Use of Antineutrino Detectors for Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment

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As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independent ... continued below

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Bernstein, A; Lambert, H E; Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Rexroth, P; Baldwin, G et al. June 5, 2006.

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As described in an earlier article [1], important information regarding reactor power and the amount and type of fissile material in reactor cores can be determined by measuring the antineutrino rate and energy spectrum, using a cubic meter scale antineutrino detector at tens of meters standoff from the core. Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards techniques do not provide such real-time quantitative information regarding core power levels and isotopic composition. The possible benefits of this approach are several and have been discussed in the earlier article. One key advantage is that the method gives the inspecting agency completely independent access to real-time information on the operational status and fissile content of the core. Furthermore, the unattended and non-intrusive nature of the technology may reduce the monitoring burden on the plant operator, even though more information is being provided than is available within the current IAEA safeguards regime. Here we present a detailed analytical framework for measuring the impact that such a detector might have on IAEA safeguards, if implemented. To perform the analysis, we will use initial data from our operating detector and a standard analysis technique for safeguards regimes, developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because characterization of the prototype detector is still underway, and because improvements in the prototype could have important impact on safeguards performance, the results presented here should be understood to be preliminary, and not reflective of the ultimate performance of the system. The structure of this paper is as follows. Reactor safeguards and the relevant properties of antineutrino detectors are briefly reviewed. A set of hypothetical diversion scenarios are then described, and one of these is analyzed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Integrated Safeguards System Analysis Tool (LISSAT) The probability of successful diversion is calculated for one specific scenario, for two cases: (1) Use of current IAEA safeguards methods; and (2) Use of current IAEA safeguards methods along with antineutrino detectors. The relative improvement in IAEA safeguards are assessed by taking the ratio of the two probabilities (with and without antineutrino detectors).

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PDF-file: 11 pages; size: 0.2 Mbytes

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  • Presented at: INMM 47th Annual Meeting, Nashville, TN, United States, Jul 16 - Jul 20, 2006

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  • Report No.: UCRL-CONF-222067
  • Grant Number: W-7405-ENG-48
  • Office of Scientific & Technical Information Report Number: 891722
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc875522

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  • June 5, 2006

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  • Sept. 21, 2016, 2:29 a.m.

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  • Dec. 2, 2016, 5:55 p.m.

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Bernstein, A; Lambert, H E; Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Rexroth, P; Baldwin, G et al. Use of Antineutrino Detectors for Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment, article, June 5, 2006; Livermore, California. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc875522/: accessed August 21, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.