement on the solutions.

Congress has played a leading role in some aspects of interagency reform. For instance, the George W. Bush Administration's creation in 2004 of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was promoted by Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator (now Vice President) Joe Biden.<sup>4</sup> Some Members call for additional Congressional initiatives.

To provide context for the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress' continuing consideration of interagency reform, this report provides perspectives on the questions and issues raised by a broad range of reform proposals offered by research organizations and selected experts. The focus is on proposals for civilian institutions and personnel. Although DOD is a key player in the missions and activities that are the object of proposed reform, its very dominance in many areas underlies calls for reform to build civilian capacity.<sup>5</sup> Thus, this report discusses DOD reforms only to the extent that they would foster improved interaction with civilians.

This report starts with a brief history of the impetus for interagency reform during the 1990s and 2000s, and a sketch of Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administration measures and initiatives, followed by a discussion of key problems in the context of the current interagency structure. (**Appendix A** provides a fuller discussion of interagency authorities and structures.) The report then provides a short synopsis of the content of reform proposals recommended or published by some three dozen foreign policy and defense organizations and experts. (**Appendix B**, **Appendix C**, **Appendix D**, and **Appendix E** provide a broader discussion of proposed reforms, with tables of the proposals.) The report concludes with a discussion of four broad overarching questions: (1) is interagency reform necessary for missions abroad; (2) which proposals are considered highest priority; (3) can interagency reform produce cost savings; and (4) must Congressional reform accompany other national security measures?

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Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.” (Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, p. 5; The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p. 29, and Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, p. 83.) For a summary of the 2010 QDR's depiction of future challenges, see CRS Report R41250, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning*, by Stephen Daggett.

<sup>4</sup> For more on S/CRS and the development of civilian stabilization capabilities, see CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino.

<sup>5</sup> This concern is voiced by policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum and by military and DOD leaders as well. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Michael Mullen (now retired) reportedly stated in March 2010: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren't moving fast enough [to invest in civilian departments]....U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our overseas commands and not enough on the State Department.” This quote is taken from news reports about his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at the University of Kansas; it does not appear in the prepared text and remarks published on the CJCS website.

## Background<sup>6</sup>

For nearly two decades, foreign policy analysts have been troubled by the difficulties that U.S. agencies experience when working together to advance U.S. interests abroad.<sup>7</sup> After the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989, U.S. policymakers were confronted in the 1990s by new types of missions—the conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere—where conflict could not be brought to an end by force of arms alone. In these operations, U.S. military forces were tasked with a variety of state-building responsibilities, such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance, which many believed were more appropriately performed by civilians. DOD soon realized that it needed assistance from civilian agencies, but those agencies often lacked the resources to help. Further, the United States’ agency-centric national security system could not provide the strong leadership and appropriate mechanisms needed to meld military and civilian contributions into effective efforts.

In a first step to address the perceived need to develop coordinated U.S. responses to crises abroad rather than relying on case by case ad hoc responses, the Clinton Administration issued the May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. This directive, entitled *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, dealt with interagency planning, collaboration, and coordination problems by creating new planning and implementing mechanisms.<sup>8</sup> PDD 56’s provisions were not systematically implemented, due to what some analysts have described as internal bureaucratic resistance, although some of its practices were incorporated into planning processes for some subsequent operations.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> This background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn in part from a now archived CRS Report RS22031, *Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization*, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, and from CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino.

<sup>7</sup> For a conceptual overview of this topic, see CRS Report RL34455, *Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates*, by Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell.

<sup>8</sup> *The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive*. May 1997. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> See Michele A. Poole, “Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations: The Impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56”, (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001). The Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of one critical nation-building tool—international civilian police forces—through PDD 71, which sets forth policy guidelines for strengthening foreign criminal justice systems in support of peace operations. (U.S. Text: *The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations*. February 24, 2000 <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm>, hereinafter referred to as PDD-71 White Paper; and U.S. Text: *Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm>.) This too encountered bureaucratic resistance.



The first widely-distributed call for broad reform of the U.S. national security system was issued in February 2001 by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, the so-called “Hart-Rudman” commission. This commission recommended a “significant organizational redesign” of the Executive Branch “to permit the U.S. government to *integrate* more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a new era—not only the traditional agenda of defense, diplomacy and intelligence, but also economic, counter-terrorism, combating organized crime, protecting the environment, fighting pandemic diseases, and promoting human rights worldwide.”<sup>11</sup> Soon after, the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), put the problems of interagency cooperation at home and abroad in bold relief for many policymakers and analysts.

The U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (October 2001) and, especially, in Iraq (March 2003) manifested—some would say magnified—the perceived deficiencies of previous interagency missions abroad. These wars heavily stressed U.S. military forces. They demonstrated that U.S. departments and agencies had difficulty working together productively, indeed they sometimes worked at cross purposes. Gradually, consensus grew that the United States needed to foster civilian-led interagency collaboration and cooperation in missions abroad, and to develop adequate civilian organizational structures, procedures, and personnel to make that possible.

### In Focus: Interagency Problems in Iraq

The 2003 U.S. military intervention in Iraq is often cited as an example of a lack of interagency coordination at multiple levels, starting with the development of appropriate strategy, planning, and direction. As described by one author, the Office of the Secretary of Defense developed its plans, disregarding State Department, USAID, and CIA planning, as well as the advice of some military leaders. The National Security Council (NSC) ceded the lead to DOD, playing a subordinate role. Factors cited by another source for problems in Iraq include “a perceived lack of direction from the president and NSC, bureaucratic infighting in Washington and overseas, cultural differences between agencies, and an inherent aversion in many civilian agencies to the execution of long-term planning,” as well as the absence of grand strategy to guide operations.<sup>10</sup>

## Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11

In the mid-2000s, several studies set forth proposals to reform “the interagency,” as the interdepartmental formal and informal cooperation system is known, largely in transitions from conflict and post-conflict settings. Two Defense Science Board (DSB) studies (in 2004 and 2005) advocated broad changes for “stability” operations—defined to include security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking and other operations needed to deal with irregular security challenges.<sup>12</sup> The DSB studies focused on reforms to be undertaken by DOD and the U.S.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Weitz, “Interagency Problems and Proposals: A Research Review,” in *Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis*, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 261-262.

<sup>11</sup> Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, co-chairs, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, The United States Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, Phase III Report, January 31, 2001, p. 47. Hereinafter cited as *Road Map for National Security*.

<sup>12</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities*, December 2004 (hereinafter referred to as *Transitions*); and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, September 2005 (hereinafter referred to as *Institutionalizing Stability Operations*). The Defense Science Board, established in 1956, is a prestigious standing committee of about forty members—civilians and retired military—selected for leadership in science and technology, and its application to military requirements. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb> The Board reports directly to the Secretary of (continued...)

military to a far greater extent than any previous or subsequent study. Nevertheless, the 2005 study also stated that DOD and the State Department needed to develop “an extraordinarily close working relationship,” and that both departments needed to augment stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Among the changes in DOD the 2005 study advocated were elevating the profile of stability operations within DOD through the creation of high level posts, and raising the status of stability operations to “core missions,” i.e., on a par with combat operations.

Over the next few years, a second crop of studies on improving missions abroad focused on proposals to bring greater coherence to a variety of peacetime activities. Some of those studies advocated that action be taken to prevent conflict when it initially seemed a possibility (and not just as a reoccurrence in post-conflict situations). They viewed preventive action as critical to U.S. efforts to contain the spread of terrorism and to combat the threats from growing transnational crime. Many saw the early proposals to improve the U.S. ability to deal with conflict and its aftermath as applicable to these “steady state” missions as well. One 2008 study drew “lessons learned” from nearly two decades of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations and stated that those lessons “can also have utility for a broader range of U.S. engagements abroad during both military and nonmilitary activities,” including pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict activities.<sup>13</sup>

These studies, spanning a decade, differed in several respects, but largely agreed on the need for U.S. government reforms. For the most part, their recommendations rested on two fundamental premises: (1) the need to empower civilians to lead and conduct all missions except those in dangerously hostile situations, providing the necessary resources for them to do so, and (2) the need to replace *ad hoc*, “stove-piped” systems with improved mechanisms for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations and for implementing them. Their recommendations were often based on the judgment that the greatest threats to U.S. security would emerge in states that were either too weak to police their territory or lacked the political will or capacity to do so. State-building (a term some argued more appropriate than nation-building) activities to promote a more stable world by fostering the development of legitimate, open, and effective governments abroad, was at the center of the strategy developed to deal with these threats. This belief ran counter to many policymakers’ perceptions during the 1990s that the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries was an overly expensive, if not futile exercise.

<b>TERMINOLOGY</b>
<p>The term “stabilization and reconstruction” (or, S&amp;R) is usually understood to encompass tasks and activities that promote security and encourage stable, democratic governance and economic growth.</p> <p>These activities can be undertaken where there are threats to peace as well as in post-conflict situations. In the past, many of the “stabilization” activities were loosely labeled “peacekeeping.”</p> <p>Reconstruction involves repairing (in some cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to support long-term economic growth and development. This infrastructure can be physical (e.g., roads and schools), or institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems).</p> <p>Many stabilization and reconstruction activities and tasks are often also referred to as “nation-building” or “state-building.”</p> <p>“Peacebuilding” encompasses all these activities.</p> <p>“Stability Operations” is a military doctrine term that also encompasses S&amp;R activities.</p>

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Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).

<sup>13</sup> Robert H. Hunter, principal author, *Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices*, RAND and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. xix. Hereinafter referred to as *Integrating Instruments of Power*.

## **George W. Bush Administration Initiatives**

Although the Bush Administration scorned the concept of “nation-building” at first, its post 9/11 military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq soon changed its perspective. As the need to foster security and build credible institutions to govern in these highly fractionalized countries became evident, the Administration adopted significant initiatives to improve agencies’ ability to carry out state-building missions more effectively and to foster interagency cooperation.

On the military side, the Bush Administration’s Office of the Secretary of Defense embraced a number of the DSB recommendations when it issued in November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05), *Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. By designating stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission,” this landmark directive moved DOD away from its Cold War focus on combat operations. It mandated that the armed services’ dedicate the same level of systematic attention to doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning capabilities for stability operations as they did for combat operations. At the same time, the directive clarified that DOD would play a supporting role to civilian leadership in many state-building situations, but cautioned that U.S. military personnel must be prepared to perform state-building functions when capable civilians were lacking.<sup>14</sup>

On the civilian side, the Bush Administration’s signature initiative was the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, starting with the creation of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004, and concluding with the on-going creation of active and stand-by components for a new interagency Civilian Response Corp. In addition, not only did the Bush Administration set forth its own plan for interagency cooperation in S&R missions in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44,<sup>15</sup> but it also partially put into force Clinton’s PDD 71.<sup>16</sup>

Another key Bush Administration initiative was a program to prepare U.S. government personnel to work together on national security missions. On May 17, 2007, through Executive Order 13434, the Bush Administration provided legal authority for the development of an interagency National Security Professional Development program.<sup>17</sup> Under guidance provided by the subsequent National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals issued in July 2007,

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<sup>14</sup> DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05 can be read at [http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000\\_05.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf). (DODD 3000.05 was subsequently reissued as DOD Instruction, 3000.05, September 16, 2009.) For an account of the events leading up to DODD 3000.05 and its major provisions, see CRS Report RL33557, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, by Nina M. Serafino. One proposal not adopted was the Defense Science Board (DSB) 2005 recommendation to create a position of Under Secretary for Stability Operations. Instead, there is a stability operations office under the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC).

<sup>15</sup> Office of the President, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, National Security Presidential Directive 44, December 2005. This directive stated: “it is the policy [of] the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies.”

<sup>16</sup> For background and origins, see CRS Report RL32321, *Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions*, by Nina M. Serafino.

<sup>17</sup> Executive Order 13434 stated: “it is the policy [of] the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies.” For more information on this program and subsequent action on national security personnel preparation, see CRS Report RL34565, *National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress*, by Catherine Dale.

the NSPD program was launched as an effort to promote the integration of resources in national security mission areas. Its stated purpose was “to attain unity of effort through awareness, relationships, and experience, and to break down cultural barriers and obstacles to coordination across jurisdictional and organizational boundaries.” The program, however, did not allocate or request central resources to accomplish its ends. It left each department and agency to build its own capacity under the program guidelines. Although agencies took the formal steps to incorporate proposed changes, absent constant direction and supervision from the White House to enforce it as a top priority and overcome bureaucratic resistance, the program largely stagnated during the remaining years of the Bush Administration.

## **The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform**

In his January 25, 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack H. Obama signaled his intent to make the U.S. government more competent and more efficient through a major reorganization, stating that his Administration would “develop a proposal to merge, consolidate, and reorganize the federal government in a way that best serves the goal of a more competitive America.”<sup>18</sup> The Obama Administration initially embraced key Bush Administration civilian capacity-building initiatives. In the early months of the Obama Administration, Administration officials signaled their support for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton asserted that the State Department needed to secure funding to carry out S&R missions and to demonstrate competence in conducting them. Then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates reiterated his support for increasing civilian capabilities, which he first expressed while serving in that position under former President George W. Bush.<sup>19</sup> Subsequently, the Obama Administration scaled back Bush Administration plans for the Civilian Response Corps and the implementation of the National Security Professional Development program, perhaps because of the cost or difficulty of fully implementing them. However, it also announced a number of its own modest steps in line with the recommendations of the many studies to enhance civilian leadership, capabilities, collaboration, and coordination, and to reduce *ad hoc* measures.

In May 2010, the White House set forth a statement of its intent to strengthen national security through a whole-of-government approach. In its 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama Administration stated that to foster national security the United States “must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same.”<sup>20</sup> It called for maintaining the military’s superiority in conventional warfare and enhancing other military capabilities, as well as investing “in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners.”<sup>21</sup> It outlined three pages of steps to take to improve defense, diplomacy, development, intelligence, homeland

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<sup>18</sup> President Obama’s January 25, 2011 State of the Union Speech can be accessed through the White House website at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address>.

<sup>19</sup> See, U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at Kansas State University, Manhattan, KA (the “Landon Lecture”), November 26, 2007 <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>, hereinafter cited as Gates’ Landon Lecture, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at the AFRICOM Activation Ceremony, Washington, DC, October 1, 2008 <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1281>; and U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C, February 24, 2010 <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425>.

<sup>20</sup> The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, p. 14.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

security, economic institutions, strategic communication, and partnerships with the for-profit private sector and non-profit nongovernmental organizations.

In December 2010, the State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly issued a “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review or QDDR (modeled after the statutorily-required DOD Quadrennial Defense Review Report or QDR),<sup>22</sup> assessing U.S. diplomacy and development capabilities and proposing reforms to make them more efficient and achieve “whole-of-government” cohesion.<sup>23</sup> The 2010 QDDR, undertaken by the Obama Administration without a statutory requirement, embraced a number of the proposals (or variations of those proposals) for national security reform that have been advocated over the past decade. These include efforts to integrate national security budgets, elevate the status of key State Department offices tasked with coordinating interagency efforts, create new regional structures, enhance the ability of Ambassadors to lead embassies and influence policy-making, and promote personnel reforms. (These are further discussed in Appendices B through E, below.)

## Key Problems and Reform Proposals

The United States’ system for decision-making and implementing foreign affairs missions and activities is considered dysfunctional by many analysts. One recent study characterizes the exercise of foreign relations as “a mob scene” of individual and independent agencies.<sup>24</sup> The problems are perceived across many national security areas, including counterterrorism, failed states/post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, democracy promotion, and transnational issues (crime, health, environment, migration, drugs).

The three most commonly cited factors<sup>25</sup> responsible for perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of interagency efforts abroad are:

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<sup>22</sup> Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, p. 2. Hereinafter referred to as *QDR*. For a discussion of the QDR, see CRS Report R41250, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning*, by Stephen Daggett. Also see CRS Report RL34505, *National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress*, by Catherine Dale.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, *The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, Washington, DC, December 15, 2010. Henceforth referred to as QDDR. (For more information on the QDDR, see CRS Report R41173, *Foreign Aid Reform, National Strategy, and the Quadrennial Review*, by Susan B. Epstein.) The QDDR document further points to relations with other agencies, private contractors, and state and local governments: “More specifically, State will enter into interagency agreements, consistent with existing law, to draw on the skills, expertise and personnel of other federal agencies before turning to private contractors where State determines that building in-house government capability or promoting bilateral working relationships furthers our foreign policy priorities. For certain core functions, State will also establish a presumption to enter into agreements to draw on other agencies and state and local government, where appropriate, to implement State programs overseas.... State will use private contractors for non-governmental functions when other agencies lack appropriate skills or are otherwise unwilling or unable to provide the services needed in an effective manner.” Pp. 33-34.

<sup>24</sup> Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, Report required by Sec. 1049, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, P.L. 110-181, Arlington, VA, November 2008. Hereinafter cited as PNSR 2008. PNSR found the mob scene phenomenon “especially [prevalent] in our attempts to manage the numerous so-called ‘soft-powers’ resident in diverse organizations within the federal government.” p. 517.

<sup>25</sup> The Government Accountability Office provides an overview of the issues in *National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration*, GAO-10-822T, June 9, 2010. This document categorizes the problems somewhat differently than this report. Its categories are: (1) developing and implementing overarching, integrated strategies to achieve national security objectives; (2) creating collaborative organizations that facilitate (continued...)

- Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities and processes;<sup>26</sup>
- Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions abroad including (1) department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency for “stove-piping,” with each agency reporting up and down through its own chain of command and responsibility for coordination placed on an overburdened White House; (2) insufficient civilian resources, including personnel, discouraging domestically-oriented agencies from directing funds and personnel away from core missions; (3) inadequate mechanisms to foster information sharing within and among agencies; and (4) insufficient leadership authority, either de jure or de facto, at the headquarters and field level; and
- Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions, possessing little, if any, familiarity with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other departments and agencies.

Some analysts also cite strong disagreements among key players over the general purposes of and means to conduct missions as factors impeding successful performance. Improved institutional arrangements and enhanced leadership may provide the means to reduce such disagreements, or their worst effect, in some, but not all, missions.

The perceived problems surface and have repercussions at all levels: in the field (U.S. embassies or interagency operations on-the-ground), at an intermediate (regional) level, at department headquarters in Washington, D.C., and within the Executive Office of the President, i.e., the White House. How these problems manifest themselves in interagency missions is briefly outlined in the section immediately below. The next section provides an overview of proposals to address these problems, with extended discussion in the appendices.

## **Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation**

Problems with strategic planning and leadership are most often attributed to deficiencies at the White House, particularly the National Security Council (NSC).<sup>27</sup> The NSC, consisting of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and others, is the ultimate locus for integrating foreign policy and national security strategy and policy making. Through its directorates and staff, it at times has been responsible for coordinating or even directing policy implementation. The term “National Security Council” is sometimes used to encompass the council itself, as well as NSC directorates and staff. Despite its central role, many analysts consider NSC staff (currently numbering some 300, including detailees) and procedures

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(...continued)

integrated national security approaches; (3) developing a well-trained workforce; (4) sharing and integrating national security information across agencies; and (5) importance of sustained leadership.

<sup>26</sup> Many civilian departments and agencies play a role in the missions and activities covered by this report. More than a dozen civilian executive branch departments and agencies may be involved in stabilization and reconstruction missions and other national security activities abroad. As most would expect, these include the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency. Others are the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Treasury, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

<sup>27</sup> For more information on the National Security Council (NSC), see **Appendix A** and CRS Report RL30840, *The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment*, by Richard A. Best Jr.

inadequate to effectively oversee steady state interagency missions and, almost invariably, prone to be overwhelmed by crises.

Crises reveal the full range of perceived problems in interagency missions. Strategic planning can break down. The usual practice calls for the relevant State Department regional bureau to direct civilian crisis planning and implementation in conjunction with the NSC, which meshes it with DOD planning if necessary. In the case of disagreements, the NSC may not always be able to play a mediating function. Usually, *ad hoc* staff-level interagency task forces are formed to coordinate the activities of civilian agencies and DOD. Task forces can form at the department level and the field level. Operations can be complicated by their members lack of interagency experience, knowledge of other agencies' contributions, and different cultures. In the field, task forces can be creative, devising solutions to problems. But task force members can end up at odds when they refer problems the task force cannot resolve up their individual chains of command.

Structural weaknesses manifest themselves at the department level, where steady state policies, plans, and programs are developed, and at the field level, where programs are implemented. Both planning and implementation are theoretically conducted in accordance with the President's broad policy guidance as developed through National Security Council (NSC) processes and meetings of the President's Cabinet, but agency interests, personalities, the availability of resources, and other factors affect outcomes.

The panoply of players, each with their own priorities and perspectives, illustrates the difficulties of developing plans for civilian foreign affairs activities and efforts. This function is usually led by the State Department and shared (not necessarily equally) by State Department regional and functional bureaus, by USAID and other agencies where appropriate, and by the Ambassadors at U.S. embassies. The implementation of field-level efforts and activities is reviewed, approved or disapproved, and overseen by the State Department regional and functional bureaus, which also secure funding for them. In other civilian agencies (i.e., the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and Agriculture, among others), headquarters units involved in foreign affairs play a large role in planning and implementing their activities as their presence abroad is often very limited. At the headquarters level, collaboration and coordination among civilian agencies varies, but often may be minimal.

Some analysts perceive a key structural weakness at the field level, where U.S. Ambassadors are responsible for transforming the President's broad foreign policy outline into concrete diplomatic measures and foreign assistance programs. At U.S. embassies (which are the United States' largest civilian permanent structures abroad), the Ambassador (or other COM) directs and coordinates foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the embassy "country teams. These teams are composed of the representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in a country. The degree to which Ambassadors can actually lead and coordinate activities varies greatly according to the interest and management ability of each individual Ambassador. And, many find that the Ambassador lacks the necessary authority to compel agency representatives to direct their activities to fulfill embassy mission, rather than agency, goals.

There are particular structural weaknesses at the regional level. Here, DOD is strong; it plans for and implements operations and activities through the regional Combatant Commands (COCOMS), also known as the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). When in combat, the U.S. military operates under its own statutory authorities. In peacetime, military personnel carrying out security cooperation and related functions (developed by the GCC and approved by each country's COM) are attached to the U.S. embassies under COM authority, although the

degree to which they view themselves as responsible to the COM rather than the geographic combatant commander varies greatly, according to some analysts. There is no corresponding regional entity on the civilian side. Further, civilian input into GCC planning is considered limited, although some GCCs have attempted over the past decade to incorporate civilian perspectives into their planning systems.

Some analysts regard the absence of permanent civilian regional structures like the GCCs as a serious deficiency. The State Department does have regional programs in many areas and a number of “coordinators” reporting directly to the Secretary of State, who play varying roles in conducting or coordinating interagency missions. For instance, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) encourages and manages interagency regional planning for counterterrorism activities. But these coordinators do not have the power to compel interagency cooperation.

## Overview of Reform Proposals

Proposals for reforming the structures, procedures, and mechanisms for foreign policy and strategy making, planning, and implementation range from all inclusive to narrow. In 2008, the House Armed Services Committee urged Congress to legislate a new National Security Act to reform DOD and the entire spectrum of interagency operations, and to codify new structures that would “flatten, simplify, and integrate” agencies’ related processes.<sup>29</sup> The same year, the Congressionally-mandated Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) also proposed a wholesale overhaul of the National Security Act of 1947.<sup>30</sup> (Subsequently, however, PNSR leaders stated that this proposal did not exclude incremental change.)

Absent full-scale reform, some analysts find but faint possibilities for the success of those interagency initiatives undertaken thus far. Stating that the U.S. government operates with core national security processes and organizations dating to the 1950s, one author judged that initiatives such as S/CRS “are bound to fail without corresponding initiatives to transform the foundations of U.S. foreign policy.”<sup>31</sup>

### **In Focus: Bureaucracy and Reform**

The difficulties in fostering interagency collaboration should not be underestimated. According to one expert on interagency cooperation, “Almost nothing about the bureaucratic ethos makes it hospitable to interagency collaboration. The collaborative ethos values equality, adaptability, discretion, and results; the bureaucratic ethos venerates hierarchy, stability, obedience, and procedures. Making the transition from an existing way of doing agency business to a new and more collaborative way requires actors to withdraw at least temporarily from the bureaucratic ethos. They must spurn something they may have at least respected if not cherished.... They must adopt the stance that purpose should dictate structure rather than allow structure to dictate purpose.”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Eugene Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 232.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Initial Perspectives*, committee print, prepared by Panel on Roles and Missions, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., January 2008, H.Prt.110-7 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 48.

<sup>30</sup> PNSR 2008, Executive Summary, p. i. The NDAA for FY2008, P.L. 110-181, Section 1049, authorized up to \$3 million for the study.

<sup>31</sup> Scott R. Feil, “The Failure of Incrementalism: Interagency Coordination Challenges and Responses,” in *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 286. Other Bush Administration initiatives Feil cited were National Security Presidential Directive 44, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, and then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy.”



The argument for wholesale reform rests on the interdependence of the entire national security system, where changes in one area will inevitably affect authorities and practices in another. Nevertheless, given the conceptual and practical difficulties of legislating and implementing wholesale reform, many analysts favor an incremental approach, with selected improvements in key areas.<sup>32</sup> Some focus on a particular agency, or certain missions or activities. Others look at top-level management structures, still others at field level practices.

While there is ample overlap in analyses and recommendations, there is also considerable diversity. These proposals are catalogued below under four rubrics: (1) improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting mechanisms and procedures; (2) correct structural weaknesses by improving institutional structures, arrangements, and authorities for coordination and collaboration at the headquarters and regional levels;<sup>33</sup> (3) address structural weakness at the field level by enhancing the authority and capacity of U.S. Ambassadors; and (4) create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms. **Table 1**, before the appendices, presents the spectrum of proposals by author and type. Source citations, and the acronyms identifying them in the tables, are found in the bibliography.

### **Improve Strategy-making, Planning, and Budgeting?**

A fundamental weakness of the current system perceived by many analysts is a lack of adequate strategy-making, planning, and budgeting capabilities and procedures. Many have pointed to these deficiencies as critically undermining the United States' ability to develop and conduct coherent and effective foreign policies, missions, and assistance activities. They also can produce duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in others. Many analysts have cited a need for systems and procedures to ensure the development of coherent strategy, guide planning, and bring to bear sufficient leadership and direction. (See the **Appendix B** text box for the difficulties of compiling comprehensive information on counterterrorism spending and foreign police and other law enforcement assistance.)

Possible options offered to address these deficiencies are examined in **Appendix B**. Some involve modifying the National Security Council (NSC) and NSC staff roles, responsibilities, or structure. These include establishing new NSC positions, establishing new NSC structures, or assigning new responsibilities to the NSC and its national security staff. Others would institute new strategy development processes and documents, or enhance strategy development and planning. Other options include integrating budgets, and improving budgeting processes.

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<sup>32</sup> PNSR's revised recommendations in September 2009 focused on building blocks to reform that could be taken without legislation, to accelerate progress towards holistic reform. Project on National Security Reform, *Turning Ideas into Action*, September 2009, p. iii. Hereinafter referred to as PNSR 2009.

<sup>33</sup> The terms "collaboration" and "coordination" are often used interchangeably. A CRS report discusses and illustrates the strict meaning of these terms: collaboration applies to agencies working together under voluntary arrangements while coordination is used when there is a lead official or agency with formal authority to instruct, direct, or order other members. (See CRS Report R41803, *Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations*, by Frederick M. Kaiser.) This report will adhere to these definitions in the CRS text. The term "cooperation," as used here, includes both collaboration and cooperation. Where "coordination" is used in quotes from or references to the works consulted for this report, the term may not be used in its strict sense.

## **Improve Civilian Institutional Authorities and Structures for Coordination and Collaboration?**

The perceived weaknesses of civilian institutions (including insufficient authority and planning capabilities, ineffective hierarchical arrangements, and a paucity of resources) are viewed as impeding their ability to conduct and coordinate interagency missions abroad. Proponents of reforms to address these problems identify two bureaucratic impediments to interagency reform. One is that agencies prioritize core missions and resist allocating personnel and other resources to peripheral missions. Another is that personnel respond to the direction and perceptions of those who evaluate and promote them, rather than to other superiors who are not in their chain of command. A perceived need to build appropriate structures and to create adequate leadership authority to overcome these obstacles undergirds many proposals for interagency reform. **Appendix C** discusses these proposals.

Because the State Department is responsible for overseeing the conduct of the President's foreign policy, many analysts focus on strengthening its capacity to lead, coordinate, and conduct civilian missions and activities abroad. Some proposals deal specifically with improving the State Department's ability to lead and conduct S&R missions. Others, however, would reallocate S&R responsibilities to other agencies.

Other institutional arrangements are proposed. Some would create new institutions specifically for S&R. On a smaller scale, others advocate establishing interagency teams or task forces. Some would enhance civilian input into GCCs and other DOD units, while others would create new civilian regional structures.

Some proposals focus on civilian personnel. Some urge a review or augmentation of the numbers of civilian personnel at the State Department and USAID. Others propose augmenting personnel and other capacity government-wide for interagency missions. Some would increase personnel in the Civilian Response Corps.

### **In Focus: Impediments to Institutional Change**

The difficulties of creating new structures or authorities, or of expanding existing ones, are illustrated by the bureaucratic opposition encountered by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) when it was established in 2004.

As described by one author: The "USAID Administrator ... was unhappy about the creation of S/CRS because he had devoted considerable attention to building a conflict management capacity in USAID,... The [USAID] Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance ... feared its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) would be commandeered by S/CRS. The [State Department] geographic bureaus ... did not welcome a new player which might threaten their control over policy toward a conflicted state. INL [the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement] did not wish S/CRS to intrude into its operational control of police training. PM [the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs] tried to reassert its earlier ownership of complex contingency planning and claimed a new responsibility for State Department-related aspects of counterinsurgency, a specific type of conflict response. The NSC ... weighed in to help it move forward. Nevertheless, S/CRS made little progress in securing interagency agreement on a formal framework and process to trigger a major R&S [reconstruction and stabilization] program."<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *U.S. Peacefare*, pp. 85-86.

## Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors?

As the leaders of the interagency “country teams,” Ambassadors are viewed by many analysts as the key to improving interagency coordination and increasing the effectiveness of interagency missions in the bilateral arena. Some analysts view strong country team leadership by an Ambassador as the key reason for what they perceive as successful interagency cooperation in recent U.S. assistance efforts in Colombia, Paraguay, and the Philippines.<sup>36</sup>

Because of their vital role in interagency cooperation, there are various proposals to enhance Ambassadors’ Chief of Mission (COM) authority. (See **Appendix D**.) Some would strengthen their authority over embassy staff or their control over funding for activities carried out by members of the embassy team. Others recommend enhancing Ambassadors’ ability to manage the interagency country teams and carry out other responsibilities. One proposal would expand COM authority to enable Ambassadors to effectively lead regional or crisis task forces.

### **In Focus: Authorities vs. Reality**

Despite the statutes, executive order, and President’s letter providing an Ambassador with authority to manage personnel and activities in-country, an Ambassador may encounter many challenges to overseeing and coordinating activities. Ambassadors must, according to one author, “counteract the never-ending problem of agency officials back in Washington eager to direct their overseas staff, sometimes without filling in the ambassador.”<sup>35</sup>

## Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms?

Few U.S. government personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to work together effectively in interagency missions, according to many analysts. There are many proposals to provide them with interagency education, training, and experience in order to create a U.S. government-wide “interagency” culture, as discussed in **Appendix E**. (See the **Appendix E** text box for insight into the differences between DOD and Department of State agency cultures.)

Some proposals call for the formation of a group of national security professionals from all levels dedicated to interagency operations, some for building-up President Bush’s National Security Professional Development program, some for developing interagency career paths, and some creating an interagency cadre of senior managers. Other proposals would overhaul personnel systems and expectations, linking interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications, opportunities, and promotions. At the other end of the scale, more limited proposals call for expanding the opportunities and incentives for interagency education, training, and professional experience, and protecting interagency personnel against political currents. Some proposals call for creating new institutions for interagency education and training, or enhancing existing ones.

<sup>35</sup> Shawn Zeller, “Who’s in Charge Here?” *Foreign Service Journal*, December 2007, p. 21. The article quotes Ambassador Charles A. “Tony” Gillespie Jr., former Ambassador to Chile, Colombia, and Grenada: “It’s awfully easy for someone back in Washington, in Justice or Agriculture, just to pick up the phone and tell a person to go and do something.... The challenge is to make sure the voice of the United States is consistent and to make sure that agency heads understand that they are supposed to let the ambassador know of their programs and give him a chance to weigh in. Otherwise it’s very easy for someone in Washington to treat the embassy as their own foreign office.” (pp. 21-22)

<sup>36</sup> Author’s interview (Serafino), October 2011.

## **Issues for Congress**

Congress has considerable authority regarding interagency reform. Through its appropriations power, Congress ultimately controls reforms that require additional resources, such as personnel, facilities, and additional education and training. Congress also sets through statute the organization of the top levels of executive branch departments and agencies, conditioning the executive's ability to put in place new high-level posts and organizational units. These include positions at the NSC, and leadership positions, i.e., Assistant Secretary and above, at the civilian departments, including State, Defense, USAID, and others. Congress also has considerable influence over other personnel matters, through its power to promote civilian and military officers and fix other terms of employment. Even where the Executive branch has the authority to make changes on its own, Congress can stimulate reforms by enacting legislation that would break bureaucratic resistance, for instance, Congress can mandate new procedures and processes by requiring strategy and budget documents that deal with these matters. Congress may also encourage changes indirectly through hearings, briefings, and meetings with executive branch officials.

While contemplating the utility of specific reforms, Members may also wish to consider a number of issues. Four addressed below are: whether interagency reform is necessary; to what extent the U.S. military should be relied upon; how to prioritize proposed reforms, and will interagency reform produce budget savings?

### **Is Interagency Reform Necessary for Missions Abroad?**

The United States' long military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided much of the impetus for interagency reform efforts, but have also raised doubts about the wisdom of the interagency S&R missions. Perceptions regarding the necessity and desirability of interagency reform for missions abroad may be tied to a policymaker's assessment of the future security environment and the appropriate scope of the U.S. response. The need for overall reform, or even limited reform in certain areas, may depend on whether one judges that (1) the conflict environment and state-building demands of the past two decades will continue into the next several decades; (2) whether there are significant new types of missions that would be made more effective by improved interagency collaboration, and (3) whether one accepts or questions the utility of such engagements.

### **Future Conflict Environment and Missions**

Initially, the perception that extensive interagency reform for missions abroad is vital to U.S. national security was fostered by the belief that weak, unstable states and post-conflict settings provide fertile breeding grounds for international terrorism. Initial proposals were grounded in the desire to bring to bear in these situations effective whole-of-government efforts to foster security, good governance and economic development, to prevent outbreaks of conflict, and to forestall reoccurrences of conflict in transitions from conflict and post-conflict settings. Some analysts soon disputed the premise that weak and failed states are per se among the most significant threats to the United States. They pointed out that terrorists find safe-haven and recruits in developed countries as well, and identified many factors—demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic—contributing to the spread of terrorism. An emphasis on weak and

failed states, they argued, can result in fruitless interventions, pointless expenditures, and too little attention on more tangible threats and areas of greater U.S. interest.<sup>37</sup>

The 2010 QDR does not discount potential threats from weak states, but discussed them in terms broader than international terrorism. The changing international environment, it judged, “will continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states ... [which] are often catalysts for the growth of radicalism and extremism.... Over the course of the next several decades, conflicts are at least as likely to result from state weakness as from state strength.” It points out some fragile states “are nuclear-armed or are critically important to enduring American interests.”

This document argues for the integration of defense, diplomacy, and development (the so-called “3D”) tools to prevent the rise of threats to U.S. interests and to meet the challenges of “a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate.”<sup>38</sup> It points to counterterrorism, building the capacity of foreign security forces, and preventing conflict as interagency missions that will continue into the foreseeable future. And, it flags a need for interagency approaches to help “strengthen weak states, including those facing homegrown insurgencies and transnational terrorist and criminal networks or those weakened by humanitarian disasters.”<sup>39</sup>

### **Utility of State-building Missions**

To those policymakers and analysts who would discount the need to deal with numerous or high visibility situations requiring extensive state-building in the foreseeable future, the need for interagency reform, especially those aspects of it dealing with increasing civilian capacity and integrative personnel measures, may seem less than pressing. Similarly, this need would be discounted by those who are skeptical that the United States can effect significant changes in other states—weak, failing, or simply seriously flawed—through military or political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions.

The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success. There is considerable skepticism that state-building efforts often result in success. In the words of one scholar, “barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11), we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake them anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.”<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> See Stewart Patrick, *Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.”* Working Paper No. 73, Center for Global Development, January 2006, and Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, *Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office.* CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006.

<sup>38</sup> QDR, p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> QDR, p. 20.

<sup>40</sup> Rajan Menon, “Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment,” as reproduced in U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Final Report.* 2008, pp. 80-81. For a short discussion of the elements contributing to the successful occupations in Japan and Germany, often not present elsewhere, see CRS Report RS21404, *U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in Japan and Germany*, by Nina M. Serafino.

On the other hand, some analysts judge that some international post-conflict state-building efforts have had considerable success. Mozambique and El Salvador are often pointed to as cases where state-building during and after civil strife promoted durable peace in the early 1990s. While two countries where the United States intervened militarily in the 1990s—Haiti and Somalia—are still highly problematic, the Balkans, once aflame with war, is stable despite the persistence of ethnic tensions. A 2003 RAND study that looked at eight U.N. peacekeeping missions (plus Iraq, where the U.N. played a role) judged that “seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic ... substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy.”<sup>41</sup> The long period of time that it takes conditions in post-conflict countries to stabilize—for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (after the Dayton peace accord of December 1995) and in Kosovo as a separate entity from Serbia (after the NATO military intervention of 1999) is not surprising to some analysts in light of assessments that state-building efforts take many years to produce results.<sup>42</sup>

U.S. and international efforts to improve the possibilities of success for mitigating conflict and improving state-building operations are demonstrating what some regard as increasing promise. Continuing research and evaluation by the U.S. and other governments, as well as academia and think tanks, are advancing a broader understanding of the sources and drivers of conflict. There is a growing body of academic and government literature on the effectiveness of mechanisms used to defuse and settle conflicts, as well as sets of state-building best practices to prevent or ameliorate conflict.<sup>43</sup> Some analysts judge that future U.S. state-building efforts—when conducted on the basis of this knowledge and carried out by trained and experienced personnel operating under a well-designed interagency framework—may be more successful than in the past.

## **To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building Capabilities?**

The use of the U.S. military in non-combat roles, particularly state-building, has a long and controversial history. During the Cold War years of the 1950s-1980s, the U.S. military focused on developing combat capabilities for decisive victories in conventional warfare. The inconclusive

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<sup>41</sup> James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, and Keith Crane, et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxxvi. The cases examined were the Belgium Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq.

<sup>42</sup> In an analysis of seven U.S. military interventions with nation-building objectives, RAND authors argue that a minimum of five years is necessary to produce even initial results. “The record suggest that, while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.” James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, and Keith Crane, et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxiv.

<sup>43</sup> Under the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. government has advanced its instruments for assessing and organizing interagency responses to conflict, in particular the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), developed by USAID and S/CRS, and the Interagency Management System (IMS), developed by S/CRS. These tools have not, however, been used consistently or systematically, according to practitioners. Reflecting on the ability of the U.S. government and the international community to deal with conflict, S/CRS acting director Robert Loftis stated that “Ideally, U.S. engagements will improve across time, tempered by testing assumptions, building knowledge, refuting simplistic models of what causes violence and replacing them with strategies built on real experience.... We cannot solve these problems alone or for the countries we aim to help. But we can improve our ability to work at the margins.” Transcript provided to CRS of remarks for delivery at George Mason University, August 10, 2011, p. 7.

1965-1972 counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, which combined military force with a program of socioeconomic reform reinforced the notion that combat was the only appropriate mission for U.S. military forces. However, events of the first two post-Cold War decades—the 1990s “peace operations,” the problematic post-combat transitions that generated insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the efforts to deter the spread of terrorism after 9/11—gradually convinced defense policymakers that future military missions would often require political, economic, and social state-building components.

A current question for U.S. policymakers is to what extent should the U.S. military provide the personnel to carry out non-combat national security activities, either in conjunction with combat operations (e.g., counterinsurgency, or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction), or as a separate military mission (e. g., counterterrorism)? DOD’s response—up to this point—may be described as an ambiguous “to whatever extent necessary.”

The DOD February 2010 QDR cites among its six key missions the need to “succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations,” and to “build the security capacity of partner states.”<sup>44</sup> DOD, however, does not see the U.S. military as the primary actor in the many non-combat missions that it performs.<sup>45</sup>

The 2010 QDR reinforces DODD 3000.05 statements that DOD would often play a supporting role in such missions and activities. However, the meaning of a “supporting role” may vary depending on the availability of civilians to carry out those missions. The 2010 QDR argues that the presence of a “strong and adequately resourced cadre of civilians organized and trained to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. military personnel” is “an important investment for the nation’s security.”<sup>46</sup> But it also reaffirms the Directive’s intent to ensure that state-building skills and abilities are available.<sup>47</sup> While DODD 3000.05 acknowledges that civilians are better suited to state-building tasks in such missions, it also recognizes that civilian agencies cannot operate in all situations, and perhaps also that they are unlikely to develop these capabilities to the extent needed, at least for some time to come.<sup>48</sup>

## **Implications of a DOD State-Building Role for the U.S. Military**

Maintaining state-building capabilities within the U.S. military services is not without cost. DOD has made a considerable front end investment in developing doctrine, training, and exercises for these capabilities.<sup>49</sup> Further developing and maintaining appropriate skill levels and special abilities (such as personnel with all needed language capabilities) comes at an additional cost. At

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<sup>44</sup> QDR, see pp 17, 20, and 26.

<sup>45</sup> “As our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, sustainable outcomes require civilian development and governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. Although the U.S. military can and should have the expertise and capacity to conduct these activities, civilian leadership of humanitarian assistance, development, and governance is essential.” QDR, p. 69.

<sup>46</sup> QDR, p. 69.

<sup>47</sup> “The Department will retain capabilities designed to support civilian authorities as needed.” QDR, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup> DODD 3000.05. Point 4.3: “Many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”

<sup>49</sup> For instance, the Army created a Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, <http://pksoi.army.mil/>, the services and JCS invested considerable effort in developing multiple doctrine and other manuals for stability operations, and military training centers developed new training scenarios for stability operations.

a time when increasing budget constraints and a drawdown of active duty troops over the next several years seem likely, defense analysts may raise concerns about the possible trade-offs of maintaining such capabilities. If the price of retaining adequate capabilities requires keeping a substantially larger number of military personnel, this additional cost may be factored into a debate over weapons modernization vs. personnel budgets.

Because of these additional costs and the burden that performing such tasks can place on overstretched military forces, as well as the perception that civilians can often perform these tasks better, DOD leaders have long pushed for the development of a civilian capacity for state-building activities. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates repeatedly urged Congress to fund these capabilities, as have the two recent Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>50</sup>

Given these costs, Congress may wish to consider whether DOD should remain the default capability for planning and conducting state-building activities or whether to expand civilian capabilities sufficiently to permit DOD to retain only those needed for situations too hostile for civilians to operate. Policymakers who judge that retaining state-building and other stability operations capacity in DOD may be the best option for the United States into the foreseeable future may wish to improve DOD's ability to carry out such missions. One option might be to implement the DSB 2005 proposal to create a position for Deputy Under Secretary for Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) that has never been instituted.<sup>51</sup> (Responsibility for stability operations remains under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, i.e., SO/LIC.) Another would be to ensure that all DODD 3000.05 mandates are fully implemented.

## **Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy**

Another area of concern is the possible effect on U.S. foreign policy if state-building activities are largely conducted by U.S. military or DOD contracted personnel. A prominent concern is the effect of military dominance on the State Department's lead role in foreign policy coordination and implementation. The current high-profile DOD role may not only undermine the current statutory basis for the conduct of foreign policy, but also empower a department whose culture and processes are more attuned to accomplishing concrete missions than guiding the flow of bilateral and international relations with a view to the long-run. In addition, many have questioned whether U.S. efforts to promote democratization and civilian control of governments abroad might be undermined by too prominent a military face on the U.S. presence around the world. A RAND publication predicts adverse consequences in both areas:

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<sup>50</sup> In its 2004 report, *Transitions*, the Defense Science Board urged Congress to adopt the legislation proposed by Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator, now Vice President Joe Biden establishing the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The following year, in a prepared statement for Congressional testimony in February 2005, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers cited the creation of S/CRS as an important step and stated that if it were "given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations." Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted at that time on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.

<sup>51</sup> *Institutionalizing Stability Operations*, p. 24. This option is not included in the tables of proposals because it concerns DOD organization.



If nation-building remains a foreign-policy[sic] priority for the United States but the majority of resources and capabilities for that priority are concentrated in DoD, that organization ... will become the lead agency for a major component of U.S. foreign policy. Such a development would weaken the role of the State Department, both at home and abroad. It would raise concerns about the weakening of civilian control over military policy and undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts around the world. In short, it would be a fundamental realignment of how the United States both sees itself and is seen globally.<sup>52</sup>

The RAND publication also raises concerns that state-building activities are made more difficult and less effective when the military takes the lead.<sup>53</sup> As DOD documents and officials public comments have repeated, the military is most often rightly the second choice for many state-building tasks. Although military personnel may become more competent at these tasks, many question whether military could ever become as competent as civilians, hired for their expertise at state-building tasks, without dedicating personnel and units specifically to those tasks. That alternative has been rejected by military in the past, and is not on the agenda for the future.

### **Short-term Trade-offs**

Short-term cost considerations may come into play in decisions regarding the DOD role in state-building. The relative budget costs between further developing capabilities in DOD and building new capabilities in civilian agencies may be an issue. As measured against the S&R capabilities envisioned by the Bush Administration's Civilian Stabilization Initiative, current capacity falls far short and is declining still further. As up-front costs are usually higher than sustainment costs, and much further investment is needed in civilian capacity to bring it up to that initiatives' goals, use of the military may be the most cost-effective in the short run. Further, some may argue that continued development of state-building and other S&R capacity is relatively modest in terms of the defense budget. Nevertheless, if the United States begins to draw down military forces with the scale-backs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the anti-nation-building arguments of the 1990s—when a smaller force was stressed by the additional tasks and the costs of the additional personnel needed to perform such missions was measured against investments in weapons modernization—may reemerge. At some point, DOD may find it too costly in terms of over-stressed personnel and foregone investment to continue to embrace stability missions on a par with combat operations, as mandated by DODD 3000.05.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, the State Department generally has exercised the lead in state-building and related activities for the past 60 years, with few exceptions. An increase of

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<sup>52</sup> Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2009, p. 64. (Hereinafter cited as *Improving Capacity for S&R*.) The quote continues: Such developments would send a powerful signal worldwide that the United States views stabilization and reconstruction as defense tasks rather than as components of its broader foreign policy. This would strengthen perceptions that the United States considers the military its primary instrument of power; it could also make stabilization, reconstruction, and other development efforts appear subsidiary to military missions. p. 65.

<sup>53</sup> "The United States would also face difficulty working with NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and IOs [international organizations] around the world, which would distrust the military's leadership of such missions. It would also make it more difficult during such operations for the U.S. government to coordinate with governments whose civilians take the lead.... With NGOs and IOs distrustful, other civilian specialists likely questioning the mission, and State and USAID capacity dwindling as resources flow to DoD, stabilization and reconstruction efforts would be undertaken without appropriate information and guidance. Moreover, because warfighting will remain the primary mission of DoD, development tasks would probably be aligned to advance military goals rather than be the objectives in themselves." *Improving Capacity for S&R*, p. 65.

capabilities and budgets in DOD, even if intended to be only temporary, could translate into a *de facto* shift from State Department leadership, with possible implications for the balance of authority between these two departments in the future.

## **Which Proposals Are Highest Priority?<sup>54</sup>**

Given that an overarching reform of the national security system appears unlikely, policymakers and analysts may debate the priority order of specific reform elements, and the possible implications of the order in which they are adopted. Should reform efforts concentrate on improving strategy-making, planning, and budgeting capabilities and procedures? Are effectiveness and improved collaboration or coordination better achieved by creating new governmental structures or rearranging existing ones, or by focusing on increasing the number of specially trained or dedicated personnel, particularly civilians? Or would augmenting current authorities and enhancing the capacity of existing structures and personnel be a more cost-effective approach? These questions have not been systematically raised. Addressing all possible questions and exploring the numerous permutations of approaches is beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, in forming their judgments, policymakers may wish to consider the following possible approaches to prioritizing reform.

## **Prioritize by System Weaknesses**

Policymakers may view priorities through many different lenses. Many may judge priorities based on their perception of the crucial strengths and weaknesses of the current system. For instance, those who emphasize the need for coherent strategy-making for crisis operations view the essential fix as at the White House level, with changes in the structure and functioning of the NSC, while those concerned with better “steady state” (i.e. a normal peacetime situation) strategy may look as well to the State Department and the embassy level. Those who believe that personalities dominate strategy-making processes and implementation regardless of structures might de-emphasize the need for higher level structural reform, and possibly emphasize the need for enhancing the capacity, authority, and flexibility of leadership at all levels. Those who see personnel at operational level as capable of correcting flaws and deficiencies of higher levels might prioritize reform at the field level, with an emphasis on the development of interagency personnel.<sup>55</sup> An emphasis on interagency professional development may also be preferred by those who judge that thorough interagency reform will require a generational change best started by institutionalizing reform from the bottom up. On the whole, specific criteria for prioritizing reform elements are lacking.

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<sup>54</sup> The proposals surveyed for this report deal in differing degrees with the specific reform elements, and do not provide a concrete guide to ascertaining relative utility and priority. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the largest number of recommendations concerned enhancing interagency training, education, and rotations, and the second largest concerned modifying NSC responsibilities or structures. Of course, the number of recommendations in each category would vary according to the sources selected. However, this selection includes many sources that could be expected to be common to most lists.

<sup>55</sup> The 2006 QDR judges the field level as integral to the development and conduct of interagency missions: “Solutions developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with common challenges in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and seamlessly to achieve team objectives.” p. 85.

One guide to developing priority criteria may be conclusions drawn from historical case studies. The editors of one compilation of 11 case studies of interagency missions<sup>56</sup> found three recurring weaknesses that some policymakers may chose to make their priorities: (1) little investment in human capital;<sup>57</sup> (2) the absence of “interagency doctrine;”<sup>58</sup> and (3) a lack of appropriate leadership at the highest levels.<sup>59</sup> However, the editors also provide a cautionary note about the limits of interagency reform. Above all, they asserted, competent leaders are more important than structures, statutes, and process. “At the highest levels of government, no organizational design, institutional procedures, or legislative remedy proved adequate to overcome poor leadership and combative personalities.”

### **Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives**

Some policymakers may view support for the efforts begun by the Bush Administration as a priority. One such effort is the national security professional development program, as discussed above. Another is the creation of civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction under S/CRS. A prominent feature of six early reports (between 2003 and 2005) on S&R operations was a recommendation to develop rapidly deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many viewed the development of civilian groups as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible. The establishment and deployment of such a corps, now underway, marks a substantial change from past practices. Some policymakers and analysts may view continued attention to and support for the needs of improving this capability as desirable, given the resources already devoted to it. However, as mentioned above, to those who doubt that the utility of state-building endeavors abroad, or are wary of undertaking such efforts while the United State faces budget difficulties, these programs may not merit priority status.

### **Prioritize by Effect on International Cooperation**

Another approach for prioritizing reforms might be to emphasize those changes that might enable the U.S. government to more effectively cooperate with other governments, international

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<sup>56</sup> James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, “Mismanaging Mayhem: Interagency Operations Past and Future,” in *Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis*, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as *Mismanaging Mayhem*. The cases included the U.S. response to the 1918 influenza pandemic, the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the energy crisis of the 1970s, three natural disasters, as well as selected aspects of U.S. conduct in four conflicts and in the Cold War.

<sup>57</sup> The editors found that throughout its history, the U.S. government “has paid scant attention to recruiting, training, exercising, and educating people to conduct interagency operations. Thus at crucial moments, success or failure often turned on the happenstance of whether the right people with the right talents happened to be in the right job. Rather than investing in human capital before a crisis, Washington plays Russian roulette.” *Mismanaging Mayhem*, p. 3.

<sup>58</sup> The editors pointed to a need for interagency doctrine, i.e., a body of knowledge for guiding joint action. “Good doctrine does not tell individuals what to think, but it guides them in how to think—particularly how to address complex, ambiguous, and unanticipated challenges when time and resources are both in short supply.... When ... [interagency doctrine] was taught and practiced, it made a difference. When not, chaos won.” *Mismanaging Mayhem*, p. 3.

<sup>59</sup> The section on leadership concluded: “Presidential leadership is particularly crucial to the conduct of interagency operations.... Likewise, congressional leadership, especially from the chairs of congressional committees, is equally vital.... In the end, no government reform can replace the responsibility of the people to elect officials who can build trust and confidence in government; the responsibility of officials to select qualified leaders to run the government; and the responsibility of elected and appointed leaders to demonstrate courage, character, and competence in the time of crisis.” *Mismanaging Mayhem*, pp. 3-4.

agencies, and non-governmental organizations in conducting activities and missions abroad. For instance, deficiencies in U.S. planning, insufficient clarity in agency roles, and agencies' unwillingness to share information and work together on projects can only complicate interactions with non-U.S. government participants and donors.

### **Prioritize by the Ease and Cost of Implementation**

Finally, some policymakers may view the ease and cost of implementation as the prime ranking factors. Some would say that Obama Administration initiatives seem to be largely based on such criteria. As of 2011, its initiatives seem to be the least costly and those that are relatively easy to implement, reflecting perhaps budget and bureaucratic pressures and a desire for greater certainty of effect before proceeding. For instance, the decision to cut back implementation of the Bush Administration's National Security Professional Development program to one pilot project focused on homeland security seems a cautious, cost-conscious decision that may also reflect resistance among departments and agencies focused on foreign affairs. Similarly, the Obama Administration effort to improve the ability of Ambassadors to better carry out their responsibilities and influence headquarters level deliberations is relatively low-cost and limited, given the more extensive proposals to enhance COM authority. The decision to elevate S/CRS and S/CT functions in the State Department hierarchy may involve significant costs and invoke bureaucratic resistance, but still may be less costly and more expeditious than other options, particularly creating a new, independent agency to assume S/CRS functions.

### **Can Interagency Reform Produce Cost Savings?**

There is a widespread expectation that interagency reform would save money in the long run. The 2010 QDDR explained the basis for that belief. Discussing plans to develop interagency cooperation on counterterrorism, rule of law, strengthening justice, interior, and health ministries abroad, the QDDR stated: "In the long-term, partnering with and building on the assets of other agencies will offer net policy gains to the U.S. government and reduce overall program implementation costs. This is a significant departure from current practice, one that we believe will save money, improve the U.S. government's ability to advance American interests, and strengthen State's engagement across the interagency."<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, some analysts believe that the cost effects of interagency reform are difficult to assess. Many analysts with experience in interagency missions expect that cost savings would accrue by eliminating the duplication of effort. The savings from duplication of effort would depend, however, on the size of the mission. Since many interagency missions involve relatively small numbers of personnel, cost savings on personnel may not be high.

Various analysts point to other possible ways in which interagency reform may produce savings:

- By facilitating the sharing of information technology, which is often expensive;
- By increasing collaboration and coordination at the planning and budgeting stages, resulting in an improved allocation of resources, because without a

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<sup>60</sup> QDDR, p. 34.

coherent strategy even the most efficient operational interagency processes and collaboration are often ineffective.<sup>61</sup>

- By hastening the date when U.S. military forces can be removed from post-conflict areas and replaced with less-costly civilian personnel.<sup>62</sup>

There may be additional costs associated with the process of interagency reform. As mentioned above, some analysts believe that savings will accrue from greater efficiency and effectiveness in missions if conducted by well-resourced civilian agencies with the resident expertise and appropriate core mandate. Nevertheless, there undoubtedly will be upfront personnel investment if the appropriate agency currently lacks the necessary capabilities to perform the mission. Some may question whether streamlining interagency processes and resources would indeed produce savings if personnel were not regularly called into action to exercise interagency skills.

## **Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security Reform Measures?**

Congress' ability to oversee national security affairs, rationalize national security spending, and promote interagency reform is hampered by its own organization and procedures, according to some analysts. Some wonder whether Congress' current organization, which treats defense and foreign affairs as separate, rather than interdependent national security functions, contributes to the perceived imbalance between military and civilian resources. In 2008, a report by RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) stated that "the integration of instruments of power and influence would be greatly facilitated by changes in the way that Congress conducts its business."<sup>63</sup>

### **Create New Select Committees**

The 2008 RAND/AAD report proposed the establishment of two new select committees, "one in each house, devoted to reviewing the overall integration of instruments of power and influence and reporting their findings in terms of possible programs and appropriations." This reform, they argued, "would help individual committees (and Congress as a whole) make better-informed decisions about the intersection of elements of power and influence—elements that do not respect institutional boundaries in Congress any more than those in the executive branch."<sup>64</sup> It would not, the report stated, impinge directly on the current distribution of Congressional power.

The same year, PNSR recommended that the Senate and House each create select committees "for interagency national security matters specifically responsible for reviewing and making recommendations for basic legislation governing interagency coordination and multiagency

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<sup>61</sup> For instance, the 2006 QDR stated that improved planning guidance to set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities would "reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies."

<sup>62</sup> "We spend so much because we are so inefficient and incapable at home with planning and resourcing and commanding and on the ground with execution," according to USIP expert Beth Cole. E-mail correspondence with Beth Cole, Director of Intergovernmental Relations, United States Institute of Peace, August 29, 2011.

<sup>63</sup> *Integrating Instruments of Power*, p. 22.

<sup>64</sup> *Integrating Instruments of Power*, p. 22. Part of the proposal was for Congress to mandate a "standing requirement for both the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office to prepare their own annual reports on this subject." p. 20.

activities.”<sup>65</sup> PNSR went further than RAND and AAD, recommending that if these select committees performed well, the Senate and House “should approve creating permanent select committees for interagency national security activities with oversight and legislative powers.”<sup>66</sup> PNSR’s proposal also called for these committees to “serve as the focal point for executive-legislative consultations on national security matters.”<sup>67</sup> The assignment of such jurisdiction to new committees, whether temporary or permanent, would have significant implications for the current distribution of responsibilities in Congress, particularly for the armed services and foreign affairs committees.

### **Create a National Security Appropriations Subcommittee**

More recently, the Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel recommended that Congress consider reconvening the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress “to examine the current organization of Congress, including the committee structure, the structure of national security and homeland defense authorities, appropriations, and oversight, with the intent of recommending changes to make a more effective body in performing its role to ‘provide for the common defense.’”<sup>68</sup> It proposed that Congress consider the possibility of establishing, at a minimum, a single national security appropriations subcommittee for the departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, as well as USAID and the intelligence community. It also proposed that Congress consider establishing a parallel authorization process to facilitate coordinating authorization action on these departments and agencies.<sup>69</sup>

### **Modify Current Practices and Procedures**

An option that would not require any structural changes would be for Congress to conform its committees dealing with defense and foreign relations to the standard declared in 1950 by then Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Arthur Vandenberg that “politics stops at the water’s edge.” Such measures might include maintaining bipartisan staffs that share all tasks and information on subjects that overlap, holding frequent joint foreign relations and armed services hearings, and sponsoring joint legislation on national security matters. Some of these measures are not without precedent.

To facilitate long-term strategy development, Congress may also wish to consider options for revising budgeting processes. For instance, Congress may consider mandating multi-year budgets in certain areas. Or, it might require civilian agencies to develop five-year budget plans, as DOD does for non-contingency operation expenditures, in order to develop consensus with Congress on

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<sup>65</sup> PNSR 2008, p. 416.

<sup>66</sup> PNSR 2008, p. 417. PNSR’s proposed jurisdiction for these select committees encompassed: “all interagency 1) operations and activities; 2) commands, other organizations, and embassies; 3) funding; 4) personnel policies; and [sic] 5) education and training; and 6) nominees for any Senate-confirmed interagency position that may be established.” p. 522.

<sup>67</sup> PNSR 2008, p. 522.

<sup>68</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010, p. 106. Hereinafter referred to as the QDRIP Report.

<sup>69</sup> *QDRIP Report*, p. 106.

long-term foreign policy goals. While such plans would be subject to much greater fluctuations than DOD weapons systems plans, for example, they still might provide a basis for executive-legislative discussions on long-term resource allocation that could facilitate strategic planning.

## Looking Ahead

The United States' ability to protect its interests and play a global leadership role may be significantly affected by the way in which it brings resources to bear on new and continuing national security challenges. Most immediate are the new state-building needs of transforming Arab States. Over the longer run, if advanced countries' economic troubles increase developing countries' economic distress, the United States may engage even more in counterterrorism and conflict prevention. In an era of constrained budgets, Congress may be increasingly interested in examining the possibilities that interagency reform may improve the use of resources. For instance, improved strategic planning and "whole-of-government" budgeting may focus resource allocation more effectively. Organizations and officials may produce better results if given the authority to harness the necessary resources to accomplish their missions, irrespective of their agency identification. Better trained and experienced personnel may carry out their duties more effectively. Finally, as the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Army, reviews its purposes while it shrinks its forces, the need for rebalancing military and civilian state-building capacity may be further emphasized.

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**Table I. Key Proposals for Interagency Reforms of Civilian Structures and Capabilities**

	Modify the NSC or NSC Tasks	Create or Improve Interagency Procedures for Strategy-making/ Planning	Develop Integrated Budgeting Procedures and Budgets	Increase State Dept. Capacity/ Authority for Interagency Missions	Augment Personnel for Interagency Missions	Reform S&R Structures	Establish Interagency Teams or Task Forces	Enhance COM Influence, Capacity or Authority	Augment Civilian Input to COCOMs	Create Civilian Regional Structures	Enhance or Modify Interagency Education, Training and Rotations	Create a National Interagency Professional or Senior Level Corps or Cadre
CWC 2011	X											
Stimson/AAD 2011					X			X				
Brookings/CSIS 2010						X						
Lamb//Marks 2010								X				
PNSR 2010												X
QDR 2010		X									X	X
QDDR 2010					X	X		X	X	X	X	X
QDRIP 2010		X	X		X	X	X				X	
Pope 2010										X		
SIGIR 2010	X		X			X					X	
Smith 2010		X	X			X					X	
CFR 2009	X	X				X						
PNSR 2009	X	X	X	X	X		X	X			X	X
RAND 2009	X					X						
Heritage 2008											X	
PNSR 2008		X									X	
RAND/AAD 2008	X		X		X			X			X	

	Modify the NSC or NSC Tasks	Create or Improve Interagency Procedures for Strategy-making/ Planning	Develop Integrated Budgeting Procedures and Budgets	Increase State Dept. Capacity/ Authority for Interagency Missions	Augment Personnel for Interagency Missions	Reform S&R Structures	Establish Interagency Teams or Task Forces	Enhance COM Influence, Capacity or Authority	Augment Civilian Input to COCOMs	Create Civilian Regional Structures	Enhance or Modify Interagency Education, Training and Rotations	Create a National Interagency Professional or Senior Level Corps or Cadre
Williams/Adams 2008	X	X	X	X								
ACTD 2007		X	X	X	X	X		X				
CGD 2007	X		X									
Cerami 2007											X	
CSIS 2007	X		X									
SFRC 2007				X				X			X	
Flournoy/Brimley 2006	X	X										
RAND/AAD 2006					X						X	
QDR 2006		X			X							X
CFR 2005				X	X	X					X	
CSIS 2005	X					X					X	
Heritage 2005							X					
Schake/Berkowitz 2005		X										
CGD 2004	X											
CSIS 2004											X	
DSB 2004							X					
NDU 2004	X											
CSIS/AUSA 2003											X	
U.S. CNS 2001	X		X									X

Source: Compiled from the indicated reports by the author.

## Acronyms

- AAD American Academy of Diplomacy
- AUSA Association of the U.S. Army
- AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command
- CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
- CEO Chief Executive Officer
- CFR Council on Foreign Relations
- COM Chief of Mission
- CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
- CWC Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
- DCM Deputy Chief of Mission
- DFA Director of Foreign Assistance
- DOD Department of Defense
- DODD Department of Defense Directive
- EUCOM U.S. European Command
- GCC Geographic Combatant Command
- GSCF Global Security Contingency Fund
- HASC House Armed Services Committee
- JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
- JTF Joint Task Force
- JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force
- NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
- NSC National Security Council
- OMB Office of Management and Budget
- PACOM U.S. Pacific Command
- PNSR Project on National Security Reform
- QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
- QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
- QDRIP Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel
- S/CRS State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
- SFRC Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
- S&R Stabilization and Reconstruction
- SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
- USAID United States Agency for International Development
- USIP United States Institute of Peace

## Preface to Appendices, Including Tables

**Appendix A** provides an overview of U.S. interagency institutions and arrangements. The subsequent appendices discuss salient reform proposals from 38 sources, with each appendix addressing one (or a subset of one) of the three problem areas perceived as contributing to the inability of civilian agencies to effectively plan, organize, and implement missions abroad.

**Appendix B** deals with proposals to improve strategy-making, planning and budgeting.

**Appendix C** surveys a broad sweep of proposals to enhance institutional arrangements, resources, and civilian authority at the headquarters level. **Appendix D** focuses on enhancing civilian authority at the field level, i.e., proposals to enhance the authority and capacity of U.S. ambassadors. **Appendix E** examines proposals to create or improve interagency personnel policies and mechanisms.

The appendices exclude discussion and proposals concerning specific field or program level interagency issues (such as those involving the structure and operation of provincial reconstruction teams) and proposals to strengthen the capacity of individual agencies and departments, other than the interagency role of the State Department. They also do not include proposals that already have been implemented. For instance, the recent creation of the Consortium for Complex Operations at the National Defense University addresses past proposals for a better interagency “lessons learned” capability, although some may argue that this capability would be better placed in the State Department or at USAID. They do not include proposals on foreign assistance reform, which is covered in a previous CRS report, CRS Report R40102, *Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations*, by Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed. They also do not address “whole-of-government” reforms that bear on the success of activities and missions abroad, for instance, the need to commit adequate resources for a substantial period of time to achieve stabilization and reconstruction goals in post-conflict settings.

As this report focuses on executive branch interagency reform, the tables do not include proposals for the reform of Congressional oversight of interagency activities. This topic is covered in a broad sense in the section “Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security Reform Measures?” above.

In the tables, the language used for the proposal descriptions is generally an exact quote or a close paraphrasing of the proposal. Quotation marks are often omitted for clarity. These tables do not include recommendations that have already been implemented.

This is far from an exhaustive list of all proposals by all individuals or organizations. Proposals were selected because they represent the types of proposals advanced, because they are issued by organizations and individuals with a recognized depth of expertise on the issues, or because they are significantly unique.

## Appendix A. Interagency Authorities and Structures

### The National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Staff Role in Policy Coordination

Established by the National Security Act of 1947,<sup>70</sup> the NSC is “the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials,” according to the White House website. The NSC also advises and assists the President on these matters and “serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies,” according to the website.<sup>71</sup> The act specifically sets forth the NSC’s “whole-of-government” coordination role, stating that the function of the Council

shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.<sup>72</sup>

The act also provides that the NSC, “for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security,” shall “consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.”<sup>73</sup> The law does not specifically set “hands-on” coordination in the implementation phase as an NSC staff function.

The law leaves wide discretion to the President in many areas. In particular, the NSC may perform “such other functions as the President may direct.”<sup>74</sup> NSC supporting units and staff are structured according to the President’s design. And the President may appoint NSC members in addition to the statutory members.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> This act (P.L. 80-235) has been periodically amended. The act mandates NSC functions, membership, participation by other officials, and auxiliary committees, and provides authority for a staff. Sections dealing with the NSC are codified at 50 U.S.C. 402. 50 U.S.C. 402 names the following as NSC members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy. The statute also provides that other heads of departments and other officials may serve as members if the President directs; those so named have varied over time. For the Obama Administration, the “directed” members include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Regular attendees also include the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors. See Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Research Report, August 15, 2011 Annual Update, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 12-13. Hereinafter cited as *The National Security Policy Process*.

<sup>71</sup> See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/>.

<sup>72</sup> 50 U.S.C. 402(a).

<sup>73</sup> 50 U.S.C. 402(b).

<sup>74</sup> 50 U.S.C. 402(b)).

<sup>75</sup> 50 U.S.C. 402(a)(8)).

Because the law leaves the President great leeway in determining NSC and NSC staff size (subject to appropriations), functions, and organization, each Administration has used the NSC differently. Over time, the NSC staff (known as the “national security staff” or NSS) has taken on among its responsibilities “coordination of the interagency policy process and policy implementation follow-up,” and “articulation of the President’s policies to other departments....”<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless, the staff structure and its role in developing and coordinating policy among executive branch agencies varies from Administration to Administration, often depending on a President’s relationships with department heads and the National Security Advisor, as well as a President’s preferences and the management style of the National Security Advisor.<sup>77</sup>

## **The State Department’s Responsibility for Oversight and Coordination**

The Secretary of State “plays the lead role in developing and implementing the President’s foreign policy,”<sup>78</sup> and is entrusted under current statutes with primacy for ensuring the coherence of foreign assistance in support of that policy. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), provides that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs ... to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.”<sup>79</sup> Oversight and direction are not equivalent to coordination, however.

This statutory language does not explicitly charge the Secretary of State or the State Department with responsibility for coordinating the implementation of U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance. Instead, coordination responsibility is vested in the Secretary of State through other legislation or Presidential orders, or a combination of those. For instance, the State Department, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State, has primary responsibility for administering all development (broadly defined to include economic, political, and social aid) assistance.<sup>80</sup> In 1992, Congress adopted legislation stating that “the Secretary of State shall be responsible for coordinating all assistance provided by the United States Government to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or trafficking.”<sup>81</sup> Through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, entitled *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, President George W. Bush vested the Secretary of State with responsibility for coordinating and leading “integrated United States Government efforts,

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<sup>76</sup> *The National Security Policy Process*, p. 30.

<sup>77</sup> *The National Security Policy Process*, p. 29. According to this report, the current organization of the NSS dates back to the George H. W. Bush Administration. “Having served eight years as Vice President and participated regularly in deliberations of the Reagan Administration, President George H.W. Bush came into office with definite ideas as to how the national security policy should be organized.... President Bush reorganized the NSC system to include a Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees, and sought (not always successfully) to establish a collegial system in which the NSC acted as a broker and coordinator of policy across the Executive Branch. The basic structural organization of interagency working groups, department deputies, and department principals ... has been retained by each succeeding presidential administration.” pp. 9-10.

<sup>78</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch>.

<sup>79</sup> 22 U.S.C. 2382; FAA, Section 622(c).

<sup>80</sup> 22 U.S.C. 2151(b); FAA, Section 101(b).

<sup>81</sup> 22 U.S.C. 2291(b)(1); FAA, Section 481(b)(1) as amended by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992, P.L. 102-583, Sec. 4(c).

involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” (The Secretary of State’s relationship to DOD under this authority seems more limited. Somewhat ambiguously, the next sentence states that the “Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”)

The State Department organizational structure includes four coordinating offices of highly differing scope. One office focuses on foreign assistance to Europe and Eurasia; another on HIV/AIDS assistance; a third on counterterrorism efforts around the world, usually on a regional basis; and a fourth on stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities throughout the world. The last of these was transformed into a bureau in late 2011. The Coordinators, i.e., the heads of the first three of these offices, are equivalent in rank to an assistant secretary rank, and are confirmed by the Senate, but they report directly to the Secretary of State rather than through a State Department bureau. The President will nominate an Assistant Secretary for the new S&R bureau. This bureau was created in line with Obama Administration plans, outlined in the December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), to upgrade the Coordinator offices on counterterrorism and on S&R—in an effort to make them more effective. (See below, the section on creating new agencies or arrangements.)

### **Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia**

Well before the call for interagency reform in complex contingency operations became widespread, Congress created two interagency coordinator posts in the State Department, one responsible for assistance to Eastern Europe and the other for assistance to the former Soviet Union.<sup>82</sup> In 2001, these posts were combined into the State Department Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. This office oversees the bilateral economic, security, democracy, and humanitarian assistance provided by all U.S. government agencies to the 18 states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This office reports to the Secretary of State through the Director of the Foreign Assistance (i.e. “F”) bureau.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> One coordinator was in charge of assistance provided under the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179), or the SEED Act. The other was in charge of assistance provided under the FREEDOM Support Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, P.L. 102-511). Section 601 of the SEED Act establishes that the “President shall designate, within the Department of State, a SEED Program coordinator who shall be directly responsible for overseeing and coordinating all programs described in this Act and all other activities that the United States Government conducts in furtherance of the purposes of this Act.” Section 102(a) of the FREEDOM Support Act provides that the “President shall designate, within the Department of State, a coordinator who shall be responsible for (1) designing an overall assistance and economic cooperation strategy for the independent states of the former Soviet Union; (2) ensuring program and policy coordination among agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in this Act (including the amendments made by this Act); (3) pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations with respect to assistance to independent states; (4) ensuring that United States assistance programs for the independent states are consistent with this Act (including the amendments made by this Act); (5) ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by agencies responsible for assistance programs for the independent states; and (6) resolving policy and program disputes among United States Government agencies with respect to United States assistance for the independent states.”

<sup>83</sup> For more information, see CRS Report R40756, *Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination*, by Marian Leonardo Lawson and Susan B. Epstein.



## **Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator**

The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) was established in 2003 by the United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25). Section 102(B)(i) of that act charges the Coordinator with “primary responsibility for oversight and coordination of all resources and international activities of the United State Government to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic....” Responsibilities include coordinating among all relevant executive branch agencies and non-governmental organizations, and dispersing funds provided under the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).<sup>84</sup>

## **Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)**

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) “coordinates and supports the development and implementation of all U.S. government policies and programs aimed at countering terrorism overseas,” according to its website.<sup>85</sup> A major S/CT function is to facilitate and encourage interagency collaboration at the regional level, in particular to stimulate ideas for multi-country activities and provide a mechanism for integrating interagency programs. (Despite the use of the term “coordination” on the office’s website, the actual function of the office appears to be encouraging collaboration, or voluntary cooperation, among agencies.) It also provides input to DOD counterterrorism activities, such as those conducted under “Section 1206” funding and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).<sup>86</sup> However, the office does not have authority to compel other offices and agencies to develop, conduct, or participate in programs, nor a program budget to leverage or compel others to participate.

Its origins date back to 1972, when the Office for Combatting [sic]Terrorism was established after the Munich Olympics terrorist attack. (According to the S/CT website, President Richard Nixon appointed a special committee which proposed that the State Department create an office to provide day-to-day coordination for counterterrorism activities and to develop U.S. government policy initiatives and responses.) In 1994, Congress provided a mandate for the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and defined the coordinator’s role as being the principal adviser

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<sup>84</sup> Specifically, 102(B)(ii) reads: “SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The duties of the Coordinator shall specifically include the following: (I) Ensuring program and policy coordination among the relevant executive branch agencies and nongovernmental organizations, including auditing, monitoring, and evaluation of all such programs. (II) Ensuring that each relevant executive branch agency undertakes programs primarily in those areas where the agency has the greatest expertise, technical capabilities, and potential for success. (III) Avoiding duplication of effort. (IV) Ensuring coordination of relevant executive branch agency activities in the field. “(V) Pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations. (VI) Resolving policy, program, and funding disputes among the relevant executive branch agencies. (VII) Directly approving all activities of the United States (including funding) relating to combatting [sic] HIV/AIDS in each of ... [14 specified countries] and other countries designated by the President, which other designated countries may include those countries in which the United States is implementing HIV/AIDS programs as of the date of the enactment of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. (VIII) Establishing due diligence criteria for all recipients of funds section and all activities subject to the coordination and appropriate monitoring, evaluation, and audits carried out by the Coordinator necessary to assess the measurable outcomes of such activities.” For more information on this act and the Coordinator’s Office, see <http://www.state.gov/s/gac>; CRS Report R41802, *The Global Challenge of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria*, by Alexandra E. Kendall; and United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of the Inspector General, *Review of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator*, Report Number ISP-I-08-23, Washington, DC, February 2008.

<sup>85</sup> See <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/index.htm>.

<sup>86</sup> Section 1206, P.L. 109-163, FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as amended, and Section 1208, P.L. 108-375, FY2005 NDAA, as amended.

to the Secretary of State on international counterterrorism matters, and providing “overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources) of international counterterrorism activities.”<sup>87</sup>

### **Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (formerly the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction)<sup>88</sup>**

In mid-2004, the Bush Administration established the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In December of that year, the office was provided with a congressional mandate (Section 408 of Division D, P.L. 108-447); in October 2008, its establishment was codified, along with that of the Civilian Response Corps and Reserve for which it is responsible (Title XVI, P.L. 110-417). (Civilian Response Corps active and standby members deploy at the request of regional bureaus and ambassadors to assist with strategic planning in conflict, post-conflict settings and states at risk of instability.<sup>89</sup> The reserve component has never been formed.) In December 2005, through Presidential Decision Directive 44, the Bush Administration provided that the Secretary of State could delegate responsibilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities to the S/CRS Coordinator.

In late November 2011, the State Department transferred S/CRS functions to a new bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), as contemplated by the 2010 QDDR. The bureau is expected to play a greater role than S/CRS in developing policy and planning for missions, becoming “the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and instability,” according to the CSO website.<sup>90</sup> The head of CSO bureau, the Assistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, will also hold the title of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

## **Other Agencies’ Roles**

### **U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**

USAID is the U.S. federal government agency primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and plays an important role in various interagency activities and missions. An independent agency, USAID receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It describes itself as “the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering

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<sup>87</sup> Section 2301, P.L. 105-277 (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, 1999), which superseded amended earlier legislation (Section 161(e), P.L. 103-236, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995) that formally established the office. For more, see <http://www.state.gov/s/ct>.

<sup>88</sup> For more on S/CRS, see CRS Report RL32862, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, by Nina M. Serafino.

<sup>89</sup> The Civilian Response Corps active and standby components have, as of October 7, 2011, a combined total of 792 members. The breakdown by agency for the 160 active members (**in bold**) and the 632 standby members (*in italics*) is: Department of State, **47** and *234*; USAID, **36** and *177*; Department of Justice, **31** and *75*; Department of Agriculture, **7** and *8*; Department of Homeland Security, **6** and *33*; Department of Commerce, **4** and *60*; Department of Health and Human Services, **2** and *42*; Department of Energy, **2**; and Department of Transportation, **1**. Data provided by S/CRS, October 14, 2011.

<sup>90</sup> [Http://www.state.gov/g/cso](http://www.state.gov/g/cso).

from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.”<sup>91</sup> USAID programs support economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, and conflict prevention throughout the world. USAID has a headquarters staff based in Washington DC of 2,255, and a staff overseas of 1,634, supplemented by 4,469 foreign nationals abroad.<sup>92</sup> USAID often carries out its program through contracts or cooperative arrangements with private voluntary organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, other governments, and other U.S. government agencies.

USAID is the lead agency in U.S. disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance. The USAID Administrator (the agency’s head) leads interagency disaster relief efforts, which often include DOD and support from the Department of Agriculture.<sup>93</sup> The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance’s Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams (generally known as DARTs) are quickly deployed to a disaster area (after an initial assessment), providing trained specialists to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions respond to disasters.

Besides its state-building and economic development activities, USAID has long played a major role in U.S. state-building and other S&R efforts in conflict and in post-conflict settings from Vietnam forward. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), established in 1994, modeled itself as a rapid response unit after the DART teams. It has had a key role in S&R efforts, in the case of Iraq arriving in Baghdad “about the same time as the first U.S. troops.”<sup>94</sup>

## **Other Executive Departments and Agencies**

Several executive departments have offices or agencies that work abroad and some have foreign service officers posted abroad whose work contributes to interagency efforts, particularly in stabilization and reconstruction missions. These include the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Transportation. All but Treasury participate in the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) system under S/CRS.

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<sup>91</sup> USAID website. [http://www.usaid.gov/about\\_usaid/](http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/).

<sup>92</sup> USAID hires personnel through a number of different authorities. The U.S. staff at Washington, DC headquarters and abroad are direct hires. Foreign nationals are hired abroad as foreign service nationals or third country nationals. In addition, as of October 11, 2011, USAID had 260 people at Washington headquarters and 515 abroad under personal services contracts. These numbers do not include a small number of people hired as “experts” or through other mechanisms.

<sup>93</sup> The USAID Administrator serves as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under a presidential delegation of authority provided by Sec. 493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The Special Coordinator’s role under that legislation is to “promote maximum effectiveness and coordination in response to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors,” as well as to formulate and update contingency plans for disaster relief. For more on the USAID and other agency roles in disaster assistance, see CRS Report RL33769, *International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress*, by Rhoda Margesson.

<sup>94</sup> Dane F. Smith Jr., *U.S. Peacefare: Organizing Peace-Building Operations* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), p. 141. This book has an extended discussion of OTI, pp. 137-143. Hereinafter cited as *U.S. Peacefare*. For more information on OTI, also see CRS Report R40600, *USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives After 15 Years: Issues for Congress*, by Marian Leonardo Lawson. The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation provides the analytic framework for work of OTI and other USAID conflict resolution work.

## **U.S. Chiefs of Mission (Ambassadors) and Embassy Country Teams**

In normal circumstances, U.S. Ambassadors overseas bear the greatest responsibility for ensuring the coordination of foreign assistance and foreign policy in the countries to which they are appointed. Under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Ambassadors are the president's personal representatives abroad. An Ambassador, or other civilian serving as a Chief of Mission (COM), has the sole authority to oversee U.S. foreign policy in individual countries.<sup>95</sup> Some experts judge that the authority exercised by Chiefs of Mission "provides the President with the clearest and most forceful cross-departmental executive authority mechanism in use today."<sup>96</sup>

Section 622(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, charges the Ambassador, or other responsible official, with the leadership role in ensuring coordination regarding foreign assistance programs, including U.S. military assistance, among government representatives in each country, under procedures prescribed by the President. Section 622(b) states: "The Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and that his [sic] comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires."

The embassy "country teams," i.e., the group in every embassy comprised of representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in a country, bear much responsibility for turning the President's broad foreign policy into concrete diplomatic measures and foreign assistance programs. The team operates under the direction and authority of the U.S. Ambassador or other COM. Country teams vary according to embassy size and U.S. interests in a country; some may include representatives from some 40 U.S. departments and agencies.<sup>97</sup> In addition to State Department personnel, many embassies have personnel from at least the departments of Agriculture, Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as USAID. Other departments represented may be Health and Human Services, Interior, Labor, Transportation, and Treasury. Individual agencies from these departments may also be represented on country teams.

As codified by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465, Section 207, an Ambassador (or other Chief of Mission) is charged, under the direction of the President, with "full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees" within the country. This statute also requires that the ambassador (or other COM) "shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country," and "shall insure that all Government executive branch employees within that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply with all applicable directives of the chief of mission." National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 gives Chiefs of Mission the authority to determine the size, composition, and mandate of personnel operating under her/his authority. (Each ambassador, upon assuming his/her post, receives a personal letter from the President spelling out similar responsibilities.) Nevertheless, the nature of

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<sup>95</sup> The U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2 (second paragraph) establishes that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints ambassadors.

<sup>96</sup> Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration*, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives 2, Washington, DC, December 2010, p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model*.

<sup>97</sup> See <http://www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php>, an information sheet entitled "Other Agencies on Mission's 'Country Team,'" posted online by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

Ambassadorial leadership and the use of country teams as integrative mechanisms varies greatly from country to country, according to observers. Much depends on the interest, knowledge, and management ability of the individual Ambassador, as well as his relationship with officials in Washington.

## **Mechanisms to Integrate Civilian Perspectives into DOD Missions and Activities**

For nearly a decade, the U.S. military has attempted to incorporate an increasing number of civilians from other departments and agencies into its structures, by creating either new interagency groups or new posts for civilian agency representatives. (Note, the State Department has long assigned senior officials as Political Advisors or POLADs to the Geographic Combatant Command, or GCC, commanders.) Beginning in 2002, as discussed below, DOD began to reach out for further civilian input by requiring each GCC to set up a Joint Interagency Coordination Group that would function as an advisory body to the combatant commander, initially on counterterrorism issues. In 2004, a USAID Office of Military Affairs was established at USAID Washington, D.C. headquarters, with liaison personnel sent to each GCC to advise on military activities with development implications. A more recent step was the creation of multiple civilian positions within some GCCs. In 2007, the U.S. Africa Command was set up as the model “interagency” command, with designated civilian billets. The U.S. Southern Command (Latin America and the Caribbean) and others subsequently increased civilian participation.

### **Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG)**

For several years, GCCs have each hosted a JIACG, an advisory body composed of military personnel from all services and civilian personnel from a variety of agencies, usually numbering about one dozen. JIACGs were established through a memorandum from the NSC Deputies Committee in early 2002 instructing Combatant Commanders to implement the JIACGs concept.<sup>98</sup> (At the U.S. European Command, the JIACG was named the Interagency Engagement Group.) Headed in most cases by a member of the federal Senior Executive Service (SES),<sup>99</sup> the JIACG was designed to facilitate interagency information sharing for the operations and activities of the combatant commands and to enhance the understanding of civilian agency perceptions and activities within the commands. The initial focus of the JIACGs was counterterrorism.

JIACG structures and tasks, as well as the use that the combatant commanders make of them, have evolved over time. Some observers express concern that JIACGs have not always fulfilled the civilian advisory function originally intended.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, it seems difficult to generalize

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<sup>98</sup> According to one source, the instruction stated Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) “will be organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.” Ambassador (retired) Edward Marks, Contractor, Camber Corporation, Joint Interagency Coordinating [sic] Group on Counterterrorism, United States Pacific Command, p. 7, <http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/678/PACOM%20JIACG%20and%20the%20War%20on%20Terror.pdf>.

<sup>99</sup> Jan Schwarzenberg, “Where are the JIACGs today?,” *InterAgency Journal*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2011), p. 25. Hereinafter referred to as *JIACGs Today?*

<sup>100</sup> Col. Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 37 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 10-18, and Gabriel Marcella, ed., *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2008, pp. 243-248.

about JIACGs. Some are little used, some are used extensively, and some have been virtually subsumed under or replaced by other interagency arrangements (see below).<sup>101</sup>

## **USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation**

In response to increasing concerns about possible conflicts between increasing U.S. military activities and sound development objectives, USAID established in 2005 an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to provide input and oversight to U.S. military activities abroad. In November 2011, OMA was renamed the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation.

Under this office, senior USAID development officials are assigned to GCCs (see above) and to Pentagon offices. In addition, military liaison officers from the GCCs and from the Special Operations Command are assigned to USAID headquarters.

## **Civilian Posts at the Geographic Combatant Commands**

While the JIACGs have operated outside the formal organizational structure of combatant commands, some GCCs have created new posts within the command's organizational structure for civilian personnel from other departments and agencies. This personnel augmentation includes senior USAID representatives that have been brought in through the USAID Office of Military Affairs, established in 2005, as well as civilians from other agencies.

Two commands have become the most integrated: the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) covering all of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), covering Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean. According to DOD's June 2011 report to Congress on the organization of the GCCs,<sup>102</sup> AFRICOM had 39 civilian "interagency" personnel assigned fulltime to its headquarters staff, with at least one from each of the civilian agencies relevant to its mission, while SOUTHCOM had 29 from 13 agencies. Both commands have also integrated senior civilian personnel into command leadership by establishing civilian "Deputy to

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<sup>101</sup> According to *JIACGs Today?*, the U.S. Pacific Command's JIACG is "essentially non-existent," while the U.S. Northern Command's JIACG is "a means of communication and coordination in the event of a national disaster." However, the U.S. Central Command JIACG is used for "integrating U.S. government activities in an active combat zone," and the U.S. Southern Command JIACG is "exploring a completely new paradigm ... analogous to a mega-embassy where day-to-day operations of many agencies functioning in the region are closely coordinated with each other." Jan Schwarzenberg, "Where are the JIACGs today?," *InterAgency Journal*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2011), p. 24. According to a recent DOD report to Congress, the U.S. Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command JIACG has more than 30 full-time interagency representatives, from a variety of domestically-focused agencies as well as from the Department of State and representatives of the U.S. intelligence community, and, at the time the report was written, was seeking a dedicated Drug Enforcement Administration representative to assist with transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Report on Organizational Structures of the Headquarters of the Geographic Combatant Commands*, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 944 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383, June 2011, p. 14. Hereinafter referred to as *DOD GCC Report*.

<sup>102</sup> DOD GCC Report, pp. 5, 18. The extent to which these civilian deputy commanders can influence the conduct of command missions is unclear. In an explanation of the SOUTHCOM civilian deputy commander's role, the report states that the position "empowers the incumbent to influence decision making at the Command in a way not possible for a POLAD. Although the CDC [Civilian Deputy Commander] does not have the authority to make decision affecting the command's military operations and personnel, or large resource commitments, he/she can shape strategic planning, strategic communications, public affairs, politico-military and intelligence analysis, and the use of security assistance dollars—and better align those missions with those of civilian agencies and country teams. This authority and direction improve USSOUTHCOM's ability to engage with and build interagency capacity." p. 19.

the Commander” posts occupied by senior State Department foreign service officials, as has the U.S. European Command (EUCOM).<sup>103</sup> EUCOM, which covers 51 countries including Russia and the countries of greater Europe, has incorporated its Interagency Engagement Group (i.e., its JIACG) into its command structure as an Interagency Partnering Directorate (currently lead by an Army civilian). As of the end of FY2011, EUCOM expected to have 13 interagency personnel at the command. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), covering 20 states (Egypt, states on the Arabian peninsula, and in Central and South Asia), has “20 liaison members from other U.S. Government departments and agencies” working with CENTCOM staff. The report contained no information on interagency personnel within the staff structure of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and NORTHCOM.

## **Other Interagency Mechanisms**

### **Interagency Task Forces<sup>104</sup>**

Interagency cooperation for missions abroad has largely been accomplished through multi-agency task forces. Most often these task forces are pulled together in times of crisis or periods of transition when agency roles are not clear, and constitute the very ad hoc structures that are criticized as inadequate and dysfunctional. At the field level, these are sometimes referred to as “hastily formed networks.”<sup>105</sup>

### **Established Task Forces**

There are long-standing task forces in two mission areas involving the protection of U.S. borders. Three task forces are organized under three GCCs to coordinate military and civilian counternarcotics, and in some cases counter-terrorism, efforts.

Following Congress’ 1988 designation of DOD as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug trafficking into the United States,<sup>106</sup> DOD set up three task forces to combat drug trafficking. The purpose of the task forces was to coordinate the support and assistance that DOD provides to civilian law enforcement agencies under other authorities.<sup>107</sup>

In 1994, two of the DOD task forces served as the base for the establishment of two interagency task forces: the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS) under SOUTHCOM in Florida

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<sup>103</sup> In the case of SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, the deputy posts were created by upgrading the political advisor posts; their titles are Civilian Deputy to the Commander, Foreign Policy Advisor [POLAD]. The AFRICOM title is simply Deputy for the Commander for Civil-Military Activities.

<sup>104</sup> Note that there also are many interagency task forces for domestic operations and activities that are not discussed here.

<sup>105</sup> The Naval Postgraduate School’s Cebrowski Institute has a center for research and advice on hastily formed networks for disaster and humanitarian crisis response. See <http://www.hfncenter.org>.

<sup>106</sup> NDAA for FY1989, P.L. 100-456, Division A, Sec. 1202(a)(1), codified at 10 U.S.C. 124.

<sup>107</sup> DOD counternarcotics assistance may be provided under Section 1004 of the NDAA for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510), as amended and periodically extended, and Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended and periodically extended. DOD may also maintain and operate equipment in support of counternarcotics and counter-terrorism efforts under 10 U.S.C. 374. For more on this counternarcotics assistance, see CRS Report RL34543, *International Drug Control Policy*, by Liana Sun Wyler.

(often pointed to as a model task force),<sup>108</sup> and Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATFWest) under the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. JIATFS stated function is “to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partners’ national security.”<sup>109</sup> JIATFWest describes its mission as providing support “to law enforcement for counterdrug and drug-related activities.”<sup>110</sup>

The third DOD task force, Joint Task Force North (JTFN) under the U.S. Northern Command, is not formally an interagency task force, but it is located at Fort Bliss, near El Paso, TX, near the civilian interagency Operation Alliance, a civilian task force of federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies. JTFN (known as Joint Task Force North until 2004) coordinates activities along the southwest border and the Gulf of Mexico. It provides support to federal law enforcement agencies for counternarcotics and homeland security missions.

### **Task Forces by Another Name**

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan may be considered a type of task force. These teams—which have consisted of 20 to 100 members—were first formed in Afghanistan in 2002, and then were established in Iraq in 2005. Members were drawn largely from DOD, the State Department, and USAID. The original concept was for the PRTs to be mixed civilian-military teams that would operate in Afghanistan’s provinces, coordinating U.S. government support from civilian agencies to local authorities and providing a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. PRTs were stood up first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Their purpose was to build basic infrastructure and to provide assistance, advice, and mentoring to provincial and local government and officials in a wide range of areas, including governance, political and economic development, rule of law, education and culture, and public health.

Despite numerous problems—among them what many considered an initial disproportionate representation by DOD, given that civilian agencies at first could not provide the requisite personnel—the PRTs have persisted in Afghanistan. In Iraq, with the transition to a U.S. State Department lead for the U.S. presence there, the 15 PRTs were dissolved in FY2011. Their engagement, stabilization, and liaison functions are conducted through State Department civilian diplomatic posts, and other functions were turned over to Iraqi provincial and local governments.

In addition, the interagency Civilian Response Corps (CRC) teams, mentioned above, may be viewed as a form of interagency task force. Although their assignments are still limited, CRC deployed personnel, often from two or more civilian agencies, work together as teams, developing data, conducting interviews, and stimulating the thinking of U.S. government employees in the field about approaches to conflict mitigation and resolution in their countries.

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<sup>108</sup> Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, *Joint Interagency Task Force—South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success*, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Perspectives, No. 5, Washington, DC, June 2011. Hereinafter cited as *Joint Interagency Task Force-South*.

<sup>109</sup> As stated on the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South website <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx>.

<sup>110</sup> See the JIATF West (JIATFWest) website, [http://www.pacom.mil/web/site\\_pages/staff%20directory/jiatfwest/jiatfwest.shtml](http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/staff%20directory/jiatfwest/jiatfwest.shtml).



## **Interagency Informal Arrangements**

Interagency collaboration may occur through informal arrangements developed by those responsible for program planning and implementation. For example, although legislation establishing the DOD Regional Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) has no provision for State Department coordination or collaboration, DOD regularly consults with the State Department on CTFP programming. In Afghanistan, DOD and civilian personnel at the field level often have devised informal arrangements to better integrate their work.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> For examples of informal arrangements in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R40156, *War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress*, by Catherine Dale. On p. 32, she writes: “On the ground, civilian and military practitioners have frequently crafted innovative arrangements for better integrating their efforts.” She provides details on a civil-military “Board of Directors” for efforts in Paktia, Paktika, and Khowst provinces.

## Appendix B. Proposals to Improve Strategy-Making, Planning, and Budgeting

Many foreign policy and interagency reform analyses express concern that successive Administrations have done at best a fair job in integrating the various elements of foreign policy making and have not engaged at all in making strategy, i.e., matching resources to policy decisions and priorities. In 2001, the United States Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) flatly stated that “Strategic planning is largely absent within the U.S. government. The planning that does occur is *ad hoc* and specific to Executive departments and agencies. No overarching strategic framework guides U.S. national security policymaking or resource allocation.”<sup>112</sup>

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in 2008 described the United States’ “inability to formulate and implement a coherent strategy” as corroding all governmental processes by “hindering planning, creating gaps, duplicating efforts, frustrating leaders, and encouraging *ad hoc* short cuts.”<sup>113</sup> Further, the PNSR historical case studies identified a link between poor strategy and policy formulation and deficient implementation, with the lack of clarity and unity at top levels fomenting rivalries and “stove-piping” at lower levels.<sup>114</sup> The reasons PNSR cited for these problems at the leadership level ranged from the behavior of top leaders to insufficient information flows at the executive level.<sup>115</sup>

Many other analysts have also cited a need for systems and procedures to ensure the development of coherent strategy, guide planning, and bring to bear sufficient leadership and direction. In discussing civil-military operations to quell conflict, from initial intervention to the state-building phase, two experts pointed to three reasons for improving strategy, planning, and leadership that would hold true for many U.S. government missions and activities abroad. These are: (1) the mutual dependence among agencies to carry out complex missions, (2) the contentious policy issues that can lead to problems in the field if not addressed at the outset, and (3) the shortages of personnel and other resources that demand their optimal use.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> *Roadmap for National Security*, p. 48.

<sup>113</sup> PNSR 2008, p. vii.

<sup>114</sup> PNSR 2008, p. 95. PNSR cited the “absence of unity, clarity, and agreement at the top energized cross-agency jealousies, ignorances [sic], and ‘stove-piping’ at the middle and lower levels charged with implementation....”

<sup>115</sup> PNSR 2008, see pp. 153-157. PNSR signaled a lack of candor and trust among general leaders and staff produced by the custom of “leaking” information to the press as a major obstacle to generating and objectively evaluating potential strategic courses of action. This, and other factors such as “poor decision support and the tendency toward consensus building” also “obscure the links between objectives and the alternative activities, programs, and resources required to achieve them.” (pp. 154-155.) PNSR also found that information “about real-world conditions does not travel easily between field-level components of institutions and the policymaking levels,” and even less readily between executive institutions.” (P. 153.)

<sup>116</sup> Specifically, these authors argued for “an interagency planning effort well in advance of deployment” citing three reasons for advance planning that would also hold true for other missions. “First, significant dependences among various agency efforts in a mission require unified policy direction and a coherent intervention strategy, one that integrates its political, security-rule-of-law, and economic lines of effort to achieve transformation. Second, contentious policy issues emerge from the outset that must be addressed to avoid policy gaps and subsequent disconnects on the ground. Finally, and often most important, a substantial number of international troops, personnel, and resources must be mobilized in a multinational and multilateral context and sustained, reasonably for at least five years, to assure that the desired transformation of power takes hold. The pool of available capabilities, however, is seriously limited. There (continued...)

From the Hart-Rudman Commission forward, many organizations and experts have advanced proposals to enhance or improve strategy-making and planning processes, including reforms at the NSC (**Table B-1**, **Table B-2**, **Table B-3**), creating specific new strategy development processes and documents (**Table B-4**), or making other changes to rationalize or enhance strategy development and planning (**Table B-5**). Many have also recommended integrating national security budgets (**Table B-6**) and/or improving budget processes (**Table B-7**).

The Obama Administration has two initiatives in the budgeting area. One is a request that Congress establish a Global Security Contingency Fund, providing a pool of integrated DOD and State Department funding for security assistance. Another is a plan for Ambassadors to participate in budget-making at the country team level. (See the section on integrated budgets, below.) In addition, State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) planners have recently formed a “3D Planning Group” to improve their collaboration in planning.<sup>117</sup>

## **Modify National Security Council and Staff Roles, Responsibilities, Processes, or Structures**

Proposals for improving strategy-making and planning have centered on the National Security Council (NSC) processes and NSC staff. Policy and strategy-making for foreign policy and affairs is the prerogative of the President, normally conducted through the NSC and its staff, with the participation of DOD, the State Department, and other agencies. Nonetheless, the President and the NSC staff have been widely viewed for many years as so overwhelmed with the tasks of conducting day-to-day governance that the NSC cannot direct the processes of making coherent policy and strategy. Analysts offer differing solutions. Some would create new NSC staff positions (**Table B-1**), new NSC staff structures (**Table B-2**), or assign new responsibilities to the NSC staff (**Table B-3**). This might require expanding the size of the NSC staff; alternatively, the President might delegate these functions to others.

The composition of the NSC itself is largely set by statute, but it is the President’s prerogative to determine NSC staff structure and size, subject of course to appropriations. Any substantial changes in staff size, or the creation of new NSC staff units or additional posts elsewhere to handle delegated functions would, through their budgetary implications, be a matter for Congressional action. Nevertheless, any codification of size or structure, as mentioned above, may be considered impinging on a president’s flexibility to structure the White House in accordance with circumstances and the capacity of available personnel.

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(...continued)

is no slack in the system.” Len Hawley and Dennis Skocz, “Advance Political-Military Planning,” in *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, Leonard R. Hawley (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), p. 37. This book was also sponsored by the Association of the United States Army.

<sup>117</sup> Diplomacy, development, and defense are the 3Ds. During the Bush Administration, the State Department Office of Strategic and Performance Planning set up “Project Horizon,” an interagency effort to identify strategic interagency capabilities that the government might invest in over the next 20 years and to provide a starting point for an interagency planning process, including the development of a scenario-based toolkit for internal agency and interagency planning. Participants included senior executives, strategic planners, and subject matter experts from 15 U.S. government agencies, as well as selected academics and private sector personnel.

**Table B-I. Proposals To Establish New Positions at the National Security Council Staff**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) 2011	Establish a new, dual-hatted position for a senior official to serve both at Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and on the NSC staff to provide oversight and strategic direction for interagency coordination and cooperation of interagency contingency operations, including contracting-related matters. This official would also ensure that each relevant agency has the necessary financial resources and police oversight to carry out its contingency-related mission, and that agency budgets, Defense, State, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), are complementary rather than duplicative or conflicting. At OMB, this official would serve as a deputy director, i.e., a presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate. At the National Security Council (NSC), this official would serve as a deputy national security adviser and deputy assistant to the President, and would attend and participate in NSC meetings as the principal advisor to the NSC on interagency contingency missions, (pp. 144-145)
CSIS 2007	Create a NSC Senior Director for Conflict Prevention and Response to provide a locus of interagency coordination on these issues in the White House. Ideally, the Senior Director would occupy the contingency planning role envisioned in Presidential Decision Directive 56. The Senior Director should be supported in large part by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development (S/CRS). (p. 36)
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2009	Establish planning and programming arrangements for preventive action at the White House level, specifically at the NSC. Create two new NSC directorates, each to handle different types of preventive action: a Directorate for Development and Governance to oversee and coordinate foreign assistance planning and programming across the U.S. government, together with a NSC Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) co-chaired by the senior director and the deputy administrator for USAID and a NSC Directorate for Prevention, Stabilization, and Reconstruction (PSR), together with a PSR IPC co-chaired by the senior director and the coordinate for SCRS. (pp. 22-23)
Center for Global Development (CGD) 2007	The President should appoint a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Conflict Prevention and Response to draft and implement an integrated U.S. government strategy for fragile and war-torn states. (p. 15)
Flournoy/Brimley 2006	Create a NSC Senior Director for Strategic Planning and an Office for Strategic Planning, both devoted to strategic planning and insulated from day-to-day demands and crisis management. The senior director would be responsible for coordinating a Quadrennial National Security Review. (p. 86)
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2005	Create a NSC Senior Director to integrate interagency planning for complex contingency operations. Create an office to support this official and to stand up an Interagency Crisis Planning Team for every stability operation being considered, providing staff and resources to support three teams simultaneously. (pp. 50-51)

**Table B-2. Proposals to Establish New NSC Structures**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2009	Establish planning and programming arrangements for preventive action at the White House level, specifically at the NSC. Create two new NSC directorates, each to handle different types of preventive action: a Directorate for Development and Governance to oversee and coordinate foreign assistance planning and programming across the U.S. government, together with a NSC Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) co-chaired by the senior director and the deputy administrator for USAID and a NSC Directorate for Prevention, Stabilization, and Reconstruction (PSR), together with a PSR IPC co-chaired by the senior director and the coordinate for SCRS. (pp. 22-23)
PNSR 2009	Establish a permanent strategy directorate within the National Security Staff., whose main mission would be to develop medium and long term strategy. (p. 40)
Williams/Adams 2008	Establish a permanent interagency group under the NSC and co-chaired by the OMB to ensure the integration of security assistance programs into the broader national security strategy, to resolve disagreements between the State Department and DOD, and provide overarching policy guidance. (Planning, budgeting, and integration would be left to those departments.) (pp. 72-73)
CGD 2004	Create a NSC Directorate to reflect the high priority assigned to weak and failed states and charge it with tracking weak and failed states and monitoring U.S. responses to them. Also create a NSC interagency Policy Coordination Committee on Weak and Failed States, with responsibility for early warning efforts and for developing and coordinating comprehensive strategies for country-level engagement. (pp. 32-22)
National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy 2004	Create a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group (NICCG) chaired by the NSC to review lessons learned and develop strategic guidance for planning and coordinating post-conflict operations. The NICCG would include representatives from DOD and the departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, and would meet on a regular basis, p. 110.

**Table B-3. Proposals to Assign New Responsibilities to NSC and National Security Staff**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
SIGIR 2010	An NSC-led interagency task force should lead a new S&R doctrine and policy formulation process to identify the applicable missions, roles, responsibilities, and operating procedures for all S&R participants. (p. 14)
Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) 2009	Increase the responsibilities of the NSC executive secretary, including managing the interagency national security human capital plan and personnel system, and other innovations proposed by PNSR. Provide statutory authority for the position of executive secretary of the President's security council., who would be appointed for a four year term beginning in the middle of a presidential administration. (pp 401-402, also see p 451)
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 2009	Create a position for an official who would analyze interagency operations, including real-time assessments of system performance, and report to the director for national security. (p. x)
RAND 2009	Realign NSC, State, and USAID roles for stabilization and reconstruction. Move some of the functions of S/CRS, including overall interagency coordination, into the NSC. (Also, significantly upgrade USAID to become the lead agency for planning and managing stabilization and reconstruction missions. Leave the State Department and S/CRS with the tasks of defining detailed strategies and policies.) (pp. 66-68)

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
RAND and American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) 2008	Under an NSC lead, involve relevant U. S. government units and agencies and host nation governments in missions and activities starting from the planning stages. NSC should also conduct a standing planning process that tries to envision the future. NSC should operate in tandem with OMB, but without giving OMB veto power over planning. Planning at this level provides central direction, overall parameters, interagency reconciliation, allocation of resources, and systemic and continuing review of results. Lower level planning and review tasks would be handled by interagency tasks forces. (pp. 16-17)
Williams/Adams 2008	Vest NSC and OMB with responsibility for overseeing the planning, funding, coordination and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction missions. (p. 99)
CFR 2005	Formally task the National Security Advisor and staff with civil-military coordination and the establishment of overarching policy associated with stabilization and reconstruction activities. Codify the new role in a new National Security Policy Directive (pp. 11-12)
Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004	The President and NSC should provide direction and coordination for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) operations, as well as for the initiation of planning processes to resolve issues without the use of military force for countries where U.S. interests are very important and the risk of U.S. intervention is high. A small, permanent cadre within the NSC Staff should provide continuity and expertise for long-term S&R issues. (pp 29-32)
U.S. Commission on National Security 2001	The NSA (National Security Advisor) should coordinate a strategic planning process on national security to translate the President's overall vision into strategic goals and priorities which would be used as the basis of specific guidance for departments and agencies on the most important national security policies. (pp. 48-49)

## **Create New Procedures to Facilitate Strategy-making and Planning**

Many proposals to make interagency missions more effective start with or include recommendations for new or improved government-wide, comprehensive strategy and planning reviews or documents. (**Table B-4**) Such annual or periodic reviews and documents would serve to clarify agency roles and facilitate agency planning and mission integration. The proposals usually call for modeling the documents after improved versions of the President's National Security Strategy Report and the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Some proposals explicitly tie the creation of new strategy documents to the development of national security budgets. There also are a variety of other proposals to rationalize strategy development and planning capabilities and processes by creating new posts, mechanisms, procedures, or practices to facilitate coordination and oversight (**Table B-5**).

In an Obama Administration effort to integrate plans and budgets, Secretary of State Clinton said that Chiefs of Mission will play a role in integrating country-level strategic plans and budgets. At a February 2, 2011, meeting of Ambassadors (billed as the first annual Chief of Mission conference) the Secretary stated, "Each chief of mission will be responsible for overseeing an integrated country strategy that will bring together all country-level planning processes and efforts into one single multiyear overarching strategy that encapsulates U.S. policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them."<sup>118</sup>

<sup>118</sup> <http://www.state.gov/secretary/tm/2011/02/155870.htm>.

**Table B-4. Proposals for Specific New Strategy Development Processes and Documents**

Organization	Proposal
<p>Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel Report (QDRIP) 2010</p>	<p>Initiate a National Security Strategic Planning Process by establishing a standing Independent Strategic Review Panel to review the strategic environment over the next 20 years and provide prioritized, goal and risk assessment recommendations. The ISRP, to be jointly established by the executive branch and Congress, would also be charged with reviewing and assessing the existing National Security Strategy and policies: as well as national security roles, missions, and organizations of the departments and agencies. It would provide recommendations and input to the National Security Strategic Planning Process and the national security department and agency planning and review processes. Using the ISRP assessment of the strategic environment, the NSC would develop a “grand strategy” for the United States that would be formalized as the National Security Strategy, signed by the President. The National Security Advisor would then direct reviews of executive branch national security departments and related assessments. (pp. 101-102)</p>
<p>Smith 2010</p>	<p>As a major part of a new Quadrennial National Security Review, thoroughly review U.S. peace-building doctrine, mechanisms, and interagency coordination. (p. 211)</p>
<p>PNSR 2009</p>	<p>Perform a National Security Review at the beginning of each presidential term that would describe the strategic landscape with an analysis of major ongoing or foreseeable worldwide commitments, the identification and prioritization of current and foreseeable national security opportunities and threads, and trends that significantly affect national security, including an assessment of existing capabilities and resources against needs, and recommendations regarding the missions, activity and budgets across the national security interagency system, and a review of the scope of national security including possible changes in roles and responsibilities within the interagency system, and among outside stakeholders. Use annual reviews to assess the continuing applicability of the PNSR’s basic assumptions. (pp. 39, 215-216)</p> <p>Based upon the assessments and priorities of the National Security Review, require the preparation of national security planning and resource guidance to be issued annually by the President to all national security departments and agencies, including guidance concerning the necessary capabilities to be developed for current and future needs. This document would be issued jointly by the National Security Staff and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which among other functions would provide guidance for the preparation of interagency plans to build required national security capabilities, linking strategy to resource allocation. (pp. 40,42, 217-218) (Also see PNSR 2008, pp. 508-509.)</p>
<p>Williams/Adams 2008</p>	<p>Develop a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan to align human capital programs with strategic goals, objectives, and outcomes. (p. 72)</p> <p>Institute a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR), jointly conducted by the NSC and OMB with interagency support and similar to the Department of Defense (DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review, to establish top-down priorities for national security, link priorities and resources. Also institute a biennial National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG) process, jointly conducted by the NSC and OMB with interagency support. The NSPG would provide guidance on a few cross-cutting policy areas, with one of the first to be S&amp;R. These documents would provide the basis for an annual NSC/OMB review of State and Defense program and budget documents. (p.100)</p>
<p>Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy (ACTD) 2007</p>	<p>Task the State Department, working closely with the NSC and OMB, with the lead in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. The State Department should also enhance its regional interagency coordination role and presence by leading the development of government-wide regional strategic plans and expanding its senior-level diplomatic visibility. (p. ii)</p>

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDR 2006	Create National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. This guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies, and help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives. (p. 85)
Flournoy/Brimley 2006	Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR), i.e., an interagency process to develop a national security strategy that sets national security objectives and priorities, identifies the capabilities required—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to implement it, and delineates agency roles and responsibilities. The president should designate a senior national security official (most likely the National Security Advisor) to lead the effort, designed to frame key decisions for the President rather than to paper over differences. The QNSR would produce a classified National Security Planning Guidance document and the existing unclassified National Security Strategy. (pp. 85-86)
Schake/Berkowitz 2005	Use the President’s National Security Strategy as an instrument to direct the executive branch department(s?), assigning responsibilities and prioritizing resources, rather than as a statement of intent and ideals as it is now. (Webpage.)
DSB 2004	The Secretaries of Defense and State should jointly propose a National Security Planning Directive to assign specific roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies and to make explicit the NSC’s role in managing national resources for crisis planning. (p. 31)
U.S. Commission on National Security 2001	The NSA (National Security Advisor) should coordinate a strategic planning process on national security to translate the President’s overall vision into strategic goals and priorities which would be used as the basis of specific guidance for departments and agencies on the most important national security policies. (pp. 48-49)

**Table B-5. Proposals to Rationalize or Enhance Strategy Development and Planning**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2010	Expresses DOD support for an improved interagency strategic planning process that makes optimal use of all national instruments of statecraft, including a significant improvement in interagency comprehensive assessments, analysis, planning, and execution for whole-of-government operations, including systems to monitor and evaluate those operations in order to advance U.S. national interests. (p. 71)
SIGIR 2010	All relevant agencies should work together to develop and implement integrated planning capabilities for S&R operations. (p. 15)
CFR 2009	Better utilize the U.S. government’s considerable early-warning capabilities (including intelligence collection systems, analysts, and products by among other things, nurturing a much closer working relationship between the intelligence and policy communities, and consolidating all instability watch-lists into a single U.S. government watch-list as part of a general effort to streamline early-warning products and integrate them more formally into planning and programming. (pp. 21-22)



<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
PNSR 2009	<p>Focus the National Security Staff on high-level policy formulation and policy guidance. (p. 39)</p> <p>Establish a permanent strategy directorate within the National Security Staff., whose main mission would be to develop medium and long term strategy. (p. 40)</p> <p>Enable the National Security Staff to perform strategic management of end-to-end national security interagency processes, development of the national security interagency system, crisis management, and presidential staffing. Improve cross-administration continuity by staffing the executive secretariat of the national security staff with career civil servants. (p. 207)</p> <p>Urge the President to issue an executive order, to be supplemented by derivative presidential policy and study directives that would establish a coherent, continuing framework and normative process for the national security system, including defining the national security interagency system, both with respect to end-to-end management of the national security interagency system and with respect to the decentralized implementation by departments, agencies, and interagency teams. (p. 209)</p>
Williams/Adams—2008	<p>Establish a single set of security assistance programs conducted under State Department authorities, with close DOD involvement in shaping programs, since DOD likely will continue to be the primary implementer. (p. 72)</p>
Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy (ACTD) 2007	<p>The State Department should institutionalize its ability to integrate U.S. government instruments of power in support of the NSC and to serve as the lead foreign affairs agency within the interagency structure. It should also enhance its regional interagency coordination role and presence by leading the development of government-wide regional strategic plans and expanding its senior-level diplomatic visibility. (p. ii)</p>
ACTD 2007	<p>The State Dept. should integrate strategic planning offices and technology infrastructures of the department and USAID, merge overlapping bureaus and functions, and co-locate related offices and personnel in Washington, D.C. (pp. i-ii)</p>
CGD 2007	<p>The NSC (and Congress) should mandate closer involvement of the State Department and USAID (and concurrence by the Secretary of State) in the uses of DOD foreign assistance funding in order to integrate development and governance expertise in such DOD activities, particularly in DOD-led counterterrorism and post-conflict initiatives. (pp. 15-16)</p>
CGD 2007	<p>The Administration should clarify agency roles and responsibilities in carrying out a strategy for fragile and war-torn states, taking into consideration the permissiveness of the operating environment in assigning lead roles. (p. 15)</p>
DSB 2004	<p>A small, permanent cadre within the NSC Staff should provide continuity and expertise for dealing with important countries and regions where there is the potential for U.S. military involvement. (pp. 29-31)</p>
CSIS/AUSA 2003	<p>Replace the current ad hoc strategy and planning process for addressing post-conflict reconstruction situations with a standing comprehensive interagency process. (p. 10)</p>

## **Integrate National Security Budgets or Improve Budgeting Procedures**

Another significant perceived system deficiency is the current practice of budgeting by agency rather than by mission or goal. Many proposals would integrate agency budgets relevant to national security, either as a whole or for a specific sector (**Table B-6**). Others seek to improve the budgeting process (**Table B-7**).

The concept of an integrated national security budget dates back at least to the 2001 U.S. Commission on National Security. The Commission faulted the budgeting process for its failure to make clear how the allocation of resources in agency budgets addressed national security goals, and to systematically consider tradeoffs in the allocation of those resources. It also noted the problem for Congressional oversight from the absence of a unified budget. “At present, therefore, neither the Congress nor the American people can assess the relative value of various national security programs over the full range of Executive Branch activities in this area.”<sup>119</sup> Budgeting by agency can lead to duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in others, as well as incoherent budget information on activities and missions undertaken by multiple agencies.

Preparation of a full scale integrated budget would be a complex undertaking. It would involve the pragmatic exercise of bringing intellectual rigor to the concepts and programs involved. Potentially, it could also involve bureaucratic challenges over the appropriate allocation of missions, programs, and funds.

Perhaps because of the complexity of preparing a fully integrated national security budget, the Commission on National Security proposed that the first of them “focus on a few of the nation’s most critical strategic goals, involving only some programs in the departmental budgets.” (The first strategic areas the Commission proposed for the initial document were homeland security, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, and science and technology.) Eventually, the Commission stated, the national security budget “could evolve into a more comprehensive document.”<sup>121</sup> That complexity may also explain why subsequent recommendations called for sector-specific integrated budgets or budget presentations (with proposals limited to security assistance, or counterterrorism), or greater transparency and combined decision-making on State, USAID, and DOD budgets in areas of overlap.

Whether an integrated national security budget or integrated sector specific budgets will increase government efficiency and effectiveness may depend on what is meant by the term

**In Focus: Need for Integrated Budgets**

Current budgeting practices for counterterrorism efforts and for foreign police and law enforcement assistance programs illustrate the problems of agency-based budgets. Several agencies—among them the Department of State, USAID, DOD, and the Treasury Department—all carry out counterterrorism efforts. However, there is no aggregated counterterrorism budget. Thus, the U.S. government cannot account for the total amount of funding it dedicates to counterterrorism efforts, nor easily identify the extent of duplication or gaps in those efforts.

Similarly, U.S. funding for support to foreign police forces is difficult to ascertain. Recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) compiled information on funding to train and equip these forces provided by seven federal agencies for counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and anticrime missions. The GAO labeled the amounts reported as “estimates.” Precise figures were not available because “according to agency officials, police training and equipping is not generally a category the agencies use to track funding.”<sup>120</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Road Map for National Security, p. 48. These problems are a by-product of the U.S. government budgeting system. Because Congress appropriates funds to individual department/agency budgets and each department or agency budgets funding for its own activities and operations, there is no authoritative cross-department record of the amounts that the U.S. government, as a whole, spends for many activities and mission. Further, an individual department or agency account may fund a wide variety of activities, but do not necessarily disaggregate data by activity. Because of this budgeting practice, there sometimes is no way to judge agencies’ funding for a specific purpose or activity, and thus the relative weight of agency contributions to an activity, without a time-consuming review of agency accounts.

<sup>120</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Multiple U.S. Agencies Provided Billions of Dollars to Train and Equip Foreign Police Forces*, Letter to Hon. John F. Tierney, April 27, 2011, p. 13.

<sup>121</sup> *Road Map for National Security*, p. 49.

“integrated.” The budget exercise of providing information on all U.S. national security accounts in one document may well bring more transparency. Funding could be totaled by mission areas, providing a comprehensive view of U.S. government spending in vital areas, such as counterterrorism, that is not now available. This could facilitate oversight. However, to achieve efficiencies and increase effectiveness by coordinating programs through shared cross-agency accounts may involve other changes. Reform of strategy and planning structures may be required to manage “blended” funds. Another drawback mentioned by some analysts are possible complications for Congress in handling integrated budgets under its current department and agency-centric committee system.<sup>122</sup>

The Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) provides Congress, through the Joint Select Committee on intelligence, with an opportunity to view the defense and international affairs budgets as a whole. This legislation consolidates the DOD, State Department, and USAID budgets, as well as others, under a comprehensive “security” category.<sup>123</sup> This type of exercise in considering overlapping defense and international affairs spending may produce useful insights for future budget integration.

The Obama Administration has endorsed the idea of establishing a full integrated national security budget and is taking preliminary steps to achieve that goal. In a May 2010 speech, Secretary of State Clinton noted that the Administration wanted “to begin to talk about a national security budget ... [where] you can see the tradeoffs and the savings.” The December 2010 QDDR, as mentioned above, signals the Administration’s intent to advance the discussion. A first step proposed in the QDDR was the pooled DOD-State Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).<sup>124</sup> In December 2011, Congress provided authority for the GSCF in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207, H.R. 1540, sent to the President on December 21, 2011).<sup>125</sup> Proposed by the State Department as a three-year pilot project, the fund may make clear the degree to which associated changes are needed.

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<sup>122</sup> Frank Olivieri, “Blended” Funds Offer Flexibility, Risk for State Department Operations,” *Congressional Quarterly*, March 14, 2011, pp. 7, 23.

<sup>123</sup> Also included in the security category are the budgets of the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the intelligence community management account. See CRS Report R41965, *The Budget Control Act of 2011*, by Bill Heniff Jr., Elizabeth Rybicki, and Shannon M. Mahan.

<sup>124</sup> For more information on the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), see CRS Report RS22855, *Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress*, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report RL33647, *A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress*, by Nina M. Serafino.

<sup>125</sup> The State Department’s FY2012 budget request describes the fund as a means to “streamline the way the U.S. Government provides assistance for military forces and other security forces....” Forces that could be assisted would be those “responsible for conducting border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces.” In addition, the fund could be used, according to State’s request, to provide assistance to foreign justice sector and other rule of law programs, and to other aspects of stabilization efforts. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, Foreign Operations*, Washington, DC, p. 161.

**Table B-6. Proposals for Integrated Budgets**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDR 2010	Cites “the creation of a unified national security budget process” as a goal of current Administration efforts to reform interagency processes, after joint mission planning, an Overseas Contingency Operations budget, and pooled funding. (p. 203)
QDRIP 2010	Establish a consolidated budget line for national security that encompasses, at a minimum, Defense, State, USAID, and the intelligence community. Task OMB and the NSC to develop a mechanism to track implementation of the various budget that support a comprehensive approach to national security. (p. ix)
Smith 2010	Develop a national security budget giving careful attention to the sources and accounts used to fund the range of U.S. government peace-building activities. (pp. 211-212)
PNSR 2009	Develop the capability to produce an integrated national security budget. The President’s annual budget submission to Congress should provide a single integrated national security budget display along with integrated budget justification material that reflects how each department’s and each agency’s budget aligns with underlying security assessments, strategy, and resource guidance. Develop a core competency within the National Security Staff and OMB to produce a national security budget and budget justification, including performing national security mission-based analysis. (p. 219) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 509.)
RAND/AAD 2008	The annual budget submission to Congress should include a separate volume with an integrated justification for the amounts requested through accounts comprising a national security budget, including foreign assistance, diplomacy, defense, homeland security, and intelligence. The OMB should conduct a national security budget review, in which the NSC should take part. (pp. 22-23)
CSIS 2007	The OMB and NSC should document clearly the connections among USAID, State Department, and DOD foreign assistance funding, to facilitate funding comparisons across agencies and sectors and for the creation of new metrics. (p. 35)
CSIS 2007	DOD, State, and USAID should present relevant congressional committees with a joint counterterrorism security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require Executive Branch transparency over how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together. (p. 38)
ACTD 2007	The State Dept. should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and OMB, in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. (p. ii)
U.S. Commission on National Security 2001	The President should prepare and present to Congress an overall national security budget to serve the critical goals that emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the President should continue to submit budgets for the individual national security departments and agencies for Congressional review and appropriations. (p. ii)

**Table B-7. Proposals to Improve the Budget Process**

Organization	Proposal
QDRIP 2010	In addition to establishing a consolidated budget line for national security that encompasses, at a minimum, Defense, State, USAID, and the intelligence community, task OMB and the NSC to develop a mechanism to track implementation of the various budgets that support a comprehensive approach to national security. (p. ix)
SIGIR 202	The NSC and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should work with the relevant agencies to develop potential S&R budget requirements. (p. 15)
PNSR 2009	Require the preparation of a national security planning and resource guidance document to be issued annually by the President to all national security departments and agencies, to be jointly issued by the National Security Staff and OMB, which among other functions would provide guidance for the preparation of interagency plans to build required national security capabilities, linking strategy to resource allocation. (pp. 217-218) (Also see PNSR 2008, pp. 508-509.)  Direct each national security department and agency to prepare a six-year budget projection derived from National Security Planning and Resource Guidance. Require each department and agency to submit its annual budget to OMB consistent with the guidance in the National Security Planning and Resource Guidance. (pp. 40, 219) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 509.)  Develop a core competency within the National Security Staff and OMB to produce a national security budget and budget justification, including performing national security mission-based analysis. (p. 219) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 509.)
RAND/AAD 2008	In addition to presenting Congress with an annual integrated justification of national security accounts, the OMB should conduct a national security budget review, in which the NSC should take part. (pp. 22-23)
Williams/Adams 2008	Budgets for security assistance should be drawn up jointly by State and DOD, with OMB providing oversight and ensuring integration. Budget requests should reflect the policies and programs that the NSC permanent interagency group, co-chaired by OMB, develops. (p. 73)
ACTD 2007	The State Dept. should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and OMB, in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. (p. ii)
CSIS 2007	The OMB and NSC should document clearly the connections among USAID, State Department, and DOD foreign assistance funding, to facilitate funding comparisons across agencies and sectors and for the creation of new metrics. (p. 35)
CSIS 2007	DOD, State, and USAID should present relevant congressional committees with a joint counterterrorism security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require Executive Branch transparency over how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together. (p. 38)
CGD 2007	The NSC (and Congress) should mandate closer involvement of the State Department and USAID (and concurrence by the Secretary of State) in the uses of DOD foreign assistance funding in order to integrate development and governance expertise in such DOD activities, particularly in DOD-led counterterrorism and post-conflict initiatives. (p. 16)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) 2007	The Director for Foreign Assistance should break funding decisions into strategic, tactical and operational components and find ways to bring appropriate actors into decisions, as well as to make clear who the appropriate decisionmaker is at various stages. (p. 4)

## **Appendix C. Proposals to Enhance Civilian Authority, Institutional Arrangements, and Resources for Interagency Missions Abroad**

The predominant role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in missions and activities that some policymakers and experts (including some DOD and military leaders) argue would be better placed in civilian hands is often attributed to the weaknesses of civilian institutions and leadership. The weaknesses cited include inadequate authority, inappropriate structures, and insufficient civilian resources, especially personnel. Most of the studies surveyed for this report judged that leaving many of the “nation-building” or “state-building” tasks that DOD has assumed in military hands is problematic. (See the section, above, entitled “To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building Capabilities?”) As a result, improvements to the existing civilian institutions and institutional authorities of the national security system, particularly the Department of State and its Secretary, have been the mainstay of many recommendations for interagency reform.

Most often, the Secretary of State leads civilian efforts in missions and activities abroad, but, on occasion, the President looks elsewhere for a leader. The civilian alternatives to leadership by the Secretary of State and the State Department for interagency missions have also been viewed by some as unsatisfactory.

Over the years, Presidents have routinely turned to the appointment of “czars” to head interagency efforts in a large number of areas of interagency cooperation. Although their offices offer a venue for interagency operations, the czars themselves often have not possessed the authority or ability to coordinate interagency operations.<sup>126</sup> Further, some Members view “czars” as lacking accountability to Congress; the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress expressly denied the Administration authority to fund such offices. (President Obama rejected the prohibition as an unconstitutional intrusion on executive branch prerogatives.)<sup>127</sup>

For certain activities and missions, Presidents may appoint “lead agencies” to coordinate interagency efforts. But lead agencies, including the Department of State when it plays this role, are often viewed as ineffective because their mandates to coordinate activities are not accompanied by the requisite authority and resources. Also, in some cases the lead agency’s agenda and underlying assumptions may not square with those of other agencies. Thus, civilian agencies often have no incentive to divert personnel and funding for programs that do not further their core functions or otherwise serve their interests.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> CRS Report R40856, *The Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional Oversight*, by Barbara L. Schwemle et al.

<sup>127</sup> White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Statement by the President on H.R. 1473*, April 15, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/15/statement-president-hr-1473>.

<sup>128</sup> One study quotes an unnamed senior NSC official: “‘lead agency really means *sole* agency as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.’” Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Arlington, VA, February 2010, p. 27. (Hereinafter referred to as *Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons*.)

Proposals to enhance civilian authority and institutions are numerous. Many proposals focus on increasing State Department capacity and authority (**Table C-1, Table C-2**), others would transfer some State Department stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) functions elsewhere (**Table C-3**). Others would create new institutions or structures for S&R and other missions abroad (**Table C-4**), create interagency task forces (**Table C-5**), enhance civilian regional presence (**Table C-6, Table C-7**), and increase civilian interagency personnel capacity (**Table C-8,**

**Table C-9, Table C-10**).

Obama Administration interagency reform plans and actions include (1) creating two new bureaus, one for conflict and stabilization operations and the other for counterterrorism; (2) establishing regional hubs; (3) better supporting the military Geographic Combatant Commands; and (4) increasing civilian personnel. These are discussed below. (Plans to enhance Chief of Mission authority are discussed in **Appendix D**.)

## **Enhance State Department Authority and Capacity**

The Secretary of State is formally the lead civilian official for developing and implementing foreign policy and, through a patchwork of statutes and executive orders, has authority for a variety of ancillary roles. (See **Appendix A**.) The Secretary's ability to carry out all her responsibilities is severely constrained by a lack of appropriate authorities and organizational structures, adequate numbers of personnel with the appropriate skills, and a sufficient budget, according to many analysts. There is particular concern that the Department of State does not possess the capacity to take the lead in three key areas: counterterrorism, security assistance, and stabilization and reconstruction. In all three areas, Congress has been willing to provide DOD with authority and resources to carry out missions.

Several of the studies surveyed recommend a wide variety of ways to enhance the State Department's ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct interagency missions and activities. These include a new authorities, new procedures, restructuring, and the cultivation of an "operational" ethos for interagency missions (**Table C-1**). The State Department's ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct S&R missions is of particular concern, and several recommendations were specifically targeted at improving S&R capacity (**Table C-2**).

The Obama Administration has proposed elevating the status and expanding the functions of the two State Department offices which coordinate interagency efforts: the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). As proposed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense and Diplomacy Review (QDDR), the Obama Administration seeks Congress' approval to establish and provide resources for a new Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Bureau and a new Counterterrorism Bureau.

On the other hand, some analysts would neither expand nor enhance the State Department's stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) role. They view the State Department's culture, rooted in its core mission of diplomacy, as an insurmountable barrier that no restructuring, increases in personnel, or additional budgetary resources could overcome. Because an agency's core mission shapes recruitment and promotion selection criteria, some analysts argue that the State Department will never make effective use of personnel skilled at planning and conducting operational missions. Some of these analysts also doubt the State Department's ability to effectively oversee missions to prevent and manage conflict. Instead, they would build up the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or create a new agency to manage operational and preventive missions<sup>129</sup> (Table C-3).

**Table C-1. Proposals to Increase the State Department Capacity and Authority to Lead, Coordinate, and Conduct Interagency Missions**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDDR 2010	<p>Expand U.S. capacity to engage regionally by establishing regional embassy hubs as bases for experts in cross-cutting issues such as climate change or conflict resolution. These experts will “ride the circuit” between posts in the region. (pp. vii, 53)</p> <p>Establish a Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) bureau (pp. 135-136) and a Counterterrorism Bureau (p. 45)</p>
Smith 2010	<p>Confirm through presidential executive order that the Secretary of State will continue to carry the responsibility for leading and coordinating post-conflict reconstruction activities. (p. 213)</p>
PNSR 2009	<p>Develop an integrated approach to the management of global civilian affairs that mirrors the core strategic management functions of the national security interagency system proposed elsewhere, including the development of an overarching blueprint for a Next Generation State Department that includes a new organizational culture that would promote operational skill sets, stronger department-level oversight functions for budget, comptroller, and personnel, a management structure that permits the department to think, anticipate, plan, prepare, and act in an integrated fashion, multiyear strategic planning and budgeting processes that both facilitate the development of long-term capabilities and permit flexibility in making tradeoffs in response to new threats, guidance, or operational requirements, among others. (pp. 212-213)</p>
Williams/Adams 2008	<p>Establish a single set of security assistance programs conducted under State Department authorities, with close Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in shaping programs, since DOD likely will continue to be the primary implementer. (p. 72)</p>
ADTD 2007	<p>The State Department should institutionalize its ability to integrate U.S. government instruments of power in support of the National Security Council (NSC) and to serve as the lead foreign affairs agency within the interagency structure. It should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and the OMB, in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. It should enhance its regional interagency coordination role and presence by leading the development of government-wide regional strategic plans and expanding its senior-level diplomatic visibility. (p. ii)</p> <p>The State Dept. should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. The State Dept. should integrate strategic planning offices and technology infrastructures of the department and USAID, merge overlapping bureaus and functions, and co-locate related offices and personnel in Washington, D.C. (p. ii)</p>
SFRC 2007	<p>The President should give the Secretary of State explicit authority to ensure that all foreign aid to individual countries and regions—including aid from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), DOD, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCC), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—is in the foreign policy interest of the United States and conforms to the strategic goals determined by the President. (p. 4)</p> <p>The President should task the Secretary of State to work closely with the Administrator of USAID to implement the President’s foreign assistance strategy. (p. 4)</p>

<sup>129</sup> CRS Report R40102, *Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations*, by Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed, and CRS Report R40756, *Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination*, by Marian Leonardo Lawson and Susan B. Epstein.



<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
CFR 2005	Make the State Department the lead agency for all civilian efforts related to S&R, and provide it with all resources and funding authority needed for executive branch Stabilization and Reconstruction programs. Establish an Undersecretary of State for Stabilization and Reconstruction and a Deputy Administrator for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations at USAID. Make USAID responsible for managing the daily operations in S&R missions and increase funding and resources accordingly. (pp. 19-25)

**Table C-2. Proposals to Strengthen the State Department Lead and Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R)**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDDR 2010	Establish a Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) bureau (pp. 135-136) and a Counterterrorism Bureau (p. 45)
Smith 2010	Building on S/CRS, create a fully integrated State-USAID office, with some staffing from the military and additional civilian agencies, to exercise the lead for S&R. Consideration should be given to transferring USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to S/CRS to take over the conflict prevention function and to integrating the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives into S/CRS as the foundation of the active component of the Civilian Response Corps. (pp. 215-216, 220)
CFR 2009	Strengthen S/CRS with more resources devoted to preventive planning and crisis preparedness to fulfill its NSPD-44 mandate. S/CRS should become the prime locus for analyzing prior operations for “lessons learned” and best practices. Fully support efforts to build up a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) for stabilization and reconstruction missions, but at the same time review the overlap between the CRC and similar USAID expeditionary capabilities to clarify their respective roles and missions. Consider the utility of standing up a dedicated mediation support unit and a related roster of regional and functional experts that can be rapidly deployed. (pp. 24-25)
ACTD 2007	Enlarge State Department operational capacity to secure the transition of fragile and failed states in close coordination with other U.S. government departments and agencies, and in partnership with other nations and multilateral organizations. Specifically, the State Department should integrate strategic planning offices and technology infrastructures of the department and the USAID, merge overlapping bureaus and functions, and co-locate related offices and personnel in Washington, D.C. The Department should establish senior-level responsibility and interagency authority for stabilization and reconstruction, and develop fully the its S&R planning and execution capacities in this area. (pp. i-ii)
CFR 2005	Establish an Under Secretary of State for S&R, and establish a new unit within the State Department which reports to this Under Secretary. Make the State Department the lead agency for all civilian efforts related to S&R and provide it with all resources and funding authority needed for executive branch S&R programs. (p. 22)

**Table C-3. Proposals to Diversify S&R Responsibilities Away from the State Department**

Organization	Proposal
Brookings/CSIS 2010	Divide S/CRS's functions among the NSC, the State Department Policy Planning Office, and USAID. Proposes the NSC take on "the design and management of whole-of-government coordination systems," a "more robust policy planning office at the State Department," would provide the "helpful planning support that S/CRS has provided to regional bureaus on a case-by-case basis," and USAID would assume the "operational responsibilities of building and maintaining the Civilian Response Corps." (p. 29) USAID might also take on the planning support if a policy and strategic planning entity were to be established there, according to the proposal. (p. 41)
RAND 2009	Realign NSC, State, and USAID roles for stabilization and reconstruction. Significantly upgrade USAID to become the lead agency for planning and managing stabilization and reconstruction missions. Move some of the functions of S/CRS, including overall interagency coordination, into the NSC. Leave the State Department and S/CRS with the tasks of defining detailed strategies and policies. (pp. 66-68)
RAND 2009	Issue presidential-level guidance as the source for a coherent and consistent package of regulations and rules that create an effective S&R new system, clarifying the roles of the State Department, USAID, and others so that agencies have incentives to make investments in the areas for which they are responsible. Develop this package in coordination with Congressional guidance regarding the definition of missions and tasks and the allocation of resources. (p. 74)

## **Create New Agencies, Arrangements, Authorities**

Recently, concerns about the gaps in civilian structures to coordinate interagency missions—both steady state and extraordinary—have led some to argue for new arrangements at the national, regional, and field levels. At the national level, some argue for new S&R institutions or arrangements, independent of existing departments and agencies.

Some have advocated the use of various interagency task forces, informed by the lessons learned from the various permanent and temporary U.S. government tasks forces, as the means to provide both much needed capacity, flexibility, and adaptability to respond to emerging situations. Some argue for improved regional arrangements.

## **Create New Structures or Arrangements for S&R and Other Overseas Missions**

In addition to reforms proposed for the NSC (discussed above), several organizations and experts have recommended a reorganization of current responsibilities for dealing with fragile states, for preventing, managing, resolving conflict, or for operational missions abroad in general (**Table C-4**). Some proposals would redistribute S&R responsibilities, enhancing the role of USAID or incorporating its offices into new combined State-USAID units.<sup>130</sup> Those who propose enhancing USAID's position in S&R structures generally judge its agency focus and culture to be better suited to the operational nature of S&R missions than those of the State Department. Two would create an independent S&R agency; one would make it responsible to the Secretary of State (CSIS 2005), the other to the NSC (Special Inspector General for Iraq, or SIGIR, 2010). SIGIR

<sup>130</sup> S&R missions were of greatest concern at the time the initial proposals were made in the mid-2000s. At that time S&R missions were post-conflict. As discussed earlier, the term now encompasses preventive measures.

argues that a new agency “would streamline decision-making and eliminate the ‘lead agency’ dilemma” that hinders interagency cooperation.<sup>131</sup>

**Table C-4. Proposals to Create New S&R Structures**

Organization	Proposal
CWC 2011	Create a permanent office of inspector general for contingency operations (which includes S&R) to regularly assess the adequacy of agency planning and readiness for contingencies, and to exercise audit and investigative authority over all functions and across all participating agencies. The CWC does not specify where this office should be placed. (p. 147)
Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) 2010	Reassign S/CRS functions to a new, independent entity, the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO), responsible to the NSC. As proposed in a February 2010 report by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the USOCO “would become the locus for planning, funding, staffing, and managing” stabilization and reconstruction operations, “replacing the fragmented process that now exists. Importantly, it would provide a single office whose sole mission is ensuring that the United States is ready to go when the next contingency occurs; and it would provide someone to hold accountable for failures in planning and executions.” <sup>132</sup> (p. 25)
QDRIP 2010	Create a National Commission on Building the Civil Force of the Future to develop recommendations and a blueprint for increasing the capability and capacity of civilian departments and agencies to move promptly overseas and cooperate effectively with military forces in insecure (pre-conflict and post-conflict) environments. (p. x) Matters to be addressed include changes in existing statutory authorities to enhance cooperation and integration of roles and missions; the development of personnel, pay, and other policies and procedures to promote and support a more mobile, deployable, and flexible civilian workforce and the development of measures to encourage and facilitate training and exercising civilian elements with military forces. (pp. 108-109)
Smith 2010	Building on S/CRS, create a fully integrated State-USAID office, with some staffing from the military and additional civilian agencies, to exercise the lead for S&R. Consideration should be given to transferring USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to S/CRS to take over the conflict prevention function and to integrating the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives into S/CRS as the foundation of the active component of the Civilian Response Corps. (pp. 215-216, 220)
RAND 2009	Issue presidential-level guidance as the source for a coherent and consistent package of regulations and rules that create an effective new system. Develop this package in coordination with Congressional guidance regarding the definition of missions and tasks and the allocation of resources. (p. 74)

<sup>131</sup> *Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons*, pp. 25, 27. SIGIR quotes an observation of an unnamed senior NSC official: “‘lead agency’ really means *sole agency*, as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.” The report continues: “When a particularly lead agency (State, Defense, or USAID) is put in charge, departmental bias can cause certain issues to become defined as a military, diplomatic, or assistance challenge, depending on which agency is in the lead. USOCO [the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations that SIGIR proposes] would bear none of these institutional prejudices.” p. 27.

<sup>132</sup> *Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons*, p. 25. This quote continues “Currently, there is no single agency that devotes its entire mission to SROs [stabilization and reconstruction operations]. For State and Defense, they are but a small part of the departments’ larger missions.” Under this proposal, USOCO would tie DOD capacity and resources to State Department and USAID expertise “by closely linking its planning and operations with State, Defense, and USAID, bringing out the best-developed SRO aspects from each, while avoiding the ‘stovepiping’ that tends to limit departmental action. USOCO would fit between and among State, Defense, and USAID, providing the integrative ‘glue’ that SRO planning and execution currently lack.” (p. 27) The report warns that because the USOCO concept “impinges upon existing ‘turf,’” it will “draw resistance.” But, the decision on whether to pursue the proposal should be shaped by a careful analysis of whether the current departmentalized system has the genuine potential to generate an integrated approach to planning and managing SROs.” (p. 27).

Organization	Proposal
CSIS 2005	Establish an independent agency for S&R operations reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Charge it with preparing stability operations and managing a Civilian Stability Operations Corps and Reserve. Consolidate S/CRS and parts of USAID into this agency. (p. 63)
CFR 2005	Establish an Under Secretary of State for S&R, and establish a new unit within the State Department which reports to this undersecretary. Make the State Department the lead agency for all civilian efforts related to S&R and provide it with all resources and funding authority needed for executive branch S&R programs. (p. 22)

### Establish New Interagency Teams or Task Forces?

Proposals to create new agencies or other arrangements that entail new structures may well be costly, the source of a wide variety of unintended consequences, and subject to bureaucratic infighting. For those reasons, many may prefer the proposals to improve civilian coordination efforts through the tool of improved interagency teams (**Table C-5**). There are a variety of interagency teams for missions abroad and domestic matters, as noted above (**Appendix A**), but information about how they function are notably lacking.<sup>133</sup> Some may consider teams yet another “ad hoc” mechanism, providing a seeming flexibility at the cost of making the structural and capacity changes needed to create an enduring system for interagency cooperation. Some may view their prospects for success as subject to the same bureaucratic obstacles—resistance to sharing responsibilities, personnel, and resources—as the development of other new interagency structures.

**Table C-5. Proposals to Establish Interagency Teams or Task Forces**

Organization	Proposal
QDRIP 2010	Establish standing interagency teams with capabilities to plan for and exercise, in an integrated way, departmental and agency responsibilities in predefined mission scenarios before a crisis occurs. (p. ix)
PNSR 2009	Establish empowered interagency teams to delegate and unify management of national security issues and missions, starting with a small set of presidential priority-issue teams. Teams would be headed by a senior executive appointed by the president, who selects members in consultation with the national security advisor, and operating under a charter developed by the national security advisor and team leader and approved by the president. The charter would include a statement of the team’s mission and objectives, authority to direct action, control resources, and otherwise carry out its mandate, and initial resource levels, to be adjusted as necessary. The team would last until its mission was completed, but leadership and membership could change. Department and agency heads would be able to appeal team recommendations and decisions to the president, the National Security Council, or its most senior subordinate councils, on the basis of unacceptable damage to national interests. (p. 55) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 514.)

<sup>133</sup> One recent National Defense University (NDU) report on JIATFS, long and widely known as the “gold standard” for an interagency task force, offered two “likely explanations” for the lack of previous work on this unit: one, a widespread presumption that the organization could not be widely duplicated and the other the “tragedy of the commons.” “Although it is clearly in everyone’s interest to better understand the relatively few interagency successes that the national security system has produced, it is not perceived to be in any given department’s or agency’s interest to conduct or fund such work.” *Joint Interagency Task Force-South*. p. 82.

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<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
	For exceptional situations, create an Interagency Crisis Task Force to handle a crisis in a country or region that exceeds the capacity of the country team or regional-level team. To be headed by a single director, the task force would be given a clear mission, clear responsibilities, authority commensurate with responsibilities, and resources. The director would be supported by an augmented interagency staff and additional resources from national security departments and agencies. The director would report to the president through the national security advisor if the mission is large and important enough, or alternatively to the head of the task force director's respective department. For crises involving complex contingencies where a large number of U.S. military forces are present, unless directed otherwise by the president, the director would be placed in a single integrated chain of command, headed by a civilian official or military officer depending on the security situation, for all U.S. civilian and military functions during the operation. (p. 56)
Heritage 2005	Build inter-agency teams within specific geographic regions to plan and implement post-conflict operations in theater, instead of building a new bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Include combatant commands in the interagency staffs. (p. 9)
DSB 2004	To respond to a threat or crisis, the President or NSC should establish a cross-government contingency planning and integration task force reporting to the NSC to orchestrate planning and provide continued integration and coordination. The number of task forces to be operating at any one time would likely range from 2 to 10. (pp. 29-30)

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## **Improve Regional Structures and Capacity?**

A variety of proposals have called for improving regional structures and capacity, either by enhancing the current military Geographic Combatant Commands or by creating new civilian regional arrangements. Especially since 9/11, many analysts perceive that the threats to the United States emanating from non-state actors and the spill-over effects of conflict in one country to its neighbors often demand a regional policy response. Because of its robust military regional commands but relatively weak civilian regional structures, some analysts question whether the United States brings the appropriate leaders to the table for decision-making on regional issues and integrates civilian and military resources to respond effectively.

### ***Enhance the Military Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)***

Most reform at the regional level to date has focused on enhancing the GCCs.<sup>134</sup> The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), created in 2008 as a model for interagency organization as mentioned above, set the standard for civilian integration into military geographic commands. However, there has been continued work to improve the model, and about the time that command was created, RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy offered further suggestions for enhancing civilian input into GCCs, as well as other DOD units (**Table C-6**). Nonetheless, some analysts are skeptical that combatant commands will be able to attract sufficient personnel from civilian agencies to operate with the degree of interagency integration originally envisioned for AFRICOM.

The Obama Administration pledged in the QDDR to support GCCs in a number of ways: making available senior Ambassador-ranked personnel as civilian deputies in addition to existing Foreign

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<sup>134</sup> For background on the combatant command system in general and details on the GCCs, see CRS Report R42077, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert. For greater discussion of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), see CRS Report RL34003, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, by Lauren Ploch.

Policy Advisors, providing USAID high-level development advisors where appropriate, and, “consistent with personnel availability,” detailing mid to senior-level State and USAID personnel to GCCs.<sup>135</sup>

**Table C-6. Proposals to Enhance Civilian Input into U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and Other DOD Units**

Organization	Proposal
RAND/AAD 2008	<p>Create a State Department Political Advisor (POLAD) Corps. Members would engage in frequent classified email exchanges and collective meetings at least twice a year to create a shared experience and reinforce the POLAD mission. Assign POLADS not just to combatant commands, but also to subordinate commands wherever that will be useful in promoting State Department-Combatant Command cooperation. POLADs should be of sufficient rank and experience to work effectively at senior military levels and be taken seriously. At the senior commands, they should be individuals who have already held an ambassadorial post. When political (and development, i.e., USAID) officers are assigned to subordinate commands within specific countries, they should be under ambassadorial authority. (p. 27)</p> <p>Where a COCOM is likely to be engaged in operations that could require the assistance of other government agencies, e.g., USAID, the Departments of Education, Justice, or Health and Human Services, or the Drug Enforcement Administration, advisors from these agencies, comparable to a POLAD, should be sent to the command. As with the POLADs, these individuals would be managed and coordinated under ambassadorial authority. (p. 27)</p>

*Create New Civilian Regional Structures*

A few analysts advocate creating new civilian regional structures (Table C-7). Some would make the military commands subordinate to them. While none of the think tank studies surveyed for this report advanced proposals for civilian regional “command,” one study by an Air Force officer argues for new State Department-led regional-level interagency organizations.<sup>136</sup> Two experts on interagency organization propose that Chief of Mission authority be expanded to provide appropriate leadership for civilian-led interagency teams that could be used at the regional level, as well as elsewhere.

The Obama Administration, in the 2010 QDDR, states its intention to establish “regional hubs” in some embassies, creating a home base for personnel dedicated to regional programs in cross-cutting issue areas who will travel to posts throughout the region (Table C-7). This is a key reform in its plan to improve the State Department and USAID ability “to think and act regionally.”<sup>137</sup>

<sup>135</sup> QDDR, p. 54.

<sup>136</sup> Robert S. Pope, Lt. Col (USAF), *U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement*, A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010, [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope\\_10\\_AFF\\_Research\\_Paper\\_FINAL-2022.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Research_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf). This study found that (1) “only a State-led model can guarantee a non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy at the regional level,” and (2) a State-led organization (which he would organize as a regional-led “country team” reporting to the Secretary of State) would “best be able to avoid overburdening the President with regional-led interagency policy disputes.” pp. 171-172.

<sup>137</sup> QDDR, p. 53.

The QDDR states that regional hubs will offer “cost savings over deploying such experts to every bilateral mission.”<sup>138</sup> In a related action, the Administration stated it would improve regional communication among bilateral posts. It would also create a new State Department “regional forum” under the State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs, where representatives from relevant agencies would “meet regularly to coordinate regional initiatives and proposals.”<sup>139</sup>

**Table C-7. Proposals for New Civilian Regional Authorities or Structures**

Organization	Proposal
Lamb/Marks 2011	Expand Chief of Mission (COM) statutory authority to allow the President to create interagency Mission Managers, subject to Senate confirmation, to lead interagency teams responding to a crisis and, in time, to steady-state interagency missions. (See Appendix D and Table D-3.)
QDDR 2010	Designate a bilateral post in key regions as a “regional hub,” and provide appropriate staffing to support and coordinate regional initiatives. Staff would consist of Foreign Service personnel or officials from other agencies. (p. 53)
Pope 2010	Create civilian interagency regional structures to be headed by the State Department. Create a U.S. Regional Mission (USRM) for each region, to be headed by a Regional Chief of Mission (RCOM), nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and supported by robust interagency staff. The RCOM and Deputy RCOM would both be Foreign Service Officers. The RCOM would have prior experience as an ambassador or a deputy chief of mission, or as a politically-appointed ambassador. The relevant geographic combatant command would transfer parts of its staff to the RCOM, including Logistics; Plans, Policy, and Strategy; and Communications, as well as its Theater Security Cooperation Program, and its Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). (pp. 174-181)
Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009	Dissolve existing military geographic combatant commands and create in their place civilian-led interagency organizations (to be called Joint Interagency Commands or JIACOMs), with regional responsibility for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, reporting directly to the President through the NSC. Include representatives from all major Federal Government agencies, including DOD, as well as assigned joint military forces. Place highly credentialed civilians as leaders, perhaps with a four-star military deputy. Leaders would possess true directive authority over all agencies and units below the NSC, including U.S. Ambassadors and country teams. The NSC would be responsible for integrating policies among these regional entities and proposing solutions to the President for intractable resource or mission conflicts. (pp. 92-96)

## Review and Augment Civilian Personnel Authority and Capacity

Only a few studies surveyed here have explicitly recommended reviewing or increasing civilian personnel authorities and capacity. Some recommendations concerned State Department and USAID personnel (**Table C-8**), some concerned interagency personnel in general (

**Table C-9**), and some concerned the interagency civilian response corps (**Table C-10**). Nevertheless, the need for an expansion of civilian personnel involved in national security missions—especially State Department and USAID personnel—has been an implicit part of the entire interagency reform discussion. For many analysts, a primary goal is for the civilian agencies to emulate the DOD practice of hiring enough personnel to provide a “float,” i.e.,

<sup>138</sup> QDDR, p. 53.

<sup>139</sup> QDDR, p. 54.

sufficient excess capacity to allow personnel to engage periodically in interagency education and training without creating vacancies at posts.

The Obama Administration’s “Diplomacy 3.0” hiring plan to increase the number of State Department Foreign Service and Civil Service and USAID personnel is intended to provide such a float. According to a recent report, for the Foreign Service Officer corps, the State Department’s goal is a 15% float, equivalent to that of the U.S. military.<sup>140</sup>

**Table C-8. Proposals to Review or Augment Civilian Personnel at the State Department and USAID**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
Stimson/AAD 2011	Redress the under-investment in diplomacy and the consequent imbalance between defense, on one side, and diplomacy and development, on the other, by fully funding Diplomacy 3.0, the Obama Administration to increase personnel in the State Department and USAID.
Smith 2010	Reexamine the dimensions of the need for a civilian “surge” capacity, including the balance between additional full-time positions for State and USAID and a reserve cadre, to meet rapidly developing additional human resource and skill requirements. (pp. 216-271)
RAND/AAD 2008	Substantially Increase the number of nonmilitary personnel at the State Department and USAID available for the types of missions conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan and their aftermath. (The report called for an increase in State Department personnel “even beyond” the 1,100 called for in the Bush Administration’s FY2009 budget.) (p. 19)
QDR 2006	Expresses DOD support for substantially increased resources for S/CRS and for the associated proposal to establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund.
RAND/AAD 2006	Create positions for military counselors to advise the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. (p. 3)
CFR 2005	Create a new unit in the State Department to further streamline and promote public security and rule of law programs, consolidating these activities at State and providing an attendant increase in resources for the department, including international civilian police. (p. 24)

<sup>140</sup> The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, *Forging a 21<sup>st</sup>-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States through Professional Education and Training*, February 2011, pp. 23-24. According to that report, Diplomacy 3.0 proposed adding 2,700 personnel to the Foreign Service above the FY2008 year-end level (bringing the number to 14,600, including about 8,800 officers) and increasing the State Department civil service staff by 13%. USAID in 2008 announced plans to double the number of its foreign service officers by the end of FY2012, for a total of 2,400.



**Table C-9. Proposals to Augment Personnel and Other Capacity Government-wide for Interagency Missions**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDR 2010	Allocate additional resources across the government in order to significantly improve comprehensive assessments, analysis, and planning for interagency operations, as well as their execution, monitoring and evaluation. (p. 71)
RAND/AAD 2008	Create cadres of civilian personnel with specialized skills that will not be needed at all times but that need to be available on an on-call basis, or a “float.” (p. 19)
RAND/AAD 2006	Create positions for military counselors to advise the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. (p. 3)

**Table C-10. Proposals to Increase the Capacity of the Civilian Response Corps**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDRIP 2010	Review and rewrite authorities to create and expand deployable capabilities of civilian departments, agencies, and institutions (particularly State, State/USAID, Treasury, Energy, Justice, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Transportation.)
CFR 2009	Fully support efforts to build up a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) for stabilization and reconstruction missions, but at the same time review the overlap between the CRC and similar USAID expeditionary capabilities to clarify their respective roles and missions. Consider the utility of standing up a dedicated mediation support unit and a related roster of regional and functional experts that can be rapidly deployed. (pp. 24-25)

## Appendix D. Proposals to Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors

As the key locus of interagency coordination for steady state operations, the Embassy country teams under the leadership of an Ambassador (or other official delegated Chief of Mission authority) are uniquely responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. Given the great disparities that observers note in ambassadors' skills and knowledge to manage country teams and oversee the foreign assistance operations of an embassy, improving Chief of Mission (COM) capacity is crucial, according to many analysts.

For those who view the "country teams" as the key element in diplomacy and foreign assistance in most circumstances, enhancing an Ambassador's authority, capacity, and control over funding is crucial. Some perceive this step as not only vital, but as an alternative to creating new structures. Over the years, there have been far fewer proposals to augment the authority and capacity of U.S. Ambassadors than for other aspects of interagency reform, and all are relatively recent.

New or improved authority is viewed by some as but one possible step in increasing the capacity of U.S. Ambassadors to carry out their responsibility for coordinating foreign policy and foreign assistance (**Table D-1**). Other possible steps are selecting potential Ambassadors and others in line for Chief of Mission posts for interagency experience, expertise, and inclination, and providing such personnel with adequate training in interagency matters (

**Table D-2**). Some may wish for progress at standardizing the education and training of potential ambassadors, and vetting candidates for skills at interagency collaboration and coordination, before enhancing ambassadors' authority over interagency resources.

Proposals to increase COM authority over budgets related to embassy operations and over interagency personnel may be resisted by executive branch agencies. Some may question whether attention to interagency reform at the COM level is sufficient, particularly because many current problems are not bilateral, but require regional or global level attention. **Table D-3** presents a unique option to expand COM authority in order to provide COMs with the power to lead, as "mission managers," interagency functional or regional teams or task forces.

### In Focus: Authority vs. Reality

The authority provided by statutes and hierarchical position can easily be undermined by actual practices. In the case of COM authority, according to one former ambassador, "Solid backing from [the Department of] State in a difference of opinion with another agency's representatives, for example, cannot be depended upon. Messages from the department on the subject, often distributed to other agencies, sometimes dismiss legitimate concerns in an offhand manner. Similarly cables addressed to chiefs of mission, often prepared by individuals not in the proximate chain of command, do not always convey the impression that the COM's authorities or views are of particular importance. If State does not treat chief of mission as personal representatives of the president, especially in open communications, it cannot expect others to do so—or respect their authority in the interagency process."<sup>141</sup>

<sup>141</sup> Edward Peck, "Chief-of-Mission Authority: A Powerful but Underused Tool," *Foreign Service Journal*, December 2007, p. 32.

Some analysts are skeptical that new or improved authorities, structures, systems, training, or selection criteria per se will help an Ambassador overcome the pulls of agency interests and pressures on a country team if that Ambassador does not have support at appropriate times of officials in Washington. A key failing of the system, in the opinion of some analysts, can be the disregard of ambassador's authority and expertise within the State Department itself, and a lack of direct support for an ambassador's position when necessary.

The Obama Administration has announced its plans to strengthen the ability of Ambassadors and other COMS to perform their role. The State Department/USAID 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) casts Ambassadors as Chief Executive Officers or "CEOs" of multi-agency missions, not only conducting traditional diplomacy, but also leading and overseeing civilians from multiple federal agencies in other work.<sup>142</sup> The QDDR highlights the key role of country teams and Ambassadors in the conduct of foreign policy and assistance, and sets forth ways in which the Obama Administration will try to improve the knowledge and skills of COMs and their ability to lead country teams. Civilian agencies "possess some of the world's leading expertise on issues increasingly central to our diplomacy and development work,"<sup>143</sup> the QDDR states. "The United States benefits when government agencies can combine their expertise overseas as part of an integrated country strategy," when "implemented under Chief of Mission authority, and when those agencies build lasting working relationships with their foreign counterparts."<sup>144</sup>

As discussed in **Appendix B**, Secretary of State Clinton has announced that Chiefs of Mission are to play a role in integrating country-level strategic plans and budgets.

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<sup>142</sup> QDDR, pp. 28-31.

<sup>143</sup> QDDR, p. 33.

<sup>144</sup> QDDR, p. 33. Addressing Ambassadors in February 2011 at an event that the State Department billed as the "first Global Chief of Mission Conference," Secretary of State Clinton repeated the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) analogy. She told Ambassadors and other COMS that they were positioned "on the front lines of America's engagement with a fast-changing world" where they must "claim the ground of being the leaders and coordinators of U.S. Government presence in every country where you serve." She also reiterated the QDDR intent to provide educational programs for Ambassadors to broaden their knowledge of foreign assistance programs and, for non-career Ambassadors, to acquaint them with the workings of other agencies. Further, she stated that interagency experience will become a priority criteria "for choosing and training chiefs of mission and deputy chiefs of mission." To give the ambassadors clout in integrating "each agency's priorities ... into a single mission that inspires support and partnership," the Secretary also repeated the QDDR intent to give COMs the authority to contribute to a home agency's evaluation of all personnel at a post. In addition, to enhance their involvement in decisionmaking in Washington, D.C., the State Department will include Ambassadors and other COM's in senior meetings at the department via teleconference facilities.

**Table D-1. Proposals to Increase Chiefs of Mission (COM) Authority**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
PNSR 2009	Proposes new language for the President’s letter to Chiefs of Mission (COMs) to reinforce the de jure authority of 22 USC 3927 and to establish procedures to ensure that country teams are in fact true interagency teams rather than a collection of individuals pursuing independent departmental/ agency agendas. A presidential letter reinforcing the COM authorities also should be provided to each cabinet and interagency head. (p. 211) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 518.)  Proposes that each ambassador or other COM have control over the assignment, evaluation, and rewards for any official assigned to an embassy or mission staff. (p. 211) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 518.)
ACTD 2007	State Department should analyze and strengthen ambassadors’ formal authority over all executive branch resources allocated to each country. (p ii) In addition to coordinating USG resources and programs through the country team, Ambassadors should be granted discretionary funding, like the DOD Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), to address emerging needs. (p. 43)
SFRC 2007	Ambassadors, as the President’s representatives overseas, should take personal responsibility in their countries of assignment for the implementation of the President’s foreign aid strategy. (p. 6)

**Table D-2. Proposals to Increase the Capacity of Chiefs of Mission (COMs)**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
Stimson/AAD 2011	For non-career State Department officials, the Foreign Service Institute should develop a brief familiarization course on the structure and procedures of the Department, the interagency process, and Washington power relationships, and personnel-related responsibilities and the role of the country team for those going abroad.
QDDR 2010	The State Department and USAID will provide training programs to improve COM performance, with USAID providing orientation to broaden the understanding of COMS with development agendas in their portfolios regarding development and assistance priorities and processes. Non-career Ambassadors will be given extensive orientation to inform them of basic processes of not just the State Department, but other agencies as well. New processes, including more regular evaluation reviews, will be developed to ensure COM and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) skills and incentives and performance to manage missions effectively, including the interests of other agencies at their posts. (p. 30)
QDDR 2010	The State Department “will expand evaluation tools” to better assess the past performance of COMs and DCMs and the ability of candidates for DCM to work with or manage interagency missions, The Department will also consider feedback from other agencies when promoting officers to the Senior Foreign Service, selecting DCMs, and recommending officers for presidential appointment as COM. Ongoing feedback on the performance of COMs will also be requested of other agencies. (p. 30)
QDDR 2010	COM’s should be included more effectively in interagency in decision-making in Washington, D.C. To that end, COMs “will be invited to participate via secure telecommunications in Deputies Committee Meetings in Washington at the discretion of the National Security Staff” and the State Department will try to obtain secure video conference capabilities for all priority embassies. (p. 29)
PNSR 2009	Proposes direct mandatory training in team dynamics, including conflict resolution for the ambassador and each member of an embassy country team or mission staff. (p. 211) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 518.)
SFRC 2007	Provide training for Ambassadors and prospective DCMs that includes a full spectrum of foreign assistance functions undertaken by the U.S. government and the ambassador’s role in overseeing them. (pp. 5-6)

**Table D-3. Proposal to Expand COM Authority**

Organization	Proposal
Lamb/Marks 2010	Proposes Congress broaden and strengthen the COM statutory authority to allow the President to create interagency “Mission Managers” who, subject to Senate confirmation, would act as the President’s direct representative in heading interagency teams to respond to a particular crisis and who would be empowered to direct departments and agencies actions and contributions to their assigned missions. Eventually this model would be applied to “steady state” interagency missions, and to regional affairs. (p. 18)

The authors of the proposal in **Table D-3** predict that implementing it would be bureaucratically contentious, but would “facilitate clear roles and missions,” empower good leaders “to be more consistently effective,” and provide those charged with “weighty responsibilities” with “commensurate authority.”<sup>145</sup> Such an expanded COM authority could provide the President with an additional tool to use for interagency national security missions abroad. It could be used to address the gap, noted in **Appendix C**, in civilian regional authority. It could also provide an alternative to appointing “czars” or lead agencies. Some might argue that it could replace the need for revising structures and augmenting capabilities at the NSC, as it might alleviate burdens there, or at State Department or other civilian agencies. Nevertheless, as the authors note, it might be subject to bureaucratic pressures. Other analysts might argue that the proposal only adds a new layer of “ad hocery” to the national security system.

<sup>145</sup> Chief of Mission Authority as a Model. pp. 22-23.

## Appendix E. Proposals to Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms

The current interagency personnel system has few incentives, but many disincentives for U.S. civilian personnel to behave in ways that are conducive to interagency collaboration and coordination. Some civilian personnel may seek interagency missions as important and interesting work, attracted by the challenges of working under difficult conditions where innovation is required. Nevertheless, agencies do not encourage personnel to engage in interagency missions, according to many sources. Agencies generally feel that they are short on personnel for their core missions and generally do not wish to spare many people for interagency activities. Some analysts point to the difficulties that State Department Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) and the Geographic Combatant Commands have had in attracting civilian personnel from other agencies as a result of that disinclination. In addition, according to some analysts, agencies do not structure their personnel evaluation and promotion systems to provide credit for interagency work. Systems may penalize those who seek interagency operations because they have not advanced steadily up the agency's career ladder.

Compounding the problem of agency disincentives are the cultural problems that can unnecessarily complicate interagency work. The great differences between the military and civilian cultures are often noted, but there are also significant differences among civilian agencies' cultures, e.g., the perception of a fast-response operational culture within USAID compared to a slower, reflective State Department culture based upon its reporting and diplomacy functions—thus making certain agencies more suitable than others for some tasks. Others believe that the cultures can change over time, given the appropriate training and incentives for interagency missions. Meantime, some consider efforts to assist with helping personnel engaged in interagency missions to understand the cultures of other agencies an important interim step.

### **In Focus: Agency Cultures**

The differences between the DOD and State Department cultures are explored in a paper written jointly by an Army Lt. Colonel and a Foreign Service Officer, where "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus." Mars is "a hierarchical and bureaucratic institution," while Venus is "an individualistic, but bureaucratic institution" with "a hierarchical structure on paper, but ... little respect for hierarchy." The world of Martians "is painted black and white—not gray," while that of Venutians "is painted gray—very little is in black or white." "Martians like to plan—they hate surprises, and abhor disorder." They make decisions through "a formal, linear, sequential problem solving process" that leads to the selection of a plan. But Venutians "believe in intuition and psychology. Planning is anathema to most" of them. "They generally prefer a more fluid approach" that responds to events rather than the selection of one plan. Martians value uniformity and teamwork, while Venutians "intellectually believe in the importance of teamwork, but in practice, find it a difficult model to use."<sup>146</sup>

Proposals for personnel reform are intended not only to provide incentives for interagency work, but establish the shared knowledge, skills, vision and trust that some analysts argue is necessary for effective interagency performance.<sup>147</sup> Many analysts consider the 1986 "Goldwater-Nichols" Act a model for the type of fundamental reforms needed to create a productive interagency environment. In October 1986, recognizing that the inability of the four U.S. armed forces to

<sup>146</sup> Rickey L. Rife and Rosemary Hansen, "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus", (Senior Service College Fellow Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 1998), pp. 4-6.

<sup>147</sup> Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, *America's Army: A Model for Interagency Effectiveness* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. p. 107.

work together effectively was jeopardizing military operations, Congress passed the bipartisan Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433).<sup>148</sup> Among other reforms, this act created more powerful incentives for officers to broaden their experience by seeking formal education and assignments in an inter-service environment with the objective of creating a “joint” culture.

Key among the Goldwater-Nichols’ changes were a requirement for joint education and training,<sup>149</sup> safeguards to protect officers with “joint” experience to ensure they would be treated on a par with those without such experience, and a joint service requirement for promotion to general or flag officer rank.<sup>150</sup> These reforms set the basis for inter-service cooperation and the evolution of “joint” military rather than service-specific loyalties and a “joint” culture.

Some argue that Congress should provide similar legislation for civilian personnel, linking interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications and rewards (**Table E-5**, **Table E-6**), as well as mandating and providing funds for additional education and training (**Table E-7**) and interagency rotations (**Table E-8**). Congress might also provide for increases in personnel to allow civilian agencies to create such opportunities while, like the military, maintaining full strength for core missions (**Table E-4**). (A key difference between military and civilian personnel systems is the DOD excess capacity of about 10% more personnel than needed for day-to-day operations, known as the “float,” to accommodate regular periods of education and training, among other service-related needs.) Congress could similarly mandate changes in training and education systems by establishing new schools or providing funds for increased interagency coursework at others (**Table E-10**, **Table E-11**). Others propose that Congress establish a national interagency professional corps, cadres, career track (**Table E-1**) or senior executive service corps or cadre (**Table E-4**), and protect interagency personnel during political transitions (**Table E-9**).

In the area of interagency personnel reform, the Obama Administration is slowly advancing the Bush Administration’s National Security Professional Development program, which seeks to expand interagency education, training, and rotations. (Discussed below in the section on establishing a national security interagency corps, cadre, career track, or executive service, and referred to in **Table E-2**.)

Legislation currently before Congress, the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314), would expand opportunities for interagency experience.

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<sup>148</sup> The bill was introduced October 24, 1985 in the House by Representative Bill Nichols (D-AL) and a similar measure was introduced April 1986 in the Senate by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). A history of the process leading to the bill’s passage is recounted in James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002).

<sup>149</sup> More specifically, the Goldwater-Nichols Act required the creation of a professional development system for “joint specialty offices” that included joint education requirements and joint duty assignments.

<sup>150</sup> Congress subsequently mandated in related legislation a requirement that candidates for general or flag officer rank have earned a “joint specialty” designation and have served a full tour of duty in a joint assignment.

## **Establish a National Interagency Professional Corps, Cadre, Career Track, or Executive Service**

The most far-reaching recommended changes to the current personnel system involve proposals to establish a national security corps or cadre (**Table E-1**). A special corps or cadre, proponents argue, would foster the development of a group of federal employees whose loyalties are not principally to an agency or department, as has been the case until now, but to the other people and entities devoted to interagency missions. Although proponents believe that these proposals hold great promise for transforming the United States' ability to perform interagency missions, they may also be the most costly, involving the creation of new units and management structures. Depending on how the corps or cadre was structured and manned, these proposals may meet bureaucratic impediments.

Some proposals would continue efforts to build an interagency cadre based on the existing National Security Professional Development program (**Table E-2**). This program was established in 2007 by the Bush Administration under Executive Order 13434. It called for each agency with a national security function to create a program of interagency education, training and rotations for its personnel. The program soon stagnated. In its 2010 report, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) cited several reasons for that stagnation: (1) sporadic leadership to improve human capital systems, (2) a lack of authority to direct an overall program, (3) unclear roles and responsibilities, (4) no common lexicon and poor communication among programs, (5) no direct funding source, (6) no defined metrics for system evaluation, and (7) a lack of coordinated congressional oversight.<sup>151</sup> Some skeptics judge such agency-centric efforts unlikely to surmount numerous resource allocation and cultural issues.

Early in his term, President Obama directed the NSC's National Security Staff to "reinvigorate" the National Security Professional Development program. Since then, nineteen executive departments have participated in NSC-led efforts to define and draft a guiding strategy.<sup>152</sup> The long run goal, according to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), is to form a cadre of interagency professionals. As of 2011, the Obama Administration has launched a second iteration of this professional development program. This iteration is focusing on a single pilot program to enhance interagency cooperation in Emergency Management, leaving aside for the moment efforts to further develop interagency professionals for other national security matters. (Further information on Obama Administration activities can be found in CRS Report RL34565, *National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress*, by Catherine Dale, pp. 17-21.)

Related proposals call for the development of a special interagency career track within individual agencies and departments (**Table E-3**). Although participating personnel would remain with their agency or department, they would be considered "interagency" personnel available to be tasked for interagency missions. Advocates argue that as specially trained and experienced personnel, attuned to the capabilities and cultures of other agencies and the requirements of interagency missions, individuals in this career track would be effective in such missions at carrying out their roles, coordinating their activities with others, and representing their agencies. On the other hand, without the provision of an excess capacity "float," such a career track may well encounter

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<sup>151</sup> PNSR 2011, p.

<sup>152</sup> QDDR, pp. 175-176.



bureaucratic resistance, as funding personnel in that track might divert agency funding from core missions. In addition, such “interagency” personnel may be perceived as secondary citizens within their home agencies, which still are dominated by people devoted to the core functions.

A third set of proposals regards the creation of a senior executive interagency leadership cadre of personnel versed in the requirements of interagency missions (**Table E-4**). Again, the effectiveness of members of this cadre may depend not only on their interagency experience and expertise, but also their ability to maintain close relationships with their home bureaus and departments when deployed.

These proposals may all require new institutional arrangements. If personnel were to be grouped in new units formed outside existing agencies, they would require new budgets. Even if incorporated into existing agencies, the ability of such personnel to perform their tasks may well benefit from the establishment of separate budget lines, so that funds do not have to be squeezed from core functions to accomplish interagency missions.

**Table E-1. Proposals to Establish National Security Corps or Cadres**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDDR 2010	As staffing numbers increase, the State Department will expand the number of interagency detail assignments in order to build over time a cadre of personnel expert in the mechanisms and objective of other agencies. The State Department will work with other agencies to expand the number of detail assignments to State. (pp. 34-35)
PNSR 2009	Create a National Security Professional Corps and create a separate cadre of national security executives to lead interagency teams. The Corps would be an integral and separate government entity; its members would not be attached to any government department. Also form a Cadre of National Security Executives, whose members are selected for their leadership ability, expertise in statecraft, and skills in their departmental specialty. They would be available for appointments by the President to lead interagency teams. (p. 229) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 511.)

**Table E-2. Proposals to Improve the Existing Professional Development Program**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDR 2010	Fully implement the national security professional program in order to improve cross-agency training, education, and professional experience opportunities. (p. 71)
PNSR 2010	Create, over 5 to 7 years, an Integrated National Security Professional system to develop and manage a cadre of professionals highly capable of working effectively across agency and governmental boundaries on complex day-to-day and crisis challenges, building on the current Executive Order 13434 program and on existing systems. Central management would be in the hands of a new congressionally created independent board, whose chief officer is nominated by President and confirmed by the Senate, and who reports to the President. (pp iii-v) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 511.)
PNSR 2008	Strengthen the National Security Education and Training Consortium (NSETC) system established by Executive Order 13434 in order to provide a common curriculum for all national security professional and practical training for junior and middle-management personnel as well as a leadership program for selected individuals. (pp. 409-410)

**Table E-3. Proposals to Establish an Interagency Career Track**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
SFRC 2007	Create career paths that include ambassadorships for USAID professional staff and consider USAID personnel for more ambassadorships. This is particularly appropriate in countries where the major U.S. mission is economic development. Provide training for ambassadors and prospective Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCMs), particularly for those with no interagency government experience, that includes the full spectrum of foreign assistance functions undertaken by the U.S. Government and the ambassador's role in overseeing them. (pp. 5-6)
CSIS 2005	Develop a National Security Career Path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training, but would leave control over the employees, including promotions, to their home agencies. Congress should approve a 10% personnel float for key civilian agencies to enable interagency education, training, and rotations. Related to this, create a "pool" of interagency duty assignments across the government. (pp. 40-41)

**Table E-4. Proposals to Establish a Senior-Level Corps or Cadre**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
PNSR 2009	Form a Cadre of National Security Executives, whose members are selected for their leadership ability, expertise in statecraft, and skills in their departmental specialty. They would be available for appointments by the President to lead interagency teams. (p. 229) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 511.)
QDR 2006	Expresses support for the establishment of an interagency cadre of senior military and civilian professionals able to integrate and orchestrate the contributions of individual government agencies on behalf of larger national security interests. (p. 79)
U.S. Commission on National Security 2001	Establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) of executive branch senior departmental managers who would rotate among departments and receive special professional education in order to broaden their experience and develop leaders skilled at producing integrative solutions to national security policy problems. Participating departments would include Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security. (pp. xvi, 101)

## **Link Interagency Education, Training, and Experience to Job Qualifications, Opportunities, and Promotion.**

Proposals to link interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications, opportunities, and promotions (**Table E-5**, and for senior leaders specifically **Table E-6**) would be the most akin to the changes in the military personnel system mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As a result of changes initiated in 1986 under this act, soldiers, sailors, and airman remain in and retain their loyalties to their service, but enjoy opportunities for inter-service education and experience. Further, inter-service education and experience is required for their promotion to senior levels. These "joint" inter-service opportunities are widely viewed as contributing to continuing improvements in military missions.

Nevertheless, for civilian personnel, the proposals are not always accompanied by the types of structural changes that also were legislated by Goldwater-Nichols, i.e., the development of the inter-service Combatant Commands that plan, organize, and conduct all military activities and operations aside from service-specific personnel training and education. Also, given that analysts view the development of a joint service culture as still a work in progress, some may question whether such education, training, and experience opportunities are sufficient to create cohesive interagency units. Still, these practices may break down misconceptions and prejudices and help

individuals understand the capabilities and operating cultures of other agencies, facilitating interagency relations at the field level, where analysts say many problems are worked out, even if they are not likely to create new loyalties and overcome “stove-piping.”

**Table E-5. Proposals to Link Interagency Education, Training, and Experience to Job Qualifications, Opportunities, Promotions, and other Rewards**

Organization	Proposal
QDDR 2010	Make successful engagement within the interagency an integral part of an individual's career development and promotion. Encourage, and to the extent possible, expect personnel to undertake short-term detail assignments in other agencies. (pp. 34-35)
QDRIP 2010	Create a system of incentives for Executive branch personnel to work in designated “whole of government” assignments. (p. viii)
PNSR - 2009	<p>Develop an integrated approach to the management of global civilian affairs that include a new overarching personnel system of systems that would permit the continuation of specialized personnel systems but would require a common professional education program and formal interagency requirements. (p. 213)</p> <p>Require individuals appointed to serve in high-level national security positions to complete a structured orientation on the policy and operations of the national security interagency system. (p. 230)</p> <p>Use promotion requirements to create incentives for service in interagency assignments. (p. 219)</p>
Heritage 2008	Have Congress establish broad guidelines and exercise oversight of national security interagency accreditation and assignments, mandating the creation of boards that set educational requirements and accredit institutions needed to teach national security and homeland security, screen and approve individuals to attend schools, and fill interagency assignments, and certify leaders as interagency-qualified leaders. (pp. 7-8). (In the congress, establish committees in the House and Senate with narrow jurisdictions over key education, assignment, and accreditation interagency programs. (p. 8)
RAND/AAD 2008	Have Congress consider legislation to establish incentives for interagency service. Even without legislation, agencies should provide tangible incentives and rewards to officers taking part in interagency service and in deployed expeditionary activities and promotion boards should take into account such service. Congress should legislate to protect experts with interagency experience from “reshuffling during political transitions.” (pp 3, 22)
Cerami 2007	<p>Create a civilian agency training and education culture, including a formal leadership development process to explicitly link synchronized and progressive professional education, training, assignments, and promotions within a system providing opportunities to interact in diverse agency and international contexts. Among the ancillary needs cited are a formal interagency knowledge management process and the definition and development of an interagency professional ethic. Expand the Office of Personnel Management's leader development and education efforts. (pp. 562-563)</p> <p>Link interagency subject matter expertise and experience to promotion and other incentives, including advanced civil schooling opportunities. (p. 565)</p>
CSIS 2004 and 2005	Link interagency rotational assignments to “increased upward mobility” for those who participate. Provide accelerated promotion consideration for mid-level career civil servants participating in interagency rotations. (pp 40-41)

**Table E-6. Proposals for Interagency Education, Training, and Experience for Senior Leaders**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
PNSR 2009	Require individuals appointed to serve in high-level national security positions to complete a structured orientation on the policy and operations of the national security interagency system. (p. 230)
PNSR 2008	Require that candidates to Senior Executive Service, military flag ranks, and similar ranks elsewhere in government complete at least one joint or interagency rotation assignment of significant duration outside their home agency. (p. 408)  Require that an individual nominated for a Senate-confirmed national security position complete a three-week course on the national security system, leadership, and values. (p. 408)
CSIS 2004 and 2005	Make promotion to the Senior Foreign Service or the Senior Executive Service for national security related positions contingent on completing an interagency rotation. (pp 40-41)

## **Expand Opportunities, Requirements, and Incentives for Interagency Education, Training and Professional Experience**

Over the years, many analysts have viewed enhancing interagency education and training (**Table E-7**) and rotations (**Table E-8**), as basic steps to more effective interagency missions. Some also find a need to protect interagency personnel during political transitions (**Table E-9**).

**Table E-7. Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Interagency Education and Training**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDRIP 2010	Create a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop and provide a common professional national security education curriculum. (p. viii)
SIGIR 2010	Integrate and increase funding for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) training programs. (p. 17)
PNSR 2009	Strengthen education and training programs for interagency personnel by creating a comprehensive, professional education and training program with an interdisciplinary curriculum and giving high priority to preparing civilian personnel for leadership positions in the national security system, among other actions. (p. 230) ( )  Require training in team dynamics, including conflict resolution, for the ambassador and each staff member of an embassy or other diplomatic mission. (p. 211)
PNSR 2008	Strengthen the National Security Education and Training Consortium (NSETC) system established by Executive Order 13434 in order to provide a common curriculum for all national security professional and practical training for junior and middle-management personnel as well as a leadership program for selected individuals. (pp. 409-410)
RAND/AAD 2008	Resources should be made available for Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and their counterparts in other agencies with actual or potential national security responsibilities to have mid-career opportunities analogous to those now available to military officers, who typically spend up to one-third of their careers in formal education. (p. 20)

SFRC 2007	Provide training for all FSOs, including ambassadors and DCMs, to prepare them for effective interaction with the military. (pp. 5-6)
RAND/AAD 2006	Adopt legislation to groom junior government officials for leadership positions in interagency activity. (Includes officials from the State Department and other civilian agencies, as well as the U.S. military. Provide mid-career educational opportunities (like those for military officers) to State Department FSOs and their counterparts at other agencies with actual or potential national security responsibilities. (p. 3, pp. 20-21)

**Table E-8. Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Interagency Professional Experience (Rotations)**

Organization	Proposal
QDDR 2010	Increase rotational assignments to other agencies and from other agencies to State and USAID. As noted throughout the QDDR, our training must focus more on how to engage and coordinate other agencies as well as ensure their representatives are effectively integrated into a Mission’s Country Team. To foster these skills, we will increase rotational assignments to and where possible from other agencies at all levels in both State and USAID. (p. 174.)
QDRIP 2010	Establish authority for an interagency assignment exchange program for national security officials. (Under the same authority, create a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop and provide a common professional national security education curriculum. (p. viii)

**Table E-9. Proposal to Protect Interagency Personnel**

Organization	Proposal
RAND/AAD 2006	Adopt legislation to insulate experts with interagency experience from reshuffling during political transitions. Adopt legislation to groom junior government officials for leadership positions in interagency activity. (Includes officials from the State Department and other civilian agencies, as we; as the U.S. military. Provide mid-career educational opportunities (like those for military officers) to State Department FSOs and their counterparts at other agencies with actual or potential national security responsibilities. (p. 3, pp. 20-21)

## Enhance Existing or Create New Education and Training Institutions

A few organizations have championed the idea of creating entirely new education and training institutions (**Table E-10**). Others have argued for incorporating new courses and curricula into existing institutions (**Table E-11**). Several U.S. government or government-funded institutions have inaugurated or increased interagency coursework; these include the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and the National Defense University (NDU), as well as the Naval Post Graduate School, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).<sup>153</sup> Some analysts judge these offerings still

<sup>153</sup> In addition to its pre-deployment training courses, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) currently offers a course in “Interagency Effectiveness, Strategies, and Best Practices,” and interagency policy seminars for senior leaders, a course on “Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations” directed at Civilian Reserve Corps members but open to others, and two distance learning courses, “Introduction to Agency Culture,” and “Reconstruction and Stabilization Introduction.” NDU and its affiliated institutions also are offering during the FY2011-FY2012 academic year a number of courses on interagency missions and S&R operations for students there, with class sizes limited to 13-18 members. Among them, these institutions offers “Leadership in the InterAgency Process” “Working the Three D’s: Afghanistan/Pakistan and Whole of Government Assistance,” “Rebuilding Weak and Failed States: Afghanistan and Beyond,” “Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding,” “The Civil War: Reassessing War, Stabilization, (continued...) ”

insufficient and urge continued work on expanding the curriculum at all institutions. Some would also try to tap into coursework at state and private educational institutions and consider whether such institutions might be encouraged to offer comprehensive coursework to meet the full range of interagency practitioner needs.

**Table E-10. Proposals to Create New Interagency Education and Training Institutions or Mandates**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDRIP 2010	Establish authority for a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop and provide a common professional national security education curriculum. (Under the same new authority, establish an interagency assignment exchange program for national security officials, see above.) (p. viii)
Smith 2010	Explore the possibility of giving the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) the mandate to take over much of the function of training in the peace-building field. In assuming such a role, USIP should collaborate closely with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), and the National Defense University (NDU). (p. 221)
PNSR 2008	Create a National Security University with interagency leadership to develop and administer an interagency curriculum. If enhancing the current national security education and training (NSETC) system does not provide sufficient quality personnel. (p. 410)
RAND/AAD 2008	As soon as possible, a National Security College should be added to NDU. (p. 20)  Modernization of education in national security affairs might include the establishment of a National Security Academy at an educational level parallel to that of the U.S. military service academies. (p. 20)
CSIS 2004 and 2005	Create a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations. (pp. 64-65) in 2005
CSIS/AUSA 2003	Establish a U.S. Training Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations. (pp. 18-19)

(...continued)

and Reconstruction,” “Responding to State Failure and Instability,” “Seizing the Sword: The Challenge of U.S. Civilian-Military Relations,” and U.S. Civilian-Military Relations Today,” as well as courses specific to Afghanistan and Vietnam. These and other institutions also offer courses on dealing with conflict.

**Table E-11. Proposals to Enhance Existing Education and Training Programs**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Proposal</b>
QDRIP 2010	Create a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop a common national security curriculum.
PNSR 2009	Strengthen education and training programs for interagency personnel by creating a comprehensive, professional education and training program with an interdisciplinary curriculum and giving high priority to preparing civilian personnel for leadership positions in the national security system, among other actions. (p. 230)
Heritage 2008	Use existing institutions in Washington, D.C. as a base for building programs to provide interagency education, and create an education, assignment, and accreditation program for interagency professionals. (p. 7)
RAND/AAD 2008	Until a National Security College is added to the NDU complex, NDU should recruit faculty and students from different elements and disciplines in the U.S. government, significantly expand the student body, and develop appropriate interdisciplinary courses. Special emphasis needs to be placed on training military officers in relevant civilian skills and responsibilities, especially those applicable in situations when it is not possible to separate military and civilian functions. At the same time, FSI should increase the number of officers among its students from DOD and other agencies. (p. 20)  Modernization of education in national security affairs might include the establishment of a National Security Academy at an educational level parallel to that of the four service academies. (p. 20)
CFR 2005	DOD and the State Department should jointly support an interagency, integrated training program(s) at the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. (p. 12)
CSIS/AUSA 2003	Increase funding for the best of existing U.S. post-conflict reconstruction education and training programs, including programs offered by the NDU, the Naval Post-Graduate Schools, and USIP. (p. 19)

## **Author Contact Information**

Nina M. Serafino  
Specialist in International Security Affairs  
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667

Pat Towell  
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget  
ptowell@crs.loc.gov, 7-2122

Catherine Dale  
Specialist in International Security  
cdale@crs.loc.gov, 7-8983