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Traditional histories of the Texas frontier overlook a crucial component: efforts to defend Texas against Indians would have been far less successful without the contributions of Indian allies. The government of Texas tended to use smaller, nomadic bands such as the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas as military allies. Immigrant Indian tribes such as the Shawnee and Delaware were employed primarily as scouts and interpreters. Texas, as a result of the terms of her annexation, retained a more control over Indian policy than other states. Texas also had a larger unsettled frontier region than other states. This necessitated the use of Indian allies in fighting and negotiating with hostile Indians, as well as scouting for Ranger and Army expeditions.
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by

William C. Yancey
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PROLOGUE

Texas has a history of frontier warfare as long and as storied as that of any other state in the union. Many Texans are taught about their historical icons from the time they are able to sit still and listen. The Texas Rangers of the nineteenth century are still revered by many as heroes whose vigilance and bravery protected frontier farmers and ranchers from vicious attacks by Indians and Mexican bandits, although in recent years, this interpretation of Texas history has come under attack. Unfortunately, only part of the story has been told. Conspicuously absent from the historiography of the Texas frontier is a scholarly analysis of the contributions made by Indian tribes who allied themselves with Anglo-Texans. The motivations of Indians who allied themselves with Anglo Texas have not yet been fully explored. Indeed, it might come as a surprise to some students of Texas history to learn that any Indians would ally themselves with Anglo-Texans; yet these Indian allies were absolutely crucial in helping Anglos to settle the frontier. Not only did Indians such as the Lipan Apaches, Tonkawas, Delawares and Shawnees give valuable service as scouts, they proved to be fierce fighters and influenced the evolution of Ranger tactics in the same way that the Colt revolver did.¹ Without these Indian allies, settlement of the Texas frontier would have been more costly in both material and human lives, and would have taken a much longer time.

¹ The use of the Colt revolver is generally regarded by historians as the reason for the most significant evolution in Ranger tactics and ability. This paper’s contention is that the tactics learned from friendly Indians are equally as important. For more information on the Colt revolver see Frederick Wilkins, The Legend Begins: The Texas Rangers, 1823-1845 (Austin, Texas: State House Press, 1996), 175-199. See also Robert M. Utley, Lone Star Justice: The First Century of the Texas Rangers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10-12.
Histories of the Texas Indian Wars began to appear shortly after the expulsion of the Comanches from the state at the close of the Red River War in 1875. In 1889, John Wesley Wilbarger, a Methodist minister, published *Indian Depredations in Texas*. This book was the first of what is referred to as the triumphalist genre of frontier history. It presents Texas settlers as invariably virtuous and Indians as either lazy, childlike people or wicked savages. Perhaps Wilbarger’s perspective was colored by the fact that his brother had been scalped by Comanches and lived eleven painful years before succumbing to his wounds. Wilbarger briefly discusses some of Texas’s Indian allies. He describes Placido and his Tonkawas as “the ever faithful friend of the whites.” While praising Flacco and Castro of the Lipan Apaches for their service to Texas, he describes the Lipan Apaches as being “unreliable deceitful and treacherous.” Similar in their approach were John Henry Brown and James T. DeShields. The works of these three men represented the dominant historical view of the Indian wars until well into the twentieth century.¹

The common theme among all of the works mentioned to this point is that they portrayed Indians as little more than stereotyped villains or marginal figures. These works seem to give the impression that Indians lived somewhere in the hinterland, occasionally rode over the horizon to plunder and pillage or occasionally trade, and then

returned from whence they came, seemingly to lie dormant until the next contact with Anglos.

In the twentieth century, professional historians began to write more documented accounts of the Texas Indian Wars. The first serious scholarly work on the nineteenth-century Texas Rangers was Walter Prescott Webb’s *The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense*. Webb’s work, while definitely biased towards the Texans, was at least well-documented and researched. Although Webb’s accounts of Indian allies did not contain the patronizing tone that characterized earlier works, they were little more than narrative, containing little analysis of the motives and contributions that impelled these friendly Indians to cooperate with the Anglos.³

During the latter part of the twentieth century, Indian history began to transform from these Anglocentric accounts into works that focused on the culture, politics, and societies of the Indian nations themselves. Books such as W. W. Newcomb’s *The Indians of Texas* and Elizabeth John’s *Storms Brewed in Other Men’s Worlds* influenced a generation of scholars in Indian history. Although not specifically dealing with frontier Indian wars (the former is a largely anthropological work while the latter deals with Indians during the period of Spanish and French colonization), the approach that these authors took, that of making the Indians the central figures and divorcing their actions from strictly Anglo concerns, was taken up by historians who did write Anglo-Texas frontier history.⁴

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By the 1990’s Texas frontier history was dichotomized into two distinct approaches: more traditional Anglocentric history which focused on the Texas military and their attempts to subdue hostile Indians, and an Indian-centered approach which focused on the motives and actions of the Indians viewed as distinct from Anglo motives. Of the first category, Fred Wilkins’s three-volume history of the Texas Rangers and Robert M. Utley’s *Lone Star Justice* have been the most prominent examples. Both of these works, while focusing on The Texas Rangers, are more sympathetic to Indians than previous works focusing on the Texas frontier from an Anglo perspective have been. Both provide narrative accounts of the contributions of Indian allies, although with little or no analysis.  

Historians of Indians during this time period approached the subject from a variety of perspectives. The book representing a complete break with the traditional approach to the history of Texas Indian wars is Gary Clayton Anderson’s *The Conquest of Texas*. Anderson views the Texas military forces as a group of bloodthirsty, Indian-hating reprobates and portrays the government of Texas (both as a Republic and a State) as actively involved in ethnic cleansing. He asserts that a desire for plunder was a chief motivation for men to enlist as Texas Rangers and that the government of Texas actively worked toward ridding Texas of all Indians. Anderson rarely mentions the Indian allies of Texas and when he does, he is rather dismissive of their motives. In

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5 Wilkins, Legend Begins; Robert M. Utley, *Lone Star Justice*.
The Conquest of Texas he states, “The Lipan Apaches, like their ranger brethren, rode for booty and revenge.”

A more balanced approach is found in F. Todd Smith’s From Dominance to Disappearance. In this book, which focuses on Indians rather than Anglos, Smith includes several accounts of friendly Indians and their alliance with the Anglo-Texans. However, the focus of Smith’s book is on the larger context of Indian decline in the near southwest, a focus that does not allow him to spend much time discussing the particulars of Texas’s relationship and motives towards her Indian allies.

Therefore, there is still a gap in the historiography of Anglo-Indian relations on the Texas frontier. The purpose of this work is to show the impact Texas’s Indian allies had on the wars that took place with the Comanches and other hostile Indians during the nineteenth century. This work will discuss the level of cooperation between Texas and her Indian allies as well as the results of that cooperation. The contribution of these friendly Indians on the tactics of the Texas Rangers will also be placed in historical context and fully examined. It is time to give these warriors their proper place in Texas history.

Anglos settlers began to categorize Indians as soon as the former appeared in Texas. They soon learned which Indian groups were amenable to trade, which groups were skilled in tracking and diplomacy, which groups were excellent wartime allies, and which Indian nations were implacable foes. After winning independence from Mexico,

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7 F. Todd Smith, From Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and the Near Southwest, 1786-1859 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).
the government of the Republic of Texas consistently dealt with the Indian nations among them by relating to them in one of the following ways: as trackers, scouts, interpreters or diplomats; military allies; or military enemies. These designations were not rigid; it was possible for a group of Indians to begin in one category and move into another. For example, the Lipan Apaches began as military allies of the Republic of Texas but by the mid-1840’s half of the nation had moved to Mexico and become enemies of Texas. By the time Texas became one of the United States, the Lipan Apaches were considered dangerous enough by Texas Rangers to shoot on sight. Conversely, Indian groups who had been hostile could move into one of the allied categories as well. Several of the Wichita and Caddo bands who had been very hostile to Texas settlers during the period of the Republic were important allies during Texas Ranger Captain John S. “Rip” Ford’s successful expedition against the Kotsoteka Comanches on the Canadian River in 1858. Occasionally, Indians would move from one of these designations to another and then back again. The Penateka Comanches were foes of Texas from before independence but during 1849, Buffalo Hump’s band served as trackers and scouts for Major Robert S. Neighbor’s expedition which was seeking to open a road from San Antonio to El Paso. This relationship did not last very long, however, as by the early 1850’s, this same band was raiding Texas settlements near San Antonio, and in the Medina and Nueces Valleys.

By 1859, all of the Indians had been removed from Texas with the exception of the Alabama-Coushattas in Polk County, the Tiguas in the El Paso area, and a small band of Tonkawas on the northwestern frontier. The Tonkawas that were removed in 1859 returned in 1863 following an attack on them by Wichitas, Caddos and
Comanches. The government of Texas provided for these people until 1867 when they were turned over to the United States Army. The federal government’s assumption of responsibility for the Tonkawas ended Texas’ relationship with the last of her Indian allies.

This paper will show that far from seeking to exterminate Indians or engage in a policy of genocide, the government of Texas, both as a republic and as a state, sought to deal with the complex conditions of the frontier in the most logical way they could. They worked with the Indians they could work with, and fought with the ones they could not. This does not suggest that racism was not a dominant force in the psyches of nineteenth century Texans. This does not suggest that Texans were not land-hungry and determined to expand at the expense of the Indians. It does, however, suggest, that the government of Texas was not engaged in a policy of ethnic cleansing as purported by Gary Anderson.
CHAPTER 1
THE LIPAN APACHE AND TONKAWA INDIAN ALLIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF TEXAS, 1836 – 1845

During Sam Houston’s first term as president, the Republic of Texas took steps to secure the aid and cooperation of the native Indians. Two groups of Indians in particular became military allies of the Republic of Texas and proved to be instrumental in subduing the hostile Indians. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to assert that the aid rendered by these two tribes, the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas, made possible the settlement of the Texas frontier. Both groups played a significant role in Texas’s wars with the Comanches and Kiowas, specifically in teaching Texas’s military forces how to locate and fight nomadic Indians. This alliance with Anglos was a fragile one and was never a partnership of equals; Anglo-Texans always remained the stronger party. However, aligning themselves with Anglos proved to be beneficial for the Lipans and Tonkawas in that it allowed them to maintain a place of importance for longer than they probably otherwise would have.

The Lipan Apaches were one of the first groups of Indians to ally themselves with Anglo settlers in Texas. The Apaches belong to the Athapaskan language family, which scholars believe originated in western Canada. Eventually, these Athapaskans moved south and split into several distinct groups. By the seventeenth century, the Apaches themselves had split into several groups. Some inhabited the mountains of New Mexico while the Lipans, the easternmost group of Apaches, had moved into the Texas Panhandle. They were the first Indians in the southwest to acquire horses and quickly
came to dominate the southern plains, sitting astride an important trade route between the Pueblo towns of New Mexico and the Caddoan groups of East Texas.¹

During the middle part of the eighteenth century, the Lipan Apaches began to be pressured by the Comanches and Wichitas. The Comanches were a Shoshonean people originally inhabiting the Rocky Mountains of Wyoming. After acquiring horses, they gradually migrated south, following the buffalo herds. The Wichitas were a Caddoan people who farmed but also hunted buffalo. Their southward migration was a result of the aggressive Osages to the north. The Spanish referred to the Comanches, Wichitas, and Caddos as Norteños or Northerners. In addition to hunting the southern buffalo plains, the Norteños were also anxious to control this trade network and push the Apaches out.²

As the Lipan Apaches were driven farther south, they began to raid Spanish settlements and attack missions and presidios. Eventually, the pressure from the Norteños grew so great that the Lipans asked the Spanish for missions to protect them. This experiment was a disaster; few Apaches came to the mission the Spanish established on the San Saba River near present-day Menard. The Spanish not only failed to gain anything of value from an Apache alliance, they made enemies of the Norteños as well. In 1758 a large force of Norteños attacked this mission and killed several priests. In order to make peace with the Comanches and Wichitas, Spain, by


² Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 205-206; La Vere, Texas Indians, 137-139;
the 1770’s, adopted an anti-Apache Indian policy. They allied with the Nortenos in an attempt to exterminate the Lipans in Texas. By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the Lipans had been driven south of the Nueces River, although a few bands still resided in the Hill Country along the Medina and Guadalupe Rivers. 3

Although the Tonkawas had been in Texas long before the Anglos as well, their origins were far different from those of the Lipan Apaches. They were the product of ethnogenesis, a mixture of Great Tonkawas, Mayeyes, Yojuanes, Yrvipiames and other Indian bands that occupied central Texas. Tracing the linguistic origins of the Tonkawas is more difficult than identifying the linguistic roots of Apache, primarily because the Tonkawa language is virtually extinct. However, scholars believe its root stock is Algonkian. Scholars also believe that the Tonkawas occupied the Cross Timbers region of Texas as early as 500 A.D. These tribes were crowded into central Texas by pressure from the Comanches and Wichitas to the north, and the Lipan Apaches and Spanish to the south and west. At one time they actually allied with the Comanches and Wichitas and lived farther north. It is believed that Tonkawa warriors were among the Nortenos who attacked the San Saba mission in 1758. Since that time, however, they had been driven south by the Comanches and eventually allied with the Lipan Apaches, who they often accompanied on raids. During the late eighteenth century, an Apache named El Mocho actually became chief of the Tonkawas until he was assassinated by the Spanish. By the time Stephen F. Austin planted a colony of

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3 Jeffrey D. Carlisle, “Spanish Relations with the Apache Nations East of the Rio Grande” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Texas, 2001), 4; Schilz, Lipan Apaches, 21; La Vere, Texas Indians, 139-146.
Anglo-Americans along the Gulf Coastal Plain in 1821, Tonkawas were living in central Texas, north and west of the Anglo settlements.4

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, neither the Lipan Apaches nor the Tonkawas were in good favor with the Spanish government. The Tonkawas at this point had established several rancherias between the Brazos and Guadalupe Rivers. Denied access to the buffalo plains by the Comanches and denied access to trade goods by the Spanish, they survived by raiding Spanish settlements and missions. Originally, the two main Tonkawa chiefs, Cuernitos and Arocha, cooperated with the Spanish in recovering their stolen cattle. However, the heavy-handed tactics used by the Spanish in their dealings with the Tonkawas caused the latter to become hostile. Soon, the Tonkawas, like their Lipan allies, were actively attacking Spanish missions and settlements.5

Given this history with the Spanish government, it is not surprising that the Lipans and Tonkawas would seize the first opportunity to acquire powerful allies. These came in the form of American traders. By the late eighteenth century, American filibusterers were coming in to Texas in order to participate in the Plains horse trade. After the United States acquired Louisiana in 1803, this activity increased. The Tonkawas had first made contact with American traders during the late eighteenth


5 Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 73-74;
century. By the second decade of the nineteenth century, American traders had become an indispensable component of the Lipan and Tonkawa economies.6

Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821 did little to improve relations between the Lipans and the government in Mexico City. The arrival of Anglo-American colonists in Texas later that year proved to be a more stable alliance for the Lipans. The Anglos, led by empresario Stephen F. Austin, had many trade goods that the Lipans needed. The Lipans, in order to buy these goods, raided ranches in Mexico for horses to trade to the Anglos. Although Mexico denied Austin a patent to open a trading house with the Lipans, the Anglos carried on a brisk surreptitious trade with the Indians anyway. In addition, the Anglo colonies were also being raided by the Lipans’ old enemies, the Wichitas. The situation was ripe for an alliance between the two groups.7

The Tonkawas as well quickly established friendly relationships with Austin and his colony. Tonkawa chief Carita developed a personal friendship with Austin that paid dividends for the Tonkawas in 1822. After a Waco attack on a Tonkawa settlement claimed the lives of thirty women and children, Austin’s militia joined their allies in attacking the offending Wacos on the Trinity River, killing forty warriors in the process. Carita’s Tonkawas returned the favor later that same year by joining an expedition led by Abner Kuykendall against the Karankawas. Although relations with the Anglos were not always good, both groups had mutual enemies and military cooperation was beneficial to both parties.8


7 Ibid., 138-39; Schilz, *Lipan Apaches*, 40-44.

8 Schilz, *History of the Tonkawa*, 140.
To modern readers, the idea of a military alliance between Anglos and Indians may seem foreign. Why would any Indian tribe ally themselves with the land-hungry, treaty-breaking Americans? Of course, students of history have the benefit of knowing the outcome of Indian relations with Anglo settlers. For the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas in the 1820s, friendship and cooperation with Austin’s colonists was a diplomatic and economic godsend. First of all, an alliance with the Anglos gave these Indians access to trade goods they so desperately needed. Secondly, the Lipans and Tonkawas saw an opportunity to restore a balance of power on the plains. For the past century they had been slowly driven south under the continued onslaught of warfare with the more powerful Comanches and Wichitas. The Norteño alliance with Spain only increased this pressure. With the Spanish no longer in charge, and with a minimal Mexican military presence in Texas, the Lipans and Tonkawas finally had an opportunity to form an alliance of their own and regain access to their old hunting grounds and trade routes. The desire to exact revenge on the Comanches and Wichitas that had killed so many of their tribesmen and driven them from the buffalo plains was another strong factor.

In any event, the alliance with Austin’s colony was beneficial to the Lipans and Tonkawas or they would not have stayed allied with the Anglos for as long as they did. These Indians were well aware of the politics of the southern plains and acted in a manner consistent with their self-interest. The situation was also beneficial for the Anglos. Although many of Austin’s colonists were recent arrivals from the southeastern

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United States, and many of them had experience in fighting Indians, Comanches and Wichitas were unlike any Indians they had ever dealt with. These Indians did not live in towns and they were difficult to catch after a raid. Having nomadic allies made good sense.\textsuperscript{10}

As early as 1825, Austin considered the Lipans “friends and brothers of the American [sic] settlers of this province,” in issuing a passport for Lipan chief Huan Novale. In 1829, Lipans led by a chief named Flacco Colonel, along with some Tonkawas and Cherokees, joined Austin’s militia led by Kuykendall in another campaign against the Wacos and Tawakonis, two Wichita bands. They attacked a force of the latter at a place called Wood’s Prairie. The Americans dismounted and fired their rifles while their Indian allies ran down the Tawakonis who tried to flee. The same force later overran a Waco camp on the San Saba. In 1832, a Mexican force under Manuel Barragan was joined by militia from Bexar and Monclova as well as Austin’s colonists and Lipan and Tonkawa warriors in a campaign against Comanche horse thieves. This force attacked a Comanche camp on the Llano, and the Lipans and Tonkawas took fifty horses.\textsuperscript{11}

By the time the Texas Revolution began in 1835, the Anglos already had over a decade of friendly relations and cooperation with the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas. Although there is no record of Lipan or Tonkawa cooperation with the Texans during the fighting with Mexico, they certainly did not take advantage of the situation and attack the

\textsuperscript{10} Schilz, \textit{History of the Tonkawa}, 141-42.

\textsuperscript{11} Copy of Passport from Stephen F. Austin to Huan Novale, January 15, 1825, in Dorman H. Winfrey and James H. Day, \textit{The Indian Papers of Texas and the Southwest}, 5 vols., (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1995), I, 1, hereafter cited as \textit{Texas Indian Papers}; Schilz, \textit{Lipan Apaches}, 44.
Anglos. More than likely, they were cautiously awaiting the outcome of the war rather than potentially picking the wrong side and incurring the wrath of the victor. After the Revolution ended in 1836, President Sam Houston sought to continue those relations with not only the Lipans and Tonkawas, but with other Indians of Texas as well. Houston made peace overtures and was able to make treaties with the Lipans, Tonkawas, Keechis, Wacos, Tawakonis, Taovayas, and Comanches. However, all of these tribes except the Lipans and Tonkawas quickly resumed raiding the Texas settlements. The Comanches were alarmed by the number of Anglo settlers that continued to pour into their territory and were displeased with the refusal of Texas officials to establish a boundary line between Anglo and Comanche land. The Lipans and Tonkawas would have been desirous of maintaining the balance of power. The presence of these Anglos in Texas gave these tribes a powerful ally against their Comanche and Wichita enemies. The Anglos not only provided them with weapons and other trade goods, but helped them fight their adversaries as well. In short, the interests of the Texans coincided with that of the Lipans and Tonkawas during this time period.12

The Republic of Texas certainly realized the value of these Indian allies. Although most of the treaty signed with the Lipans at Live Oak Point on January 8, 1838, dealt with the topics of trade, friendship, and ingress and egress, Article Six included specific language that made it clear that the Texans were interested in continuing a military alliance. It stated the following:

It is further agreed by the contracting parties that the persons and property of any of the Lipan shall be secure and not be disturbed by any of the Citizens of the Republic while they may be passing through any part of the same in a peacefull [sic] manner, and the persons and property of the Citizens of the Republic and all other Anglos.

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other persons and their property at peace with this Republic, or such other persons and their property who may be invited to this Republic by its policy or authorities shall not be molested nor disturbed by any of the Lipan while passing through any part of this Republic, excepting such Indian tribes as the Lipan may be at open war with [italics added].

This language suggests that the Republic of Texas expected the Lipan Apaches to be at open war with other Indian tribes and that such conflict would take place within the boundaries of the Republic of Texas. The Comanches had already raided frontier settlements and taken captives, a practice which horrified Anglo-Texans. Through this treaty, the Republic was making it known that although the Lipans were not to make war on or raid Anglo or Tejano settlements, they were expected to fight Comanches. Unlike the relationship the Republic of Texas had with the immigrant Indians in East Texas, whom they used primarily as scouts, the language of this treaty makes it clear that the Lipans were to be military allies, actively involved in making war on the Comanches and Wichitas. Again, such an agreement was in the best interest of both parties, although it was disingenuous on the part of the Houston administration, since they were urging peace with the Indians at the same time they were encouraging Lipans and Tonkawas to war with them. ¹³

The Tonkawas had also signed a peace treaty with the Republic of Texas, on November 22, 1837. Like the Lipans’ treaty, the Tonkawas’ dealt with ingress and regress, trade, called for the Tonkawas to refrain from raiding Texas settlements, and promised to punish any Texan who committed crimes against the Tonkawas. The next

¹³ Treaty between Texas and Lipan Indians, January 8, 1838, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, I, 31-32; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 161-162; Randolph B. Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 166.
April, Tonkawa chiefs Campos, O’Quinn, and Placido, who had become the principal chief upon the death of Carita in 1826, traveled to Houston, where they signed another treaty and received $116 worth of goods. Notably absent from these proceedings was Tonkawa chief Sandia. His band lived far to the west of the others and refused to stop raiding settlements. The Republic of Texas put pressure on Placido to get Sandia to stop raiding. Eventually, after becoming frustrated with attempts to explain to Anglos that he had no control over Sandia’s band, Placido convinced his erstwhile tribesman to cooperate by giving him gifts.¹⁴

Why would the Republic of Texas, so shortly after winning independence from Mexico on the field of battle, be so eager to maintain the friendship and services of the dwindling remnants of these once powerful people? The answer lies in an examination of early Ranger and militia campaigns against the Comanches. In the spring of 1837, a Ranger company commanded by Micah Andrews and including Noah Smithwick was stationed at a small fort on Walnut Creek, near present-day Austin. After spotting a Comanche campfire on the hills one night, fifteen Rangers under the command of Lieutenant Nicholas Wren volunteered to go after them. They got lost and failed to find the Comanche camp, although they did stumble upon the Comanche horse herd. The next morning the Comanches recovered their horse herd after the Rangers failed to post a guard. President Houston later relieved Lieutenant Wren from duty.¹⁵


Another example that illustrates the inexperience of early Ranger expeditions was recorded by George B. Erath. Erath was a member of a Ranger force commanded by Lieutenant Stilman Curtis that operated between the Brazos and Colorado Rivers. In January of 1837, the Rangers discovered a trail of Indians heading toward the settlements and moved to intercept them. They discovered the Comanche camp and opened fire. Although initially successful, they were quickly flanked by the Comanches and took some casualties, including one Ranger killed and hacked to pieces. Erath led a flanking party which was almost cut off. In the end, the Rangers were lucky to get away.16

The above incidents suggest that the Anglos had not yet become adept in fighting mounted, mobile Plains Indians. The initial problem in this type of warfare was finding the enemy. The Comanches did not dwell in permanent towns like the Indians in the United States did. Comanche raiding parties used the element of surprise to hit quickly and then disappear. Since the Anglos were not skilled in fighting this type of enemy, they needed military allies who were.17

The first recorded instance of a joint military campaign between Rangers and their Indian allies occurred during the early part of 1839. In January, Lipan scouts


17 Although mounted volunteers under Henry Wax Karnes were successful in locating and attacking a Comanche camp in 1837, Karnes had lived among the Comanches for a period of time and understood how they fought. Other captains had to rely on Indian allies. For a full account of Karnes’s campaigns see Stephen L. Moore, *Savage Frontier Volume II, 1838-1839: Rangers, Riflemen, and Indian Wars in Texas* (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2006), 18-19, 323-36.
reported a large body of Comanches camped on the San Gabriel River in present Burnet County. A force was quickly organized consisting of Captain Noah Smithwick’s Bastrop Rangers, Captain William Eastland’s LaGrange Rangers, forty-two Lipans led by Cuelgas de Castro, and twelve Tonkawas led by Placido. The Lipans were actually mustered into state service and Castro was designated Captain. No records survive for the Tonkawas, but they were presumably treated the same way.\(^{18}\)

The Lipans eventually tracked the Comanches to an area close to the confluence of the San Saba and Colorado Rivers. On the morning of February 15, the Rangers were in place to attack the Comanche camp. Castro’s son, Juan Castro, and thirty Lipan warriors were to stampede the Comanche *caballado*.\(^{19}\) The remaining Lipans and Tonkawas were placed in the center of the battle line. At daylight, the Texans and their Indian allies attacked. Juan Castro and his men quickly stampeded the Comanches’ horses while the main body overran the Comanche camp. However, after the initial success, Moore, perhaps realizing that he was badly outnumbered, ordered a retreat. This gave the Comanches a chance to regroup and counterattack. Castro, Flacco and the Indian allies were in the process of dispatching some Comanche warriors when they had to retreat as well due to heavy enemy fire. Flacco had just killed a Comanche with his lance and was about to take his scalp when he had to retreat. Lipan Lieutenant Juan Seis then expressed a desire to retrieve the scalp but he was not allowed to

\(^{18}\) Noah Smithwick, *Evolution of a State*, 154-55; for another account of this battle including a muster roll, see Moore, *Savage Frontier II*, 158-168.

\(^{19}\) A *caballado* is a Spanish term for horse herd. Many of the primary sources prefer this term, hence its usage here.
advance, since doing so would prevent the rest of the force from firing on the enemy for fear of hitting him.  

At this point, according to Smithwick, Castro was so disgusted by Moore’s handling of the battle that he took many of his Lipans and left the field. He also asserts that Castro verbally upbraided Moore before leaving, saying that retreating when the enemy was on the run was unheard of. In any event, Castro and most of his Lipans were out of the battle at this point. The Comanches made two attempts to dislodge the Texans from the ravine they occupied. They then sent a woman and some warriors under a white flag to parley with the Rangers. They claimed to have several Anglo prisoners who they wanted to trade for Comanche prisoners taken by the Lipans. Juan Seis acted as spokesman and interpreter and lied to the Comanches. He told them that the Texans had not lost a single man wounded during the entire fight. Apparently, the Comanches believed him and did not desire to continue the battle since they had lost their chief, Quinaseico, in the initial assault.

The Texans would not have been able to exchange prisoners anyway because, according to Moore’s official report, the Lipans had killed the Comanche prisoners they took. Another unpleasant surprise awaited the Rangers when they went to retrieve their horses. While Juan Castro and his Lipans were busy running off the Comanches’ horses, the Comanches had apparently stolen the Texans’ horses as well. Since the Lipans had already left with the ninety-three horses and mules they took from the

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Comanches, the Rangers were forced to walk home. Eventually they met up with Castro, who gave them forty-six of the captured horses.\textsuperscript{22}

This campaign reveals several things about the importance of the Indian allies to the success of Ranger operations against the Comanches. First, if not for the Lipans, it is doubtful that Moore and his men would have found the Comanches. Previous Ranger expeditions made before the alliance with the Lipans and Tonkawas show that Anglos had a difficult time locating mobile Indians who did not live in stationary or semi-stationary villages. Second, this incident demonstrated that the Lipans were only willing to fight with Anglos who were aggressive and decisive. Retreating in the middle of a successful assault was not the way an Apache warrior fought battles. Had Moore managed to regroup his men in the Comanche camp and had them reload while the Lipans were advancing, the outcome of this battle would probably have been more favorable to the Texans and their Indian allies. It is certainly probable that Cuelgas de Castro thought so because the Lipans did not participate in another campaign with the Anglos until 1840.\textsuperscript{23}

Eventually, Moore would learn from this incident and his next campaign against the Comanches would be more successful. For the time being, Moore’s tone in his official report to the War Department was anything but complimentary to his Indian allies. Apart from mentioning their help in tracking the enemy, his only other mention of them is negative. He stated that they killed their prisoners without advice from the Rangers, and that they only turned over forty-six of the ninety-three horses they took.


from the Comanches. Furthermore, while he commended Captain Eastland, Lieutenants Dawson and Bain, and Adjutant Bugg, there was no commendation for the bravery and prowess of the Lipans and Tonkawas.⁴

Although the Lipans waited a year before participating in any more expeditions with the Rangers, Tonkawa scouts were active during 1839. In March a group of thirty warriors under Campos were involved in an expedition led by Ben and Henry McCulloch of Gonzales. The Tonkawas and Rangers (there were only five of the latter) tracked a war party of Wacos to Peach Creek in present Bastrop County and attacked them, killing ten. They collected several scalps and severed the Wacos' arms, probably in preparation for the ritual cannibalism practiced by the Tonkawas. McCulloch rewarded his Tonkawa allies with salt, guns and horses.⁵

After this expedition with the McCullochs, Placido’s Tonkawas attached themselves to General Edward Burleson. They often camped on his farm near Bastrop and served as scouts and warriors on several campaigns that he led, including, in August of 1839, the Cherokee War in East Texas. In December of 1839, Burleson was ordered by Secretary of War Albert Sidney Johnston to take the Frontier Regiment of the Texas Army and conduct a punitive campaign against the Comanches on the northwestern frontier. Burleson’s force consisted of four companies of infantry, a company of Rangers under Matthew Caldwell, Cuelgas de Castro’s Lipans, and Placido’s Tonkawas. In mid-December Burleson’s command began to move from the Austin area towards the upper Colorado River. On December 23, near the confluence

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⁴ Moore to Johnston in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, I, 57-59.
⁵ Wilbarger, Indian Depredations, 367-371; Schilz, Tonkawas, 160-61.
of the San Saba and Colorado Rivers in present San Saba County, Caldwell’s Rangers and Castro’s Lipans discovered fresh Indian sign. By Christmas Eve, they had found the Indian camp, now determined to be a group of Cherokees under The Egg and John Bowles, survivors of the Cherokee War, heading for Mexico, twelve miles distant on the west bank of the Colorado. A brisk fight ensued in which both The Egg and John Bowles were killed and twenty-four women and children captured. One Tonkawa was wounded in the action and Burleson praised his Indian allies, writing, “The Lipan and Tonkawa Indians have also performed their duty with fidelity as scouts, and with bravery in the field.”

However, their most valuable service came as a result of the Council House Fight in March of 1840. Twelve chiefs of the Penateka Comanches had come to San Antonio for a council. They brought a captive named Matilda Lockhart who reported that she was badly mistreated and that the Comanches had many more captives. After the Comanche chief Muguara declared that they brought the only captive they had, the Texans locked the doors, intending to hold the chiefs hostage until the rest of the captives were brought in. A fight ensued which resulted in the deaths of several Anglo soldiers and thirty-two Comanche warriors and twelve chiefs. After this incident in San Antonio, the Comanches returned to the plains to regroup. The frontier initially remained relatively quiet until the summer of 1840. In July of that year, a Tonkawa

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scout named Antonio led a group of nineteen Rangers under Captain J.R. Cunningham up the Frio River to look for Comanches. Antonio and four men were detailed to stampede the Comanches’ caballado. They were successful in this, and on one of the mules found a bag containing several hundred silver dollars.\(^{27}\)

In retaliation for the Council House Fight, in August of 1840 a Comanche war party of about six hundred warriors skirted the western edge of the settlements and descended on Victoria. After rounding up a huge herd of horses and mules, they continued on to the coast, sacking the town of Linnville, a point of entry on Matagorda Bay, killing some of the surprised citizens who were unable to escape into the bay in boats, and looting warehouses. By this point, the Anglos were aware of their presence and several volunteer companies had begun to form under Ben McCulloch, Adam Zumwalt, Matthew Caldwell, and Edward Burleson, among others. These volunteers decided to intercept the Comanches on Plum Creek, southeast of present-day Austin in Caldwell County. Accompanying Burleson’s men were Placido and thirteen Tonkawas who ran the thirty-odd miles from Burleson’s home near Bastrop to Plum Creek. Placido’s warriors, wearing white arm bands to distinguish themselves from the enemy, soon acquired mounts and participated in the running battle that ensued after the Comanche line was broken. The Texans and Tonkawas inflicted heavy losses on the Comanches at Plum Creek, with several accounts mentioning the solid performance of the Tonkawas.\(^{28}\)


In October of 1840, John H. Moore led his LaGrange Volunteers onto the plains near the headwaters of the Colorado River in present Mitchell County. Whatever differences he had with Castro must have been addressed because the Lipan chief and his warriors accompanied him. Again, they proved valuable in locating the Comanche camp. It seems that Moore must have learned from his previous encounter; this time he posted a guard to protect the Rangers’ horses. Again, the Lipans stampeded the Comanche caballado, but this time Moore pressed the attack vigorously and the result was a rout. Over one hundred Comanche warriors were shot and thirty-four women and children were captured. Over five hundred horses were captured as well.29

From these incidents it is easy to see a progression in the tactics and abilities of the Texas Rangers and mounted volunteers. The earliest battles with Comanches were characterized by bad decisions, inability to locate the enemy, and a complete misunderstanding of how to fight the plains warriors. By late 1840, the Rangers were inflicting devastating blows on the Comanches in their own country and had adapted their tactics to meet those of their foes. It is almost inconceivable to assume that this progression in tactical ability was just a coincidence. The influence of the Lipans and Tonkawas on the Texans’ ability to locate and fight the Comanches is clear.

At this point the alliance with the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas had been beneficial for Texas. Just how beneficial was it for the Indians? Evidence suggests that the arrangement was mutually beneficial for all parties. When Anglo colonization of Texas began during the 1820’s, the Lipans and Tonkawas acquired a new trading

29 Telegraph and Texas Register, November 14, 1840, Houston; Wilkins, Legend Begins, 86-87; Utley, Lone Star Justice, 33; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 176; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 24.
partner. Their alliance with the Republic of Texas proved to be beneficial because they had steady access to goods they desperately needed. By 1840 the Republic had furnished the Lipans with over $2,500 worth of goods, a fact that also demonstrates the importance the Republic placed on these warriors. The Tonkawas benefited greatly from their association with Edward Burleson. Again, the alliance was never a partnership of equals and there were some difficulties. For example, in 1822, after some Tonkawas stole cattle from the Anglos, Stephen F. Austin went to the Indians’ camp and had the offenders whipped, forcing Carita to apply half of the lashes himself. While such harsh treatment emphasized the fact that the Anglos were the dominant partner in the relationship, the Lipans and Tonkawas certainly realized the benefits or they would not have remained allied.30

In early March of 1840, several depredations were committed in the Austin area which were blamed on the Tonkawas. President Mirabeau Lamar had his Adjutant General Hugh McLeod write to Burleson, instructing him to “bring the tribe here [Austin] as soon as possible.” Despite his reputation as an Indian hater (a mostly deserved reputation), Lamar certainly understood the importance of having Placido’s Tonkawas as allies, writing that he hoped that “there may be some excuse for the Tonkaways [sic], whose enmity would be greatly injurious to us. . . .” While Burleson and the Tonkawas were en route to the capital, more depredations were committed, proving their innocence.31

30 Gregg Cantrell, *Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 139.

31 Draft on the Government to McHugh and Geraghty, January 8, 1838, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, I, 32; Drafts on the Government during
In addition to the economic benefits of cooperation with the Anglos, the Lipans and Tonkawas also acquired powerful allies in their continuing war against the Comanches. After a period of adjustment, the Anglos soon learned effective tactics from their Indian allies and began to attack Comanches on the plains where they lived. Texas independence also gave the Lipans and Tonkawas allies against Mexico. Cuelgas de Castro evidently harbored strong feelings against Mexico, telling Secretary of War Robert A. Irion that he vowed “eternal hatred to the Mexicans and friendship for the Texians.” The downside, of course, was the increasing number of Anglos immigrating to Texas. This seemingly never-ending Anglo expansion would soon threaten the Lipans and Tonkawas. In 1840, however, the alliance was working well for both sides.32

In 1841, the Tonkawas and Lipan Apaches were again in the field alongside their Ranger allies. In January, over one hundred Lipans and Tonkawas joined a force of 125 Rangers under George Erath in pursuit of some immigrant Indians in the vicinity of the Trinity River near present Arlington. They failed to locate any hostile Indians and saw no fighting.33 A few months later, however, the Lipans saw considerable action with a Ranger commander with whom they would later be identified, John C. Hays.

March, 1838, in ibid., 33-42; Hugh McLeod to Edward Burleson, March 7, 1840, Edward Burleson Papers, Texas Collection, Baylor University, Waco, TX (quotations); Jenkins and Kesselus, Edward Burleson, 227.

32 R. A. Irion to Sam Houston, March 14, 1838, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, 44.

33 Erath, Memoirs, 51; Wilkins, Legend Begins, 91.
In April, Hays led a force of thirty-five men into the Hill Country, finding a small Comanche camp at Uvalde Canyon in present Uvalde County. The Rangers quickly dispatched this band of only twelve (killing ten and taking two prisoners), and returned to San Antonio to recruit more men before going back to find the main Comanche camp. At this point Flacco and ten Lipans joined the expedition. Hays and his men followed the Comanches' trail into the hills and were spotted by Comanche buffalo hunters. Knowing that he had to move quickly because the hunters would soon alert the main Comanche camp, Hays took twenty-five men with good horses, including Young Flacco (Flacco Colonel’s son) and presumably the rest of the Lipans, and made a forced march. After riding about eight miles, they came upon the Comanche camp.34

The Comanches placed about one hundred warriors between the advancing Rangers and their women and baggage. The Rangers and Lipans opened fire while Hays and Flacco rode closer to the front in order to better gauge the Comanches’ strength. At this point, Hays’s horse became spooked and bolted through the Comanches. Flacco, who thought Hays was making a charge and did not want to be outdone, followed suit. They both managed to ride through the Comanches and worked their way around their flank to rejoin the rest of the Rangers. It was this incident which prompted Flacco to declare that Captain Jack, as the Indians called him, was “bravo too

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much.” By the time they rejoined the rest of the Rangers and Lipans, the battle was in full swing and the Comanches soon retreated.35

The Lipans, especially Flacco, liked to fight with Hays because he fought Comanches the way they did. However, they remained active in campaigns with other commanders as well. In May of 1841, a volunteer company under Mark B. Lewis was actively patrolling the region near the headwaters of the San Saba in present Schleicher County. Again, Lipan Apache scouts were instrumental in locating the Comanches and fighting them as well. This led to several running battles in which three Comanches were killed and two war parties chased away. While en route to San Antonio after these engagements, the Lipans discovered another trail, but it was soon ascertained that these were Cherokees heading for Mexico, and therefore left unassailed. It is uncertain why Lewis let these Cherokees go when Burleson had attacked their countrymen several months earlier.36

In July, Flacco with fifteen Lipans and Tonkawas again accompanied Hays on an expedition against the Comanches, this time up the Frio River, past its headwaters in present Uvalde County. The Comanches had burned the grass in the area, and forage and water for horses was hard to come by. Near the headwaters of the Llano in present Kimble County, Flacco’s scouts became nervous upon discovering the trail of a large number of Comanches, and led the party away from the area. They were subsequently discovered by an enemy raiding party, who ran back to their camp to warn the others.

35 Lamar Papers, 4:234-245; Webb, Texas Rangers, 71; Wilkins, Legend Begins, 96.

36 Mark B. Lewis to Branch T. Archer, indorsed June 2, 1841, Administrative Papers of the Republic of Texas, Texas State Library and Archives, Austin.
Again, Hays took the men with the best mounts and attacked the Comanche camp. He later estimated that they faced around two hundred warriors, who again formed between the Rangers and their own camp. After exchanging fire and killing a few Comanches, the Comanches withdrew and Hays made no effort to pursue, obviously realizing the odds were against him. Despite the fact that the campaign was relatively unsuccessful, Hays, in his official report to the Secretary of War singled out Flacco for commendation. He wrote, “I cannot close this communication without mentioning the service and bravery of Demacio (a Mexican) and Flacco (a Lipan).”

The Lipans and Tonkawas were involved in numerous engagements in 1841. Their cooperation with Texas was bearing fruit for both sides and they had numerous occasions to make war upon their Comanche enemies. Unfortunately, the close of 1842 would also see serious damage done to the alliance between the Lipan Apaches and the Republic of Texas. The death of Flacco at the hands of Anglos and the subsequent cover-up by the government would result in Lipan hostility toward Texas and the migration of a large number of those Indians into Mexico. However, the level of cooperation between the two was still very strong as 1841 ended and 1842 began.

During the early part of 1842, the Comanches raided near San Antonio. In the process of stealing horses, they killed some Tejano ranchers south of the city. Upon learning of the presence of hostile Indians, Hays quickly gathered a force of forty-two men and headed south in pursuit of the raiders. Flacco was with him, but whether or not any other Lipans were present is not clear. After crossing the Nueces River in what

is today Atascosa County, the Rangers located the Comanches. Hays next sent one of his Tejano privates mounted on Hays’ own horse to ascertain the precise location of the Comanches. While the rest of the company was waiting, Flacco tied a red handkerchief around his head so that he could be distinguished from the hostile Indians in the thick of battle. Before long, the men heard gunfire and the sound of horses. The Tejano galloped into view with five or six Comanches right behind him. As soon as they saw the main body of volunteers, the Comanches quickly turned to warn the others. In typical fashion, Hays ordered a charge which eventually left thirteen Comanches dead. Conspicuous in this fight was Flacco, who was often targeted by the Comanches.  

In June of 1842 Castro and several other Lipan Apaches visited Sam Houston, who had been re-elected as president in late 1841. Houston gave them a passport to return through the settlements to their camp west of Austin. In this document, Houston acknowledged the importance of the Lipans and stated that they might be needed in future conflicts not only with Indians, but with Mexicans as well. The Secretary of War also noted in an official report the importance of Flacco and his band to the security of the Texas frontier.

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38 James T. DeShields, manuscript dated May 10, 1910, John Coffee Hays Papers, Center for American History, Austin, TX. DeShields states that this incident was related to him by A. J. Sowell. While DeShields places this encounter in early 1843, Flacco was already dead by that point. Early 1842, then seems the most likely time for this to have taken place. Unfortunately, many records were destroyed when the capitol area burned in the 1880’s and accounts such as these are based on the fuzzy recollections of participants.

The Republic of Texas soon required the services of these Indian allies again. In September of 1842, Mexican General Adrian Woll invaded Texas and captured San Antonio. After fighting an engagement with around 200 volunteers under Hays, Caldwell, and the McCulloch brothers on Salado Creek, Woll left the region with several citizens of San Antonio as prisoners. President Houston was now under pressure to authorize a punitive retaliatory raid into Mexico. Reluctantly, he appointed General Alexander Somervell to lead the volunteers on what eventually became the ill-fated Mier expedition.40

After innumerable delays, the force left San Antonio on November 13. Hays was put in charge of a mounted spy company, and Flacco and his Lipans joined him. By early December, Hays and Flacco were on the Rio Grande scouting, having left the rest of their men on the Nueces. A few days later, Flacco rode back to the main body to report that Hays was in Laredo. By this point, the expedition was already in danger of breaking up, due in part to Somervell’s poor leadership and partly because of the rebellious and impetuous nature of Texas frontiersmen. After crossing the Rio Grande, indecision temporarily paralyzed the army. Somervell made the decision to return home, but many of the Texans had come for a fight. About 300 men under Colonel Thomas J. Green and William S. Fisher decided to continue on to Mier, where they were surrounded by a larger Mexican force and forced to surrender. Hays and some of his men returned to San Antonio, although they took their own route, Hays being quite disgusted with Somervell.41

40 Campbell, Gone to Texas, 179-181.

41 Wilkins, The Legend Begins, 148-156.
The activity of Flacco and the Lipans is somewhat murky during this period as well. According to Sterling Brown Hendricks, a Mississippi lawyer who came to Texas in 1841 and participated in the campaign, somewhere south of the Nueces, Flacco and his Lipans warned his company about a Mexican ambush. What happened next was a serious blow to the alliance between Texas and the Lipan Apaches. According to Noah Smithwick, one of Flacco’s warriors was a deaf mute. On the Medina River, this man became sick and Flacco halted to rest. Apparently, they were traveling with some Anglo soldiers who decided to move on to San Antonio. The next day, Tom Thernon and another Anglo were missing from the troop. When they arrived in Seguin a few days later, they had Flacco’s horses with them. At around the same time, Flacco and his friend were found dead, apparently murdered.  

When Flacco’s father, Flacco Colonel, learned that the expedition came back but that his son was not with them, he became suspicious and appealed to his friend Smithwick for help. He asked Smithwick to write to President Houston and General Edward Burleson, commander of the Texas Army, for information. Apparently, Smithwick had already learned the fate of young Flacco and kept the information from his father. He did however, agree, to write the letters. Knowing that the Lipans would be angry and seek revenge, the government of Texas fabricated a cover-up story. A letter came back from Houston, as well as one from another friend of the Lipans, Jose Antonio Navarro, stating that young Flacco had been killed by Mexican bandits.

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Houston also sent a touching letter expressing his condolences. Smithwick states that he took these letters to Flacco Colonel’s camp and translated them into Spanish for him, leaving out certain parts that might cast doubt on the Mexican bandit story. Flacco Colonel was overcome with grief and went on a long fast. Eventually, the fast was broken when Smithwick’s wife cooked dinner for the chief and his wife and encouraged them to eat. Apparently, Flacco Colonel and his band were not deceived by the cover-up for long because they were soon raiding around San Antonio and Seguin. They eventually withdrew across the Rio Grande into Mexico, where that band became hostile towards Texans.  

Again, the actions of both the Texans and Lipans in the aftermath of this sad story reveal much about the attitudes and expectations of each party. President Houston and the Texas government realized that if the Lipans knew that the murder had been committed by Anglos who went unpunished, they would retaliate. More important, Texas would lose the services of these valuable allies. Therefore, they made up a story designed to throw the blame onto another ethnic group and got a member of that group, Jose Antonio Navarro, to support it. It is unclear why the real perpetrators, presumably Tom Thernon and another Anglo, were not brought to justice. Certainly it was known that they had been seen with Flacco’s horses. Under the treaty the Republic of Texas had signed with the Lipan Apaches in 1838, the Republic was obligated to punish citizens that damaged person or property belonging to the Lipans. Of course the treaty required proof in order for punishment to take place, and they may have felt there was

43 Wilkins, Legend Begins, 152; Letter to Flacco from Sam Houston, March 28, 1843, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, I, 164-165; Schilz, Lipan Apaches, 49.
not enough proof, despite the possession of Flacco’s horses by two Anglos known to be in the vicinity at the time of the murder.  

It is also possible that President Houston did not want to reap the wrath of his constituents by prosecuting an Anglo for crimes against an Indian. Many frontier Anglos viewed Indians of any tribe as little more than animals and might be incensed to the point of violence if one of their own was arrested for alleged crimes committed against a native. President Houston and others in the government apparently believed that the Lipans would accept this fabricated story about Mexican bandits and perhaps saw this lie as a way to pacify the Indians while avoiding a political firestorm. It is also probable that in the shadow of the Mier disaster, Houston and others in the government viewed Flacco’s murder as a relatively insignificant matter.

Unfortunately for the Texans, the ruse did not work. Something obviously bothered Flacco Colonel about the details from the very beginning, as evinced by the visit to his friend Smithwick, asking him to look into the matter. The story obviously did not sit well with the Lipans because it was not too long before they began to raid ranchos around San Antonio and Seguin. It seems probable that they found out the truth somehow and took matters into their own hands. Their enmity towards Texas afterwards is understandable. They had been close allies with the Texans, fighting not only Comanches, but Mexicans as well. If they indeed discovered that the official story the government told them was a lie, it would have been considered not only a breach of contract, but a serious breach of friendship and trust as well. Apparently, personal

44 Treaty between Texas and Lipan Indians, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, I, 31-32.
relationships with individual Lipan Apaches of Flacco Colonel’s band were broken as
well. Smithwick states that although the old chief had been a friend and visited him
rather frequently, he never saw him again after the day his wife fed young Flacco’s
parents.45

The end result is that because of their refusal or inability to investigate the details
of Flacco’s murder, the Republic of Texas not only lost a valuable ally, they also made a
new enemy. After Flacco Colonel’s band left Texas for Mexico, only four hundred Lipan
Apaches remained. Eventually the Lipans who went to Mexico melded with the
Mescalero Apaches and would continue to cause problems along the Texas frontier
until 1881. Some blame has to be assigned to President Houston for this incident, a
rare blemish on an otherwise honorable history of dealing with Indians. Smithwick as
well shares some responsibility for his duplicitous conduct, although he might have
feared for his life.46

Although both the Lipans and Tonkawas had become invaluable to the Texans
as scouts and warriors, the alliance between Anglos and Indians in Texas was never a
partnership of equals. In 1842, a Tonkawa man was killed by an Anglo settler. The
Indian had come to the man’s house and asked for a drink of water. When the Anglo
man refused, the Tonkawa pointed an empty gun at him. The settler responded by
shooting the Indian. The Tonkawas, who had become attached to General Edward
Burleson and lived on his property, were so incensed by this incident that they refused


W. Baylor’s fight with a Mescalero Apache band in the Guadalupe Mountains in 1881
was the last Indian battle fought in Texas.
to scout for him anymore until restitution had been made. Burleson not only refused to
take their side and intervene on their behalf, he responded to their refusal to scout and
fight by threatening to evict them from his property. Faced with little choice in the
matter, The Tonkawas eventually relented. This incident shows that while the
Tonkawas may have initially perceived themselves to be on an equal footing with their
Anglo benefactor, who they probably viewed as something of a war chief, the reality
was that Anglos, while they may tolerate the Indians, would never allow them to occupy
a place of equality in the alliance.47

During the 1840’s settlers from the United States continued to pour into Texas.
As a result, the Colorado River valley near Bastrop, where the Lipans and Tonkawas
liked to camp, began to fill with Anglos who were not happy about having Indians living
so close to them. In 1843 President Houston appointed Thomas J. Smith to be their
agent, with instructions to “take active measures to protect them” from the settlers. Also
during the summer of 1843, disease broke out among the Lipans and Tonkawas,
depleting their population by close to 20 percent. Another significant change for the
Lipans and Tonkawas which occurred in 1843 was the shift in Indian policy brought
about by Sam Houston’s second administration. These two groups, who had been at
war with the Comanches and Wichita bands for hundreds of years, were now being
asked to refrain from attacking their ancient nemeses and attend council talks with
them. The Lipans readily acceded to these requests; the Tonkawas, however, took
some convincing.48

47 Telegraph and Texas Register, September 7, 1842, Houston; Himmel,
Karankawas and Tonkawas, 87.
In 1844, the Lipans, now led by Ramon Castro after the death of his father, Cuelgas de Castro, moved to the Guadalupe River in present Comal County where they remained throughout the rest of that year. The Tonkawas remained near Bastrop. Unable to hunt buffalo and feeling hemmed in, they began to steal cattle from local ranches. Cambridge Green was appointed agent for the Lipans and Tonkawas in February of 1844. In December of that year he reported to Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas G. Western that settlers in the Goliad and Seguin areas believed “that the Lipan and Tonkawa commit depredations daily.”

The Lipans continued to support President Houston’s peace policy during 1844. Three Lipan chiefs accompanied Agent Green to a council at Tehuacana Creek near present Waco in May of that year and brought with them a female Comanche captive to return to her people. During the actual council, interpreter Luis Sanchez, speaking on behalf of the government of Texas, informed the assembled Indian leaders that the Republic would not permit theft and war to be made upon the Lipans and Tonkawas. However, he also promised that the Lipans and Tonkawas would be kept from doing the same to the other Indians of Texas and that they would not be permitted to range far up the river valleys. Obviously, although the Republic was encouraging peaceful relations between their allies and the Comanches and Wichitas, they were realistic enough to

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48 Letter from Thomas G. Western to Sam Houston, April 9, 1844, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, II, 11-12; Letter from Western to Robert S. Neighbors, February 12, 1845, ibid., 197-198; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 189.

49 Oath of Office as Indian Agent Taken by Cambridge Green, February 10, 1844, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, II, 4-5; Letter from C. Green to Thomas G. Western, December 14, 1844, in ibid., 151-152 (quotation); Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 189.
understand that having them in close proximity would not be conducive to a successful peace policy.\textsuperscript{50}

Unfortunately, the Comanches were not contacted about this council until many of them had already left for their spring buffalo hunt. Another council was scheduled for September at the Tehuacana Creek grounds, but did not actually get underway until the Comanches arrived on October 7. Again, the Lipans attended and supported Houston’s peace policy by bringing in four female Comanche prisoners. President Houston himself was also present, which pleased the Indians, many of whom were upset that he had not been there in May. Houston made a speech in which he declared that he wanted the Indians to “bury the tomahawk” with the Lipans. Roasting Ear of the Delaware and Narhashtowey of the Waco also mentioned their desire for peaceful relations with the plains Apaches. Although there is no record of any of the Lipan leaders having spoke at this council, both Ramon Castro and Chico placed their mark on the treaty that was signed on October 9, 1844.\textsuperscript{51}

In February of 1845, Robert S. Neighbors replaced Green as agent to the Lipans and Tonkawas. Neighbors was an excellent choice as agent. He showed a respect for Indians that was uncommon among Anglos of the day. He would continue to play a large part in the history of both tribes until his death in 1859. In the spring and summer of 1845, the Lipans moved south of San Antonio to the San Marcos River to make room

\textsuperscript{50} Letter from Western to Houston, April 9, 1844 in Winfrey and Day (eds.), \textit{Texas Indian Papers}, II, 11-12; Minutes of Council at Tehuacana Creek, May 13, 1844, in ibid., 38.

\textsuperscript{51} Note from Western to Benjamin Sloat, September 22, 1844, in ibid., 97; Minutes of Council at the Falls of the Brazos, October 7-9, 1844, in ibid., 105, 108; A Treaty Signed in Council at Tehuacana Creek, October 9, 1844, in ibid., 119.
for the German settlers who were establishing farms in the valleys of the Comal and Guadalupe Rivers. The Tonkawas were moved to the Blanco River southwest of Austin. This relocation did not prevent citizens from making complaints about them. Lipans were blamed for depredations near Victoria, and the Tonkawas were blamed for murders in Gonzales County. José Antonio Navarro accused both groups of stealing his cattle and killing his overseer. Eventually, Neighbors was able to disprove all of these charges. In fact, a Lipan named Simon Castro had almost $500 worth of livestock stolen from him by an Anglo named James Taylor during this period.  

In September of 1845, Neighbors brought several Lipan and Tonkawa leaders to a council at Tehuacana Creek. This council marks the first recorded instance in which the Tonkawas were willing to sit down and negotiate with the Comanches. During this council, Ramon Castro of the Lipans and Campos of the Tonkawas both spoke in favor of peace. However, Campos did remark that the absent Wacos were responsible for stealing his tribe’s horses and if Texas wanted the Indians to go to war with the Wacos, he was more than willing to do that.  

This ability to bring the hostile Indians to the table was both a reflection of the success Texas had in taking war to them, and of Houston’s peaceful overtures. Regardless of whether one believes Lamar’s hard war stance or Houston’s peace policy was more

52 Letter from Western to Neighbors, February 12, 1845, in ibid., 197; Ibid., July 8, 1845, 273; Ibid., 293; Letter from Neighbors to Western, September 15, 1845, in ibid., 361-62; Description of Stolen Goods, May 30, 1845, in ibid., 256-257; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 188-189.

53 Minutes of a Council Held at Tehuacana Creek, September 12-19, 1845, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, II, 335-343.
effective, neither goal could have been accomplished without the Lipan and Tonkawa allies. On a strategic level, these two groups provided military aid for the Republic of Texas against both Indian and Mexican foes. When the strategy changed to one of peace, the Lipans and Tonkawas supported the peace policy and refrained from raiding their ancient enemies. On a tactical level, the Lipans and Tonkawas taught Texas Rangers and militia how to fight mounted, mobile Plains warriors. The importance of this tactical evolution cannot be understated. For their troubles, they were removed from the settlements, accused of depredations they did not commit, and had a treaty broken, resulting in the defection of half of the Lipan Apaches into Mexico. Hopefully, future historians will pay more attention to the contributions of these warriors than either current historians have or their Anglo contemporaries did.
CHAPTER 2
THE IMMIGRANT INDIAN ALLIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TEXAS

Early Anglo settlers in Texas encountered many obstacles. Among these were their unfamiliarity with the terrain and the diversity of people. The vast majority of Anglo immigrants in the early nineteenth century came from the heavily forested regions of the southeastern United States, so the prairies and high plains of central and west Texas presented unique challenges to these people. In addition to the difficulties caused by the terrain, Texas was peopled by a diverse array of ethnic and linguistic groups, both Indian and Hispanic. It was necessary to have competent guides and trackers who could understand native languages as well as navigate the difficult landscape. The government of Texas found competent trackers readily available in the form of immigrant Indians who had recently been pushed from the United States into Spanish Texas. Indian groups such as the Cherokees, Delawares, and Shawnees played a significant role in the settlement and development of Texas. In order to understand the participation of these Indians, it is necessary for one to consider the circumstances that caused them to be in Texas.

As the United States expanded rapidly westward during the last decades of the eighteenth century and first decades of the nineteenth century, many Indian nations were faced with the dilemma of choosing between accommodation to Anglo culture and territorial expansion or moving westward to preserve their language and culture and to seek new hunting grounds away from American intrusion. Some of these Indian nations faced internal political battles over acculturation which resulted in various bands splitting from the main body and moving west. This was the case with the group of Cherokees.
who settled in Texas. By 1810, many traditionalist Cherokee leaders in the southeastern United States decided to part with the progressives who urged acculturation with the ever-encroaching Anglo society. These traditionalists moved west of the Mississippi River to present-day Arkansas. However, this put them in Osage territory and war quickly broke out. A further division arose between these western Cherokees. On one side were Tahlontuskee, the principle chief of Cherokee Nation West, who wished to see an end to bloodshed and fighting with the Osage. Opposing them were the faction led by Duwali (or Chief Bowles as he was called by Anglos) who wished to uphold the Cherokee tradition of blood revenge against the enemies who were killing their warriors. Duwali’s faction was in the minority and as was typical with dissenting factions among the Cherokees, they removed themselves and eventually settled in Spanish Texas along the Neches River in present Smith County.¹

Other Indian bands were pushed out of eastern North America by war and loss of territory to treaty. One of these groups was the Delaware, or Lenni Lenape. Originally inhabiting parts of present-day Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York, the Delawares were pushed westward by a series of disastrous wars with the Iroquois and broken treaties by the United States. By the late eighteenth century, this nation had

¹ La Vere, The Texas Indians, 157; Dianna Everett, The Texas Cherokees: A People Between Two Fires, 1819-1840 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990); For a fuller treatment of Cherokee politics and the tradition of dissenting factions removing themselves from the main body see Stanley W. Hoig, The Cherokees and Their Chiefs: In the Wake of Empire (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998).
become splintered, and many of these scattered bands settled in Spanish territory near Cape Girardeau, Missouri.²

Settling near the Delawares in Missouri were remnants of the once-powerful Shawnee nation. This group of Indians once dominated the Ohio River valley and had established towns as far south as Alabama and Georgia. Their defense of ancestral land in Kentucky against settlers led by Daniel Boone and others was well known and was the reason that area earned the moniker “the dark and bloody ground.” By 1800 the Shawnees, while still powerful in the Midwest, had splintered to a degree, and the group that settled in Missouri came to be known as the “Absentee” Shawnee, a designation which distinguished them from the band led by Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa (The Prophet). Around 1800 these Absentee Shawnee began to wander south, eventually settling in the area between the Sabine and Red Rivers in northeastern Texas. The Delaware eventually joined them in various waves between 1807 and 1820, after the Louisiana Purchase transferred Missouri to American control.³

The Delaware and Shawnee enjoyed friendly relations with both the Mexican authorities and the Anglo-American settlers who began to arrive in Texas after 1821. They supported themselves by farming, hunting and trapping, and carrying on an extensive trade with Anglo Texans as well as Plains Indians. Upon arrival in Texas, both groups had sought to obtain legal title to their lands, but the bureaucratic morass of


the Mexican government delayed the process time and time again. In the fall of 1835, the Texas Revolution began and these immigrant Indians had to deal with a new government.  

The governing body of revolutionary Texas in the fall of 1835, the Permanent Council, realized that the immigrant tribes to the north would either have to be made allies or at least neutral while the Anglo-Texans were revolting against Mexican rule. In order to accomplish this, they sent emissaries to these Indians to make treaties. Michel Menard, a trader who had been associated with the Shawnee for over a decade, was sent to Nacogdoches to meet with leaders of the Delaware and Shawnee and was successful in his mission; both groups agreed to remain at peace with the Texians. Sam Houston was sent to treat with Bowles and the Cherokees. Houston, who had lived with the Cherokees in Tennessee and Arkansas, spoke their language, and had been adopted by Cherokee leader John Jolly (Oo-loo-teka), was an excellent choice for this assignment. His mission was also successful. A treaty was signed that guaranteed the Cherokee title to their lands in exchange for loyalty to the government of Texas. During the period between the fall of the Alamo and San Jacinto, despite rumors to the contrary, there was no Indian uprising on Texas’s northern frontier.

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While the immigrant Indians would eventually be employed by the government of Texas primarily as scouts, trackers, and interpreters, there is evidence that during the Revolution some within the military and government circles wanted to enlist them as military allies. During the early months of 1836, Houston as commander of the Texas army authorized Hugh Love to go to Nacogdoches and raise a brigade of “Cherokees, Delaware, Shawnee, Kickapoo, and any other friendly tribes.” Their incentive to enlist was to be $7,000 and half of all the property they took. Apparently, this brigade never materialized. However, interim president David G. Burnet also believed that enlisting the aid of immigrant Indians was a wise choice as well. In the spring of 1836, he sent Menard to parley with these Indians to guarantee their neutrality in the conflict with Mexico. He also instructed Menard to raise a company of Shawnee scouts, provided they were men who could be trusted.6

After these brief experiments with using the immigrant Indians as military allies, the government of the Republic of Texas dropped this idea and later began to use them as trackers, scouts, and interpreters. The advantages to the Texans of this relationship were obvious. What was less obvious to the casual observer is why these immigrant Indians chose to ally themselves with Anglo-Americans, especially when many of these bands arrived in Texas to get away from this same group of people. The most likely explanation was that having observed Anglo society and culture for over a hundred years by this point, these Indians could see the handwriting on the wall. The Cherokees, Delawares, and Shawnees in Texas were but splintered remnants of once

powerful nations shattered by the inexorable movement of Anglo expansion, and it was probable that they viewed their only logical course of action as being one of cooperation with the powerful Americans. Not only had these immigrant Indians had a long history of observing Anglo aggression, but they had achieved a measure of acculturation into white society as well. Many of the leaders of these bands, especially the Cherokees, were mixed-bloods who were able to adapt to both cultures and saw the benefits in cooperating with the Texans. Anglos also provided a ready market for agricultural, hunting and trapping trades and access to manufactured goods as well. In addition to these benefits, friendship with the Anglos also provided protection against the aggressive Comanches, Kiowas, and Wichitas to the west.7

After Texas won its independence from Mexico as a result of the Battle of San Jacinto in April of 1836, the Texans turned to the task of organizing a permanent government. Elections were set for September 5 of that year and Houston, the hero of San Jacinto, was elected to be the president of the Republic of Texas, his term to begin in December. Houston advocated a policy of peace and friendship toward the Indian groups in Texas and his administration took steps to ensure the loyalty of both the immigrant nations in east Texas and the nomadic bands of the Plains as well. These policies met with varying degrees of success.8

Relations with the immigrant tribes were quiet during the first half of the Houston administration. However, the Republic of Texas did take measures to utilize the skills of


8 Campbell, Sam Houston, 91-92.
these Indians to its advantage. On June 12, 1837, Congress voted to approve the organization of a mounted “spy”, or scout, company composed of some of the immigrant tribes in East Texas. This company was not organized until December of 1838 when Brigadier General Kelsey Douglass of the militia organized a company of thirty Shawnee scouts. Shawnee leader Panther served as captain of this company, and famed scout Spy Buck served as interpreter. Another Indian company of mostly Cherokees was enlisted under Anglo captain James Durst during this same period. These Indian Rangers served for just over a month and were paid at the same rate as Anglo Rangers.  

These attempts on the part of the Houston administration toward friendship and conciliation with the immigrant Indians as corporate bodies were short-lived, due to the desire of settlers for their fertile lands. Early during his term as president, Houston submitted to the Senate for approval the treaty he had signed with the Cherokees in February of 1836. Among other things, this treaty guaranteed to the Cherokees and their “associate bands” a large tract of land in east Texas bounded by the Neches River on the west, the Sabine on the north, the Angelina on the east, and the San Antonio Road on the south. The Senate delayed doing anything with the treaty for nearly a year, then rejected it.

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9 H.P.N. Gammel (comp.), The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897 . . . (10 vols.; Austin, 1898), I: 1334-1335; Stephen L. Moore, Savage Frontier Volume II, 1838-1839: Rangers, Riflemen, and Indian Wars in Texas, 103-108; An excellent feature of Moore’s book is his inclusion of muster rolls for each Ranger and militia unit he discusses, including the Shawnee and Cherokee companies discussed here.

10 Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 156-157; Treaty Between Texas and the Cherokee Indians, February 23, 1836, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, I: 14-17 (quotation).
The Cherokees were also implicated as conspirators in the Cordova Rebellion. Vicente Cordova, a Tejano from Nacogdoches who had remained loyal to Mexico, was encouraged by elements in the Mexican army and government to raise a force of sympathetic Tejanos and Indians to attack East Texas. Cordova went to Cherokee territory and spoke to chiefs Bowles (Duwali) and Big Mush (Gatunwali). While the Cherokee leadership listened to him, they waffled on whether or not to openly support his rebellion. Cordova did recruit a few hundred Indians from the East Texas bands. Eventually, his rebellion was defeated in a battle near Nacogdoches and in another battle farther north near a large Kickapoo village in present Anderson County. However, the enlistment of Indian warriors into Cordova’s force and the fact that he was given an audience by the Cherokee leadership would become a powerful weapon in the arsenal of those who wished to see the Indians removed.11

Friendly relations between the Republic of Texas and immigrant Indians ended in December of 1838 when Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar was inaugurated as the second president. The constitution of the Republic of Texas prohibited Houston from succeeding himself and his political allies either refused to run or committed suicide before the election. Lamar, a native Georgian and hero of San Jacinto, was an implacable political foe of Houston’s and had campaigned for the presidency that fall on a platform of driving the Indians out of Texas. His popularity was due in large part to his aggressive Indian policy, a policy shared by many Texans who were concerned that Houston’s peace policy had been a failure and that Houston was soft on the Indian

issue. In his first address to Congress, Lamar reiterated his intentions toward the Indians of Texas by declaring a policy of “the prosecution of an exterminating war on warriors; which will admit no compromise and have no termination except in their total extinction or total expulsion.”

Lamar’s hard stance against the Indians was not merely rhetoric. In the summer of 1839, he ordered elements of the Texas Army to occupy Cherokee land. This was in response to some captured documents that implicated Bowles and the Cherokees in a plot to cooperate with the Mexican government and attack Texans. In reality, the messenger sent by the Mexican government, Manuel Flores, was killed by Texas Rangers before he ever got to the Cherokees. In the eyes of the Lamar administration, however, the fact that these Indians were to be approached by Mexican spies was enough to justify their expulsion. When the Texas Army arrived on Cherokee land to observe their movements, Bowles ordered them to leave. Lamar then issued an ultimatum demanding that the Cherokees abandon their land and leave Texas forever.

Because many of the immigrant Indian groups had associated or allied themselves with the Cherokees, Lamar took steps to ensure that one of the more powerful of these groups, the Shawnees, would not interfere in the upcoming conflict. He sent a letter to Shawnee chief Linney that characterized the Cherokees as liars and deceivers, assured the chief that the Texans could stamp out any joint insurrection of Mexicans and Indians and promised to plead favorably on the Shawnees’ behalf before

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the Congress of the Republic. If Lamar wrote a similar letter to any other Indian band in East Texas, it is not known. Likely, he wrote to Chief Linney because the Shawnees had been loyal to Texas and had shown distrust and suspicion of the Cherokees as late as the previous winter. It is also likely that Lamar did not want to have to fight all the Indians in East Texas and preferred to simultaneously cajole and intimidate the Shawnee.\textsuperscript{14}

As final negotiations were taking place on July 15, Captain William Kimbro’s company of mounted volunteers from San Augustine was ordered to Linney’s Shawnee town in present Smith County to guarantee their neutrality by taking the locks of their rifles. Obviously, President Lamar and his army generals did not place as much trust in the Shawnees as his letter to Chief Linney would have had them believe. One of the privates in Kimbro’s company, John Salmon “Rip” Ford later wrote that one of the Shawnee warriors, Spy Buck, was observed coming and going from the scene of fighting. Spy Buck claimed he was merely an observer but Ford thought it probable that he had participated on the side of the Cherokees.\textsuperscript{15}

Because of their nonaggression, the Shawnees were allowed to stay on their land until a valuation of their property could be made and compensation given. On August 2, 1839, a treaty was signed between representatives of Texas and Shawnee leaders Elena, Pecan and Green Grass at Nacogdoches. In this treaty the Shawnees

\textsuperscript{14} Letter from M.B. Lamar to Linney, the Shawnee, May, 1839, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), \textit{Texas Indian Papers} I, 35, 66-67; Moore, \textit{Savage Frontier II}, 104.

agreed to be escorted out of Texas after they had been compensated for their land and improvements. Their gun locks were to be returned to them upon leaving Texas and payment was to be made to them partly in cash, partly in goods. Some individuals, such as the scout Spy Buck, were paid in cash. Thomas J. Rusk and James S. Mayfield were named commissioners in charge of Shawnee removal. The government of Texas eventually paid over $12,000 for Shawnee property.¹⁶

The result of the Cherokee War was the expulsion of the immigrant bands from Texas. This conflict also marked the end of cooperation between the Republic of Texas and large bodies of immigrant Indians. Although some remnants of these bands would return to Texas after Houston regained the presidency in late 1841, their numbers were too small to alarm neighboring Anglos and they were limited to living near the frontier. However, these Indians later became indispensable to Texas as scouts, trackers, and interpreters.¹⁷

Houston, during his second term, sought to reverse the Republic’s Indian policy and took a conciliatory approach. Texas had been at war with the Penateka Comanches since early 1840 as a result of the Council House Fight. Although Houston wanted to talk to the Penatekas and bring them into negotiations, messengers could not approach any Comanche camp for fear of being attacked on sight. In order to solve this problem, President Houston turned to his old allies, the Delawares and Shawnees. He wrote a letter to United States Army General Pierce Butler in Indian Territory asking for

¹⁶ Treaty Between Texas and the Shawnee Indians, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, I: 50, 80-81; Valuation of Shawnee Indian Property, in ibid., 67, 92-94; Draft on Government, in ibid., 72, 98-99.

aid. Butler sent a contingent of Delaware scouts to Texas which was soon joined by their families and Shawnee allies.\textsuperscript{18}

In March of 1843, the Republic held a council at Tehuacana Creek. Present at this council were Delaware and Shawnee leaders, as well as representatives of native Texas Indian groups such as the Caddo, Ioni, Anadarko, Tawakoni, Wichita and Keechi. These Indians were living on the upper Brazos River northwest of present Waco at the time. The treaty they signed guaranteed that they would not enter the settlements without permission, promised to keep whites out of their territory, and gave them trading privileges at government authorized trading houses. It was signed by Delaware chiefs Roasting Ear, James St. Louis, McCulloch, Shawnee chief Linney, as well as the chiefs of the aforementioned Caddoan and Wichita bands. Delaware Indians John Conner, Jim Secondeye and Jim Shaw served as interpreters as well as Luis Sanchez and mixed-blood Cherokee frontiersman Jesse Chisholm. Although this council is one of the first recorded instances where these men would take an active role as either interpreters or scouts, their names soon became ubiquitous in any record of Indian relations in Texas. Another council was arranged to be held in September at Bird’s Fort on the Trinity River, near present-day Arlington. Absent from these proceedings was President Houston, a fact lamented by many of the Indians.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Houston to Terrell, Black, and Smith, March 29, 1843, in Houston, \textit{Writings}, III, 346-347; H. Allen Anderson, “Delaware and Shawnee,” 247; Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance}, 178;

\textsuperscript{19} Minutes of Indian Council at Tehuacana Creek, March 28, 1843, in Winfrey and Day, \textit{Texas Indian Papers}, I: 149-163; Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance}, 178-179.
Also notably absent from the proceedings at Tehuacana Creek were the Comanches. Of course, without the cooperation of these Plains warriors, any peace policy was only so much empty rhetoric. On May 7, 1843, Houston dispatched his superintendent of Indian Affairs, J.C. Eldredge, along with Hamilton P. Bee, trader Thomas M. Torrey, and Delaware scouts Conner, Shaw, Secondaye, Jack Harry and Joe Harry to find the Comanches and bring them to Bird’s Fort for the September council. Eldredge’s relations with his Delaware guides were less than ideal on this trip. He and Shaw apparently had a difference of opinion about who was in charge on this trip and the sensitive Eldredge took exception to Shaw’s opening talks with Wichita and Keechi leaders without consulting him first. Eldredge also complained of Shaw’s and Conner’s translations and became irritated when the Delawares suggested that the Comanches would be more amenable to holding a council at Coffee’s old trading house on the Red River rather than at Bird’s Fort. He also referred to Secondaye as “the most miserable of interpreters.”20

In early June, the party, now joined by Waco chief Acaquash, stopped at José María’s Anadarko village on the Trinity River near present Fort Worth. Eldredge reported that Shaw was ready to quit the expedition unless the Comanches were found soon, saying that he would “be damned if he would go a long distance after the Comanche, for $150.” Shortly after this incident, the expedition traveled further up the Trinity to a Tawakoni village where they learned that Pah-ha-yuco’s Penateka Comanches were camped on the Canadian River in the Indian Territory. In early

August, the expedition reached Pah-ha-yuco’s village, now camped on the Red River. At this point, Acaquash saved the lives of the three Anglo-Texans. Although Pa-ha-yuco was interested in making peace, some of the Penateka warriors expressed a desire to kill the Anglos in revenge for the Council House Fight. Acaquash made a speech in which he notified the Comanches that President Houston had replaced Lamar. In this manner he was able to keep the Penatekas from killing the Anglos.²¹

By this point it was too late to bring them in to the Bird’s Fort council, but an agreement was signed in which the Comanches and Texans agreed to a cease-fire. The Comanches also agreed to meet with representatives of the Republic on the Clear Fork of the Brazos in December but it is unclear whether or not that meeting ever took place. Eldredge’s dissatisfaction with the Delawares continued on the return trip. In his report to President Houston, he complained continuously about their procrastination, about Shaw and Conner wanting to stop at every Indian village to trade, and numerous other problems. Secondeye eventually tired of Eldredge’s complaining, took the party’s only rifle, and left him on the prairie with some broken-down horses and a young Delaware guide who could not speak English. When Eldredge threatened to report his behavior to Houston, Secondeye responded “that no one had told him [Secondeye] that I [Eldredge] was captain of the party, and that he knew his own business and should do as he pleased.”²²

²¹ Letter from J.C. Eldredge to Sam Houston, in Winfrey and Day, Texas Indian Papers, I: 213; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 181-182; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 25.

²² Letter from J.C. Eldredge to Sam Houston, in Winfrey and Day, Texas Indian Papers, I: 213-218; Armistice Signed by Comanche and J.C. Eldredge, Ibid., 228-230;
The council at Bird’s Fort concluded with a treaty signed on September 29, 1843. The terms were similar to those of the earlier treaty made at Tehuacana Creek. The Indians were to return all captives, cease all raiding on Texan property, and stay away from the settlements among other things. This treaty was signed by leaders of the Delaware, Chickasaw, Waco, Tawakoni, Keechi, Caddo, Anadarko, Ioni, Biloxi, and Cherokee. Shaw, Sanchez and three others served as interpreters. Again, however, the Comanches were not present and without their cooperation, Houston’s peace policy could never be sustained.23

Despite the absence of the Comanches at Bird’s Fort, the Delaware had proven to be indispensable allies for President Houston in implementing his peace policy. First of all, without the Delaware scouts, contact with the Comanches could not have been made. They were trusted by the Comanches at a time when no Anglo could have been, and their role as facilitators between the Republic of Texas and the Plains Indians has never been fully appreciated by historians such as Gary Anderson and others of his ilk. Second, the leadership of Delaware chiefs at councils such as Bird’s Fort convinced the Wichita bands and eventually the Comanches that Houston and his government could be trusted. Without their assistance, Houston’s peace policy would have failed.

The Delawares continued to urge the Comanches to come to council talks. The Comanches eventually agreed, on the condition that Houston would be present, and a council was called for Tehuacana Creek in April of 1844. When the time for the council

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23 Proclamation by Sam Houston, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, I: 241-246.
approached, runners, including Delawares Conner and Captain Stump, were sent to bring in the Comanches. When they arrived at Mopechucope’s camp, they discovered that his band and others had just left to catch mustangs and hunt buffalo, among other activities. Mopechucope, claiming to speak for all the Penateka bands, sent a letter to President Houston informing him of the temporary scattering of his people as well as his regret that the Penatekas would not be able to attend the April council. The chief expressed hope that they could meet at Tehuacana Creek later in the year and also informed Houston that his main goal for any council was to establish a boundary line between the Anglos and Comanches. Mopechucope’s words were probably translated by Conner and written by Daniel G. Watson, an Anglo trader traveling with the group.24

While these runners had gone to bring in the Comanches, some 500 Delaware, Shawnee and Caddo gathered at the council ground on Tehuacana Creek. The Wacos, Tawakonis and other Wichita bands did not arrive until May. These Wichita bands had been accused of stealing horses from the Anglos and were promptly given a stern lecture about the importance of abiding by the Bird’s Fort treaty by Delaware chief St. Louis and Shawnee chief Jim Black Cat. Even the Delaware Jim Ned, reputed to be a prolific horse thief himself, accused the Wacos and Tawakonis of stealing from a Mr. Bryant on Little River. The council concluded with the Wichita bands promising to return any stolen property and requesting to see President Houston himself. A new council

24 Letter from Mopechucope, Comanche Chief, to Sam Houston, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, II: 6-9; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 182-183; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 26.
was called for September 15 and Conner and Shaw were given the responsibility for bringing in the Comanche leaders.\textsuperscript{25}

During the summer of 1844, horse theft and other depredations by the Wacos and Tawakonis continued to be a problem. Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas G. Western authorized the Shawnees led by Black Cat to “act in conjunction with such as citizens as may be authorized by the Government to chastise the hostile Indians who may commit depredations on the Frontier Settlements . . .” It is unknown whether or not such military cooperation with the Shawnees took place, but this statement shows that the Republic of Texas was willing to utilize these Indians as military allies as well as scouts and interpreters.\textsuperscript{26}

The Delawares remained active throughout the summer of 1844 as well. Shaw was sent out to talk to the Comanches and bring some of their leaders in for talks. Conner was also active in dealing with Mopechucope and his band of Penateka Comanches and maintaining peaceful relations with them. Shaw and Jack Harry also sent warning that the Wacos planned an assault on Torrey’s Trading House with 200 warriors. Caddo leaders Red Bear and Bintah planned to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Wacos but were dissuaded by José María. With the element of surprise gone and opposition from the Caddos, the Wacos called off the attack.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} Minutes of a Council at Tehuacana Creek, May 12-May15, 1844, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), \textit{Texas Indian Papers}, II: 31-56; Thomas G. Western to Benjamin Sloat, June 15 and 25, in ibid., 72, 76; H. Allen Anderson, “Delaware and Shawnee,” 258-259.

\textsuperscript{26} Permission to Enlist Military Aid of Shawnee Jim Black Cat, June 24, 1844, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), \textit{Texas Indian Papers}, II: 74-75.
By 1844, the Republic of Texas had come to increasingly rely on their Indian allies for help in maintaining good relations with the Plains bands. Scouts and interpreters such as Shaw, Conner, and Jack Harry were constantly employed on important missions involving the Comanches. Delaware leaders St. Louis and Roasting Ear and Shawnee headman Black Cat were instrumental in swaying the Plains Indians into cooperating with the government. To say that these Indians played a crucial role in the relative success of Houston’s peace policy is an understatement. Of course, not every Indian ally proved to be so accommodating. Superintendent Western referred to Ned as a “refractory spirit” for defying Western’s orders and the Bird’s Fort Treaty and bringing his band into the settlements. Aside from this incident, however, relations with the immigrant Indians were good during this summer and the Republic of Texas profited immensely from the cooperation of these allies.28

Not only did the government realize the worth of maintaining friendly relations with the Delawares, but there are indications that ordinary citizens of Texas valued these Indians as well. In July of 1844, a small party of Delawares hunting along the Trinity River was attacked by a group of Anglos. Two Indians were killed in this attack and much of their property was stolen. According to Superintendent of Indian Affairs Western, “the murderers were pursued by the good Citicens [sic] of the Vicinity, were captured and executed by summary process. . . .” This incident shows that the citizens

27 Letter from Thomas G. Western to Benjamin Sloat, June 25, 1844, ibid., 75-76; Letter from Western to Houston, June 30, 1844, ibid., 77-78; Letter of John Conner and James Shaw to Sam Houston, October 2, 1844, ibid., 101-103; Letter from Western to Sloat, July 27, 1844, ibid., 83-84; Letter from Western to Houston, July 27, 1844, ibid., 84-85; Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 184.

28 Letter from Western to Houston, July 9, 1844, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, II: 78-79.
of the frontier valued the Delawares and their contributions to Texas. It also tends to belie the notion that all Anglo Texans were inveterate racists.  

Although a council had been called for September 15, the Comanches did not arrive at Tehuacana Creek until October 7. This council was the largest gathering of Indians in the history of the Republic of Texas. Eleven tribes were represented, including, for the first time since the Council House Fight, the powerful Comanches. The council began with a speech by President Houston in which he called for all Indians to live peacefully. The Delawares were represented by St. Louis and Roasting Ear, the latter of whom made an eloquent speech urging the Indians to accept peace with Texas. Shawnee chief Black Cat was present as well. Representing the Penateka Comanches were Mopechucope, Buffalo Hump (Pochanaquarhip), and Chomopardu. The main point of contention in these negotiations was the establishment of a boundary line between Texas and the Comanches. Houston wanted a line run through Comanche Peak, south through Uvalde Canyon to the Rio Grande. Buffalo Hump argued that the buffalo went further down the river valleys than that and wanted a boundary much closer to Austin and San Antonio. Despite not being able to come to an agreement on this point, the council concluded on October 9 with a treaty which was essentially the same as the earlier Bird’s Fort and Tehuacana Creek treaties. Without the assistance of such immigrant Indians as Shaw, Connor, Black Cat, St. Louis, Roasting Ear and others, it is doubtful that the Comanches could have been brought to the negotiating

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29 Letter from Western to Anson Jones, December 24, 1844, in ibid., 155.
table in the wake of that incident. The indispensability of these Indian allies had been
and would continue to be proven.  

Several incidents occurred after the October 1844 council that threatened to
break the peace. Each time, the immigrant Indian allies played a significant role in
mending broken relations. In November of 1844, a son and daughter of a Mrs. Nancy
Simpson were kidnapped from Austin by Waco Indians. In January of 1845 they were
spotted by some Delawares near Brushy Creek, north of Austin in present-day
Williamson County. Unfortunately, the daughter, Jane, died the day she was abducted
but the son, Thomas, was acquired by Pah-hah-yuco’s Comanche band, which turned
him over to the Delawares. He was returned to his mother in February of 1845. This
was a direct result of the October 1844 Tehuacana Creek treaty in which the
Comanches promised to return captives.  

Houston’s term as president expired in December of 1844 and he was
succeeded by Anson Jones. Jones, who desired to follow his predecessor’s peace
policy, called for another council at Tehuacana Creek to address the recent
depredations. Again, Shawnee chief Black Cat and Delaware chief Roasting Ear urged
cooperation with the Texans. They were joined in this effort by Comanche chief Pa-ha-
yu-co, and Anadarko chief José Maria. All Indians present acknowledged that the

30 Minutes of Council at the Falls of the Brazos, in ibid., 103-114; A Treaty Signed
in Council at Tehuacana Creek, October 9, 1844, in ibid., 114-119; Smith, Dominance to
Disappearance, 185-186; J.D. Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 26-27.

31 Letter from Western to Sloat, November 7, 1844, in Winfrey and Day (eds.),
Texas Indian Papers, II: 131; Letter from Western to Sloat and L.H. Williams, in ibid.,
161; Letter from Western to Mrs. Simpson, February 4, 1845, in ibid., 191-192; Smith,
Dominance to Disappearance, 186.
recent trouble had come from the Wacos and other Wichita bands and they agreed to do what they could to stop these raids. Superintendent Western was especially appreciative of Roasting Ear’s influence with the Comanches and urged him to continue to be a peaceful influence upon that nation.  

Problems with some of the Delawares during the early part of 1845 only served to highlight the importance of that particular group to the success of Texas’s Indian policy. Unfortunately some of the young men of Roasting Ear’s band (as well as the old chief himself) had discovered the pleasures of whiskey and had begun to enter the settlements while drunk. A member of that band, Black Snake, was accused of stealing horses in the vicinity of Montgomery. Superintendent Western reminded Roasting Ear that he had a treaty obligation to keep his young men in line and that the Republic had one to punish those peddling whiskey to the Indians.  

Some of the Delawares also ran afoul of Western for coming into Bastrop to do some unauthorized trading. They were accompanied by an Anglo trader named Isaac Pennington who represented himself as their agent. Western wrote to the Delaware’s actual agent, Benjamin Sloat, asking him to remind the leaders of some of the offending bands (Ned, Delaware Bob, Buffalo Wilson and St. Louis were specifically named) of their obligations under the 1843 Bird’s Fort treaty. He also wrote to Lipan Apache and Tonkawa agent Robert S. Neighbors and authorized him to arrest Pennington and make the Delawares take their peltries to Torrey’s Trading House on the Brazos. Neighbors

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32 Talk of Pah-hah-yuco and Roasting Ear, January 19, 1845, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, II: 172-175; Letter from Western to Roasting Ear, January 25, 1845, in ibid., 181-82.

33 Letter from Western to Roasting Ear, January 26, 1845, in ibid., 182-183; Letter from Western to Sloat and Williams, February 8, 1845, in ibid., 195.
never got the chance as Pennington died somewhere on the Guadalupe River. The Delawares tried to sell their peltries in Bastrop but were refused and eventually made their way back to Torrey’s.\textsuperscript{34}

A potential diplomatic disaster took place in the spring of 1845 when a party of Delawares led by Jim Ned’s brother, Jack, killed three Comanches at the headwaters of the San Marcos River in present Hays County. Penateka Comanche chief Pah-hah-yuco quickly sent word to the Texans that neither they nor their Indian allies should approach Comanche camps because his young braves were angry and seeking revenge. Although downplaying this incident as a “slight misunderstanding” in a letter to Lipan Apache and Tonkawa agent Neighbors in which he nevertheless cautioned him to prevent his Indians from straying too far on the plains, Superintendent Western obviously regarded it as a grave and potentially disastrous setback for the Republic’s peace policy. He wrote to Indian agents Benjamin Sloat and L.H. Williams, “We must exert our best efforts to prevent the Catastrophe [sic]. The Delaware are, as it were, the connecting link between us and the Comanche and it is important at this juncture that the best understanding should exist between them.”\textsuperscript{35}

Despite the bad relations with the Delawares, Mopechucope still placed great confidence in Shaw. In June, his band was camped on the Colorado above Austin and

\textsuperscript{34} Letter from Western to Sloat, February 28, 1845, in ibid., 203; Letter from Western to Robert S. Neighbors, March 2, 1845, in ibid., 205-206; Letter from Western to Sloat, April 2, 1845, in ibid., 211.

\textsuperscript{35} Letter from Western to Neighbors, April 9, 1845, in ibid., 216, (first quotation); Letter from Western to Sloat and Williams, April 9, 1845, in ibid., 217, (second quotation); Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance}, 186; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, \textit{Buffalo Hump}, 28.
one of his wives ran away. Mopechucope sent word to agent L.H. Williams that he believed that she went to Austin or one of the other towns and that Shaw should be sent to fetch her. Evidently the old chief placed great value on this particular wife because he instructed “that no man must have any illegal intercourse with his wife, as he loves her and will know when he sees her wheather [sic] anything has happened to her [italics in original].” The fact that he asked for Shaw by name, despite the bad blood between the Delawares and Comanches, speaks volumes about Shaw’s reputation and worth. Unfortunately, it was later discovered that Mopechucope’s wife had been killed and scalped by Wacos.36

In July, Western sent Agent Sloat with Jim Shaw and two Anglos named Paul Richardson and Foster to visit Mopechucope’s Comanche camp on the San Saba. Western had originally planned to send sixty or so Delawares and friendly Caddos with Sloat but was warned that the Comanches would see this as an act of hostility. Sloat’s party was originally met with a warm reception. However, the party’s horses ran off, and Shaw went to retrieve them, worried that if the riderless horses were found in the settlements, the government might think the delegation had been killed. In Shaw’s absence, the mood in the camp turned ugly. Apparently relatives of those slain by the Delawares on the San Marcos were agitating for revenge and Sloat and his men were put under guard. Buffalo Hump and his band arrived, headed for Mexico on a raid. Buffalo Hump was likely still irritated over the failure of the Republic to delineate a boundary line and the arrival of his band of warriors added tension to the already dark

36 Letter from Williams to Western, June 23, 1845, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, II: 270-272; Letter from Williams to Western, July 16, 1845, ibid., 291.
atmosphere. Fortunately for Sloat, when Jim Shaw returned, he brought with him his brother Bill (Tall Man) and a lot of trade goods. The Comanches agreed to make peace with the Delawares and forego revenge in exchange for these goods. Buffalo Hump made Sloat accompany him as far as San Antonio, presumably to be allowed to pass closer to that town, and Sloat was able to secure a promise from Santa Anna to attend a council in September.\(^37\)

That council was called for September 15 at the grounds on Tehuacana Creek. Western sent Jack Harry to Warren’s trading post on the Red River to invite the Delaware leaders McCulloch and St. Louis to attend. However, Harry’s wife became ill and he sent the message to Warren’s by another Delaware. Eventually, Harry would make an unsuccessful search for St. Louis’s band. He did, however, meet with some members of Jim Ned’s band and learned that the “refractory” Delaware leader was refusing to go to the September council and urging other Delaware bands to abstain from going as well.\(^38\)

The Comanches under Mopechucope were present at the Tehuacana Creek council grounds as early as September 12. However, the council did not get underway until a week later, September 19, because the requisite gifts to be distributed among the Indians had not yet arrived. When the council did get underway, the Wacos, Tawakonis

\(^{37}\) Letter from Western to Sloat, July 10, 1845, in ibid., 279; Letter from Williams to Western, August 1, 1845, in ibid., 304; Report of Benjamin Sloat, July 12, 1845, in ibid., 283-286; Letter from Sloat to Western, August 18, 1845, in ibid., 325; Letter from Sloat to Western, July 24, 1845, in ibid., 299; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, *Buffalo Hump*, 28-29.

\(^{38}\) Letter from Western to McCulloch and St. Louis, July 25, 1845, in ibid., 299-300; Letter from Williams to Western, August 1, 1845, in ibid., 305; Letter from Williams to Western, August 16, 1845, in ibid., 322.
and Wichitas were not present. Much of the talk concerned the Comanches using their influence to get these bands to stop stealing horses and committing depredations. The Delaware were still looked up to by many of the other Indians at the council, as evidenced by Ioni chief Toweash’s appellation of St. Louis as “My Grandfather.” The council concluded on September 27 with the customary giving of gifts.\(^39\)

Although the September council had been a nominal success, especially in regards to bringing the Lipans, Tonkawas and Comanches into an agreement for the first time, the real issue plaguing the frontier was the depredations being committed by the Wacos, Tawakonis and Wichitas. With that fact in mind, the Republic’s Indian Affairs office continued to make efforts to bring in these Wichita bands and to bring back the Comanches to exert some influence on them. Again, Delaware scouts Jack Harry and Shaw took the lead in bringing the Comanches in. This time they were acting under the direction of Indian Agent Paul Richardson, who was appointed to be the Comanche and Keechi agent following the untimely death of Benjamin Sloat in October.\(^40\)

By November 13, the Wichita bands had arrived for a council, although the Comanches had not. Once again, Jim Shaw and Jack Harry served as interpreters. Commissioner George W. Terrell opened the council with a speech in which he claimed that Texas had upheld their treaty obligations while the Wichita bands had not. He

\(^39\) Minutes of a Council Held at Tehuacana Creek and Appointment of Daniel D. Culp as Secretary, September 12-27, 1845, in ibid., 335-344; Letter from J.C. Neill, Thomas I. Smith, and E. Morehouse to Anson Jones, September 27, 1845, in ibid., 369-370.

\(^40\) Letter from Williams to Western, November 3, 1845, in ibid., 396; Letter from George Barnard to Western, October 6, 1845, in ibid., 377-78; Letter from the Office of Anson Jones to Paul Richardson, October 13, 1845, in ibid., 384. Richardson had accompanied Sloat on his expedition to the Comanches the previous July.
stated that although some Anglos had murdered some Delawares, the offenders were caught and promptly hanged. This was probably a reference to the July, 1844 incident. Terrell charged the Keechis in particular with kidnapping and horse theft. The chiefs of these Wichita bands promised to abide by the terms of the previous year’s treaty and the council concluded on November 16 with the stipulation that Jack Harry and Agent Richardson would go to their camp and retrieve the captive and stolen horses.41

On November 20, Agent L.H. Williams received word that Santa Anna’s and Mopechucope’s bands of Penateka Comanches were on their way to the council grounds with eleven other chiefs and nearly forty warriors. At that point the Wichitas were already gone and the only people left at the Tehuacana Creek grounds were Williams, Shaw, and some Rangers. This council commenced three days later with the usual speeches, with Shaw again serving as interpreter. The Comanches reaffirmed their desire for peace and friendship with Texas. At some point before the Comanches got to the council grounds, the Texas authorities learned that Buffalo Hump had lost his wife and after the council was over, Shaw was sent to find her.42

This council with the Comanches in November of 1845 was the last Indian council conducted by the Republic of Texas. Texans had already voted in favor of annexation by the United States in October. On December 29, 1845, United States

41 Minutes of a Council with the Waco, Tawakoni, Keechi and Wichita Indians, November 13, 1845, in ibid., 399-404; Conclusion of a Treaty at Tehuacana Creek, November 16, 1845, in ibid., 404-405; Letter from Western to Paul Richardson, November 17, 1845, in ibid., 496.

President James K. Polk signed the Texas Admission Act and Texas officially became a state on February 19, 1846. Although not widely recognized, the immigrant Indians from the United States had played a central role in the development of Texas during its years as an independent republic. The Delaware, Shawnee and Cherokee had contributed greatly to the Republic’s knowledge of the people and landscape of East Texas during the 1830’s and had even served in Ranger units for a brief period. The Lamar administration rewarded them with expulsion from the Republic. During Houston’s second term as president, these immigrant Indians, particularly the Delaware, took center stage in promoting his peace policy among the so-called wild tribes. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state that without the aid of such scouts and interpreters as Jim and Bill Shaw, Jack Harry, Jim Secondeye and John Conner, and the political leadership of chiefs St. Louis and Roasting Ear, Houston’s peace policy in the wake of the Council House fight might have been an abject failure. These Indians would continue to play a major role during the period of Texas’s statehood.43

43 Campbell, Gone to Texas, 186.
CHAPTER 3
THE INDIAN ALLIES OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, 1845 – 1853

On February 19, 1846, Texas was formally annexed by the United States, ending its ten year history as an independent republic and becoming the twenty-eighth member of the Union. Unlike other new states, however, Texas retained control over her public lands as a result of entering that union as a sovereign nation rather than a United States territory. This concession would have significant consequences on Indian policy in Texas. Because the federal government owned no public land in Texas, they were unable to place reservations there without leasing land from the state and working closely with state officials.¹

This unique relationship between the federal government, which had the responsibility for dealing with the Indian situation, and the state government, which needed to keep its constituents happy, created a dichotomy in Indian policy in which the two levels of government worked against each other, even when they appeared to be cooperating. For example, when Texas was an independent republic, its leaders had to choose a policy toward the Indians within their borders and act consistently with that policy. Thus, when Sam Houston was in office, he pursued a peace policy toward the Indians and sought negotiations and treaties with them. Conversely, during Mirabeau Lamar’s presidency, war and removal were the official stance of the administration. Both presidents, regardless of whether one agreed with their stance towards Indians, directed public policy in a manner consistent with their proclamations. After annexation, however, Indian policy became the problem of the federal government, and state

¹ Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 191; Campbell, *Gone to Texas*, 186.
officials became free to use the Indian situation as a political weapon rather than engaging in statecraft. This allowed Texas politicians to praise Indian allies while tacitly supporting efforts to remove them from the state. In other words, in the eyes of Texas politicians, because the ultimate responsibility for the Indian situation lay with the United States government, they were free to bow to public opinion regarding Indian removal or any other Indian policy for that matter.

Two factors complicated this unique situation in Texas. The first is the aforementioned fact that there was no federal land in Texas and the federal government was forced to work closely with the state government on the issue of Indian policy. The second factor was the frontier. Texas was the only state to be admitted to the Union with such a long and unsettled Indian frontier. Most states had dealt with their Indian frontier either before or during the time they became United States territories. Of course, some southeastern states such as Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi went through the process of Indian removal in the 1830’s, but the Indians in those states had already been largely subdued militarily, and they were encircled by Anglos through land cessions. The exception may be the Seminoles in Florida, but the Florida swamps did not attract as many settlers as the rich prairie land of west Texas did. In short, Texas had to deal with an Indian frontier at the same time it was dealing with issues like other states and this generated a fair amount of confusion.

Although they would later be critical of the federal government’s handling of Indian affairs in their state, most Texans in 1846 were probably happy to have the United States deal with the problem. Many frontier Texans supported annexation because of the protection that federal bayonets would provide. Immigrants had
continued to pour into Texas throughout the 1840’s and the frontier line constantly moved west. The influx of settlers was particularly hard on Texas’s Indian allies. By early 1846 the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas had been removed from the Colorado River valley near Bastrop to the area between the San Marcos and San Antonio Rivers. The Delaware and Shawnee were moved from Bosque Creek to the upper Brazos, near where the Wichita and Caddo bands were living. The failure of the Republic of Texas to establish a definite boundary between Comanche territory and Anglo Texas exasperated and angered many Penateka Comanche leaders, although they had remained peaceful until this point. Factions began to develop between Comanche leaders who favored peaceful relations with the Anglos and those who wanted to resist further encroachments upon their territory.2

This factionalism among Comanche leaders particularly disturbed Col. Pierce Mason Butler, the federal agent for the Comanches based in Indian Territory. Butler, a former governor of South Carolina, had been personally involved with Indian relations in Texas, having represented the United States government at the March 1843 Tehuacana Creek council. He had also had good relations with Comanche leaders. However, by the fall of 1845 they had become increasingly distant. Butler proposed that the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs take charge of the Indian situation in Texas before official annexation, a proposal the federal government approved. He sent word to the Comanches via the Delawares and other allied Indians that a council would be held at

2 Campbell, Gone to Texas, 159; Letter from R.S. Neighbors to T.G. Western, February 4, 1846, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 13-14; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 202; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 29-30.
Comanche Peak (present Hood County) in May of 1846 and that gifts would be distributed.³

Because the ethnic and political climate on the plains was tense, Butler’s party included an array of friendly Indians including the ubiquitous Delawares and Shawnees, some Cherokees, Kickapoos and Choctaws. Among this diverse array of Indians were many prominent individuals including the Delaware Black Beaver, Seminole chief Wild Cat (Coacoochie), and Cherokees John Guess (Sequoyah’s son), Jesse Chisholm, and Elijah Hicks. The latter two were mixed-bloods who had a significant impact upon the history of Texas. Chisholm had previously served as an interpreter at several Indian councils and is perhaps best known for the trail named after him, which connected Texas cattle ranches to railheads in Kansas after the Civil War. Hicks’s journal of his journey with Butler is the best record of that event left to historians. The inclusion of these prominent Indians shows the degree to which government officials continued to rely upon them as intermediaries with the plains nations.⁴

Despite the presence of these Indian guides, the party got lost and was unable to find Comanche Peak. Eventually, Butler’s party met with the leaders of the Penateka Comanches, Wichita, Caddo, Tonkawa, and Lipan Apache bands. A treaty was signed

³ Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 192; Minutes of Indian Council at Tehuacana Creek, March 28, 1843, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, I: 156-158.

between these groups and the United States on May 15, 1846, although it was not ratified by the United States Senate until almost a year later. The terms of this treaty were similar to treaties that these Indians had entered into with the Republic of Texas. They agreed to return all prisoners, both black and white, to cease stealing horses from United States citizens and to place themselves under the sole protection of the United States. The federal government for its part stipulated that it would regulate trade with the Indians and only allow licensed traders in their territory, return all Indian prisoners held by Texans, and punish all American citizens guilty of murdering or stealing from Indians. In addition to these standard terms, the United States also prohibited liquor sales to the Indians and added that schoolteachers and “preachers of the gospel” would be sent among them.5

Notable signers among the “friendly” Indians include Tonkawa chiefs Placido and Campos, Caddo chiefs José Maria and Bintah, and Wichita chiefs Kechikaroqua and Acaquash. The interpreters for this council were the ever-present Luis Sanchez and Delawares John Conner and Jim Shaw. Despite the change in sovereignty from the Republic of Texas to the United States, the Anglo leaders still relied upon the Delawares and other Indian allies to act as go-betweens with the Comanches. Butler’s efforts represented a continuance of both United States and Republic of Texas Indian policy in regard to pursuing negotiations with the Plains nations rather than making war on them. Conspicuously absent from these talks, however was any discussion of a

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5 Treaty between United States and the Comanches, Ioni, Anadarko, Caddo, Lipan, Longwa, Keechi, Tawakoni, Tonkawa, Wichita and Waco Indians, May 15, 1846, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 53-57, (quotation pg. 56); Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 193; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 30.
boundary line to halt further westward Anglo expansion, an issue of importance not only for the Comanches but for Texas's Indian allies as well. Representatives from the Comanches, Wichita bands, Caddoan bands, Tonkawas and Lipans traveled to Washington D.C. in the summer of 1846 to discuss this issue. Lieutenant Governor Albert C. Horton, serving as Governor Pro Tempore in place of James Pinckney Henderson, who had gone to Mexico to take command of Texas volunteers, issued a proclamation urging all surveyors and settlers to stay out of Indian territory until this issue was settled. While in Washington, José María signed a peace treaty between his Anadarkos and the United States.6

In Texas, state officials were not so much concerned with what to do with the Indians as they were concerned that their lands be made available to settlers moving west. In fact, after annexation, the policy of Texas towards Indian land claims changed considerably. Although the last two presidents of the Republic of Texas, Sam Houston and Anson Jones, discussed the issue of a boundary line with Comanches in treaty negotiations (albeit unsuccessfully), the official position of the State of Texas was that Indians had no legal claim to land anywhere in the state.7

6 Proclamation, June 1, 1846, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III, 62; Treaty between U.S. and Jose Maria and the Anadarko Indians, July 25, 1846, in ibid., 68; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 30-31; By this time, the Caddo and Wichita bands were actively seeking peace and encouraging the Comanches to do the same. Therefore, from this point forward, they are considered allies of Texas and the United States. Although José Maria and Bintah are listed with the Tonkawas in the Butler-Lewis treaty, they were definitely Caddoan chiefs. For brevity's sake, Wichita, Tawakoni and Waco leaders have all been labeled by the author as Wichitas. All of these groups spoke a Wichitan language and were related. For more information see La Vere, The Texas Indians.

7 Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 185-186, 191.
Even as Colonel Butler was meeting in council with the Indians, war was beginning with Mexico, a war that would eventually claim Butler’s life. Mexico had never recognized the legitimacy of Texas independence and annexation to the United States was unpalatable to the Mexican government. Even if they had recognized Texas as an independent nation, Mexico considered the Nueces River to be the southern boundary of Texas, while Texans insisted upon the Rio Grande. In June of 1845, before annexation was completed, United States President James K. Polk, with the consent of the Republic of Texas, sent an army under General Zachary Taylor to the disputed area on the south side of the Nueces near Corpus Christi. Negotiations to buy large tracts of Mexican territory continued throughout the rest of that year. Finally, in May of 1846, skirmishing occurred near the Rio Grande and President Polk asked for a declaration of war against Mexico.8

Eventually, between 5,000 and 7,000 Texans would serve in Mexico, including Governor Henderson who took a leave of absence to command a division of Texas volunteers. Among those who left Texas to fight in Mexico were seventeen Tonkawa warriors who accompanied Burleson to Matamoros. They served as scouts and participated in the battle of Monterrey in the fall of 1846.9

However, Henderson and his lieutenant governor, Albert C. Horton, were also concerned about the threat of Indian attacks on the northwestern frontier. In June of 1846, Brevet Colonel William S. Harney, commanding the Department of Texas,

8 Campbell, Gone to Texas, 187-188.

requested that five companies of Rangers be mustered to protect the frontier. The United States Army subsequently decided they did not need more Rangers, which touched off a flurry of correspondence from Austin to Washington. In one of these letters, Governor Pro Tempore Horton requested that President Polk authorize a company of “Delaware or other friendly Indians” to assist in patrolling the frontier. According to Horton, “They would render the most valuable assistance, by having it in their power to obtain and give the earliest information of any suspicious movement, made by the Indians on the frontier.” This statement shows the high confidence that Texas authorities continued to place in the Delawares.\textsuperscript{10}

It is doubtful that this Delaware Ranger company was ever authorized by the federal government. One particular Delaware, however, was considered of such importance to frontier defense that Horton ordered him to be mustered into a company for fear of losing his services. Jim Shaw was attached to Captain John J. Grumbles’ Ranger company as a scout but did not think he would be paid if he was not officially mustered and was ready to quit. Horton, writing to Ranger Captain Howe, offered the following opinion of Shaw:

\begin{quote}
The services of this Indian, I regard as extremely important to us and I am not willing to lose them, by not complying with his request in this matter. His intimate acquaintance with the country, and the various Indian tribes, enables him to obtain and give information, with regard to their movements etc, which otherwise, we could not be possessed of – Indeed, we cannot do without him, and I would be greatly obliged if you would come over and satisfy his wishes, by mustering him into the service.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} Letter from W.S. Harney to A.C. Horton, June 26, 1846, in Winfrey and Day (eds.),\textit{ Texas Indian Papers}, III, 64-65; Horton to J.K. Polk, October 21, 1846, in ibid., 79 (quotations).
Two months later, Shaw had still not been mustered into Captain Grumbles’ company. In order to maintain his services, Grumbles had provided rations and pay for Shaw, as well as Shaw’s son and nephew out of his own pocket. In a letter to Secretary of War William L. Marcy, Governor Henderson (resuming his duties upon returning from Mexico) urged the federal government to reimburse Grumbles for his expenses in this matter. 11

Despite the state’s official position that Indians had no right to land anywhere in Texas, they continued to employ the immigrant Indians every time contact had to be made with the Comanches or Apaches. At the time Henderson wrote to Marcy in January of 1847, Shaw had left Grumbles’ company to accompany Robert S. Neighbors on an expedition to the headwaters of the Colorado River. Neighbors, a former Texas Ranger and Republic of Texas Indian agent, had learned from some Penateka Comanches that a band of approximately 2,000 Mescalero Apaches led by chief Senecu had come into Texas and camped there. Neighbors and Shaw traveled to their camp with presents and instructions from Governor Henderson that they leave the state immediately. Henderson’s concern was that if they were allowed to stay any length of time, they would make a claim to remain in Texas, a situation that would contribute to the already contentious atmosphere on the frontier. Shaw’s importance is again displayed by this incident. Instead of sending armed men, Henderson sent one Anglo agent and one Indian scout and interpreter. Henderson ended his letter to Marcy by requesting that Neighbors be named United States Indian Agent for Texas, a request

11 Horton to Captain Howe, November 4, 1846, in ibid., 80 (quotation); Henderson to W.L. Marcy, January 10, 1847, in ibid., 81-82.
that was honored in March of 1847. Neighbors was an obvious choice for this job. He had been a Texas Ranger and Republic of Texas Indian agent, and had worked closely with many of the Indians he would be called upon to supervise. Moreover, unlike many federal Indian agents, he had a genuine respect and concern for the Indians in his charge and worked zealously on their behalf.\textsuperscript{12}

One of Neighbors’ first acts as Special Indian Agent for Texas was to request that the government hire Jim Shaw as an interpreter. In making this request to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, William Medill, Neighbors wrote, “I have selected Jim Shaw, a Delaware Indian, as the most proper person for that station. With him, and my own knowledge of the Indians, I can communicate with all the bands on our borders, and shall not need any other except at some genl. assembly of the tribes.” Neighbors’ request was granted and Shaw accompanied him on many trips to Comanche country. One such visit in the summer of 1847 was prompted by an attack on John C. Hays’s party of surveyors west of Fredericksburg. Neighbors, Shaw, and a small party of Delawares went in search of the Comanche band that had made the attack and carried off some prisoners. Although the Delawares advised against making contact with this party on this occasion, Neighbors used these Delawares to communicate with them in order to get the prisoners back.\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{13} Neighbors to Medill, April 24 and August 5, 1847, NARG 75, LR.
Neighbors’ job was made more difficult by the continued westward expansion of Texans and their “take no prisoners” policy. In April of 1848 a Ranger company under Captain Samuel Highsmith attacked Kechikaroqua’s Wichita village, killing twenty-five. These Indians had been at peace with Texas since the 1843 Bird’s Fort Treaty. Later that year, another Ranger company under Lieutenant Thomas Smith attacked a party of Wichitas and Caddos who had attacked a party of surveyors. After this incident, while returning to camp, they came across a Caddo teenager and killed him for no apparent reason. After they examined his body, they determined that the boy was from José María’s village and had previously served their company as a hunter.14

Neighbors was livid over these attacks, but being realistic he had come to expect such incidents to continue as the line of settlement moved farther west into Indian lands. As he assessed the Indian situation at the beginning of 1849, he began to realize that something different would have to be done to protect the Indians in his charge. Sometime in the early part of that year, in a population report to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Neighbors observed that while relations with most Texas Indians were good, the attacks on the Lipan Apaches and Wichitas during 1848 made it impossible to renew relations with them without large numbers of presents being given. Perhaps the most revealing part of Neighbors’ report is the following statement: “Most of the tribes are disposed to cultivate the soil; and, by proper encouragement could be induced, in a short period, to settle down and turn their attention to farming. By the laws of this State, the right of soil is denied the Indians; consequently they have made but small progress

14 Neighbors to Medill, April 10 and April 28, 1848, in ibid; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 198-199; Himmel, Karankawas and Tonkawas, 98, 107.
in farming.” By this statement, it is clear that Neighbors believed the Indians could be productive citizens of the United States if Anglos could be kept off of their land. Consequently, in March of 1849, he proposed a reservation system for the state of Texas. Neighbors’ plan called for a number of reserves, each with its own army post to enforce federal law and protect the Indians. Each reserve would also have its own government office for agricultural, vocational and educational training. Unfortunately for Neighbors, a Democrat, Zachary Taylor, a Whig, was inaugurated as president that same month and he lost his job. It would be another five years before Neighbors’ reserve plan would come to fruition in Texas.15

The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican War in 1848, created new opportunities for folks seeking land in the West. This treaty transferred to the United States the area which became the present-day states of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, and Colorado. This transfer of sovereignty, combined with the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in northern California, caused a wave of emigration to the west coast. Several routes were already beginning to be established across the Northern Plains to California, and mercantile interests in Texas began to clamor for a southern route across their state. In late 1848, a group of San Antonio merchants devised a plan to extend a wagon road from their city to El Paso on the north bank of the Rio Grande. A Mexican city of the same name had existed on the south bank of the Rio Grande for centuries but only recently had American merchants

began to take advantage of the strategic location on the north bank of the river. The San Antonio group hired John Coffee “Jack” Hays, famed Texas Ranger and Mexican War hero, to blaze this trail. Hays took a party of thirty Indian guides and Rangers, but was unsuccessful. They got lost, nearly starved to death and had to return to San Antonio.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite Hays’s unsuccessful attempt, it was clear to the United States government that a route to California across the southern plains of Texas was not only desirable but necessary. In early 1849, with California emigrants already starting to gather at Texas frontier towns such as San Antonio and Fredericksburg, General William Jenkins Worth, commanding the department of Texas, sent two expeditions to blaze a route to El Paso. The first, a fifteen-man party led by Lieutenant William H. C. Whiting, went due west from San Antonio to El Paso and was almost exclusively an Army affair. The second was led by former United States Indian Agent Robert S. Neighbors. His good relations with the Comanches, through whose territory the expedition would be traveling, made him a perfect choice to command the party. Accompanying Neighbors was former and future Texas Ranger John S. “Rip” Ford, two other Anglos, five friendly Indians and a band of Penateka Comanches led by Buffalo Hump (Potsanaquarhip). This expedition explored a more northerly route to El Paso, leaving from Torrey’s Trading House near present-day Waco.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance}, 194;

The expedition was not even officially underway before the Indian allies proved their worth again. Neighbors had traveled from San Antonio to Austin, where Ford and Thomas Woolridge joined him. The three Anglos were to ride from Austin to Torrey’s Trading House on the Brazos River. Somehow, they got lost but luckily ended up on the Bosque River at the residence of a Delaware woman. This woman was John Harry’s mother, and John Harry was to meet them at Torrey’s. He instead wound up guiding the three Anglos to Torrey’s where they assembled the rest of their party and gathered supplies for about two weeks before setting out for El Paso.18

The party which assembled at Torrey’s Trading House consisted of Anglos Neighbors, Ford, Doc Sullivan and Alpheus Neal, Shawnees Joe Ellis and Tom Coshattee, Delawares Jim Shaw (the official interpreter for the expedition) and John Harry, Choctaw Patrick Goin, and Buffalo Hump’s Penateka Comanche band. During this period of time the Penateka Comanches could be considered allies of the United States and of Texas. Their leaders trusted Neighbors and they had been at peace with Texas for the most part since 1844. Although this expedition represents the high-water mark of their cooperation with Texans, it is significant because for the first and only time, Comanches actually guided Texans through their territory.19

One of the most complete records of this expedition can be found in Ford’s memoirs. He kept a detailed journal of the expedition and his observations of both the Comanches and what he terms “half-civilized Indians” reveal much about Anglo


19 Ibid., 115; Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 203; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, *Buffalo Hump*, 33.
attitudes. Ford had a high respect for the Delawares and Shawnees, particularly Shaw, whom he credits with saving his life on at least two occasions. The first incident occurred at the headwaters of the Leon River in present Eastland County, the fourth day after leaving Torrey’s. The party had rendezvoused with Mopechucopé’s Comanche band and Ford was attempting to impress the Comanches by jumping on top of a diamondback rattlesnake and quickly jumping off, a trick he had successfully executed with less dangerous snakes in the past. Shaw quickly intervened saying, “Don’t go any nearer, that snake can bite a man a little further from him than his length – about ten feet. He can strike you on your mule. He jumps as he strikes.” Ford wisely reconsidered his action. The second incident occurred after Mopechucopé’s band had separated from the expedition. Near the confluence of Spring Creek and the Colorado River in present San Saba County, the party met Sanaco’s and Yellow Wolf’s Comanche bands. Ford saw an Anglo female captive who had been tortured and started to talk to her. Again, Jim Shaw stopped him and told him not to speak to her or Ford could be killed.

At this location, Buffalo Hump quit as the expedition’s guide. According to Ford, the Comanches held a council and invited Shaw, who reported the proceedings to Neighbors. Shaw told Neighbors that the Comanches were afraid that the Mexicans in the vicinity of El Paso would kill Buffalo Hump because he had done a lot of raiding in that area and was wanted by the Mexican authorities. Gary Anderson claims that Buffalo Hump withdrew from the expedition in February after visiting an army officer in Fredericksburg and learning that the purpose of the expedition was to build a road.

However, the expedition left Torrey’s Trading House in March and Ford’s account states that Buffalo Hump was with them until they reached the Colorado River which would have been in early April at the earliest. Yet Anderson does not even reference Ford’s account in the brief space (three paragraphs) he devotes to the Neighbors expedition. The most likely explanation for the disparity in the two accounts is that Ford’s memoirs simply do not conform to Anderson’s preconceived notions of Anglo-Comanche relations. The theme of his book is one of ethnic cleansing and extreme racism on the part of Anglo-Texans; cooperation between these Texans and Comanches does not fit his thesis so he simply ignores it. One might argue that Anderson does not consider Ford a reliable source because his memoirs contain many anecdotes and some obvious exaggerations. However, he had no problem citing The Adventures of Bigfoot Wallace, a work which is more heavily anecdotal and was not edited by a trained historian. Clearly Anderson is picking information which fits his thesis and leaving out that which does not.21

After Buffalo Hump quit as guide, a Nokoni Comanche named Tall Tree or Guadalupe was hired. Before the expedition came to the Pecos River, they ate relatively well, thanks to the hunting skills of the Indians. Ford wrote, “Our half-civilized Indians were skillful hunters, particularly John Harry. They killed turkeys daily, and we fared well.” However, once the party crossed the Pecos, game became scarce. Ford did not have a very high opinion of Tall Tree or of the Comanches in general as guides.

21 Ibid., 120-121; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 33; Gary Anderson, Conquest of Texas, 221-222, 230; John C. Duval, The Adventures of Bigfoot Wallace, the Texas Ranger and Hunter (Philadelphia: Claxton, Temsen, and Haffelfinger, 1871).
Tall Tree complained so much about lack of food that his sister scolded him. Ford wrote, “The Comanche brave did not bear fatigue and hunger with the fortitude we supposed he would exhibit. The Delawares, Shawnees, and the other more-civilized Indians, showed themselves superior to the nomads of the prairies during the whole trip.”

Tall Tree’s complaints notwithstanding, he did prove useful for his connections. Before the party crossed the Pecos, near Castle Mountain in present Crane and Upton Counties, their path intersected the Comanche war trail to Mexico. They were already starting to experience some hunger pangs from the scarcity of game in the region when they happened upon an acquaintance of Tall Tree’s returning from Mexico, who roasted a mule and shared it with them. It is doubtful that a party of Anglos, even accompanied by Indians such as Shaw, would have been able to approach this man without a Comanche present. In this manner, at least, Tall Tree proved to be an asset to the expedition.

According to Ford, however, Tall Tree’s navigational skills left much to be desired. He eventually guided the expedition to a spot on the Rio Grande some twenty miles below El Paso. The group was near starvation and it was decided that Neighbors and Sullivan would mount the two best mules and ride ahead of the others to the closest settlement and get help. Ford and Shaw were left in charge of the main party. The fact that Jim Shaw was placed on an equal footing with an Anglo doctor, lawyer, and Ranger officer shows the high degree of confidence that was placed in him. Four or five miles

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22 Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, 121 (first quotation), 125 (second quotation).

23 Ibid., 122-123.
east of San Elizario, the main party under Ford and Shaw were met by a Mexican
carrying a cartload of supplies for them. They eventually made their way to San
Elizario, then to El Paso, and after a period of rest, back to San Antonio. On the return
trip, they parted ways with Tall Tree and hired a Mexican guide named Zambrano. He
led them by the Hueco Tanks and Guadalupe Mountains, then down the Pecos River to
the Horsehead Crossing where they picked up their old trail. Between Castle Mountain
and the head of the Concho River, they met a group of settlers headed for California led
by Captain B.O. Tong of Seguin. This group hired John Harry to guide them to El Paso.
The remaining members of the expedition arrived in San Antonio in early June.24

The Neighbors expedition was important in the development of Texas as a state.
Until that time, many considered West Texas to be an absolute wasteland. According to
Ford, this expedition proved that the region was arable, or at least ranchable. It also
proved that a wagon road between San Antonio and El Paso was practical and solidified
Texas’s claim to the El Paso region. None of this was possible without the assistance
of the Indians who made up the Neighbors Expedition. The Comanches provided the
knowledge of the terrain necessary to make it across the vast open spaces of West
Texas. The Hays expedition had proved that it was easy to become lost in these
regions. Also, had the Comanches not cooperated with the expedition, they could have
easily denied access to their territory to Neighbors’ party or waited until they were far
from the settlements and attacked them. Even Tall Tree, whom Ford considered a poor
guide, proved indispensable when he met a friend on the plains who offered to share
roasted mule with the hungry travelers. The immigrant Indians (Delaware, Shawnee

24 Ibid., 128-129.
and Choctaw) were also crucial to the success of this mission. They consistently supplied the party with meat. Jim Shaw’s skills in translation, diplomacy and Comanche culture saved both Ford personally and the expedition collectively from disaster on numerous occasions.

Despite the valuable contributions of the Texas Indians, most settlers still considered them a nuisance at best, and dangerous at worst. Many Indians had been forced into a situation where they had to either steal livestock or starve. Towards the end of 1849, the Indian situation in Texas was becoming tense once again. On Christmas Day of that year, a group of Limestone County citizens sent a petition to Governor Peter Hansborough Bell informing him that parties of Caddo and Delaware Indians had been stealing livestock in the area, particularly along the Navasota River. These citizens asked Governor Bell to request that soldiers from Forts Worth and Graham be sent to remove these Indians above the line of forts. Among these Indians was José María’s Anadarko band.\footnote{Petition from the Citizens of Limestone County to P.H. Bell, December 25, 1849, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), \textit{Texas Indian Papers}, III: 107-108.}

The situation continued to worsen throughout 1850. Despite its obligation under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States was not able to stop the Comanches, Lipans and other Indians from raiding in Mexico. In addition, these Indians were committing depredations on ranches in the Rio Grande Valley. By late summer, the Penateka Comanches had camped on the Clear Fork of the Brazos River and some were afraid that they were about to go on the warpath. In September of 1850, United States Special Indian Agent for Texas John Rollins met with Lipan Apache chiefs Chiquito and Chapota on the Llano River, the first meeting that government officials had
with any Lipans since the attacks on their villages two years previous. Rollins was unable to bring all of the Texas Lipans to the Llano; the largest band under John Castro remained on the Pecos River where they had unsuccessfully tried to raise corn. Rollins was able to induce these Lipans to come in for talks by distributing $60 worth of goods to them. They gave him information about the Comanches on the Brazos, offering their services in the event that the United States went to war with the Comanches.26

Although Rollins was clearly pleased at being able to renew relations with at least two bands of Lipans, and he was subsequently able to verify their information about the Comanches’ current location, he did not believe that the Comanches were spoiling for a fight as the Lipans made it sound. He attributed the Lipans’ attitude to the fact that they hated the Comanches, would have liked to see them destroyed by the U.S. Army, and they needed a job. Instead, Rollins believed the Comanches were on the Clear Fork for two reasons: they were afraid of federal troops on the Rio Grande and they were induced to go there and trade by trader George Barnard. Rollins then took John Conner and five other Delawares with him to visit these Comanches and try to get them to meet at a council on the Llano in November.27

Rollins was successful in getting the Comanches to meet in council, not in November on the Llano, but in December on Spring Creek, in present San Saba County. Rollins and Company B of the Second U.S. Dragoons were guided to the meeting place from Fort Martin Scott by a group of Delaware Indians. The treaty was

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26 Letter from J.H. Rollins to G. M. Brooke, September 25, 1850, in ibid., 124-126.

27 Ibid.
almost identical to the Butler treaty of 1846, with the added stipulations that the Indians agreed not to raid in Mexico, and to return runaway slaves. Rollins represented the United States, while the notable Indian signers were Comanches Buffalo Hump (Pochanaquarhip) and Ketumpse, Lipans Chiquito and Chapota, and Waco Acaquash. Delaware John Conner and Cherokee Jesse Chisholm served as interpreters. The United States Senate, however, refused to ratify this treaty because they had no control over the public lands in Texas.28

The Tonkawas were becoming increasingly threatened during the early 1850’s. They were denied access to the buffalo plains by the Comanches and game was beginning to be scarce in the central Texas region where they lived. In addition to the decline in hunting, the other pursuit which had sustain the Tonkawas since the arrival of Anglos in Texas, the hide & fur trade, also suffered a decline. The death of their protector, Edward Burleson, in 1851, compounded the problems that the Tonkawas faced.29

Rollins became increasingly sick during the latter part of 1850 and early part of 1851, and he eventually died in the summer of 1851. Before his death, Congress passed legislation authorizing two subagents to assist him. Jesse Stem was assigned to the Tonkawas, Wichitas and Caddos, and John A. Rogers became subagent for the Lipan Apaches and Penateka Comanches. Rogers was immediately confronted with a

28 Treaty Between the United States and the Comanche, Caddo, Lipan, Quapaw, Tawakoni, and Waco Tribes of Indians, December 10, 1850, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III, 130-137; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 204; J.D. Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 36.

29 Catlett to Medill, May 12, 1849, Howard to Lea, March 31, 1852, Capron to Lea, May 24, 1852, NARG 75, LRTA; Himmel, Karankawas and Tonkawas, 108.
diplomatic conundrum in his relations with the Penateka Comanches although he likely did not realize it. A cholera epidemic in late 1850 had killed off many Penateka Comanche leaders who had cooperated with Texas and the United States and were likely to do so in the future, including Mopechucope. New leaders like Ketumpse, who owed their advancement in the tribe to the death of more established leaders, were eager to cooperate with the government. However, others such as Buffalo Hump and Pa-ha-yuco were becoming increasingly frustrated with the constantly westward moving line of forts and the government's refusal to declare a boundary line and were drifting farther north into the orbit of the more hostile Kotsoteka and Yamparika Comanches. The result is that Rogers and Rollins’ successor George T. Howard did not deal with the main body of Southern Comanche warriors, but with a band of about seventy mostly elderly people.30

Nevertheless, in October of 1851, Rogers met with representatives of Ketumpse’s Comanche band, Lipan and Mescalero Apaches at the San Saba treaty grounds, site of the previous December’s council. After two days of speeches in which Rogers lectured the Indians about the need to give up nomadism and plant corn, a treaty was signed. The Indians agreed to abide by the Butler treaty of 1846 as if they had signed it themselves and to stop raiding in Mexico. Notably absent from these proceedings were Buffalo Hump and Pa-ha-yuco which meant that it was binding on very few Penateka Comanche warriors. Ketumpse signed for the Comanches. Rogers was able to bring John Castro’s band of Lipans into these talks for the first time since

30 Letter from John A. Rogers to P. H. Bell, November 25, 1851, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 155; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 202-205.
the hostilities of 1847-1848. Chiquito and Chapota also signed for the Lipans. Tomas-Pano signed as principal chief for the Mescaleros. Delaware John Conner interpreted for the Comanches and José Sandoval for the Apaches.31

Despite Rogers’s best efforts, good relations with the Lipan Apaches would not continue for very long. He resigned in May of 1852 and was replaced by Horace Capron. By the summer of 1852, drought and the ever-decreasing buffalo herds forced many Lipan bands to resume raiding ranches for livestock. The new Indian Agent for Texas, George T. Howard, a former Texas Ranger, was confronted with depredations in Gillespie County and other frontier areas. The situation with the Lipans was already tense in the late fall of 1852 when a local Tejano reported to Colonel William S. Harney, commanding the Department of Texas from San Antonio, that Manuel’s Lipan Apache band had attacked a ranch forty miles south of the city. Agent Howard, who knew Manuel and his people, was suspicious of the report and after investigating the matter, learned that Manuel’s band was visiting Fort Mason, 200 miles northwest of San Antonio, at the time of the attack. Unfortunately, Howard’s intelligence came too late to stop Colonel Harney from sending a detachment of dragoons under Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke to attack the Lipans. On January 12, 1853, Cooke found the Lipans in camp near the head of the Guadalupe River in present Kerr County. He did not immediately attack because they appeared to be peaceful; however while pausing to assess the situation, the Indians spooked and ran. Cooke’s troopers

31 Negotiations Between the United States and the Comanche, Lipan, and Mescalero Tribes of Indians, October 26, 1851, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 143-144; Treaty Between the United States and the Comanche, Lipan, Mescalero and Other Tribes of Indians, October 28, 1851, in ibid., 150-154; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 205.
charged the village, killing several warriors, taking eighteen women and children prisoner and capturing 150 horses. After rounding up the prisoners, the cavalrymen set fire to the village, ironically destroying presents distributed to these Indians by Agent Rogers in the fall of 1851.32

While this attack on the Lipans made it nearly impossible to gain their trust again, it did serve to highlight to federal officials the need for a better solution to the Indian situation in Texas. In 1852 Democrat Franklin Pierce was elected president and his Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, as well as many Texas officials, began to press for what Neighbors knew was necessary in 1849, a clearly defined reserve. Davis pressured Texas to mark off some land and sell it to the federal government. He summed up the problem in the following statement: “While the Indians have no territory of their own, they have virtually the right to roam where they will, and the military force can only interpose when they assume the character of an enemy.”33

Davis’ succinct analysis of the Indian situation in Texas demonstrated the growing understanding in Washington and in Austin of the need for clearly defined boundaries between Anglos and Indians in Texas. Discussions with the Indians during the last years of the Republic and the early years of Texas’s statehood centered on the establishment of a boundary line. Because of the inexorable flow of settlers into Texas and their desire for land, such a boundary was never established. Instead, settlers

32 Capron to Lea, January 23 and February 18, 1853, NARG 75 LRTA; Howard to Lea, March 18, 1853 in ibid; Letter from P.H. Bell to G.T. Howard, August 31, 1852, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 181; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 207.

33 Letter from Jefferson Davis to Peter H. Bell, September 19, 1853, Governors’ Papers, Texas State Archives.
pushed Indians who had demonstrated a desire to be at peace and cooperate with the Anglos out of their hunting grounds and left them in a situation which forced them to starve or steal. Despite the best efforts of Indian agents like Neighbors, the desire for land overruled any respect for territorial rights of Indians, even Indian allies, during this period. The government of the state of Texas was able to foist the problem onto the federal government, declaring respect for the Indian allies while at the same time denying that they had rights to land anywhere within the borders of Texas. This official attitude encouraged settlers to ignore treaties and continue to move west. They were bolstered by certain Texas Ranger companies who preferred to assume that any Indian encountered was hostile. While this was certainly not true of all Ranger captains, a significant number of them had assumed this attitude during the late 1840’s and early 1850’s. The United States army, stationed in various posts along the frontier, was also at a quandary in regard to Indian relations. While United States Indian Agents continued to negotiate with the Indians, Army officers increasingly regarded all Indians encountered on the high plains as enemies. As Secretary of War Davis succinctly put it, the Army could only assume an adversarial relationship with these Indians while there were no clearly established boundaries.

The state of Texas’s Indian allies on the cusp of the reservation experiment was a precarious one. Some of these groups, such as the Lipan Apaches and Tonkawas, had been military allies of Anglo Texas for almost thirty years at this point. They had gone from being able to ally themselves with Anglos from a position of relative strength (they were needed to help Anglos learn how to locate and fight Comanches) to being in a dependent, almost subservient role. The Lipan Apaches had been moved out of the
Medina and Guadalupe valleys into the harsh country west of the Pecos River. They would soon come to believe that their destiny lay elsewhere and move to Mexico to join their other tribesmen and Mescalero cousins. The Tonkawas were pushed out of the Colorado valley near Bastrop and wandered the western edge of the settlements, never able to find a permanent place for long before settlers arrived. They would continue to ally themselves with Texas for many years but would never be equal partners; their role would always be one of dependence. Immigrant Indians such as the Delawares and Shawnees, despite being crucial to Houston’s and Jones’s peace policy in the last years of the Republic, were moved away from their Bosque Creek homes further up the Brazos. The Wichita and Caddo bands, despite becoming allies of Texas and urging others to come to peace with the Anglos, were treated in a similar manner and often shot on sight by Rangers. The Penateka Comanches, ravaged by disease and controlled by older chiefs who wished to avoid bloodshed, had assumed a docile posture. Those who disagreed with this conciliatory policy and were frustrated by the United States governments ability to establish a boundary line, such as Buffalo Hump and Pa-ha-yuco, drifted north into the orbit of the more warlike Kotsoteka and Nokoni Comanches. By 1853, many of these Indians had decided that settling on a reserve was preferable to the current state of affairs.34

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34 Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 211.
CHAPTER 4

THE RESERVATION EXPERIMENT, 1854 – 1859

By 1859, the governments of both Texas and the United States had come to believe that settling the Indians on reservations was the only way to save them from destruction and end warfare on the frontier. Because the federal government owned no public land in Texas, state officials needed to be convinced of the necessity for leasing land for reserves. Robert S. Neighbors took the lead in this process. In 1852, Neighbors, now a member of the Texas House of Representatives co-sponsored a bill with his old friend and El Paso expedition compatriot, state Senator John S. “Rip” Ford, which authorized the governor to set aside public lands in Texas to be leased to the United States government for the purpose of establishing Indian reservations. Governor Peter H. Bell initially refused to sign the bill, but in late 1853 relented under pressure from the Pierce administration. In an address to the legislature on November 9, the outgoing governor urged passage of a bill providing for the establishment of reserves. This would bring yet another important shift in the relationship of Texas with its Indian allies.¹

Before the state legislature would agree to the establishment of the reserves, however, they insisted upon two stipulations: First, the federal government had to remove all Indians who were not native to Texas, and second, they had to agree to return the land to the state when the reservations were not needed anymore. The United States agreed to the stipulations and in April of 1853, about 300 Delawares, Shawnees and Quapaws were rounded up by Agent Howard near Forts Graham and

¹ Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 210-211; Neighbours, Neighbors, 104.
Croghan and removed to Indian Territory. For the second time, these faithful allies of Texas were removed from the state. Like before, they would soon return.²

The state legislature then set to work drafting legislation to provide for reservations. On February 6, 1854, newly inaugurated governor Edmund M. Pease signed a bill which provided for twelve leagues of land in West Texas for reservations, although only eight leagues were actually used. Agent Neighbors, who regained his job under the new Democratic administration of Franklin Pierce, and Major Marcy of the Army scouted the locations for the reserves and found two locations near Fort Belknap that were satisfactory to both the Indians and the state government. One reserve was established for the sedentary Indians just south of Fort Belknap in the rich Brazos bottoms in present Young County. It came to be known as the Brazos or Lower Reserve. By late May of 1855, this reserve had grown to a population of about 750 Indians. These Indians included José María’s Caddos, Acaquash’s Wichitas, the Delawares under Jim Ned and John Conner, and Placido’s Tonkawas. By the end of 1855, there would be just over 1,000 Indians on this reserve. George W. Hill, who had replaced Jesse Stem as Caddo agent, was initially named agent in charge of the Brazos Reserve but was replaced in the summer of 1855 by former Texas Ranger captain Shapley P. Ross.³

² Proceedings of House of Representatives Committee on Indian Affairs, August 26, 1850, NARG 75, LR; Neighbours, Neighbors, 110.

³ Report of R.B. Marcy and R.S. Neighbors to P.H. Bell, September 30, 1854, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 186-89; Census for the Caddo, 1855, census for the Anadarko, 1855, census for the Tawakonis, 1855, census for the Wacos, 1855, census for the Tonkawas, 1855, NARG 75, LRTA; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 219-220; Neighbours, Neighbors, 40.
A separate reserve was established for the Comanches further upstream on the Clear Fork of the Brazos in modern Throckmorton County and became known as the Clear Fork or Upper Reserve. Neighbors was less successful in inducing the nomadic Comanches to populate this reserve. Only Ketumpse’s and Sanaco’s small bands of Penateka Comanches settled there in the fall of 1854. More notable Penateka leaders such as Buffalo Hump and Pa-ha-yuco stayed away and remained hostile. Census records for this reserve show that the bands that did populate the Clear Fork Reserve were composed mostly of the elderly, women and children. This suggests that many of the young warriors may have joined Buffalo Hump or the Kotsotekas and Nokonis. In March of 1855, the small bands already on the reserves were joined by seventy-nine more Penatekas, who reported that the Northern Comanches planned to break up the reserves. In October of 1855, John R. Baylor was named agent for the Clear Fork Reserve, while Neighbors was given the title Supervising Agent over both reserves.4

Neighbors would have liked to bring the Apaches to the Brazos as well, but the attacks on the Lipans in 1852 and 1853 made that impossible. Instead, he proposed taking the remaining four leagues of land allowed by law and setting them aside for the Lipans and Mescaleros in the Trans-Pecos region of Texas. Those reserves never materialized because of renewed depredations by the Lipans. Their anger over being attacked in 1852 and 1853, loss of buffalo as well as the transfer of most of Texas’s Army contingent to deal with troubles in Kansas created a situation in which the Lipans attacked farms and stole livestock in the Laredo and San Antonio areas in 1854. The

4 Census for the Comanche, March, 1855, NARG 75, LR, Texas Agency; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 40.
final straw came when three members of the Forrester family were brutally murdered some twenty-five miles north of San Antonio. The three perpetrators were widely believed to be Lipans, a suspicion which was confirmed in the minds of many when John Castro fled Texas for Mexico. Although it turned out that the perpetrators had been a renegade band of Tonkawas, Agent Howard’s inept handling of the situation caused John Castro to flee for his life. With him went the last hope of any friendly relations between Anglos and Lipan Apaches in Texas.5

Continued depredations on the frontier in the late fall of 1854 led General Persifor F. Smith, commanding the Department of Texas, to order a campaign against the Comanches. He directed Captain William J. Newton to lead 300 dragoons out of Fort Chadbourne to find stolen livestock. Smith and Newton had come to suspect Ketumpse’s and Sanaco’s band on the Clear Fork Reserve. Northern Comanches and Penatekas who had rejected reservation life often passed through that reserve on their way to and from raids, making it appear that the reserve Indians were the raiders. The mistake Neighbors and other government officials had made was in assuming that in dealing with Ketumpse, they were dealing with a person of influence and importance in Comanche circles. In any event, Neighbors learned from the commanding officer at Fort Belknap that Newton’s force intended to attack the Upper Reserve. Whether or not this was true or just a rumor, Neighbors was alarmed and quickly wrote Governor Pease

5 Report of R.B. Marcy and R.S. Neighbors to P.H. Bell, September 30, 1854, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III, 189-90; Letter from E.M. Pease to R.S. Neighbors, March 24, 1854, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), in ibid., 183; Pease to Citizens of Burnet, Bell, McLennan and Williamson Counties, May 8, 1854, in ibid., 184-185; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 215-217;
asking him to use his influence to get General Smith to suspend the operation. Major Steen visited Clear Fork and found no stolen animals, which placated Newton. The rumors frightened Sanaco’s band, however, and they ran away. This incident served to build a level of distrust between the Indian agents and the Army, a rift that would continue to grow and have serious consequences for the Indians.  

Depredations continued during the summer and early fall of 1855. On August 31 of that year, a party of twelve to fifteen Indians raided along Cibolo Creek in present Kendall County, carrying off some livestock and killing two people, a slave woman and a twelve year-old boy. The residents of Bexar County blamed the raids in their area on the reservation Comanches and Wichitas but they were more likely committed by Northern Comanches, as subsequent evidence later showed. Lipan raids continued all along the South Texas frontier from Webb to Comal counties, and the residents of the frontier counties began to grow restless and clamor for Rangers. Governor Pease called out one Ranger company under the command of Captain J. M. Callahan and stationed them near the headwaters of the Guadalupe and Blanco Rivers in present Kendall and Kerr Counties. This seemed to stop depredations in the area for a short time, but they soon did more harm than good. Pease was hesitant to call up more Ranger units, writing to General Smith, “There is great danger, if I call out volunteers, that they may in their zeal to punish the Indians, do something to interfere with the efforts now making by the General Government to settle the Texas tribes at the reservations on the upper Brazos.” Instead, he requested that General Smith send

6 Neighbors to Pease, December 7, 1854, in Winfrey and Day (eds.) Texas Indian Papers, III: 191-192; Anderson, Conquest of Texas, 266; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 40.
some cavalry troops to patrol the Hill Country and stop the depredations. This help
never arrived.⁷

Livestock had been stolen from the two reservations on the Brazos as well, a fact
that tended to implicate the Northern Comanches rather than Ketumpse’s band.
Neighbors asked Major Gabriel René Paul at Fort Belknap to help track down the
missing livestock and to help patrol the area. Paul refused, so Neighbors turned to a
more reliable source, his own Indians. In the summer of 1855 he authorized Agent
Ross to organize a “ranger” company of sorts, composed of Brazos Agency Caddos,
Wichitas, and Delawares.⁸

In September of 1855, some horses were stolen from the Brazos Reserve and
Ross sent a party of twelve Delawares and a Caddo to recover them. The party was
commanded by a Delaware named Jacob. They left the agency on the 24th, and
followed the trail of the thieves for five days before coming across a fresher trail and
deciding to follow it. After following the new trail for half a day, they crossed the Red
River and saw ten Indians approaching. They were Yamparika Comanches and their

⁷ Letter from Bexar County Committee to E.M. Pease, September 1, 1855, in
Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III, 232-34; Letter from Comal County
Committee to E.M. Pease, September 13, 1855, in ibid., 237-238; Petition to E.M.
Pease for Rangers in Goliad County, September 13, 1855, in ibid., 238-240; Letter from
E.M. Pease to P. F. Smith, September 5, 1855, in ibid., 235-236 (quotation, pg. 235);
The governor’s instincts about volunteers proved to be correct. In early October,
Callahan chased some Lipans across the Rio Grande into Mexico. Finding opposition
stiffer than he expected, his Rangers took refuge in the border town of Piedras Negras,
Coahuila, burned it to the ground, and retreated across the river losing many of their
guns, horses and almost creating an international incident. For more information see
Ronnie C. Tyler, "The Callahan Expedition of 1855: Indians or Negroes?" Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 70 (April 1967).

⁸ Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 226.
leader told Jacob they were going to Texas to kill and steal horses. He also said they had just passed two Nokoni Comanches who had killed a man at the mouth of the Clear Fork and stole seven horses from the Leon. Jacob proposed that both parties camp for the night, and the Yamparikas agreed. As they set up camp, Jacob gathered much intelligence from the Yamparika leader, who apparently did not realize they were reserve Indians at first. Jacob learned that the reserve horses had been stolen by five Tawehash Indians, that the Northern Comanches had declared war on all people south of the Red River, Anglo and Indian, that they planned to kill John Conner, and that the Northern Comanches and Kiowas were making their winter camp on the head of the main branch of the Red River. After this, Jacob told the Yamparika leader that he lived on the Brazos Reserve and showed him the pass which Agent Ross had issued him. The situation became tense immediately. Neither group built a fire or slept during the night. While some of the Comanches gambled, the Delawares managed to cut some of their bow strings. At daybreak, the Yamparika leader ordered his men to attack, but the Delawares, who understood Comanche, charged first, killing seven and wounding one. Going through the Comanche camp they found a velvet coat caked with blood, a daguerreotype, and the Comanche leader’s shield which had twenty female scalps tied to it, half of them Anglo. This proved that at least this band of Northern Comanches had been doing some depredating in Texas9

In doing the job that the Army should have been doing, these thirteen Indian scouts from the Brazos Agency proved who was committing depredations in Texas and

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9 Ross to Neighbors, October 7, 1855, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, III: 250-251; Baylor to Neighbors, October 7, 1855, in ibid., 251-253.
why. Neighbors became understandably alarmed. Many federal troops that had been in northwestern Texas were still in Kansas or Utah, and the troops at Fort Belknap and Fort Chadbourne were mostly infantry, hardly effective against the mobile Comanches and Kiowas. What mounted troops there were on the frontier were mostly dragoons, an outmoded style of heavy cavalry that carried sabers and carbines rather than revolvers. What Ranger troops had been called into service were in the Hill Country, South Texas, or burning and looting border towns in Coahuila. Neighbors was convinced that the Northern Comanches could attack at anytime and that the only thing stopping them from wreaking havoc were a few hundred poorly equipped soldiers and the Brazos Reserve Indians. Accordingly, he asked Governor Pease to press the federal government to provide more troops.10

The federal government responded to the call for more troops in northwestern Texas by sending the Second Cavalry in late 1855. This elite unit was specifically designed for mobile plains operations and was intended by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis to replace the ineffective infantry units and dragoons, which were basically mounted infantry. The Second Cavalry was outfitted to fight from horseback, carried revolvers rather than carbines, and were mounted on the finest horseflesh the army could procure. Furthermore, this unit was commanded by someone who had experience in Texas, former Republic of Texas Secretary of War Albert Sidney Johnston. The Second Cavalry set up headquarters ten miles west of the Clear Fork Reserve at Camp Cooper.11

10 Neighbors to Pease, October 20, 1855, ibid., 257;
The arrival of the Second Cavalry also signaled a shift in the War Department’s policy toward the plains Indians. After all, elite units were designed to fight, not to watch Indians on a reservation. From early 1856 forward, any Indians not on a reservation would be considered hostile and subject to attack. In order to pursue this policy, however, the hostile Indians first had to be located and for that, the reserve Indians were needed. In June of 1856, a detachment of the Second Cavalry under Colonel Robert E. Lee left Camp Cooper looking for Buffalo Hump’s Penatekas and Iron Jacket’s Kotsotekas, both of whom were believed to have committed recent depredations. Accompanying Lee was a group of Caddo and Delaware scouts from the Brazos Reserve led by the ubiquitous Jim Shaw. Lee’s command traveled west to the headwaters of the Brazos in present Stonewall County and then turned north. After three weeks, they reached the Red River but had still seen no hostile Indians. Determined not to give up yet, Lee sent a detachment under Major Earl Van Dorn with Shaw and several Indian scouts. They found one small hunting party and killed four Comanches. Because of a drought, most of the Northern Comanches were on the Arkansas River in Colorado Territory hunting buffalo.\(^\text{12}\)

Although Lee’s expedition was unsuccessful in locating and bringing to battle the Northern Comanches, Shaw and the Delaware scouts did play a vital role. They guided Lee’s men through an area of Texas that few Anglos had ever seen before and got them back safely. According to Lee, the expedition at least served noticed that the


\(^{12}\) Simpson, *Cry Comanche*, 75-76; Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 226-227.
Army was willing and able to ride out onto the high plains in search of hostile Comanches. Without the Delawares, this could not be done. If the Army got nothing else from this expedition they learned what the Texas Rangers had long known: extensive campaigning in hostile territory required the use of Indian allies as scouts.\(^{13}\)

When they were not scouting for the Army or the Rangers, the Indians on the Brazos Reserve continued in their efforts to adjust to reservation life. Their crops for 1856 and 1857 were largely successful and were considered by Agent Ross to be superior to those of the local farmers. In 1857, schools were established on both reserves. Although the Penateka school did not fare very well, the Brazos Reserve school showed some promise. Well into 1857, it appeared that the reservations were serving their purpose and the Indians were beginning to acculturate to Anglo society.\(^{14}\)

Unfortunately, the political climate began to change in 1857 for a number of reasons, and by 1858, public opinion was turning in favor of removing the Indians to Indian Territory. John R. Baylor was dismissed as agent of the Clear Fork Reserve for stealing and afterwards did everything he possibly could to destroy both reservations. He was replaced by Agent Matthew Leeper, a more savory albeit hardly more effective character. The outbreak of the Mormon War in Utah also caused the federal government to order most of the Second Cavalry away from Texas to deal with that conflict. Less cavalry meant increased raiding and Baylor and his cronies were


effectively able to blame depredations on the reserve Indians. Another factor contributing to the loss of support of the reservation experiment was that Neighbors’s main political ally, Sam Houston, lost his Senate seat and then failed in a bid for governor of Texas in 1857. The new governor, Harden Runnels, was more interested in maintaining the support of the frontier population than in seeing justice done for the Indians who had helped and were continuing to help tame the Texas frontier. The same year, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, also opened the Wichita Agency in southwestern Indian Territory to house the northern Wichitas and Caddos, many of whom had relatives on the Brazos Reserve. Soon, some Texas politicians and land speculators who coveted the rich Brazos River lands that the reserves occupied, began clamoring for the removal of the Texas Indians to this new agency.¹⁵

The political changes in and of themselves may not have been momentous were it not for the increased attacks of the Northern Comanches. In October of 1857, the Kotsotekas under Iron Jacket launched raids into Texas, stealing horses from both the Clear Fork Reserve and 180 horses from a local ranch. Shortly thereafter 150 horses were reported stolen from Erath and Comal Counties. With most of the Second Cavalry gone, the only troops garrisoned in northwestern Texas were infantry and they were not very effective against mounted plains warriors.

These continued depredations put many frontier residents of Texas in a state of panic and it was clear that with the Second Cavalry gone, the infantry was not going to be much help in putting a stop to the raids. Therefore, on January 26, 1858, the state

¹⁵ Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 228; Neighbours, *Neighbors*, 183, 194-195;
legislature passed a bill authorizing Governor Runnels to call up 100 Rangers and providing $70,000 to equip and maintain them. Captain John S. “Rip” Ford was appointed to lead this force. Ford’s instructions required him to cooperate with the Army and Indian agents, but not to brook any interference with the progress of his mission. That mission was defined as follows: “Follow any and all trails of hostile or suspected hostile Indians you may discover, and if possible, overtake and chastise them, if unfriendly.” In short, Ford’s job was to discover who was doing the raiding, and if it was the “unfriendly” or non-reserve Indians, follow them and inflict a devastating blow.16

In February, Ford’s Rangers left the Austin area for the frontier. His men established Camp Runnels on the Clear Fork of the Brazos, in between the two reserves and convenient to Fort Belknap as well. Ford’s company scouted near the reserves and was unable to find any evidence that the reserve Indians were in any way culpable in recent depredations. At a meeting at Baylor’s ranch, Ford’s lieutenant, Allison Nelson, tried to convince him to plant evidence using Comanche arrows and blame depredations on the Clear Fork Comanches. Ford refused. In fact, the area was raided by Northern Comanches and part of Ford’s command pursued them unsuccessfully. While at the Brazos Reserve, Ford formed a favorable opinion of the reservation experiment. In a letter to Governor Runnels he wrote:

They have cut loose from the wild Indians for good, and have, so far as they can, identified themselves with the whites in every way. They say they wish to become Americans. The strides they are making in the way of becoming civilized are great, and, I might even say, astonishing. They are trying to imitate the whites in manners, in dress, in agriculture, and in all essential particulars. They have large fields of wheat and corn, which they have planted themselves, and are now cultivating. Waggons [sic] drawn by oxen and driven by Indians;

16 Runnels to Ford, January 28, 1858, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, III: 272-273; Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 229;
women and children dropping corn; all give the scenes at the different villages quite an American appearance. There is no disorder, no discontent, and no disposition to give trouble to the Agent or the Government. They are endeavoring to fulfill the treaty stipulations and to give satisfaction to the Americans. I speak of what I have seen and heard, and believe it is true. I should view any combinations of circumstances which tended towards the breaking up of this Reserve, as a serious misfortune to the State of Texas, and a calamity over which the philanthropist might mourn.¹⁷

After becoming convinced that the Northern Comanches and not the agency Indians were to blame for the depredations, Ford began to plan an expedition into the heart of Kotsoteka country to punish them. Agent Ross promised the support of the Brazos Reserve Indians, who were very eager to inflict a blow upon the Comanches who had stolen their livestock and to prove their loyalty to the United States and to Texas. Initially, one of the most important leaders on the Brazos reserve, Anadarko chief José María, was reluctant to participate. Agent Ross soon discovered that the old chief had made a treaty with the Comanches and the Creeks in which it was agreed that one party could not make war on another without the consent of the third. Agent Ross told him he was right to honor his treaty but that he could send a messenger to the Creeks and obtain their consent. He did, and was soon ready to lead his people on the expedition.¹⁸

On April 22, 1858 Ford's Rangers and 113 Brazos Reserve Indians left Camp Runnels and rode north to find the Northern Comanches. Agent Ross was in command of the Indians. Jim Pockmark and José María led the Caddos, Placido and O'Quinn led

¹⁷ Ford to Runnels, Governors Letters, Texas State Archives (quotation); John Ford affidavit, November 22, 1858, Edward Burleson statement November 22, 1858, NARG 75, LRTA; Neighbours, Neighbors, 197-198.

¹⁸ Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, 227-228.
the Tonkawas, Acaquash led the Wacos, Jim Linney led the Shawnees and Delawares, and Nid-e-wats led the Tawakonis. Ford described these Indians as “men of more than ordinary intellect who possessed minute information concerning the geography and topography of that country – of all of Texas, most of Mexico, and all of the Indian Territory and adjacent regions.”

On April 29, the party began crossing the Red River. Here the Indians probably saved the command by identifying areas of quicksand to avoid. After getting across this stream, the Indian scouts would move fifteen to twenty miles ahead of the main force because they were in hostile territory. In early May, they came across a buffalo herd and the Indians had a successful hunt that provided fresh meat for the expedition. On May 11, the Indian scouts spotted Comanche buffalo hunters and on the morning of May 12, the 100 Rangers and 113 Indians approached Iron Jacket’s Kotsoteka encampment in present Roger Mills County, Oklahoma.

Ford’s original plan had been to surround the camp during the night and just before dawn have the Indians stampede the Comanche caballado. However, they arrived too late and at 7 a.m. on May 12, they overran a small camp of five lodges. Two Kotsotekas escaped to warn the main camp. With the element of surprise now gone, Ford employed a different tactic. He placed the reserve Indians in front of the Rangers to make the Comanches think they were dealing with bows and arrows rather than rifles and revolvers. As the reserve Indians approached the main camp, Iron Jacket rode out to confront them. The Kotsoteka chief got his name from the coat of Spanish mail that

19 Ibid., 229, 231-32 (quotation); Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 229.

20 Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, 229-232.
he wore. Iron Jacket was also a medicine man and believed that not only would his armor protect him from projectiles, but that he could blow them aside with his breath. Ford described this part of the battle saying, “He would move forward a short distance, describe a circle, and expel breath from his mouth with great force. . . . He was destined to fail: our Indians were armed mostly with Mississippi rifles and six-shooters.” As Iron Jacket put on this display with his warriors behind him, at least six rifle shots rang out from the Indian allies and emptied the Kotsoteka leader’s saddle.21

The Indians and Rangers then charged into the camp and the fighting became fierce. At one point the Comanche second-in-command tried to rally his men but was shot down by a Shawnee named Chul-e-quah. Ford’s command pursued the Kotsotekas until early afternoon when they returned to the enemy camp to rest their tired horses. They were not able to rest for long, however, as warriors from another Comanche camp three or four miles up the Canadian River rushed to join the battle. The reserve Indians tried to induce them to make a foolish charge but the Comanches refused to take the bait. Ford then decided that the Indians would remain with the prisoners and captured horses while the Rangers attacked. They did, and they Comanches soon left the field.22

As the Rangers and Indians moved back through the abandoned Comanche camp on the way to their own camp, they noticed that many of the dead Comanches were missing hands and feet. It was soon determined that these appendages were taken by the Tonkawas for their ritualistic cannibalism. This practice of the Tonkawas

21 Ibid., 232-233.

22 Ibid., 235-236.
made them the *bêtes noirs* of the Brazos Agency and was extremely disconcerting to the Anglos. At least one Anglo was curious about the practice, however, and asked Tonkawa O’Quinn what nationality tasted best to him. When O’Quinn replied that the answer was a big fat Dutchman he had killed on the Guadalupe in 1849, he almost came to blows with a ranger named Holzinger. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed, the subject was dropped, and the unity of the group remained intact.²³

The importance of the Indians to the success of this expedition can not be overestimated. Not only did they scout for the force, they provided the majority of fighting men. In Ford’s official report to Governor Runnels he wrote, “In justice to our Indian allies I beg leave to say they behaved most excellently on the field of battle. They deserve well of Texas and are entitled to the gratitude of the frontier people.” In his congratulatory address to the members of the expedition, given at the Brazos Reserve, Governor Runnels declared, “Be assured that the deeds of gallantry and valor, performed by each and all of you who were engaged in the fight, gallant Rangers and brave Indian allies, Officers and men will be held in grateful rememberance [sic] by the people of Texas.” As subsequent events would show, he could not have been more wrong about the public perception of the Indian allies. Praise for the Indian allies was not confined to those in the state government. The *Austin State Gazette* recommended that Placido be rewarded for his involvement with a gift of some livestock. The editor also offered this backhanded compliment:

He has done much by his example and by his conversation to encourage his countrymen to abandon their wild pursuits of the chase, and follow those of

²³ Ibid., 236-237.
civilized life, and he has had, and continues to have much to contend against in the indolence and improvidence of the Indian character.24

Despite the success of the Canadian River expedition and the assistance provided by the Brazos Indians, the clamor for their removal continued to grow throughout 1858. John R. Baylor organized meetings and petition drives aimed at closing the reservations. He also founded a newspaper in Weatherford called The Whiteman to promulgate his racist views. Baylor contributed frequent editorials to this paper designed to convince people that the Indians of both reserves were involved in raiding and killing settlers. In one such letter he claimed that a man killed in a recent raid was pierced with arrows fletched with chicken feathers. The implication was clear: Comanches did not keep chickens but Wichitas and Caddos did.25

The Canadian River expedition also failed to halt the raids of the Northern Comanches. In fact, they were furious over the incursion into their territory and began to raid with more frequency. When elements of the Second Cavalry returned to Texas in 1858 following the end of the Mormon Rebellion, there was pressure on them to do something. In the fall of 1858 Major Earl Van Dorn began planning another punitive expedition to Comanche territory. Van Dorn had been critical of Agent Shapley P. Ross, alleging that he favored Rangers over the regular Army because his Indians had never accompanied an Army expedition. Van Dorn must have forgotten his own experience with Jim Shaw and his Delaware scouts in 1856. In any event, Ross

24 Ford, *Rip Ford’s Texas*, 238 (first quotation); Address by H.R. Runnels to Captain Ford’s Company of Texas Rangers, May 28, 1858, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, III: 287 (second quotation); Reprinted in *Dallas Herald*, July 24, 1858 (third quotation).

25 Baylor to editor, April 15, 1858, NARG 75, LRTA; Neighbours, *Neighbors*, 195
retorted that Van Dorn could use the Brazos Indians anytime he wanted and in September of 1858, about 100 Caddos, Wichitas, Delawares and Shawnees accompanied Van Dorn into the Indian Territory.  

Agent Ross was ready to lead his Indians into the field again but was asked by Tonkawa chief Placido to remain at the Agency. The Indians were afraid that if anything happened to the agent, they would be blamed for it, which, given the current political climate in northwest Texas, was an astute observation. They also wanted Ross to remain to protect their wives and children. Instead, they requested that Ross’s son, twenty-year-old Lawrence Sullivan Ross, a future governor of Texas, lead them. On October 1, 1858, Van Dorn’s four companies of the Second Cavalry and the Brazos Reserve Indians struck Buffalo Hump’s town on the Cimmaron River in present Oklahoma. While the soldiers attacked the camp, the Indians stampeded the Comanche caballado. Over seventy Comanches were killed as opposed to five killed and twelve wounded among Van Dorn’s command, among them Van Dorn and Ross. Unfortunately, Van Dorn was unaware that Buffalo Hump was at that moment meeting with the Supervising Agent in charge of Indian Territory to discuss settling on a reserve. The attack killed any chance of that. 

Not content to let the Army deal with the Northern Comanches, Governor Runnels assigned Rip Ford to raise another company of Rangers in November of 1858.


Ford’s company began scouting up the Colorado River to the mouth of Pecan Bayou in present Mills County. He then received a letter from Agent Ross stating that Northern Comanches had stolen horses from the Brazos Agency and requesting help in tracking down the thieves. The Rangers went to the agency and were joined by a contingent of Shawnee and Delaware scouts. The party traveled first to Camp Radziminski on the Red River in present Kiowa County, Oklahoma, hoping to organize a joint expedition with Major Van Dorn. When that did not materialize, Ford’s company moved west along the Red River in search of hostile Comanches. Two Shawnee veterans of the Canadian River campaign played prominent roles on this expedition. Chul-e-quah was in charge of the scouts, and Jim Linney was in charge of the advance guard. Somewhere south of Pease River, Chul-e-quah and Linney, communicating in sign language, changed the direction of the march at a right angle. When Ford asked Linney what was going on, he said Chul-e-quah had found no water in that direction. Ford later learned that the Shawnees had found signs of a Comanche party too numerous for the Rangers and Indians to successfully deal with but if they told Ford about it, he would attack anyway. While definitely manipulative, the Shawnee’s ploy may have saved the expedition and Ford’s life.28

By the time Ford’s party arrived back at the Reserves in late December, all Hell had broken loose. Baylor had continued to agitate for the removal of the Indians and had gathered a mob of around 300 men calling themselves the “Jacksboro Rangers.” This group had begun to put pressure on local law enforcement and soon sheriffs were trying to go onto the Reserves and arrest Indians. On one such occasion, Young

28 Runnels to Ford, November 2, 1858, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 304; Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, 245-246.
County Sheriff Joseph R. King tried to arrest one of the Clear Fork Comanches. He was met by Agents Leeper and Neighbors who told him in no uncertain terms that the Reserves were federal property and that he had no jurisdiction over them. The sheriff backed down but incidents of this sort continued.29

Then, the week after Christmas of 1858, a vigilante group led by Erath County resident Peter Garland found a small hunting party of Caddos and Wichitas just outside the limits of the Brazos Reserve in Palo Pinto County and fired into their tents killing four men, three women, and wounding several children. A livid Neighbors asked for an arrest warrant and got one from District Judge Nicholas Battle who ordered Ford to serve it. Ford refused, saying he would only assist the Erath County sheriff. The sheriff was on the side of the mob so nothing was done, in spite of Governor Runnels sending several letters to Ford, assuring him that he had legal jurisdiction to serve the warrant and arrest Garland and his cronies.30

Neighbors then asked Governor Runnels to impose martial law. Runnels, afraid of offending the frontier population to whom he owed his election, refused. Instead, he issued a proclamation in which he ordered the vigilantes to stay away from the reservations and cooperate with the civil authorities. This pronouncement had little effect. Baylor and his mob were hell-bent on attacking the Indians and all civil order in

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29 Neighbours, Neighbors, 220-221.

that part of Texas had crumbled. The vigilantes had no fear of the law, and peace officers were afraid to serve the mob with warrants.\(^{31}\)

Despite the threats to their homes, women and children, at least forty Brazos Reserve Indians left with Van Dorn on another punitive expedition that spring. On May 13, 1859, the Caddos, Wichitas, Delawares and Shawnees participated in Van Dorn’s attack on a Comanche camp on the Cimarron River which killed 57 Comanches. The Reserve Indians were led by Caddo Jim Pockmark and Delaware Jack Harry. Shawnee Jim served as an interpreter and was instrumental in gathering information about the Comanches’ location. Van Dorn preferred the Reserve Indians to act as scouts only but they insisted upon entering the battle and wore white headbands to distinguish themselves from the enemy.\(^{32}\)

While these warriors were fighting with Van Dorn, Baylor’s mob, some 300 strong, began to increase their threats against the Reserve Indians. On March 28, Baylor and his “Jacksboro Rangers” entered the Brazos Reserve with the intent of attacking the Indians. They expected Allison Nelson, Ford’s lieutenant on the Canadian River campaign to show up with hundreds more. When Nelson arrived with only thirty-five, they lost their nerve and left. Shortly after this incident, Neighbors published a letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs approving Neighbors’ recommendation to move the Texas Indians to Indian Territory. Neighbors hoped that the knowledge that the Indians were leaving would put an end to the threats against them. It did not. At

\(^{31}\) Proclamation by H.R. Runnels, January 10, 1859, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, III: 312.

this point, Baylor and his minions were out for blood and would be satisfied with nothing less.33

By early May, the agents had already been at work for a month rounding up Indian property and preparing for the move. At this point, Baylor’s mob moved toward the agency again. A prominent member of the mob, a Jacksboro resident named Patrick Murphy, killed a Caddo named Fox, who was carrying mail to Neighbors from Fort Arbuckle. Murphy scalped the man and rode back to the mob with his trophy. Other members of the mob chased other Indians but were not able to catch them. Neighbors convinced a United States Marshal to arrest Murphy. The marshal rode to Jacksboro with twenty soldiers and ninety Indians but a huge crowd gathered and forced them to back down. Murphy went unpunished.34

This display of power emboldened Baylor and his cohorts and on May 23, Baylor, Nelson, Murphy and the rest of the “Jacksboro Rangers” rode to the Brazos Agency bent on killing Indians. Outside the agency headquarters they were confronted by Captain Jacob Plummer and a company of the Seventh Infantry. Baylor warned Plummer that he had come for the Indians and if any soldiers shot his men, they would be prosecuted and executed by the state of Texas. Plummer replied that the Army would defend federal property and the Indians in its charge. While Baylor and Plummer were staring each other down, the mob grew restless and caught an old Caddo man and woman. They killed the woman, hung the man, scalped him and left him to die. That was the last straw for the Indians. About fifty enraged Indians led by José María

33 Smith, *Dominance to Disappearance*, 236-237.

34 Ibid., 237-238.
and Jim Pockmark, who had just returned from campaigning with Van Dorn, charged the mob. Plummer ordered his men into the fray alongside the Indians. The mob, which had previously appeared bloodthirsty, now ran and tried to take refuge at William Marlin's ranch just outside the Reserve. Intermittent shooting between the two parties continued for hours. At one point, Jim Pockmark challenged Baylor to meet him in single combat. Baylor remained hidden inside the ranch house.35

Neighbors tried to get indictments against the leaders of this vigilante group but no one was willing to testify. Governor Runnels appointed a peace commission that was decidedly pro-Baylor. His instructions to the commissioners stated, among other things, "With acts of violence which may have been already committed you have nothing to do, as they must be adjudicated upon by the courts of the country, but you will use all your exertions to gather facts for the purpose of ascertaining the true causes of the difficulties and to remove by all legal means those causes in the future and thereby secure a settlement between the parties which will ensure permanent peace." This was basically empty rhetoric, since everyone already knew what the "true cause of difficulties" was. It was also unlikely, with the Indians soon to be removed, that the mob, especially after the whipping they received at the hands of fifty Indians on May 23, would come back for another try. This appointment of commissioners was Runnels attempt to appear to be doing something without really doing anything.36

35 Letter to Runnels, May 24, 1859, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), Texas Indian Papers, III: 328-329; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 238-240.

36 Appointment of Peace Commissioners by Runnels, June 6, 1859, ibid., 331-332; Smith, Dominance to Disappearance, 240-241.
The commission eventually concluded that the Reserve Indians had been responsible for the depredations. In the meantime, one member of the commission, John Henry Brown, who later wrote an influential history of the Indian wars in Texas, organized a Ranger company and stationed them just outside the Brazos Reserve. He claimed in his communications to Neighbors that his orders from the state authorized him to shoot any Indian caught off the reserve without an Anglo chaperone. When Neighbors protested that the Indians were in the process of rounding up their livestock for the move to Indian Territory, Brown replied that if they needed Anglo chaperones, he would be happy to have his Rangers escort them. Otherwise, if he found Indians off the Reserves without white men accompanying them, they would be shot. Neighbors, disgusted, refused to let Brown’s Rangers follow the Indians on their errands and as a result, when the Indians moved, they left much of their livestock in Texas.37

In late July, the Indians began the trek northward. Leeper and his 380 Comanches left first, followed by Neighbors, Ross, and the 1,056 Caddos, Wichitas, Delawares, Shawnees and Tonkawas from the Brazos Reserve. On August 8, the caravan crossed the Red River. That night, Neighbors wrote to his wife that he had “crossed all of the Indians out of the heathen land of ‘Texas’ and am now ‘out of the land of the Philistines’.” Unfortunately, Neighbors would pay for his stance in defense of the Indians. On September 14, 1859, he was in the town of Fort Belknap finishing up some paperwork with the Young County clerk of court. When he left the office, he was confronted by Patrick Murphy, who asked if Neighbors had accused him of horse theft.

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While Neighbors was distracted, Murphy’s son-in-law, Edward Cornett, shot the agent in the back with a shotgun at point-blank range.\textsuperscript{38}

The story of the Indian allies during the reservation period is a sad commentary on the faithfulness of the state they had served. The Caddos, Wichitas, Delawares, Shawnees and Tonkawas participated in military expeditions with both Texas Rangers and Army troops and risked their lives. Despite the efforts of men like Neighbors and Ross, the political climate combined with fear of Indian raids was such that a small cadre of ruffians could incite the frontier population to clamor for their removal. The majority of Texas’s population, concentrated in East Texas in the late 1850’s, were distracted by national events and by rumors of secession that would soon draw Texas into the Civil War. The unique conditions under which Texas was admitted to the Union caused a dichotomous Indian policy to develop between Washington D.C. and Austin. Since ultimate responsibility for Indian policy lay with the federal government, Texas politicians were able to charge the national government with incompetence and indifference, while at the same time hampering the government’s efforts. Such a situation allowed Gov. Hardin Runnels to praise the Indian allies in May of 1858 after the Canadian River campaign and a year later tacitly support their removal.\textsuperscript{39}

Yet, the assistance rendered by the Indian allies enabled them to stay in Texas longer than they otherwise would have. If the Wichitas and Caddos had not given up raiding and turned solely to agriculture (they had practiced agriculture for centuries but

\textsuperscript{38} Neighbors to his wife, August 8, 1859, Neighbors Papers, Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin, TX; Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance}, 244; Neighbours, \textit{Neighbors}, 282-283.

\textsuperscript{39} Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance}, 230, 240.
supplemented it by hunting and raiding), it is far more likely that they would have been removed or even exterminated sooner. Even the Tonkawas, the *bêtes noirs* of the Texas Indians, were so loyal to the Anglos that even after removal, a remnant came back to Texas and stayed until 1884. The Delawares and Shawnees made themselves indispensable to both Texas Rangers and the United States Army by being able to guide these units into areas where Anglos could not otherwise travel safely. Their skill as interpreters and intermediaries with the Comanches and Kiowas made them useful and ensured their place in Texas until political conditions grew too contentious. Perhaps these Indians could have provided some measure of frontier defense for Texas during the Civil War as well.
When the reservation Indians were removed from the state in 1859, the government of Texas was confronted with a problem of its own making. For the better part of a decade the Indian allies had been a buffer to aggression from the Northern Comanches and Kiowas. Delaware, Shawnee, Caddo, Wichita and Tonkawa scouts had ridden with both Army and Texas Ranger expeditions, enabling them to locate hostile Comanches and reliable sources of water. With these Indians gone, what would the Rangers do for scouts? Apparently, Texas was not as short-sighted as one might think at first glance. Although the main body of the Tonkawa tribe under Placido was removed to Indian Territory, a small group of those people led by Castile remained in Texas. Texans tolerated this band because they were too small to cause much trouble, and they had demonstrated unquestioning loyalty to Texas in the past. James Buckner "Buck" Barry, a lieutenant colonel of state troops during the Civil War stated in his memoirs that “frontier citizens never objected to the residence of the Tonkawas within the state...” While this statement is perhaps an exaggeration, frontier Texans did appear to be more tolerant of the Tonkawas than they were of other Indians.¹

Despite the hostility shown towards the other reservation Indians, Castile’s Tonkawas continued to be used as scouts by Rangers. On July 1, 1860 forty-five Tonkawas mustered into state service as an “Indian Spy Company.” They were commanded by Captain Peter Fulkerson Ross, son of former Brazos Reserve agent

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Shapley P. Ross and older brother of Ranger captain, future Confederate general, and Texas governor Lawrence Sullivan “Sul” Ross. Ross’s Tonkawas were attached to the Ranger battalion commanded by William C. Dalrymple, which had its headquarters at the confluence of Hubbard’s Creek and the Clear Fork of the Brazos in present Stephens County.2

In February of 1861, Texas joined other southern states and seceded from the Union. Since many of her men soon joined the Confederate armies fighting east of the Mississippi River, the government of Texas took measures to ensure the neutrality of the Indians on the northwest frontier of the state. In March of 1861, Henry McCulloch, commanding the First Texas Mounted Rifles, requested that Castile’s Tonkawas be attached to his unit to serve as scouts. That summer, several Tonkawas did accompany his regiment into Indian Territory to meet with the Indians there on behalf of the state of Texas. In June of 1861, McCulloch met with Wichita and Caddo leaders at the Wichita Agency in present Caddo and Grady Counties, Oklahoma, and assured them that he wanted friendship but would punish them if they committed any depredations in Texas. The Wichitas and Caddos voiced their concerns about McCulloch’s heavy-handed tactics to Albert Pike, an Arkansan who had concluded a treaty with these same Indians as well as the Penateka Comanches earlier that spring. Ultimately, the Confederacy’s policy of feeding these Indians and distributing payments to them kept them from going hungry and raiding Texas farms and ranches.3

2 Muster Roll of Captain P.F. Ross, Indian Spy Company, July 1, 1860, Ross Family Papers, Texas Collection, Baylor University, Waco, Texas; Smith, Frontier Defense, 22.

3 Smith, Frontier Defense, 33-34; Anderson, Conquest of Texas, 334.
The Civil War in the Indian Territory was a microcosm of the conflict raging across the nation. The Indian nations divided over support for the Union or Confederacy, mostly along old tribal divisions that had little to do with the national conflict. Many pro-Union or “Pin” Indians fled the Indian Territory during the early part of the war when Confederate fortunes were in the ascendancy in that region. These Indians camped in southern Kansas where they were welcomed by Army officers and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In early 1862, the Bureau began to distribute annuity payments to these refugee Indians, a move which pleasantly disposed these Indians towards the Union. In the early fall of 1862, some 1500 Creeks, Seminoles, Caddos, Wichitas, Shawnees, Delawares and Kickapoos joined the Army’s First Indian Brigade.4

Having a chance to settle old scores was apparently as much of a motivating factor to these recruits as any desire to serve the Union. In October of 1862, elements of the First Indian Brigade commanded by Ben Simon marched into Indian Territory and headed for Fort Cobb in present Caddo County, Oklahoma. After attacking the poorly defended fort, these Union Indians, joined by José María’s Caddos and Buffalo Hump’s Penatekas attacked the Tonkawas camped in the Eureka Valley, five miles east of Fort Cobb. The attack lasted all night and into the morning. When it was over 137 Tonkawas, including Placido, and four Anglo settlers were dead. The motivation for the massacre involved old tribal hatreds. Most of the Texas Indians held a long-standing animosity toward the Tonkawas for their practice of ritual cannibalism. They were also hated, especially by the Comanches, for their ready alliance with Anglo-Texans.5

4 Anderson, Conquest of Texas, 335-336.
About 115 Tonkawas survived the massacre and fled for protection to Fort Arbuckle in the Chickasaw Nation. Because Chickasaw law prohibited other Indians from occupying their territory, the commander at Fort Arbuckle requested permission from the Chickasaw leadership for the Tonkawas to stay there, a request that was granted. The Confederate commander at Fort Arbuckle gave the Tonkawas what food he could spare. On November 1, 1862, the Tonkawas were moved eighteen miles to Rocky Creek where they stayed until the next summer.6

In August of 1863, Lieutenant Colonel James Buckner “Buck” Barry of Texas' Frontier Regiment requested that the Tonkawas in Indian Territory, now led by Campo, be moved back to Texas and employed as scouts. Despite the fact that he had supported John R. Baylor’s efforts to have the Indians removed from Texas in 1859, Barry and the Tonkawas had a mutual respect for each other. Barry had also been on expeditions with Indian scouts as a Ranger in the 1850’s and understood their worth. In addition to possessing the confidence of the Tonkawas, he was also a well-respected member of the frontier community, having served as sheriff of Navarro County as well as with Jack Hays' regiment in the Mexican War. Barry possessed a large ranch in Bosque County, and he carried much clout with frontier Texans. His efforts to bring the Tonkawas back were supported by his neighbors.7

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5 Ibid., 336; Smith, Frontier Defense, 120; Himmel, Karankawas and Tonkawas, 84; J.D.Schilz and T.F. Schilz, Buffalo Hump, 48-49.
6 Barry, Buck Barry, 175.
7 McCord to Barry, August 11, 1863, James Buckner Barry Papers, Center for American History, Austin, Texas (hereafter cited as Barry Papers); Barry’s Memoir, 112, Barry Papers.
Castile’s band was gathered at Camp Colorado while Barry completed arrangements to bring Campo’s band back to Texas. On August 12, Campo’s band arrived at Cloud’s Landing on the Red River where many were sick and unable to travel without rest. They were received by Captain John T. Rowland commanding Company D of the Frontier Regiment. On August 15, these Tonkawas, many still sick and feeble, arrived at Camp Brunson in Clay County. The captain commanding at that post, Joseph Ward, provided them with seven days rations of beef and flour and on the 17th sent them to Fort Belknap, the sick riding in wagons. The commanders of the various frontier posts were eager to have them as scouts but the Tonkawas wished to see Barry first and then follow whatever instructions he gave them. When Campo’s band got to Fort Belknap, they met in council with Castile’s band and all agreed to accept Castile’s leadership.8

Barry provided rations and clothing for the Tonkawas on their journey from Fort Arbuckle to Fort Belknap because, as yet, the state had made no provision for subsisting them out of the treasury. Less than a week after the Tonkawas arrival at Fort Belknap, plans were set in motion by Barry and his commanding officer, J.E. McCord, to send Campo to Austin to plead the tribe’s case before the governor, Pendleton Murrah. McCord initially instructed Captain Loyd of the Frontier Regiment’s Company C to allow one of his men, James Cloud, to accompany Campo.9

While these preparations were being made, Colonel McCord presented some documents pertaining to the subsistence of the Tonkawas to Governor Murrah. The

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8 Rowland to Barry, August 12, 1863, Ward to Barry, August 16, 1863, in ibid.; Smith, Frontier Defense, 120.

9 McCord to Barry, August 23, 1863, Barry Papers.
governor responded to him, through Adjutant General Jeremiah Y. Dashiell, that he
could not reimburse Barry and McCord without legislative approval (the legislature was
not in session) and that he would not if he could because the budget for frontier defense
was already stretched to the breaking point. Dashiell did advise McCord to broach the
subject with Confederate General Smith P. Bankhead, who was the commander of the
Confederate sub-military district encompassing that part of the frontier where the
Tonkawas were to be used. McCord requested that Bankhead make some
arrangement and advised Barry that it would be pointless to send Campo to Austin until
the legislature met. In short, the government of Texas wanted the Tonkawas to do their
scouting and did not mind them being in the state, but at this point, they were not going
to pay for their subsistence.\textsuperscript{10}

While this bureaucratic wrangling was taking place, the various company
commanders of the Frontier Regiment posted along the frontier were vying for the
Tonkawas' services. In late September and early October, a group of Tonkawas
scouted for Captain M. B. Loyd, commanding Company C at Camp Colorado. When
the scout was over, he sent them back to Fort Belknap, where the main body of those
Indians was camped. In a letter to Barry, Loyd stated that they would have preferred to
stay at Camp Colorado in present Coleman County, but Company C did not have the
resources to feed the entire band and they did not want to be separated. Loyd’s
estimation of the abilities of the Tonkawas is revealed in the following statement: “If you
can’t prevail on them to be separated and let me have ten or fifteen families or if you

\textsuperscript{10} Dashiell to McCord, September 3, 1863, McCord to Barry, September 18,
1863, in ibid.
proffer [sic] to send them all along, we will feed them by your order and take a pleasure
in doing so – for they are the best trailers now known. . . .”11

Most other officers in the Frontier Regiment shared Captain Loyd’s assessment of the Tonkawas’ abilities. In October of 1863, Castile reported that a raid on the Texas frontier by the Comanches and Kiowas was imminent. The report so alarmed Governor Murrah that he ordered Colonel McCord to concentrate as many of his men as possible at Fort Belknap in order to meet the threat. The report of a raid turned out to be false, but Castile’s information was considered so reliable that the authorities did not hesitate to act on his report.12

The Tonkawa scouts were in such demand that no less a nemesis than John R. Baylor requested that he be able to employ them on a scout. Baylor had recently been put in charge of an outfit called “the Brush Battalion,” a unit made up of deserters from the Confederate Army who had been avoiding conscription by hiding in the wooded areas of north Texas. General McCulloch had planned to use these men to supplement his thin forces protecting the frontier. In a letter to Buck Barry, Baylor wrote the following:

I am sent to the frontier to do what I can to aid in its defense and I know I may rely upon your aid and assistance as we have been working together in this thing for years. I want the assistance of the Tonks [sic] Indians in spying for me. . . . I want you to use your influence with them to join me and say to them that although we were not friends once, that is all forgotten and I want to kill the Comanches who murdered Placido for he was my friend. [italics added]

11 Loyd to Barry, October 4, 1863, in ibid.

12 Dashiell to McCord, October 11, 1863, McCord to Barry, October 26, 1863, Bourland to McCord, October 30, 1863, in ibid.
This statement shows the high estimation placed on the Tonkawas’ scouting abilities by most Anglos associated with the frontier. If the foremost proponent of Indian removal was desirous of using them as scouts, it is no surprise that other frontier commanders felt the same way. This also reveals a side of Baylor’s character that few, if any, historians have considered. Either Baylor called Placido his friend in an attempt to put the best face possible on his former anti-Indian activities or he really considered Placido his friend. Baylor had known Placido during the reservation days and probably developed a friendship with the chief, as many frontier Anglos did. This statement also shows that frontier attitudes toward Indians were varied; even the most notorious Indian-hater was capable of showing affection for an Indian.13

The Tonkawas, who were too numerous to remain at Fort Belknap or Camp Colorado and did not wish to be separated, were moved to Deep Creek in Callahan County in late November of 1863. In December, the commander of the Confederacy’s Border Regiment, James G. Bourland, reported a planned Indian raid on the Texas frontier led by former Reserve Indian allies, Delaware Jim Ned and Caddo Jim Pockmark. Both of these men had been pulled into the Union’s orbit and lived for a time in southern Kansas. Bourland requested that Barry and the Tonkawas join him in an expedition against these Indians.14

Despite the fact that the Tonkawas were highly regarded by both state and Confederate army officers, the state of Texas still debated whether or not to pay for their

13 Baylor to Barry, November 20, 1863, in ibid. (quotation); Smith, Frontier Defense, 81.

14 Loyd to Cloud, November 22, 1863, Bourland to Barry, December 7, 1863, in Barry Papers.
subsistence. In December, Governor Murrah urged the state legislature to appropriate $20,000 for them until the Confederate government agreed to take over their care, stating in his address, “They are in our midst; they are friendly; they are willing to fight for us; they are desolate and without a home.” The legislature initially voted against appropriating this money. Because Barry had been feeding them since August, Colonel McCord sent an officer to Shreveport, Louisiana to meet with Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, commanding the Confederacy’s Trans-Mississippi Department to try to get the Confederate army to take over the responsibility for feeding these Indians, an effort which was unsuccessful.\(^{15}\)

Colonel McCord initially toyed with the idea of soliciting funds for the upkeep of the Tonkawas from private citizens, writing to Barry, “. . . it is possible that we may have to appeal to the patriotic citizens of the Frontier for reimbursement and subsistence for these unfortunate people.” Instead, in the face of the Confederate government’s refusal to take up the responsibility for feeding these Indians, he ordered Barry to take the Tonkawas and turn them over to the nearest Confederate authorities anyway. James G. Bourland, commander of the Confederacy’s Border Regiment, indicated that he would be happy to take charge of them. On New Year’s Day, 1864, Bourland wrote Barry and directed him to bring the Tonkawas to Gainesville along with all receipts, vouchers, and any other records relating to their care. These records were to be presented to the regimental quartermaster who would then turn over the records and the Tonkawas to Captain William C. Twitty. Bourland also requested that Barry bring a _______________________

\(^{15}\) McCord to Barry, December 7, 1863 in ibid; Message from P. Murrah, December 4, 1863, in in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, IV: 79 (quotation).
In August, Castile and forty-five Tonkawa warriors were mustered in as a Ranger company for Young County. Castile was listed as captain while the muster roll shows that the Tonkawas possessed only four rifles, the rest being armed with bows and arrows. Unfortunately, Governor Murrah was less than happy about having the Tonkawas constitute a separate company and preferred to use them as scouts attached to the Frontier Regiment. Writing on behalf of the governor, Inspector General David B. Culberson stated, “The propriety of arming so large a body of Indians, and allowing

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16 McCord to Barry, December 7 and 9, 1863, in Barry Papers, CAH, Austin, TX; Bourland to Barry, January 1, 1864, in ibid.; Gammel, ed. and comp., Laws of Texas, 4:738-739.
them to roam over the Country, appears doubtful and may be productive of bad results." Culberson also stated in his letter that rifles would be provided for the Tonkawas as long as they served as scouts and not as a distinct company. Major Quayle requested twenty rifles for their use. These rifles eventually got to the Tonkawas the next February.¹⁷

Once the state decided to assume responsibility for the upkeep of the Tonkawas, they also had to provide for their care administratively since Lieutenant Colonel Barry and other Frontier Regiment officers were in Confederate service. Accordingly, in June of 1864, Yearby H. Isbell, a private in the Frontier Regiment’s Company D, was appointed as agent over the Tonkawas and ordered to take them to Fort Belknap and oversee their subsistence there. Barry and Company D’s Captain, S. G. Thompson, obligingly released him from service so he could perform these duties for the state. In December, Brigadier General James W. Throckmorton, now commanding Texas’ state troops, wrote to Barry and asked him to write to General John G. Walker, commanding the Confederacy’s Department of Texas, requesting that Isbell be formally released from Confederate service. This request was granted and Isbell continued in his capacity as Tonkawa agent until the end of the war.¹⁸

In January of 1865, Isbell left Fort Belknap to make arrangements to supply and clothe the Tonkawas. In his absence, he turned them over to Barry with some

¹⁷ Barry to Murrah, May 13, 1864, Governor’s Papers, Texas State Archives, Austin (first quotation); Culberson to Quayle, September 26, 1864, Quayle Papers, Rare Book Room, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama (second quotation); Smith, Frontier Defense, 121.

¹⁸ Quayle to Barry and Quayle to Thompson, June 11, 1864, Throckmorton to Barry, December 24, 1864, Barry Papers, CAH.
suggestions. Apparently, Castile’s warriors had done all the scouting to this point and Isbell wrote Barry that Major Sparks, commanding one of the Frontier Regiment’s companies, had suggested that Campo’s warriors be sent on a scout as well.

According to Isbell, this would serve the dual purpose of relieving Castile’s band from its schedule of incessant scouting and keep Campo’s people from being a nuisance in camp. Three weeks later, Isbell was on his way back to Fort Belknap. Among the tasks he had accomplished for the Tonkawas was buying corn, having clothes made for them, and procuring the twenty rifles which Major Quayle had requested the previous September. When General Throckmorton took over command of the First Frontier District in December, he brought those rifles from Austin and left them in Decatur, where Isbell got them and took them to Fort Belknap.¹⁹

The Tonkawa scouts played a part in the debacle known as the Battle of Dove Creek in January, 1865. They were instrumental in leading Captain Silas Totten, commanding Texas’ Second Frontier District forces to a large encampment of Mexico-bound Kickapoos twenty miles southwest of present San Angelo. On the evening of January 7, the Tonkawas made contact with Captain John Fossett, commanding a company of the Confederacy’s Frontier Regiment. Totten and Fossett decided to launch a dawn attack on the morning of January 8. The result was a disaster for the Texas and Confederate forces. There were over 500 Kickapoos, armed with Enfield rifles. The combined state and Confederate force lost twenty-six killed and twenty-three wounded, the heaviest losses of any frontier engagement during the Civil War. Although the battle was poorly managed and should never have been fought, the

¹⁹ Isbell to Barry, January 26 and February 16, 1865 in ibid..
Tonkawas performed admirably, not only locating the Kickapoo camp but garnering some initial success in running off the Kickapoos' *caballado*.

In March of 1865, Campo’s band, seeking food for themselves and forage for their horses, wandered away from Fort Belknap into the settlements. Although they were entirely peaceful, the presence of a large body of Indians greatly frightened citizens in such frontier towns as Waco. Barry sent one of his men, A.B. Smith, after them but when he got there, he learned that they had moved west. A heavy downpour prevented him from crossing the Brazos or the Bosque rivers. Major Sparks, commanding a detachment of the Frontier Regiment at the latter stream, advised Smith to let the Tonkawas go since they had to travel by Captain Totten’s post and he was sure they would return to Fort Belknap. Eventually they did just that.

The collapse of the Confederacy during the spring of 1865 again left the Tonkawas in a precarious position. The Confederacy had only recently assumed responsibility for their upkeep. Although federal troops arrived in Texas in June of 1865, their concern was with enforcing Reconstruction and scant attention was paid by the federal government to the frontier and Indian situation in general. By October of that year, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had still not appointed an agent for any of the Texas Indians. Provisional Governor Andrew J. Hamilton forwarded a request for agents from some concerned citizens while adding that he concurred with their assessment.

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21 Smith to Barry, March 21, 1865, Barry Papers, CAH.
22 T. H. Stribling and P. Smythe to President of United States, October 14, 1865, in Winfrey and Day (eds.), *Texas Indian Papers*, IV: 87-88.
Nothing was done by the federal government for the Tonkawas during 1865 and the state resumed paying for their subsistence. In September of 1866, Governor Throckmorton, the former Confederate general, began corresponding with the Bureau of Indian Affairs in an attempt to get the federal government to assume responsibility for the Tonkawas. Because the Tonkawas did not want to return to the Wichita Agency in Indian Territory, where their enemies lived, Throckmorton recommended that the state legislature donate a league of land somewhere near a United States Army post for the remaining 170 tribesmen to live. He also requested that the Indian Bureau provide them with beef rations, blankets, clothing, farming utensils, livestock and a yearly annuity of between $5,000 and $6,000. Obviously, an agent was needed to oversee their welfare, and Throckmorton suggested that it should be a local man. The Governor summed up his request with the following statement, “Thousands of dollars of money is distributed annually by the Government to other tribes, who continually depredate upon our citizens, and I think if possible, something might be given to the unfortunate ones, of whom I have written, who have always been peaceable and honest.”

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, D. M. Cooley, soon replied to Throckmorton, but his response was not what the Governor wished to hear. The Bureau of Indian Affairs planned to move the Tonkawas to the Wichita Agency where they could be supervised along with their enemies, the Caddos, Wichitas and Penateka Comanches. Throckmorton again took up his pen in defense of the Tonkawas. He wrote that the state legislature had passed legislation providing for a league of land to be set aside for

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23 Throckmorton to U.S. Indian Commissioner, September 20, 1866, in ibid., 110-111.
the Tonkawas and $3,500 for their subsistence over the next two years. Throckmorton described the situation to Commissioner Cooley in the following manner:

Texas can ill afford this, when we have so many who are suffering, of our own people. But these poor Creatures have been so faithful to the whites, since the first settlements in Texas, and they having suffered so much at the hands of the other Indians, it would be cruel in Texas, to force them away or leave them to suffer. There is no portion of our people who will complain at the Tonkawa’s [sic] being settled among them, provided they have an agent and are provided for. Knowing the feeling that exists between these Indians and the other bands at the Wichita Agency, and that all the other tribes are unfriendly to them, and the Tonkawa afraid, and distrustful of the others, I can but urge upon your Department the propriety of making provision for these people, and leaving them at the home I may select for them, some where in our State.24

. It certainly would have been easier and less expensive to the state to allow the Bureau of Indian Affairs to remove the Tonkawas to the Wichita Agency. However, Throckmorton’s language suggests a genuine feeling of pity mixed with gratitude for the role the Tonkawas had played in helping Anglos settle Texas. Particularly telling is his assertion that the citizens of Texas did not mind the Tonkawas being in the state as long as they were provided for and supervised. This suggests a level of acceptance and understanding on the part of the general public in Texas that tends to undermine the notion of Texans and their politicians as inveterate racists. Granted, the relationship between Anglos and the Tonkawas was not an equal one; it never had been. During this period the Tonkawas were dependent upon the mercy and kindness of Anglos in Texas. However, Governor Throckmorton’s correspondence conveys a genuine affection and sense of duty towards these people that does not fit with the notion of ethnic cleansing.

24 Throckmorton to D. M. Cooley, November 3, 1866, in ibid., 123.
Throckmorton’s plan to settle the Tonkawas on a plot of land and have them supervised by a state Indian agent appeared at first to be sound. In the spring of 1867, the Tonkawas and their newly appointed agent, John L. Lovejoy, left the Austin area for Jack County where the state of Texas wanted to locate them. However, during the trip, the warriors became restless and one of them attacked Agent Lovejoy, nearly killing him. Only the intervention of the Tonkawa women kept Lovejoy from being murdered. After this incident, it was decided that they could not be controlled by the state and a decision was made to turn them over to the United States Army at Fort Richardson, a newly built post located at Jacksboro. On April 18, 1867, the remnant of the Tonkawa Indians was turned over to Major Samuel H. Starr, commanding the Sixth Cavalry at Jacksboro, ending any involvement with the government of Texas.25

Governor Throckmorton’s disappointment in this turn of events was palpable. Writing to Commissioner of Indian Affairs L.V. Bogy, he stated, “The Indians looking alone to the General Government for support and protection were little disposed to respect authority that sought to restrain them from licentiousness, idleness and the wandering life of beggary which they had adopted.” His plan had been to settle the Tonkawas on a reservation and begin the process of “civilizing” them. Apparently, the Tonkawas were not happy about this and preferred to retain some measure of their previously nomadic lifestyle. After all, their experiences with reservation life were not happy ones. They had been harassed out of the Brazos Reserve in 1859, along with the Caddos, Wichitas, Shawnees and Delawares. When they were relocated to the Wichita Agency, they were attacked by the other Indians, reducing Tonkawa numbers

by half. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Tonkawas would have been reluctant to succumb to reservation life again.26

Although Throckmorton’s tone in his letter to Commissioner Bogy was definitely one of disappointment, he was not ready to see them removed from the state, provided certain conditions were met. He continued:

I would most respectfully urge upon the Dept the necessity of locating these Indians near one of the frontier posts of Texas, and the placing of them under the charge of a special Agent, or of the Commandant of such posts. Situated in that way the warriors could render efficient service to the Government as guides, scouts and trailers, in campaigns against the hostile tribes. In the event this suggestion is not deemed proper, then I would recommend that they be sent without delay, to the Wichita Agency near Fort Arbuckle in the Indian Territory, with the other tribes, of which Agency they were living at the beginning of the late war. . . . I would state also that should the Dept. deem it proper to settle these Indians in Texas, if they should be located upon any of the public domain of the State, that title will be made to the Indians for the same as long as the Indians may see fit to occupy it, and every facility, will be afforded to make a selection of lands that will be suitable to their wants.

The governor clearly believed that the Tonkawas could continue to be of benefit to the state of Texas. However, if they were not willing to be used as scouts for the Army, he recommended that they be removed to the same reservation where half of their people were murdered in 1862. Again, this demonstrates that while the government of Texas was more than willing to acknowledge the service previously rendered by the Tonkawas, and willing to provide for them if they were useful to the state in frontier defense, once they were no longer useful, they were willing to abandon them to

26 Ibid.
whatever fate awaited them in Indian Territory while the government of Texas washed
its hands of the problem.\textsuperscript{27}

Fortunately for the Tonkawas, the Army and Bureau of Indian Affairs were more
than willing to employ them as scouts. After residing near Fort Richardson for a short
time, they were moved to Fort Griffin in Shackleford County, near the old Comanche
Reserve. From their camp seven miles from the fort, the Tonkawa scouts participated
in numerous campaigns with the Army, most notably with Colonel Ranald S.
Mackenzie’s Fourth Cavalry during the Red River War of 1874-1875. Tonkawa scouts
located the Quahadi Comanche camp in Palo Duro Canyon in 1874 and led the charge
that drove the Comanches out of the canyon during that battle. Unfortunately, their
effectiveness as trackers and scouts soon placed them out of a job. After the last of the
Comanches went to the Kiowa Agency at Fort Sill, Indian Territory in 1875, the
Tonkawas had little to do. Fort Griffin was closed in 1881 and many of the Tonkawas
succumbed to alcoholism. Since the buffalo range had all but disappeared by that
point, they were reduced to living off small game and begging from the local ranchers.
Finally, in 1884, the Bureau of Indian Affairs removed them to the Oakland Agency near
Ponca City, Oklahoma Territory. The Tonkawas never returned to their native state as
a tribe and by 1937 had intermarried with whites to the extent that there were no more
full-bloods left.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{28} Ernest Wallace, \textit{Ranald S. Mackenzie on the Texas Frontier} (College Station:
Texas A & M University Press, 1993), 140-142; Smith, \textit{Dominance to Disappearance},
247, 249.
The story of the Tonkawas during the post-reservation period is at once tragic and hopeful. Although these people had been removed to Indian Territory in 1859, a small band managed to stay in the state where they were instrumental in scouting for the Texas Rangers. After the massacre of over 150 Tonkawas at Fort Cobb in 1862, a Texas Ranger and former member of John R. Baylor’s “Jacksboro Rangers”, Buck Barry, took it upon himself, at his own expense to bring the survivors back to Texas where they could be cared for and protected. While it is certainly true that Texas frontier leaders saw the value of using these Indians as scouts, Barry’s actions also show a true compassion for these people and appreciation for the service they had rendered to Texas in the past. Although Governor Murrah lobbied to have Barry reimbursed from the public treasury, he was repaid only a fraction of the expenses he incurred in providing for the Tonkawas before the legislature voted to pick up the expense in December of 1863.29

The attitudes of Barry and others in the Texas and Confederate frontier defenses run counter to the portrayal of Texas attitudes toward the Tonkawas promoted by Gary Anderson. In *The Conquest of Texas*, Anderson claims, “Texas officers recruited a few scouts from among the Tonkawas, but the state mostly refused to feed them and they roamed along the Red River corridor, both hungry and angry.” As the record shows, this statement is patently false. Texas officers recruited more than a “few scouts” (Castile had forty-five warriors mustered into a Young County Ranger company in 1864), and the state eventually made provisions for the Tonkawas. They were provided with food, clothing, weapons and a place to camp. Although these accommodations

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29 Buck Barry’s Memoirs, Barry Papers, 118-120; Strong to Barry, May 5, 1865, in *ibid.*
were far from ideal, they afforded the Tonkawas subsistence and protection from hostile Indians, things they would have been hard pressed to find in Indian Territory. Anderson’s portrayal does not only a disservice to the Anglos he seeks to vilify, but also to the Indians he supposedly seeks to commend.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{30} Anderson, \textit{Conquest of Texas}, 337.
The story of Anglo-Indian relations in Texas is not always a pretty one. As Gary C. Anderson and others have pointed out, Anglos were land-hungry and viewed Indians as little more than animals. Many of them had no compunction about shooting Indians before determining if they were friendly or hostile. However, some were capable of cooperating with Indians and even forming friendships. When Texas was still a Mexican territory, Stephen F. Austin realized the value of having Indian allies and took steps to insure their friendship. The Republic of Texas later officially authorized this friendship in the form of treaties and provided their allies with goods and foodstuffs. In return they received the help of scouts and warriors who knew the unsettled country west of the settlements, and knew how to fight mounted mobile Indians. A cursory examination of Anglo military excursions against the Comanches demonstrates that prior to using Lipan and Tonkawa scouts, their attempts at fighting Comanches were frustrating at best and inept at worst. Indeed, it is not a stretch to assert that these Indian allies were as responsible for making the settlement of the frontier possible as any white man.¹

Although the benefits of the alliance to these Indian allies were certainly not as long-lasting as those the Anglos received, it would be a mistake to conclude that the relationship was always parasitical (a parallel that strangely pictures a large parasite preying on a smaller host). First of all, the Lipans and Tonkawas regained access to the buffalo plains for a brief period. They also received trade goods they needed and got a chance to strike back at the hated Comanches. Eventually, both groups would be moved onto reservations, first in Texas, and later in the Indian Territory. While both

¹ Anderson, Conquest of Texas, 8-9.
tribes lost their autonomy and eventually their identity, they survived longer than many tribes of comparable size and power. The events surrounding the murder of Young Flacco and subsequent removal of his band to Mexico are indeed a blemish upon the conduct of the Republic of Texas. However, the alliance with the Tonkawas and Ramon Castro’s band of Lipans would continue into statehood. The Tonkawas (who had few friends because of their cannibalism, among other things) gained a powerful ally who protected them (for the most part) from more powerful enemies. The destruction of a large part of their population at the hands of hostile Indians in Indian Territory in 1862 when no Anglos were around to protect them attests to this.\(^2\)

Other native Texas tribes such as the Wichitas and Caddos initially resisted Anglo encroachment upon their territory. They eventually came to believe that the only way for them to survive was to cooperate with Anglos, a conclusion they reached during the latter years of the Republic. These Indians adapted to reservation life relatively easily and became noted for their fine crops. They participated in both Army and Ranger expeditions against the hostile Northern Comanches and proved themselves to be valuable scouts and warriors. Although they were removed from the state in 1859, it is likely that had they continued to be hostile toward Texas, they would have been removed or ravaged by war much sooner. Their cooperation with the government of Texas assured their survival, and today their descendants still live in Oklahoma.

The immigrant Indians occupy a similar place in this narrative. The Delaware and Shawnee had observed for several generations the inexorable flow of Anglo

expansion and realized that the only way for them to survive was to cooperate. In doing so, they made themselves indispensable. During the Republic, they served as intermediaries between the government of Texas and the Comanches, Wichitas and Caddos. Records of Army and Ranger expeditions during the 1850’s are replete with references to these Indians as invaluable guides, trackers and scouts.

The fact that historians have for the most part ignored these Indians and the role they played in settling the frontier is inexcusable. Books that supposedly deal with the Indian wars in Texas have marginalized the contributions of these Indians. Perhaps the reason for this is that they do not fit easily into preconceived notions of Anglo-Indian relations. This would seem to hold true for histories of both Anglo Texas and Indian Texas. Frederick Wilkins’s *The Legend Begins* contains more detailed accounts of these Indian allies in battle than most books, but is silent when it comes to the details surrounding Flacco’s death. Perhaps this unpleasant incident was omitted because it casts a negative light on both the government of Texas and the Rangers.³

On the other end of the spectrum, while purporting to attempt “a new cultural conversation to advance our understanding of ethnic conflict in the American West,” Gary Anderson’s book *The Conquest of Texas* almost completely ignores a key component of that conflict, the Indian allies of Texas. The involvement of these Indians simply does not fit with his thesis of ethnic cleansing. Perhaps it is time to reconsider our models of understanding frontier conflict. The good work done by Anderson and others in terms of increasing our understanding that Indians were not merely pawns of

³ Wilkins, *The Legend Begins*, 159. Wilkins states here that “exactly who killed the Lipan scout has never been conclusively determined.” Smithwick’s account is rather damning however. It is strange that Wilkins considers Smithwick a reliable source on other accounts but not this one.
Anglo expansion should not stop when it comes to Indian warfare, but should continue to be explored, especially if it challenges existing ideas about the frontier.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{4} Anderson, \textit{Conquest of Texas}, 15.
APPENDIX

MAP OF FRONTIER TEXAS, 1849-1852
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