OPINIONS OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN HOUSTON ABOUT THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN SECULARISM AND ISLAM IN TURKEY

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This study was designed to examine the opinions of Turkish immigrants living in the Houston metropolitan area about the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey. The study examined the role of the practice of religion on the opinions about the clash between secularism and Islam. A final sample consisted of 40 immigrants recruited through purposeful and snowball sampling. In-depth interviews and a survey including screening questions were conducted. The results indicated that practice of religion has a partial impact on the opinions of Turkish immigrants about the conflict between secularism and Islam. Future research should further examine if the experience of living abroad for a long period influence Turkish immigrants’ opinions about the same issue.
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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of a series of such global events as September 11, the Iraq war and the Danish cartoon crisis, the rise of radical Islam has become a widely debated issue. While the Western world is mainly concerned about the radicalization of Islam and its posing a severe challenge to civil liberties as well as democratic states all over the world, the Muslim countries are confronting the bipolarities within themselves. One of the most manifest forms of the conflict in various Muslim countries today takes place between the secular and Islamic discourses. While the secular wing of the debate is oftentimes represented by the state elites or the army, the Islamic discourse best manifests itself among religious social groups and, if given the chance, in the political parties within the state structure. Turkey, among other countries with Muslim populations, is a very special case with its secular state and the large Muslim population. In order to better understand the nature of the conflict between secular and Islamic discourses in this country, it is particularly significant to analyze the self perception of Turkish citizens on the issue of the conflict between secularism and Islam. Accordingly, the central issue for individuals in Turkey is whether they see an on-going clash between Islam and secularism. This central question, being at the heart of my study, will be discussed in the following pages in terms of the relationship between

1 The Danish cartoon crisis led to the outrage of many Muslims due to the mocking of the Prophet Mohammad. The cartoons sparked plenty of protests from Morocco to the Philippines. Crowds attacked the embassies of Denmark and other European nations in their countries. This incident was seen by many as a concrete example of the conflict between Western Europe and global Islam.
the practice of religion and opinions about the conflict between secularism and Islam.

Recent studies have discussed the historical and the current conflict between secularism and Islam very well (Çınar 2005; Davison 1998; Kushner 1997; Göle 1997). Turkish citizens’ perception of the issue has also been the subject of some articles and fieldwork (Toprak and Carkoglu 2006). I argue that there are two significant issues ignored in the current literature that need to be addressed for a better understanding of public opinions about the conflict between secularism and Islam.

The current studies do not make a distinction between the opinions of the practicing and non-practicing Muslims while analyzing their views about whether there is a conflict between secularism and Islam or if Islam is compatible with a secular state. This thesis aims to fill that gap by studying those non-practicing Muslim Turks as well as practicing Turks.

The opinions of Turks that live outside of their country as opposed to those that reside in Turkey about the conflict between secularism and Islam have been overlooked by academia in studies of secularism and Islam in Turkey as well. The population has been selected among Turks living in Turkey (Toprak and Carkoglu, 2006). For this reason, the studies on public opinion about the conflict between secularism and Islam have so far reflected the views of Turks living in the motherland. This paper aims to shed light on how Turks living in the Houston metropolitan area perceive the conflict between secularism and Islam in their country. By illustrating the case of
Turkish immigrants in Houston, I aim to explore if living abroad tends to change people’s opinions about the conflict between secularism and Islam.

Paying attention to these two common pitfalls in studies of public opinions about the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey, this study will ask those questions:

1) Does the practice of Islam have an impact on opinions of individuals about the level of the conflict between secular and religious segments of Turkish society?

2) Does the practice of religion influence individuals’ opinions on whether they see Islam as a challenge to secularism?

Overall, the goal of this research is to analyze the impact of practice of religion on opinions of Turkish immigrants living in the Houston metropolitan area about the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A Transnationalist Approach to Immigration

Much of the literature on immigrant populations has been dominated by the transnationalist approach after the application of the assimilationist framework (melting pot), cultural pluralism (beyond the melting pot), and structuralist approach respectively (Laguerre, 1998). The literature heralds the emergence of a new type of migrating population that differs from the old immigrants in that it is not easy to think of the new kind of migrating population dissociating it from its networks, activities and lifestyles that are products of both host and home societies (Schiller et al., 1992). It has been underscored that this new kind of immigration is not a one-way activity. While the old immigration theories usually deal only with host countries, the transnational approach takes home countries into account as well (Vertovec, 2007; Portes, 1997; Rogers, 1986, and Basch et al., 1994).

In recent years, the frequent use of the term transnational in quite a number of conferences and papers stirred some anxiety about theoretical ambiguity and analytical confusion in the use of the term. While some scholars start to deploy the term in their works, others were hesitant to adopt the term. In an attempt to clarify the meaning of the term, various scholars initiated to make a definition. For instance, Schiller et al. (1992) defined transnational migration as:
We have defined transnationalism as the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated transmigrants. Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relationships—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously. (p. 1)

Two things demand special attention in this definition. First is the call for the scrutiny of both home and host societies. The second is the all-encompassing nature of the transnationalist approach, which means transnationalism does not only deal with one specific dimension of immigration. Scholars who adopt a transnationalist framework to analyze the current migrant attitudes acknowledge that it is important not to overlook any of the social, cultural, and political dimensions of migrant experiences in addition to the economic dimension in order to reach a broader understanding of contemporary migration (Portes and Bach, 1985; Sassen, 1988). Those dimensions have been seen as interrelated areas. Some scholars have argued that there is an undeniably close link among globalization, world capitalism, changing technologies, and rapid and convenient transportation systems (Schiller et al., 1992).

Schiller et al., in their ground-breaking article on transnationalism, describe transnationalism as a product of world capitalism (1992, p. 8). They argue that as a consequence of deindustrialization and transition to service sector and clerical employment in developed countries, the manufacturing industries and related jobs have been exported to Third World countries. On
the other hand, the local economies of the Third World countries have been disrupted by the intrusion of transnational corporations, which led the citizens of the Third World countries to seek ways to set up businesses in the West and the U.S. usually through the help of the ethnic enclaves already settled in the host country (Schiller et al., 1992).

Another topic under transnationalism that has been frequently discussed by scholars is about the question of whether diffusion of goods and ideas from powerful nations to poor ones lead to homogenization of culture. Hannertz (1990) argues against this notion of creolization because he believes due to movements of cultural goods across nations, we have been witnessing cultural flows. As transmigrants bring some cultural goods as well as their networks from the home country with them, they bring about a kind of cultural flow from the home to the host country. Besides, the flow occurs in opposite direction when migrants bring some gifts from the host country once they pay visits to their home countries. As for the political dimension of transnational migration, Sutton and Makiesky-Barrow (1987) maintain that the fact that most migrants keep their interest and involvement in the politics of their home country through networks they build leads to a bi-directional flow of ideas.

Another important related topic on transnationalism is the flexible nature of identity politics that the transnational position triggered. Schiller et al., argues that whereas some migrants prefer to lean more toward one society than the other, the great majority of migrants embrace several identities that link them to more than one society at a time (Schiller et al.,
The authors see the identification with complex identities as a way of resistance against the political and economic challenges migrants have to confront with in any of the societies they somehow associate themselves with. Vertovec (1999), too, describes the condition of transnationalism as a refusal of fixity often serving as a valuable resource for resisting repressive local or global situations.

Transnational religious life of the individual has also been one of the highly debated issues among the scholars of transnational migration. To understand the role of religion in transnational migration, Levitt (2004) proposes to examine the ways in which ordinary individuals live their everyday religious practices across borders, and find out what kind of impact those activities have on their sending and receiving country membership. Levitt notes that widely available patterns of religious institutionalization help migrants easily engage in the host country traditions while sometimes enabling migrants to keep the religious practices they used to perform in their home society. Because the prayers in certain denominations are similar all around the world, migrants do not have difficulties participating in any church wherever they go. Castells (2000) describes those groups as a network society, decentralized, flexible yet connected networks that provide customized services and goods. He further elaborates: “Just as decentralized, adaptive modes of production are suited to meet the challenges of global economic competition, so flexible production and dissemination of religious goods may be better suited to meeting the needs of contemporary religious consumers” (2000, p. 11).
Transnational religious organizations usually provide new comers a place to stay, or a job besides the religious services they provide. This condition helps new migrants to bear with the hardships of migrant life. It should also be noted that many migrants see religious belonging as a way to protect themselves and their children from what they think as the inferior Western values while at the same time it provides them with an immediate community that share the values of migrant’s home society, which creates a secure familiar environment for migrants (Levitt, 2004).

The literature on transnational migration has addressed the political, economic, cultural and religious dimensions of migration. Scholars also talked about their concerns about the theoretical ambiguity and analytical confusion in the use of the term. As the literature has shown, the transnationalist approach is mostly applicable to the condition of the first generation migrants. The question of whether transnationalism will be applicable to second and latter generations has yet to be addressed.

As the Turkish community in Houston consists mostly of first generation immigrants, and they carry many of the features described in the literature, transnationalism is the primary theoretical orientation for this research.
Secularization and the Fate of Religion

Secularization is usually defined in the literature as “the process whereby domains of social activity and human experience previously organized around religious norms are ‘desacralized’ by their reinterpretation and reorganization in terms of ideals of a less sacral nature” (Berger, 1990; Bell, 1977; Wilson, 1982).

Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim are the most prominent figures to have expressed concern about the role of religion in modern society. As they were reacting to the economic and social upheavals of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, partly as a consequence of rapid industrialization, they did not neglect to elaborate on the role of religion on the European populations of which they were a part (Zeitlin, 2004). Marx defined religion as a form of alienation. It is a tool that disguises the exploitative relationships that exist in capitalist society. According to Marx (Zeitlin, 2004) religion serves to convince people that such exploitative relationships are just natural. Thus, Marx believes the actual causes of social distress can not be removed until the injustices of capitalist society are revealed. This disillusionment will only be possible, according to Marx, as the religious element is taken away. Furthermore, the need for religion will vanish once social conditions will change and man will have reasonable relationship with the fellow human beings and the nature (Zeitlin, 2004). In this respect, religion, to Marx, is an epiphenomenon, part of the superstructure that will not exist in the ideal society.
Max Weber somehow justifies Marx’s perspective about religion. Weber does not see a future for religion in modern society either. He believes the relationship between religion and the world tends to develop in a certain direction, which means the relationship between those two is steadily disappearing (Dillon, 2003). This disappearance will continue to the extent that the religious factor ceases to be an effective force in society, which is an inevitable result of the process known as secularization (Dillon, 2003).

Emile Durkheim, who used a functionalist approach, focused on the binding features of religion more than anything else, “Religion celebrates, and thereby reinforces the fact that people can form societies” (as cited in Beckford, 1989, p. 25). Unlike Marx and Weber, who believed in the inevitability of the end of religion, Durkheim maintained, “The religious aspects of society should be allowed to evolve alongside everything else, in order that the symbols of solidarity appropriate to the developing social order (in this case incipient industrial society) may emerge. Religion as such will always be present for it performs a necessary function” (Dillon, 2003). As it is clear, Durkheim predicts a future for religion as long as religion sustains its functional qualities of social stability, social integration and solidarity. To Durkheim, modernization brings about the progressive differentiation and specialization of social structures. Commerce and industrialization will result in division of labor which will trigger the differentiation of social institutions. The sacred canopy (Berger, 1990) of the premodern society will not serve for sometime and the collective foundation of morality and identity will be lost as well. Yet Durkheim sees this loss of religion as a temporary dysfunction of
early modernization because society cannot survive without a collective moral basis. For that reason, Durkheim expects civil religion to take religion’s role of the creation of stability and coherence (Heelas, 1998).

Talcott Parsons, perhaps the most prominent figure of 20th century American functionalism, emphasizes the integrative role of religion like Durkheim. Religion, to Parsons, is considered central to the complex models of social action and social systems. In order to develop an understanding of Parsons’ functionalist view of religion, it is important to take a look at the conditions of post-World War II America. After WW II, America experienced a settled period of industrialism in which consensus appeared possible (Dillon, 2003). In such an environment, the sociologists of the period, including Parsons, believed that social order should be based on religious orders. This optimism of the postwar period, however, came to an end due to the conflictual environment of 1960s. Yet Peter Berger, in this period, stresses the continuing significance of religion only with an inverted version of the Parsonian model. Though Parsons mentions religion among the central elements of social systems and social action, Berger sees religion as a sacred canopy that serves to give answers to the questions and concerns of believers particularly during social and personal crises (Karlenzig, 1998). In this respect, Berger challenges the secularization thesis that presupposes the decline of religion in modern society. Although Berger agrees that the secularization thesis applies almost well to the Western Europe, Islam and the United States appear to be great exceptions to the over-generalization of the
secularization thesis that suggests secularization process brings about the inevitable eroding of religion as a result of modernization.

Daniel Bell (1977) argues that religion serves no longer as the collective conscience of society as Durkheim suggested since society is disjointed. As Bell further maintains:

Religion is not an ideology, or a regulative or integrative feature of society- though in its institutional forms it has, at different times, functioned in this way. It is a constitutive aspect of human experience because it is a response to the existential predicaments which are the ricorsi (the pure form of reflection) of human culture. (p. 442)

Bell here suggests that religion exists not because it glues society together, nor to numb individuals as pornotopia has become the opium of the masses after religion. For Bell, religion, probably with changing forms and rituals, survives as long as people keep asking existential questions to themselves.

Wilson (1982) makes a relatively comprehensive definition of secularization which deserves to be quoted at length here:

The decline in the proportion of their time, energy, and resources which men devote to their empirical concerns; the decay of religious institutions; the supplanting, in matters of behavior, of religious precepts by demands that accord with strictly technical criteria; and the gradual replacement of a specifically religious consciousness by an empirical, rational, instrumental, orientation. (p. 149)

As Wilson defines secularization as the decrease in the social significance of religion, he also touches upon the decreasing significance of religious institutions. He also emphasizes the changing consciousness of individuals as a result of secularization process. Wilson argues the religious consciousness leaves its place to the rational, empirical and instrumental
consciousness. Wilson holds the Christian parties of continental Europe as an example to illustrate the weakening significance of religion claiming that those parties, by virtue of their Christianity, are no longer distinguishable from parties of any other kind. According to Wilson (1982), “Religion no longer explains the world, much less the cosmos, and its explanations of social phenomena are utterly ignored” (p. 170). In addition to religion’s failure to sustain its role to present an explanation to the world, Wilson believes religion does no longer serves as an explanation to individual concerns either. According to Wilson (1982), modern society has various means of diverting and silencing emotional expression or outburst. Wilson (1982) suggests, “The pop concert, and the pop festival are the occasions for release; the mass media of simultaneous distribution, and especially television, are the agencies by which the emotions are numbed” (p. 170). Seeing the end of the significance of religion for society as well as individual through such examples, Wilson regards secularization as an inevitable process for any modernizing society.

The British freethinker Thomas Woolston is known to put a date for modernity to triumph over religion. He assumed in his writings that Christianity would disappear by 1900 (Stark and Finke, 2000). August Comte, in France, too maintained that human society was going beyond the theological stage of social revolution as a result of modernization. (Stark and Finke, 2000). The prominent anthropologist, Anthony F.C. Wallace believed the evolutionary future of religion is extinction (as cited in Stark and Finke, 2000, p. 58). Bryan Williams is another scholar that referred to secularization as “the process
implicit in the concept of secularization concedes at once the idea of an earlier condition of life that was not secular, or that was at least much less secular than that of our own times” (as cited in Wilson, 1982, pp. 150-51).

Studies of most scholars we have mentioned so far presented us the basic assumptions of the secularization thesis. One of the basic assumptions of secularization is that as industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization increase, religiousness must decrease. In other words, modernization is a long, linear, upward curve, and the long, linear, and downward curve in religiousness is inevitable as a result of secularization that is an integral element of modernization. Another proposition of the secularization thesis is that secularization does not only bring about the disintegration of modern institutions and the decline in the social influence of religion as a result but it is also instrumental in decreasing the individual religiousness and belief. Peter Berger (as cited in Stark and Finke, 2000), long one of the most prominent advocates of the secularization thesis elaborates:

Moreover, it is implied here that the process of secularization has a subjective side as well. As there is a secularization of society and culture, so there is a secularization of consciousness. Put simply, this means that the modern West has produced an increasing number of individuals who look upon the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations. (p.60)

Another proposition of the secularization thesis is that secularization makes people immune to superstitions or any kind of spirituality. However, the climbing number of new religions and religious movements in the Eastern
Europe, and the Soviet Union as well as the U.S. and the Muslim countries has been emerging (Stark and Finke, 2000).

Still another important point about the secularization thesis is that although most secularization studies focus on Christendom, some scholars tend to apply it globally. In this sense, it is not only Christianity that is assumed to die out but also belief in supernatural forces or agencies in the world.

Despite the universalist views of Marx, Weber, Durkheim and the latter generation of secularization thesis including Berger, Bell, Wilson, and Wallace that predict the inevitable decline of religion in modern society, there occurred, finally in 1990s, a wave of scholars who avoid casting an end to religion (see Casanova, 1994; van der Veer 1994). Their studies helped heighten our appreciation of the modern world's diversity. They basically focus on the variable nature of religious change in the developing world as well as even in the West (Stark and Finke, 2000).

After long years of consensus on the irreversible demise of religion in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and some opposition to the inevitability of this situation, some scholars finally paid attention to Islam’s relationship to secularization, which perplexed many scholars. As Gellner (as cited in Heelas, 1998, p.152) aptly put it:

It is possible to disagree about the extent, homogeneity, or irreversibility of this trend [i.e., secularization]... but, by and large, it would seem reasonable to say that it is real. But there is one very real, dramatic and conspicuous exception to all this: Islam. To say that secularization prevails in Islam is not contentious. It is simply false. Islam is as strong now as it was a century ago. In some ways, it is probably much stronger.
Gellner argues modern Islam is unique among world religions in that it evolved a social organization and ideology in its ability to adapt to the changes of modern nation-building (Heelas, 1998). In other words, Gellner proposes that Islam has been able to play an efficient role in nation-building while this role has been played by ethno-nationalism in the West. Thus, Gellner underscores that we do not cast a decline for Islam as it has been able to be the constitutive element in Muslim society.

Gellner is right in his argument that Islam serves as a uniting force in some countries with Muslim populations. The Turkish case is a good example to that. Though secularism in Turkey starts off as the modernization project of Turkish Republic in the process of nation-building, it is apparent that Islam attempts to regain its role as a constitutive element due to the relative failure of secularism. Gellner points out this paradoxical situation noting that as the modern state diminishes the role of Christianity in the West, it revitalizes religion (Islam in this case) in the Muslim world. Though Gellner distinguishes Islam’s relationship to modernization as such from that of Christianity, he makes another kind of over-generalization talking about the Muslim world.

Nilüfer Göle, the prominent Turkish scholar, in an edited volume would find the Universalist assumption about the over-simplified understanding of religion’s fate as she believes, in order to understand the rising clash between secular and Islamic discourses; it is of utmost importance to elaborate on the significance and relevance of modernization theories. Modernization theories usually force us to accept the universal definitions of things that are already determined by the West and put it out there for the
use of the rest of the world. Thus, she argues, “Distancing oneself from universalistic approaches to modernization permits one to examine the subjective construction of meaning and cultural identity” (Bozdogan & Kasaba, 1997, p. 81). For this reason, she advocates the study of the contemporary Islamic movements and Islam’s relationship to secularization outside of the Eurocentric perspective. This kind of approach to modernization (i.e., the Eurocentric approach) negates time and space dimension, and the contribution and creativity of local cultures under varying degrees of influence of the West. Because such an approach suggests that modernization is closely blended with Westernization and anything outside of Western is pre-modern (Bozdogan & Kasaba, 1997; Çınar, 2005), the Western-oriented modernization approach despises the alternative modernization projects that pose a challenge to the already existing modernization project in a society. As her argument illustrates, Göle suggests that the relationship between secularization and religion does not have to follow the same linear story. Thus, she suggests that we cannot predict the demise or rise of religion beforehand just by looking at the existing relationship of religion and secularization in the West.

Gülap, in an edited volume on Turkish secularism, argues that compared to the rise of secularization in the early years of Republic, we see the rise of Islamism as a result of the “frustration of the promises of Westernist modernization and a critique of modernism” (Bozdogan & Kasaba, 1997 p. 54). As we see from this quote, it is apparent that secularization did not simply arise as a response to the pressure of the mosque or the rapid
industrialization in Turkish society. Instead, the contentious rise of Islam has been assumed to occur as a result of the failure of imposed secularist Kemalism.

According to those scholars, let alone talking about the universal demise of religion as a result of modernization, they would oppose to an over-simplifying discussion of a relationship between Islam and secularization as they believe countries with Muslim populations develop different responses to secularization. In this respect, rather than taking up a universalistic approach of looking at the relationship between Islam and secularization, it is much plausible for those scholars to talk about the Islam in a specific country and secularization or modernization process of that country.

In short, the relationship between secularism and religion appears to have been a conflictual one in literature. The researcher of this study does not claim to generalize the findings to other Muslim communities. This study has particularly focused on practicing and non-practicing Muslim Turks residing in Houston. Considering the overall declared conflict between secularism and religion in literature, this research has elaborated on opinions of individuals of a specific Muslim community. The question of the difference between opinions of practicing and non-practicing Muslim Turks on the level of conflict between the state-sponsored secularism and Islam remains to be answered. Another question that needs to be dealt with is if practice of Islam has influenced individuals’ opinions on whether they see Islam as a threat to secularism in Turkey.
HYPOTHESES

A guiding assumption in this study is that opinions of practicing Muslim Turks tend to differ from opinions of non-practicing Muslim Turks about the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey. In other words, the researcher proposes that practice of religion has a significant impact on the opinions of Turkish immigrants living in Houston about the conflict between Islam and secularism in Turkey.

H1: It is hypothesized that the non-practicing Muslim Turks are more likely than the practicing Muslim Turks to believe that Islam poses a threat to secularism in Turkey.

H2: A second hypothesis is that the non-practicing Turks are more likely than the practicing Turks to think that the level of the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey is quite high.

A religiosity index was developed to distinguish the practicing Muslim Turks from non-practicing Muslim Turks. Non-practicing Muslim Turks are expected to be more likely than practicing Turks to see Islam as a threat to the current secular regime. In addition, it was assumed that practicing Turks are more likely than non-practicing Muslim Turks to see Islam as a social phenomenon that poses no threat to secularism in Turkey. Also, it has been hypothesized that non-practicing Muslim Turks are more likely to
believe that the level of conflict between Islam and secularism in Turkey is quite high.

As most non-practicing Muslim Turks are socialized to believe that secularism is one of the indispensable pillars of Turkish Republic, they are more like to see that Islam might pose a threat to secularism. On the other hand, as religion is part of their daily lives, most practicing Muslim Turks think that Islam is a power-free social phenomenon.

Basic demographic characteristics of the respondents are studied as well. The study of the overall demographic features such as age, length of stay in the U.S., education and occupation of Turkish immigrants helps hold constant economic and social factors. Those demographic and occupational factors have shown that both practicing and non-practicing Turks share quite similar economic and social conditions in Houston. In this respect, those demographic and occupational factors do not affect attitudes towards religion and secularism for that particular immigrant community in this study.
METHODOLOGY

Data

A major source for this study was 40 in-depth interviews (conducted either in Turkish or in English) with a sample of Turkish immigrants residing in the Houston metropolitan area. In addition to the in-depth interviews, I also conducted participant observation research at a variety of religious and secular community activities and get-togethers.

A Brief Description of the Turkish Immigrant Population in Houston and Two Turkish Organizations

First generation Turkish immigrants I interviewed in Houston, by and large, were a successful group composed generally of graduate students, professional job holders, and entrepreneurs. A fairly large number, particularly women and children, came to accompany their husbands and fathers who sought economic betterment and educational opportunity. There are, of course, a considerable number of women who come on their own to get graduate education as well. Through participant observation, I discovered that most Turkish immigrants are affiliated with either of the two Turkish organizations, Raindrop Turkevi and American Turkish Association-Houston (ATA). During this research, my encounter with some of Turkish organizations located in Houston has been to highlight the significance of networks in the establishment and organization of Turkish immigrants. Plenty of studies have illustrated how networks supply immigrants with information, food, shelter,
religious services and other sources. Thus, they have been helpful in decreasing the costs involved in coming from one country to another (Portes, 1997). In addition to the activities and facilities the two Turkish organizations provide to the Turkish immigrants in Houston, I also focused on the finding that most individuals who come to live in Houston get affiliated with one of those organizations compatible with the individual’s world view s/he has developed in Turkey.

ATA-Houston and Raindrop Turkevi, two Turkish organizations that take up different discourses, serve to hold two important segments of the Turkish community together in Houston. Even the official websites of those organizations help define the distinctive features of them. ATA-Houston is a secular organization that attempts to help the recently arrived Turkish immigrants for housing, jobs, and other facilities that would reduce the hardships of a new-comer. Rather than providing jobs and other facilities, this organization guides the immigrants how to handle such initial matters of finding a place to live, or how to get a driver’s license. Besides easing the life of a recent immigrant, ATA-Houston also organizes cultural events such as the Turkish festival, folk dance performances, Turkish movie nights, ladies luncheon, and Republic Balls. It also offers Turkish classes to those willing to learn the language. Also, this organization sometimes takes initiatives and lobbies the American authorities in global politics such as the Armenian genocide issue through transnational activism. For example, they lobbied some members of the U.S. senate to show their disapproval of some senators’ support for the so-called Armenian genocide. By this way, they
represent the stance of the Turkish Republic on the issue on an international platform thanks to their presence in the U.S.

Raindrop Turkevi is another Turkish organization with distinctively religious discourse in addition to the nationalist motifs it carries. Raindrop is part of a transnational movement widely known as the Gulen Movement. Members of Raindrop or Raindrop affiliated individuals have usually been members of similar organizations located in the motherland. Actually, those other organizations similar to Raindrop located in various cities in Turkey, and the U.S. are civic organizations based on religious beliefs. In this respect, Raindrop exemplifies the institutional characteristics of transnational religiosity. Raindrop, for its individual members, becomes a place where a common vocabulary and shared set of expectations about rights and responsibilities are worked out. Members of the Gulen Movement that defines itself as an Islamic movement and devotes itself to education and the spread of the word of God through civic engagement with the humanity initiates open up those organizations wherever they go. Raindrop in Houston is not the unique organization of the Gulen movement in the U.S. There are similar organizations of the Gulen movement in some other cities of the U.S. under the same name or different. Because members of Raindrop fulfill multiple roles and participate in multiple settings, they influence the secular world, and in return, are influenced by it. Though members vary a lot, it is the school teachers and graduate students that consist of the large majority. Besides, medical doctors, housewives and constructors are welcome as well. Since it is a religiously oriented organization, Raindrop attracts individuals from different
segments of Turkish community in Houston. Because it is a ring of a larger chain of religious organizations, recently arrived Turkish immigrants are usually directed by the affiliated organization they used to be part of in their previous residential places. For instance, members who teach at the private Turkish elementary and high schools in Houston usually come from the schools opened up by the Gulen movement that operates under the Ministry of Education in Turkey.

There are some key features that facilitate the engagement of the Raindrop members into the larger American society and the Turkish community in Houston. First, the model for prayer, administration, social, cultural and religious activities in organizations of the Gulen movement are quite similar in Turkey and Houston. Thus, members know how to participate in any organization wherever they go. Members express that the principles that guide their activities are the same. For example, all members are supposed to devote time to Allah by participating in weekly meetings or an ifthar in Ramadan month (fast-breaking dinner) with Americans, Indians, the Chinese and etc. Engagement in Raindrop activities enables immigrants to adapt to the larger society for the organization arranges activities that bring Turks with other members of American society.

Part of a member’s identity in Raindrop includes thinking herself as a social change agent. The change here does not only include the change in Turkish society. It is rather a global change. Members claim they believe that believers of various faiths could come together and work for the peace of the world. This only could become possible through mutual understanding and
dialogue of members of different religious faiths. Thus, most members define their movement as a movement to serve humanity. With such opinions in mind, Raindrop like other organizations of the movement abroad fosters its members to learn the language of the society they live in. So, quite a large number of Turkish immigrants in Houston speak English even before they come to the U.S. Those who do not speak the language of the host country immediately get enrolled in a language course upon their arrival.

Despite their motivation to get integrated into the larger society, many respondents that participate in the activities of Raindrop see religious belonging as a way to protect themselves and their children from what they perceived as inferior Western values. Some parents send their kids to Saturday school to strengthen their religious education and to ensure their fluency in Turkish culture and language. On the one hand, parents say they encourage their kids to learn English very well, and make friends with kids of other nationalities to broaden their horizons. Still on the other hand, they want their children to preserve their national and religious identity.

The activities Raindrop hold can be categorized into two groups. One group of activities carries nationalistic concerns such as trips to Turkey for non-Turkish friends, the Turkish festival at which various aspects of Turkish culture are exhibited. For instance, examples of the Turkish cuisine, Turkish music and forms of art such as ebru (drawing pictures on water) are exhibited on the festival by the community members both for the Turkish immigrants that seek to feel at home and foreigners. The other set of activities include the celebration of the birthday of Prophet Mohammad, organization of Eid
prayers, whirling dervishes-dance performance, and Noah Puddings Day celebration. Raindrop also gives Turkish language courses, English conversation classes, and Turkish food cooking classes.

Individual members in this movement get the petition forms of Ebru TV (a Turkish TV channel based in New Jersey) filled out at universities they attend or during events they hold. When a group in one part of the country needs help building a prayer place, school or culture centers like Raindrop, leaders from other parts of the country go and help or raise fund for that cause. Other organizations of the movement based in Turkey could raise funds to support an organization of the movement abroad in need. Or an organization of the movement abroad could help an organization of the same movement in Turkey as well. Individual members also use their transnational activism in a political space in order to support a political cause in Turkey. They, for example, lobby the American politicians to oppose the Armenian genocide sending letters to senators or visiting them as the ATA members do.

As ATA-Houston and Raindrop Turkevi summarize in their websites, they work to build bridges between different cultures, to fulfill the cultural and social needs of the Turkish community living in Houston, to help new-comers adapt to the new immigrant life, and to provide guidance for college and graduate students in a variety of educational services (ATA-Houston; Raindrop Turkevi). Though some of the services ATA and Raindrop provide and some of the activities they organize bear similarity to some extent, the motivating force for those organizations tend to differ. While ATA-Houston serves its members with nationalistic concerns, the motivating force for
Raindrop can be explained as the religious concerns besides the nationalistic ones. In this respect, the target community of Raindrop does not only include Turkish immigrants. Many individual members of Raindrop believe that they have some good religious and cultural values they could contribute to the host society members. In this respect, they have a purposeful interaction with the members of the new society they want to engage in, which in return facilitates their integration. Even a quick look at the activities held by those organizations, except those such as Turkish movie nights, Turkish courses, and etc., give us some clue about differing discourses of those organizations. While ATA-Houston organizes Republic Balls on September 29 every year to celebrate the foundation of the secular Republic, Raindrop prefers to celebrate the birth of Prophet Mohammad commemorate the Sufi poet, Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi, or organize Eid prayers or fast-breaking dinners at which they invite their non-Muslim and non-Turkish friends as well.

The participants I interviewed in my research and most other Turkish individuals I have met during the participant observation among Turkish immigrants in Houston, I have seen that most individuals choose to get affiliated with either of the two Turkish organizations. The number of those who participate in the activities of both organizations is very limited. Likewise, the number of individuals who do not participate in either of those organizations is quite small as well. During organizations’ activities, it was clear that most of the individuals choose their friends among the fellow members of the organization they are associated with. Throughout our interviews, I did find evidence the members of Raindrop are, more or less,
pious individuals whereas ATA members are usually secular individuals. While the pious individuals that are usually members of Raindrop prefer to strengthen their ties with their fellow organization members, and the members of the host society, they tend to be hesitant in their interaction with the secular members of ATA. They do not necessarily attempt to avoid contact, but their contact with those people is that of a slow and sure activity. The same is valid for individuals at ATA. Apparently, Turkish individuals are able to sustain their religious or secular worldviews and lifestyles in Houston through ATA and Raindrop as those organizations help create similar micro secular and religious environments the first generation immigrants used to live in Turkey. In this respect, the way the secular and religious immigrants treat each other in Houston is quite similar to the larger picture in Turkish society. The existing debates and conflicts that take place between secular and religious segments of Turkish society in the motherland appear to survive in the U.S.

Dependent Variables

Dependent variables in this study are “conflictvl” (opinions on the level of the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey), and “Islamthrea” (Islam as a threat to the secular regime). “Conflictvl” is an ordinal variable: “no clash” coded as 1, “only a bit” as 2, and “quite much” as 3. “Islamthrea” is a nominal variable: “yes” coded as 1, “no” as 2, “not sure” as 3, and “DK” (do not know) as 99.
Independent Variables

The independent variables listed in Table 1 include: age, level of education, length of stay in the U.S., sex, occupational category of respondents, and religiosity index. As participants were asked for their age, level of education and length of stay in years, those variables are interval-ratio variables. Religiosity index is an ordinal variable because lower scores mean less religiosity and higher scores mean more religiosity. Occupation and “pracreli” (practice of religion) are nominal variables for categories of those variables are mutually exclusive but not ordered. Sex is another nominal variable coded as 1 for “male” and 2 for “female” otherwise. As the transnationalist approach suggests, most first generation immigrants keep the religious practices they used to perform in their home country. Those immigrants usually complete most of their formal education in their home country and they reach a certain age when they immigrate. Thus, theoretically, such demographic variables as length of stay, age, sex, level of education and occupation of respondents as well as the practice of religion needs to be included in order to develop a broader understanding of the Turkish immigrant community in Houston.
Table 1 *Descriptive Statistics for Variables about Demographic Features of Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean/Percent</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>28.23</td>
<td>5.071</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay (years)</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial and Professional</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service sector</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Assistant</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA\(^a\)= Not applicable

The interview sheet includes both open-ended and close-ended questions. The interview questions are about the current political and social issues related to the relationship between secularism and Islam currently being debated in Turkish society and media. The participants were asked about their views about each question. Then, answers of the subjects were analyzed. Because this is a comparative study of practicing and non-practicing Muslim Turks, some screening questions were asked to determine which group the subject falls into. An index of religiosity was developed to distinguish practicing Muslim Turks from non-practicing Muslim Turks based on the frequency of private religious practices, and the level of religiosity of self according to the subject. In a total of 7 questions, respondents were
asked about their religious practices. One of the questions was about how much religious the respondents see themselves. It was coded as “thinkslf” (Do you consider yourself a religious person?) The response categories for this question were coded as such: “not at all” coded as 1, “somewhat” as 2, and “very” as 3. The other 5 questions were about the practice of religion: “prayer”, “fasting”, “quran”, “halalfood”, and “alcohol” (abstaining from alcohol) whereas the last question is “religedu” (How much is respondent in favor of their kids getting religious education?). The respondent categories for all questions were coded as 1 indicating less religiosity and 3 indicating more religiosity. The scale was calculated based on scores which produced scores from 0 to 21. A new variable called “pracreli” was constructed to distinguish practicing respondents from non-practicing ones.

According to this scale, those who score nine or higher out of twenty one on practices were considered as “PRACTICING MUSLIMS”, while those who score eight or less out of twenty one were classified as “NONPRACTICING MUSLIMS”. I assume that it might be more difficult for a Muslim that lives in a country that is predominantly Christian to follow some requirements of their religion. For example, finding a mosque to perform the Friday prayer nearby their work place within the work hours, a grocery store to purchase halal meat or a tutor that would teach their kids how to read Quran may not be an easy task for a Muslim who might find it easier to pay attention to the same issues in a predominantly Muslim society. Therefore, external causes might play a deterrent role in paying attention to all of the items above. However, items such as Quran reading, fasting, and abstaining from alcohol,
which demands individual effort free from external deterrent factors will help measure the religiosity of the subjects in any way. For this reason, I believe 9 is a sufficient score to call a person religious. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was calculated to be 0.9772, which illustrates a high correlation between variables.

Data Collection Procedure

The reasons why I limited my research with Turkish immigrants in Houston metropolitan area were: First, in this way, I would be able to hold constant geographic, economic, social, and political factors. Second, Houston has been historically an attractive place for many immigrants. The city is ranked ninth on the 2002 Census list of large American cities with the highest percentages of foreign-born residents. It also has substantial populations of Turkish immigrants as well as other immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds. Also, Houston is known to host the headquarters of some Turkish American organizations such as Turkish Cultural Center (Raindrop Turkevi), The Institute of Interfaith Dialogue(IID), the American Turkish Association of Houston (ATA-Houston), Turkish American Student Association (TASA) and the Institute of International Commerce and Partnership (IICP). There is one mosque established by Turks called CITADEL, one small market which imports mainly food from Turkey and seven Turkish restaurants serving Turkish cuisine to their clients at different locations all over Houston. ATA-Houston and Raindrop Turkevi are the most influential Turkish organizations upon the lives of Turkish immigrants in
Houston. Thus, apart from the interviews and the survey I conducted, I also made participant observation attending various activities of those organizations, which enabled me to develop a broader understanding of Turkish immigrants’ opinions about the research topic.

Given that my study is basically exploratory, I formed a sample of 40 Turkish immigrants, half of whom are practicing Muslims while the other half of the sample is chosen among non-practicing Muslims. As for the sampling technique of the study, I used snowball sampling and purposeful sampling. Since at the beginning it would be difficult for me to locate my population, I used snowball sampling as my first choice of sampling techniques. In this way I got in contact with people mainly through personal contacts, as well as religious institutions, community facilities, and restaurants. I asked my first respondents to determine their successors. In this way, I reached some key informants that would fit either of “practicing Muslim” or “non practicing Muslim” categories, so that I could reach the target number of forty. Yet, this would take a great amount of time to complete the study. Purposeful sampling, in this regard, facilitated my job as I selected participants who reflected the practice/non practice criteria in the population that I intended to study. Thanks to the references given by the first interviewees, I reached people with different religious life styles in terms of their religious life.

Face to face interviews were made at various places such as the participant’s home, office or at a restaurant or café depending on the choice of the participant. The interviews were carried out either in English or Turkish
depending on the participant’s choice of language. I requested my respondents to sign consent forms at the beginning of each interview.

Data Analysis

Qualitative methods were used to analyze the findings of the participant observation and the answers of the respondents to the interview questions. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) was used to analyze the data collected. After the data collected, they were entered into a SPSS data file. Bivariate analyses were used to estimate the relationship between practice of religion and opinions of Turkish immigrants.
LIMITATIONS

The sample size is relatively small due to lack of time. For the interview questions are related to some political and social issues, the respondents’ level of education was an important criterion in the selection of the subjects. The participants were chosen among individuals that have some college education. As those individuals either work at professional jobs or graduate students occupied with their own researches, it was not easy to get in touch with a lot of individuals.
RESULTS

The overall demographic features of the respondents participated in this study were illustrated in Table 1 on page 31. Table 1 includes descriptives of age, education and length of stay of respondents in years as well the frequency distributions of gender and occupational category of all 40 respondents. Overall demographic features of Turkish immigrants in this study are more or less similar. The respondents’ average age is 28. Only a few participants are older than 30. The average year of education is around 16, which indicates the participants have at least college degrees. The average length of stay (4.33) is relatively short, which prevents us to measure the impact of length of stay in a foreign country on views of immigrants related to political and social issues in their home country. On the other hand, the relatively short length of stay of Turkish immigrants helps limit this study with first generation immigrants.

Fifty percent of respondents have been found to be earning their lives as student assistants, which shows the primary reason to come to the U.S. for the participants of this research is education. Yet it is important to note that immigrants usually choose to come to the U.S. only after they get their college education in Turkey, which has a significant implication for this research. Considering the relatively short length of stay in the U.S. and the answers given to the interview questions as well as the participant observation have shown that the first generation Turkish immigrants who came to the U.S. at
least after getting their college education tend to keep their views formed in Turkey about the political and social issues in their home country. During the participant observation, it has been found out that most Turkish immigrants choose to socialize with their politically like-minded expatriates. Briefly, the first generation Turkish immigrants tend not to change their opinions about political and social issues in their home country because they completed most of their formal education in Turkey and prefer to socialize with the like-minded Turks in the host country.

Table 2 illustrates the descriptives for “think of self” (How much religious the respondent considers himself). 40% of all respondents reported to be very religious and 25% see themselves as not religious at all whereas 35% view themselves as somewhat religious. Table 2 indicates more than half of the Turks (60%) in this research consider themselves to be at least somewhat religious.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thinkself</td>
<td>1 not at all</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 somewhat</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 very</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The bar chart for religiosity index shows that “Quran reading”, among other religious practices, is the least frequently carried out practice with an average of 1.83 by among both practicing and non-practicing Muslim Turks. The bar chart also illustrates that most Muslim Turks abstain from alcohol. In other words, “abstaining from alcohol” is the most common category with a mean above 2.33. Abstaining from alcohol is followed by fasting with an average of 2.25, indicating that fasting is the second most carried out religious practice by the participants of this research on our religiosity scale.

![Bar Chart](image)

**Figure 1:** Overall means for religious practices of 40 respondents

Twenty subjects scored below 9 whereas the rest of the respondents scored above this score in the religiosity index. According to this, there are twenty participants marked as practicing and twenty others defined as non-practicing Muslim Turks based on their scores on the religiosity index.
In addition to the findings of the survey, the close analysis of the interviews tells a lot about the differences between the opinions of practicing and non-practicing Turks. The first question on the interview is an identity question. Though the answers to that question varied, there were some similarities between the answers of non-practicing and practicing Muslim Turks. Only one person out of 20 non-practicing Muslim Turks identified herself as Turkish-Muslim stating no reason for doing so. All the other non-practicing Turks preferred to identify themselves as Turks. The reasons for choosing national identity over religious identity varied. Yet most non-practicing Turks believed national identity is a much more distinctive identity as they live in a foreign country whereas they found religious identity as an outcome of a personal choice that might be changed due to preference of individuals. Stating that religious identity is too broad to be able to define an individual that lives in a foreign country, almost all of non-practicing Turks emphasized that individuals are born into a national identity that could not be changed. Only one non-practicing respondent posed a different reasoning for his preference of Turkish identity over religious identity. This person proposed that as the national identity is the one that is recognized by the state, he chooses to identify himself as a Turk rather than a Muslim.

As for practicing Muslim Turks, six out of twenty believed that being a Muslim is a lot more important than being a Turk. Those who think as such rationalized that Islamic identity has a consolidative feature not only for the Middle-East but also for the world. One of the practicing individuals that preferred Muslim identity over the national identity stated: “As a woman who
uses hijab/ headscarf, I get easily recognized by other people that I am a Muslim. So, I choose to introduce myself as a Muslim”. Most practicing Turks, like their non-practicing fellow citizens, preferred the national identity over the religious identity giving the same reason. They thought that the national identity is a much more distinctive identity since they live in a foreign country that hosts many Muslims from different nationalities. As they do not want to associate with the Muslims of other nationalities, they first introduce themselves as Turks. One of the participants summarized the reasons why she prefers to introduce herself as a Turk:

I do not want to get directly associated with other Muslims because the word Muslim connotes some stereotypical images in non-Muslim individuals’ eyes. I use Turkish identity not that Muslim identity is less important but to distinguish myself from other Muslims.

That answer above reflects the opinions of most practicing Turks that participated in this research. Though they find Muslim identity no less important than the national identity, the fact that they try to avoid association with other Muslims shows that they believe Turkish Muslims have some better characteristics than other Muslims. Hence, they see Turkish identity as distinctive for two reasons. First, they believe, in a foreign country that has so diverse a society, the Turkish identity helps them differentiate themselves from other nationalities. In addition, the Turkish identity enables them to disassociate themselves from the rest of the Muslim world, which has been associated with so many stereotypes.

As a result both most non-practicing and practicing Muslim Turks prefer Turkish identity over Muslim identity but for some remarkably different
reasoning. While most non-practicing Turks see religious identity as a personal choice that might be changed, most practicing Turks choose to introduce themselves as Turks though they believe religious identity is at least an equally important identity for an individual.

The second question on the interview was about if the state should be the only responsible organ to provide religious education. Only two respondents stated that the state should not have a say in religious matters because it is incongruent with secularism. Yet one of them noted that the state ought to make sure a decent religious education is provided by civil organizations. The other person that thought that the state should not be responsible for religious education stated that religious education requires voluntary act. Thus, civil religious organizations and the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a state institution that mainly deals with religious affairs might offer religious education for those that feel the need for it. Otherwise, no religious education should be given at state schools. All other subjects thought that the state control over religious education is vital in order to avoid religious fanaticism. For example, one of the non-practicing Turks claimed: “The religious education offered by those civil institutions outside of state control is primitive, sectarian and leads to fanaticism”. Hence, members of various religious sects and other religious groups should be banned from providing religious education. They also agree that religious education should not be compulsory. Some non-practicing Turks also proposed that other religions must be taught at state schools as well.
Only two individuals out of twenty practicing Muslim Turks believe that the state should be the only responsible organ to provide religious education. One of those subjects proposed that so many different interpretations of religion may lead to the emergence of deviant interpretations, which may, in turn, result in religious fanaticism. Therefore, the state should be the only responsible organ to offer religious education. The other practicing person in favor of state control over religious education argues:

If the overall level of education in society is considerably high, then civil organizations might offer religious education as well. Otherwise, there needs to be a central control mechanism. In this respect, the state is the safest organ to provide religious education free from religious fanaticism.

Other practicing Turks believe that the state might provide religious education but it is not satisfactory. For this reason, civil religious organizations may be able to offer religious education as well so that individuals that want to get further religious education could find an option. Also, many practicing Muslims agree that the religious education should be optional. If the parents do not want their kids to get religious education, they may choose not to get that service for their kids. One of the practicing participants noted:

The state should keep offering religious education at schools but religious groups that represent different traditions and schools of thought within Islam, and religious organizations of other religions should also be free to offer religious education.

In short, there is no consensus even among practicing Turks about who should be responsible for the religious education in Turkey. Yet overall, both practicing and non-practicing Turks agree that the state should offer optional religious education. When it comes to other organs that may provide
religious education, the non-practicing Turks disapprove of the civil religious organizations to do this whereas the great majority of practicing Turks claim that the religious groups should be allowed to do this service for those who seeks further religious education in addition to the one given at schools.

Another question was about the controversial headscarf issue that has been debated for so long in Turkey. The participants were asked whether they favor the ban on the use of headscarf in the public sphere such as universities. The answers of non-practicing Turks are more diverse than those of practicing Turks. Two non-practicing Turks stated that they did not have a clear-cut opinion about the issue. One of those respondents argued she wanted the ban to be lifted because she thought it is an individual right to put on headscarf while at the same time she thought that the emergence of headscarf in the public sphere is incongruent with the notion of secularism. So, she believes though the ban sounds like a fascist application, she still finds herself more likely to defend the ban due to her concerns about the maintenance of secularism. The other respondent that noted she did not have a clear-cut opinion about the issue saw the problem deeply seated in the nature of the philosophies underlying the conflicting discourses in Turkey. She noted: “On the one hand, Turkish society is predominantly Muslim. On the other hand, the Turkish state is secular. The fact that secularism and Islam is incompatible is the reason that creates the problem”. She proposed that Turkey has to produce its own solution through consensus. Also, most non-practicing Turks believed that the ban should be lifted. Those individuals believed that although there might be some female individuals that wear
headscarf as a religious symbol, they believed that not the great majority put on headscarf for political reasons. They see it as an individual right and freedom of religious practices. One of those against the ban expressed that she used to favor the ban before she came to the U.S. because it might put pressure on those females that do not cover their head. However, she now believes that females who cover their head are mistreated and are exposed to unfair treatment in Turkey. Still another non-practicing Turk stated he believed that the ban should be lifted not because it is an individual right but because it leads to an increase in the number of females that cover their hair and the ban on headscarf makes female individuals more radicalized.

Four out of twenty non-practicing respondents believed that the ban should not be lifted mainly because it is used as a political symbol in Turkey. One of those in favor of the ban proposed to distinguish between headscarf and turban. He further maintained:

Headscarf is a global phenomenon put on by women of different nationalities such as Russia, Italy, Spain, Greece and even Japan. It is a traditional accessory used by women in those countries as it is the case in Turkey. However, turban is a political symbol that is not related to religion at all. Therefore, turban should be banned in the public sphere while headscarf should be allowed.

As for the opinions of the practicing Turks, there is almost a consensus that the ban on headscarf should be lifted. Most practicing Turks see the use of headscarf as an individual right and they argue the freedom of religion requires the lifting of such a ban. Many of them thought the argument about headscarf’s being a political symbol does not make sense. One practicing respondent argued that the ban leads to the radicalization of the females
covering their hair. Still another practicing participant complained that the ban leads to brain drain: “Lots of female students that choose to cover their hair have to go to either Europe or the U.S to further their education. Or, those that are not lucky to get education abroad do not get education at all solely due to the ban”. This person like some other respondents sees the ban against the principle of equal opportunity in education.

To the question about if the army should get involved in politics, all practicing Turks agreed that the army should not have a say in politics. Instead, they placed trust on the national parliament in political matters. The army has been the object of criticism regarding the lack of democratic control over the institution. The practicing Turks argued that the autonomous role played by the military in Turkish political life is regarded as a major impediment to democratic consolidation. One of the practicing Turks specifically argued against the involvement of the army in politics proposing: “The army officials get an ideological education. They do not know what is going on on the globe. Many of them do not speak a second language even. They may not be able to develop a versatile viewpoint on many issues. So, the political agenda they would put forward may not serve the good of the civilians”. Most practicing Turks also emphasized that the involvement of the army in politics is not a common practice in democratic developed countries. Thus, the Turkish army too should not go beyond its fundamental duties designated in the Constitution.

Unlike the practicing Turks, the great majority of the non-practicing Turks approved the political involvement of the army proposing the same or
slightly different reasons. Among other reasons given by non-practicing Turks about their approval for the political involvement of the army, the most common reason was that the Turkish democracy is not sophisticated enough. So, it needs to be protected by the army. One of those in favor of the autonomous army argued:

I think the army is the only organ to maintain secular and democratic system in our country *unfortunately*. I trust neither the Turkish people and nor the political parties on that. The military cures the extremities in our democracy. I wish the Turkish people were educated enough. Then, we would not need the military to guide us in political matters.

Five out of twenty non-practicing Turks stated they found the involvement of the army in politics anti-democratic because their involvement usually results in military interventions. Therefore, like the practicing Turks, some non-practicing Turks saw the army as one of the major impediments to Turkish democracy.

Though most non-practicing Turks approved the army’s involvement in Turkish politics if needed, the great majority of them did not support the April 27, 2007 military e-note that accounted for the worries of the military about the activities of the 59th government and candidacy of Abdullah Gul for the office of presidency. Some of them saw that event as an over reaction of the army. They believed that it hampered the reputation of the army in the eyes of Turkish people. Even some non-practicing Turks interpreted that particular event as a post-modern coup d’etat. One of the respondents argued the army should have collaborated with the civil society secretly because their direct interference resulted in the loss of trust in them. Only two non-practicing Turks
out of twenty supported the e-note of the military without any reservation. They told the army expressed its opinions and concerns about a specific political issue as the rectors of a couple of universities, trade union leaders, businesspersons and politicians did.

Most practicing Turks found that e-note as an anti-democratic interference of the army to the politics. Some suggested that such practices of the army cause people to lose their sympathy and trust they have placed on the army. Still some others see that particular event as a form of intimidation suggesting that the army in Turkey is intolerant of pluralism considering its past interventionist practices. Two practicing respondents found it as an untimely and groundless over reaction though they noted that they did not see it as a coup d’etat.

Upon the question of “What do you think about the religious individuals’ taking an active role in politics?”, most non-practicing Turks stated that for it is an individual right to be voted, any person regardless of their religiosity could take an active role in politics. Three non-practicing Turks noted that we need to distinguish between pious individuals and Islamist individuals. According to those respondents, Islamists should be banned from politics since they have a hidden agenda to replace the current democratic and secular system with a theocratic one. Thus, while they approve the religious individuals’ involvement in politics, they think the Islamists should not be allowed to do so. One out of twenty non-practicing participants believed that religious people should not be allowed to take part in politics at all because it is usually the less educated segments of the society that vote for religious candidates. According to that
respondent, those religious candidates seek to establish an Islamist state in the long run.

While some non-practicing Turks emphasized the need to make a distinction between religious individuals and Islamists, four of the practicing Turks told that we need to distinguish between the religious people and the religious leaders. Those that proposed to make such a distinction thought that they do not approve religious leaders’ involvement. All practicing Turks approved religious individuals’ involvement in politics arguing, like their non-practicing fellow citizens, that the right to be voted is an individual right as long as pious politicians keep their religiosity in their private life. They further argue that pious politicians like others should be judged on their merits rather than their piety. Most practicing Turks also emphasized that if the majority of people in a country are religious, then their representatives might also be pious as well.

Most non-practicing Turks disapproved the presidency of Abdullah Gul, known as leading a religious private life, suggesting that he might have a hidden agenda. Though some of those who oppose Gul’s presidency stated that they were not against religious individuals’ involvement in politics, they said they are skeptical because he is a product of an Islamist ideology. Still some of them straightforwardly noted that it is the piety of Gul that concerns them. Only three out of twenty non-practicing Turks believed that Gul must be judged based on his merits and achievements. In this respect, they told they found him pretty eligible regardless of his piety.
The practicing Turks, on the other hand, saw Abdullah Gul as a chance for Turkey. Most practicing participants believed that Gul’s presidency might be interpreted as a challenge to status quo in Turkish politics. One of the practicing Turks noted: “Our previous presidents had elite backgrounds. For the first time in Turkey, a person that has a humble background has been elected to this position, which makes us hopeful about the improvement of our democratic system”. That is, the presidency of Abdullah Gul has been interpreted by the pious people as an end to the autonomy of a certain group in Turkey.

Related to the question on the interview about the involvement of religious individuals in politics, participants were also asked on the survey whether they see Islam as a threat to secularism in Turkey. As Table 3 indicates practicing Muslim Turks tend to view Islam differently than non-practicing Muslim Turks. None of the practicing Turks believe that Islam is a threat to the secular state in Turkey compared to 25% of non-practicing Turks who do so. On the other hand, 85% of practicing Turks seem not to see Islam as a threat whereas 45% of non-practicing Turks think the same, a fairly large percentage-point difference (40%).
Table 3 **Percentage Distribution of ISLTHREA do you think islam is a threat to secularism by PRACRELI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISLTHREA Category</th>
<th>PRACRELI practice of religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-practicing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Yes</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Not sure</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 40

The great majority of non-practicing Turks believed that there has been a remarkable increase in the level of the conflict between the secular and the religious segments of Turkish society since AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to office. Though they believed that the polarization is not solely the product of the AKP rule, it has reached its peak lately. Suggesting that there is a seemingly optimistic improvement in economy of the country, one non-practicing participant stated that the AKP rule might lead to a civil war in Turkey in the long run. Some non-practicing participants maintained that the lack of efficient opposition parties that would produce wise policies alternative to those of AKP stood as part of the problem.

The practicing Turks like their non-practicing counterparts argued that the polarization between the secular and religious segments of the society has increased a lot during the AKP rule. Yet unlike the secular respondents most religious participants accused the secular segments of deepening the conflict. One of the practicing subjects argued: “AKP seeks to decrease the...
conflict but the seculars do not want to negotiate on any social and political issue”. Seeing the AKP rule as a significant change in the almost uninterrupted secular rule for so long in the history of Turkish Republic, the practicing Turks claimed that the seculars are worried because they are about to lose their privileged position.

Answers to the question about the AKP rule indicates that most practicing and non-practicing Turks agree that the polarization between the secular and religious segments of Turkish society increased a lot during the AKP rule. Pertaining to that question on the interview, the respondents were also asked during the survey about the level of the conflict between secularism and religion in Turkey. Table 4 shows the association between the practice of religion and opinions about the level of the current conflict between secularism and Islam. As Table 4 illustrates, the great majority of both practicing Turks (70%) and non-practicing Turks (60%) believe that the level of the conflict between secularism and Islam is currently quite high. That is, the percentage distributions show there is only a slight difference between the opinions of practicing and non-practicing Turks about the level of conflict between two discourses.
Another question on the interview was about the differences and similarities between Turkish secularism and the implementation of secularism in the U.S. Most non-practicing Turks proposed that the U.S. is not a secular state. Some of them believed that the domestic and the foreign policies of the American government are based on non-secular grounds. Most non-practicing Turks stated that there are great differences between the philosophies of Islam and Christianity. While Islam tends to organize both social and political life in addition to personal life, Christianity does not have such an all-encompassing claim. They further argued that as Christianity occupies only the private lives of individuals, it does not pose a threat to the state, which enables the emergence of freedom of religion. Four non-practicing respondents reported they did not have any opinion about the issue. While the seculars thought that the overall philosophy of Islam makes it incompatible with secularism, practicing Turks argued it is the authoritarian nature of...
secularism that seeks to control religion and leave only limited room for freedom of religion.

Turkish secularism seems to be interpreted by practicing Turks more as managing religion and restricting religious practices. One of the practicing Turks argued the U.S. has a secular system whereas Turkey has laicism very similar to French laicism. Another respondent noted that though the American state is much more close to the Jews and the Christians, I feel much freer to practice my own religion as a Muslim in the U.S. than I do in my own country. Still another respondent asserts:

The implementation of secularism in the U.S. is a bit more democratic than the Turkish secularism. Even though the American state does not stand in an equal distance to all religions, the state institutions ensure the democratic application of secularism. However, religion is controlled by the state in Turkey.

Still some other practicing Turks believed that the American state is not secular at all. Yet they found it quite democratic, which enables them to practice their religion. Other than those respondents that found Turkish secularism more authoritarian compared to the implementation of secularism in America, a few practicing Turks stated no opinion about the issue.

The opinions of the non-practicing and the practicing Turks about the religious communities –the Naksibendi community and the Gulen movement-differ a lot. Most non-practicing Turks opposed the religious communities because they thought those communities seek to replace the secular system with an Islamic state. One of the non-practicing respondents reported: “I’d rather describe them (religious communities) as cults not communities
because they are not mainstream movements. The leaders of those groups fall for power. The ultimate goal of those people is to change the current regime”. Another non-practicing participant stated that she did not criticize the members of those communities. She maintained that the hierarchical order those communities take up is what disturbs her. Still another person asserted that those religious groups should be disbanded by the state as they have a hidden agenda. A female respondent that has lived in the U.S. for long years stated that she had no clear-cut opinion about those groups. She told that she is not sure if they do what they do for nationalistic concerns or to carry out a hidden agenda in the long run. One person out of twenty non-practicing respondents stated positive opinions about those religious groups. She argued that particularly the Gulen movement could be resembled to a social organization that invests in education and sets up economic networks among the Anatolian middle-class whose members lead relatively humble religious lives.

The practicing Turks, on the other hand, did see neither the Naksibendi community nor the Gulen movement as challenges to the secular state. Instead, they agreed that those communities are civil society organizations loyal to the state under any condition. One member of the Gulen movement noted:

As a supporter of the Gulen movement, I think this movement backs the middle-class and the poor in the educational field. In addition, the movement sets up significant networks among the small and the middle-sized business owners. They open up hospitals, newspapers, television channels, and schools all over the world, which leads to the integration of its members with the larger society.
Still another practicing respondent proposed that we need to keep in mind that those communities should be defined first as religious communities, and then as civil society organizations.

The great majority of the non-practicing Turks thought that secularism needs to be protected from the rising Islamic threat. Most of them believed that it is the army together with the Constitution and laws that could protect secularism. Three respondents believed that education could protect secularism curing the fanaticism of Islamists. Only a few non-practicing Turks argued secularism does not need protection of any group and institution.

Some practicing respondents believed that the pious people should be protected against the authoritarian nature of Turkish secularism. Those respondents proposed that secularism needs a more democratic redefinition that fits the realities of contemporary Turkish society. Only one person out of twenty practicing Turks longed for an Islamic state whereas all other practicing Turks said that they do not want to live in an Islamic state. Instead, they told they wish to see an actual separation between the state and religion, which would set the grounds for both freedom of religion and the equal distance of the state to every single religion as well as atheism.
CONCLUSION

This study examined the impact of practice of religion on the opinions of Turkish immigrants in Houston about the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey. This study challenges the universalistic assumptions of the classical sociology of religion that proposes that as secularism prevails in a society, religion is exposed to decline. On the other hand, findings of this research presented some evidence for the discussion of new generation of sociologists who challenge the assumptions of the classical sociology of religion and secularization. As Casanova, Gellner, Gôle, and Gülalp suggested, we witness the rise of Islamism in countries with Muslim populations rather than an inevitable decline of religion. This study indicates that the prevailing claim in the works of classical sociology of religion and secularization does not seem to take place in Turkish society. Despite the 85 years of secularism experience of Turkey, the discussions of first generation Turkish immigrants have illustrated that the relationship between secularism and Islam is quite controversial, which reflects the ongoing conflict between two discourses. Particularly, the way practicing Turks attempt to organize their individual and community lives around religion even in a country they live as immigrants illustrates the increasingly significant role of religion in modern society.

One of the most striking findings of this research is that the great majority of both practicing and non-practicing Turks tend to prefer national
identity over religious identity because they find the national identity much more definitive and distinctive in such a diverse society as America. The participants’ answers to the identity question on the interview indicate that both most practicing and non-practicing Turks tend to have an essentialist view of national identity. While most of them see religious identity subject to change, they refer to national identity as an identity individuals are born into that may not be changed.

The views of respondents reflect that most non-practicing Turks tend to see the army as the guardian of the secular regime whereas practicing Turks believe involvement of the army in politics is one of the major impediments to Turkish democracy. As the army in Turkey is known to be the self-declared guardian of secularism, it is the non-practicing Turks that place trust on the army even in political crisis whereas the practicing Turks trust the national assembly.

While most non-practicing Turks believe that the headscarf is a political issue, practicing Turks see it as an individual right and freedom of religion. So, in the headscarf issue, too opinions of practicing and non-practicing Turks differ.

There are also differences between the opinions of Turkish immigrants on whether they see Islam as a threat. As it was hypothesized, the non-practicing Muslim Turks are more likely than the practicing Turks to see Islam as a threat to the current secular regime. None of the practicing Turks see Islam as a challenge to secularism whereas some of the non-practicing Turks
(25%) regard it as a challenge. Thus, the findings supported the hypothesis about the opinions about seeing Islam as a threat.

It was hypothesized that non-practicing Muslim Turks are more likely than the practicing Turks to believe that the level of conflict between Islam and secularism in Turkey is quite high. However, the analysis of the interviews illustrates that despite all these differences between opinions of practicing and non-practicing Turks, the only matter they seem to agree is that both most practicing and non-practicing Turks tend to believe that the level of conflict between secularism and Islam is quite high. In this respect, the findings of this study did not provide support for that particular hypothesis.

Future research needs to include comparative studies of the first and second generations of Turkish immigrants to find out if opinions about the relationship between secularism and Islam in Turkey change among different immigrant generations. Much comprehensive future studies might also focus on the comparison of opinions of Turkish immigrants and Turks residing in the home country.
APPENDIX A

CODEBOOK FOR VARIABLES
Variables are listed in alphabetical order. The following information is provided for each variable entered into SPSS.

- Variable name (in bold),
- Variable label;
- Numerical variable values for each variable;
- Numerical variable values for No Answer (NA) and Don’t Know (DK).

**Variables**

age:
Age of respondent at the time of interview
Values: 22 and over

education:
Highest year of school completed
Values: 15 and over

sex:
Respondent’s sex
Value Labels
1 Male
2 Female

pracrelti:
Practice of religion of respondent
Value Labels:
1 Non-practicing
2 Practicing
lenghtsta:
Length of stay of respondent in the U.S.
Values: 1 year and over

occupation:
Occupational category of respondent
Value Labels:
1 Managerial and professional specialty
2 Service
3 Student Assistant
4 Unemployed
8 NA

conFLICTlvL:
Opinions of respondent about the level of conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey
Value Labels:
1 No clash
2 Only a bit
3 Quite much

islthrea:
Do you think Islam is a threat to secularism in Turkey?
Value Labels:
1 Yes
2 No
3 Not sure
99 DK

religindex:
Respondent's religiosity index

Values: 2 to 21
APPENDIX B

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Before agreeing to participate in this research study, it is important that you read and understand the following explanation of the purpose and benefits of the study and how it will be conducted.

Title of Study: ___ “Opinions of Turkish Immigrants Living in Houston about the Conflict between Secularism and Islam in Turkey”__

Principal Investigator: ___Betul Balkan___, a graduate student in the University of North Texas (UNT) Department of ___Sociology___.

Purpose of the Study:

The purpose of this study is to inquire about the evaluations and personal opinions of the Turkish immigrants about the clash between secularism and Islam in Turkey. Participants will also be asked to make comparisons between Turkish secularism and the implementation of secularism in the US.

Study Procedures:

I will conduct interviews that will be audio-recorded for the purpose of transcription only upon the consent of the participants. Interviews will take no more than 2 to 3 hours. The subjects will be asked several questions on some current debates on the conflict between secularism and Islam in Turkey as well as their opinions about the Turkish secularism and American secularism comparatively.

Foreseeable Risks:

No foreseeable risks are involved in this study.

Benefits to the Subjects or Others:

This study is not expected to be of any direct benefit to the participant. On the other hand, the study will provide important data for the students of immigration as well as people conducting research on the topics of secularism and Islam in Turkey as it is about the opinions of Turkish immigrants in Houston about the conflict between secularism and Islam.

Procedures for Maintaining Confidentiality of Research Records:

Names of participants will not be displayed under any circumstances. Interviews will be tape-recorded only upon the consent of the participants. Subjects’ confidentiality/ anonymity will be maintained through signed consent forms.
Questions about the Study: If you have any questions about the study, you may contact _Betul Balkan_ at telephone number _713-820-1812_ or the faculty advisor, _Dr. David Williamson_, UNT Department of _Sociology_, at telephone number _940/565-2215_.

Review for the Protection of Participants: This research study has been reviewed and approved by the UNT Institutional Review Board (IRB). The UNT IRB can be contacted at (940) 565-3940 with any questions regarding the rights of research subjects.

Research Participants' Rights: Your signature below indicates that you have read or have had read to you all of the above and that you confirm all of the following:

- **Betul Balkan** has explained the study to you and answered all of your questions. You have been told the possible benefits and the potential risks and/or discomforts of the study.
- You understand that you do not have to take part in this study, and your refusal to participate or your decision to withdraw will involve no penalty or loss of rights or benefits. The study personnel may choose to stop your participation at any time.
- You understand why the study is being conducted and how it will be performed.
- You understand your rights as a research participant and you voluntarily consent to participate in this study.
- You have been told you will receive a copy of this form.

__________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant

__________________________________________  Signature of Participant

For the Principal Investigator: I certify that I have reviewed the contents of this form with the participant signing above. I have explained the possible benefits and the potential risks and/or discomforts of the study. It is my opinion that the participant understood the explanation.
APPENDIX C
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Part A:

1. How long have you been living in the United States? ______ (in years)

2. Age of respondent ______

3. Gender of respondent
   1 Male
   2 Female

4. What is your highest degree of education? Where was it obtained and in what field?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where Obtained</th>
<th>Field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 High school diploma</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Some university education</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Graduate Degree</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. What is your occupation?
   ____________________________________________________________

Part B: Items related to the practice of religion:

6. Do you consider yourself a religious person?
   1 Not at all
   2 Somewhat
   3 Very

7. How often do you perform the daily prayers (five times a day)?
1. Never
2. Sometimes
3. Always

8. How often do you fast during Ramadan month?
   1. Never
   2. Sometimes
   3. Always

9. How often do you read Quran?
   1. Never
   2. Sometimes
   3. Quite often

10. Do you abstain from alcohol?
    1. Not at all
    2. Sometimes (on religious days)
    3. Always

11. Do you prefer to eat halal food?
    1. Never
    2. Sometimes
    3. Always

12. How much are you in favor of your kids getting religious education?
    1. Not at all
    2. Somewhat
    3. Quite much
APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1) How would you identify or describe yourself? Why?

2) What do you think about the state being the only means of providing religious education as it is the case in Turkey right now? Who else could be eligible to provide religious education in the country?

3) Do you think the ban on headscarves in some public places (e.g., universities) in Turkey should be lifted? Why?

4) What do you think about the role of the military in terms of the initiatives it takes on related to domestic political issues in Turkey?

5) Do you think Abdullah Gul could represent the office of presidency well? Why or why not?

6) What do you think about AKP’s coming to office for a second time successively? Considering, for example, their policies in such fields as economics, relations with the EU and the U.S.A, their position on the Kurdish problem, as well as their approach to issues of secularism and Islam, do you think the AKP government is an advantage or a disadvantage for the country?

7) Do you support April 27, 2007 military e-note that accounted for the worries of the military about the activities of the 59th government and candidacy of Abdullah Gul for the office of presidency? Why?
8) In your opinion, which one describes Islam best in the current situation in Turkey?

__Islam is a political tool (as a tool to replace the current regime).
How?

__Islam is an indispensable cultural component of Turkish culture. How so?

__Other (describe) _________________________________

9) What do you think about the involvement of individuals with religious background in politics?

10) Which one of the following describes you best?

a) Secular

b) Religious

c) Liberal

d) Other (describe) _________________________________

11) Do you see any major differences between American secularism and Turkish secularism?

__ Yes (Please specify) _________________________________

__ No (Please specify) _________________________________
12) What do you think about the large religious communities such as Naksibendi and Gulen? Do you think they operate as civil society organizations or communities with hidden agendas to replace the secular Republic with an Islamic one?

13) Does secularism need to be protected?

   ___ Yes (If so, which institutions in Turkey would you describe as the protectors of secularism?) ____________________________

   ___ No
REFERENCES


