TRANSPARENCY: Tracking Uranium under the U.S. / Russian HEU Purchase Agreement Page: 3 of 7
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TRANSPARENCY: Tracking Uranium under the
U.S. / Russian HEU Purchase Agreement
Janie B. Benton
U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration
Daniel J. Decman and Douglas A. Leich
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
INTRODUCTION
By the end of August, 2005, the Russia Federation delivered to the United States (U.S.)
more than 7,000 metric tons (MT) of low enriched uranium (LEU) containing
approximately 46 million SWU and 75,000 MT of natural uranium. This uranium was
blended down from weapons-grade (nominally enriched to 90% 235U) highly enriched
uranium (HEU) under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement that provides for the blend
down of 500 MT HEU into LEU for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. The HEU
Transparency Program, under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
monitored the conversion and blending of the more than 250 MT HEU used to produce
this LEU. The HEU represents more than half of the 500 MT HEU scheduled to be
blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the elimination of more than
10,000 nuclear devices.
The HEU Transparency Program has made considerable progress in its mission to
develop and implement transparency measures necessary to assure that Russian HEU
extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons is blended down into LEU for
delivery to the United States. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in-
process containers, observation of plant operations, nondestructive assay measurements
to determine 2U enrichment, as well as the examination of Material Control and
Accountability (MC&A) documents.
During 2005, HEU Transparency Program personnel will conduct 24 Special Monitoring
Visits (SMVs) to four Russian uranium processing plants, in addition to staffing a
Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) at one Russian site.
BACKGROUND
In February 1993, the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation
signed a bilateral agreement for the purchase of LEU derived from 500 MT HEU
removed from Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement provides each
government the right to assure that transparency objectives of the Agreement are met,
including provisions for nuclear material accounting, control, and access. It is on a
government-to-government basis that transparency monitoring is performed. The sale and
purchase of the resultant LEU is a separate commercial contract that is, however,
dependent on the assurance that the transparency objectives are being attained.
The NNSA, the U.S. Department of State, and the Russian Federal Atomic Energy
Agency (Rosatom) are responsible for negotiating transparency-monitoring rights. These1
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Benton, J B; Decman, D J & Leich, D A. TRANSPARENCY: Tracking Uranium under the U.S. / Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, article, October 19, 2005; Livermore, California. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc892480/m1/3/: accessed April 23, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.