
This dissertation addresses an ignored [partly for its controversial nature] aspect of Nietzschean philosophy: that of the role of modern woman in the creation of a future horizon. Details of the effects of the Enlightenment, Christianity and democracy upon society are discussed, as well as effects on the individual, particularly woman. After this forward look at the changes anticipated by Nietzsche, the traditional roles of woman as the eternal feminine, wife and mother are debated. An argument for the necessity of a continuation of the battle of the sexes, and the struggle among men and women in a context of sexual love and friendship is given. This mutual affirmation must occur through the motivation of pride and not vanity. In conclusion, I argue that one possible avenue for change is a Nietzschean call for a modern revaluation of values by noble woman in conjugation with her warrior scholar to bring about the elevation of mankind.
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by

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who supported me through the long years of working on this dissertation. My mother, who taught me to dream and to know that dreams take effort, was the continual thread of encouragement throughout this process. Thanks to all the members of my current and past dissertation committees and Dr. Reban for lasting through them all. I would especially like to thank Dr. Forde and Dr. Godwin for their unwavering guidance and encouragement. Special thanks to Dr. Ruderman for being my moral support and advisor. To a friend Nietzsche would be proud of, thank you Dr. Julie Harrelson-Stephens for her unwavering loyalty and advice. To Dr. Lori Fowler, Shirley, Larry, and all my TCC colleagues I really appreciate the encouragement. Thank you to Chris, who through the years had to take on so much extra responsibility so that I could read, write, and rewrite some more! Thank you Brendan, Connor, and Kathleen for your support when I was locked away to write. Rainer and James, I want to thank you for the original push down this road. Most importantly, to my daughter Ayden, thank you for being my inspiration and motivation.
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ABBREVIATIONS

(A) The Anti-Christ

(BGE) Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future

(BT) The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music or Hellenism and Pessimism

(CW) The Case of Wagner: A Musician’s Problem

(D) Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality

(EH) Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is

(GM) On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic

(GS) The Gay Science

(HAH) Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits

(PT) Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks

(RWB) Richard Wagner in Bayreuth

(TI) Twilight of the Idols: Or How to Philosophize with a Hammer

(TSZ) Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One

(UM) Untimely Meditations: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life

(UW) Unpublished Writings: From the Period of Unfashionable Observations

(WP) The Will to Power

*Primary sources are noted in the body of the work by aphorism number unless otherwise noted specifically as a page number.
INTRODUCTION

Few philosophers have been as controversial as Friedrich Nietzsche. Endless amounts of literature repeatedly interpret Nietzsche’s views on topics from the will to power to nihilism. Furthermore, after a half century, heated debates are rekindling about Nietzsche’s work and how its self-proclaimed disciples have used his teachings in the annihilation of millions. With all this intense scholarship, strangely Nietzsche faces little integrated debate, in one area of his works. This overlooked theme is that of his observations on women. This is perplexing given that few writers can claim to have made the impact on modern politics and social and moral culture as Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche “challenged all the social and moral valuations and bases of contemporary western civilization with his proclamations...he set the individual completely free...as he had never been before...from all bondages of this world and beyond.”¹ Similarly, he has been noted by Walter Kaufmann, in the translator’s preface to Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), as “not only a great thinker but also a fascinating human being of exceptional complexity and integrity.” Even Ellen Kennedy, one of Nietzsche’s detractors, states, “Nietzsche’s cultural

¹ Kashyap, Subhash. The Unknown Nietzsche: His Socio-Political Thought and Legacy. Delhi: National, Delhi, 1970. Page 263
and political analysis pushed through the socially accepted boundaries of good and evil and sought to transvaluate all values in bourgeois society."² Thus, Nietzsche scholars and detractors alike argue for the depth of the impact of his work on culture, politics and the individual. His influence is explored and examined from nearly every aspect. Why, then, is it generally accepted, even among Nietzsche scholars, that while he was a philosopher of deep insight into the human psyche, it is simultaneously argued that “in matters touching women and sensuality… (he) no longer has anything to tell us?”³

Even Walter Kaufmann, one of Nietzsche’s most ardent revisionists, in his attempt to un-demonize Nietzsche, specifically cordoned off the topic of women from the entire body of Nietzsche’s works. Kaufmann notes “[BGE] is one of the great books of the nineteenth century, indeed of any century [he equates it to Plato and the Bible!]…but there are some passages that strike me as blemishes without which the book would be better; for example, the tedious remarks about women.” Furthermore, in several footnotes on these blemishes he says “fortunately for Nietzsche, this is surely wrong…at these points Nietzsche’s deliberate ‘untimeliness’ now seems time-bound, dated, and as shallow as what he attacked.”⁴ Is he sure that the remarks were ‘tedious’ and did not constitute

part of Nietzsche’s overall philosophy? Does he propose to have better insight into Nietzsche’s philosophy than Nietzsche himself?

Richardson states “most of Nietzsche’s interpreters have found his remarks about women simply embarrassing. Hence the common effort of scholars to dismiss them from the field of inquiry by branding them just personal idiosyncrasies, lying quite apart from his philosophical thought.” 5

One of Nietzsche’s own contemporaries, German feminist Hedwig Dohn, characterized Nietzsche’s comments on women as ‘Gedanken-Tro: delmarkt’ …[an intellectual flea market]…where the dregs and sediments of centuries of half thoughts which have crept around the corners and wrinkles of the human brain for countless generation occasionally come to light.”6 Thus she argued that he was merely restating pieces of filth that had been present in the minds of men for generations—he just stated them aloud.

Kelly Oliver puts Nietzsche’s thoughts on women in “accord with those of the ‘narrow-minded’ bourgeois who was his primary philosophical and cultural target.” In this one area, he is not targeting his enemy but is in cahoots with him; thus, undermining the voice of women. She furthermore charges Nietzsche with “preventing the possibility of a feminine voice.” Oliver argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy relegates women to having no voice of their own, only a copy of the male voice she serves. She claims, in fact, that Nietzsche’s strategies for new

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philosophy “are often dependent on the preclusion of a feminine other... through the sacrifice of the other... especially that of the feminine mother.”

Male excellence and achievement come only at the exclusion and sacrifice of the female. Simultaneously, male enrichment is a product of the efforts of the feminine. Remarkably, she states this analysis only moments after hailing him as a creator and a visionary who tried to 'open philosophy.'

The common understanding is that Nietzsche has “nothing more to offer than the common prejudices of his age and sex. On this point, perhaps the most crucial in his thought, Nietzsche betrays his own philosophical intentions.” Thus while Nietzsche is hailed and touted as a visionary, a challenger of old ideas and views in most areas, both his supporters and detractors think he has little of import to convey on the topic of women. In fact they argue he betrays his own philosophy with his traditional misogyny.

My argument is that Nietzsche’s ‘tedious remarks’ were anything but, and that one cannot separate out one argument or thread of Nietzsche’s thought from the overall fabric of his philosophy. The opening line of *BGE* states, “supposing truth is a woman.” This alludes to his insight and the deeper complexity of his views not only of the ‘truth’ but also of ‘woman.’ There is undoubtedly more here than meets the eye. Thus, if as Oliver says “most critics and scholars choose to

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ignore Nietzsche’s woman,” then I argue that they are missing an important piece of the larger puzzle that is Nietzschean philosophy.\textsuperscript{10}

Although not all Nietzscheists stand in unison on his misogyny, there are some who attempt to reconcile his views on women. Their tactic has been to either agree and defend what is viewed as Nietzsche’s misogyny [and thus face a similar criticism] or argue that as in other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy his little truths are “naughty and screameth too loudly” (\textit{Thus Spake Zarathustra TSZ 18}). Thus, these scholars attempt to soften Nietzsche’s comments. A perfect example of this sanitizing can be found in Kashyap. He states “there are several aphorisms in Nietzsche that show he really had remarkable insight into the psychology of women... [but!]...due allowance of course, has to be made for Nietzsche’s style of expressing [himself].”\textsuperscript{11} Unlike many of his contemporaries, Kashyap does attempt to defend Nietzsche’s stance as not irrelevant. “It would be obvious to any discerning reader that Nietzsche’s views were not merely aphorisms vomited off-hand, as is sometimes supposed, but were the result of considerable thought on and insight into the social institutions of marriage and family, and as such, even today deserve respect and consideration.”\textsuperscript{12} He thus attempts to explicate Nietzsche’s understanding or insight into women not at a base level but through their role in society’s constructed views on marriage and the family.

\textsuperscript{10} Oliver, Kelly. 1995. Page 21
\textsuperscript{11} Kashyap, Subhash C. 1970. Page 44
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. Page 56
There may be more here than originally thought. Richardson brings up the possibility that “just as Zarathustra hides his truth about women (TSZ I 18) so we might see Nietzsche as disguising how important these issues are to him, and so how crucial to us in assessing his thought.”

Therefore, just as one cannot [and should not] attempt to view the eternal recurrence, nihilism or any other aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy as dissociated arguments, one should not attempt to extract isolated comments and attempt to piece together an understanding of Nietzsche’s view on the feminine as other than part of his overall philosophy.

This project endeavors to consolidate an understanding of Nietzsche’s observations on the feminine as part of his overarching vision. This vision, I argue, includes an important diagnostic as to the effects of the democratic movement on the image, role and psyche of women. I contend that Nietzsche, true to his status as an insightful cultural physician, predicted the position of the feminist movement and the individual female encounter today. As Gary Shapiro noted, “contrary to much Anglo-American opinion, Nietzsche is generally a meticulously careful writer.” If so, then we must think again about how to view his ‘insight’ on woman. Only within his complete philosophical framework can we grasp Nietzsche’s woman in all her glory and petty weaknesses.

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13 Richardson, John. 1996. Page 192
15 Solomon, Robert. *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Chapter 4, Page 89-109 notes “N can also be surprisingly insightful and sensitive about women’s situation and motivation, an aspect of his thinking that is...”
Nietzsche critics and scholars choose to ignore Nietzsche’s woman …they don’t take him seriously.” Yet, as I will argue, only through a complete understanding of the role of Nietzsche’s democratized woman can we fully comprehend his overarching philosophy.

I begin with a brief overview of Nietzsche scholarship as a whole. This is necessary as I argue that his view of woman is inseparable from his overarching philosophy. This review leads into an examination of woman through the lens of Nietzsche’s grand theory and its subsequent components; specifically, truth, nihilism, eternal recurrence, will to power, the Übermensch, and art. After this revisit to Nietzsche’s perspective, I turn to the ramifications of his political thought. In Chapter II, I address his ideas on the changes brought forth by Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy. In Chapter III, I discuss Nietzsche’s arguments on the long term diagnosis of the democratic disease on women, as they relate to the three roles of woman as wife, mother, and the eternal feminine. Then in Chapter IV, I continue with a discussion on the role of rank and tension in the interplay of the sexes. This perspective, I contend, gives insight into the undercurrent of change and hope which pervades Nietzsche’s writings. I argue that Nietzsche did not have a monocular fix on where or when revaluation or change would occur. Rather he saw the seeds of possibility which the inevitable democratization would bring. This perception allows for a look to

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16 Oliver, Kelly. 1995. Page 21
one possible outcome of the revival of a healthy femininity. Chapter V turns to a
discussion on the possibility of woman as the *Ubermensch* and the specific role
seduction must play. Chapter VI closes with the new horizon of hope to be found
in Nietzsche.

But why does an interpretation of Nietzsche’s woman matter? I would
argue that while Nietzsche was easily dismissed until recent decades, he has
become pivotal to our understanding of “where we have come from and where
we may be headed.” 17 As best stated by Allan Bloom, “Nietzsche’s work
restored something like the soul to our understanding of man.”18 This work adds
to our observations of Nietzsche and his overall thought on the problems facing
democratic societies today, particularly those of modern democratic women.
Furthermore, it also gives direct political and cultural implications for the
institutions of a democratic state and the character of its citizens.

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When attempting a thorough review of literature on Nietzsche, I was amazed at the rows and rows of library shelves [and Internet sites] dedicated to what appeared to be such a complete and detailed scholarship of every aspect and minutia of Nietzsche as to resemble the carrion left in the wake of a flock of birds of prey—picked over so completely that little is left to be identified. However, upon dedicated reading and indexing, it becomes apparent that erudition on Nietzsche is limited to several main themes. I attempt here to give a postcard summary review of the many themes of Nietzschean scholarship; from biological insights, to his politics, to the main threads of his overarching philosophy. It is necessary for my later analysis to have a short overview of all areas of Nietzschean scholarship in order not only to show the lack of inclusion of woman in his overarching view, but also to paint the larger picture into which the final chapters show that woman is a central thread. It makes a more complete picture for later analysis to summarize here.

Section 1: The Realities of a Nietzschean Past

The analysis of any great individual begins with a view to his life and times. A look at Nietzsche and Nietzschean philosophy is not exempt from an attempt to link Nietzsche’s personal life and ‘baggage’ to his philosophy. Writers in this
mode spend countless pages in biographical study of every minutia of his life. These are nearly always chronologically based works, attempting to connect one thought to some event in Nietzsche’s past to gain insight into his arguments. These tenuous connections center primarily on four major facts: Nietzsche’s father’s untimely death, his childhood surrounded by females, his lifelong illness [brought on by either military exposure or sex] and his two romantic failures.19

These scholars point to his own nihilism, for example, and his misogyny in particular as direct results of his personal life.

Interestingly, as these scholars tell us, thorough review of his personal letters carries a much more optimistic view of the future than his works. These letters, however, do show us an egoistic man who was often alone with feelings of abandonment and betrayal; his sickness and exhaustion permeated his life. He blamed his physical conditions partly on his father’s genes and partly on his contemplations and writing. These accounts offer occasionally well written and thoroughly enjoyable personal glimpses into a complex character.20

It is enticing to attempt to connect portions of Nietzsche’s life to his philosophy. However, as Nietzsche openly argued that philosophers [before him] were “not honest enough in their work (BGE 5)...and that “in the philosopher...there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is” (BGE 6 Italics in

19 Klossowski and Irigary, among others, view his rejection by Salome as his source of hatred of women.
20 These writings are characterized by Barry, Del Caro, Durant, Fuss, Hayman, Hollingdale, Kohler, Menchken, Safranski, Santaniello, Shapiro, and Salome.
original), we must look askance at any connection. These statements and many more of a similar vein (BGE 9, 25, 34, 211; Will to Power (WP) 141, 345, 346, 379, 380, 407, 426) show that Nietzsche argued that intellectually dishonest did not allow that there is “no epistemological skepticism or dogmatism ever risen free from ulterior motives” (WP 410).

What does this mean for our understanding of the effect of Nietzsche’s life on his work? If all philosophical ideas are based on the individual who supposedly ‘discovered’ them and not on some universal truth, then Nietzsche’s prescriptions would contain this same flaw [or would contend this is not a flaw]. As Nietzsche stated, these truths “too may be just his own.” If this is so, then perhaps there is some connection between Nietzsche’s life and his works, and one should then consider the source of the comments. However, intellectual honesty is a key to Nietzsche’s virtue both in himself and the new philosopher of the future (Human all to Human (HAH) 225, 227). Thus his acknowledging the nature of previous [and often current] intellectual inquiry opens the door to an honest acknowledgement of personal influence if not its complete elimination. This acknowledgement, while perhaps not divesting Nietzsche of influence, must be noted as part of Nietzsche’s uniqueness. He specifically states, “I am one thing and my writing another” (Ecco Homo (EH) III 1).

If we look specifically to the effect of Nietzsche’s life on his perspectives on women, we should begin with his comment that “Stridberg by the way, thinks
that I understand women better than anyone else in the world."²¹ Nietzsche professed in his own writings to be the only philosopher to ‘ever truly understand women.’ I would argue again that a thorough review of Nietzsche’s writing on women would be imperative to the consideration of woman and her place in his overall philosophy. Nietzsche himself was humored and a bit honored, it would appear, that someone [Stridberg] supported his self-proclaimed insight into women. Whether this insight was the product of his youthful exposure to them, his unfulfilled love or his own particular insight into the human psyche is, I would argue, not part of the argument itself. The specific effect his possible idiosyncrasies might have on the content or substance of Nietzsche’s woman is left to later chapters.

A second strain of biographical Nietzsche scholarship is one which attempts to link (or unlink) the chain of Nietzsche’s thought to Hitler and National Socialism.²² “With few exceptions literature on Nietzsche from 1933 to 1950 concentrated on the relationship between his philosophy and Nazi ideology and practice, and even assumed an immediate connection between them…this view of Nietzsche was reinforced by Georg Lukac’s influential commentaries, which condemned Nietzsche.”²³

²² The works in this area are characterized by authors such as Hinderks, Morgan, Nicholas, Reyburn, Santaniello, Smith and Tellenbach.
The philosophical link with National Socialism reigned in Nietzsche scholarship until Walter Kaufmann’s, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ* (1950). In his seminal work, Kaufmann reevaluated Nietzsche’s concept of power. Previously it had been argued that Nietzsche’s will to power focused on power over others; this was considered power flowing out of the self. Kauffman argued, conversely, that Nietzsche’s primary focus was on power within, the power of self-overcoming. This reevaluation of a central theme of Nietzschean philosophy essentially led to the “de-Nazification and depoliticization of Nietzsche.”

Kaufmann’s interpretations opened the door to decades of new Nietzsche scholarship. He claimed that any connection to Nazism was based on a misunderstanding of Nietzsche. This attitude pervaded Nietzschean scholarship for nearly half a century and continued to center the focus of Nietzsche’s thought and directives internally, as the individual for Nietzsche was thought to be “sacrosanct.”

Recent works, however, such as Golomb and Wistrich’s *Nietzsche: Godfather of Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses of Philosophy* (2002) and Richardson’s *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism* (2004) has seen resurgence in scholarship on the Nietzsche-Nazi connection. These interpretations center on

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25 These arguments are best noted in the works of such authors as Bataille, Chambliss, Giddens, Manthey-Zorn, Nicolas, Solomon, Stack, Taylor, Thiele, and Yack.

two themes. The smaller, more historically based works concentrate on the relevance of Nietzsche to the Nazi movement and its characters, regardless of their “misinterpretations” of his writings. This body of work focuses on Nietzsche’s influences in the mind of its actors, not the validity of those actors’ interpretations of his thought.\textsuperscript{27} \textsuperscript{28}

The second and growing body of work on the Nietzsche-Nazi link centers on reevaluating the basis of Kaufmann’s interpretation of will to power. These scholars are less concerned with the actors and historical aspect of World War II’s National Socialist and Fascist movements as they are concerned with focusing attention on Kaufmann’s arguments. Western thought on Nietzsche, they argue, has been so completely pervaded and whitewashed by Kaufmann that we have missed many of the ‘valid’ connections between Nietzschean thought and Nazi practice.\textsuperscript{29}

Aschheim writes, “In Britain and the United States, the perception of Nietzsche as the major force behind the creation of radicalized novel and uniquely murderous furor of anti-Semitism has had to contend with Walter Kaufmann’s interpretive hegemony and thus only recently has found its


\textsuperscript{28} These works constitute a new branch of Nietzschean philosophy and are characterized by such writers as Aschheim, Burkhardt, Detweiler, Golom, Lang, Mah, and Wistrich.

\textsuperscript{29} This whitewashed Nietzsche is also the theme of Appel, Freidrich. \textit{Nietzsche Contra Democracy}. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999
historians.”30 Aschheim and others of this school argue that a whole generation gave the issue of “Nietzsche as a theorist of the social order...a wide berth.”31 These writers assert that we have failed to acknowledge the valid political connotations of Nietzschean philosophy. It is noted that the ideas of physiology and power are pervasive in Nietzsche and must be reevaluated. They argue that the will to power is not only internal self-overcoming but also power over and conflict with external forces. As Mandel stated, “although Nietzsche appears to condemn anti-Semites and misogynists he gives credence to their fears when he talks about what is behind the masks of Jews and women—the will to dominate.”

These scholars argue that the whitewashing of Nietzsche by western interpretations has been so pervasive as to exclude such obvious and dramatic aspects as his stances on violence and war (WP 125, 868, 898, 900, 954-960; BGE 208).32 Dombrowsky argues that Nietzsche “makes...covert comments in favor of war, and some overtly, in favor of military culture” (HAH 65, 235, 285; Genealogy of Morals (GM) III 25; WP 126-127).33 It is obvious, they affirm, that Nietzsche was a political supporter of the “maintenance of the military state as the last means of all of acquiring and maintaining the great tradition with regard to the supreme type of man, the strong type” (WP 729). Thus supporters of this

33 Dombrowsky, Don. 2004. Page 93
movement argue that to maintain strong men, which is obviously the ultimate
goal of Nietzschean philosophy, a military state is necessary. A military state, in
its very nature, demands acquiring, domination and power over others. This
interpretation calls for struggle, war, illness and destruction.

Emphasizing the political ramifications of Nietzschean philosophy, this
group of scholars point to Nietzsche’s praise of the institutions of the Greek state,
Imperium Romanum, the Russian Empire, Julius Caesar, Alcibiades, Cesare
Borgia, Napoleon and Machiavelli as hints to his political views (*BGE* 197, 199-
200; *WP* 27, 544, 871; *The Anti-Christ* (A) 46, 61).\(^{34}\)\(^{35}\)

The question then becomes, for both branches of this area of study,
whether there is coherent politics to be found in Nietzsche? This again directs us
along two lines of work. Some argue that there is coherent political direction in
Nietzsche, and others argue that Nietzsche is ‘dogma-less.’

One of the political readers of Nietzsche, Detweiler notes that “to the
extent that Nietzsche’s political views are integral with the rest of his thought--to
the extent that they are made possible by it…even required by it…we stand guilty
of both sanitizing and trivializing his contribution when we deliberately sweep
under the rug its unsavory political implications.” Detweiler analyzes the specific

\(^{34}\) The authors supporting the reinterpretation of the ramifications of will to power and Nietzsche’s
politics are best characterized by Appel, Dombrowsky, Mugge, Porter and Vattimo.

\(^{35}\) Porter, James. *The Invention of Dionysus: The Essay on the Birth of Tragedy*. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2000. Porter goes so far as to claim on page 2 that the “images of
Nietzsche in circulation today are in some respects so elaborately controlled that it will be
necessary to raise the question of Nietzsche’s acceptability, if only to underscore the simple fact
that “Nietzsche” is a construct, roped off within secure bounds, vigilantly policed and contained.”
political claims of Nietzsche’s path. He argues that skepticism, conservatism, nationalism, and utilitarianism are all ruled out as responses to modernity by Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{36} He noted “no simple shift from democratic political institutions to the right kind of aristocratic ones could by itself bring an end to the decadence that afflicts the modern world… (we need spiritual change also).”\textsuperscript{37}

Detweiler does put forth a concept of a new type of hierarchical society he calls aristocratic radicalism as the inevitable political solution for Nietzsche.

Yet contrary to this, Aschheim argues that “Nietzscheanism was not--nor could it have been a separate political ideology backed by its own political party or movement… it was not organized… requiring no formal commitment, possessed of no set dogma”\textsuperscript{38}

Interestingly, I found that it has been argued that Nietzsche was an anti-Semite, an anti-Nazi, a statist, an individualist, a social Darwinist and that he was against communism, socialism, anarchism, democracy, liberalism, utilitarianism, militarism, woman’s suffrage, universal suffrage, the Platonic state, the Hegelian state, the French revolution and the Reich under Bismarck. Thus it appears that Nietzsche’s political stance is contradictory, non-existent or so completely vague that scholars can not determine his direction! His thoughts on politics have been conversely trivialized, demonized, and romanticized.

\textsuperscript{36} Detweiler, Bruce. 1990. Page 87

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. Page 62

\textsuperscript{38} Aschheim, Steven. 1992. Page 85
Obviously these and numerous other threads in Nietzsche need to be explored [as much as they are claimed to have been ignored] for their ramifications both in the political sphere and to determine a broader, richer comprehension of Nietzsche’s overarching philosophy. These recent and intriguing changes in the direction of Nietzsche scholarship away from its Kaufmann-centric domination, I contend, will have a dramatic effect on the works we see in the next decade. This change will occur because, as in this paper, Nietzsche is viewed and interpreted as being of more political importance.

Section 2: The Main Themes of Nietzschean Philosophy

We turn now to the largest segment of Nietzsche scholarship, those relating to and concentrating on what are characterized as Nietzsche’s main themes: truth, advancing nihilism, the will to power, eternal recurrence, the Ubermensch, and the role of art. These works are so numerous and varied as to take a whole volume merely to brush upon the tip of the proverbial iceberg. I attempt here to make a concise review.

A: Truth and Knowledge

Nietzsche’s negation of the existence of a metaphysical truth is a rare area of scholarly agreement. Truth for Nietzsche, as put forth by previous philosophers, is a mere version of reality that suits those espousing it. It is not the result of a deeper understanding of a universal truth. A philosopher’s insight
is merely his own will to power, his creation, wanting to be recognized as the truth of existence. His verity fits into his existence in an attempt to explain his nature. Nietzsche sees this as a desire for justification of his character through truth (HAH 608).

From this point of acceptance several heated academic arguments begin. Fierce debate on the nature of truth and the effect of the negation of truth has influenced twentieth century non-Nietzschean scholars in numerous fields from sociology to psychology to biology. This inquiry has often centered on language, its characteristics and role in our understanding of things, ourselves and the world.39

Nietzsche scholarship, however, tends to focus on whether or not Nietzsche’s denial of a metaphysical truth creates inconsistencies in his own arguments, and, to a secondary amount, what role the search for truth itself has in his overall philosophical design.

Some writers contend that Nietzsche himself proposes metaphysical truths in the form of his concepts on the eternal recurrence and will to power. They state the obvious inconsistency of these proposals with Nietzsche’s noting that there are no truths. Because of this denunciation, they argue that at worst one can not give credence to any of Nietzsche’s theories, and at best we must note that Nietzsche warned us of their inevitable weaknesses as being only his truths. This arm of scholars and their criticism of Nietzsche’s theories of will to

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39 These constructionist, deconstructionist and post-structuralist arguments are well represented in the works of Blair, Burr, Gilman, Parker, Newman, Sander, Southwell, Shotter and Velody.
power and the eternal recurrence hold that we can not give credence to Nietzsche's perceptions as they are self contradictory.

On the other hand, de Man argues that Nietzsche's denying of metaphysical truth and then stating one is, in fact, a way for Nietzsche to subvert metaphysics from within. This is done, he argues, by revealing its inherent weaknesses. His “internal errors are consistent as the new model of philosophical rigor."40 Still other academics reject the idea that any inconsistencies exist within Nietzsche. Magnus, for example, denies the metaphysical aspect of Nietzsche’s will to power and argues that it is instead only a doctrine about the nature of philosophy itself. And Derrida, while also repudiating the metaphysical nature of Nietzsche, argues that as metaphysics is built into our language Nietzsche has no other way to explain his ideas without using metaphysics, even if his idea itself is not metaphysical.

Finally, others maintain that while Nietzsche denied universal metaphysical truths and he puts forth no metaphysical theories, he does accept the ascetic ideal and faith in truth. In the end, whether Nietzsche is consistent, inconsistent or subversive the reigning view appears to hold that Nietzsche accepted some type of truths whether empirical or ideal, as a ‘perspective’ or ‘correspondence’.

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Therefore, they argue, the existence of some type of truth is not what is in question.\textsuperscript{41}

If it is not the existence of truth that is in question for these academics, then what is? It is argued that the use or value of the ‘truth’ in question is what matters. Nietzsche himself stated that “knowledge and wisdom in themselves have no value; no more than goodness: one must first be in possession of the goal from which these qualities derive their value or non-value” (\textit{WP} 244). Thus any trait must first be examined for its goal—its purpose, before determining its value. Clark, Danto and Loeb all contend that truth, to be of Nietzschean benefit, must facilitate or affirm life. Clark does conclude with a twist that one can not argue for a more life affirming truth without, however, knowing if it is in fact ‘true’.

An overwhelming number of authors in numerous fields continue to debate the intricacies of the existence and value of Nietzsche’s truth.\textsuperscript{42} This debate lies at the heart of the possibility, or lack thereof, for a future for Nietzschean philosophy as something other than a mere examination of the times. Further, the existence of some truths, even temporarily and personally, makes the statement “supposing truth is a woman” deserving of new research on Nietzsche’s role for woman and her possible truths.

Another piece of the debate on Nietzsche’s truth is the desire or search for knowledge and where that desire leads us. The longing for knowledge,

\textsuperscript{41} The debates in this area of Nietzsche research are best reviewed in Clark, Maudemarie. \textit{Nietzsche: On Truth and Philosophy}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990

\textsuperscript{42} Some of the most relevant to an overall understanding of Nietzsche’s truth are Bayer, Clark, Derrida, Gillespie, Jasper, MacMuray, Moles, Rampley, Schutte, Strong and Taffel.
Nietzsche states, is fabricated “solely from psychological needs” (WP 12). This need originates from the necessity to have a horizon upon which man looks to obtain his groundings, his value, his role or place in the universe.

What constitutes man’s horizon or what we ‘accept’ as truth? Rorty argues that it is what we currently hold to be justifiable. It is man’s fundamental set of assumptions about all things. The accumulation of knowledge gives mankind its set of suppositions about society. These assumptions he does not question. All men and mankind must have this type of horizon. It is the framework upon and through which we act. It guides our actions.

Modern man will come to a crisis of horizon. Ironically, it is through the quest for knowledge itself that man will come to question his horizon. It is argued that over time science will eliminate the ability of man to use faith or religion to set these limitations. “It becomes increasingly clear…that science alone leads into the abyss. It can destroy values but cannot create them. In the end science can not tell us how we ought to live, which means science can not assume the mantle of the religion it destroys and its truths can not assume the mantle of divinity.”43 Therefore, through scientific honesty we eliminate even the possibility of a horizon, religion or purpose as “faith in science is dying as well--it destroys the possibility of absolutes” (WP 1, 2; The Gay Science (GS) 344; GM Sec 3 24; The Twilight of the Idols (TI) sec 5). Thus our search for true groundings through science leads us to the loss of the possibility of the very thing we crave, the very

43 Detweiler, Bruce. 1990. Page 69
thing we search for. Science can not successfully replace our lost horizon with anything of value to society.

As Jasper notes, “Science can not give us purpose or meaning to life. It is a means not an end.” 44

Science is not the only culprit in creating this loss. Nietzsche also foresaw that the unlimited choices offered in a democratic society would create boundless possibilities. On the one hand, this universality may be good for the higher type of man who can still discriminate, but for the rest of us this limitlessness creates an impossible task. Limitlessness will cause the majority of men to lose their ability to discriminate or to make choices. This is done, Nietzsche argues, because the pity and tolerance of democracy will lead us to become pliantly accepting of all. This objectivity will render us unable to make decisions. It is a type of paralysis that leaves us unable to believe in anything strong enough to fight for it for “it requires an effort for us to deny anything” (WP 218). How can one make choice when you love nothing, hate nothing and are angered by nothing?

Paglia notes that democracy makes this no-saying [making choices] even harder. It does so by making any type of disapproval to be considered a form of discrimination. Discrimination has come to be associated not with the higher ability to rank or make choices but with ignorance and bigotry.45

44 Danto and Loeb both contend that the search for truth in science has no value and is not life affirming “true” or not.

Once we lose our horizon, man will come to know the reality of the “shabby origins of values…the universe seems to have lost value, seems meaningless” (WP 7) and then the “will to nothingness has become master over will to life” (WP 401). Thus we are overwhelmed by the depression and meaninglessness of what one comes to understand is only an economically driven, lonely life.\(^46\) We are filled with an “emptiness that devours without being satisfied with living.”\(^47\)

As we shall see in Chapter V, the ability to discriminate while being open to all things is a necessary quality of the *Ubermensch* and is highly probable in higher women.

B: Nihilism

This abyss of nothingness to which our thirst for knowledge leads us is another major theme in Nietzsche scholarship. In fact, the advent of nihilism [or the belief in nothing] has come to be associated almost exclusively with Nietzsche. Discussions on Nietzsche's nihilism are often biographical and-or historical and contemplate Nietzsche's own nihilism while debating his ‘truncation’ of a concept put forth by others centuries before. But work in the meaning of nihilism shows disparity in Nietzschean academia, primarily as to the extent of Nietzsche's nihilism and the possibility for hope or creativity after its advent. In discussing Nietzsche's own nihilism or modern society's, it is

\(^{46}\) This area of study is characterized by authors such as Bayer, Clark, Derrida, Gillespie, Jasper, MacMurray, Moles, Rampley, Strong, and Taffel.

commonly accepted that Nietzsche argued this state was one of the most critical problems in modern western society.\footnote{Taylor, Quentin. \textit{The Republic of Genius: A Reconstruction of Nietzsche’s Early Thought}. New York: University of Rochester Press, 1997}

Whether nihilism is an abstract hypothesis about modern life or concrete cultural experience, the largest area of debate centers on the cause or causes of this condition. It is argued [as discussed above] to be the result of science’s destruction of God, the equalizing forces of Christianity, or the pity and tolerance of democracy.\footnote{These arguments are most diverse and well argued by Maudemarie Clark and Urs Sommers.} \footnote{Nihilism scholars who deliberate and ponder these questions with amazing persistence and points of minutia include Bauer, Feuerbach, Kazantzakis, Klossowski, Mistry, Morrison, Nabais, Pfeffer, Schutte, Stirner, Strauss, Strong, Taylor and Whitlock.}

The despair and meaninglessness of nihilism could have been the end of Nietzsche’s exploration, but he continued to struggle with affirming life and giving purpose and meaning to existence. Nietzsche argues that the story of man does not end with nihilism. In fact, Nietzsche claims that the state of nihilism “is only a transitional stage” (\textit{WP 7}).\footnote{Yet other Nietzscheists argue that there were many stages or manifestations of nihilism—Kuhn attributes the most at six!}

Disparity again arises in Nietzsche scholarship as to the possibility of a future or hope after the advent of nihilism. Whitlock argues that Nietzsche doesn’t see nihilism as the end of society but merely the beginning used to get optimism. Schacht takes this further and argues that Nietzsche wants something to come out of nihilism-to create from destruction. Thus, as I discuss in Chapter
VI, nihilism creates a negative dialectic or Dionysian tragedy of destruction and creativity, of despair and hope.\textsuperscript{52}

C: Will to Power

Another of the largest areas of erudition in Nietzschean scholarship is that of his concept of will to power. Debate begins even before a discussion on its meaning as to whether or not Nietzsche intended to publish his notes on will to power. This publication was not constructed by Nietzsche but by his publisher and family after his mental demise. Among those who argue for its non inclusion are Porter and Alderman. They reject Nietzsche’s notebooks as unpublished and abandoned by Nietzsche with reason. Others, like Danto, argue that regardless of Nietzsche’s noninvolvement in publication, the notebooks are insights into Nietzsche’s thought and should be treated as such.\textsuperscript{53}

Once one looks to the meaning of will to power itself and not solely a discussion of the validity of its inclusion in Nietzschean philosophy, one is struck by the deepest and potentially most dangerous differences in interpretation of Nietzschean thought. The main disagreement appears to be whether or not will to power is power over self only or if it involves an external overflowing of energy or power over others. This is the heart of the questions upon which all the other arguments associated with will to power revolve. The lines are very distinctly

\textsuperscript{52} These arguments are best characterized by Bates, Freyberg, Hollingsdale and Peters et al.
\textsuperscript{53} Both sides of this debate can be further found in Giddens, Stack, and Strong.
drawn here as the ramifications to Nietzsche’s acceptability, as well as the political and philosophical outcomes, are affected by this choice. Let me reiterate: when Nietzsche discusses will to power or one’s desire to enforce one’s will, is this centering on overcoming internal desires and drives or other’s external to our own selves either in part or in toto?

The seminal works of these disparate arguments both begin with a basis in Nehemas’ interpretation that will to power is a fullness and excitement of overflowing of will. They are epitomized in Kauffman’s interpretation of internal self overcoming and Golom and Westrich’s view of will to power as external domination.

Within the larger debate on internal or external overcoming are many smaller threads of discussion on the struggle and ranking among stronger and weaker, healthy or sick instincts and their drive to overcome. The body is the basis for claims of will to power because it provides the “correct idea of the nature of our subject” (BGE 13). Nietzsche sees the constitution of the body as a type of chain of command within which there is resistance and struggle among the body’s multiple systems and functions from the cellular level upward. This creates an “aristocracy in the body… a slavery and division of labor: the higher type possible only through the subjugation of the lower, so that it becomes a function” (WP 660, 928). The body thus demonstrates a physiological order of rank and division of labor between different functions. Life itself is a continual struggle with opposing forces that seek to dictate and ‘discharge their strength’.
To be healthy we must have struggle and dominance. There must be rank as one drive must control and exploit in order to have all drives service one goal. The goal is determined by which instinct or drive dominates.  

Thus every organism, because it is living, “seeks above all to discharge its strength” (*BGE* 13).

According to Nietzsche, the weak also have these drives but they are unable to get them to work together, to unite for a common goal. “All living things are obeying things and this—whatever cannot obey itself, is commanded” (*TSZ* 2, 34; *GS* 347; *WP* 954). In the modern world we are weak and unhealthy as we can not discriminate and rank our drives (*WP* 788; *BGE* 200, 258). We can not do so because we have too many choices—we are overcome by the unlimited possibilities. Every desire, every drive wants to be the master, and we can not choose among them (*BGE* 6; *WP* 481).

A recently renewed and growing area of debate on will to power focuses on the struggle or act of struggling itself. This is viewed as a dialectical conflict or dichotomy of negation and destruction, of Apollonian forces and Dionysian rebirth. The debate of hierarchy and struggle will be of significance to my discussion on the competing forces of male and female in Chapter IV.

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54 Robert Solomon did not like Nietzsche’s drive theory and attempted to remake them into passions and motivations of human behavior.

55 This area of study includes authors such as Ahern, Clark, Cox, Lingis, Mlikotin, Salter, Siemans, Solomon, Stack, Stambaugh, Staten and Taffel.

56 This duality is discussed in the works of Heidegger, Deleuze, Staten, Siemans and Lingis.
D: Eternal Recurrence

A fourth area of concentration in Nietzsche’s overarching philosophy is that of the eternal recurrence. Again, the debates begin long before a discussion on the idea of the eternal recurrence itself commences. Is the eternal return of the same only a ‘spontaneous’ idea that occurred during a biographical event, or does the concept play a significant role in what Nietzsche offers us to combat nihilism?

Further deliberation in this area tends to focus on several themes. First are those that attempt to determine the scientific validity of the eternal recurrence. In essence, can Nietzsche’s theory stand up to the test of time and any scientific theory of time? Is the concept of a repeated reliving of the same life possible? These works ask questions such as whether time is linear, time is universal, time is looped or simultaneously both linear and universal. The other aspect of this line of questioning is whether or not you are living the same life simultaneously, or repetitively. They look for proof, as Nietzsche himself attempted to do in his notebooks. This proof is imperative, Clark argues, for without verification the eternal recurrence won’t have the effect Nietzsche desires.57

Contrarily there are those who contend that the truth of the ‘concept’ of time or even the truth of the eternal recurrence is irrelevant. Ahern, Magnus and Soll all point out that it is not the validity of the eternal recurrence that is relevant.

57 Discussions on time and the cosmological aspect of the eternal recurrence are discussed by Cantor, Capek, Kain, Lachmann, Lessig, Magnus, Moles, Mongue, Safranski and Simmel.
What matters is its psychological effect. They note that the question of the eternal recurrence is asked of Zarathustra by a demon as a “what if” statement. This is done, they contend, in order to determine only how one would feel to relive every moment of their life again. For these writers, eternal recurrence is the moment of decision on how you would answer this question: would you dance joyfully at the mere possibility of reliving your life again, or would you be filled with despair and abhorrence? The eternal recurrence, is argued then, to be an affirmation of life. It invites one to “affirm all of one’s actions and experiences and to accept all that is accidental and contingent.”

It is faith that no matter how excruciatingly lonely it becomes or how many and intense the sources of suffering are, one will revere and want to be worthy of life. And one will be worthy when, in the midst of great suffering, life itself is never betrayed by blaming or hating it because one suffers and understands that one will continue to suffer. On the contrary, one can laugh with amor fati and dance with death and...those who are unworthy...those who, seek merely to preserve themselves, commit the blasphemy of cursing life out of resentment.

The eternal recurrence has become a “test of our attitudes toward life.” Mlikton also points out the requirement of the eternal return here is not only to reaffirm life but to do so without resentment.

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62 This test hypothesis is debated in Ahern, Allison, Clark, Fink, Knight, Loeb, Lomax, Magnus, Nabais, Safranski, Schacht, Schutte, Shapiro, Soll, Solomon, Tanner, and Yack.
The eternal return of the same plays an intricate part in the role of resentment and the potential of women to reaffirm life after feminism. This is discussed in greater length in Chapter III.

Yet another direction of research on the eternal recurrence is argued by Salter. He puts forth the eternal recurrence as an acceptance of the challenge of hopelessness. He argues this is Nietzsche’s attempt at a non-religious religion to replace the death of God. Thus it is thought of as a restoration of faith in life, a “call to a new beginning” (TSZ 1:1). This gives the eternal recurrence divine connotations and sets it up as an alternative to religion and science as the bases for man’s horizon.63

A final piece of academic scrutiny comes to us from the feminist writer Irigary. She argues that Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same is not the “mechanism through which the self becomes other…it is the mechanism through which the other becomes reabsorbed into self.”64 Thus the eternal return is a tool of the dominate one to use the strength and character of the weaker to become more, to attain more. A version of this is also argued by Lambert in his conception that the eternal recurrence is a reaffirmation of love.

In the end, Mlikotin and Shapiro give us the largest area of debate on the question of the eternal recurrence by stating that the greatness of the proposition is its variety of interpretation. They point out the benefits of multiple

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63 Similarly, Baumer, Bertram, Steinbuch, Stern and Strong discuss the eternal recurrence as religious dialectic to replace the life versus after life question.
64 Oliver, Kelly. 1995. Page 106
interpretations. This allows for some, like Danto and Schacht, to interpret the eternal return as a message or concept of joy and hope or spiritual enhancement. At the same time, Heller interprets it as one of nihilism and despair. Still others, like Salter, can interpret it as an understanding that nothing in life is guaranteed except the exhilaration of life itself which compensates for the despair and the monotony. And finally Ansell-Pearson, among others, can argue that it is an “act of creation, of giving all to the past but giving oneself to the future---it is faithful to man’s promise”\(^{65}\)

So how does one have the power to pull out of western nihilism and issue a resounding cry of joy or hope for life, for the eternal recurrence?

E: The Philosophy of Art

One proposition is for the role of art or the aesthetic to aid in the vision of Nietzsche’s future. There is immense significance in the role of art in his overall philosophy as seen in Nietzsche’s own words. “The greatness and indispensability of art lie precisely in its being able to produce the appearance of a simpler world, a shorter solution to the riddle of life. No one who suffers from life can do without this appearance, just as no one can do without sleep.”\(^{66}\)

Paglia and Lesser are two writers who attempt an understanding of art. They note the relevance of and do a review of several aspects of art and pop art to

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politics and philosophy in very Nietzschean terms. I argue throughout this dissertation that the role of art or of the creator is integral to the powers needed by the philosopher of the future. He must be able to initiate a new horizon for mankind through his creative or artistic powers. A detailed explanation of this argument can be found in Chapter III.

The debate on Nietzsche’s philosophy of art runs along several main themes. First there appears to be a discussion on whether art is a representation of truth or an act of creative interpretation put forth by the artist. Nietzsche scholarship concentrates on the negation of art as truth. No Nietzscheists that I found put forth the idea of art as an interpretation of truth or reality. Nietzschean art is accepted to be an illusion or veil created by the artist.

Therefore, real debate on the role of art in Nietzsche, I found, focused on the validity of the artist interpretation of his personal will and the use of this interpretation in overcoming nihilism. Berkowitz argues that for Nietzsche art is discovered and is better suited to grasp and convey knowledge than philosophy.

Nietzsche argues that art is an act of the struggle of will to power. This struggle is an application of the duality of the Apollonian and Dionysian cycle of destruction and creation. It is noted by most scholars that Nietzsche argued for one to surrender to the Dionysian and primordialism in order to, in an act of

\[\text{Osborn summates the outcome of these discussions best when he argued that Nietzsche does not see meaning in art nor is it a sensual representation of the truth.}\]
creation, give birth to new forms and values.\textsuperscript{68} This struggle, however, is a continual process, as Nietzsche notes:

I feel myself impelled to the metaphysical assumption that the truly existent primal unity, eternally suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable illusion, for its continuous redemption. And we, completely wrapped up in this illusion and composed of it are compelled to consider this illusion as the truly nonexistent—i.e.—as a perpetual becoming in time, space and causality, in other words an empirical reality (\textit{Birth of Tragedy (BT)}, page 45).

Thus Nietzsche appears to argue that the illusion of art is necessary, continually necessary, to create new non-existent realities for us. Solomon, interestingly, moves beyond the mere duality of this struggle of creativity and argues that art is a Darwinistic survival skill—an emotional strategy that is life enhancing. He argues this is not a weak or passive instinct but an ecstatic and creative one. This active, life enhancing strategy, although emotional, is not irrational. Furthermore, it is converted into values which can then be brought into the service of Nietzsche’s revaluing.\textsuperscript{69}

A final debate in Nietzsche’s philosophy of art is over the needed characteristics of the artist or aesthetic in order for the act of creation to occur. While artistic power creates,

its primary operations are omitting, overlooking and failing to hear. Therefore antiscientific…for it does not have equal interest in everything that is perceived… salvation does not lie in knowing but in creating. Our greatness lives in supreme semblance, in the noblest fervency… nature

\textsuperscript{68} This is where feminism and early feminist theory often found themselves in agreement or great contention with Nietzschean thought as will be discussed shortly.

\textsuperscript{69} Solomon, Robert, 1973. Page 269. A closer look at these arguments can be found in the writings of Came, Deleuze, Moore, Rampley, Solomon and Young.
immersed the human being in nothing but illusions—that is his true element. He sees forms; he senses stimuli rather than truths.70

Thus the artist must be able to omit, to negate, must not live in science and 'knowing' but in creating, in semblance, and illusion.71 The artist must immerse himself in man’s natural element of stimuli and appearance. Nietzsche places these abilities, I argue, more intrinsically in women than men.

Just as there is rank in society for Nietzsche, there is also rank in art. Artistic illusion itself is of no use to Nietzsche. In fact, Rothen argues that Nietzsche lamented on the modern degradation of art. This disappointment, he claims, pervades Nietzsche. He argued that its new purpose had become “to intoxicate!...[and] to silence the conscience...to help the modern soul to forget its feelings of guilt, not to help it to return to innocence” (Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (RWB) 200). This is exactly the result he argued against. Art, like truth, eternal recurrence and the will to power, must serve one’s existence. It must be life affirming to be of value and considered art to Nietzsche. Thus art has the job of drawing men higher—of instilling an illusion large enough to displace the nihilism of the modern world. For Nietzsche, art must create beauty, a beauty so intense it could spontaneously give hope and lead men.


71 The characteristics noted here, the ability to omit, to overlook, to be antiscientific, to create, to semblance, to stimulus will be of central concern later in our discussion of the role of modern democratized woman in Nietzsche’s future.
F: The *Ubermensch*

The remaining main area of study in Nietzsche’s overarching philosophy is the concept of the *Ubermensch*. The *Ubermensch*, or ‘over man’, is a future concept of man. For Nietzsche, culture’s purpose is to direct its efforts to producing such an individual. The *Ubermensch*, it is argued, would overcome nihilism and create a new horizon for mankind. The literature on the *Ubermensch* is split between those who argue that Nietzsche anticipated the coming of a future philosopher, with or without divine connotations,\(^2\)

those who argue that Nietzsche abandoned the idea and instead replaced it with the concept of self renewal through the eternal recurrence,\(^3\) and finally those who argue that the *Ubermensch* is Nietzsche’s own, or Zarathustra’s, revenge against time or reality.\(^4\)

But who can become the *Ubermensch*? Are there any particular societal based conditions to create a superman? Are their individual conditions such as race, creed, caste or gender? It is debated among scholars that Nietzsche had no direct prescription or guide for the *Ubermensch* and that his contentions on

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the subject were not that of a ‘manual’.75 Without said manual, the question then is if superior beings can be created, or are they just born. Nietzsche doesn’t directly tell us, but he gives us direction and delineations of what can and can not breed the *Ubermensch*. At numerous points Nietzsche notes that the higher man can not only be a thinker; he must also be a warrior. This is necessary because sometimes to obtain knowledge one must be proactive and ready ‘to spill blood’ if need be. In fact, Mlikotin argues that “Nietzsche wants his hero to be both a man of action and a thinker, but the latter quality is obligatory.” Furthermore, the same conditions of cruelty and intense suffering create the philosopher and the warrior (*Day Break (D)* 42; *TSZ* page 29). In spite of these unfavorable conditions, the *Ubermensch* can have no pity, anger or desire for revenge (*HAH* 943). He must be willing to question all, to risk all for the “secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is--to live dangerously! Live at war with your peers and yourselves” (*GS* 283)!

In the end, neither physical force alone, nor wealth, nor racial origin are necessary prerequisites [of the *Ubermensch*]. Foremost qualities are related to the classical notion of the human character: moral strength, the body and mind working in unison, the ability to stand alone and be able to assume responsibility, to be your own master and thus be able to guide others.76

In Chapter VI, I discuss the possibility of woman as *Ubermensch* given Nietzsche’s delineation and direction of her development.

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76 Mlikotin, Anthony. 1991. Pages 139-140
This leads us to the question as to what social or political order gives us a higher man. The *Ubermensch* can not exist outside of some type of society. This creates a problem in that societies have already developed their particular framework. Therefore, whatever culture one finds oneself in must be overcome [perhaps even destroyed] by the *Ubermensch*. This is done through the development of self-knowledge and understanding of the fabric of the society. Perhaps it is only at the end of any culture that the foundations of the *Ubermensch* become possible for only “a people that becomes conscious of its dangers produces genius” (*Unpublished Writings (UW)* Page 7).

A final area of debate on the topic of the *Ubermensch* is whether or not these guidelines are for everyone. Can anyone be the *Ubermensch*? Is this a democratic vision or a hierarchical one only for the highest type of man [or woman]?\(^{77}\) It is unlikely that Nietzsche would or could envision an entire culture of superior men and women. As stated repeatedly, there must be rank. So perhaps the prescriptions of who can achieve are not for all and may be “for the rest of us poison” (*BGE* sect 30). For as he stated, “An educator never says what he himself thinks, but only what he thinks of a subject in relation to the profit of him whom he is educating” (*WP* 352).\(^{78}\) Therefore, perhaps Nietzsche, as the teacher or harbinger of the *Ubermensch* writes, like Plato, different messages for different types of people at different levels of interpretation.

\(^{77}\) Detweiler, Bruce. 1990.

\(^{78}\) Scholarship on the *Ubermensch* is best characterized by the works of Appel, Clark, Knight, Lomax, MacMurray, Moles, Moore, Schutte, Steinbuch, and Tassone.
Section 3: Woman

A: Nietzsche’s Women

Finally, almost as an afterthought, one notes the sparse sum of works dedicated solely [or even in part] to a seemingly smaller thread of Nietzsche’s tapestry. Of particular importance is the lack of effort to comprehend Nietzsche’s view on woman.79 Here I discuss several smaller arguments centering on gender, or the feminine, in Nietzsche. Because there has been no overarching theory of women in Nietzschean scholarship, works on the feminine in Nietzsche can best be described as disjointed snapshots of a wide variety of observations. These observations include study on his alleged misogyny and its possible biographical causes, the characteristics and ranking of women’s traits [particularly lying and playfulness], the role of creation and resentment in women, the impossibility of woman as free spirit, and Nietzsche’s effect on the feminist movement.

As noted in the earlier discussion on biographical scholarship, Nietzsche is often condemned as a misogynist. His comments on women’s character and what appears to be a support for her traditional roles as wife and mother lend credence to this definition. Authors such as Holub and Abby look to particular events and times in Nietzsche’s life to explain his views. As is commonly known, a childhood surrounded by women and the influences of his sister, mother and

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79 The biographical scholars do note his failed relationships, and his being raised by a household of women as claims for his misogyny but do not tend to concentrate on his philosophy in respect to woman.
Lou Salome have all been thought to be the cause of these perspectives.\textsuperscript{80} Abby goes so far as to point out that Nietzsche himself argued that misogyny was a form of self-loathing (\textit{D} 193, 294, 346). Whether this was a biographical insight or a defense of his non-misogyny will hopefully become clearer throughout the course of this work.\textsuperscript{81}

Looking beyond the personal glimpses into Nietzsche’s misogyny, scholarship does attempt to address the noted traits Nietzsche associates with women. In a general comparison of male versus female Nietzschean characteristics, Holub and Abby find conflicting conclusions. While Holub maintains support for Nietzsche’s subjugation of women, Abby claims that Nietzsche saw female traits as societal and not merely biological (\textit{HAH} 383; \textit{GS} 66). Societal constraints, she argues, can be changed and adjusted and are therefore not concretely male or female. She notes, therefore, that the traits Nietzsche associates with woman are not truly feminine in nature. Furthermore, she argues that many of Nietzsche’s comments on the potential of women support her contentions that traits can be altered or developed (\textit{HAH} 377, 411, 425).

Other authors, while not looking at the impact of a complete set of female traits, do argue for or against one particular drive or characteristic. This direction

\textsuperscript{80} Holub sees a distinct change in Nietzsche’s woman before and after his association with Salome.

\textsuperscript{81} Other biographical scholars who look to the role of women in Nietzsche’s personal life include Barry, Chamberlain, Durant, Fuss, Hayman, Kohler, Mencken, Peters et al, Safranski, Salome, and Shapiro.
of scholarship includes Richardson’s discussion on female empathy versus male aggression in the development of knowledge. Interestingly, both traits are argued to be simultaneously helpful and detrimental. Richardson maintains that empathy, for example, is useful when one attempts to understand various perspectives, but it is also non-supportive of the necessary discrimination or no-saying needed for higher man.

Another such discussion is Lambert’s questioning of the role of female loyalty and man’s dissatisfaction in bringing man to accept the eternal recurrence. Lambert, in fact, argues that the eternal recurrence is itself a concept of great love, one which can enable man to state unhesitatingly, “I will take you, with all your flaws, with all the suffering, over and over again.” Thus without woman’s loyalty to draw men into relations, he can not gain the necessary desire to face the devastating thought of the eternal recurrence.

Derrida and Rampley explore the idea of woman as the giver or bringer of truth. They argue that this is an empty gift—as there is no truth. In a similar inquiry, Gillespie and Strong analyze Nietzsche’s comparison of woman as truth. They also contend that, for Nietzsche, woman is all appearance and that no truth lies beneath her construct. They connect the many veils of woman to the many layers of deceit needed to keep man from nihilism. Thus, they argue, to avoid
knowing of the nothingness, one must not look beneath the veils of woman’s illusion. Thus deception by woman keeps man from nihilism.\textsuperscript{82}

Finally, Bates’ book on play in a godless world is probably the most definitive and comprehensive work on a single female trait in Nietzschean scholarship. Bates argues that the accepted concept of play contends that children’s games bring structure to chaos, but for Nietzsche play shows the meaninglessness of life. Facing this meaninglessness with laughter and a carefree spirit is also necessary to overcoming nihilism. A carefree or light-hearted nature, Bates contends, is a trait which Nietzsche associates most with women (\textit{GS} 62, 67; \textit{BT} Page 60). Hopefully this new direction of thought will lead to further discussion on the future role of play or laughter in Nietzschean scholarship.

Another aspect of the scholarship on Nietzsche’s woman is what I would call traditional women’s roles; that of wife and mother. Here I limit the review to discourse on Nietzschean woman. Later in this chapter I examine Nietzsche’s effect on the feminist movement and feminist theory directly.

Nietzsche looked longingly toward the eternal feminine (\textit{GS} 67, 70, 74, 339; \textit{EH} III 5). He expressed repeatedly his disappointment in the ever growing knowledge about ‘woman’ that would erase her mystery and allure to man. He gives great credence to the strength and role of woman as drawing man up into himself and society. Women traditionally filled this uplifting role through their

capacities as wife and mother. These traditional feminine roles begin with the act of marriage. Marriage is interestingly one of the most explored areas of Nietzschean feminine scholarship. Unfortunately, this is perhaps more as a result of its affect on the male than a desire to more fully comprehend female roles. This research takes two very distinct paths. The more traditional and expansive argument is on the detrimental effects of marriage to a higher man. Nietzsche notes, “men generally sink somewhat when they take wives, while wives are somewhat elevated” (HAH 394).

There have been more recent and smaller lines of inquiry looking into the positive roles of marriage. One particular debate is about the nature of friendship and its role in guiding both male and female. Specifically, the rarest types of marriage will be one of friendship. Nietzsche put great store on the necessity of friendship in marriage (HAH 424; WP III 317). He writes, “The best friend will probably get the best wife, because a good marriage is based on a talent for friendship” (HAH 378).

Whether arguing for or against the value of marriage, both aspects of the debate usually begin with a discussion on Nietzsche’s three types of love as noted in BGE 194.

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83 HAH 394, 405, 426, 427 429, GM III 7 all are pointed to as denoting the devaluation of a man in marriage.
84 This line of inquiry can be characterized by the works of Derrida, Durant, Holub, Irigary, Kashyap Kazantzakis, and Moore.
85 Lambert, Laurence. 2001
Regarding a woman, for example, those men who are more modest consider the mere use of the body and sexual gratification a sufficient and satisfying sign of 'having,' of possession. Another type, with a more suspicious and demanding thirst for possession sees the 'question mark,' the illusory quality of such 'having' and wants subtler tests, above all in order to know whether the woman does not only give herself to him but also gives up for his sake what she has or would like to have; only then does she seem to him 'possessed.' A third type, however, does not reach the end of his mistrust and desire for having even so: he asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not possibly do this for a phantom of him. He wants to be known deep down, abysmally deep down, before he is capable of being loved at all; he dares to let himself be fathomed. He feels that his beloved is fully in his possession only when she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him just as much for his devilry and hidden insatiability as for his graciousness, patience and spirituality.

This excerpt shows that love for Nietzsche is a possessive selfish emotion.

Solomon disagrees slightly by adding a twist to his definition of selfish. He states that “it [love] is an emotional strategy of all embracing possessiveness, declaring oneself one with an opponent one cannot overcome…true love…is ecstatic and creative, not reactive. It is by no means universal in its scope and is first of all a kind of self-love…not vanity but self-assurance.” Similarly, Lambert appears to agree with this softening of the possessive nature of Nietzschean love with the statement that the desire to be known for who you are “turns something possessive into something given voluntarily…as a choice worthy for itself.”

Thus for Nietzsche love is a possession, a selfish but non-vain type of self love which is both emotional and creative. This group of writers argues that marriage, for a select few who have true or correct love, can have a powerful and necessary outcome. As Gary Shapiro writes, “Nietzsche’s idea of an Alcyone

86 Lambert, Laurence. 2001. Page 165
marriage is one of a faithful married love, of a marriage based on genuine reciprocity of interests, activities, and conversation. This type of marriage is like the Alcyone rare and exceptional. “87

So it is argued, particularly by Lambert, that love may be the answer, the one emotion powerful enough to draw man up to accept the suffering in the eternal recurrence in order to obtain the power of love. For as Nietzsche notes:

A full and powerful soul not only copes with painful, even terrible losses, deprivation…it emerges from such hells with a greater fullness and powerfulness, and, most essential of all, with a new increase in the blissfulness of love. I believe that he who divines something of the most basic conditions for this growth in love will understand what Dante meant when he wrote over the gate of his Inferno: I too was created by eternal love (WP 1030).88

But what of the female role once a marriage is obtained? Most Nietzsche scholars argue that motherhood is the ultimate goal of woman. It is the purpose behind her every action. Lambert argues, in fact, that woman’s true happiness is found in motherhood through the creative love of a child. He notes that “man is merely the means to woman’s true happiness, the child, that which she produces and molds and on whom she exercises her primary creative love.” 89 Lambert argues that parental love, while another form of possession, is completely different form than the adult variety. Parental love, he argues, has to learn to let go and let be—to allow the child to become what it is. In the end, this is a


88 Discussions on marriage in Nietzsche are characterized by the writers Abby, Holub, Kazantzakis, Lambert, Richardson, Shapiro and Solomon.

possession of gratitude, not knowledge. The child is indebted to the parent, and
the parent uses this debt to possess the child.

Few authors attempt to connect creation and giving birth to the feminine in
Nietzsche, in spite of the argument that childbirth is the ultimate goal of women.
They often look to associate birth and creativity instead with an effeminate male.
This line of scrutiny is repeatedly associated with discussions on the Dionysian
and pervades nearly all Nietzschean scholarship.

In specific relation to the female and the act of pregnancy and birth,
several varying sentiments have been put forth. For example, Abby argues that
Nietzsche saw sex as degrading women. She further argued that pregnancy is a
shaming admission of sin. On the other hand, Graybeal states that to Nietzsche
pregnancy is creation, fertility, and the possibility of new. In fact, she argues he
has contempt for sterile, unfruitful people (TSZ 46, 111, 145-146, 181). She
notes that “clearly for Nietzsche pregnancy is a very positive condition, it is, in
fact ‘a solution’ perhaps even the one solution to the riddle that human existence
itself is…” 90 Limited debate exists on the female and not an emasculated
effeminate male giving birth. 91

Another, more concentrated area of scholarship on Nietzsche’s woman is
a discussion on woman’s search for independence and her call for equality. The
primary works on women’s call for independence focus on the larger issue of

90 Graybeal, Jean. Language and ‘the Feminine’ in Nietzsche and Heidegger. Bloomington:

91 Discussions on this topic are primarily to be found in Abby, Graybeal, Lambert and Oliver.
resentment in Nietzsche. Resentment is the desire of a weaker trait or individual to blame the state of its weakness or position on another stronger individual or trait. Resentment is argued to be developed from the Christian and Democratic ideals of equality and pity. Christianity and equality grant infinite value to all lives, even when one is weaker or inferior. The inferior perceives his state to be the result of an active participation by the stronger. Solomon examines directly the roles of pity and justice in relation to resentment. Appel argues that pity is a ‘bad’ trait and makes one think they are subject to fortune; your fate is not under your control in any way. It reinforces the weakness of the lower trait or individual which is terrible for both superiors and inferiors. It makes the latter think to acquire the former’s place. Simultaneously, the weaker may also attempt to destroy the stronger by bringing guilt to the higher, strong type. Any discussion on resentment is a direct argument to the motives of woman in her drive for ‘equality’ and the incentives behind the feminist movement as a whole.

In specific response to feminist resentment, Krell accuses women of this very act of resentment. He argues women present a repeated story of domination to which they attribute always the same accuser. They regard their own existence as an injustice and so attempt to avenge not only themselves but all generations of women before them. “And they cry, pity me, pity me.” He therefore directly correlates the feminist movement’s blame of woman’s condition

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in society to Nietzschean philosophy of resentment as a type of revenge against a higher, healthier [masculine] trait.

Paglia also speaks directly to ‘blame’ feminists and charges them with both overt and covert use of intimidation to any who speak against them. She claims feminists are not as noble in their goals of equality as they profess. In fact, they are just as guilty of the same domination they have charged to their male masters. She argues that equality is a myth or fantasy which feminist propagate for their own political benefit. Nietzsche, I argue, would partly agree with Paglia in her low estimation of the goals of feminism. In Chapters II and III this estimation is discussed in greater length.

Interestingly, while resentment is a trait caused by weakness, it is not itself helpless. Resentment is a very powerful tool, an active tool, wielded by the passive and weak against the healthy and strong. Resentment can be a very effective force for change as shall be discussed in Chapter V.\(^{94}\)

A look at literature on the feminine is not complete without some discussion on the battle of the sexes. Nietzschean scholarship gives us an indication as to the possible roles or actions that might occur in this ongoing struggle. The duality of this battle is represented in Nietzsche’s writings as another struggle, that of Apollonian and Dionysian forces. Often Apollo is associated with male traits of rationalism while Dionysius is associated with female emotions and giving birth.

\(^{94}\) Discourse on resentment includes such authors as Ahern, Appel, Irigary, Krell, Mandel, Paglia, Rothen, Solomon, Stack, Steinbuch, and Strong.
Within the study of this conflict between rationalism and emotion, several interesting views are put forth. Oliver studies this duality directly and concludes that the female, who brings death to reason and philosophy, is merely the inverted image of male; thus woman has no prospect of developing. In fact, she has no opportunity to advance separate from being a mirror for man. Abby, similarly, argues that Nietzsche directly disclaims any possibility of a woman as free spirit (HAH 431, 432, 435). This would seem to eliminate any likelihood of woman as a future Übermensch. Surprisingly, however, this statement is made only pages after she argues against common claims that Nietzsche wanted to limit female education (HAH 411). Abby does conclude that the reason Nietzsche wanted to deny a classroom instruction to woman was not from a lack of ability but from the potential damage of a German grammar school education to the free spirits of women.

Irigary continues the argument of woman’s exclusion in Nietzsche with the similar statement that the female has no image and is allowed no image, other than to bring forth man’s success. Her role is not an independent one. She concludes that woman is kept completely subservient and isolated by man’s goals for without using woman, man will not achieve. She calls for women to be free to find themselves directly instead of having to be used up in the production of men.

Interestingly, Lambert, on the other hand, argues that “Nietzsche assumes that women have the advantage in the antagonism between the sexes and that
the abolition of antagonism is contrary to women’s interest.”95 This line of inquiry considers the struggle or tension of the male-female interaction as necessary to the development and fulfillment of both players. Lambert’s thought is in direct correlation to Paglia’s decade earlier conception that male and female development is dependent upon each other. She argued that “when women cut themselves off from man, they sink backward into psychological and spiritual stagnancy.”96

B: Nietzsche and the Feminists

In spite of the lack of direct scholarship on this topic, feminist writers have often reacted to his writings within their field. Nietzsche had two direct and nearly opposite effects on the German feminist movement. One such influence was upon Helene Lange, leader of the more conservative and mainstream German feminism known as the Allegemeine Deutsche Frauenverein (ADF). This movement was comprised largely of middle and upper class women. They maintained that an individual woman’s nature was important but not to the point of requiring a social reordering that would exclude their traditional roles in society. They sought only to enrich their lives outside the limits of wife and mother without jeopardizing those responsibilities. They rejected sexual equality and license and the ‘hunger for sensation’ as valid developmental arguments of

95 Lambert, Laurence. 2001. Page 240
the individual. Instead, they called for individuality as a process of gradual
change through education.

The ideas of Gertrud Baumer, also a member of the ADF, ran along lines
similar to Lange. She called for individual change against the ideas of self-
interest and ostentation. Uniquely, she advocated that the marketplace debases
culture. In this she praised Nietzsche for his awareness of the corrupting role of
commerce. In spite of this praise, both Baumer and Lange blamed the moral
corruption of their rival feminist group, the Neue Ethik [new ethic], on Nietzsche.
Their biggest criticism of Nietzsche was his philosophical bases for individual
freedom. They worried that his teachings of social and moral revaluations were
too radical for the feminist movement. They pointed to his Dionysian orgiastic
call to the primordial world as the direct cause of the path of the New Ethics
platform.

This alternative branch of early feminism [the New Ethic] was a minor
association under the umbrella of the Bund für Mutterschutz [organization for the
protection of motherhood]. Although its parent association, the bund, was
officially moderate and responsible, the members of the New Ethic were very
outspoken on their views of individual self-realization through obtaining all their
instincts desired. This concept was epitomized in their leader Helene Stoker.
This was a proletarian feminist movement. These women, unlike the members
of the ADF, often worked outside the home and had obtained a measure of
independence. Perhaps because of this they did not argue for ‘a little more
freedom or a profession,’ as their rivals did, but for a new type of social ordering. They looked to change women’s conditions in labor and social welfare. In their call for social change, the New Ethic argued for contraception, legalized abortion, divorce, free love, and homes for unmarried mothers. Furthermore, they pointed to marriage as the main cause of discrimination against women.

Nietzsche’s immoderation was quickly focused on by members of the New Ethic as a basis for their concept of self-realization. They further supported such ideas as the artificialness of good and evil. This reinforced their contention of the artificial construct of women’s roles in society. These feminists argued for the fulfillment not of a traditional societal role for women but for her individual ‘nature.’ They struck out against the prevailing moral values of the time and attempted to “become what they were!” 97 They searched for individuality through immoderation and complete individual freedom including free love. Stoker praised Nietzsche for freeing mankind.

These radical arguments of the New Ethic led to their denial of entrance into the organization of women’s groups led by Helene Lange, as well as to the rejection of their platform. Primarily from necessity, as these radical ideas were not a good fit for a broader emancipation movement, this branch of feminism turned away from Nietzsche’s immorality. By the end of the century the German feminist movement [along with other equality movements worldwide] had completely turned away from these individual perspectives toward societal

corrections. This led them to concentrate on bringing change through socio-economic adjustments. This shift was characterized by writers such as Lily Braun. She wanted to keep Nietzschean thought out of the feminist debate and looked solely to socioeconomic change. This change was needed to increase the independence of woman. This was necessary, she argued, because until women were independent economically, they needed men and marriage.

After the movement away from Nietzschean individualism had occurred, the feminist movement and Nietzschean thought had a near half-century of dissociation.

In recent decades modern feminists [and non-feminists] again took up a limited deliberation on Nietzsche’s observations and their effect on women. Unlike the early feminists, they did not appear to concentrate solely on his philosophies of individualism and the Dionysian. Instead, academic deliberation on this subject can be generalized as those who maintain he has something of value to say about women and those who adamantly argue that he does not.

Those who reject Nietzsche’s [and traditional society’s] feminine base their arguments against the male understanding of the female or feminine on three subtly different interpretations. The first argues that the definition of female is wrong as it is only obtained thorough the male perspective, through his consideration alone without input from her. This feminist camp, as epitomized by

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99 This dissociation may have more to do with his association with Nazism and the overall avoidance of Nietzsche during that time period than any relation to the feminist movement.
de Beauvoir and Irigary, argues that traditionally, male philosophers have incorrectly defined the female, her traits, and role in society on an erroneous understanding. “The deepest problem with this portrayal [of woman] is also the most obvious one. Namely that it is simply not true, and this is because it has been constructed through an inner conversation of man with himself rather than through any genuine dialogue in which women were allowed to say, for themselves, who they are and what they wish to be.” The point of contention, then, is that males historically describe the nature of women through only their own perceptions.

A second grounding of the error in the construction of woman, it is argued, is that in western culture the feminine is not defined in and of itself but only as the flip side of the masculine. Therefore, woman is only the opposite of man. As the opposite of her male counterpart, she is determined to be weak, submissive, vain, nurturing, and non-rational.

Finally, authors such as Irigary argue that all aspects of female-feminine, maternal and woman-are all servant to the masculine domination of culture. Thus the interpretation of female is in error as her identity is defined by her role, which is completely prescribed and determined by her subservience to male in a masculine dominated society.

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101 Other authors who see Nietzsche’s perspective as the typical male bias are Figes, Eva. Patriarchal Attitudes: Women in Society. New York: Persea Books, 1987 and Schutte, Ofelia. 1984
Regardless of which bases for an incorrect interpretation of women is being argued, all modern feminist literature begins with the teachings of Simone de Beauvoir. She maintained that being a woman is not the same as being female. She maintained that the concept of ‘woman’ is a social construction that “normalizes females to exhibit feminine characteristics and inhibit masculine characteristics. She introduced a concept of gender apart from sex, through which women and feminists are not naturally identical with being female.” De Beauvoir’s distinction is fundamental to feminist theory. Being female is of the body, but gender is an acquired cultural meaning. To de Beauvoir, we are all people first and we can transcend our gender. She argues that women are identical to men in their abilities, particularly to take a transcendental position in relation to their experience. Thus what defines female is constructed by societal forces.

Another feminist writer, Irigary, subtly splits from de Beauvior’s definition of feminism in the contention that only male forces and not societal ones define the female. Because this construction is a masculine myth created for his own purposes, we see feminists discrediting traditionally female associated traits as weak and bad and male associated traits as good. Whether societal or masculine based—this is done in order to break the encumbrance of these views to feminine equality.

102 Oliver, Kelly. 1995. Page 129
103 ibid. Page 178
In either case, as female definitions have no factual basis, they should be disposed of and instead De Beauvoir encourages females to victory through acquiring or conquering male associated traits. She suggests that “women should leave behind the burden of the category ‘woman’ with the cultural associations of passivity, weakness, nurturance, emotionality, and so on, to enter the world of men as equal persons—active and strong.” 104

What does this mean? Interestingly, here there is a direct connection to be explored between being female and Nietzschean philosophy. As a deconstructionist, he fully understood [and at times applauded] control of the artificial or surface of existence (GS 374; EH 9; A 56; WP 15). As I show, this ability to change and control the surface of existence is key to Nietzsche’s directives to modern woman. And, in fact, the interplay and conflict of biology and created image is an important link in the chain of Nietzsche’s prediction on the results of the democratic equalizing movement (GS 333). This is a result of biology giving man and woman not a true nature but certain biological traits that one can attempt to suppress or elevate to different ends. As we shall see in Chapter IV, Nietzsche does address this duality in depth.

In summation of Nietzsche scholarship on woman and his influence on the feminist movement, one can state that Nietzsche had a small and limited impact on the early feminist movement through his influence on setting the individual free and by his stance on immoderation. After early feminists moved away from

104 ibid. Page 13
an individual perspective to a societal one, however, his influence waned. He then went through nearly a century of neglect and abuse by Nietzsche scholars and feminists alike. Most of the works in this period in relation to Nietzsche’s woman are criticisms on his misogyny and his traditional secondary and maternal based interpretation of woman. Strangely, feminist scholarship followed similar development. From early individual freedom and immoderation to societal based deconstructionist literature, feminism morphed. For three quarters of a century it became militant and blame oriented. The ‘man’ literally was seen as the root cause of female ills. This ran parallel to an increased discussion on resentment and the power of the weak in Nietzsche. In the nineties, a shift in both Nietzsche and feminist scholarship occurred.

An example of this recent shift is given in the review of Paglia’s opposition and frustration to the then current ‘blame’ feminism. This shift opened the door for many works on both areas of scholarship. Richardson agrees that there has been a change in feminism. He sees this as a new rejection of the goal of equality with men and equal access to male goods. This, he argues, lets females have solidarity over generations as well as allowing for differences between men and women. He contends that the challenge is to identify female strengths and disentangle them from “behavior or disposition that allow or reflect women’s domination by men.”

105 Richardson, John. 1996. Page 194
This dissertation attempts to further open discourse on Nietzsche’s woman not only for its use in better understanding of Nietzsche’s overall philosophy of the future, but also the ramifications politically and culturally of democratization. I hope to demonstrate that Nietzsche, contrary to previous perspectives, was “heavily influenced by the question of women.”\textsuperscript{106} Furthermore, I argue he offered a possible avenue to the revaluation of cultural values through a revival of a healthy femininity through a vigorous and strong dynamic between the sexes.

\textsuperscript{106} Graybeal, Jean. 1990. Chapter 2
CHAPTER II

NIETZSCHE FORSHADOWS: THE EFFECTS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY

In order to view the complex weaving that is Nietzsche’s overarching philosophy of woman; I begin by looking at the key concepts of the political and cultural ramifications Nietzsche foresaw in Christianity, the Enlightenment and Democratic movements. To begin, this is done from a point of perspective that Nietzsche himself used. As a cultural physician, Nietzsche had the ability to look to a particular trait in a society or individual and determine prospectively what effect[s] it would have upon society. In order to get a clear picture of how woman fits into Nietzsche’s overall prescription for man’s future, I first examine what changes in them he predicted would occur due to these movements.

While extensive previous work has been done on Nietzsche’s expectations of the Enlightenment, Christianity and democracy, none have taken these views farther to examine how their particular ramifications on women would play back into his overarching philosophy. I intend, at first, to follow the well trod path of Nietzsche’s expectations and then veer into unexplored territory by using this information in the following chapters to focus directly on women’s future roles.
Section 1: History and the Changing Man

The basis for Nietzsche’s foreshadowing of change, it must be noted, lies in the contention that man does not have a fixed nature; in fact, man’s ‘nature’ does not exist. If this is so it may seem to be an impossible task to view or debate man or man’s actions from either a historical perspective or in an attempt to predict the effects of a social construct or event. Perhaps one can only see one of many possible outcomes. However, Nietzsche gave great consideration to the difficulties of viewing man and culture historically. Men treat history as a science, when it is not. He noted, “what can statistics prove; that there are laws in history? Laws? Are the effects of inertia, stupidity, mimicry, love and hunger to be called laws” (HAH 113)? Here he is obviously pointing out that history [and perhaps the future] is full of passion and impulse. It is not rational nor will it ever be complete.

While it is difficult not to judge man historically, we must live historically in that we take accumulated, constructed knowledge of man’s existence and we live within its precepts. Man lives historically in that the past is remembered. Man suffers from the past. Both individual man and the species as a whole are prone to this affliction. The past accumulation of knowledge gives mankind the set of assumptions about society that are considered the truth. These assumptions he does not question. Nietzsche calls this man’s horizon. All men and mankind must have this horizon. It is the framework upon and through which we act. It
guides those actions. A horizon is constituted by man’s fundamental set of assumptions about all things. It is the set of truths that he can not question.

These precepts and their effects on man are what Nietzsche examines. It is interesting to note that his analysis occurs within the knowledge that those precepts change over time and that those alterations will cause new values, beliefs and identities in man, woman and society. It must be considered that Nietzsche himself was viewing the relations of men and women at a particular point in time; specifically, at the beginning of the push for feminine independence and long before the sexual revolution. Thus we must determine if Nietzsche’s version or perspective is skewed by his point in time, or if he is one of those rare philosophers who can see beyond his own time to look forward to see what losses will result from the occurrence of both independence and the sexual revolution. I argue that he does see beyond his time [hence his comments on its results] and, in fact, warns us of the effects of both.

Nietzsche would argue that difficulty in examining history arises as mankind thinks that:

they must interpret an event correctly in order to conclude something about the essence which produced the painting, that is, about the thing—in—itself…Both sides overlook the possibility [it]…has gradually evolved, indeed is still evolving, and therefore should not be considered a fixed quantity…we have been the painters…the human intellect allowed appearance to appear, and projected its mistaken conceptions onto the things…(HAH 16).

Nietzsche notes that man looks for a cause in all things, and if he looks backward as a crab to explanations he ends up “believing backwards too” (TI 24). Thus he
is stating that we think every event must have a cause and that nothing can
occur without a prior intent (WP III 627). Nietzsche contends that man will be
unable to see an event and not search for its cause, for:

in every judgment there resides the entire, full, profound belief in subject
and attribute, or in cause and effect [that is, as the assertion that every
effect is an activity and the every activity presupposes an agent]; …I notice
something and need a reason for it; this means originally: I seek an
intention in it, and above all someone who has intentions, a subject, a
doer…habit makes us expect that a certain often observed occurrence will
follow another: nothing more (WP III 550)!

He repeatedly points to this flaw in his other writings as well and further notes
that we not only expect causes but specific ones that fit our own perspectives,
“we begin to see causes based upon our own expectations of the cause, for
example, a Christian looks to sin a banker to business and a girl to her love” (TI
the great errors 4). Thus we must be aware that man tends, erroneously, not
only to look for a cause in all events but a specific cause to fit our expectations.
We must remember that there may be no reason, no cause. For feminists in
particular this may generate the expectation of a specific creator of women’s
subjugation. Thus they may see the need for a belief in the ‘conspiracy by men’
to create and maintain their current set of secondary circumstances.

Finally, it is important to note that although one must live historically, no
one can return to the past [or remain in the same place]. Nietzsche states:

no one is free to be a crab. It’s no use: one must go forwards, that is to say, further, step by step, into decadence [this is my definition of modern
“progress”…] one can hinder this development, and in this way block up
the degeneration, gather it up., make it more vehement and sudden: more
than that one can not do (TI 43).
This inability to return to a former state is oft repeated in his works (TI IX 43; GS 377). In Thus Spake Zarathustra 2 42, for example, he notes that one can not will backward no matter how strong one’s desire to do so; one can only will forward. “We can not go back to the old system; we have burned our bridges behind us—all that remains is to be brave, whatever may result” (HAH 248). For it is “no longer possible to return to what was good and higher in antique virtue, however much one might want to. It is in this oscillation between…an imitated or hypocritical Christianity of morals and an equally despondent and timid revival of antiquity that modern man lives, and does not live very happily” (Schopenhauer as Educator (SAE) 133). Our past is behind us, our bridges have burned, and we are destined to suffering if we don’t accept this proposition. Nietzsche would not be one to attempt or ask for a return. In fact he states, “No deed can be undone by being regretted; no more than by being forgiven or atoned for” (WP II 235). These steps were thought to be irreversible. Thus there is no question for Nietzsche of ever reinstating a previous existence or culture for Nietzsche. Man can not unlearn or return to a former version of himself. It will always have been altered by what man has learned or experienced since the original. Nietzsche argued that one needed to use the basis of man’s changeable nature while avoiding a historical perspective to look to where the paths of our society would take us. These paths, once begun, were inevitable and must be viewed as such. His disgust and longing that this path not be followed does not diminish his

understanding of the inevitability of its destination. This argument throws a wrench into the feminist contention that Nietzsche desired a return to women’s traditional roles. If one can never return to a prior state, this inability would also apply to conventional gender based moralities and existences.

Now that I have examined the basis of Nietzsche’s understanding of change over time [whether past or future], I turn to using this interpretation to discuss how he anticipated the general changes in Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy. Furthermore, in the next chapter I address the specific changes to men and women as a result of these movements.

Section 2: Christianity

One of the first paths of man to have great significance for change was the onset of Christianity. Nietzsche saw several problems in a religion based upon a loving God and a universal afterlife. He noted that, “Christianity conceded immortality to every ‘Peter and Paul’ thereby imbuing even the most wretched existence with eternal significance and infinite value.” This diminished the worth of the higher man and increased the value of the weak, as all became deserving of consideration. All men were measured equally valuable, and life on earth was viewed as temporary. The concept of the equality of all souls before God, furnishes the prototype of all theories of equal rights, mankind was first taught to stammer the proposition of equality in a religious context, and only later was it made into morality; no wonder that man ended by taking it seriously, taking it practically!—that is to say, politically, democratically, socialistically, in the spirit of pessimism of indignation (WP 765).
Thus the “doctrine of equality has been more thoroughly sowed by Christianity than by anything else” (A 21, 41, 43, 46, 51).

Furthermore, Nietzsche notes that Christianity called for all to judge everything and everyone. The ego of a divine soul allowed this to become a duty. The concept of eternal rights made everything on earth temporary and conditional. Once every man was equal and all had significance, then man [and woman] began to consider his opinion valuable and to question everything above him [her].

In addition, the great value Christianity placed on every life made man consider his circumstances as not under his own control. Christianity says that “everyone is necessary, one is a piece of destiny, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole” (WP 136). Man under Christianity can not dare to “credit himself with all his strong and surprising impulses—he has conceived them as ‘passive’ or ‘suffered’ as things, imposed on him…man has belittled himself” (WP 136).

Why is man’s state so pitiful and full of suffering? Who is to blame for his lowly status and condition? Nietzsche wants man to know that no one is to blame for him... [that] there is no being that could be held responsible for the fact that anyone exists at all, that anyone is thus and thus, that anyone was born in certain circumstances, in a certain environment...there is no place, no purpose, no meaning, in which we can shift the responsibility for our being, for our being thus and thus (WP 725).
The less well-constituted individual attempts to place himself within a sphere in which he can justify his lack of power, his lack of ability and strength. The healthy individual does not need an excuse or someone responsible for his failure, and Nietzsche argues that even to "require interpretation of this sort" is a symptom of decay. Christianity values all that makes man weak and takes away his strength (EH 132; WP 169). Nietzsche argues that for 2000 years Christianity has taken “sickness, old age, [and] contradiction into all our instincts” (A 19). Thus since the dawn of Christianity, man has adhered to the ideas of equality and pity which are, in fact, contrary to his natural instincts of dominance (EH 50; WP 207, 209; BGE 263, 265). Nietzsche states “the Christian proves himself to be an exaggerated form of self-control: in order to restrain his desires he seems to find it necessary to extirpate or crucify them” (WP 228). Yet all organisms, all existence is based on hierarchy (WP 492, 518, 660; BGE 257).

Under Christian morality, traits such as pride become a sin while humility becomes a virtue (BGE 212, 257, 296). Equality suppresses “feelings of rivalry, of resentment of any” in the lower classes. Yet the higher man doesn’t want equality; his will to power drives him to want distinction. Nietzsche notes “as if a monk or priest had any right to join in a discussion about what a Fredrick II may demand of himself. Don Juan is sent to hell. That is very naïve. Has it been noticed that in heaven all interesting men are missing? The church sends all “great men” to hell—it fights against all ‘greatness of man” (WP 871).

Nietzsche argues that the equalizing aspect of Christianity leads one to overvalue oneself and all men. This increased value sows the seeds of the herd instinct of self-preservation. Within the instinct of self-preservation lies resentment and revenge against any who would challenge that instinct or its foundations in equality (WP 373). Therefore, Christianity breeds the resentment and revenge of the weaker against the stronger. It breeds the herd instinct against all that is higher and more honorable. The “herd morality (of Christianity)—values individual only from the point of view of the whole, for sake of the whole” (WP 275). In Nietzschean text the desire for self-preservation is called by another name—the herd instinct. Although it is one of the most powerful drives of man “in the healthy organism preservation is not the dominant drive.”

Nietzsche defines this type of morality as a desire for “security, absence of danger, comfort, the easy life, to do away with the shepherd to have universal green pastures of happiness, abolish suffering, sympathy with others and equal rights” (WP 957). Herd man, he argues, “pursues a narrow egalitarian happiness that puts him beyond love, creation, and longing, beyond exertion and distinction.”

He notes that the herd man is the greatest danger to man’s future (TSZ III 26-27; EH IV 4; WP 1021).

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110 Detweiler, Bruce. 1990. Page 73
When Christianity gives way to the Enlightenment it has sown deep these seeds of weakness, resentment, tolerance, egoism, egalitarianism and pity. The Enlightenment movement brought forth a transition from belief in religion or philosophy to find the answers to the questions of man’s existence; this belief was to be replaced by one which valued man’s intellectual search for truth. It was argued scientific knowledge would give us our needed groundings. Nietzsche was one of the first thinkers of note to be concerned with a society that based its values in science and the search for knowledge through science (GS 37, 59, 107, 112, 123, 300; WP 50, 53, 457, 688). He was worried, interestingly, that the Enlightenment would lead to an increase in the same traits that its seeming opposite, Christianity, espoused. He states,

But it is revenge above all that science has been able to employ—the revenge of the oppressed, those who had been pushed aside and, in fact, oppressed by the prevailing truth—Truth, that is to say, the scientific method, was grasped and promoted by those who divined in it a weapon of war—an instrument of destruction—to make their opposition honorable…(WP 457).

Thus, similar to Christianity, the Enlightenment was a movement of the weak. It continued to advocate the belief in a cause, and both movements justified increasing their power by bringing down the values and moralities of their stronger enemies or persecutors.

Given their similar bases, the Enlightenment would deepen the effects of the former movement, furthering the leveling of individuals and increasing acceptance, tolerance and pity. While escalating the effect of Christianity, the
Enlightenment would dangerously be perceived as being a separate, unique and non-moral based movement. According to Nietzsche, this would hasten the descent of mankind into a deep state of societal nihilism (GS 346, 347). George Morgan notes that to live out the consequences of their effects “is a task of the first magnitude…a catastrophic historical experience…it is the knell of a civilization.” He argues that to “lead men through this crisis becomes the central problem of Nietzsche’s philosophy.”

This condition of depression would coincide, Nietzsche notes, with the inevitable disillusionment with both knowledge and religion. This break would come when man began to disassociate the good from either type of truth. Reason and science, it would be found, can not bring him truth and happiness.

Science, and previously metaphysics or religion, have all been shown to be based on illusion, as mere stages of illusion. “The quest for absolute truth is becoming a restless unmasking of illusions: everything is false, it concludes, and the result is to intensify the pessimism derived from the self and contemporary civilization, by adding the pessimism of the intellect” (EH 443).

Nietzsche warned that man will then attempt to find a new avenue to happiness and pleasure. This desire would turn man to illusion, untruths, mysticism and fantasies. A lie, Nietzsche argues, is more useful or desirable

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112 Ibid. Page 49
113 Ibid. Page 47
than the truth. A life of instinct and illusion is preferred by Nietzsche because, unlike truth, it brings pleasure. But this shift away from reason would also create its own difficulties. For:

among the things that can drive a thinker to despair is the knowledge that the illogical is necessary for man and that much good comes from it. It is so firmly lodged in the passions, in speech, in art, in religion, and generally in everything which endows life with value, that one can not extricate it without doing irreparable harm to these beautiful (HAH 31).

Thus the loss of faith in science, though necessary and inevitable, will be a difficult transitional period of nihilism until man accepts the need for illusion. This necessity is of direct relevance to the increased role for women in modern society. In chapter III I shall discuss the Nietzschean contention that women are by nature more capable of both creating and believing in illusion. This creativity is necessary for the recreation of a new horizon for mankind.

Section 4: Democracy

The final social movement of concern to Nietzsche was democracy. He saw this stage as an inevitable conclusion to the promulgation of the first two. He states in the preface of Will to Power, “I describe what is coming. What can no longer come differently.” Democracy was a child born from the Christian ideals and thus its heir. This parenting occurs in spite of the fact that modern secular society is the “ungrateful heir of a parent it disavows as its spiritual opposite…both promise almost everything to almost everyone for almost nothing” (BGE 202). The equal rights promised by Christianity are guaranteed by
democracy. Democracy puts government in the hands of the undeserving and ignores man’s natural inequalities. A government of the people, Nietzsche argues, puts power in the hands of the inferior. The ruling castes are “systematically enslaved, robbed of their rights and drugged and anaesthetized into yielding their position to the mediocre against whom they would otherwise be immeasurably stronger” (TI 200-210; A 241-246). And with this power transfer from the ruling elite to the masses Nietzsche was concerned that once all are equal “nobody would need ‘rights’ any more” (BGE 202). He was unquestionably against promoting equal rights for the unequal (BGE 228, 265; TI Expeditions 48; WP 75, 734). He argued that “democracy represents the disbelief in great human beings and an elite society…everyone is equal to everyone else” (WP 752). And when all are taught to think of themselves as the same as anyone else and as equally capable, then the lower man succumbs to what he refers to as the “evil falsity of willing beyond one’s power” (TSZ IV 13, 8) 114 And when this willing beyond oneself occurs, the worst will happen, for equality of rights...[are]...all too easily changed into equality in violating rights—I mean, into a common war on all that is rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power and masterfulness—today—the concept of greatness entails being noble, wanting to be oneself, being able to be different, standing alone and having to live independently...and to ask it once more: today—is greatness possible? (BGE 212; HAH 21)

So Nietzsche worried that the democratic call to equality would herald a war on any that stood above the masses. The weak herd would so hate and distrust the

elite that the whole ‘psychology of the age’ seems directed toward ‘slandering and belittling’ the will to power of the higher man. This would lead to the destruction or denigration of the healthier traits and the higher man. He stated that “In the age of suffrage universal, i.e. when everyone may sit in judgment on everyone and everything, I feel impelled to reestablish order of rank” (WP 854 italics in original).

Consequently, from this equalizing, democracy is the road to mediocrity (BGE 203; TI 39; GM 3 sec 25). Nietzsche contended that democracy would cause a leveling of unequals, a lessening of tensions of the spirit. This occurs, according to Dannhauser, because any government that yields to the laziness of public opinion breeds conformity.115 Egalitarianism suppresses the individual, while the group tyrannizes. All Darwinistic aspects of society are removed. There is no more survival of the fittest because “the strongest and most fortunate are weak when opposed by organized herd instincts…by the vast majority” (WP 685). Thus Nietzsche would argue that we need to defend the “strong against the weak—the fortunate against unfortunate—healthy against those degenerating and afflicted” (WP 685). He sees everywhere those on top and surviving are not the strong but the weak devaluers of life. Once the weak are dominant, it will be inconceivable to have “subordination…it will no longer be possible to achieve a number of its [subordinations] most astonishing

consequences, and the world will be poorer. Subordination must vanish, for its basis is vanishing: belief in absolute authority, in ultimate truth…rather it requires an inherited adoration of princeliness, as of something superhuman” (HAH 441).

In *Will to Power* Nietzsche notes that two or three generations after establishing equal rights the race will no longer be recognizable. He worries in a very Tocquevillian manner that if one wants power, one will have to pander to the mob against any type of privilege or higher traits. Then even the higher man will want to be mediocre in exchange for the desires of the herd. To be open-minded, he argues, is “the honorable term…that makes mediocre men and employable workers…poor in will…prepared for slavery in the subtlest sense” (WP 132, 864). In a decided foreshadowing, Nietzsche warns that when the general equal rights war is over the battles will turn on the solitary personality (WP 887). Thus individuality must be completely defeated and uniformity to the herd mentality will prevail. The herd first will destroy rank, then difference. We can see direct examples of this in today’s society by the tyrannical majoritarian response to people such as Mel Gibson, the Dixie Chicks and Don Imus. This suppression of independent thought, he warns, will occur when society turns from development of an intelligent mass herd into an audacious ruling race (WP 995).

We see more direct evidence of this in the United States today. We demand equality and tolerance to unprecedented levels. We attempt not only to

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level the playing field but to remove the field entirely. In our schools we give ribbons on field day not for first, second, or third place and so on, but for participation. Now being the best is a ‘quiet’ personal victory; what matters to society is just showing up. In school sports many teams now do not have try-outs; everyone, regardless of ability, makes the team and is guaranteed minimal playing or participation time. Winning is not the goal. Athletic events are not for striving and excellence, but for fun. We don’t worry about having the best team or the best players. In addition, educators are being required not to use red ink for paper corrections on student assignments. This is done so as not to deflate the ego of a student who has turned in a poor quality product. We have forgotten that rank is a mode of evaluation. It is a way to measure effort and achievement.

This battle for and against individuality comes simultaneously with the development of work as the new ‘goal’ of man in society. Nietzsche warns that in a democratic society work will be elevated into a goal, an end in and of itself (D 173, 175, 204; HAH 457) Man will be unable to contemplate, to sit and reflect. For

every man is ashamed to be calm, long reflections almost cause rays of conscience. Men think with their watches in hand, the way one eats lunch, with one eye on the exchange list...man is tired; he wants not only to let go, but to lie down and collapse...any disposition toward joy calls itself need for recuperations, and begins to be ashamed of itself...(BGE 339; A 42).

For modern democratic man, success is measured only in work productivity. Because all other forms of competition and comparison have been negated by the egalitarianism of democracy, man’s only outlet becomes industry. This drive
for recognition through work becomes the focal point of man, so that even when he is tired and needs a rest he can justify it only through a desire to be more productive upon his return.\textsuperscript{117} There becomes no other measure or meaning of existence than material, industrial output. Industriousness has done much to lead to a lack of faith as the values of industry replace those of Christianity in a democratic society. This simultaneously protects the herd man from the nihilism of Enlightenment as Christian moral values are replaced with industrial ones and brings man closer to complete nihilism as the meaninglessness of this new horizon will be readily apparent. For “if you give up Christian faith, you pull the right to Christian morality out from under your feet. This morality is simply not self evident…Christian morality is a commandment; its origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism, all right to criticism, it is true only if god is truth—it stands and falls with faith in God.” Its power was in “contending that good and evil are not conventional value judgments devoid of all actual truth but ‘true’ aspects of the objective world…[these views] lacked courage and moralized and idealized the world.”\textsuperscript{118} The complete absence of morality or groundings in democratic society is of great concern to Nietzsche. Nietzsche argues that modern man is no longer reflective and has no morality of his own; instead we are consuming the moral capital we have inherited from our forefathers, which we are incapable of increasing but know only how to squander…thus it has come about that our schools and teachers simply

\textsuperscript{117} This is very similar to a Tocquevillian argument. See Democracy in America pages 656-661 and 525-529.

\textsuperscript{118} Safranski, Rudiger. 2002. Page 152
abstain from an education in morality or make do with the mere formalities: and virtue is a word that no longer means anything (SAE 132-133).

Finally, democracy “weakens our capacity to reach conclusions, or to finish” (WP 125). We will “bow our heads like a Chinese mechanical doll to every power, whether it be a government, public opinion or a numerical majority…any power whatever pulls the strings” (HAH 99). Thus democracy completes the path of its parents, Christianity and the Enlightenment, in making us unable to make choices, therefore giving us unlimited possibilities. Egalitarianism, Nietzsche argues, is a mix of all, with no ability to have a sense of discrimination or distinction. “What is necessary has come to disgust us” (WP 8). Democracy creates a new race of multiculturalists with a bad conscience” (GS 377; GM I II; WP 960). A perfect example of this was a car commercial I recently saw on television. This action filled commercial featured a lion eyeing a gazelle. Suddenly they both took off running; the camera panned over the speed of each separately. You saw the speed and grace of the gazelle, the power and danger of the lion. The lion leapt. You thought the lion was moving in for the kill, but it reversed the image and the gazelle killed the lion! Consider the implications of this--glorifying the prey, the weak, killing off the strong more dangerous predator.

Section 5: The Time of Decadence

Can modern democratic society, which seeks equality and subdues man’s drives for power, offer a place for the enhancement of man? Interestingly, Nietzsche argued that this mature civilization is simultaneously the height of
decadence [and degradation] but is also necessary for the rise of greatness, like facing death to awaken a desire for change, or hitting rock bottom before one can build. He argues this occurs “because within this twilight zone the danger of falling into the abyss is so great, the great moral natures are called upon to act” *(BGE section 200).* Perhaps then one society, in its impending doom, is pregnant with the birth of the next civilization. But the possibility of birth is a miniscule one and can only occur if the last man is averted, if there is still enough nobility or wildness left in man [or woman] to build upon.

Now we have seen where Nietzsche predicts our general path to be leading man. He had a rare ability to foresee the effects of cultural movements and used this to determine where the movements of his day would inevitably take us. His question to us then is: are we better off when we arrive at the destination? He does not mean are we all better off—but whether the culture, the times can produce greatness, whether it can ennoble man. As Klossowski stated, Nietzsche questioned “what can still be created from the acquisitions of our knowledge, our practices, our customs, our habits.”119 So the goal is not merely a sympathetic understanding of where we are or even where we are going, but of what we can make and achieve from this path we have begun.

Having briefly viewed the debilitating effects Nietzsche predicted these movements would have upon man, the question is how he advises we overcome its debilitating forces. Furthermore, if the state and society is the foundation

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necessary to build great men, one would ask which society or state is needed? Here again we see the ‘practicality’ of Nietzsche. He does not attempt to give us specific step by step instructions; instead, he states that this is where we are headed because of society’s forces. For example, “before we think of acting, a tremendous amount of work has to be done. In the main, however, a shrewd exploitation of the given situation is, no doubt, our best, most advisable course of action…the immediate task is to make the personal ideal prevail and become real!” This act can only be accomplished when man holds himself to be ‘worthy of glory…[and able to]…behold themselves again in a higher sphere.”

Democracy, which brought about the leveling, may make a leader stand out (BGE 242; WP 55). The noble man fights against mediocrity and leveling (WP 953). Nietzsche looks with longing on the idea that the same conditions that hasten the evolution of the herd animal also hasten the evolution of the leader. Nietzsche thought democracy would accelerate this transition and thus increase the gulf between the herd and the great man—building a base upon which great man would rise (WP 898, 901-903, 956). This very political aspect of Nietzschean thought is currently being reinterpreted. No matter where one’s path leads, it must be exploited and used to the fullest advantage.
CHAPTER III
WOMEN: THE THREE ROLES OF EVE

In this chapter I shall discuss the traditional interpretations of woman as the eternal feminine, wife, and mother. These conventional construals shall be juxtaposed with both feminist and Nietzschean considerations of these roles and the image of democratized woman as Nietzsche predicted her. I then argue within these three images specifically for the Nietzschean necessity of rank. This hierarchy is not only one within the genders overall but between them as well. Therefore, not only would some women be of higher ranking than others, but also some women would be of higher ranking than some men and vice versa. I also argue that ranking for Nietzsche is not a static event. It is a continual and ceaseless battle among traits and characteristics both within and amongst us.

When discussing the roles and interpretations of women, Nietzschean scholars often get stuck arguing more about his lack of anticipation and obvious dread of the forthcoming changes in women than where those changes might lead. However, it must be considered that regardless of his lack of enthusiasm he did predict the feminist movement as an unavoidable stage of democracy. He repeated in no uncertain terms that mankind can not return to a former state or version of man, no matter how much it is desired. He knew the changes to women’s status and nature were inevitable (*HAH* 248; *D* 573). Thus, any...
academic arguments or criticisms which are based on claims of Nietzsche’s desire to return woman to her former state are not grounded in his philosophy.

In discussing the past benefits of the traditional roles of women, Nietzsche is noting within his concept of will to power the healthy and unhealthy aspects of particular traits. Then, given particular strengths and weakness of both men and women, one can elucidate on the benefits and drawbacks of the foreseen cultural changes in society to those traits.

The inescapability of the effects of Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy on the traits of men and women does not, however, mitigate our responsibility to analyze the path we have chosen \((HAH\ 33,\ 39,\ 155,\ 282)\). Our reluctance or inability to do so is not a valid excuse for avoidance. Nietzsche observes that while “many people are obstinate about the path once it is taken, few people about the destination” \((HAH\ 414,\ 494)\). We tend not to care about where change is taking society as a whole and individuals in particular because we are looking straight down at our feet, worrying about stones to remove from our path. His point is that we must not blindly follow a route without looking up to see where we are headed. This does not mean we have to know the destination. Nietzsche himself admits he doesn’t know the end of our course \((WP\ 907;\ HAH\ 107)\). In fact, there may be many possible outcomes. It is the higher woman [and man’s] potential ability to choose a new path that is imperative.

However, the direction we are headed matters. Nietzsche [like Aristotle] asserts that “when one changes the concept of government, one changes all
relationships” (HAH 450). So where culture is transformed, we change. Modifications in society change both traits in man and within his relations.

Furthermore, as man’s responsibilities to himself and others are derived from those traits, these too are altered. Thus we can not look to the alterations of one gender or man in isolation. We need to analyze the effects on both men and women within their relations to one another. Neither is transformed in seclusion.

So how did the Enlightenment and democracy affect the traits and interactions of man and woman? Having reviewed in the previous chapter the overall direction of the effects of Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy, one can extrapolate from Nietzsche’s descriptions of women’s [and man’s] character the specific influences of these movements upon them.

Section 1: The Biology of Rank

Any discussion of explicit traits for both men and women must begin with the realization that not all drives and qualities are equivalent. Equality is an unjustifiable value for Nietzsche. This is so because biology shows us that a natural aristocracy exists. Biology is the harbinger of rank, of strong and weak, of male and female (WP 942; BGE 264). There must be some mode of dominance and submission.

Inherent biological traits as a basis of hierarchy may seem to be a direct contradiction to Nietzschean philosophy. If there is no universal or inherent truth, how can there be intrinsic characteristics in nature? For Nietzsche, I argue, the
difference lies in the understanding of ‘nature’ and ‘biology.’ Nature, for Nietzsche, is biology, and biology is not a metaphysical truth. Biology shows us rank even within ourselves. All mankind is different in its biology, like fingerprints. We are genetically predetermined to be short or tall, blond or redhead. This is what Nietzsche means by natural differences or natural aristocracy (*TI* 38; *BGE* 257; *GS* 377).

Today we attempt to control this biology; we color our hair, work out, and even take growth hormones. But biology is there. When we stop our elements of control, the variances stop. Our hair grows out and our ‘natural’ color returns. Without permanent surgical alternation, biology controls. Yet biology does not predetermine morality or immorality (*HAH* 8, 19, 141; *WP* 786, 1024). In fact, Nietzsche notes that “morality is an opposition movement against the efforts of nature to achieve a higher type” (*WP* 400). I am not arguing that there exist ‘true’ feminine or masculine natures that must be discovered. I suggest only that certain male and female biological traits exist, and that certain of these should be selected for suppression, and others for revival, to advance what Nietzsche would regard as an elevating outcome for mankind.

Furthermore, Nietzsche reiterates that nature is indifferent to the morality of good and evil (*HAH* 107; *WP* 351, 462, 850). This is not to say that nature or biology gives us no guidance (*WP* 685). Its primary indication to us is that of the existence of and necessity for rank.
There is an order that exists among traits and among the individuals who possess them, both male and female. Ranking is necessary to society and to the individual to “cultivate the inner self knowledge” that is needed “to live well” (HAH 107). This is done in order that man can judge himself and the actions of others within his given society. Egalitarianism, which levels and generalizes, is worthless as anything universal is worthless (BGE 43, 59). The principle of rank is not universal, as only the strong and healthy have the ability to rank. It is not a universal principle. When all is desired or acceptable, there can be no evaluation or discrimination among traits or goals.

So what should be the basis of rank of the traits Nietzsche assigns to men and women? The exceptional and ennobled are specifically what Nietzsche searches for when he views the changes in man’s character. He directs us to ask “what have you done to surpass man?” For “ennoblement of human nature…is…the supreme goal…all social and political institutions—marriage, family, education, state, government, etc. should be judged with reference to their utility for the furtherance of this goal.” As Nietzsche notes “every important world civilization has defined its artistic tradition in elitist terms of distinction and excellence.” Thus, for Nietzsche, it is impossible to have greatness without rank and discrimination, and this rank should be based on the goal of ennoblement. Thus the selection of healthy biological traits to elevate or

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120 This is the first question asked in TSZ 2.
121 Kashyap, Subhash. 1970. Page 266
122 Paglia, Camille. 1994. Page 115
revive in man and woman and the suppression of unhealthy traits can lead to an elevation of mankind.

An important aspect of this interplay of traits, however, is that the order of rank, the roles of commander and obeyor, can and must change. This is not a static interplay but an active one. For Nietzsche, “every new enhancement requires new slavery” (*BGE* 257).

It is imperative to keep Nietzsche’s goal at the focus and forefront of any discussion on Nietzschean thought. In considering this, once the realm of his classification system is established we can not judge his account of human traits by our own value system. This, as was already discussed, is a critical error when judging the past. Nietzsche himself shows us how to properly view history. He discussed the past in connection with its own system [not the morality and ideals of his age]. He then discussed his era as one of ongoing changes, and he looked to the future with its new possibilities.

Epochs are formed when a coherent single ‘spirit of social interaction’ exists. Thus “history must be viewed for its own values and morality, not changed to fit any morality or agenda today. Morality is not truth but answers by men at different epochs.”¹²³ To properly understand these periods and their motivations, we must view them through their own hierarchical ranking of traits and men. Nietzsche attempted to look at different periods and determine what

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the ranking structure of the time was and what the results of this system would be. I begin here with a similar approach when looking at the roles of women.

It is an easy knee jerk reaction to Nietzsche’s idea of the necessity of hierarchy to state that the requirement of rank itself guarantees that women are subservient to men as a whole. Feminists like Tina Chanter argue that, “historically, accounts such as these have not been allies of feminism, but have tended to promote the subjugation of women.”\(^{124}\) I argue that Nietzsche’s positioning is much more complex. Just as some men were of higher rank and order than other males so also are females ranked by their traits and abilities. Additionally, as noted previously, rank is not static. All traits and those who possess them are in a constant battle of supremacy and acquiescence.\(^{125}\)

Specifically, I look at the traits Nietzsche declares are both primary and variable in woman. These traits are deception, vanity, shame, and reason. The variance in these traits leads to divergence in language and action between man and woman; particularly, one notes the altering behaviors in the fields of marriage, love [sex] and child birth. Common belief and feminist literature relegate the qualities associated with traditional female roles to these three spheres of influence.\(^{126}\) Nietzsche begins his depiction of woman not from his own time but as she is considered in her traditional roles of man’s uplifter [the

\(^{124}\) Chanter, Tina. 2001. Chapter 5

\(^{125}\) This battle and its inherent tension is the subject of Chapter IV.

\(^{126}\) Kelly Oliver argues that you must delineate the three roles as separate entities.
eternal feminine], supportive helpmate [wife], and the bearer of strong children
[mother].

Section 2: The Eternal Feminine

First I address the role of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal feminine’ image of woman
as the guiding motivation to man. She is painted as a beautiful, mysterious,
flighty, birdlike creature that, like “truth,” is not understood by men (BGE 237).
She has been the generator of inspiration through illusion. While this vision of
woman as muse is part of her traditional role in society, it will be part of his
prescription for her future power as well. This power will be utilized by woman to
create a new illusion for man.

For Nietzsche the ability to create an illusion is one of the most enhancing
and compelling of life’s powers. Masks are necessary for the highest types.
“What is noble—that one constantly has to play a part that one seeks situations
in which one has constant need of poses…” (WP 944). A higher man must
disguise himself to preserve himself (WP 985). And “A great man—when not
speaking to himself, he wears a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it
requires more spirit and will” (WP 962). He wears a mask not only to protect
himself from the masses, but also to gain the distance required to seduce the
masses to his illusion.

Creating the chimera is one of woman’s consummate powers. Nietzsche
asks, “who is better at this than woman” (BGE 148)? In fact, the feminine is what projects itself as something it is not. She is the consummate actress (GS 361; HAH 400). Interestingly, woman’s power of illusion is so great that she not only convinces man of her false identity, “but she can and wants to believe them herself” (BGE 148). And “if someone wants to seem to be something, stubbornly and for a long time, he eventually finds it hard to be anything else” (HAH 51). Woman is the consummate creator of illusion. She uses the power to create masks to exemplify passion and mystery. She produces longing. This illusion lures man and society. The goal is to draw both upward. This uplifting is achieved because man hopes to be entitled or worthy of her affections and esteem. The passion of this distance creates reverence and desire to achieve. He must search and work to win her. The male is enticed into a love of life, “which is the love of a woman who makes us doubt. We doubt….our own capacity to draw her flesh to our flesh.” Men are not the only receivers in this interaction. Nietzsche contends that women gain pleasure in being the object of love and devotion (HAH 400; GS 363). This idea is best noted in Glenn Close’s character in Dangerous Liaisons when she stated that “men enjoy the happiness they feel, we enjoy the happiness we give…[our] illusions are by their very nature sweet.”

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127 Perhaps will to deception for the purpose of ennobling man is woman’s will to power.
129 Krell, David. 1996. Page 23
In her role as the eternal feminine, Nietzsche would argue that the woman who is all veils, who has nothing hidden underneath her mask, stimulates men to the highest degree (HAH 405). He is compelled forward endlessly in a search for her non-existent soul. What has “bewitched him was precisely that she seemed utterly changeable and unfathomable” (GS 67). In fact Nietzsche gives woman the advice to keep reinventing her masks (BGE 278). He directs her to simulate an unknowable wild and dangerous character. Would a woman be able to hold a man enthralled he asks, “if we did not consider it quite possible that she could wield a dagger [any kind of dagger] against us? Or against herself—which in certain cases would be a crueler revenge” (GS 69).

The inability to know ‘true’ woman is key to understanding Nietzsche. He often compares truth to woman; her appearance, illusion, and evasion require that Nietzsche dispel the myth of the moral qualities of veracity. The truth does not assure the good. It is a moral prejudice that the “truth is worth more than a mere appearance” (BGE 34; HAH 42; WP 853). It does not serve as the highest value standard for Nietzsche. “The will to appearance, illusion, deception, becoming and change…count here as being more profound, more originary, more metaphysical than the will to truth, actuality, being.” In fact a lie can be of more value to Nietzsche than the truth. He advises “that if there is anything to be worshipped it is appearance that must be worshipped, that the lie—and not the truth—is divine” (WP 1011). Deception and falsehoods are necessary, just

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130 Krell, David. 1996. Page 35
as the lie as described in Zarathustra’s dream sequence is the power to continue
dreaming to make a new dream.\textsuperscript{131} I would argue that for Nietzsche an
estimation or ideal should not be ignored or criticized for its lack of root ‘truth’ but
for its outcome. In a very Machiavellian sense, would one rather be highly
esteemed and powerful from a false interpretation of oneself or denigrated due to
a correct one (\textit{WP} 962; \textit{BGE} 4)?

An important aspect of illusion to consider is the strength behind the desire
to create a false perception. Nietzsche argues the longing to produce illusion is
generated by either pride [stoltz] or vanity [eingebildet]. These traits are mirrors
of the sick and healthy sides of a drive. Vanity, the weak or unhealthy trait, is
bowing to the authority of others as to our worth. It is trying to mislead others as
to our value. “The vain are good actors whose entire spirit is consumed with
ensuring that others watch them because their sense of self-worth is wholly
dependent upon the validation of others” (\textit{TSZ} II 15, 22).\textsuperscript{132} This is a sign of a
weak slave spirit (\textit{HAH} 89). The vain, while not wanting to give up “their belief in
themselves, the personal, right to their merits at any price…don’t want…to
answer for anything, or to be blamed for anything, and owning to an inward self-
contempt, seek to lay the blame for themselves elsewhere” (\textit{BGE} 21). Thus, we
may be able to judge how far women have come on the path to self actualization
by the reason behind their illusions. Nietzsche asks “how much ‘slave’ is still

\textsuperscript{131} As interpreted by Shapiro, Gary. 1989. Page 76
\textsuperscript{132} Appel, Fredrick. 1999. Page 40
That seeks to seduce him to good opinion about herself; it is also the slave who afterwards immediately prostrates herself before those opinions as if he had not called them forth” (BGE 261). Thus a creator of illusion who uses this strength to conceive an illusion from the unhealthy drive of vanity is slave-like.

This is posited in opposition to the development of illusion through pride. This healthy drive is in knowing your self worth and not bowing to the authority of others. The noble soul has reverence for itself (BGE 287). Illusion through pride occurs in projecting your correct value and not attempting to mislead others as to your value. “It is self-sufficiency, pride—the opposite of vanity—indepedence, responsibility to self, self reverence.”¹³³ This does not mean the projected illusion is true. For “A great man—when not speaking to himself, he wears a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it requires more spirit and will” (WP 962). Thus the illusion only reflects the healthy trait of pride in oneself and not vanity which desires validation from outside. The proud and healthy do not create false illusions to give others a higher opinion of his worth, if fact he may hide his true value to the point that other higher men may not recognize him (WP 988). This makes it difficult for the healthy to find each other.

Yet if pride is the healthy version of vanity, then illusions created from pride versus those from vanity would have a life affirming connotation for Nietzsche. This is the significant distinction. As discussed at great length, the lie is valuable

¹³³ Morgan, George. 1941. Page 133
in Nietzschean philosophy, but not just any lie—only one that fulfills his goal of ennobling man. Thus illusion must be created from the trait of [assertive] pride and not [slavish] vanity.

Another facet of creating a vision and having it believable is to keep the viewer at a distance. Illusion requires distance, like watching a magician’s trick. We cannot become too focused on the actual. Close examination or inquiry reveals its falsity. Thus creators of fantasy must keep apart from us while they simultaneously draw us toward the seduction of their illusion. “Anyone who wants to idealize his life must not desire to see it too closely, and must keep his sight back at a certain distance” (HAH 279). Yet again we see a necessary trait, a healthy trait for Nietzsche, being associated with woman. It is argued by Nietzsche that women were historically the guardians of distance (GS 6, 34, 206, 218, 243, 294, 299, 362; HAH 64; EH 6). This distance helped to continue illusions and thus maintain and preserve caste and culture (HAH 64).

Maintenance of distance is necessary to avoid initiating feelings of pity and shame (GS 274, 275; BGE 40; EH I 4). Women, through their desire for intimacy, must avoid the pull of these weak and sick traits.¹³⁴ This is her biggest challenge in the future.

After defining Nietzsche’s woman as creator of illusion, its purpose and the distance required to maintain the illusion, feminists judge Nietzsche’s view of woman and find it lacking. How can Nietzsche condone woman’s existence as

lie and illusion for the purpose of assisting not herself but man? How can Nietzsche promote distance and lack of understanding between the sexes? These questions show a lack of understanding of Nietzsche’s argument on the illusion of woman and its relation to the value of lying. This disconnect can be seen in Chanter’s statement, “Nietzsche recognized that ‘ideal’; woman is based on a lie. This acknowledgement does not, however, prevent Nietzsche from going on to demand that women continue to conform themselves to masculine ideals.”¹³⁵

The falseness of female character is acknowledged by Nietzsche [and feminists] to be the basis of the traditional interpretation of female character. As part of this same argument, Oliver notes that the idea that “the feminine gives herself for what it is not is merely another stereotypical characteristic of femininity, because of their femininity woman shouldn’t be trusted…women control and seduce men.” She is affronted because Nietzsche encourages the continuation of woman’s lies. There are two distinct objections here. First is the contention that woman, because she creates illusions, is perceived as untrustworthy and devious. There is an obvious disconnect here in the author’s moral judgment of lies and illusion and Nietzsche’s acceptance of the need for ‘lies’ and their non-moral basis. To be a wearer and creator of masks is not to be evil (BGE 4; WP 132, 944, 962). We are placing moral judgments and values on a trait. To use illusion, to seduce, is not ethically wrong for Nietzsche. There is a

¹³⁵ Chanter, Tina. 2001
tendency in feminist literature to give moral hierarchy to male and female traits. This is done to point out that previous description’s of women and their attributes are an aid in their subjugation; it increases their enslavement to male fulfillment through ensuring their secondary role. In the push for gender neutral equality, feminists specify that different means less. Why? Nietzsche would not argue this way. There is no moral judgment in the spirit of sexuality. In fact, there is no moral judgment at all. He would affirm that men are as they are and women are as they are. Furthermore, while traditionally woman played a secondary or slave role to man this does not preclude her taking a primary or master role. In fact, all healthy and sick traits, all opposites, are in constant battle and each takes their ‘turn’ in domination in a constant and eternal struggle (GS 361, 377; BGE 2; WP 642).

Just as one can not judge illusion on a moral basis, one can not look to the historical role of women with this same eye without devaluing their role in the development of mankind. Nietzsche argued that to use today’s standards condemns woman's “whole past as slavery, enslaves them to the modern ideal of autonomy and blinds them to [their] past nobility.”136 To look to woman’s past as purely one of subservience, and not to recognize the power of women in their roles, is to denigrate the power of their past stewardship and guidance in society.

The second aspect of Chanter’s contention is that Nietzsche demands woman continue the lie of her traditional roles in order to fulfill the male will to

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136 Richardson, John, 1996. Page 139
power. Nietzsche’s non-condemnation of the falseness of woman’s identity, she argues, substantiates this belief. Feminism wants to eliminate woman’s masks. It calls for the facts of woman to be known. This is impossible for Nietzschean woman; as she is all masks. On the other hand, this does not mean that Nietzsche wants woman to continue to wear the same mask eternally, but rather that illusion [though dangerous] is powerful and necessary (WP 223). He would further argue that woman in wearing masks is not conforming to man made identities; she creates the fantasy. She is the author. Traditionally she used her power to create illusions around the fantasies of men. She did this, according to Nietzsche, to use her power to gain protection and avoid work (HAH 356; EH III 5; GS 66). These semblances [and the reasons and purposes behind them] can and will change, but culture needs illusion. Man and woman need camouflage between them because what lies below is of less value to them both. For “if one severs an ideal from reality one debases the real, one impoverishes it, one defames it” (WP 298). Thus the mask of the ideal “restores and strengthens the instinctive” (WP 346).

The acceptance of the past value of this role for the feminine does not negate that Nietzsche knew the power of this illusion was coming to an end. Nietzsche, contrary to feminist belief, argued that knowledge of the ‘facts’ of woman, while inevitable, may be of less value to society and to woman than an uplifting illusion.
In the past, the myth of the eternal feminine fulfilled the nature of both male and female. Thus it was life affirming and ennobling. Nietzsche predicts that the ‘knowledge’ feminists are attempting to educate both men and women about will destroy her strange and wonderful magic, and man will become disillusioned with her. The longing to be worthy of woman would dissipate as the feminist movement began to inform men about woman (BGE 175, 232). What made woman ‘mysterious and unknowable’ were the very biologically based differences that women struggle to downplay, overcome and eliminate. These elusive misunderstood qualities are what brought pleasure to men. As woman loses her powers of illusion, Nietzsche warns all that for which she is shamed will come to light, her “pedantry, superficiality…petty licentiousness and immodesty” which is all concealed and lies below the male’s ideal of woman. When the veil of mystery is removed and the empty truth revealed, Nietzsche expects that not only man will lose the power and happiness of fantasy. He contends that woman gains pleasure in being the object of love and devotion. Thus if man becomes disillusioned and turns from her, she is denied that which she seeks for her happiness and pleasure.

He warns that she will fall from the sought after mystical feminine to what he calls the “eternally boring.” Nietzsche saw directly the results of the lost illusion between the sexes in the form of Madams de Stael and Roland (BGE 209, 232, 233). Knowing woman has become too easy. She has little value. The sublime inspirational eroticism of the eternal feminine has become ‘friends
with benefits.’ Nietzsche predicts that man’s desire for knowledge, for woman, will “cease the less it gives pleasure [and that instead] illusion, error, and fantasies, because they are linked with pleasure, will reconquer former territory step by step…[and] mankind will have to weave its cloth from the beginning again” (HAH 251). Thus Nietzsche argues that the inevitable disillusionment with knowledge and woman will result in a revaluation of mankind; the creation of new social structure.

Nietzsche calls woman’s enlightening men about

woman as such…one of the worst developments in the uglification of Europe.” He warns that “woman’s influence in Europe has decreased proportionately as her rights and claims have increased; and the emancipation of woman insofar as that is demanded and promoted by women themselves [and not merely by shallow male] is thus seen to be an odd symptom of the increasing weakening and dulling of the most feminine instincts. There is stupidity in this movement, an almost masculine stupidity of which a woman who had turned out well---and such women are always prudent---would have to be thoroughly ashamed (BGE 239).

Thus woman, in attempting to claim additional power through male will to power such as through voting rights and employment, will lose her female will to power. So when we reject our instinctual drives or biological hierarchy one diminishes its power. He continues

to lose the sense for the ground on which one is most certain of victory; to neglect practice with one’s proper weapons; to let oneself go before men, perhaps even ‘to the point of writing a book,’ when formerly one disciplined oneself to subtle and cunning humility; to work with virtuous audacity against men’s faith in a basically different ideal that he takes to be concealed in woman, something Eternally-and-Necessarily-Feminine---to talk men emphatically and loquaciously out of their notion that woman must be maintained, taken care of, protected, and indulged like a more delicate, strangely wild, and often pleasant domestic animal; the awkward
and indignant search for everything slave like and serf like that has characterized woman’s position in the order of society so far, and still does, --what is the meaning of all this if not a crumbling of feminine instincts, a defeminization (BGE 239)?

Nietzsche worries that woman has not considered the costs she will pay for her independence. She may trade her own weapons and powers, her instinctual will to power, for weaker male traits. He terms her emancipation as masculinization. Thus the feminine deteriorates. Further, in defense against claims of his chauvinism, he argues that woman will have no trouble gaining that which she desires. Her ability is not in question. She can traverse the path taken; again the important facet is to look to the destination. Nietzsche laments what he sees as a loss of her powers.137 This is not to say that she can not adapt and incorporate new powers. As Nietzsche stated woman can become anything she desires “even man” (HAH 425). However, taking male traits of power into the feminine would be to have a weak or unhealthy version of said trait. Woman must incorporate male traits within her own biological strengths in order to turn potentially sickly characteristics into healthy ones.

Nietzsche sees his age as a period of woman’s storm and stress. In the three or four civilized European countries, one can in a few centuries educate women to be anything one wants, even men - not in the sexual sense, of course, but certainly in every other sense. At some point, under such and influence, they will have taken on all male virtues and strengths, and of course they will also have to take male weaknesses and vices into the bargain. This much, as I said, one can bring about by force. But how will we endure the intermediate state it brings with it, which itself can last for centuries, during which female follies

137 Kashyap, Subhash. 1970. Page 47
and injustices, their ancient birthright, still claim predominance over everything they will have learned or achieved (HAH 425)?

This transition period in which masculine traits are being incorporated directly by the female will be one of great resentment and dominance by woman. Woman will use her new powers and knowledge to dominate and take revenge upon man. It is only after a long period of ‘follies and injustices’ that she will incorporate her new knowledge of male traits into their healthy role within the feminine biology. This incorporation is a key to one potential healthy path for revaluation for Nietzsche.

With all this discussion on illusion it is important to ask, why are women inherently better at deception? Is it a necessity developed from her secondary role? Does woman’s weaker and more delicate biology require a manner of deception to ensure survival? Paglia argues that biology is our hidden fate, it is the force of personality.138 This again is a hint to a more integrated reading of Nietzsche’s woman. Nietzsche was concerned that the push for emancipation was not to understand or allow strong or healthy women but to allow or change woman into man (TSZ 4; BGE 219, 232; HAH 425). In essence the war for equality is not to allow women to be stronger, healthier, more perfect women; but to take over male territory. If this is so then Nietzsche warns that those traits associated with female biology, such as deception and desire for love, will be labeled weak and unhealthy. This is because women will have to attempt to distance themselves from these characteristics in order to obtain their ‘opposites’

in male. Emancipated woman should desire for her own, male traits such as economic independence, a desire for scientific truth and relationship [sexual] freedom. Nietzsche worries that on the basis of this principle alone she will begin to unlearn all her most valuable characteristics; “her prudence and art—of grace, of play, of chasing away worries, of lightening burdens and taking things lightly—and her subtle aptitude for agreeable desires” (*BGE* 232). He predicts the feminist movements will fight against all former traditional roles and drives for the female.

The ability to create illusion has been used as a secondary or passive power by women and weak males such as priests and artists (*BGE* 232). The way in which Nietzsche’s women use their power, Richardson notes “disvalues women not as ‘weak’ in physique but as ‘sick’ in the way they will to power, a defect that persists when this power is pursued spiritually. The crux is that women are typically reactive...they pursue power in an indirect, even distorted form, because they wish to grow not in themselves but in or through some other.” Richardson stresses that for Nietzsche’s woman, the weakness of her spirit is not in her lack of action or desire for power, but in her indirectness. She seeks power through others, through a man or child. He argues that woman is reactive and indirect; thus she is “metaphysically flawed, for Nietzsche’s power ontology.”

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139 Richardson, John.1996. Page 192  
140 Ibid.
Feminist scholars argue that this passive and indirect way in which woman was traditionally viewed to use her power means that she has no value in and of herself.\textsuperscript{141} She is guided by vanity not pride. She can exercise power only as a representation of and for something else. “She plays her part so well only because it is not her due, gives her no advantage. Unless she wants in fact to take part in the master’s game. In which she can not win…Indeed, never.”\textsuperscript{142} She is not using deception to make herself esteemed but working to uplift another. The action occurs because of the movement or action by others.

Yet Nietzsche maintains that it is only the “weaker nature…that makes progress possible (HAH 224). This is because resentment leads to action. It is creative and full of energy (WP 179, 373, 579, 765, 864; GM I 10). We must first acknowledge here that ‘progress’ is not necessarily a positive event for Nietzsche. The delicate and weak make change inevitable. Sometimes change is life enhancing and at other times it is not. This is dependant upon the force behind it. The battle of rank among the drives is the power generator of change. Thus how women use their traits, their powers of deception, can determine the shape, pace and outcome of change. For example, illusions created with pride and not vanity may be for Nietzsche healthy and dominant. In Chapter V I address the pride driven motive of women’s illusions. Again this is key, as the development of a healthy dynamic between the sexes is one of the most


\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
promising avenues of change given the cultural conditions after Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy.

Section 3: The Feminine as Wife

The second traditional role of woman was that of marriage. At first glance it appears that Nietzsche would argue for man to avoid marriage and the webs of deceitful woman at all costs.

Happiness of marriage. Everything habitual draws an ever tighter net of spider webs around us; then we notice that the fibers have become traps, and that we ourselves are sitting in the middle, like a spider that got caught there and must feed on its own blood. That is why the free spirit hates all habits and rules, everything enduring and definitive; that is why again and again, he painfully tears apart the net around him, even though he will suffer as a consequence from countless large and small wounds—for he must tear those fibers away from himself, from his body, his soul. He must learn to love where he used to hate, and vice versa. Indeed, nothing can be impossible for him not even to saw dragon’s teeth on the same field where he previously emptied the cornucopia of his kindness—From this one can judge whether he is cut out for the happiness of marriage (HAH 427).

This aphorism appears damning to Nietzsche’s view of marriage. But for Nietzsche, as in all things, marriages have rank. Hasty marriages without forethought or entitlement are unhealthy. They can cause self betrayal (GM III 7). This betrayal can take numerous forms in Nietzsche. Great disappointment may occur for woman, because she can not love a man who fails. Traditionally, woman’s vanity required that her husband be important and successful in order for his successes to elevate her (HAH 401). The only man who merits a wife is one with a goal and the strength to achieve that goal. Woman needs to have a
man worthy of her affections. He must be a man of success and the high regard of others (HAH 434, 435). Her value is diminished if he fails. In vanity driven woman, her self-regard is determined by the significance of the man who loves her. This need is abrogated in a woman driven by pride and not vanity. This variance for the future shall be discussed in Chapter V.

Another aspect of the failure of marriage’s traditional role for women is that it brings shame. Woman uses sensuality and seduction to lure men to marriage. This action catches the female in her own trap (HAH 415). As a believer in her own lies, her expectation of sensuality and sexual love are high. She believes in love—“that is her characteristic faith” (BGE 114, 269). The eventual awareness of this self-deception, in most females, brings shame at their own naivety or belief. She is not shamed by its falseness but by the fact that she had convinced herself of the ‘truth’ of her own lie (BGE 183). That she can no longer believe is devastating. “Thus a psychic knot has been tied that may have no equal. Even the compassionate curiosity of the wisest student of humanity is inadequate for guessing how this or that woman manages to accommodate herself to this solution of the riddle, and to the riddle of the solution…in sum, one cannot be too kind about women” (GS 71).

Like illusion, shame can be the root of both a healthy and a sick response in mankind. On the one hand, shame sparks creativity and leads one forward. It does this by making us desire to be more, to accomplish more. “One must want to have more than one has in order to become more…For this is the doctrine
preached by life itself to all that has life; the morality of development” (WP 125). On the other it causes weaker characters to seek alternate roots of retribution and domination against the bringers of shame. We call bad those who bring shame (GS 273). Liberation is “no longer being ashamed in front of oneself” (GS 275).

But why, one might ask, if marriage brings such disillusionment would woman continue to desire marriage? According to Nietzsche it was not solely for ‘protection’ or out of biological weakness. It was an ingenious ploy to evade working! She wanted to avoid drudgery!

An indication of the cleverness of women is that, almost everywhere, they have known how to have others support them, like drones in a beehive. Just consider the original meaning of this, and why men do not have women support them. It is certainly because male vanity and ambition are greater than female cleverness; for through submission, women have known how to secure for themselves the preponderant advantage, indeed domination (HAH 412).

Thus marriage was part of a ploy by women to escape toil. Nietzsche does not see this as an unhealthy trait. In fact he calls men vain in reference to their actions and vanity as discussed is an unhealthy trait. Nietzsche sees the female escape as a result of this trait in conjunction with a female’s superior intelligence. Thus he is not praising men for their commitment to work or their ‘honest labor.’ Female cleverness merely out maneuvers or uses male vanity, which is an unhealthy trait. In fact he excuses women their historical deception. In today’s society, however, this interpretation would ‘get the hackles up’ of most feminists. They argue his comments denote that women were lazy and deceitful and not as
industrious and honest as men. Nietzsche would not place such moral connotations on drives. Today’s moral value judgment on a non-moral biological argument is misdirected. Nietzsche would not argue that women were incapable of industriousness or the ability to participate in the work force. Nietzsche in fact warns them about taking the ‘apple of work’ from Adam. This apple in the Lockean Garden of Eden is the ability to be responsible monetarily for one’s self. To work and earn one’s own possessions is a seductive danger similar to the first apple in Eden. Nietzsche does not view the ability to work, to become a cog in the machine of economics, as a healthy characteristic of modern society. He argues that “where we once forced slaves to labor, we now force ourselves… In fact, work becomes almost a religion onto itself: all longing for the noble, love,\(^\text{143}\) heaven have been replaced by work” (\textit{HAH} 283). Women rush and push to be ‘allowed’ a career, to escape the home and be free of enslavement. Lampert argues that the self-reliance sought by modern woman is the illusory self-reliance of work dependent modern males.\(^\text{144}\) The goal is not an ennobling one for Nietzsche. Prior to ‘emancipation’, woman used her work free life to a higher purpose, as guardians of rank and bearers of strong children (\textit{HAH} 64; \textit{BGE} 239; \textit{EH} III 5; \textit{GS} 72).

Another aspect of Nietzsche’s view on emancipation was the validity of the professed goals of the women’s movement. He asks what the emancipators’

\(^{143}\) Interesting that Nietzsche puts longing for noble with that of love. This also portends the Chapter VI discussion on the power and role of love in Nietzsche’s future.

intentions are; for determining their real path may give insight into its possible destinations. Does woman want equality? Does she look with longing at man’s necessity for labor and desire work? Or perhaps having been weak she seeks dominion upon men? The question becomes for Nietzsche whether the seeds of the feminist revolution were a call for justice or a desire for revenge (*HAH* 420, 457, 473; *BGE* 219, 225). Is the movement based in a healthy or sick, strong or weak instinct?

Work is not something that a healthy soul seeks. In fact, “whoever does not have two thirds of his day for himself is a slave, whatever he may be: a statesman, a business man, an official, or a scholar” (*HAH* 283). “Slavery today...where are those for whom they work?...utility and pleasure are slave theories of life: the ‘blessing of work’ is the self-glorification of slaves—incapacity for leisure” (*WP* 758; *HAH* 611). Nietzsche saw that women were being seduced by the Lockean revaluation of labor, and the desire for male will to power. In this instance Adam fed Eve the apple of labor. In Genesis, labor is a form of punishment with no natural end. Once woman accepted the values of the enlightenment and desired to gain strength through the male will to power of labor, she must work for what she has. She needs to amass as much wealth as possible in order to protect herself. Women force themselves to do slave labor. Toil is now mankind's religion. We replace longing for the noble and for love with employment and vocation. Exertion has become an anesthetizer, a drug for the masses to avoid the nihilism of modernity.
That we lay more value on satisfying our vanity than on all other comforts [security, shelter, pleasure of all kinds] is revealed to a ludicrous degree by the fact that [except for political reasons] everyone desires the abolition of slavery, and utterly abhors bringing men into this state: while each of us must admit that slaves live more securely and happily than the modern worker in all regards, and that slave labor is very little labor, compared to that of the worker. One protests in the name of human dignity but expressed more plainly, that is that good old vanity, which experiences not-being-equal to or publicly-being-esteemed-lower as the harshest fate (HAH 457).

Mencken interestingly predicts that with women attempting to gain power through employment, a revaluation will occur “with woman the producer and man the parasite.”¹⁴⁵ This shows the extent to which we value labor in today’s society. Those who do not produce are considered parasites. This is not a Nietzschean perspective of either labor or the ennobling of man. Mencken also forgets several biological traits Nietzsche ascribes to man and woman. First, that man’s shame and need to provide and protect was greater than woman’s will to power. Thus man will fight to maintain his place as provider, even as woman is masculinized. Second, it should be noted that even when man was the producer, woman served the maternal function as bearer of and raiser of children and the maintenance of society. She had input. If women become the producers as Mencken predicts, what will man’s function be? He can not be bearer of children or the maintainer of distance. Thus, Mencken may be correct in that man may become the first parasite.

But mankind judges, Nietzsche argues, the value of another’s estimation of our worth not on that which we ourselves place value upon but upon that which

they do (HAH 533). So perhaps feminists’ desire to conquer man's world of work and aggression comes from placing a high value on its goals. This is a symptom of weakness for Nietzsche—to gain self value from without. He argues that we are more sensitive to others' opinions than to our own (HAH 546, 549, 583).

Section 4: The Feminine as Mother

The final traditional role of woman is that of motherhood. Lampert notes; that for Nietzsche, "man is merely the means to woman’s true happiness, the child, that which she produces and molds and on whom she exercises her primary creative love." Thus woman is fulfilled through the creation and development of the child (BGE 239; EH III 5). Nietzsche states that the “sum of all this is what mother love is; it is to be compared with an artist’s love for his work” (GS 72). The benefits and joy of suffering through child bearing are critical to Nietzsche.

The future promised and made sacred in the past...true life as collective survival through reproduction, through the mysteries of sexuality...every element of the act of reproduction of pregnancy and birth, awoke the highest and most festive feelings...pain is declared holy...everything that vouches for the future requires pain...For there to be the eternal joy of creation, for the will to life to affirm itself eternally, there must also eternally be the ‘torment of the child bearer’ (TI What I owe the Ancients 4).

Another trait of the maternal is the inability to let someone suffer (HAH 429, 431; BGE 202). The maternal instinct of nurturing and ‘taking care’ disallows one to purposely or intentionally let another feel pain or suffering.

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However, pity is an unhealthy trait for Nietzsche. This sickness is due to pity’s removal of obstacles for those one has pity upon. We remove the stones from their path. This is tantamount to destroying those we profess to be assisting (WP 453; GS 338). “When I see any one halted as a result of some stupid accident, at something less than he might have become,” that is when Nietzsche pities (WP 362).

Pity is a slave virtue that has nothing good to add to the world (BGE 260; GM preface 5). Pity is inefficient, as it doesn’t diminish suffering, and is in fact a false front of superiority and thus revenge. Through pity, the vain seek to benefit from showing “benevolence to those who are already dependent in some way…pity is the most agreeable feeling among those who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests; for them easy prey” (GS 13). Thus again the sickness or health of a trait or instinct may come from its inspiration. Pity is driven by vanity and is a weak and unhealthy trait while suffering, and the ability to let someone suffer is a result of the healthy trait of pride (GS 13).

Struggle for Nietzsche is necessary to achieve greatness and ennoblement, thus the removal of obstacles limits suffering and effort and limits what man can become. This may seem counterintuitive, but pity hurts those one attempts to help. Nietzsche argues one must be given the chance to fail, learn, and grow on his own.

They wish to help and have no thought of the personal necessity of distress, although terrors, deprivations, impoverishments, midnights,

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147 Solomon, Robert. 2003. Page 97
adventures, risks, and blunders are as necessary for me and for you as are their opposites. It never occurs to them that, to put it mystically, the path to one’s own heaven leads through the voluptuousness of one’s own hell (GS 338).

Traditionally, the maternal instincts acted through vanity to ‘pity’ or decrease the suffering of others. This trait as discussed in Chapter V can be altered through the incorporation of masculine traits into the maternal to allow suffering and diminish the vain power of pity.

Although feminist arguments attempt to disassociate woman’s identity from child bearing; this is the heart of the biological difference of male and female. They argue with great fervency that childbirth is at the heart of male oppression. In an attempt to sever the correlation of woman with this purpose, Oliver states that the “maternal function can not be identified with either the woman or femininity.”\(^{148}\) Furthermore, it does not make up the essence of what woman is nor does it define her reality. Women have babies. And, except in Arnold Schwarzenegger movies, men do not. They are biologically the producers, the creators. Whether she bears a child or not the decision or non-decision must occur. One must decide, determine and act to have or not to have children. Because she must at some point in her existence decide this question, she is at core maternal (GS 72; EH III 5; HAH 392).

One of the largest concerns of the changes to the traditional woman for Nietzsche is to be “wary of a neutered population” (HAH 441; BGE 242). What does this mean? There are two avenues of thought that can be followed at this

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\(^{148}\) Oliver, Kelly. 1995. Page 134
juncture. First, as Nietzsche warned emancipation would masculinize woman, perhaps this is a warning against that eventuality. As discussed above, Nietzsche worried over woman’s loss of power and the decreased struggle or tension between the sexes. Additionally, modern Nietzschean debates center on the polarity of male and female. Are these genders opposites—mirror reflections of each other? Or is the castrated male the opposite of man and woman lays somewhere in between? Historically castrated males are often portrayed as feminine; why? Why is it argued that to make man less is to make him female? No other species is regarded as such—not horses, dogs, or cows. Neutered man serves no traditional female function. He is neither the eternal feminine, nor wife, nor mother. The castrated male can not give birth. He does not have the Nietzschean traits of woman as he is not the creator of illusions, he is not seducer, deceiver or birdlike in spirit. For Nietzsche, eunuchs are not equal to healthy females; they are in fact sick, unhealthy males. This is an important distinction as it is argued that for Nietzsche, giving birth to the philosopher of the future can only be done by a male mother.

In summation, the differences among women are due to differences in the three aspects of woman, but all have this trinity within. It can not be separated and expunged. As Nietzsche argues, one trait or drive will dominate. That trait will direct the character of the organism. This is key, as a revival of healthy traits within the dynamic of the battle of the sexes is one of the possible areas of revaluation of values contemplated by Nietzsche.
Section 5: The Role of Love

Nietzsche has great expectation for love as a motivation of both men and women. Passion or seduction sublimated into love has great power (*BGE* 18). After the advent of nihilism, it may be one of the last items of ‘morality’ with the strength to aid the *Ubermensch* in revaluation. As woman is central to the roles of seduction and love, this may herald her important role in the prospects of the future; for “the spiritualization of sensuality is known as love: it is a great triumph over Christianity” (*TI* I 3). This triumph occurs as only seduction and sensuality retain their power after Christianity. Nietzsche argues that the priest attempted to gain power through the invention of ‘sin.’ He reviles and denounces one of the healthiest characteristics of women--seduction. Woman is thought to bring sin to man by bringing him to knowledge; to science which is the death of God (*TI* I 48). Thus to fight her power, Christianity attempts to make women and procreation vulgar; because for Christianity only in the maiden is the whole body pure” (*TI* I56). Solomon proclaims that Nietzsche “attempts a wholehearted defense of the passion…human nature is defined, for better or worse, by its characteristic passions.”

Nietzsche argues that woman maintains a decided expectation of the connections of love (*BGE* 114). She seeks a relationship that makes time itself stop and take notice! This seductive, high level of feeling still brings great pleasure and displeasure, for

when it has gone, passion leaves behind a dark longing for itself, and in disappearing throws up one last seductive glance. There must have been a kind of pleasure in having been beaten with her whip. In contrast, the more moderate feelings appear flat; apparently we still prefer a more violent displeasure to a weak pleasure (HAH 606).

Woman holds the whip, the initiator of both pain and pleasure through passion. Being female means power. Woman’s belief in love and appearance of surrendering to love brings her power over others. This may be why she, unlike man, is loyal to the concept of love. “Freedom, justice, love—sexual love too belongs here: it desires to over power, to take possession, and it appears as self-surrender” (WP 111, 776).

We need passion, Nietzsche argues, for it is “in our wild nature that we best recover from our un-nature, our spirituality” (TI I 6). This passion is needed to help recover our ‘nature.’ This is a role he assigns woman as she is inherently more wild and passionate. She is more immoderate. Democracy and equality have attempted to remove that fervor. Feminists argue against the image of woman as seductive passion. They see this interpretation as demeaning her as a “slave to her passions, capable only of emotional responses to the situations she finds herself in and entirely consumed by her unreflective attitudes of love and hate.” Schutte continues in this anti-Nietzschean anti-passion argument by stating that Nietzsche sees love as egoism--of loving the feeling of love, rather than the other person. This is just the fulfillment of a natural role. She contends

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that he excludes the possibility of love between the sexes and that “this has
important effects upon his sociopolitical thought.” I would argue that love is
not excluded from Nietzsche. In fact, as argued in Chapter IV, love is focal to
Nietzschean thought. And he states that “the individual can not live more fairly
than in being prepared to die in the struggle for love and justice and in sacrificing
himself to it” (RWB 212).

I have discussed here the relevant traits and roles of Nietzsche’s woman. I
have evaluated the aspects of these characteristics before and after the advent
of change. The abyss nears as women give up their most inherent potential
powers of illusion and creativity. These are potentially healthy drives, but
traditionally woman used them through an indirect application of vanity and not
pride.

The direction of this path gives Nietzsche both great and overwhelming
despair. He wonders if women have realized the sickness or stage of
descending their emancipation has wrought. “Probably all of us have sat at
tables where we did not belong; and precisely the most spirited among us, being
hardest to nourish, know the dangerous dyspeptic which comes of a sudden
insight and disappointment about our food and our neighbors at the table—after
dinner nausea” (BGE 282). Here is where Nietzsche predicts women will find
themselves after democracy. The most spirited can not be nourished on
traditional feminist rhetoric or emancipation ‘sameness’ which is so alien to her

152 Schutte, Ofelia. 1984. Page 180
biology. So she sits in a state of nausea. Nietzsche argues that women today
must realize the basis of feminism is vanity. They must draw away and demand
revaluation that does not diminish their past and that regains some of their lost
powers. He argues that one can hope, but “few become what they are” (*HAH*
263).
CHAPTER IV
THE BODY CONTROL: TENSION AS A BUILDER

Throughout the earlier chapters, I touched upon the Nietzschean necessity for rank among traits and individuals. In this chapter I delve into its role in Nietzsche’s overarching philosophy and its role in the necessity of ordering the traits of men and women. It is important to understand that his concept of rank occurs not as an isolated list or check sheet of traits, but as a constant struggle, a repeated interaction of both weak and powerful drives. Consideration of this continuously changing rank is further complicated by the incessant alteration of drives over time (HAH 500). It is necessary to analyze this struggle and its dynamics of change because, for Nietzsche, they are the builders of life, love and the enhancement of man. Here is a potential given current cultural conditions for a possible revaluation of values through the revival of strong individual traits of men and women within their dynamic and eternal struggle.

Section 1: The Struggle

The process of struggle is illustrated by Nietzsche through an understanding of biology (WP 489, 492). Physiology is imperative to our comprehension of man. He states, “man…is nervous system…not soul”
Biology not philosophy holds power over man.\(^{153}\) What does biology demonstrate to us? Nietzsche argues that it is adamant in its refutation of equality (\textit{WP} 52). He notes that in cells and tissue we see “slavery and a division of labor: the higher type possible only through the subjugation of the lower, so that it becomes a function” (\textit{WP} 660; \textit{GS} 118). Physiology divines to us that even at a cellular level, life is tension and competition. This struggle among the traits or cells generates differentiation and hierarchy. Nietzsche calls for life as a reflection of biology; invigoration and action are a result of the constant pressure created by continual resistance of domination by opposites. Yet for life to exist, the varying traits must work together within the hierarchy created.

Motion and action are generated by a continuing resistance and antagonism between opposites (\textit{WP} 518). A dynamic relationship is thus established and generates change. This change may be either societal or personal. This action is a result, Nietzsche argues of the feelings of pleasure and happiness that arise through our power over another. He notes that it is

\(^{153}\) Physiology defines our traits and determines the melody or direction of our drives. Biology gives ‘tempo’ to one’s actions (\textit{BGE} 85). For example, what we consider reason or psychological behavior is determined at a biological level (\textit{WP} 229 255 314 392 400). A profiler with the FBI told me that part of her job in identifying untruthful statements by individuals comes from a scientific understanding that the body is allergic to telling lies. There are very distinct physical effects of lying which include eye movement, nose rubbing, and hand placement. It takes a severe conscious effort to overcome these instinctive biological actions to an emotional act. Similarly, Solomon argues that there is a connection between instinct and actions. He notes that man routinely explains animal behavior in terms of instinct; yet assumes that virtually no human behavior [except those associated with sexual differences] is related to instinct. A growing number of academics agree and the new field of sociobiology is emerging from the increased attempts to associate man’s actions to biology.
through the risk laden act of struggling and victory that power, pain and pleasure are gained (WP 1023, 1040; HAH 103, 104). In fact, how power is exercised between the competing forces can even change the nature of those exercising power.”\textsuperscript{154} The struggle itself and participation in the byplay of forces can qualitatively alter each individual’s means to power” (BGE 176).\textsuperscript{155} Yet the struggle which is the means to happiness is the struggle for life (BGE 225; GS 318, 338; TI 12; HAH 104). In fact, there is no physical or psychic force except this (WP 688). Thus, in order for motion or action to occur, we must remain within this eternal battle.

However, no victory is permanent and the struggle is not static. Always new powers and new forces will and must compete for dominance. Within the complexity of this dynamic combat, it must be kept in mind that tension develops on both sides of the struggle. No drive or trait rules forever; over time new “factions in the struggle emerge with different quanta of power” (WP 633). This occurs because “man is the animal ‘that is still not fixated.’ This signifies his nearly boundless alterability…man’s lack of fixation permits one drive to be concealed by another and even to be transferred into its opposite.”\textsuperscript{156} This opposition is repeated in many forms; from within [against oneself], between man and woman, between the classes in society and between cultures. Because the


\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.

act of struggle itself is necessary, complete and unending domination can not bring progress, pain or pleasure. The permanent total subordination and subservience of one drive to another is not life enhancing. Struggle and tension must be constant yet ever changing.

Everlastingly a given quality contends against itself and separates into opposites; everlastingly those opposites seek to re-unite...like wrestlers whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is on top...the definitive quality which looks permanent to us exposes but the momentary ascendancy of one partner. But this by no means signifies the end of the war; the contest endures in all eternity (Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (PT) Page 54).

Man needs differences for enhancement. This opposition must be strikingly intense. “Indeed where the plant ‘man’ shows himself strongest one finds instincts that conflict powerfully” (WP 966). We need a pathos of distance to create the desire to develop a higher, rarer type (BGE 257; GM I 4). This is necessary, Rosalyn Diprose argues, because Nietzsche suggests that man is more likely to find “ourselves, in our effects, in everything which bears witness to what we are, our friendships, our enmities,...in the objects we love (Untimely Meditations (UM) 129). This is because there is something about our relation to others which determines the place we occupy.” 157 Thus it is through interaction with opposites and the feelings they occasion that the great man develops (WP 967). Through the interactive dynamic of resistance and antagonism by an equally healthy or strong force, we are enhanced. It is through the drive for the pleasure of compelling that greatness is attained; the larger the resistance that is

overcome, the larger the feeling of power (TI 115; D 442; GS 86). The common or lesser man and woman are those that do not feel or know of this delight. Those of “common nature know nothing whatever of the pleasure of conquest and the insatiability of great love, nor of the overflowing feeling of strength that desires to overpower to compel itself, to lay to its heart” (WP 873).

Physiologically the greatest difference in individuals is that between men and women. There can be and are differences and change among and within the genders, but they also have the undertone or guidance of sexuality. Other possible variances are those of class, ethnicity, or natural ability; but if there is to be enough differentiation or opposition to cause the Nietzschean required struggle for life, it is mostly likely to occur between the genders (WP 1050). This tension is due, Nietzsche argues, to their inherent biology which will cause “men and women to act differently in response to the same stimuli. In fact these responses will keep men and women separate; will keep them from a proper ‘understanding’ of each other” (BGE 85). Thus men and women express themselves through the understanding of their instincts which are developed, honed, and used independently, based upon their different biological needs.

However this ‘miscommunication’ in Nietzschean philosophy is a necessity. For Nietzsche man and woman are diverse in spirit and in instinct as a result of their physical distinctions (WP 489, 492; BGE 231). He states that “there is an unchangeable this is I about man and woman” (BGE 231). There are separate ‘kinds’ of sexuality with biological attributes that lend themselves to
variances in the spirit of male and female characters. These Nietzschean traits give rise to disparity, tension and struggle and are necessary for pleasure, progress and life. Due to the fact of their physiological disparity, these instincts can be our greatest source of strength. Man should not attempt to eliminate the innate disparity and tension between the sexes. These drives and traits are our most ‘natural’ opposites. It is important that “one possesses them to the highest degree” (WP 928). Mankind must develop these drives because “genius resides in instinct, goodness likewise. One acts perfectly only when one acts instinctively” (WP 440). We must act instinctively through the guidance of our physiology. Furthermore, the will to power requires differentiation in order to generate the concept of distance and the necessity to work to draw oneself upward. To this end he emphasizes the necessity not only of an individual feminine functioning, but of a preservation of a distinct polarity in the sexual relationship. As noted repeatedly, this does not mean a regression into the traditional secondary roles for women--only opposition.

This brings me to the specific biological differences of men and women. As noted, there is diversity not only in traits between the genders but “the degree and kind of man’s sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of his spirit” (BGE 75). Consequently there are variations of spirit among individual men and women. Camille Paglia stated this well when she noted that “sexual geography…alters our perception of the world.”158 So if we are at the core

biologically different, then these differences will cause or be reflected in several aspects of man and woman. These differences will be manifested through the interactions of not only the genders but each individual.

Many fields of study and government programs argue that gender based differences should be eliminated. They argue this is necessary, as these differences generate miscommunication and negative results such as financial and physical domination.\(^{159}\) There is a strong desire to end the battle of the sexes through education about women and by decrying the differences associated to gender. For Nietzsche however, the elimination of separate identities through exposure and neutrality of gender would be the death knell of enhancement. If the struggle of opposing drives and traits is the essence of life, then ending this tension means the destruction of man. “If you would do away with firm opposition and differences in rank, you will abolish all strong love, lofty attitudes, and feelings of individuality” (\textit{WP} 936). Nietzsche argues that the further development of man is specifically tied to the “antagonism between the sexes” (\textit{WP} 1050). Our enhancement rests in the continual power struggle, the sustained existence of two sexes, two opposites in eternal opposition. Nietzsche does recognize that this struggle is dynamic; there will be periods of great hostility and reconciliation (\textit{BT} page 33). The democratic, modern problem is not the differences or struggle of men and women but the attempt to deny the fundamental antagonism that of necessity exists between them. Eternal hostility

\(^{159}\) Irigaray, Luce. 1991.
and tension is essential, and the desire to eliminate it, he argues, is a sign of shallowness. “Equal rights tries to put all in one place permanently…but it doesn’t bring the freedom it promises, but [instead] produces dependence through normalization…thus democracy is a disguised and nihilistic mode of domination.” Therefore, to accomplish democratic equality is to eradicate greatness, love, art, and happiness; all for the sake of meaningless sameness. Furthermore, Nietzsche argues that no social contract “can erase the injustice and inequality of the male-female relationship” (GS 319). He states that to speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless, in itself, of course, no injury, assault, exploitation, destruction can be ‘unjust’ since life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction and simply can not be thought of at all without this character…(so) means of preventing all struggle in general—would be a principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness (GM II 11).

Is this eternal tension and struggle for domination of necessity a type of parasitism--a feeding of one off of the merits of the other? I would argue that for Nietzsche, opposition is about each entity playing its role in the changing hierarchy which aids them both. This is a type of mutualism. It is not a one-way street of taking and stealing but of helping to realize what could be at times an unequal but fulfilling function. The hierarchy of these roles is not eternal and unchanging. They are, like the waves and the shores, in a ceaseless battle. They continue to exist as separate yet mutual entities but are continually altering

161 Ibid. Page 30
One has only to walk the beaches to see the constant and eternal shifts of power within the struggle. “The river and the mountain, for example are power quanta repelling each other insofar as the river cannot wash away the mountain and the mountain can not bury the river. They exist as what they ‘are’ only though mutual resistance and opposition.”162 This giving and taking, the interaction of male and female opposites within this struggle, Nietzsche would not call just. However it is nature, and nature is without conscience. Nature is chaotic and whimsical. This interaction “is a meaningless, but dynamic play of growth, enhancement, overpowering and struggle.”163

Specifically how is this struggle reflected in the traits and characteristics of woman? I contend that several generations after Simone de Beauvoir’s announcement that society had made women soft, alluring, mysterious, weak and emotional; we must accept that society has made them into something else. Nietzsche, I argue, anticipated and understood that democracy would attempt to enhance the non biological traits of women (BGE 2, 200; A 1; WP 881, 928). Thus he foresaw the intense internal conflict of ‘modern’ masculinized woman (BGE 167). As women ‘freed’ themselves from the bondage of family and stereotypical weakness and irrationality, what would freedom bring? Nietzsche worried that it would be an elimination of her most innate traits and means of will to power. “Emancipated women are consequently those who approximate the

162 Ahern, Daniel. 1995. Page 14
163 Shapiro, Gary. 1989. Page 292
male norm: they are rational, repressed, self-disciplined, autonomous, competitive, and so on.” Nietzsche hoped that she would eventually become dissatisfied with playing on the male field with only male traits and would seek to reevaluate her old powers and incorporate them into a hierarchy with her new ones. A more thorough discussion of these changes is found in Chapter V.

This revaluation must occur within the antagonism of the battle of the sexes. Here may be mankind’s greatest potential for a healthy future. The necessity of the continuation of the duality and struggle of opposites is seen repeatedly in Nietzsche through his use of the Dionysian and Apollonian images. He argues that we need to return Dionysus to the stage with his proper opposite, Apollo. Dionysius has been under repeated attack by Socrates, Christianity, and the Enlightenment; just as traditional female images have been. They have attempted to embrace the reason of Apollo and diminish the primordialism of Dionysius. But “philosophy is not, in spite of its self-representation, a rational, intellectual system of inquiry and knowledge acquisition, based purely on truth considerations and the requirements of conceptual coherence. It is a practice, a strategy, and thus part of a struggle, a battle…it ‘does’ things…it is a drive for mastery—consequences of will to power.” Philosophy, according to Nietzsche is both reason and passion. Thus I would argue that neither can exist in their fullness without interaction. Their independent identities are dependent

upon contrast with one another. Struggle against this domination hones the drives of each. The “measure of failure and fatality must grow with the resistance a force seeks to master…[it]…acts as a lure to life and strengthens will to power” (WP 694). Therefore stronger man is needed for stronger woman and vice versa (WP II 5, 362). To redirect woman and man’s interaction in the future, it must be acknowledged to occur within a renewed relationship of difference and tension. This struggle must include aspects of both Apollo and Dionysus; of reason and passion.166 This is necessary “because these two principles—Dionysian and Apollonian—[like man and woman] are both contradictory and interdependent aspects of artistic genius, following and augmenting one another” (BT 49).167

This Nietzschean directive for the future role of men and women is in direct contrast to democratic thought which argues for man and woman to be independent and look to themselves for their goals and identity. Yet Nietzsche would argue that hidden in equality is subjugation to a view of oneself as prescribed by the whole—thus your view is not from within but without. I argue that he calls for us to stand against the views of the many, against the incorrect morality of democratic society to become what we really are together as man and woman. For only a man who “is man enough, will—save the woman in woman” (TSZ III 54, 2). The reciprocal is also possible; only a woman who is woman

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166 Birth of Tragedy, page 53 “it might also be historically demonstrable that every period rich in folk songs has been most violently stirred by Dionysian currents, which we must always consider the substratum and prerequisite of the folk song.” A look at the 60’s revolutionary era would appear to uphold this prediction. An era ripe with folk music and Dionysian behavior.

enough can save man. This task of elevation can be accomplished only by the artistic, noble and sovereign individual.\textsuperscript{168}

This interaction may require subservience or obedience by one or the other entity for a period of time. Nietzsche knew the idea of inequality or obedience would have to overcome the burden of democratic resistance as nothing is more antithetical to postmodernist sentiment than the idea of obedience, because it is automatically associated with ‘repression’ and runs counter to the negative, reactive conception of freedom…yet obedience engenders strength and self-command—command over one’s herd self, to become who one authentically is.\textsuperscript{169}

Who one is may temporarily place one in a position of obedience. The qualities and traits that would lead to this ranking in both men and women are further discussed in Chapter V.

Section 2: A Nietzschean Analysis of Love

The epitome of mutual enhancement through the struggle of interaction and possible temporary obedience is seen in Nietzsche’s perspective on love.\textsuperscript{170} Nietzsche’s contention is that passion is one of the few forces strong enough to guide man toward a new horizon. Within this context he debates several types of love (\textit{WP 172}).

Christian love, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, is considered by Nietzsche to be an unhealthy drive. This love of one’s neighbor is led by the

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid. Page 63
\textsuperscript{169} Patton, Paul. 1993. Page 239-240
weak traits of pity and resentment (BGE 104; The Case for Wagner (CW) 1; GS 14, 141, 345, 370; WP 30, 69n, 134, 155, 169, 176, 221, 269, 312). This is not to say that Christian love doesn't have power. It can give energy and passion to one's action, but its motivation is directed by the unhealthy traits of pity and vanity.

On the other hand, sexual love is obsessive and desires complete possession and dominance. This form of love worked well for men and women in traditional roles as men desired to possess the object of their desire and women were fulfilled when they became possessed (GS 118; WP 864). Woman's total gift of self made this type of love possible and fulfilled each entity. Sexual love, Nietzsche argues, is falsely claimed to be based on surrender and altruism (GS 14). He argues that, while putting itself forth as the opposite of egoism, it is more closely linked to “domination and egoism [and] actually may be the most ingenuous expression of egoism” (GS 14; HAH 523). Nietzsche calls this a slavish love (WP 964). It is slavish because its motivation is self love [vanity] and not respect for self [pride]. As discussed in Chapter III, traits motivated by vanity are sick and weak; those motivated by pride are healthy and strong. He specifically states, “I wish men would begin by respecting themselves: everything else follows from that…This is something different from the blind drive to love oneself: nothing is more common, in the love of the sexes as well (WP 919). Thus sexual love is limited in its vision. It can elevate the lovers only to the height of themselves because within their vain possession all
outside disappears. They can not be elevated or look above themselves. In contrast to slavish love “that idealizes and deceives itself there is a divine love that despises and loves, and reshapes and elevates the beloved” (WP 964). There is an affirmative affect with transfiguring virtues within the love of the sexes (WP 1033; BGE 260). This love is based on the strong trait of pride that allows the individuals to be ‘happy’ with the increase of power of the other. It “rejoices in resistance to the highest possible power which it helped the other to obtain” (GS 61, 86; WP 873; D 422). Only the healthy and strong can reach this level of sexual love. This type of love “despises and loves and reshapes and elevates the beloved” (WP 964). This ‘grand passion’ does not want to please or persuade; “it commands; it wills” (WP 842). In order to reach this type of love one must have a firm root in oneself to give to another--to overflow into another (WP 873). Thus a great and noble love is the overflow or appropriation of “a superabundance of personality” (WP 296).

This concept of love fits well with Nietzsche’s physiological perspective. Strong, healthy drives in constant struggle seek to expand their strength on a healthy, worthy opposite. This expansion of power brings pleasure.

A final type of love with enough passion to motivate man to action is that of creative love. The emotions of an artist for his work or a mother for her child are examples of creative love (GS 72, 376). He states that “females find in their children satisfaction for their desire to dominate, a possession, an occupation,
something that is wholly intelligible to them and can be chattered with: the sum of all this is what mother love is; it is to be compared with an artist's love for his work" (GS 72, 369, 376). This love, although necessary for production of art and children, is not a love which elevates. Creative love, like sexual love, is again motivated by the weak and unhealthy trait of self-love. The vain artist like the vain mother loves his creation primarily for his role in its production and not for the value of the creation (GS 87, 369). In fact, Nietzsche notes that “usually a mother loves herself in her son more than she loves the son himself” (HAH 385). She may even want to have 'bad' unhappy children to demonstrate her own maternal worth to others (HAH 387). The artist similarly is dedicated solely to his value within his creation (HAH 145). Thus creativity is an act of possession (HAH 209).

A further unhealthy trait of both the artist and maternal is their desire to ease suffering (HAH 148; WP 72; BGE 239; EH III 5). As discussed at length in Chapters II and III, the elimination of suffering is detrimental to society for Nietzsche. Suffering is in fact an essential and vital part of the elevation of man.

Like sexual love there can be a noble version of creative love. This would occur when the creator's motivation is pride. This driving force would be illustrated in the creator's ability to view his work for its own merits and separate out one's own worth. Furthermore, Nietzsche argues that the role of creative love is to “cultivate the esteem for the passions…they also glorify the frightful satisfactions of passion…In any event, they keep alive curiosity about the
passions; it is as if they wished to say: without passions you have experienced nothing at all” (HAH 629). The future role of creative love is discussed in Chapters V and VI.

Because we must have passions strong enough to be the basis for the enhancement of man, Nietzsche worries that modern morality wants to extinguish the “passion for power, love, revenge and possessions” (WP 383). Thus modern man would have no control over his (or her) impulses because they have all been “brought to ill repute.” Society has denigrated passion as it fears its inability and weakness in maintaining control over it (WP 778). It is not “sufficiently strong enough to employ them” (WP 778). In spite of modern society’s war against noble passion, love has an important role in Nietzsche. He argues that enough passion resides in man that the possibility of rare and noble love must still exist. Tracy Strong notes that “Nietzsche typically speaks of the relation between the mature individual...and the world as one of love... [It] also denotes a relation to someone…which creates the illusion necessary for life.”

Perhaps love is a form of knowledge, a capacity to create something that is more than oneself. This is a relationship to something higher than oneself and can not be taught. We are unable to ‘know’ ourselves. We must find ourselves as “one will have found oneself when one has lost oneself and been freed from what one is by love: what have you…truly loved? What has pulled out your soul--mastered it and at the same time made it joyful? Love pulls us away from ourselves and

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dissolves the self into what Nietzsche calls freedom.”\textsuperscript{173} The powers that help to free us in order to form uplifting ideals in love are sensuality, intoxication and a superabundant animality (\textit{WP 823}). Man needs these emotions, these passions, to reach a state of prideful self respecting love in order to help him face the eternal recurrence. Thus “what the lover needs is the beloved, and what the beloved needs is the lover. The highest pitch of the lover’s passion desires the eternal return of both beloved and lover...to avow to shout, It’s you, you I want and want eternally as you are...not from anything he lacks...(but) because he has himself.”\textsuperscript{174} Thus one wins one’s beloved by affirming that you would take them repeatedly, eternally as they are. This love, this desire, is not due to any incompleteness or weakness in either the lover or the beloved. In fact the opposite is true. Love is as a result of the abundant excess of power and pleasure they both give and receive in the cycle of struggle. This love, or the illusion of love, draws one upward due to one’s own strength and not from any insufficiency in the lover. Nietzsche calls for the “youthful soul (to) look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it?...your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you” (\textit{SAE} Page 129). He declares this to be a primary motivator of mankind.

What a tremendous amount can be accomplished by that intoxication which is called ‘love’ but which is yet something other than love!...love we

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. Page 34
\textsuperscript{174} Lampert, Laurence. 2001. Page 119
discover is the greatest stimulus of life…it does more than merely imagine; it even transposes values…the lover is more valuable, …his whole economy is richer than before, more powerful, more complete than in those who do not love, the lover becomes a squanderer: he is rich enough for it. Now he dances, becomes an adventurer (WP 807-808).

Love generates action and ability through its overflowing of power and energy. This profusion of passion creates the ability to laugh and to dance. Emotion and not reason bring us to this point. “Nature is in its depths much richer, mightier, happier, more dreadful; in the way you usually live you do not know it: learn to become nature again yourselves and then with and in nature let yourselves be transformed by the magic of love and fire” (RWB Page 221). Through love we are transformed; we are free and fearless in our natural state of suffering and joy. Love brings us not only to emotions such as happiness but also to those of deepest life, such as sorrow.

Where is this rare love found? Is it possible for this noble love to exist within marriage? What type of marriage would best develop true love? Nietzsche argued that “a marriage is worth as much as those whom it joins together…in general it will be something wretched and inept” (WP II 317). But as Nietzsche would argue most individuals are wretched and inept it may be possible for the higher individuals to have a conversely uplifting relationship. Nietzsche gives us several guidelines for a ‘good’ marriage. First he argues that marriage is like a long conversation. Most of the time spent together is spent talking. Thus one should ask when selecting a spouse if you could, for many years, have great
talks with them (HAH 406). In a great marriage there must be a balance of passion and friendship.

Friendship is of great import to Nietzsche. He argued when discussing Schopenhauer that he had “not a single companion truly of his own kind to console him—and between one and none there lies, as always between something and nothing, an infinity” (SAE Page 139). He continues on the next page to state that the great man, even the solitary philosopher needs a companion.

It is precisely such natures as he who want love, who need companions before whom they can venture to be as simple and open as they are before themselves and in whose presence they can cease to suffer the torment of silence and dissimulation. If you remove these companions you create an increasingly dangerous condition (SAE page 140).

Great men need a friend within whom they can unburden their inner thoughts. This will lift for a time the torment of their self-reflection and inner struggles. Furthermore, a friend is someone whose face “is your own face, in a rough and imperfect mirror” (TSZ I 14). Thus a higher man seeks a higher woman; someone who is an imperfect reflection of oneself; a mirror opposite. In this same consideration he argues that friendship is not based upon compassion but “shared joy” (HAH 499). This would point to moments of laughter, not pity or sympathy, as the basis of the human connection. A noble relationship is one of conversation, unburdening and laughter. A healthy marriage creates more than you are alone, together (TSZ 2, 20, 36).
A noble relationship between man and woman is difficult for Nietzsche to foresee. This he argues is because woman doesn’t have a talent for friendship. She is all love (TSZ 2, 14). However, if she can master herself, she can develop a talent for friendship. If this occurs, then there is potential. This new ability, Nietzsche predicts, will be ripe with the future. Woman, through developing the ability for friendship, will be ready to create a new role for herself. This would allow for the development of an almost Nietzschean feminism. This branch of feminism would argue for women to work within the struggle of opposites with man to develop an inner identity of self-respect. Thus, if after having developed through democratization more masculine traits they can reevaluate their feminine biological traits within a context of pride, they will become more the equal of healthy men. If they cease to deceive themselves about their self worth and desires such as the motivation behind ‘equality’, then they would be healthy opposites within the struggle of strong traits.

Marriage, and not a form of elevated concubinage, such as a modern Aspasia, is necessary for Nietzsche in the highest form of love. This is a priority not because Nietzsche desires the ‘addition of more and more zeros’ to the human population, but rather, marriage is necessary for the well married couple to produce and raise a child that would affirm man’s existence.

He further warns democratic woman of the damage she is inflicting on noble relationships. He advises that

those noble, free-minded women who set themselves the task of educating
and elevating the female sex should not overlook one factor: marriage, conceived of in its higher interpretation, the spiritual friendship of two people of opposite sexes, that is, marriage as hoped for by the future, entered into for the purpose of begetting and raising a new generation. Such a marriage, which uses sensuality as if it were only a rare occasional means for a higher end, probably requires and must be provided with a natural aid: concubinage. For if, for reasons of the man’s health, his wife is also to serve for the sole satisfaction of his sexual need, a false point of view, counter to the goals we have indicated, will be decisive in choosing a wife. Posterity becomes a coincidental objective, its successful education, highly improbable. A good wife, who should be friend, helpmate, child-bearer, mother, head of family, manger, indeed who perhaps has to run her own business or office separate from her husband, cannot be a concubine at the same time: it would usually be asking too much of her. Thus the opposite of what happened to Pericles times in Athens could occur in the future: men whose wives were not much more than concubines then, turned to Aspasia’s as well, because they desired the delights of a mentally and emotionally liberation sociability, which only the grace and spiritual flexibility of women can provide. All human institutions, like marriage, permit only a moderate degree of practical idealization, failing which, crude measures immediately become necessary (HAH 424).

Reading this quote makes democratic citizens cringe. They believe that women can be helpmate, mother, professional, homemaker and still a sexual being! She can do it all. Yet this is not what Nietzsche is professing here. He states she can do all of those things if the only goal is to beget and raise children. If the goal is for a rare and noble love, if the goal is to raise a child who will affirm man’s existence, she can not and neither can man. He is not attempting to return woman to a traditional role. Nietzsche only wants her to analyze the price she pays for the current path she travels.

Furthermore, Nietzsche contends that the noble marriage must be indissolvable. The feminist Schutte is distraught at this proclamation. She argues this shows his repression of the individual feelings of love. I would argue
the opposite. To make something indissolvable gives it higher meaning and value.\textsuperscript{175} It was one thing to have no means of divorce when couples did not select their mates and were sold into arranged marriages, or when women thought marriage was their only option. It is quite another today when both parties enter marriages with free choice and when women’s options are not limited to marriage. Divorce, and in particular ‘no fault’ divorce, lowers the value of marriage. One no longer enters this union as eternal but as something to participate in until ‘I am unhappy’ or until ‘something better comes along.’ Given Nietzsche’s physiological argument that life is an ebb and flow of suffering and joy, of dominating and being dominated; it must be understood that times will come when one is suffering and being dominated. Yet if one doesn’t wait and escapes, they will never feel the joy as well. We will miss more of those rare moments of bliss that constitute the full value of life in an attempt to chase the idea that we can have constant bliss. Man needs to recognize that happiness is not had in extended times “it must be measured and grabbed in moments” (\textit{HAH} 471). These moments are what life consists of; rare seconds, blips in time where we are filled with the joy of life. The memory of these moments will carry us through our existence if we are lucky enough to have even one instant such as this (\textit{HAH} 586, 624).

\textsuperscript{175} Nietzsche argues that you cannot be “irresponsible and live for the moment—as these types instinctively ‘prefer what dissolves them, what makes the end come faster (A 39)” It is similar to his thoughts on the institution of marriage. He argues that it has lost its meaning and thus “we are getting rid of it” in the modern era. He argues it is being lost because if "society cannot vouch for itself as a whole up to the most remote generations, then marriage has no meaning at all (TI Raids 39)."
According to Nietzsche, modern marriage is headed down a path incapable of nobility. Is there a possibility of correcting what we have? It would take a strong individual with an even stronger gaze “and a better will to further what is evolving and imperfect rather than to penetrate its imperfection and reject it” (HAH 587). Thus Nietzsche does not advocate a rejection of democratic thought and all the changes it has wrought. He suggests that the strong man can look within the changes to guide the path to a new destination. This can be done through the ability to construct and believe in a new illusion or a new image for the future.

In creating this image it may be necessary to use ‘immoral’ means to achieve great outcomes. Nietzsche argues that the “victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same ‘immoral’ means as every victory: force, lies, slander, injustice” (WP 306). “The social instinct grows out of pleasure” (HAH 98). Thus in order to generate a culture or society, one must have a horizon which pleases. That is why man needs illusions to be beautiful and create pleasure; like taking medicine with ‘a spoonful of sugar.’ The past was built on lies and the future must be also. In order to gain nobility we need illusion. 176 Thus illusion is not only acceptable but “necessary for sentient being to be able to live.”177 Thus life wants deception and needs self-deception (HAH Page 5). Woman’s inherent trait is to create illusion. Perhaps the future requires a democratized woman of

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176 Kohler, Joachim. 2002. Page 24
177 Ibid.
pride to create a new illusion for mankind. These illusions must contain the pleasant yet also be useful. This is an inherent ability of woman for Nietzsche.

Perhaps this revaluation, this new horizon, occurs through a reintroduction of the battle of the sexes. Nietzsche sees this interaction not as a mere necessity to create “babies”, as many feminist argue, but as a “fitting image for the spiritual endeavors of humanity right up to the highest.” Therefore, like human DNA, perhaps the birth of a new horizon must be made of parts of the old. The big concern for Nietzsche, however, would be if woman has become so masculinized by her demands for equality that she, like man, would become a “sterile animal” (*BGE* 144). If so, there is no hope for a creative birth of a new goal for mankind. Woman, at least higher woman, must retain some of her ‘feminine’ biological traits to remain fertile and able to give birth to the future horizon.178

Woman retaining some feminine biological traits is essential to Nietzsche’s overall philosophy. This retention of or nurturing of certain healthy biological traits does not constitute a ‘nature’ for woman, only the selection and use of strong drives. The creator of future values must have the ability to create a lie in the form of a new horizon. The creator must also believe in the horizon himself in spite of knowing the truth of its non-existence. Furthermore, this illusion must bring together pleasure and usefulness. The female trait of illusion and self-deception is considered one of the primary traits necessary for the success of the

178 Oliver hints at this idea but never supports the idea with Nietzsche’s overall philosophy on where democracy leads woman.
*Ubermensch* in creating a new horizon. Interestingly, Nietzsche states that in love “the force of illusion reaches its highest … and so does the capacity for sweetening (and) for transfiguration, when a man is in love he endures more than at any other time, he submits to anything” (*A* 23). Thus perhaps the power of deception is increased in a state of euphoric love, a time at which we are most likely to be susceptible to fantasy. Nietzsche tells us not only who can bring the future horizon but in what circumstance it might be possible. This condition is through the heightened powers of fantasy in noble love.

Nietzsche’s directive that the philosopher of the future must be a seducer reinforces the role of fantasy in love. The role of sexual seduction uplifted within a noble friendship is important in the creation of a new horizon. It is through the demand for the ecstasies of sexuality that the demand for art and beauty makes the world perfect through love (*WP* 801, 805). If all “credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth comes from the senses, and the senses have to be seduced in order to teach one an abstract truth, than in effect the teacher must be a seducer” (*BGE* 134). Great teachers do not use abhorrence of knowledge to bring you to information. I must admit I have yet to ‘convert’ or stimulate a student to the pursuit of knowledge through abhorrence.179

Nietzsche argues that teachers and creators seduce you.180 Woman, according to Nietzsche, is the master of seduction; therefore, she is the consummate

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179 Every semester hundreds of thousands of ‘average’ Americans are guided, directed and seduced by thousands of ‘us’. Our power for influence is nearly limitless. Few challenge what we teach, and in a Nietzschean seductive manner we could create an army of disciples.

180 Paglia argues the opposite for learning and conversion in academics by abhorrence.
creator and teacher. Through this physiologically based power, woman has a definitive role to play as the creator and seducer of man to a new horizon.
CHAPTER V

WOMAN AS THE UBERMENSCH: SEDUCTION WITH PRIDE

In the last chapter I discussed the role of struggle, particularly between the sexes, as the energy behind the will to power. It was shown that the role of a noble love, marriage and friendship were of key importance to Nietzsche’s philosophy of the future. In this chapter the details of the parties involved in that struggle, specifically the traits of female and male, are analyzed. From this reflection it becomes apparent that, despite his misogynistic reputation, Nietzsche had a dynamic and powerful role for woman to play.

To understand the future of both the male and female roles within Nietzsche’s struggle, I look to the physiological and democratized strengths and weaknesses of each. This is done through an evaluation of their individual traits using a Nietzschean perspective in contrast to democratic feminist values.

Nietzsche argued that the moment when we realize that there is no need to blame others, to seek revenge for what we are, then we can and must embrace everything that came before to acknowledge who we are. This moment of self-realization for women will occur when woman is no longer ashamed of having played a ‘secondary’ role. They must move forward to will something ‘female.’ This act of creativity is the birth of a new horizon. The production of this horizon needs evaluation, faith, love, annihilation, communication and
creation [all traits Nietzsche associates with the female]. I would argue that Nietzsche saw the potential of masculinized woman as the creator of the new horizon for man. This potential necessitates a nurturing of selected healthy biologically feminine traits. These traits are identified in his list of the traits necessary for the *Ubermensch*. They are deception, immoderation, struggle, laughter, will to simplification, visible happiness, psychological nakedness and the will to be terrible (*WP* 688). All of these are drives he associates with women. Yet woman has always had these biological traits. So why can she now be the bringer of horizons? It is because the motivation behind the use of her powers has changed. Her call for egalitarianism and the use of her powers in democratic society was based on vanity and a desire for revenge. After the masculinization of woman, she developed several abilities within these powers, particularly the ability to rank and a transition from vanity to pride or independence. With this new focus woman can turn from self pity to strive to generate a higher being than self, something of value to mankind (*TSZ* II).

So how and when will woman have reached this state? First, contrary to feminist theory, it must be accepted by democratized female that the male is physically stronger (*BGE* 239; *WP* 140; *TI* 460). Accepting this premise does not subjugate woman in any way; it is a mere acceptance of a biological trait. Woman must acknowledge that, in general, her physical form is more delicate

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and ethereal than man’s. This is not to say that all men are stronger than all
women, or that all women are daintier.

What I fight against: that an exceptional type should make war on the
rule—instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is the
precondition of the value of the exception. For example, the ladies, who
instead of feeling their abnormal thirst for scholarship as a distinction want
to disrupt the status of women in general (WP 894).

As discussed in the previous chapter, there is rank both among and between the
genders. This is physiology, not morality. This is the exceptional making war on
the rule.

Historically, in fact, woman, through her acceptance of this physiology,
directed males to use their physical strength to protect them, to honor them.
They did this by making males believe they had the ability to lift the weight of
responsibility from the tense and profound male soul (WP 943). Nietzsche
states, “How, in fact, does one gain authority over those who possess physical
strength and authority? (They compete with the awe inspired by princes, by the
victorious conqueror, by the wise statesman). Only by arousing the belief that
they have in their hands a higher, mightier strength…” (WP 140). Woman has
this capability, he argues, because she is more natural than man. This is
because she is more driven by biological instinct than man. Naturalness lends
itself to a wilder nature, giving woman the ability to have a lighter spirit. Thus she
is able to dance and play. This is an important trait for Nietzsche as spontaneity
is required for creativity (GS 62, 67). Furthermore, woman, like nature, is nobly
outrageous in her prodigal indifference. She is capricious (BGE 188). This whimsical coldness leads to a destructive trait in woman.

Traditionally for Nietzsche, woman is regarded as the creator and giver of life, the one who offers pity and denounces suffering. He portrays her as both creator and destroyer. Her role as creator through the maternal and the eternal feminine was discussed in great length in Chapter III. Yet woman is also capable of great destruction. Nietzsche notes that in her ferociousness woman can “tear men to pieces while enchanting them” (BGE 239). She can rip them apart while she enthralls them. Woman, when she hates, is more dangerous than man.

First and foremost because once their hostile feeling has been aroused, they are inhibited by no considerations of fairness but let their hatred swell undisturbed to the final consequences, and second because they are practiced in finding sore spots [which every man, every party has] and stabbing there…while men, when they see wounds, become restrained, often generous and conciliatory (HAH 414).

He further argues that in quarrels between woman and man, men must endure more. He argues that men are tortured at the thought of harming woman, but women suffer at the thought of not having harmed men enough (HAH 420). Thus woman is more treacherous and less inhibited in bringing destruction and suffering upon others. These depictions of women have often led feminists to decry Nietzsche as portraying men as honorable and just while women are vicious and spiteful. Yet Nietzsche argues that to be creator one must first be a destroyer and be able to break values to pieces (BT 3; TSZ II 34). The greatest type of individual, for Nietzsche, is the noble creator. Being able to destroy, to have the necessary attributes and abilities for destruction, are necessary for the
highest type of man. He states that “whoever wants to be a creator in good and evil, must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the greatest goodness: but this is—being creative” (EH IV 2). For Nietzsche destruction is necessary and valuable in the revaluation of values. Therefore, when feminists contend that Nietzsche is ‘unfair’ in his depiction of women by labeling them destroyers, they are putting their own [democratic] moral values on Nietzschean non-moral interpretations. While modern morality looks to these traits as negative, Nietzsche would not give them the same connotation. The ability for destruction is a powerful and healthy Nietzschean trait (BT 3).

Another important aspect Nietzsche associates with women is her superior intellect. “Women’s intellect manifests itself as perfect control, presence of mind, and utilization of all advantages…women have the intelligence … when women [look] for a clever, alert, and brilliant being, one sees very clearly how a woman is looking for an idealized woman—that is, not for a complement, but for the perfection of their own merits” (HAH 411). Nietzsche frequently comments on woman’s superior intellectual ability (HAH 404, 412). He argues that she can use this drive to become anything she desires [even men] (HAH 411). Yet men have achieved more with their intellect. Why? Nietzsche argues it is because women were unable to discern and rank (HAH 416, 419). This is the reason he calls for everyone, most importantly women, to learn the scientific method. Science will help one learn “extreme circumspection…this advice should be given to women particularly, who are now the hopeless victims of all hypothesis, especially those
which give the impression of being witty, thrilling or energizing” (HAH 635). Caution is necessary for women because they “are much more personal than objective, their range of ideas can tolerate tendencies that are logically in contradiction to one another; they tend to be enthusiastic about the representatives of those tendencies, one after the other, and accept their systems wholesale” (HAH 419). Woman has a partisan nature and a disdain for science (HAH 416). This is due to woman’s more instinctive nature. She desires passionate emotion about her ‘truths.’ She ‘wants to be forcibly carried away, in order to thus increase one’s own strength” (HAH 635). Thus she is led by her vanity to accept that which stirs the passion of her natural instinct. Traditional woman lacked the ability to order and then to remember what order she committed to (GM II 2, 57).

While Nietzsche’s contemporary woman was unable to discriminate among ideas and theories, emancipated woman inevitably learned ‘a science’ and thus developed a method of circumspection. This causes woman to moderate her enthusiastic responses. Feminists argue that Nietzsche’s declaration of women as being less objective than men was based on a false perspective of women. This interpretation, they claim, was made by Nietzsche [and previous male philosophers] in order to deny woman an equal education. I argue, however, that Nietzsche doesn’t refuse women an education. He laments their intellectual value being lowered by the type of education offered by the then--current system. He notes “for heaven’s sake, do not pass our gymnasium education on to girls
too! For it often turns witty, inquisitive, fiery youths—into copies of their teachers” (HAH 409)! Here I would point out that he uses the word *too* as an indication that he also laments this education for male children. His use of the gender neutral word *youths* would similarly suggest that he does not want this type of education for a child of either gender. It is bad enough, by Nietzsche’s reckoning that boys are stuck being turned into dulled carbon copies of their teachers; do not subject girls to this denigration as well. This is not to keep women uneducated. In fact, he offers up what is a necessary or good education. A high-quality school “demands much sternly, the good even exceptional is norm. Praise is rare, indulgence nonexistent and blame apportioned sharply, objectively without regard for talent or kin” (WP 912). This type of education is needed for both noble man and woman in Nietzsche’s future philosophy. This strict and hierarchical education is necessary in order for higher man and woman to rank and to maintain their pride [not vanity] based instincts.

Another aspect of woman that is of great concern to Nietzsche is woman’s ability to create illusion through deception. The necessity for deception and the influence of illusion are primary in Nietzschean philosophy. If woman is civilized and educated in a manner similar to men, they may turn from this female trait. I have argued that Nietzsche would lament the loss of woman’s ability to create illusions as a higher woman who has not lost the ability of illusion is essential in establishing a new horizon for society. Nietzsche directs them to use this power to “create a basis on which to establish a profound level of understanding in
society... [to] provide a response to the great silence of nature and the erosion of the meaning of society.”\textsuperscript{182} Illusion is a necessary force of formation. This ability is paramount as Nietzsche disputes the existence of a universal truth. If there is no universal grounding for woman, then there is none for man as well, and illusion is needed for its power to persuade. Illusion can encourage the disbeliever to accept, it can ensnare the student to learn, it can seduce the lover to commitment. Woman creates, markets, and sells her own illusion not only to others but also to herself. If no truth exists, then all is illusion, and if women are the generators and creators of illusion, who has power to form and develop society and values? Who has the potential to make life more affirming? Woman! A woman, Nietzsche hopes, who through democratization has not lost or sacrificed the ability to create illusion.

Through illusion a creator defines the beautiful. Illusion is a tool against democracy. This is so because democracy is a talent for suffering; and beauty, for Nietzsche, combats the “talent for suffering” (\textit{BT} page 44). For while he argues that suffering is necessary, ‘the talent’ for suffering and being unable to overcome suffering is not. Thus he would advise one to use beauty to create the illusion of a goal or hero to uplift man. An act of creation is needed to be the “great salvation from suffering, and life’s alleviation...but for the creator to appear, suffering itself is needed, and much transformation” (\textit{TSZ} 2, 24). The future can only be acquired by suffering and living within the traits produced in

\footnote{\textsuperscript{182} Safranski, Rudiger. 2002. Page 88}
man by Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy. This prescription, however, calls for the maintenance of opposites, of the mirror images of male and female both internally and between the genders. For a higher culture must give people two chambers of the brain—one to experience science, the other non-science: living juxtaposed in that confusion is visible...the source of power in one region is the regulator in the other. Illusions...and passions must provide the heat, which the deleterious and dangerous consequences of over heating must be averted with the aid of scientific knowledge.183

Rudiger Safranski interprets this as meaning "passions aim for totality and science teaches reserve...passion, owning to its vigorous focus, posits itself as absolute and admits no alternative beyond that focus...science, however, by dint of its methodological distance keeps us aware of the relativity of knowledge.” Nietzsche would argue for the necessity of both scientific distance and total passion, the interplay of opposing forces—tension. Science is needed to teach distance, to inform one how to discriminate and rank. Passion is needed to give energy, to give complete surrender and acceptance to the newly created horizon. This is why it is imperative for women, the more passionate gender, to learn the scientific method. She has the biologically more passionate instincts. This does not mean she must take on the masculine form of reasoning; in fact, she must not. She must learn within her female trait of passion to use the scientific method, not to eliminate her desires or openness to contemplating all possibilities but to order them.

183 Ibid. Page 202
The concern Nietzsche holds for society and woman in particular is that as they democratize they may not be able to maintain the abilities of their nature. He is troubled that as woman becomes more Apollonian, or reasoning, she will lose her primarily Dionysian primordial powers. As noted previously, within this change woman must maintain the conflict with the Dionysian aspect of her instincts. If she does not, happiness, progress and power will be denied to her. Both man and woman must learn to be the perfect Apollonian-Dionysian blend. Thus she must retain some of her previously primary Dionysian form. Nietzsche calls to woman [and man] to remember their primordialism. Yet Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy push for the elimination of the passionate Dionysian and a total embrace of Apollonian reasoning.

This push is reflected in the democratic pressure on females to have multiple successful roles. Woman is convinced by the morality of egalitarianism that the traits associated with male are 'better' and should be desired. Therefore, woman has attempted to take on these roles. As predicted by Nietzsche, after only a few generations woman would be successful at incorporating male traits. The reach for economic equality and independence has made more demands on this generation of young females than any before. Their heroes are females like Kim Possible and a never ending series of women who look like supermodels and who save the world on a regular basis while maintaining valedictorian status and a fulfilling personal life. Laura Croft and even new versions of Cinderella add to the growing cadence of this vision. This
is what today’s young girl is being fed. Few can be ‘superwoman.’ If woman can not be loving, nurturing, caring mothers and successful in their careers and marriages, what will they sacrifice--themselves? Will the inability to successfully fulfill all these roles lead to a new version of motherhood or a new, improved productive worker, free from bonds of guilt and motherhood, or perhaps even a hyper-feminized seductress?

The confusion of today’s woman is a result of the endless possibilities that democracy has brought and demanded that woman consider. The morality of egalitarianism requires her to possess all. There appears to be little contention or protestation by women of these demands. Yet as one self-proclaimed antifeminist, Camille Paglia, argues ‘women can not have it all’. She puts forth the Nietzschean idea that the battle of femininity is not with the male establishment but with ‘ourselves’: “how do we keep mind and body together.”\(^{184}\) She calls for women to remember their nature. She directs women to stop their quest of conquering the male world of commerce. She appears to call for them to stop assimilation of male traits. I would argue this is what Nietzsche is calling for, an identification of both genders with their physiology. Unfortunately, Paglia misdirects woman’s revaluation. While correctly directing them to their own nature and decrying feminist notions of ‘sameness’, she also eliminates difference or rank among men and women. She is not the Nietzschean alternative she claims to be. Her ‘in your face’ bisexuality decreases the power

\(^{184}\) Paglia, Camille. 1994. Page 180
of women just as the feminists she claims to combat. This is so because it diminishes those same biological differences between males and females she criticizes feminism for forgetting.\textsuperscript{185} She speaks of women using her own powers and laments society’s denial of male traits such as aggression. Yet she doesn’t see her own inconsistency as she repeats the tired argument of feminists: that women need to act more like men. For example, she directs females to be like Madonna because she is full of aggression! Aggression is not traditionally, physiologically or naturally considered a female trait.\textsuperscript{186} So again the ‘answer’ to the problem of female equality is absorbing or taking on male characteristics or traits. She speaks of being like men, acting like men, and becoming aggressive ‘like men’, but that again is the male arena and woman has her own!\textsuperscript{187}

Paglia does attempt to give woman a vision of a more natural woman, one whose identity is based upon her biology. She sees the ideal woman as the femme fatale. These women are represented by characters such as Madonna and Elizabeth Taylor. She argues they epitomize woman’s ancient and eternal power in the sexual realm. I again would argue that Paglia is inconsistent in her call to physiology. Yes, woman is femme fatale. But she is not solely the ‘tigress in heat;’ nor is this the sole basis or foundation of the biology of women.

\textsuperscript{185} Oliver also touts erotic love between women as needed for their primary identification model (page 178)!

\textsuperscript{186} I would argue that aggression is also not psychologically or societally considered a female trait but that would not be a Nietzschean defense

\textsuperscript{187} Paglia, Camille. 1994. Page 24
the dominatrix Paglia suggests is at heart in all women, and yet another to the maternal, and yet another to…? She forgets her own suggestion that women are “full of paradoxes, concealment, and exhibitionism that make woman so elusive and so dominant.” Furthermore, she argues that woman is “earthy and sensual, passionate and willful, yet tender and empathetic.”

A tigress in heat has little empathy or tenderness. Can women such as Audrey Hepburn or Jackie Kennedy, who exude tenderness and the eternal feminine, not be considered as primordial in the use of their biological powers as Madonna or Liz Taylor? Are they less led by their biological instincts?

This misconception of the biological instincts of women is seen in her interview with Hutton. She states, “I don’t want to have maternal feelings for men. I mean I don’t want to stroke them.” Hutton quips that “they will stroke you back you know.” To which Paglia responds, “I mean psychologically.” But what she misses is that Hutton meant it as well. She is so focused on eliminating the idea that a woman needs to mother or ‘take care of her man’ that she denies a primary aspect of the feminine, the maternal.

She attempts to put the sexual relationship on equal footing through immersion in complete immoderation. She espouses experimentation and bisexuality while simultaneously claiming to be attempting to return to males their more aggressive and dominant biology. Bisexuality lessens both male and female power. Women don’t have to eliminate the maternal, watch porn and be

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188 Ibid. Page 18
bisexual to be completely free in their ‘true biological’ nature. In fact, Nietzsche argues that complete immoderation is only possible for the few who can rank and discriminate. Women do not need acceptance of yet more ideas. Unlimited choices create stagnation and leveling, for any but the higher man.

Strangely, at the same time that Paglia calls for a more nature based interpretation of male and female, she calls for us to defy nature’s tyranny. I argue that Nietzsche would advocate that power comes from using nature’s tyranny. Power is in nature’s tyrannical “gifts.” Talent, ability, beauty, gender, and strength are all powers based upon natural endowments. Nature endows men and women with unique physiology. This tyranny calls to them in the form of differing drives. As discussed in the previous chapter, woman must have physiologically based tension with man to ‘progress.’

What type of man is needed for noble woman? Nietzsche calls for man to be both a scholar and a warrior. Further, he argues that identical conditions are needed to create both.

The same discipline makes both the good soldier and the good scholar; and looked at more closely, there is no good scholar who does not have the instincts of a good soldier in his make up…to be able to command and also proudly to obey; to stand in the ranks, but also capable at any time of leading, to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh the permitted and the forbidden on a shopkeepers scales; to be a foe more to the petty, sly parasitic, than the evil (WP 912).

Thus, like Nietzsche’s noble woman, he is both commander and commanded.

This is the reverse side of the physiologically based struggle between man and woman. The noble woman is directed by pride to be a seductive creator. A
noble man is directed by pride to live a more affirming life. A “warrior is one who does as commanded but whose command is to surpass man” (TSZ Page 29). This is an intriguing line. Noble man is commanded [or directed] to act by another, to live a more affirming life. Who directs the warrior? A noble woman directs man as only she can love a warrior (TSZ I 7). The future must hold companionship of the two, commander and commanded. Yet again this is not a stagnant relationship as both command and both are commanded within an eternally dynamic relationship.

Noble woman loves the courageous, untroubled, scornful and mighty, not mere soldiers or athletes but warriors. To be a noble warrior, a man must be in a bloody war with himself that never ends. Thus he, like noble woman, is driven to surpass himself. This is a struggle driven internally by pride and not a vain desire for an outside estimation of himself. This is not an egoistical, physically combative battle. This struggle is inspired by the challenge of noble woman. She leads noble man, Nietzsche argues, because she is equated to his desires of wisdom and life. As Nietzsche tells in his story, Zarathustra must come down from the mountains. He is alone. He needs laughter and dancing. Zarathustra is pushed to leave his lonely high perch by the vision of the promise of the love of woman as wisdom. So he leaves behind the serious and profound to explore the dance. He can not reach his goal alone.

189 Graybeal, Jean. 1990. Page 43
Interestingly it is at first the desire for any conversation that draws Zarathustra from his isolation. But, the ability for long conversations, it may be remembered, is one of Nietzsche’s important traits in a noble marriage. In his story, however, we learn that neither Zarathustra nor woman is yet ready for their partnership. She can not lead, and he can not obey her. She was not yet ready to be his partner, and he is not ready to be hers. She must be able to create an illusion without vanity, and he must be able to write in his own blood. In the end, he returns to the stillness of the mountain because he is not yet ready to act within the noble struggle. He is scholar but not warrior. Thus he is not ‘man’ enough for noble woman. He realizes the type of struggle needed is one for which he is not yet ready.

According to Nietzsche, noble man and woman will only be ready when they are free. What constitutes this freedom?

Having the will to responsibility for oneself. Maintaining the distance that separates us…freedom means that the manly instincts, the instincts that celebrate war and winning, dominate other instincts, for example the instinct for happiness. The human being who has become free, not to mention the spirit that has become free, steps all over the contemptible sort of well being dreamt of by grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free human being is a warrior…look for the highest type of free human beings wherever the highest resistance is constantly being overcome; five steps away from tyranny, right on the brink of the danger of servitude (TI Raids 38).

Danger and tension make us worthy.

Modern democratic society does not develop the warrior scholar. The failure of democratic society to give rise to the scholarly warrior would be of no

190 Ibid.
surprise to Nietzsche. Egalitarianism has embattled the masculine identity.
Nietzsche predicted that democracy would make men “modest, industrious,
beneficent, temperate...But...that seems only the ideal slave; the slave of the
future” (WP 356). Man has become so tired and weak, through excessive work
openness excessive ideas and will bow down before all complex ideas (HAH
403). Man is imperiled. He is effeminized through the triumph of democracy.
His biologically healthy and strong traits of aggression and dominance are anti-
egalitarian. His identity is lost due to the demands of equality and sameness.
His role has become distorted and undefined. He is no longer the provider, the
protector. Furthermore, through his ‘education’ about women, he is no longer
motivated by the mystery and longing for woman. His confusion is apparent.
What does woman want? Should he open the door for a lady? Or will he be
punished for considering her ‘unable’ to do so herself? He attempts to avoid
conflict with woman and to be egalitarian; yet, at the same time, he is stronger
physically and is driven by his instincts of possession. Where are the outlets in
society for male strength and aggression? In a culture dominated by
sameness and equality, there is none. We see the damage this has on young
males in the unacceptability of their ‘boyish traits.’ No longer are antics of young
males put down to ‘boys will be boys.’ Instead when youths show signs of too
much aggression, in order to conform to our views of behavior, we medicate
them! This can be seen in today’s Ritalin infested society. We have become a

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culture that prosecutes a five year old male for ‘sexual harassment’ and
suspends a straight ‘A’ boy scout for bringing a pocket knife to school in his
ejacket. In our desire for perfect egalitarianism, we are unable to use our common
sense. Equality demands it.

Is democratic America in its zenith? Nietzsche gives us hints!

The signs… the esteem for war and the pleasure in war diminish, while the
comforts of life are now desired just as ardently as warlike and athletic
honors were formerly…ancient national energy and national
passion…[are]…now transmuted into countless private passions and have
merely become less visible…great love and great hatred are born…cruelty
becomes more refined…threat of wounding and torturing others with words
and looks reaches its supreme development in times of corruption: it is
only now that malice and the delight of malice are born…tyrants
[emerge]…in these ages bribery and treason reach their peak, for the love
of the newly discovered ego is much more powerful than the love of the
old…one lives for today, and this state of the soul makes the game easy
for all seducers (GS 23).

As I read the list of signs of decay I find myself nodding at each entry. This is a
list of the ailments of our culture. I would argue with a Nietzschean eye upon us
that we are in this age. We are sickly and weak. He gives us another list of how
to assess our culture.

Ages are to be measured according to their positive forces—we moderns
with our timid concern for ourselves and love of our neighbor, with our
virtues of work, humility, propriety, scientific thought—hoarding,
economical, mechanical—prove to be a weak age…our virtues are
conditioned, are demanded by our weakness… equality…belongs
essentially to decline. The gulf between one human being and another,
between class and class; the multiplicity of types; the will to be oneself, to
distinguish oneself—what I call the pathos of distance is typical of every
strong age. The tension, the extension between the extremes is getting
smaller and smaller today—the extremes themselves are shrinking down
to similarity in the end (TI Raids 37).
Our nation is in a phase of deterioration. Nietzsche argued that we could witness the decline of a culture in the degeneration of the physiology of its people (A 17). I would argue that this is very obvious in our society today. It is seen in the increase of obesity, particularly in our young, as well as the increase in diseases such as diabetes and heart disease. We are also witnessing the first ever decrease in the average life span of our citizens. These signs for Nietzsche are indicative that modern democratic American culture is in a state of decadence. This is a key juncture. Now may be the time for revaluation to occur. One of the few possibilities for change to occur is within the roles of male and female. The tension of this relationship and its interaction through the passion aroused by love may potentially be the only area in which enough strength and health exists to create the new horizon. Thus woman may potentially be the only force with enough naturalness, and thus passion, to drive the action.

Interestingly, resentment, which is a weak trait for Nietzsche, may be the generator of a healthy enhancement of mankind. The traditional ‘suppression’ of women was expunged by the feminist movement and the sexual revolution. But with the new order, the new hierarchy, women became the suppressor of excess vitality in society. Now the suppressed male may seek revaluation along with those healthy and higher women suppressed by the egalitarianism of the feminist movement.

This revaluation occurs through the Nietzschean perspective because struggle is ongoing and tension demands change. He predicts that, “a species
comes to be a type...fixed and strong, through the long fight with essentially constant unfavorable conditions" (BGE 262). Change occurs from struggle, and long hard battles are the most creative. Subordination or slavery may be necessary for transformation. "Slavery is the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and cultivation" (BGE 101). Bondage is a type of restraint created through hierarchy. The pressure of controlling the thing that is constrained eventually leads to a build up of a 'surfeit of strength', and then the ruler is "destroyed by its own vitality, strength, and power. This is the path to change. The old rank that repressed the vitality is itself obliterated" (WP 1022). So the old hierarchy which controlled the vigor of another is torn down by that which it suppressed [and so on and so forth eternally]. Thus revaluation occurs when "there is a tension of new needs, of men with new needs, who suffer from the old values" (WP 1008). The constrained man, the constrained drive, becomes full of potential energy. When this overflows it becomes the kinetic energy of change. This fullness "leads you to enrich everything: whatever you see, whatever you will, you see as swollen, packed, vigorous, over loaded with strength. In this state you transform things until they are mirrors of your own power—until they reflect your perfection. This necessity to transform things into perfection is ---art" (TI Raids 9). Art for Nietzsche is not any act of creation, but 'good' art is that which creates a horizon. It must have the purpose of drawing men higher—of instilling an illusion large enough to displace the nihilism projected with the fall of

Christianity and the rise of science. Art must create beauty. A beauty so intense it could spontaneously give hope and lead men.  

Those who create this beauty create a revaluation. Through the abundance of their power they transform those around them. This creation is for Nietzsche the result of tension and pressure (TI 44). This is the end product; the new horizon which guides great man.

Thus through the paths of Christianity, the Enlightenment and democracy man and woman have both, as discussed previously, served time in their interactive struggle as commander and commanded. Yet Nietzsche would argue that society is ripe again for a revaluation. However, man may have lost too much of his active biological instinct to create the beauty necessary for change. He has not the power to seduce woman to a new revaluation. This is because the new hierarchy has to consider woman and man as they are after the masculinization of women and the feminization of man. It must also attempt to bring the unhealthy aspects of culture to health. The new valuation must reinvigorate the warrior in man and de-uglify woman (WP 1012). What does that consist of for Nietzsche? He calls for a redefining of roles upon a more biologically based definition. This does not mean a return to traditional male and female roles. He merely desires for the fulfillment of both higher male and female as individuals and as a gender. Nietzsche states that “each has as much right as his power is worth” (HAH 93). Therefore it is up to man and woman to establish their value. This value can not happen in isolation. For Nietzsche,

193 Nietzsche argues that contrary to uplifting art is the “pessimist’s perspective” which is to bring to life what is ugly, hard, questionable...this is the mood of resignation not nobility (TI Raids 24).
“everything in our modern world is so dependent on everything else that to remove a single nail is to make the whole building tremble and collapse” (RWB Page 209). Man and woman can not enhance society independently. They must each have a place and role within the struggle of opposites or all potential for future enhancement is lost. He notes “a drive as master, its opposite weakened, refined, as the impulse that provides the stimulus for the activity of the chief drive” (WP 966). Therefore there must be a role for both man and woman together. As discussed in Chapter IV, this interaction, in order to give both the greatest possibility for Nietzschean enhancement, must occur within the mutually beneficial passion of a sexual love of two proud driven opposites who have a talent for friendship. Thus the revival of a healthy femininity and a healthy dynamic between the sexes may be the most promising area for potential cultural revaluation given current conditions.

So the new field for modern women to conquer is woman! She needs a new awareness of the power of femininity, of motherhood, of woman, within a drive to create a society that will be ascending, that will ennoble mankind. She must create a new society that will raise more than female shopkeepers. Man must be allowed a role in this revaluation. His role must also fulfill his will to power. Woman can not continue to deny his strengths. He must be allowed to be less ‘tame.’ Nietzsche argued that the beast is harmed by taming; and taming of the beast does not give rise to a better man only a weaker and less harmful one (WP 397). To help the higher man to become the warrior woman needs,
man’s nature must be set free. Nietzsche hints that “war and universal military service are the necessary antidotes to democratic effeminacy” (HAH 235; GS 285; GM III 25; WP 126, 127).\(^{194}\) Simultaneously, women should aim to develop what they are given their distinctive biological strengths. This is a dynamic task. It is accomplished through actively willing their own power (BGE 233, 239).

Currently, woman is dominant not through her own power but through her masculine traits.\(^ {195}\) This development of woman can be done by using an active approach to dominion and power. This is attained through accepting the differences among traits and genders and having the strength to rank and judge them. This is difficult, as discrimination is not a democratic value. Historically, Nietzsche argued ranking was a trait based upon masculine physiology. However, I have argued that females [not feminists], through learning the scientific method, have gained the potential of this ability. Nietzsche calls for the higher individual to then use this trait upon themselves. Thus woman must look within and rank her own goals and drives.

Nietzsche gives us advice on changing egalitarian herd values. He contends that “the seductive power that antiquity exercises on such well-turned-out, i.e. strong and enterprising souls is the most subtle and effective of all anti-democratic and anti-Christian influences even today, as at the time of the

\(^ {194}\) Durrant, Will. *The Story of Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1933. Page 327. We may witness the change in male aggression and behavioral roles in the next few years as a result of the large numbers of males fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq for the last 6 years. This would be an interesting follow-up study for this paper.

\(^ {195}\) Richardson, John. 1996. Page 198
renaissance” (WP 957). To create change one can look to the time of the ancients, to a time of a different value system. This can be used to tempt and seduce man to want distinction; to want more than the herd. In fact he argues that we need to want even more. It is still possible that we should want to be “gods again” (WP 958, 1038).

Previously it has been argued that when Nietzsche speaks of giving birth to a new horizon, this birth was intended to be by the means of a masculine bearer. However, I put forth that as Nietzsche foresaw the masculinization of women, perhaps he was writing to a future version of woman. Nietzsche predicted the desire of rebirth of the Dionysian in modern woman. He knew of her frustration and the conflict she would face upon having conquered the male drives of commerce and independence. He felt nausea at the impossibility of the democratic superwoman’s role and what woman would potentially lose. Yet perhaps his nausea was really the morning sickness of a new birth on the horizon. After a period of exposure to all ideas and desires, woman would through a scientific education develop the ability to rank and discriminate. This ability she previously lacked. This is necessary as Nietzsche argued that we must kill off compassion and egalitarianism. The question would be is higher woman close to admitting that we are not all the same? Do only those on bottom keep us in tyranny by demanding equality? Higher man and woman need the

196 Oliver, Kelly 1995. Page 144-145
courage and self-honesty to say reject equality; all is not the same. Being able to ascertain differences is not a bad or evil thing.

Modern democratized woman must look at the path she has been traveling and determine what has been produced. This evaluation must occur soon as ‘woman’ is at a critical juncture. The ideas and dreams of the early feminist movement have brought many of its original goals to fruition; suffrage, employment and educational opportunities have all advanced. Yet, if woman continues down the road to perfect egalitarianism and sameness, Nietzsche would argue that the offsetting loss would be her traditional biological powers. Assessment of the path is necessary.

Fortunately, blind continuation down the current course is unlikely. Nietzsche predicts that in all cultural systems revaluation is inevitable. This appraisal occurs because “people who comprehend a matter in all its depth seldom remain true to it forever. For they have brought its depths to the light; and then there is always much to see about it that is bad” (HAH 489). Man is continually drawn to ideas, and then upon knowledge and examination of those concepts, he turns from them (HAH 500). Thus women will examine the goals of feminism; view its depths and review what needs correction. This does not mean a complete abandonment of the ideas of feminism. Nietzsche does not advocate a jump into complete rejection of past values nor a jump into their opposites. He looks for a correction, an examination of all that has been produced by a culture. He states,
We often make the mistake of actively opposing a direction, a party, or epoch because we coincidentally get to see only its superficial side, its stunted aspects or the inescapable faults of its virtues...perhaps because we ourselves have participated to a large degree in them. Then we turn our back on them and seek an opposite (HAH 587).

Furthermore, “the truthfulness demanded by morality finally calls in question the very morality in which it is rooted.”197 The push for perfect equality will eventually lead to questioning the biological differences that are argued at base to be nonexistent. Upon review and rejection of this base, a change must transpire. A type of ennoblement will come about through the past degeneration of woman (HAH 224). A look at the outcomes of the democratic movement and the push for egalitarianism will be the motivation for females and males to reevaluate their roles.

Together with higher man, woman needs to work to create an ennobling goal for mankind that evolves on purpose and not as an accident of history (TSZ IV 3; SAE 6; BGE 61, 258; WP 679, 681, 997, 1001). This new order, this new horizon is necessary, according to Nietzsche, for mankind; and we must will it (SAE 6; A 3; TSZ III 4; WP 868, 898). This new view must be based upon the “opposite of all the herd thinks desirable...which [will] train men for the heights, not for comfort and mediocrity...”(WP 957). It will begin with deception of the new values hidden within the prevailing laws and continue with the rearing of a new generation, perhaps many generations to create a new type of man (WP 957). Higher man will have the ability to hide, or lie about the direction of the

197 Jaspers, Karl. 1966. Page 147
new hierarchy, for the bringer of new horizons must “when not speaking to himself, wear a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it requires more spirit and will. There is a solitude within him that is inaccessible to praise or blame, his own justice that is beyond appeal” (WP 941). So the great man lies to others but not himself. He seeks self understanding and respect only from within; thus his illusion is not based upon vanity or a desire for others to ‘know’ him. To heal nihilism through deception requires pride.

Why is this new goal so necessary? The feminine, I argue, realizes that she stands at the brink of perishing as a separate identity and is choosing instead to revalue her goals just as Nietzsche predicted. The higher stronger female survived by granting herself exceptional actions.

They experiment in self overcoming and freedom, they venture where they are not permitted [barbarism] they create control of strength of will through every kind of asceticism, they don’t communicate out [beware of charm] they learn obedience [subtlety] they never say fair is fair, they treat requital [giving back] as a rare privilege and they have no ambition to emulate the virtue of others (WP 941).

She does this now because “one must be faced with the choice of perishing or prevailing. Problem: Where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? They will be the elements capable of the greatest severity toward themselves and able to guarantee the most enduring will” (WP 868). Woman has taken the path of revolution and is at a juncture. She can continue, along with man, down the path of egalitarianism to sameness. She can continue to deny her biology, or she can revalue her own powers.
When woman chooses a new horizon what will woman create? What illusion will be strong enough to guide her and man to a new set of values? Nietzsche gives us no direction or manual, only clues. His question to any creator of horizons would always come down to the simple results. What type of man does this society produce? Nietzsche argued for the exceptional individual. The individual is formed by society and culture, and thus to shape culture is to shape man and mankind. For Nietzsche “mankind must work continually at the production of individual great men—that and nothing else is its task” (SAE Page 161).
CHAPTER VI

A POTENTIAL HORIZON

As previously stated, Nietzsche does not give us a manual or guidelines to create ‘great men.’ I have argued that this is because he understood the fluid and variable nature of man and culture. He does not prescribe a solution for society in his teachings. Instead he instructs that he who “wills the ends must will the means” (WP 142). The creator of new values must determine the path. This is not an undertaking for the many.

A new horizon or goal must be formulated. While there are other potential avenues for revaluation, I argue that the one with the most potential given current cultural conditions is occurring within the dynamic of the struggle between the sexes. This is likely, as discussed at length in Chapter II, because the Enlightenment, Christianity and democracy incorporated many unhealthy and weak traits into society and man. The primary difficulties were seen to arise from the slavish qualities of egalitarianism and pity. These traits must be combated by a reintegration of rank. Thus, as a result of a revaluation, new elite and powerful drives and people will be formed (HAH 585; D 175, 186, 308; A 57; WP 997, 999). This new hierarchy can live within the framework of democracy for several generations (HAH 466). It “must…appear in association with the prevailing moral laws, in the guise of their terms and forms…” (WP 957). Over

198 Furthermore, new elites means new slaves (BGE 257).
several generations within the framework of the old system the new master type is created.

In order to examine the potential role of woman within the revaluation, I then looked to the traditional roles associated with the feminine. These roles of the eternal feminine, wife and mother were discussed at length in Chapter III. It was concluded that these biologically traditional roles were based upon woman’s abilities of generating illusion, maintaining passion and creating life. It must be noted that to create a new horizon, to be a revaluer of values, several traits are necessary. First among these traits is the ability to create or give birth to the new horizon. As discussed in preceding chapters, while man is the sterile animal, woman is the creator not only of life but of illusion. Traditionally woman, Nietzsche argued, used this power for the vain purposes of giving value to her existence. This was an unhealthy use of this drive for Nietzsche as the value of woman’s existence or opinion was gained externally. Democratization and the incorporation of masculine traits such as a scientific education and economic independence allows [some] women the ability to seek value within. After this transformation, use of the power of illusion can be from and for the drive of pride and not vanity. She can create a new illusion and seduce man to acceptance of that illusion through self-assurance and love (BGE 128, 134, 418). Woman alone has this power (BGE 148).

Maintenance of the creative ability, however, requires one to have distance. Illusion and seduction require separation by their very natures. The
power of illusion is lost with the advent of knowledge (HAH 428). Thus the feminist desire for educating man about woman is contrary to the retention of this power. The goal of eliminating the misunderstandings and battles between the sexes must end. Instead the tension of opposites, as discussed in Chapter IV, must continue (HAH 531; BGE 238). The physiological basis of these differences also gives us the greatest potential for distance and thus for elevation.

The final aspect of the future potential of woman addressed in this dissertation was under what situation or interaction would a noble partnership occur. The necessities for a noble marriage were discussed in Chapter V. In addition, a final trait of the revaluer is the necessity for laughter. Interestingly, Nietzsche compares woman to a more childlike existence and naiveté then man, and thus closer to the new beginning. She is the one who can and has spent time in childlike pursuits with children (TAG 62; BT 142; HAH 342). She knows how to spin and twirl with ecstasy. Women are light lively little sprites (TSZ Page 24). Furthermore, the only god or philosopher who can succeed [in revaluation] is the one who knows how to dance (TSZ 68; GS 381). Woman in her wild birdlike frivolity thus has more potential than man (BGE 237; HAH preface page 8). Therefore the higher woman is a rarer and more valuable thing than the higher man (HAH 377).

Graybeal argues that perhaps Nietzsche wants women to discover the child in man and move him to play. Without her, he stays serious and grave in
the mountains and doesn't descend to the valleys. Laughter and frivolity is needed within the tension of the battle of the sexes. “Zarathustra tells us…the greatest sinner is the one who curses those who laugh, and asks ‘does one have to curse right away, where one does not love?...and he himself simply did not love enough: else he would not have been so wroth that one did not love him.”

One cannot laugh where one does not love. Laughter and love are connected for Nietzsche. Frivolity helps to overcome the suffering associated with the life of a grand passion (HAH 606; BGE 248). Yet one can not laugh where one does not love. The great or ‘true’ love has power, Nietzsche argues. Love can bring out the best and worst in man (BGE 163).

It is love alone that can bestow on the should, not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it—thus only he who has attached his heart to some great man receives thereby the first consecration to culture (SAE Page 162).

A great love empowers, it makes one want to be more. It can make the heavy, great spirit lighter (BGE 90). This is the goal for Nietzsche. “Is it not enough, more than enough, to suffer, love and live in the midst of the beauty and horror of the innocence of becoming” (WP 552)?

For Nietzsche, “pleasurable feelings based on human relations generally makes man better, shared joy, pleasure taken together, heightens this feeling, it gives the individual security…thus social instinct grows out of pleasure” (HAH

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199 Graybeal, Jean. 1990. Page 49
200 Staten, Henry. 1990. Page 156
98). Even philosophy needs the strength of love. He argued that “the greatest error or nonsense in philosophy was its lack of sensuality” \((WP\ 1046)\).

This is not a mere call to sensuality and the physical act of love \((BGE\ 120; HAH\ 418)\). In fact, the sublimation of the sex drive increases the power of love as it gives it time to purify and sharpen its powers \((BGE\ 189)\).

Nietzsche contends that in order for the revaluer to see validity in his great risks and struggles, he must have children \((HAH\ 455)\). This creation of another sort extends our selfishness or self thinking to the future. The existence of oneself past one’s own lifetime allows for an extension over time. Without the potential sacrifice of something dear to us at a later date, we are unwilling to sacrifice today. This type of self-sacrifice is also considered by Nietzsche to be a female trait. As Mencken argues “man seeks the welfare of the race as he actually sees it and woman seeks the welfare of generations yet unborn.”\(^{201}\) The long term sight on culture and society belongs in the realm of the female.

Finally, it must be noted that Nietzsche was correct in his viewing the sickness that democracy would bring to society and particularly to women. He knew, however, that this illness must run its course. It has been shown repeatedly that he did not advocate a return to the traditional roles of male and female. This return would have been impossible given Nietzsche’s understanding of the results of the egalitarian movement.

\(^{201}\) Mencken, Henry. 1976. Page 175
He predicted the incorporation of masculine traits into the feminine and vice versa. Given this incorporation he directed man and woman to reevaluate their roles based upon the outcome of those changes. He states, “with every great force [even the most dangerous] humanity must think how to make it into a tool of its own intentions” (HAH 446). Thus in the end someone needs the courage to say ‘screw egalitarianism’ and make a new path. I would argue that Nietzsche predicted this cry for differentiation would come from a higher woman.

The higher woman, the revaluer of values, must build a new feminine. She must will it (WP 940). She may need to use great force and tension to derive this new image (WP 980, 981). But this version of woman must give to both man and woman a new horizon to search and conquer. This new vision must consider a role for man which fulfills his will to power as much as the female. There must be an outlet for his physical strength and aggression. There must be tension and difference. This illusion should be based on a more biologically diverse view of man and woman, which is possible only through laughter and joy [perhaps found within a great love] (BGE 223, 294). “A full and powerful soul not only copes with painful, even terrible losses, deprivations, robberies, insults; it emerges from such hells with a greater fullness and powerfulness; and, most essential of all, with a new increase in the blissfulness of love” (WP 1030).

In the end, for Nietzsche “life is at bottom of things…indestructibly powerful and pleasurable” (BT Page 50). He knows that life consists of rare, isolated moments of the greatest significance, and of innumerably many intervals, during which at best the silhouettes of those
moments hover about us. Love, springtime, every beautiful melody, mountains, the moon, the sea—all these speak completely to the heart but once, if in fact they ever do get a chance to speak completely. For many men do not have those moments at all, and are themselves intervals and intermissions in the symphony of real life (HAH 586).

Thus if our "soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event---and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified and affirmed" (WP 1032).
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