CLENCHING THE FISTS OF DISSENT: POLITICAL UNREST, REPRESSION, AND
THE EVOLUTION TO CIVIL WAR

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Previous scholarship has long concentrated on the behaviors of belligerents during regime-dissident interactions. While much of the progress in the literature concentrated on the micro-level processes of this relationship, little research has focused on providing a theoretical reasoning on why belligerents choose to act in a particular manner. This project attempts to open the black box of decision making for regimes and dissidents during regime-dissident interactions in order to provide a theoretical justification for the behaviors of the belligerents involved. Moreover, this project argues that there is a relationship between the lower level events of political violence and civil war as the events at earlier stages of the conflict influence the possible outcome of civil conflict. Regimes and dissidents alike are strategic actors who conduct themselves in a manner to ensure their survival while concurrently attempting to succeed at achieving their respective goals. Although all authoritarian regimes are similar in their differences to democracies, there are significant differences between the regimes, which influence the decision making of the regime leader to ensure the survival of the political institution. In addition to influencing the decision calculus of the regimes, the behavior of the regimes impacts the probability of civil war at later stages of the interaction. Conversely, dissidents also perform as strategic actors in an attempt to gain their preferred concessions and outcomes. Although their comprehension of the coercive capacity of a regime is limited, their knowledge of the repressive capacity of the regime provides them with the understanding of their future fate if they escalate to violence against the regime. This project is conducted using two theories on regime and dissident actions and responses, two large-N empirical analyses of regime and dissident behaviors during nonviolent and violent
dissident campaigns from 1945-2006, and two historical case studies of Egypt and Syria during the Arab Spring as well as the period preceding the uprising.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Puzzle: The Rise of the Arab Spring

December 17, 2011 marked a day of tragedy which subsequently sparked widespread mass dissent throughout several countries in the Middle East. Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia served as an expression of his personal discontent with his treatment by local Tunisian authorities, who earlier confiscated his work materials as a vendor (Al Jazeera 2011). While his action represented an expression of his personal discontent, his act served as an inspiration to incite widespread dissent over the dissatisfaction and frustration with the mass unemployment, economic maladies, the political status quo in the Middle East, and the overall lack of political reforms and representation of the public at large. This first sparked protest in Tunisia, which led to mass nonviolent demonstrations throughout the country. In the end, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down from office and Tunisia proceeded in a new political direction. The mass unrest continued to spread geographically as new mass demonstrations erupted in Egypt in Tahrir Square in Cairo and other urban areas of the country. The Hosni Mubarak regime used both concessions and repression in an attempt to suppress the dissidents and maintain his continued control of political power. In the end, Mubarak ultimately failed to satisfy the overall dissidents of the Arab Spring, eventually stepped down from power, and the Egyptian military. The spirit and fervor of the Arab Spring spread rapidly throughout all of the Middle East. Each of the countries involved in the Arab Spring confronted a different environment: some of the countries experienced mass protests and political unrest while others encountered nominal dissent
from their domestic population. Some of the regimes faced a widespread violent opposition from all aspects of society which threatened the tenure and stability of the state whereas other regimes faced a dissent that remained nonviolent in nature and failed to escalate to violence. The outcomes of these dissident-regime interactions produced varying outcomes as well. Since the action by Bouazizi and the consequent rise of pro-democracy dissent in Tunisia, we witnessed various regime responses and outcomes from the interaction between the regimes and protest movements: regime change (Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia); political and/or economic concessions by the regime (Algeria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia); successful repression of the dissidents by the regime (Bahrain and Iran), and civil war (Libya, Syria, and Yemen). Each of these events of political unrest illustrated diverse characteristics and outcomes; however, the overall event of the Arab Spring provides illustrations of larger research questions regarding political unrest and dissident-regime interactions.

1.2. Extant Work

Much of the prior research on the dynamics of dissidents-regime interactions was devoted to the micro-level processes of dissident and government actions and reactions as studies demonstrated that the two political actors inherently influence the reaction of the other (Carey 2006; Francisco 1995, 1996; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Lichbach 1987, 1995; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996; Shellman 2006a, 2006b). Other studies emphasized more specific research questions regarding the behavior of certain regime types (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Davenport 1996a, 1999, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport and Inman 2012; Poe and Tate 1994; Richards 1999). Moreover, prior studies concentrated on the repression of opposition, the political unrest of dissidents, and how this affects their actions toward their respective regime

1.3. Research Questions

While each of these strands of literature have provided significant comprehension of various subjects, the overall important understanding of “why” remains unfounded. The act of opening the black box of decision making remains to be tackled and definitively answered. While various factors influenced the outcomes of the interactions- the role of the military, social media, economic dissatisfaction, lack of political reforms- are each influential in the rise of political unrest, we still do not have a comprehensive understanding of why regimes choose certain responses over other actions. Conversely, we still do not completely understand why dissidents choose to take certain actions against a regime rather than selecting other tactics they could employ. Several studies argue and identify a continuum of political violence where events of political violence during earlier stages of the continuum may influence later stages specifically the onset of civil conflict (Davenport, Armstrong, and Lichbach 2008; Rost 2011; Thoms and Ron 2007; Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Young 2013). In this manner, the onset of civil war cannot be segregated from lower levels of political violence as these events influence the outcome of the regime-dissident interactions and more specifically, whether civil war begins between the belligerents. The lingering question of “why” still remains as we still attempt to gain more understanding in why certain dissidents choose to escalate to violence against the targeted regime whereas other dissident movements remain nonviolent and at times, retreat back home.
1.4. Chapter Outline

Chapter 2, “Appetite for Destruction: Institutional Survival and Political Unrest” is a theoretical and empirical chapter that attempts to decipher the reasoning for regime behavior when faced with political unrest. Prior research explored various facets of regime behavior and provided significant results (Carey 2006, 2010; Conrad 2011; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Francisco 1995, 1996; Fjelde 2010; Franklin 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Gartner and Regan 1996; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012; Henderson 1991; Hoover and Kowalski 1992; Lichbach 1987; Moore 2000; Rasler 1996; Wright 2008). Moreover, the central premise of this research begins with the seminal work of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), which attempts to understand regime actions by concentrating on the central tenet of a political leader: namely the desire to remain in power and how this preference influences all decision making. When faced with a challenge to the control of political power, the regime will act in a manner to ensure its retention of power. Therefore, the possible responses of repression, toleration, or concessions are selected to keep the leader in power and suppress the rising challenge of the political unrest. If all selections are made for the same reason, why does one regime select one option whereas another regime prefers a different response to the political challenge? I argue this decision stems from the interaction of two concepts: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perception of threat posed by the political unrest.

While all authoritarian regimes share the commonality of being non-democracies, there are significant differences between the various types of authoritarian regimes, which ultimately influence whether a regime possesses the institutional traits and framework for the institution to survive if it undergoes a period of political reform. I argue that single party and military regimes
can survive in the new environment by adapting to the new atmosphere through various manners. Conversely, I argue that monarchies and personalist regimes are highly dependent on retaining the political status quo as the regimes and the leaders themselves cannot survive in a new political environment. Moreover, I argue that the manner in which the dissidents challenge the regime influences the counter response. If the dissidents employ violent tactics targeted at the regime in power, the leader cannot ignore the challenge and instead must react to the dissidents. While both concepts separately influence the outcome of the regime-dissident interaction, I argue that the interaction of the two concepts influence whether the targeted regime responds with the desired concessions of the dissidents or refrains from giving into the demands of the opposition.

I test this relationship using a quantitative analysis of protest campaigns from 1945-2006 selected through the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 1.0). Using a logit regression model, I test four hypotheses on regime behavior when confronted with a formidable challenge by dissidents. I find that the two variables of interest: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perception of threat posed by the political unrest are significant predictors of regime behavior when interacted. I find that when faced with nonviolent political unrest, single party and military regimes are unlikely to provide the desired concessions of the opposition. If the dissidents employ violence targeting the regime, single party and military regimes are instead more likely to give into the dissident’s desired reforms. On the other hand, I find that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to offer the preferred concessions of the opposition if the dissidents remain nonviolent in their political unrest. If the dissidents alter their tactics to employ violence targeted against the regime, monarchies and personalist regimes modify their response and become less likely to provide the preferred reforms of the dissidents.
Chapter 3 “Legacy of Brutality: How Low Level Political Violence Evolves into Civil War” presents a study that attempts to build on the findings of the previous chapter. In Chapter 2, I identified how the institutional framework of certain regime types provides the leader with the ability to survive in a post-reform environment if the regime grants the desired dissident concessions whereas other regime types depend on maintaining the political status quo for the survival of the regime. The institutional framework of authoritarian regime types not only influences whether these regime will provide concessions to dissidents but it also impacts how the regime will respond to conflict and whether the regime-dissident interaction will evolve into civil war. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 2, certain authoritarian regimes have the institutional framework and traits which permit the regime to survive in a post-reform environment. Therefore, I argue that certain authoritarian regime types are more likely to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to repress prior challenges to its tenure while other authoritarian regime types are less likely to exhibit its willingness to repress opposition movements. In other words, I expect that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to have demonstrated their repressive capacity when faced with previous challenges by opposition and therefore, future dissidents are unlikely to escalate to violence when targeting these types of regimes. In this manner, the dissidents will refrain from escalating to violence in future iterations if the regime already demonstrated its willingness to repress challenges to its tenure. The dissidents understand that if the regime demonstrated its willingness to repress opposition in the past, it will likely react in a similar manner to future challenges to the tenure of the regime.

In Chapter 3, I also attempt to determine why dissidents conduct themselves in a particular manner during regime-dissident interactions. Specifically, I attempt to determine why certain dissident campaigns elect to escalate to violence whereas others refrain from violent tactics and
continue with a nonviolent approach to dissent. Prior research approached similar questions by emphasizing regime characteristics to determine why challengers resort to violence against the regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Young 2013). I argue that dissidents suffer from a limited knowledge of the capacity of the state to repress challenges to their tenure and little to no understanding of the willingness of the regime to employ their repressive capacity when challenged. Therefore, the dissidents rely upon other resources of information. Specifically, since the dissidents are not privy to this important information, they can only rely on what they know or have experienced. In this manner, they look to the past regime behavior to influence their future decision calculus. The past behavior of the regime when faced with opposition provides critical information to the future dissidents on whether they should escalate to violence or continue down a nonviolent path. If the regime previously responded to oppositional challenges through repression, the dissidents understand they will likely meet a similar fate if they decide to escalate to violence. On the other hand, if the regime failed to demonstrate the willingness and capacity to repress when confronted with a challenge to its tenure, the future dissidents see an opportunity to gain their preferred concessions and reforms. If they escalate to violence in their campaign targeted against the regime, they could influence the regime to provide them with their preferred reforms and concessions.

Moreover, I argue that the dynamic relationship between dissidents and regimes at earlier stages influences whether the interaction escalates to civil conflict. Specifically, the response of authoritarian regimes at earlier stages of the conflict impact whether the belligerents escalate the conflict to civil war. Certain authoritarian regimes such as single party and military regimes possess institutional attributes which permits the regime to survive in a post-reform political environment. Single party regimes can become one of many political parties and the elites of the
A former single party can compete in political elections and influence policy making in the new political environment. Military regimes can survive in a new political environment by going back to the military barracks and resume military activities by concentrating on national security issues rather than political issues. When faced with a violent challenge by dissidents, these regimes are more likely to provide the preferred concessions and reforms, which satisfies the desires of the dissidents and the escalation to civil conflict is avoided.

On the other hand, other authoritarian regimes do not enjoy these attributes which permit the regime to survive in a new political environment. Monarchies and personalist regimes depend on retaining the political status quo where the regime leadership remains insulated from the influence of the population through a small winning coalition. If these regimes undergo a transition in the political environment, the regime will lose control over political power and the leadership may likely face exile, imprisonment, or death (Geddes 1999). Therefore, when faced with a violent challenge by dissidents, these regimes are more likely to respond with violence, leading to the escalation to civil conflict.

I test these relationships using a quantitative analysis of protest campaigns from 1945-2006 selected through the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes dataset (NAVCO 2.0). Using a Cox duration analysis model, I test three hypotheses regarding the outcome of regime-dissident interactions as well as the behavior of dissidents in determining whether it should escalate to violence against an authoritarian regime. While prior studies use measures of state capacity such as GDP per capita, military expenditures, or military personnel, I use a measure of regime repression from the Human Rights Protections Scores dataset in order to determine the legacy of repression of a particular regime. I find support for my theory and the three hypotheses derived from it. First, I find that dissidents are unlikely to escalate to violence against a regime that
demonstrated its willingness and capacity to repress. If the regime demonstrated its repressive capacity and its willingness to employ these measures during previous challenges targeting the regime, the dissidents gain valuable information that influences the dissident decision calculus of whether to escalate to violence or remain nonviolent in their opposition. Second, I find that regime-dissident interactions involving single party or military regimes are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. As noted above, I find that single party and military regimes are more likely to provide dissidents with their preferred concessions or reforms if the dissidents pose a perceived threat to the regime through violence. Therefore, belligerents have no incentive to escalate to civil war as both actors gained a preferred outcome. Third, I find that regime-dissident interactions between dissidents and monarchies or personalist regimes are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. As noted in Chapter 2, monarchies and personalist regimes do not possess the ability to survive in a post-reform environment as demonstrated with single party and military regimes. These regimes depend on retaining the political status quo and therefore, a violent challenge by dissidents is likely to be met with violence in kind by the regime, leading to the escalation of civil conflict.

Chapter 4 “Master of Puppets: A Study of Egypt and Syria on the Path to the Arab Spring” provides two qualitative case studies in an attempt to illustrate the proposed theories in the previous chapters regarding belligerent actions during regime-dissident interactions through the examples of Egypt and Syria. While both Egypt and Syria were longstanding authoritarian regimes who experienced domestic uprisings during the Arab Spring, there were several significant differences between the regimes which influenced the decision making of the belligerents as well as the outcome of the interactions. Although Hosni Mubarak maintained his control of political power through the execution of the Emergency Laws in 1981, the National Democratic Party (NDP) profoundly influenced the Egyptian political system under Mubarak and controlled policy making
and advancement in Egypt. As Egypt displayed traits of a single party regime, I argued that when faced with a nonviolent challenge by those involved in the Egyptian protests, the Mubarak regime is unlikely to provide the desired concessions. While Mubarak did eventually step down from his position of power, the nonviolent nature of the Egyptian Arab Spring did not present a significant challenge to the Mubarak regime. Therefore, the option of not giving into the preferred concessions of the dissidents presents a less costly decision.

On the other hand, the decision making of the dissidents and the prospects for civil conflict in Egypt also presents an interesting portrayal of the theory proposed in Chapter 3. In their opposition of the Mubarak regime, the dissidents participating in the Egyptian Arab Spring targeted a government which demonstrated a longstanding pattern of human rights violations and the suppression of any opposition to its tenure. With the clear demonstration of his willingness and capacity to repress challengers, the dissidents strategically remained nonviolent in their opposition to the Mubarak regime. If the regime consistently exhibited its willingness to employ repressive tactics against any opposition, the Egyptian dissidents during the Arab Spring likely understood a future response by the regime if they too engaged in violence targeted against the regime. In the end, they are more likely to remain nonviolent in their opposition to the Mubarak regime.

Syria under the rule of Bashar al Assad also presents a compelling example of the theories proposed in Chapters 2 and 3. The Assad regime largely maintained the control of political power in Syria through the support of a small group of loyal Alawites and family members. When faced with a nonviolent challenge by the dissidents, I would expect that the Assad regime would provide the opposition with their preferred concessions. Although Assad ultimately did not give into the overall goals of the dissidents, he did offer certain reforms but did not actually provide them. Moreover, a violent dissident campaign targeted at the Assad regime developed within a few
months after the beginning of the Syrian Arab Spring. Thus, I would expect that the regime would
avoid providing the desired concessions of a violent dissident challenge as the regime is dependent
on retaining the political status quo. If the leadership provided these reforms, this would threaten
the foundation of the regime and possibly lead to the loss of political power.

On the other hand, the dissidents in the Syrian Arab Spring provides an illustration of the
theories proposed in Chapter 3. As noted in the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
reported I consulted with for this study, the Assad regime repressed the Syrian population who
presented a threat to the tenure of the regime. Despite this demonstration of repressive capacity,
there were significant differences between the Hafiz al Assad and Bashar al Assad regimes which
contributed to the view of Bashar as a weak and less feared leader by the Syrian population.
Moreover, the introduction of a period of political openness during the Damascus Spring followed
by a period of suppression during the Damascus Winter provided important information to the
dissidents. While Bashar did repress certain opposition to the regime, he did not consistently
demonstrate this trait. Therefore, I expect that the dissidents viewed this inconsistency as a
possibly opportunity to gain their preferred concessions if they challenged the regime. In the end,
I expect that the dissidents in Syria were more likely to escalate their opposition tactics to violence
in order to challenge the regime and the Assad regime would respond in kind in order to protect
his political position.

The conclusion of this work- Chapter 5- reiterates the significant contributions of this
work to the overall study of political violence. First, I find support for the arguments concerning
the decision making of the regime when faced with a violent and nonviolent dissidents. In the
end, the contextual environment of the regime-dissident interactions is significant as it influences
decision making by the regime. The probability of regime survival in a post-reform environment
and the perception of the threat posed by political unrest are significant concepts that need to be interacted in order to illustrate the environment facing the regime. Second, I find support for the arguments regarding the dissident decision calculus of whether to escalate to violent tactics targeted at a particular regime. While the dissidents do not possess complete understanding of the willingness and capacity to repress by the regime, earlier demonstrations by the regime provide significant information of whether the regime will repress in future iterations. Moreover, I find support for my arguments regarding how the response of authoritarian regimes at earlier stages of the conflict influence the prospects for the escalation of civil conflict. Based on the institutional arrangement of authoritarian regimes, certain regimes are better suited to provide concessions when they are threatened with violent dissident challenges, which allows them to avoid the escalation of civil conflict. On the other hand, other authoritarian regimes are dependent on preserving the current institutional framework, which restricts their options when faced with violence from dissidents. These regimes are more inclined to respond to violence with violence in kind, which may escalate to civil conflict.
CHAPTER 2

“APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION”? INSTITUTIONAL SURVIVAL AND POLITICAL UNREST

2.1. Introduction

The “Arab Spring” of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrated a powerful expression of discontent from the populations of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen against their respective governments. The pro-democracy mass movements were sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia on December 19, 2010 and continued to diffuse throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Reuters 12/19/10). Since the action by Bouazizi and the consequent rise of pro-democracy dissent in Tunisia, we witnessed various regime responses and outcomes from the interaction between the regimes and protest movements: regime change/reform (Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia); political and/or economic concessions by the regime (Algeria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia); repression of the dissidents by the regime (Bahrain and Iran), and civil war (Libya, Syria, and Yemen). In addition to sharing the same geographic region and similar religious composition, the noted countries are all longstanding non-democracies and each faced a challenge to the continuance of power by the current regime. While a similar range of developments has occurred in other regions in the world throughout history, the recent events of the Arab Spring provide an illustration of an interesting research puzzle: What accounts for the diversity of regime responses to protests and outcomes to these state-society clashes? Why do targeted regimes react to mass dissent by offering reform or repression? What is the process behind the decision-making of an autocratic regime when faced with the rise of political unrest?
In the next section, I present an overview of the literature regarding political unrest/dissent, the response of regimes to the political unrest such as repression and concessions, and the dynamic interaction between the actors. I then introduce my theory and derive hypotheses regarding the driving factors which influence the response of a regime to mass protest. I argue that this process is influenced by two concepts: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perceived threat posed by the political unrest to the continued survival of the regime. Next, I describe my research design and operationalize my variables. I then use several logit models in order to test the proposed relationship regarding why a regime selects a particular response to political unrest. Finally, I offer an analysis of these results and present my conclusions of this study as well as methods of improving this study.

2.2. Literature Review

As demonstrated in the brief example of the Arab Spring in 2011, when a regime faces mass unrest from their population, they may respond in various manners: concessions through policy changes, concessions through monetary goods, continue with the status quo or essentially ignoring the protest campaign, regime change or reform, or repress the opposition (Conrad 2011; Fjelde 2010; Franklin 2009; Taydas and Peksen 2012). In comparison to facing armed conflict such as an insurgency or civil war, the regime possesses more options in their response to nonviolent protest or dissident collective action that has not escalated to civil war, insurgency, organized armed conflict such as various methods of repression, escalating the level of repression, or cooperation in the form of reform or concessions (Shellman 2006a, 2006b). Conversely, a regime confronting a rebel group engaging in violent conflict has fewer options as they commonly resort to conflict or risk a change in the control of the executive (Quinn et al. 2007).
The literature on contentious politics has made great progress toward understanding the interactions between dissidents and the regime and argues that there is a dynamic relationship between the types of political unrest and links them through the process of the dissent-repression nexus (Carey 2006; Francisco 1995, 1996; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Lichbach 1987, 1995; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996; Shellman 2006a, 2006b). Many of the studies in this strand of the literature approach the relationship between dissidents and the regime by concentrating on the micro-level processes of tactics and maneuvers between the actors and how the actions of the actors influence each other. These studies argue that there may be a reciprocal relationship between the belligerents as the government responds to the political unrest with repression or accommodation and consequently, dissidents respond to the regime repression with increased levels of political unrest or acquiescence (Hoover and Kowalski 1992; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996). On the other hand, other studies demonstrated that the opposition and regime may choose to alternate between violent and nonviolent tactics when faced with a particular response from their opponent (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996). Finally, the dynamic interaction between the actors may evolve in nonlinear fashion as political unrest by the dissidents may induce government concessions and government repression may break the will of the dissidents and push them to deescalate and possibly demobilize (Lichbach 1987; Lichbach and Gurr 1981).

The repression literature has also made great advancements in determining which government types are more likely to repress and the conditions where governments are more likely to employ repressive measures against their population. In the early work on regimes and repression, Poe and Tate (1994) found that democracies are less likely to repress oppositional

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1 For a comprehensive review of the repression literature, see Davenport (2007b) and Davenport and Inman (2012).
challenges from the domestic population. After this innovative discovery, there have been several studies on the relationship of regime type and the various facets of regime repression and their propensity to suppress opposition. Davenport (2007a) demonstrates significance for a “tyrannical peace” as he finds that single party regimes are less likely to repress their population than other autocratic regime types. Furthermore, he notes that military regimes are less repressive than other autocracies in civil liberty violations but more repressive regarding physical integrity violations (Davenport 1995, 2007a). Democracies, on the other hand, are less likely to repress their population than any autocratic regime type (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Davenport 1996a, 1999, 2007b, 2007c; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport and Inman 2012; Poe and Tate 1994; Richards 1999).

The literature has also demonstrated the effect of the past on future behaviors of the regime. Previous experiences with regime repression affect the probability of the regime employing similar methods in the future (Carey 2010; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996; 2007c; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Hoover and Kowalski 1992; Josua and Edel 2015; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Rost 2011; Thoms and Ron 2007). Furthermore, Davenport (1996) finds that the number of years since democratization and number of years since political conflict influences the decision of the regime to repress its population. Finally, the most consistent finding in the literature concerns the threat perception of the regime and its subsequent response. Specifically, if the regime perceives an escalation in threat to the survival of the institution, it is highly likely that it will respond to the unrest with repression (Davenport 1995, 1999, 2007b; Earl 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Gartner and Regan 1996; Josua and Edel 2015; Regan and Henderson 2002; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
While all of the noted studies produced significant results in understanding the dynamic relationship between dissidents and government as well as regime repression, we are left uninformed concerning why the regime chooses a particular alternative when faced with rising dissent that poses a challenge to the regime. Earlier studies contributed pieces of the puzzle regarding a regime response to political unrest and when governments repress dissidents but we are lacking a comprehensive theory to understand this phenomenon. Furthermore, these studies often avoided unpacking the differences between autocratic regime types and instead highlighted differences between democracies and autocracies when faced with mass political unrest. I attempt to fill in this gap of the literature by arguing the decision of a regime to repress the political unrest or accommodate their demands may be influenced by the interaction between the level of threat by the political unrest and the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment.

2.3. Theory

In all government types, democracies and non-democracies, the primary concern of the leader is institutional survival or in other words, to gain control of the government and maintain their authority (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). While democratic governments impose specific term limits on their leaders, nondemocratic leaders typically attempt to extend their control of power for a longer period of time through various methods and strategies. When faced with a regime crisis or the direct challenge to the continuous political power of the government through political unrest, the leader will likely respond in one of several manners: repression, toleration or ignoring the unrest, or concessions. Furthermore, the regime may choose to alternate or combine several of the responses as demonstrated in the case of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi during the Iranian Revolution. The Shah severely repressed certain aspects of Iranian society and introduced
martial law to the urban areas. In the same vein, he also attempted to accommodate the opposition by pardoning thousands of political prisoners, providing economic concessions to certain classes of society, and allowing for political exiles to return to Iran such as Ayatollah Khomeini (Rasler 1996).

Regardless of the actual response by the regime, all regime responses to political unrest are conducted in order to maintain the status quo and ensure the survivability of the institution. In other words, the regime acts in a manner to increase the risks and costs of participation, deter the political unrest and retain the control of power. If the regime represses the dissidents, it is a strategic maneuver to suppress the opposition by increasing the costs of continuing to engage in political unrest by introducing the costs of being repressed. Similarly, if the regime offers reform through policy or monetary concessions to the dissidents, the response represents a method of quelling the disruption by increasing the costs of protesting as they may lose the potential benefits gained through the concessions. In the end, both responses by the regime are selected to impede the opposition and preserve the status quo of the current regime in power.

If all possible responses are chosen for the same reason, why does one regime opt for one response when faced with a contentious challenge while another regime selects a different response? What is the process behind the decision-making of an autocratic regime when faced with the rise of political unrest? I attempt to provide an explanation to this process by focusing on two concepts: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perception of threat posed by the political unrest to the continued survival of the institution.
2.3.1. The Probability of Institutional Survival in a Post-Reform Environment

I begin with the assumption that all governments, democratic and nondemocratic, require the support of a selectorate and a winning coalition in order to retain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). A leader comes into office and often preserves her position through a patron-client relationship or in other words, the continued support of a specific group of advocates or winning coalition whose backing allow for her continued rule. In return for their continued support, the leader of the regime provides benefits to those members of the winning coalition in order to survive politically. In a democracy, the winning coalition is significantly large as all citizens of voting age may influence the outcome of the election. Since the winning coalition is so large, it is too expensive and illogical to purchase the loyalty of the necessary number of people with private payoffs in order to gain and maintain political power. Therefore, the leader provides public goods in order to gain the support of the public. In this regard, the benefits are nonexclusive and typically delivered in the form of public goods available for all of the population, regardless of their contributions to the production of those public goods or their support of the regime. On the other hand, this creates a possible new issue of loyalty to the democratic leader despite still receiving public benefits. Conversely, an autocracy distributes the benefits in a selective or exclusive manner in the form of private goods or payments to the members of its winning coalition. In other words, the leader is discriminate about providing private goods and benefits to only those essential to maintaining her control of political power. In this manner, the leader pays off the winning coalition members and through these payoffs, she continues to maintain her position of power. Finally, the leader and the winning coalition prefer to keep the coalition at a minimal amount of members in order to gain maximum profits and benefits for its members and to minimize the overall amount of payouts from the leader (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) specifically concentrate on the survival of the individual leader and that the leader will conduct herself in a manner to ensure her continued survival in the position of power by providing public and private benefits. This study, however, argues that the specific institutional framework of the regime provides the necessary protection for the survival of the leader. As discussed below, there are significant differences between the types of authoritarian regimes, which permit the leader to remain in power despite a change in the political environment. On the other hand, other authoritarian regimes possess the institutional attributes to retain political power in the current institutional framework; however, the leader is vulnerable and likely to lose power if the particular political institution is changed. While Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explicitly refrain from a categorical focus on types of political systems, there are significant differences in the size of the winning coalition based on the type of the political institution (Haggard and McCubbins 2001; Heger and Salehyan 2007; Shugart 1999). Geddes (1999) disaggregates the concept of regime type by classifying the different types of non-democratic regimes into the categories of military regimes, personalist regimes, single-party regimes, and hybrid regimes. Wright (2008) also contributes to this discussion by identifying that monarchies should be treated as a separate regime type, which may also produce diverse effects and traits compared to other types of autocracies.

Each of these autocratic regime types has different winning coalition sizes, which influences the decision-making of the leader in all facets but particularly regarding the response of the regime to contentious opposition. I argue that the winning coalition of a regime specifically influences the leader’s decision-making through the costs and costliness of the decision. The decision is first influenced by the costs of the response, which subsequently affects the amount of private funds that the leader possesses to satisfy the members of the winning coalition. Repression,
policy concessions, and monetary concessions have direct and indirect monetary costs in order to implement the response. Second, the decision of the leader must also take into account the costliness of the regime response. Similar to the costs of the regime response, the leader is primarily concerned with the survival of the institution, the deterrence of political unrest, and how the specific response could possibly influence the loss of power. The costliness of the response is based on the costs associated with the response by the regime. If the regime response significantly reduces the private funds to pay off the winning coalition by increasing the number of winning coalition members or by using the funds to respond to the political unrest, the coalition members may shift their loyalty to an opposing contender or become the opposition themselves as they may perceive the gain of more benefits through the support of someone else. Thus, the leader must ensure to retain a significant amount of private funds and the continued loyalty of the winning coalition members to guarantee the stability of her regime. While each type of regime response has similarly associated costs across institutions, the type of institution influences the costliness of the response through the size of the winning coalition.

While all authoritarian regimes have smaller winning coalitions than those found in democracies, they demonstrate significant differences between each other particularly in regard to the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment. As explained above, all responses to political unrest are conducted to ensure the survival of the institution against the possibility of reform of the government. On the other hand, if the regime succumbs to political unrest and undergoes reform, the current regime type may be modified and the survival of the former leader and the winning coalition in the new government will likely be threatened. However, the type of regime influences the probability that the current administration will survive in the
post-reform environment. Certain traits of the former regime type increase the probability of whether or not the former administration will survive in the environment after reform.

*Single party regimes* are political institutions where the access to positions within the administration and policy influence is controlled by the dominant party within the country. While other political parties may exist, the dominant party retains exclusive control of the leadership, the distribution of benefits, all advancement within the government and bureaucracy, and decisions regarding policy-making. Therefore, if one aspires for a leadership position within the party or to influence policy within the government, she must advance through the ranks of the dominant party rather than exist outside of the party (Geddes 1999). Within single party regimes, the leader is less politically insulated from the mass population and the winning coalition is larger compared to monarchies and personalist regimes. While the party controls access to office and influence over policy-making, it is not exclusively the leader and a small winning coalition that controls the regime but rather the political party itself and the members within the party. Therefore, if the regime responds to dissent with concessions and the winning coalition consequently expands, the individual member of the winning coalition does not lose as many benefits and patronage compared to a winning coalition member in a personalist regime or monarchy.

While the winning coalition in a single party regime is smaller than those found in a democracy, there is a significant difference between single party regimes and other forms of authoritarian regimes. In single party regimes, the country is already accustomed to a political party managing the government and the political power and influence within the regime does not surround one leader. Thus, if reform occurs in a single-party regime, the former ruling administration will likely survive as the party can participate in the new political environment. In this manner, the former ruling party becomes a viable political party in a multi-party electoral
system and competes with other political parties for influence over policy-making and control over the central government.

Military regimes also have a significant likelihood of surviving in a post-reform environment. *Military regimes* are political institutions where a small group of officers control the regime and regularly consult in order to conduct policy-making. While there may be an observable leader of the regime, the military junta commonly conducts government decision-making as a collective entity. A small group of military officers comprise the winning coalition and access to the regime is severely limited. Unlike single party regimes, a military regime does not allow for elections in order to gain political influence, which allows for the regime to be insulated from the mass population (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Davenport 2007a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006).

The winning coalition within military regimes retain exclusive control over the security apparatus and are highly proficient in the ability to employ violence, repression, and coercion and thus, a divide in the literature exists whether they are more likely to engage in repression when faced with political unrest (Davenport 1995; Davenport 2007a; Keith 1999, 2002; Poe and Tate 1994) or refrain from using violence (Geddes 1999). Moreover, military regimes are different from other regime types with smaller winning coalitions such as personalist regimes and monarchies. Typically, leaders of military regimes are not career politicians and are more concerned with the survival of the military, national security, the maintenance of domestic order, and military autonomy from civilian influence (Geddes 1999). The goals of many military regimes often do not concentrate on the survival of the military regime itself but rather salvaging social and political order such as in the four cases of military government in Turkey (Harris 1995; Jenkins 2001). Moreover, when faced with a post-reform environment, the military junta governing the military
regime can survive as their authority is not contingent on remaining in political power. In other words, when faced with reform, those leading a military regime can go back to the barracks and focus exclusively on military affairs. Therefore, the leader, the winning coalition within a military regime, and the military itself will survive in a post-reform environment.

In contrast, personalist regimes and monarchies have smaller winning coalitions that concentrate solely on the leader herself and thus, operate in a different manner in a post-reform environment. *Personalist regimes* are political institutions where the individual leader controls all aspects of the state, including the political and security apparatuses. Although the personalist leader may be a part of the military or the head of a political party, she controls all aspects of the regime while the military and/or political party has no autonomous influence over policy-making. Furthermore, she relies on political patronage in order to gain control over political power and to ensure that her institution survives (Geddes 1999). In order to retain control of the regime, she depends on a small winning coalition to provide support of her administration and in exchange for their loyalty, she uses private payoffs to the members of the coalition. In a personalist regime, the regime is politically insulated from the mass population as the winning coalition of the regime is very small and the leader controls all aspects of the regime.

*Monarchies*, on the other hand, are political institutions controlled exclusively by a monarch and her ruling family (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Geddes 1999). Fjelde (2010) compares monarchies to military regimes as a small ruling faction typically controls policy-making and remain segregated from political opposition. Conversely, I argue that monarchies are more similar to personalist regimes as the monarch and the royal family comprise the winning coalition and the mass population has little to no opportunity of influencing from below. Therefore, the
winning coalition is commonly quite small and the leader remains politically insulated from the mass population.

Furthermore, monarchies and personalist regimes are parallel in the manner that the regime type is constructed. In both regime types, the leader is the center of political authority and a small winning coalition provides the essential political insulation from the mass population. If the country undertakes reform, I argue that both monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to survive than military or single party regimes. Like single party regimes, monarchies and personalist regimes both wish to survive and remain in power; however, these regimes cannot transform and evolve to survive in the new environment. Unlike military regimes, they cannot retreat back to the barracks and it is highly unlikely that they will transform into a competitive political party such as found in former single party regimes. In monarchies and personalist regimes, the main source of power for the leader resides in the control of all aspects of the government and an accompanying small winning coalition to provide protection for the leader from the population. In accordance to the selectorate theory, she provides private benefits to the winning coalition so they will continue to support and protect the tenure of the leader (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). However, in a post-reform environment, monarchs and personalist leaders no longer possesses the monetary funds or political power for private payoffs to satisfy the winning coalition and consequently, the necessary political insulation from the population. The concessions and reforms given to the opposition would likely destroy the foundation that both regime types depend upon to ensure their continued survival. Therefore, it is unlikely that the former administration in monarchies and personalist regimes will survive in a post-reform environment.
2.3.2. Perceived Threat Posed By the Political Unrest

Recent research has demonstrated that while the regime type and capacity are important in understanding the response of a regime to political unrest, the nature and level of the perceived threat produced by dissident activity is an important influence on the response of the regime (Davenport 1995b, 2007b; Gartner and Regan 1996; Regan and Henderson 2002). In other words, whether or not the political unrest presents a significant threat to the survival of the institution affects how the regime will respond to the dissent. Several studies have found that if the dissident activity is highly threatening to a regime, there is a significant likelihood that the regime will respond to the contentious challenge with repression (Davenport 1995b, 1999, 2007b; Earl 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Gartner and Regan 1996; Josua and Edel 2015; Regan and Henderson 2002; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Davenport (2007b) terms this relationship as the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness”. Thus, the characteristics of the political unrest specifically the nature and level of threat are important to understanding the response of the regime to the contentious challenge.

As demonstrated by Gartner and Regan (1996) and Regan and Henderson (2002), the goals or demands of the dissident group provide a significant indicator of the threat presented by the group. If the dissidents aims to supplant the current leader and state or demands a significant structural transformation of the institution, this presents a direct threat to the continued rule of the leader and her winning coalition. On the other hand, if the dissidents do not aim for the termination of the current institution but rather minor policy accommodations, the regime’s perception of threat from the political unrest may be lower compared to a call for a comprehensive change in the political status quo. Finally, if the desired policy concessions open the regime to political competition, dissolve the political insulation that the leader and winning coalition enjoy, and
transform the structure of the political institution, the contentious challenge may be perceived as highly threatening to regimes that are less likely to survive in a post-reform environment.

Although the nature of the dissident demands may demonstrate a threat to the continued rule of the regime, this may not always be the case. A regime may face demands by dissident groups calling for their overthrow or termination at several points during its tenure; however, the dissident group itself may not present a threat to the regime because it is too small or unorganized. Thus, while the group demands the dissolution of government, the regime is never in danger of overthrow or reform because the group is not a risk to the survival of the institution. Political unrest is often spontaneous and many dissident groups have limited organization, which influences the level of threat perceived by the regime. Rebel groups, on the other hand, present a significant threat to the regime as they are often highly organized and devised for a longer duration (Lichbach 1995). Therefore, the more organized a dissident group, the more likely they are able to sustain repressive actions by the regime and consequently, more likely to be perceived as a significant threat to the regime.

Furthermore, the magnitude or size of the dissident group and the nature of the protest campaign may also be significant to the perception of a threat by the regime. Dissident groups that are small in magnitude may gather together in protest and call for the dissolution of the regime but never render a formidable threat to the regime. Therefore, the larger the magnitude of a dissident group, the more likely the dissident group will be able to sustain repression and consequently, pose a strong, viable threat to the regime.

While the magnitude and goals of a protest campaign may be construed as a threat to the regime, the most significant indicator of threat perception is whether the contentious challenge engages in violence directed at the regime. Campaigns that engage in political violence against the
regime are more likely to be perceived as a considerable challenge to the continued rule of the current regime than nonviolent campaigns. Once the dissidents escalate their activity to violence, the regime can no longer ignore the demonstration and is forced to react to the political unrest either through concessions, reform, or repression. Davenport (1995b) explains that when dissidents escalate their activity to violent measures, this may create an environment of mass disorder for the society as the violence may affect uninvolved citizens either through death or recruitment to the dissident cause. Furthermore, if the dissident violence is perceived by society as dangerous or if it actually endangers nonparticipants, the citizens may be more tolerant of regime repression of the dissidents as they are viewed as threatening to the citizens themselves (Davenport 1995b). This will likely influence the regime to respond to political violence in turn with repression of the protest campaign as they represent a significant threat to the survival of the regime.

On the other hand, if the political unrest remains nonviolent, the decision of the regime to violently repress the dissidents could actually backfire as the regime may lose citizen support and actually incite them to mobilize against the regime leader. Moreover, the international community may respond to this violent action through punitive repercussions targeted at the regime in power (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Davenport 1995b; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Therefore, the regime may foresee a negative reaction from the domestic population and possibly punitive response from the international community and determine that giving into the desired concessions of the dissidents is a less costly response to the nonviolent political unrest.

Through the discussion of the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the perceived threat posed by the political unrest, I derived four hypotheses to attempt to explain regime decision making when faced with political unrest targeted at the regime.2

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2 Prior studies on the micro-level processes of conflict noted that a regime may use both repression and concessions simultaneously when faced with a dissident challenge through political unrest (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000;
Hypothesis 2.1.: When faced with a high threat from dissidents, single party and military regimes are more likely to provide concessions or reform than monarchies and personalist regimes.

Hypothesis 2.2.: When faced with a low threat from dissidents, single party and military regimes are less likely to provide concessions or reform than monarchies and personalist regimes.

Hypothesis 2.3.: When faced with a high threat from dissidents, monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to provide concessions or reform than single party and military regimes.

Hypothesis 2.4.: When faced with a low threat from dissidents, monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to provide concessions or reform than single party and military regimes.

2.4. Research Design

2.4.1. Methodology

In order to address the questions posed in this research, I constructed a dataset of political challenges to the continued rule of a regime by a dissident opposition. The specific cases selected for the dataset are identified as “regime crises” where the political unrest by the dissidents is directed as a challenge to the tenure of the current political regime in government. There have been thousands of protests in the world throughout history; however, a regime in power does not always respond to all types of protests within their respective society. Furthermore, the theory presented in this study attempts to provide an explanation of why regimes respond in a particular manner to episodes of political unrest directed at the regime. Therefore, while there are numerous examples Rasler 1996, Shellman 2006a; Shellman 2006b). Rasler (1996) particularly demonstrated this phenomena in her work on the Iranian Revolution and Shah Reza Pahlavi. As noted above, this work assumes that the regime leader is a rational actor who operates in a manner to ensure their continued survival. Thus, this action is a strategic action by the regime to suppress the political unrest through the suppression of the dissidents through force or the provision of certain concessions. Despite these expectations, I do not test for this relationship in this study as the data and information does not exist in the dataset.
of political unrest that may be directed at some facet of society or an opposing ethnic group, the campaigns selected in this dataset must be directed at the continued survival of the current regime and must present a crisis to the regime\(^3\). I use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset (N.A.V.C.O. 1.1) compiled by Chenoweth (2011) to select the observations of campaigns of political unrest for this study. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) define a campaign as “…a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective.” In order to be selected into the dataset, the protest campaign must be specifically directed at the regime itself and the campaign must present a challenge to continued rule of the regime. The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 is a cross sectional dataset with the unit of analysis of the political campaign itself. In other words, each observation represents the regime crisis or a contentious challenge by the dissidents from 1945 to 2006.

2.4.2. Dependent Variable

In order to capture the regime response to a protest campaign, I created a measure of the successful achievement of the desired reform by a dissident group within a protest campaign. While this study specifically concentrates on determining what factors influence an authoritarian regime to provide concessions to dissidents, I use a proxy measure of the successful attainment of dissident goals to measure the dependent variable. The logic behind this coding decision is that with the successful attainment of dissident goals, the regime provided the dissidents with some form of concessions that would satisfy the demands of the protest campaign.

\(^3\) The inclusion criteria are outlined in the codebook for the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset (N.A.V.C.O. 1.1). Specifically, Chenoweth (2011) notes that the protest campaign must be directed at the regime, have a political objective, and present a challenge to the government.
The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset provides three separate dichotomous measures of the outcome/successfulness of the protest campaign: *success*, *limited*, and *failure*. The *success* variable is a dichotomous variable noting whether the protest campaign actually gained all of its stated goals while the *limited* variable is also a dichotomous variable indicating whether the dissidents secured at least some of its prescribed goals (Chenoweth 2011). From this data, I created the dichotomous dependent variable, *success_limit*, which measures “1” if the protest campaign gained all of its stated goals (*success*) or if it gained some of its goals (*limited*). On the other hand, the variable measures “0” if the campaign failed to gain its stated goals. With a dichotomous dependent variable, I use a logit model in order to test my theory concerning the determinants of a regime response to political unrest.

2.4.3. Independent Variables

In order to operationalize the first concept of my theory (*institutional survival in a post-reform environment*), I use four variables representing the autocratic regime types from the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014): *single party regime*, *military regime*, *personalist regime*, and *monarchy*. Each of the four variables are dichotomous, measuring “1” if the institution in power in a country demonstrated traits of the particular regime type during the year and “0” otherwise. Thus, according to the Autocratic Regimes Dataset, if a specific country is considered a single party in a particular year, the *single party* variable measures “1” and all other regime type variables are “0”. In line with my proposed theory, I expect that single party

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4 The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset also provides an ordinal variable *Outcome*, which measures the level of success of the protest campaign ranging from failure to limited to successful gain of the prescribed goals of the protest campaign.

5 The N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset includes forty-two democracies, twenty-three colonies, and five warlord governments. I do not include these regimes in my analysis and instead rely exclusively on the four authoritarian regime types noted above.
and military regimes will act similarly when faced with a particular level of threat from the political unrest while personalist regimes and monarchies will act in a related manner when faced with a significant threat from a protest campaign.

As the second concept of my theory concentrates on the threat perception of the regime, I include a variable to account for whether the dissident group represents a high or low threat. I incorporate a dichotomous variable, violence ($viol$), which represents whether the dissidents primarily engaged in violence against the regime during the protest campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Many protest campaigns alternate between violent and nonviolent strategies and other campaigns have violent factions simultaneously with nonviolent factions (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996); however, this variable specifically emphasizes whether or not the identified protest campaign primarily used violent strategies during the years the campaign was active.

As my theory argues that the determination of whether a regime provides concessions or represses a dissident challenge stems from an interaction between two concepts, my third independent variable ($regime*viol$) represents the interaction between the first two independent variables. I generate four interaction variables representing the probability of post-reform institutional survival (authoritarian regime type) and whether the dissident challenge represents a high or low threat to the tenure of the regime ($violence$). When I test the proposed hypotheses, I drop one of the regime type variables and its corresponding interaction term in order to provide a baseline of comparison between the baseline and the other regime types. I expect that the response

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6 While I discuss other manners how a political unrest campaign can be perceived as threatening to a regime, I specifically use whether the contentious challenge engages in violence against the regime. This presents a significant threat as the regime is forced into responding to the dissident activity. While the literature argues that the goals of the challenge may represent a threat to the regime, the N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset controls for this already. The codebook explains the campaigns selected for the dataset have a political objective. “Campaigns are purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime.”
of the regime to political unrest changes in the proposed manner once they are exposed to the threat by the dissidents through violence.

2.4.4. Control Variables

In order to isolate the effect of other influences on the regime response to political unrest, I include four control variables. First, a country’s ethnic fractionalization ($ef$) is controlled for as the composition of ethnicity within a country may affect the likelihood of the onset of political violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Reynal-Querol 2002a). The variable ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the probability of two random people within a country being from the same ethnic or religious group.

Second, I include the log of the country’s population ($\ln\text{pop}$) as a control variable. This variable represents the logged population of the respective country where the protest campaign arises and is collected from the final year of the protest campaign. This variable is measured by the Penn World Tables 6.2 and gained from the N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

I also incorporate control variables that represent the characteristics of the campaign of political unrest. First, I include a variable, log of members ($\ln\text{members}$), which represents the magnitude of the dissident group. A large number of people participating in a protest campaign decreases the risk of suffering costs of participation for individuals (arrest, incarceration, injury, or death) and stimulates others to join in order to gain future benefits (Rasler 1996). Therefore, a large number of members participating in a protest campaign may be highly threatening and represent a significant challenge to the standing regime and their continued hold on power.
Second, I use a variable representing the log of the duration of the protest campaign \((lduration)\). As the N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset is not a time series dataset, I account for the element of time by including a variable signifying the duration of the protest campaign. The variable measures the logged duration of the conflict in days and is provided by N.A.V.C.O. 1.1 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). It has been demonstrated that the duration of the protest campaign influences the outcome of the campaign (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

2.5. Results

Table 2.1 on page 35 presents the results of the four logit regressions. In each of the four models, the baseline of comparison is changed. As discussed above, I intentionally drop one of the four regime type variables \((probability\ of\ post\-reform\ institutional\ survival)\) as well as the corresponding interaction variable between the regime type and whether the dissident group presents a significant threat to the regime through violence \((regime*viol)\). The omitted regime type serves as the baseline of comparison for the other variables in the model. Therefore, the results for each model are interpreted as in comparison to the particular omitted regime type. As the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the dissident campaign gained its preferred reforms or not, I use a logit regression model to test my proposed hypotheses (Long 1997). The coefficients of logit models cannot be directly interpreted but the sign of the coefficient demonstrates the direction of the effect of the variable on the dependent variable. Therefore, in order to determine the effect of the specific variable on the dependent variable, I also include the predicted probabilities of the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean (Long and Freese 2006)\(^7\) in Tables 2.2 and 2.4.

\(^7\) In order to determine the predicted probabilities of the particular variable, I use the command, \texttt{prchange}, which calculates the marginal and discrete change for the coefficients. In order to isolate the effect of the specific regime
In the first four models listed in Table 2.1., we observe the direct effects of the independent variables without the interactions between concepts proposed in the theory. The results of these models demonstrate how authoritarian regimes respond to dissident opposition which remained nonviolent throughout the political unrest. In the second group of four models listed in Table 2.3., we observe the effects of the independent variables with the interactions noted above. I introduce four interactions within these models. These results permit us to observe the response of the regime to a dissident violent challenge targeting the tenure of the leader.

Table 2.1.: Logit Model: Probability of Concessions to Dissidents (Direct Effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.748 (.603)</td>
<td>0.028 (.582)</td>
<td>-0.128 (.679)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>1.036 ** (.515)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.075 ** (.495)</td>
<td>0.940 (.575)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party regime</td>
<td>-0.081 (.563)</td>
<td>-0.802 (.563)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.190 (.642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy Regime</td>
<td>0.247 (.888)</td>
<td>-0.480 (.890)</td>
<td>0.292 (.869)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>-1.754 *** (.586)</td>
<td>-1.801 *** (.600)</td>
<td>-1.739 *** (.583)</td>
<td>-1.761 *** (.598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members (Log)</td>
<td>0.211 (.130)</td>
<td>0.235 (.133)</td>
<td>0.209 (.128)</td>
<td>0.220 (.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (Log)</td>
<td>0.199 (.159)</td>
<td>0.193 (.171)</td>
<td>0.196 (.158)</td>
<td>0.203 (.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Linguistic</td>
<td>0.645 (.846)</td>
<td>0.688 (.854)</td>
<td>0.652 (.846)</td>
<td>0.642 (.851)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
<td>-0.352 ** (.149)</td>
<td>-0.373 *** (.141)</td>
<td>-0.352 ** (.150)</td>
<td>-0.355 ** (.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness of Fit</td>
<td>0.3637</td>
<td>0.3528</td>
<td>0.3613</td>
<td>0.3672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An (***) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level
An (**) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level
† The dependent variable of concessions is created from the success and limited outcome variables found in the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1) Dataset (Chenoweth 2011).
# Goodness of Fit test: Prob> chi2

---

35
Table 2.2.: Marginal Effects of Direct Effects Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Regime</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.29 - 0.25)</td>
<td>-0.20 (-0.47 - 0.08)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.36 - 0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-0.18 (-0.48 - 0.11)</td>
<td>0.01 (-0.27 - 0.29)</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.36 - 0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy Regime</td>
<td>0.06 (-0.37 - 0.49)</td>
<td>-0.12 (-0.55 - 0.31)</td>
<td>0.07 (-0.35 - 0.49)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>0.25 (0.00 - 0.51)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0.26 (-0.02 - 0.51)</td>
<td>0.23 (-0.05 - 0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Members</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.01 - 0.11)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.01 - 0.12)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.01 - 0.11)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.01 - 0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>-0.43 (-0.71 - -0.15)</td>
<td>-0.44 (-0.73 - -0.16)</td>
<td>-0.43 (-0.71 - -0.15)</td>
<td>-0.43 (-0.72 - -0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Duration</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.03 - 0.13)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.03 - 0.13)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.03 - 0.12)</td>
<td>0.05 (-0.03 - 0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>-0.09 (-0.16 - -0.01)</td>
<td>-0.09 (-0.16 - -0.02)</td>
<td>-0.09 (-0.16 - -0.01)</td>
<td>-0.09 (-0.16 - -0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Linguistic Frac.</td>
<td>0.16 (-0.25 - 0.57)</td>
<td>0.17 (-0.24 - 0.58)</td>
<td>0.16 (-0.25-0.57)</td>
<td>0.16 (-0.25 - 0.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5.1. Direct Effects Model

2.5.1.1. Military Regime as the Baseline

In the first model, I use military regimes as the baseline category and therefore, all of the variables are interpreted in comparison to military regimes. The coefficient for personalist regimes is statistically significant at the .05 level and operates in a positive direction. This variable performs in an unexpected direction compared to my theory. I originally proposed that compared to single party and military regimes, monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to provide the desired concessions of dissidents when faced with any type of protest- violent or nonviolent. When I run the marginal effects of the variable as listed in Table 2.2. on page 36, we see that personalist regimes are 25 percent (c.i.: 0.00-0.51) more likely to provide the desired concessions or reforms to dissidents if the protest campaign remains nonviolent. This finding supports my expectations listed in Hypothesis 4 as I proposed that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to
provide the desired concessions of dissidents when faced with a nonviolent political unrest. This outcome falls in line with the findings of other studies. While Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) specifically concentrate on the effectiveness of nonviolent protest campaigns over violent campaigns, they note that authoritarian regimes may find the costs associated with the repression of nonviolent protest campaigns to be expensive as the actions may possibly provoke punitive repercussions from the international community and increase domestic support for the opposition.

The variable for violence is also highly significant but performs in a negative direction. This suggests that compared to military regimes, any regime facing a violent protest campaign are less likely to provide the desired concessions of the dissidents. When we observe the marginal effects, it notes that authoritarian regimes facing a violent dissident campaign are 43 percent (c.i.: -0.71 - 0.15) less likely to give into the reforms preferred by the opposition. This finding seems logical as dissidents using violence targeted at the regime represents a significant challenge to the tenure of the leader, which may impact the survival of the institution. Therefore, she is unlikely to give into the preferred reforms of the opposition. This result falls in line with prior literature which proposed that authoritarian regimes are more likely to respond to violent dissident challenges with repression (Davenport 1995b, 1999, 2007b; Earl 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Gartner and Regan 1996; Josua and Edel 2015; Regan and Henderson 2002; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999)

Finally, the variable representing the population of the country is statistically significant at the .01 level and operates in a negative direction. This suggests that the higher the population of the country, the less likely the regime will provide the desired concessions of a nonviolent dissident campaign. Specifically, the marginal effects suggest that a regime with a higher population is 9 percent (c.i.: -0.16 - 0.01) less likely to give into the reforms of a nonviolent protest campaign.
Prior studies noted that larger populations may provoke state repression as the larger population damages the natural resources within the country and the number of opportunities for opposition increase (Carey 2010; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

2.5.1.2. Personalist Regime as the Baseline

In the second model, I alter the baseline category and use a personalist regime as the baseline of comparison. In this model, we see that the three variables representing the various regime types are not statistically significant. Despite this, the variable representing a violent protest campaign is significant and it performs in a negative direction. Similar to the model with a military regime as the baseline, this suggests that any regime facing an opposition which primarily employs violent tactics is less likely to give into the reforms demanded by the dissidents. The marginal effects of the variable suggest that any regime facing a violent protest campaign is 44 percent (c.i.: -0.73 - 0.16) less likely to provide the desired concessions. The violent nature of the protest campaign presents a substantial challenge to the leader and her continued control over political power. When faced with the prospects of losing political power, the regime leader acts in a manner to preserve and maintain her position and does not give into the concessions preferred by the dissidents.

Similar to the model with military regimes serving as the baseline, the variable for the population of the country is significant at the .01 level and performs in a negative direction. This indicates faced with dissidents using a nonviolent approach, a regime with a higher population is unlikely to provide the opposition with their desired concessions. The marginal effects suggest that in this scenario, the regime is 9 percent (c.i.: -0.16 - 0.02) less likely to give into the reforms of the protest campaign.
2.5.1.3. Single Party Regime as the Baseline

In the third model, I changed the baseline category of comparison from personalist regimes to a single-party regime. This permits me to demonstrate how the regime type variables perform in comparison to single-party regimes. Similar to the model with military regimes as the baseline category, the variable for personalist regimes is statistically significant and operates in a positive manner. This suggests that when faced with a nonviolent protest campaign, personalist regimes are more likely to provide the desired concessions demanded by the dissidents. When I tested for the marginal effects of the variable, we find that personalist regimes are 26 percent (c.i.: 0.02-0.51) more likely to give into the preferred reforms of dissidents if the campaign remains nonviolent. This finding provides support for my expectations outlined in Hypothesis 4 as I proposed that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to give into the desired reforms of a nonviolent protest campaign. As suggested above, previous studies by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found that nonviolent protest campaigns are more successful in their interactions with authoritarian regimes than violent campaigns. They note that if the regime chooses to repress nonviolent political unrest, their activity could induce undesired results as the domestic population may shift their support to the dissidents or the international community may respond with punitive repercussions. Therefore, the regime may find it less costly and more beneficial to give into the concessions desired by the opposition.

Similar to the previous two models, the variable for a violent protest campaign proves to be significant at the .01 level and operates in a negative direction. This suggests that any regime targeted by a protest campaign using violence is unlikely give into any concessions desired by the dissidents. When I tested for the marginal effects for the variable, the results indicate that any
authoritarian regime facing a violent protest campaign is 43 percent (c.i.: -0.71 - 0.15) less likely to provide the reforms demanded by the dissidents. As noted above, the violent nature of the protest campaign represents significant challenge to the leader and her continued control of political power. In order to ensure the preservation of her position, the leader is unlikely give into the concessions desired by the dissidents.

Finally, the variable representing the population of the country experiencing the political unrest also is statistically significant at the .01 level and performs in a negative direction. This suggests that the higher the population of a country, the less likely the leader of the regime will provide the desired concessions of the protest campaign. When I tested for the marginal effects of the variable, we see that a regime with a higher domestic population is 9 percent (c.i.: -0.16 - 0.01) less likely to provide the dissidents with their preferred concessions.

2.5.1.4. Monarchy as the Baseline

In the fourth model, I changed the baseline of comparison to monarchies, which allows for me to compare how the variables of interest perform compared to monarchies. Similar to the model with personalist regimes as the baseline, the three regime type variables do not prove to be statistically significant. Despite this, the variable representing a violent protest campaign is significant at the .001 level and operates in a negative manner. Similar to the other three models, this suggests that when faced with a violent challenge by a dissident campaign, any authoritarian regime is unlikely to provide the desired concessions of the opposition. When I tested for the marginal effects of this variable, the results indicate that any regime facing a violent dissident campaign is 43 percent (c.i.: -0.72 - 0.15) less likely to give into the desired concessions of the dissidents. This finding is logical as violent dissident activity often proves to be a significant
challenge to an authoritarian regime and therefore, the leader acts in a manner to preserve her political power by not providing the preferred reforms for the dissidents.

Finally, similar to the other three models using direct effects, the variable representing the population of a country is significant at the .05 level and performs in a negative manner. This indicates that with a one unit increase, a country with a higher population is unlikely to give into the reforms demanded by a dissident campaign. When I tested for the marginal effects of the variable, the results suggest that a country with a higher domestic population is 9 percent (c.i.: -0.16- -0.02) less likely to provide the desired concessions of a nonviolent protest campaign.

Table 2.3. : Logit Model: Probability of Concessions to Dissidents (Interactive Effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Party* Violence</td>
<td>.290 (1.03)</td>
<td>16.56*** (.907)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>16.19*** (.989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military* Violence</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>17.25*** (1.02)</td>
<td>1.25 (9.58)</td>
<td>16.84*** (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy* Violence</td>
<td>-15.81*** (1.44)</td>
<td>.519 (1.46)</td>
<td>-15.44*** (1.43)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist* Violence</td>
<td>-15.84*** (.913)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-15.54*** (.858)</td>
<td>-13.17*** (1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Regime</td>
<td>-.162 (.733)</td>
<td>-16.78*** (.711)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-15.68*** (.729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-17.05*** (.815)</td>
<td>-.562 (.703)</td>
<td>-15.92*** (.821)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy Regime</td>
<td>15.72*** (.988)</td>
<td>-.799 (1.14)</td>
<td>15.55*** (1.00)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>16.46*** (.684)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>16.35*** (.629)</td>
<td>14.34*** (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Members</td>
<td>.200 (.143)</td>
<td>.208 (.142)</td>
<td>.204 (.137)</td>
<td>.177 (.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>-1.44 (.840)</td>
<td>-18.03*** (.808)</td>
<td>-1.80*** (.772)</td>
<td>-17.65*** (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Duration</td>
<td>.189 (.179)</td>
<td>.226 (.206)</td>
<td>.208 (.185)</td>
<td>.228 (.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>-.343*** (.153)</td>
<td>-.335*** (.148)</td>
<td>-.362*** (.153)</td>
<td>-.298 (.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Linguistic Frac.</td>
<td>.796 (.897)</td>
<td>.879 (.895)</td>
<td>.877 (.888)</td>
<td>.831 (.909)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 117 117 117 117
### An (***) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level
### An (**) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goodness of Fit</th>
<th>0.5378</th>
<th>0.5892</th>
<th>0.5082</th>
<th>0.6186</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The dependent variable of concessions is created from the success and limited outcome variables found in the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1) Dataset (Chenoweth 2011).

# Goodness of Fit test: Prob> chi2

### Table 2.4: Marginal Effects of Interactive Effects Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Party*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>(-0.24 - 0.31)</td>
<td>(0.98 - 1.76)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>(0.30 - 0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military* Violence</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.03 - 1.84)</td>
<td>(-0.09 - 0.45)</td>
<td>(0.31 - 0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy*</td>
<td>-2.16</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>(-2.90 - 1.42)</td>
<td>(-0.18 - 0.29)</td>
<td>(-2.84 - 1.40)</td>
<td>(-0.66 - 0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist*</td>
<td>-2.18</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-2.14</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>(-2.83 - 1.54)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.76 - 1.53)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.66 - 0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>(-0.22 - 0.17)</td>
<td>(-1.79 - -1.00)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>(-0.83 - 0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.81 - -1.02)</td>
<td>(-0.27 - 0.12)</td>
<td>(-0.84 - 0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy Regime</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46 - 2.84)</td>
<td>(-0.25 - 0.11)</td>
<td>(1.46 - 2.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.61 - 2.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.61 - 2.91)</td>
<td>(0.31 - 0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Members</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>(-0.01 - 0.07)</td>
<td>(-0.01 - 0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.01 - 0.07)</td>
<td>(-0.01 - 0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.44 - 0.03)</td>
<td>(-1.90 - -1.11)</td>
<td>(-0.49 - -0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.94 - -0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Duration</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.02 - 0.08)</td>
<td>(-0.01 - 0.05)</td>
<td>(-0.02 - 0.09)</td>
<td>(-0.01 - 0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.09 - -0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.05 - -0.00)</td>
<td>(-0.10 - -0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.02 - 0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Linguistic Frac.</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.13 - 0.34)</td>
<td>(-0.07 - 0.21)</td>
<td>(-0.12 - 0.37)</td>
<td>(-0.03 - 0.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.5.2. Interactions Model

In the next four models listed in Table 2.3, on pages 41-42, I test for the interactive effects of the variables of interest. In addition to the variables provided in the first four models, I also include four new variables representing the dissident-regime interactions between a particular authoritarian regime type and violent dissidents. In order to model this environment, I created four
interaction variables of each of the authoritarian regime types and a violent protest campaign. In order to include the four interaction variables, I also retained the variables for the four regime types and a violent protest campaign in the four interaction models. In the interpretation of the four interaction models, the direct effects of the four regime types and the variable representing a violent campaign are substantively meaningless. Therefore, I only report the results of the four interaction variables and the control variables.

2.5.2.1. Military Regime as the Baseline

In the first model of Table 2.3., I use military regimes as the baseline category of comparison for all of the variables used in the model. The coefficient for the interaction term for single party regimes and violence is positive but insignificant; however, this is somewhat expected as my theory expects the two regime types (military and single party regimes) to operate in a similar fashion when faced with a violent protest campaign. On the other hand, the variables for monarchies and personalist regimes operate in a manner expected by my proposed theory. First, the coefficient for the interaction term for monarchies and violence is highly significant at the .01 level and operates in a negative direction. Table 2.4. on page 42 lists the marginal effects for the variable, which suggests that in comparison to military regimes, monarchies are 2.16 times (c.i.: -2.90 -1.42) less likely to provide concessions to a threatening challenge by an opposition.

Second, personalist regimes similarly operate in an expected manner as monarchies when confronted by a violent contentious challenge. The interaction term for personalist regimes and violence is highly significant and functions in a negative manner. According to the marginal effects, in comparison to military regimes, personalist regimes are 2.18 (c.i.: -2.83 -1.54) times less likely to reform when faced with a violent challenge by dissidents. Both of the findings
demonstrate support for Hypothesis 3 as it implies that monarchies and personalist regimes are less likely to give into the desired concessions and reforms of violent dissident challenges than single party and military regimes. Interestingly, while much of the prior literature suggests military regimes are likely to engage in repression when faced with violence (Davenport 1995; Davenport 2007a; Keith 1999, 2002; Poe and Tate 1994), this study finds that monarchies and personalist regimes are much less likely to respond to violent challenges with reform to satisfy the dissidents.

In this model, only one of the control variables proves to be significant. Similar to the direct effects model, the variable for the log of population is significant at the .05 level and performs in a negative direction. According to the marginal effects, compared to military regimes, the larger the population of an authoritarian-led country faced with a nonviolent protest campaign, the less likely the regime will concede to the demands of the opposition. Specifically, it is 5 percent (c.i.: -0.09 - 0.01) less likely to give into the desired concessions of the dissidents, compared to military led regimes. This finding performs in an expected manner as noted in the previous literature, which argued that large populations may incite the use of state repression by the regime as the number of opportunities for dissent increase and the large population strains the natural resources of the state (Carey 2010; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

2.5.2.2. Personalist Regime as the Baseline

When I designate personalist regimes as the baseline of comparison, we can examine how the regime types that are expected to reform when faced with violent challenges (single party and military regimes) operate compared to regimes that depend on remaining in power to survive (personalist). The interaction term for single party regimes and violence is significant at the .01 level and performs in a positive manner. Based on the marginal effects of the variable, we observe
that single parties are 1.37 times (c.i.: 0.98-1.76) more likely than personalist regimes to provide concessions to dissidents who present a significant challenge through targeted violence. Furthermore, the interaction term for military regimes and violence operates in a similar manner as it is also highly significant and operates in a positive direction. When I test for marginal effects, we see that military regimes are also more likely to give in to the demands of the dissidents if they employ violence against the regime. In particular, they are 1.43 times (c.i.: 1.03-1.84) more likely than personalist regimes to provide concessions to violent challenges to the tenure of the government.

Combined together, these findings fall in line with the expectations outlined in my theory and specifically in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, compared to personalist regimes, we see that both military and single party regimes are more likely to concede to the demands of protest campaigns when they employ violent tactics against the government. The decision to reform when faced with dissident violence represents a strategic maneuver by the regime leader as she weighs her options when responding to the opposition and identifies that the costs of reform are less than those associated with repression. Furthermore, she understands that the institution can survive in a post-reform environment either by returning to the barracks (military regimes) or by contending politically if the concessions lead to a new political infrastructure (single party regimes).

2.5.2.3. Single Party Regime as the Baseline

In the third model, I use single party regimes as the baseline of comparison for the other regime types. By examining the results of this model, we can observe how regimes that are expected to repress dissidents when faced with a violent challenge perform in comparison to regimes which can survive in a post-reform environment. The interaction term for monarchy and
violence operates in the expected manner as the coefficient is highly significant and performs in a negative direction. According to the corresponding marginal effects, compared to single party regimes, monarchies are 2.12 times (c.i.: -2.84 - -1.40) less likely to provide concessions to protest campaigns that employ violence to challenge the power of the regime. In addition, personalist regimes perform similarly to monarchies when faced with violent challenges by dissidents. According to the associated marginal effects, personalist regimes are 2.14 times (c.i.: -2.76 - -1.53) less likely than single party regimes to concede to the desired changes for the dissidents. Both findings provide support for the expectations proposed in Hypothesis 4 as the leaders of monarchies and personalist regimes depend on maintaining the political status quo and therefore, they are unlikely to give into the preferred demands of the dissidents. In other words, monarchs and personalist leaders understand that their survival is contingent on remaining politically insulated from the domestic population and controlling political power as they are unlikely to endure a transformation of the political infrastructure.

Finally, we see that the coefficient for the log of population is significant at the .05 level and functions in a negative manner. Similar to the model with military regimes, the marginal effects of the variable suggests that compared to single party regimes, an authoritarian-led country with a large population is 5 percent (-0.10 - -0.01) less likely to provide concessions to dissidents. As explained above, the variable operates in the expected manner by prior studies which proposed that countries with large populations are likely to use repression due to an increase in the number of chances and the overuse of natural resources (Carey 2010; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
2.5.2.4. Monarchy as the Baseline

In the final model, I used monarchies as the baseline of comparison for the other regime types. According to the results for fourth model, we see that the interaction term of a single party regime type and violence is highly significant at the .01 level and performs in a positive direction. This suggests that a single party regime in power faced with a violent dissident challenge is more likely to give into some form of desired reform. Furthermore, we can infer from the marginal effects that a single party regime facing a violent challenge from dissidents is 58 percent (c.i.: 0.30-0.87) more likely to provide concessions to its challengers than a monarchy. Similarly, despite possessing regular access to military weapons and a high proficiency in violence, military regimes are also 61 percent (c.i.: 0.31-0.91) more likely to resort to reforms to quell violent dissent than monarchies. These findings demonstrate support for Hypothesis 1 as this suggests that single parties and military regimes are likely to operate in a similar manner by granting the preferred concessions to the dissidents when faced with a violent protest campaign. Furthermore, this contributes support to the theory that military regimes will refrain from violence (Geddes 1999) in the debate regarding how military regimes will respond when faced with domestic violence.

On the other hand, the interaction variable for personalist regimes and violence is also significant at the .01 level but the coefficient for the term implies a negative direction. This suggests that compared to monarchies, we are less likely to observe a personalist regime to provide concessions when faced with a violent challenge from dissidents. When I account for the marginal effects of the variable, we see that personalist regimes are 47 percent (c.i.: -0.66- -0.29) less likely than monarchies to provide concessions to dissidents who use violence against the government. Although this finding for personalist regimes uses monarchies as a baseline comparison and I expect that the two regime types will operate in a similar manner, this provides partial support for
Hypothesis 4 as personalist regimes are even more unlikely than monarchies to give into the desired concessions of the dissidents.

2.6. Conclusion

At the beginning of the chapter, I highlighted several examples of countries that encountered domestic strife during the Arab Spring in order to demonstrate the diversity of regime responses to civil unrest. While some regimes countered the domestic uprising with quick and overwhelming repression, other authoritarian governments conceded to some or all demands of the dissidents. While this has been documented throughout history and prior research has identified the dynamic relationship between the belligerents, there is a theoretical gap in understanding this phenomenon. *What accounts for the diversity of regime responses to protests against the government? What is the process behind the decision-making of an autocratic regime when faced with the rise of political unrest?*

I attempted to fill this opening in the literature by proposing a theory to understand why some regimes repress domestic political unrest while others give into the desired concessions. In order to comprehend the decision-making by an authoritarian government faced with a significant challenge by dissidents, we must concentrate on the interaction between two concepts: the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment and the nature of the political unrest. First, the probability of an institution surviving in new political conditions influences the decisions by the leader as she understands the ramifications if the control of power (political, economic, and military) shifts to a domestic challenger. Although all potential regime leaders desire to gain and maintain control of their respective government (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), the structure of authoritarian regimes varies between the types of autocracies that provide certain
regime leaders and their winning coalition the necessary political insulation from the mass population. In this manner, the construction of certain governments such as monarchies and personalist regimes protects the leader from domestic challenges and allows the leader to maintain her position of political power. The survival of the leader depends on maintaining the political status quo as the institution cannot survive in post-reform environment. On the other hand, the structure of other regimes such as single party regimes does not afford their leaders this luxury as the winning coalition is larger and the government possesses minimal political insulation. Furthermore, the structure of these regimes as well as military regimes benefits the current administration as they can endure in a post-reform environment by going back to the barracks or becoming one of several political challengers.

Second, the nature of the political unrest establishes the actual threat conceived by the regime. Previous literature on repression demonstrated that the magnitude and nature of the dissident activity affects the response of the regime and furthermore, if the dissidents employ violence against the regime, there is a significant probability that the regime will respond with repression against the opposition (Davenport 1995b, 1999, 2007b; Earl 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Gartner and Regan 1996; Josua and Edel 2015; Regan and Henderson 2002; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). While this is one of the most robust findings in the repression literature, this is not always consistent as not all regimes respond to dissident violence with state repression and many regimes restrain nonviolent domestic protest with overwhelming violence. In order to understand why regimes respond to dissident challenges in a particular manner, we must observe the interaction of the nature of the political unrest and the probability of institutional survival in a post-reform environment.
The results of this analysis demonstrate significant support for the proposed theory and the corresponding hypotheses. By using a direct effects model as well as an interactions model, we are able to examine the actions of a regime when faced with a nonviolent campaign as well as a violent protest campaign. Moreover, we also witness to the benefit of using interaction terms to model the appropriate environment that the dissidents and regimes face. Finally, by altering the regime type as the baseline of comparison in each of the models, we are able to examine the effects of a specific type of authoritarian regime when faced with a violent protest campaign in contrast to the baseline category of authoritarian regime.

As expected, we see that military and single party regimes are more likely than monarchies and personalist regimes to provide some or all of the desired concessions of a violent dissident challenge. The regime leaders understand that their survival does not depend on maintaining the status quo for the political infrastructure and those within the current administration can still contend for political power in a post-reform environment. Therefore, the costs and costliness of conceding to the demands of a violent opposition are lower than those associated with repression. On the other hand, we observe that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely than military and single party regimes to respond to violent protest campaigns in a similar manner through state repression. The administration comprehends that the survival of the leader and the winning coalition depends on maintaining the current structure of government and if the regime concedes to the demands of the dissidents, this may be the first step toward the demise of the regime. Therefore, the costs and costliness of repression are lower than those associated with the decision to give into the desired changes of the opposition.

Furthermore, we observe the expected results for an authoritarian regime when faced with a nonviolent protest campaign. On one hand, the results suggest that in comparison to monarchies
and personalist regimes, single party and military regimes are significantly less likely to provide the desired reforms of a nonviolent protest campaign. This speaks to the actual threat of the protest campaign and the regime’s perception of the costs and costliness associated with the response. Since the dissidents do not employ violence, the regime does not perceive the unrest as threatening to their survival and thus, views repression as a less costly and more beneficial response to the unrest. Moreover, I found that in both models with military and single party regimes as the baseline, monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to concede to the demands of the protesters if the campaign remains nonviolent. This finding suggests that despite the low probability of survival in post-reform environment, monarchies and personalist regimes perceive nonviolent protest campaigns as less threatening to their survival and therefore, the response of concessions may be less costly for the state. Furthermore, the result falls in line with the expectations in Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), who proposed that the repression of nonviolent protest campaigns may backfire on the regime by generating support for the dissidents and creating problems for the state internally and externally.

Finally, we see that violence is not always the primary factor in whether a regime decides to repress violent dissidents or give into the desired concessions of the protest campaign. In three of the four models, the variable for violence is statistically significant and performs in a negative direction. This specifically suggests that any regime type that counters a violent challenge from a dissident campaign is unlikely to provide the preferred reforms of the opposition. On the other hand, this study demonstrates that in fact, certain regimes do accommodate the desires of some dissident campaigns that employ violence against the state. With these findings in mind, this suggests support for my contention that the contextual environment is important to understand as
the regime decision making is conditional on both the level of dissident threat and the probability of post-reform survival for the institution.

While this study contributes to the state repression and dissent-repression nexus literature through a theoretical explanation of why regimes respond to civil unrest in a particular manner, the study could be improved to divulge further information and understanding into the state decision-making process. First, the dependent variable could be altered by accounting for the actual response of the regime to the dissident campaign. As the current dependent variable measures reform through whether the campaign received some or all of its desired demands, an expanded variable could provide information for the actual goals of the protest campaign as well as if the regime actually enacted the desired reforms. In this study, the measure is crude description of whether the outcome is fruitful for the dissidents but it lumps together all dissident goals regardless of the vastness and depth of the desired change. A disaggregated variable which indicates whether a regime expanded its selectorate and winning coalition through political amendments versus whether a regime provided economic concessions or more minor political concessions would be beneficial in understanding the regime response to political unrest.

Second, the number of observations could be increased to include more cases of protest campaigns. Although the proposed theory does not attempt to explain all types of protests and it is necessary to restrict the types of protest campaigns to those cases which target the regime, the N.A.V.C.O. dataset restricts the inclusion of protest campaigns which had 1000 or more members participating in the movement. If this restriction was relaxed and the number of observations subsequently increased, the issue regarding a low number of observations would be resolved and the understanding of regime response to protests would be enhanced. Furthermore, as the N.A.V.C.O. dataset has expanded to the new version (N.A.V.C.O. 2.0), which provides yearly
information and measures of the characteristics of the protest campaign and corresponding state, this study could overcome the low number of observations by accounting for the regime response to civil unrest for each year of the protest campaign.8

While much progress has been made in the understanding of dynamic contentious politics and state repression over recent years, the field has made limited advancement in comprehension of the question of “why” regarding regime response to political unrest. My contribution to the study of contentious politics attempts to expand the understanding of the regime’s decision-making process when faced with protest campaigns aimed at the administration. In doing so, this study reveals that the nature of the political unrest and the probability of institutional survival in post-reform environment through the costs, costliness, and strategy of regime influence the regime in the decision to repress the dissidents or concede to their desired changes.

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8 This will be the next step in this study. I will use the new version of N.A.V.C.O. (2.0) and merge in the same information from other datasets in order to retest and confirm the results found in this chapter.
3.1. Introduction

On December 19, 2010, in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest of his treatment by the local Tunisian police (Reuters 12/19/2010). This act of protest sparked a larger protest movement throughout Tunisia, demanding political reforms and protesting against the widespread unemployment and rampant political corruption including the regime of long-time leader President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The mass protest movement in Tunisia initially took a peaceful approach but turned violent after the Tunisian regime deployed the anti-riot police (the Brigades de l’ordre public or BOP) to disperse the peaceful demonstrations. Despite attempts to repress the political unrest, the Tunisian regime ultimately failed and on January 14, 2011, President Ben Ali abdicated power and went into exile (Schneider 2011). Soon after, several pro-democracy mass movements erupted throughout the Middle East and North Africa during the “Arab Spring” of 2011. The regimes in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen observed diverse aspects of their domestic population united together in mass demonstrations to express their discontent with their respective political regime. In response to the political unrest, the regimes in power employed various strategies and tactics such as repression, political concessions, monetary concessions, and reforms in order to subdue the rising dissent. In the end, the regime-dissident interactions produced a diversity of outcomes across the countries: regime change/reform (Egypt, Morocco, and
Tunisia); political and/or economic concessions by the regime (Algeria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia); repression of the dissidents by the regime (Bahrain, Iran); and civil war (Libya, Syria, and Yemen).

While each of the countries involved in the Arab Spring have considerable differences, there are several similarities between them: Each country exists in the same geographic region and are comprised of somewhat similar religious and ethnic compositions. In addition, all of the countries were well-established autocracies and each regime faced a significant contentious challenge to the sustained control of power by the current regime. While similar challenges to the control of regimes and resulting range of developments and interactions have occurred in other regions in the world throughout history, the recent events of the Arab Spring provide an illustration of an interesting research puzzle: Why do certain contentious interactions between dissidents and regimes evolve into civil war while other interactions do not? What is the relationship between lower levels of contentious activity and civil war? More importantly, what accounts for the response of dissidents to the actions of the regime? In other words, why do certain protest campaigns fail to resort to violent tactics and the dissidents go home, satisfied or unsatisfied, while in other cases, the dissidents escalate the contentious challenge to higher levels of violence, which may evolve into civil war?

Prior studies of civil war approached the research question of what incites the onset of civil conflict with competing explanations: grievances or opportunity/greed arguments (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1970; Hegre et al. 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). While many of these studies focused on the structural conditions and characteristics of countries that experienced the onset of civil conflict, recent studies argue for an interactive, escalatory relationship between the dissidents and regime, which spirals into civil war from lower levels of conflict (Davenport, Armstrong, and Lichbach 2008; Thoms and Ron 2007; Rost 2011; Sambanis
and Zinn 2005; Young 2013). In this manner, there is a dynamic interaction between dissidents and the regime, which may evolve into civil conflict. This study attempts to build on this literature by arguing that the interactions between dissidents and regimes at lower levels of conflict affect the decision of opposition movements to escalate the violence against the regime. I propose that this process is influenced by the two primary factors: the response of authoritarian regimes at earlier stages of conflict and the legacy effects of regime repression, which influence the escalation to violence and consequently, the outcome of the interactions between the actors.

In the next section, I present an overview of the current literature on the dissent-repression nexus as well as the causes of the onset of civil war. I then introduce my theory and corresponding hypotheses regarding the influential elements which affect how certain interactions between regimes and dissidents can escalate to violence. I next describe my research design, model, and operationalize the variables used in the analysis. I then test the proposed relationships using a Cox duration model of 250 government-targeted opposition movements and present an analysis of the results. Finally, I present my conclusions of the study as well as methods of improving study of this relationship.

3.2. Literature Review

In recent years, there have been many studies focusing on regime repression as well as low levels of political unrest and interactions between dissidents and regimes. Several studies focus on the dissent-repression nexus and suggest that there is an interactive relationship regarding dissident methods of political unrest and the subsequent response by the regime in power (Carey 2006, 2010; Francisco 1995, 1996; Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993; Lichbach and Gurr 1981; Lichbach 1987, 1995; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996; Shellman 2006a, 2006b). In this manner, the dissidents and
regime operate in an action-reaction process whereby one response by an actor does not occur independently of the former response but rather, the relationship evolves into a dynamic, interdependent cycle. Several studies argue that there may be an influential relationship between the actors as one actor (dissidents or regime) escalates their activity to more violent measures and consequently, the other actor (dissident or regime) reacts to the increase in violence in a linear fashion with intensified violence (Carey 2006; Hoover and Kowalski 1992; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000; Rasler 1996). Other studies demonstrate that the opposition and government may choose to alternate or substitute between violent and nonviolent tactics when faced with a particular response from their opponent (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000) or the regime may pursue a mixed approach of concessions and repression (Rasler 1996). On the other hand, some studies find that the action-reaction cycle between the regime and dissidents may proceed in a non-linear manner as government repression may not incite an increase in dissident violence and an escalation in political unrest by the dissidents may not be met with state repression (Carey 2010; Gartner and Regan 1996; Lichbach 1987; Lichbach and Gurr 1981).

Scholarship focusing on civil war has evolved over time as well. Earlier studies concentrated on the causes of the onset of civil war through competing arguments of grievances and opportunity/greed. Grievance theories of conflict commonly attributed the move toward civil conflict as originating with political, economic, and social grievances by the dissidents. Much of the work stemmed from the concept of relative deprivation whereby an individual or group recognizes a disparity between their “value expectations” and their “value capabilities” (Gurr 1970). Essentially, the group determines that an inequality exists between the expectations of the group and the actual reality of what is afforded to them, which provides an incentive to mobilize and progress toward rebellion. Regan and Norton (2005) later built upon this model by arguing
that the element of grievances provides the driving factor for mobilize a movement but rather it is the element of opportunity or greed that allows for a rebel group to advance into civil war.

Opportunity-based theories of civil war, on the other hand, provided a competing explanation to the onset of civil conflict to the grievance-based by arguing that grievances were an invariant feature in most environments but an opportunity to rebel was essential for the onset of civil war. Specifically, while dissidents may share collective grievances against the regime in power, civil conflict will not ensue if the opportunity costs of engaging in rebellion were too high. Fearon and Laitin (2003) contributed to the opportunity-based theories of civil war onset by identifying that countries with certain structural and environmental conditions such as a large population, mountainous terrain, political instability and weak states in the form of financial and bureaucratic weakness are more likely to experience civil conflict as there is an opportunity for the rebels for advance to civil war. Hegre et al. (2001) furthered the opportunity-based theory of civil conflict by identifying institutional conditions that provided the opportunity for civil conflict to erupt. Specifically, they found that an inverted-U relationship exists as democracies and full autocracies were less likely to experience civil war while transitional governments and anocracies with autocratic and democratic traits were more likely to experience civil conflict. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) contributed to this strand of civil studies as they determined certain types of natural resources (drugs, timber, diamonds) provided a significant source of opportunity for civil conflict as it may serve greed purposes or a motivation for profit and to finance the rebel organization.

Recent studies have taken a different approach to the study of civil war than the grievance and opportunity strands of the literature. These studies identify a continuum of conflict whereby lower levels of political violence and repression may impact the occurrence of higher levels of
conflict found in civil war (Davenport, Armstrong, and Lichbach 2008; Rost 2011; Thoms and Ron 2007; Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Young 2013). In this manner, the study of civil war onset does not begin at an arbitrary number of battle deaths but rather there is a dynamic relationship between the regime and its citizens as dissident-regime interactions as well as regime repression of non-combatants may influence the eruption of future civil conflict. Thus, lower levels of violence between dissidents and a regime cannot be treated exclusively separate from higher levels of violence found in civil wars. Rost (2011) and Thoms and Ron (2007) demonstrate that there is a significant relationship between human rights violations, state weakness, and the onset of civil war as regime repression and a weak state may be viewed as driving factors in the escalation to civil war. Sambanis and Zinn (2005) focuses on self-determination movements and link lower levels of conflict with the escalation to civil war by arguing that regime repression motivates and incites dissident groups to escalate their political unrest to more violent methods of dissent, leading to civil war. Finally, Young (2013) highlights the escalation to civil conflict argument by contending that civil war arises through the dynamic interaction between dissidents and the regime during lower levels of conflict. He specifically argues that the onset of civil war is based on the interaction between the state, dissidents, and citizens and how much societal support a leader garners from the population, which consequently influences her job security. If she enjoys high levels of support by the citizenry, there will be less dissident supporters and a low likelihood of violent political unrest. Additionally, if the state possesses greater military capacity, the dissidents will not expect success from their activity, leading to fewer challenges so the state is less likely to repress. Therefore, with low levels of regime repression and minimal political unrest, the country is less likely to experience civil war.
Davenport, Lichbach, and Armstrong (2008) also contribute to the argument for an escalation process to civil war by proposing three methods of how lower levels of violence may lead to civil war: inflammation, incapacity, and ineffectiveness. In the inflammation hypothesis, regime repression incites the dissidents to escalate their political unrest to more violence, leading to civil war. The incapacity hypothesis suggests that civil war emerges when the regime suffers from an inability to successfully suppress the initial dissident activity so the dissidents escalate the political unrest to more violent behavior. According to the ineffectiveness hypothesis, the action-reaction cycle between the regime and dissidents is already violent and the dissidents are able to withstand the regime repression and escalate their activity to higher levels of political violence, leading to civil war. In the end, they find that each of the hypotheses explain a significant number of civil conflict onset observations; however, more importantly, their work highlights the necessity of concentrating on the relationship between lower levels of conflict such as regime repression and dissident political violence and higher levels of conflict such as civil war.

While significant progress has been made in understanding civil war onset with the noted studies of civil conflict, I attempt to contribute to this strand of the literature by arguing that the potential onset of civil war must be treated as a continuum of conflict whereby the relationship between dissidents and the regime is a dynamic process that influences whether the interaction spirals into civil conflict. In this manner, I argue that the previous interactions between the dissidents and the regime, whether directly or indirectly, influence whether the dissidents resort to the escalation of violence in order to achieve their aims, leading to civil conflict. In my theory below, I outline how the response of authoritarian regimes to earlier stages of conflict and the legacy of regime repression impacts the decision making of the dissidents in future stages.
3.3. Theory

As noted earlier, much of the earlier literature on civil war focused on the structural conditions that provided the opportunity for civil war to arise. While many of the identified conditions are important in understanding the causes of civil war, the literature failed to acknowledge that the escalation to civil war is an outcome of earlier interactions between the dissidents and the regime (Young 2013). During the interactions between dissidents and regimes at both lower levels of conflict and higher levels of conflict such as civil war, there are essentially at least two actors who both desire the realization of certain goals that may be diametrically opposed to each other. On one hand, regimes desire the preservation of the status quo with the current regime structure remaining in control of government and the leader of the regime equally desires her continued survival. Dissidents, on the other hand, aspire for some form of change, often political, through concessions or the reform of the government. Both parties are rational actors and during their interactions, they both conduct themselves in manner to ensure their continued and future survival. Although there is a conflict of interest between the actors, if both actors prefer to survive the dispute, why do some dissident-regime interactions escalate to violence whereas other protest campaigns remain nonviolent in their opposition to the regime? I attempt to provide an explanation for the outcome between the belligerents by focusing on the escalation of dissident violence as explained by the responses of authoritarian regimes to earlier stages of conflict and the legacy of regime repression.

3.3.1. The Legacy of Repression

During interactions between dissidents and a regime, the dissidents can influence the state of affairs through various methods; however, the most important course of action they control is
increasing the threat they pose to the regime by escalating to violence. While it has been demonstrated that nonviolent dissident activity can be highly effective and possibly even more successful than violent dissident activity (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), the primary method for the dissidents to produce an increase in threat is through an escalation of violence projected at the regime. This study argues that dissidents do not operate from a position of perfect information. Regimes enjoy near complete information concerning its capabilities; however, it is unlikely that the dissidents have a significant understanding of the military capabilities or economic capacity of the regime (Pierskalla 2009). While the dissidents may not possess accurate information concerning the “coercive capacity” of the regime, they do not operate in a vacuum and have knowledge and experiences which influence their perception of the repressive capacity of the regime.⁹ Specifically, dissidents are familiar with how the regimes have conducted themselves in the past as they have observed the “repressive capacity” of the regime against others or previously experienced it firsthand. Several studies identified that the previous experiences of a regime using repression influence future decisions concerning the use of repression as a method of responding to dissident activity (Carey 2010; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996b; 2007c; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Hoover and Kowalski 1992; Josua and Edel 2015; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Rost 2011; Thoms and Ron 2007). Davenport (2007a; 2007c) explains that previous uses of repression decreases the costs of future decisions to use similar tactics and reduces uncertainty for the regime as the leadership understands the consequences of the maneuver and whether the application of repression will be successful in the future. While this reduces uncertainty for the regime and provides information about the

⁹ I refer to “coercive capacity” of the regime as its military resources and military personnel. On the other hand, “repressive capacity” is referred to when discussing the ability of the regime to repress its citizens. I discuss the reasoning for this distinction in the following paragraphs.
efficiency and consequences of the repressive maneuver, I argue this also provides information for the dissidents and reduces their uncertainty about the future responses of the regime to political unrest. The information and perception of the repressive capacity of the regime influence dissidents and their decision to escalate the political unrest to more violent forms of dissent, specifically rebellion. Based on their previous personal experiences or observations of repression targeting others in their community, they have an awareness of what the regime has done in the past when faced with a domestic challenge and a perception of how the regime may respond in future interactions with dissidents. This perception, in turn, influences the dissidents’ risk calculus concerning whether they should increase the threat they pose to the regime. In this manner, they use their awareness and perception of the regime’s repressive capacity based on their demonstrated legacy of repression in order to predict what the reaction of the regime will be if they decide to escalate the unrest to violence and consequently, the threat posed to the regime. In conducting this calculation, they attempt to determine if an escalation in violence would allow them to achieve their goal of concessions or reform, lead to an escalation in repression, or possibly evolve into civil war.\footnote{There are other issues that influence the dissident decision calculus to escalate to violence, remain nonviolent, or retreat back to home. These issues particularly include the capacity of the dissidents to escalate to violence as well as the ability to sustain a violent counteraction by the regime.}

While the military is utilized for purposes of repression rather than national security in certain cases (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Svolik 2013), this may not be the norm in most cases of repression. As argued in DeMeritt (2015), regimes often employ state security forces as agents of repression against their domestic population rather than using a divided military. Regime leaders may encounter a principal-agent issue when they use the military to repress their citizens. Enlisted members of the military may prove to be disloyal to the orders of their officers if they are asked to
repress or kill the dissidents challenging the regime (Geddes 2009), particularly if the ethnic composition of the military is divided among various ethnic groups who may be directly involved in the dissident activity (Hendrix and Salehyan 2016). In this scenario, enlisted military members may encounter a dilemma of whether to repress civilians within a country who may be a member of the soldiers’ ethnic or religious group or reneg on the officer’s order by refusing to repress. Therefore, the leader may rely upon other agents of repression such as paramilitary forces, mercenaries, or thugs to conduct the repression of those involved in contentious challenges against the regime (Colaresi and Carey 2008; DeMeritt 2015; Geddes 2009; Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2012; Mason and Krane 1989; Mueller 2000; Snyder 1992). By using these types of forces, the possibility of multiple conflicting loyalties found in cases of enlisted military members is avoided as these agents of repression remain loyal to the regime leader and the monetary payoffs given to them for their services. Furthermore, these types of repressive forces are highly trained and well-versed in conducting repression targeted against civilian populations while military members are more likely to be experienced in engaging in battlefield operations and conflict against opposing military members.

3.3.2. The Response of Authoritarian Regimes to Earlier Stages of Conflict

In Chapter 2, “Appetite for Destruction: Institutional Survival and Political Unrest”, I argued that there are varying effects regarding the response of a regime to political unrest by the dissidents (state repression or concessions) based on the institutional framework of the regime (Backstrom 2012). Specifically, certain regimes such as monarchies and personalist regimes are highly dependent on retaining the political status quo and the necessary political insulation from the general population through a small winning coalition. This institutional design permits the
regime leader to control who comprises the winning coalition and how they may influence decision making and policy making (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Frantz and Ezrow 2011; Geddes 1999). Therefore, when faced with a contentious challenge from those outside of the winning coalition, they can ignore the challenge, if nonthreatening, or repress the dissidents, if they perceive the activity as threatening to their continued survival (Ulfelder 2005).

The structural design of personalist regimes and monarchies allow for the leaders to be politically insulated from the masses within a country, which benefits the leaders as their political survival does not depend on the support of the mass population. Monarchs and personalist leaders specifically rely upon a small winning coalition, whose backing and loyalty solidifies their control of power and protects the leader from the need of political support by the domestic population (Geddes 1999). The power structures within personalist regimes favor the personalist leader as she possesses considerably more control over who will be included in the winning coalition and often purges those within the inner circle to ensure loyalty to the leader (Frantz and Ezrow 2011). Therefore, when faced with a contentious challenge from those outside of the winning coalition, they can ignore the challenge, if nonthreatening, or repress the dissidents, if they perceive the activity as threatening to their continued survival (Ulfelder 2005). Moreover, monarchs and personalist leaders understand their sustained control of the regime depends on keeping the structure of the regime in its current form and the insecurity of the personalist leader to challenges from inside and outside of the inner circle influences her response to any challenges. If she would agree to reforms or concessions in the manner of political liberalization, the consequences of her actions would likely result in the loss of support by the winning coalition, the political insulation from the population, and accordingly, political power. The concessions themselves would put the leader in a weaker position in the eyes of the winning coalition through the actual costs of the
concessions as well as the costliness of decision. Furthermore, monarchs and personalist leaders are less likely to offer reforms or concessions because the leaders are unlikely to survive in a post-reform environment as they may be imprisoned, exiled, or put to death by their successors (Escriba-Folch 2013). Geddes (1999) finds that personalist leaders rarely leave office quietly as the challenges to their continued rule often result in violence and conflict through mass uprisings, revolutions, or the assassination of the leader herself. The regime leaders know and understand this possible future dilemma and will conduct themselves in a manner which would protect the continued survival of the regime. Therefore, a violent contentious challenge by a dissident group presents a significant threat to the survival of the current regime and the regime will likely respond with the violence in kind targeted at the dissidents, likely leading to the escalation of civil conflict.

Conversely, single party and military regimes are likely to operate in a different manner than monarchies and personalist regimes when faced with a threatening contentious challenge by dissidents. Single party regimes are political institutions where the access to political positions and policy influence is solely controlled by the dominant political party within the country. Thus, if one wishes to advance politically or project some form of influence over policy making, she must advance within the political party rather than existing outside of the party (Geddes 1999). While the winning coalition is smaller than those found within democracies, the coalition is larger compared to winning coalitions in monarchies and personalist regimes, which consequently decreases the political insulation of the leader from the mass population. In contrast to personalist regimes and monarchies, the leader of single party regimes have less influence and control over who is included in the winning coalition, which directly influences the security of the leader in power (Frantz and Ezrow 2011). Furthermore, this allows for a greater percentage of the population to be involved in the political party and the political process itself (Davenport 2007a). Despite this,
if the regime is opposed by those outside of the winning coalition, the regime in power has options in how it may respond to the dissident challenge. If the regime provides concessions or reform to those within the opposition and the winning coalition consequently expands, the individual winning coalition member does not lose as many benefits compared to winning coalition members in personalist regimes and monarchies. Former single party regimes can become one of several political parties in a new multiparty political environment and compete for control of the government (Huntington 1991). The elites formerly associated with the single party regime can become political candidates in the new political environment and possibly regain political control of the government through the new political process (Ulfelder 2005). Additionally, countries which experienced single party regime rule are already accustomed to a political party and its bureaucracy managing the government and consequently avoided the political environment of power, influence, and patronage concentrated in one leader as found in personalist regimes and monarchies.

Military regimes, on the other hand, are political institutions where a small group of officers or junta controls the administrative and political functions of the government and consult as a collective entity in order to formulate policy and conduct decision-making. Unlike single party regimes, access to the winning coalition is closed to the mass population and strictly limited to the small group of military officers. Furthermore, military regimes rarely allow for elections to gain political influence, which consequently accounts for more political insulation for the regime from the masses (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Davenport 2007a). Although the leaders of military regimes are highly trained in the use of coercion and violence, it is disputed whether the regimes are more likely to engage in repression when faced with dissent (Davenport 1995; Davenport 2007a; Keith 1999, 2002; Poe and Tate 1994) or avoid using overwhelming force to overcome the
political unrest (Geddes 1999). Despite easy access to arms, extensive training in coercion and a small winning coalition, military regimes can transform and survive in a post-reform environment by going back to the military barracks and serving its primary functions. Typically, military leaders do not aspire to become career politicians and do not possess political aims of controlling the regime but rather serve a praetorian/guardian role to ensure domestic order and political stability within the country as well as the continued survival of the military. In this manner, military regimes are more concerned with the national interests of the country and prefer to serve as the military element of the government rather than performing both the executive and military functions (Brooker 2000; Geddes 1999; Huntington 1991; Nordlinger 1977; Ulfelder 2005). Consequently, their direct control of political and governmental power is often temporary until the desired stability is achieved (Huntington 1991; Ulfelder 2005). Therefore, when faced with contentious activity, both single party and military regimes are more likely to respond to the challenge with some manner of concessions or reform as those involved in the current regime can survive in a post-reform environment by changing their role to adapt to the new political setting. Moreover, the contentious activity likely ends and does not escalate to civil conflict.

When dissidents attempt to determine whether to escalate targeted violence against the regime, they rely upon earlier experiences of regime repression (the repressive capacity of the regime) to influence their decision calculus on whether to escalate their political unrest to violence or maintain a nonviolent approach. The legacy of repression specifically the willingness and capacity for repression directly influences the decision of the dissidents of whether to escalate to violence against the regime and consequently, the outcome of regime-dissident interactions,

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1 Ulfelder (2005) suggests a caveat to this expectation as the military holds an interest in public order and national security within the country. Therefore, violent dissident activity may push the military regime to remain in power until domestic order is reestablished.
specifically the dissidents successfully gaining their desired concessions or reform, the regime successfully repressing the dissidents, or the evolution to civil war.

On the other hand, the response of the authoritarian regime at earlier stages of conflict also influences the prospects for civil conflict. As noted above, certain authoritarian regimes specifically single party and military regimes are better suited to survive in a post-reform political environment and therefore, will likely respond with concessions that will placate the dissidents and through this action, ensure the regime remains in political power and avoid civil conflict. Other authoritarian regimes are dependent on retaining the current institutional foundation for its survival and this necessity influences the response of authoritarian regimes to the challenge of dissident violence, likely leading to the escalation of civil conflict. Through the theory and logic noted above, I propose three hypotheses that I will test in the following section.

**Hypothesis 3.1.:** Dissidents are unlikely to escalate to violence against a regime which demonstrated its willingness and capacity to repress in the past.

**Hypothesis 3.2.:** Regime-dissident interactions involving monarchies or personalist regimes are more likely to escalate to civil conflict than regime-dissident interactions involving single party and military regimes.

**Hypothesis 3.3.:** Regime-dissident interactions involving single party or military regimes are less likely to escalate to civil conflict than regime-dissident interactions involving monarchies or personalist regimes.
3.4. Research Design

3.4.1. Methodology

In order to address the questions posed in this research, I constructed a dataset of contentious political challenges to the continued rule of a regime by a dissenting opposition. The specific cases selected for the dataset are identified as “regime crises” where the political unrest by the dissidents is directed as a significant challenge to the tenure of the current political regime in government. There have been thousands of protests in the world throughout history; however, a regime in power does not always respond to all types of protests within their respective society. Furthermore, the theory presented in this study attempts to provide an explanation of why certain regime-dissident interactions evolve into civil war while others do not. Therefore, while there are numerous examples of political unrest that were directed at some facet of society or an opposing ethnic group, the campaigns selected in this dataset must be directed at the continued rule of the current regime and must present a crisis to the regime; however, not all of the campaigns listed in the dataset are violent campaigns. I use the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Dataset (N.A.V.C.O. 2.0) to select the observations of political unrest campaigns for this study (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). In their initial work on this dataset, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) defined a campaign as “…a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective.” In order to be selected into the dataset, the protest campaign must be specifically directed at the regime itself and the campaign must present a challenge to continued rule of the regime. Therefore, the unit of analysis for this study is the regime crisis-year or each year of the regime crisis itself or a contentious challenge by the dissidents from 1945 to 2006. In this model, the dependent variable is a measure of whether the dissidents escalate to violence in the year of observation. Therefore, I use a duration model in order to test my theory concerning
the determinants of why certain regime-dissident interactions escalate to civil conflict and others fail to escalate. Specifically, I test my hypotheses using a Cox proportional hazards model. In this study, the model assesses the risk of a protest campaign escalating to civil conflict in the next time period.

3.4.2. Dependent Variable

As this study attempts to determine how lower levels of violence can evolve into civil conflict, my dependent variable in the model represents the outcome of the interactions between belligerents by year. I created a dichotomous variable that identifies the actions of contending dissident groups against regimes in power. In this manner, the variable identifies whether the protest campaign escalates to violence or continues to remain primarily a nonviolent campaign. I created this variable by consulting the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2015 provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute Sweden. This dataset provides information on armed conflict from 1946 through 2014 where one of the actors in the conflict is the state itself. UCDP defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of the state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” The information for the dependent variable is obtained from the variable, \textit{int}, or the \textit{intensity level} of the conflict, which provides the level of intensity between the parties within a dyad per given year of the conflict. These levels are coded as “minor armed conflicts” where the number of battle deaths per given year reaches 25 or “wars” where the number of battle deaths per given year reaches 1,000 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015.)
Through this information, I created a dichotomous variable, *escalation*, which measures “0” if the protest campaign does not escalate and remains primarily a nonviolent campaign or “1” if the number of battle deaths according to the *intensity level* reaches 25.\(^{12}\)

3.4.3. Independent Variables

In this study, one of my independent variables is the legacy of repression, which represents the history or legacy of repression employed by the regime in power. While many studies incorporate a measure of military expenditures or number of military personnel to represent the coercive capacity of a regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Young 2013), the capacity of the regime to repress violent contentious challenges is not always performed by the national military and is often conducted by private security forces or mercenaries loyal to the regime leader (Colaresi and Carey 2008; DeMeritt 2015; Geddes 2009; Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2012; Mason and Krane 1989; Mueller 2000). Furthermore, my argument claims that the dissidents possess a limited understanding of the economic, military, or coercive capacity of the regime and little to no understanding of the willingness of the regime to employ their repressive capacity when challenged. Therefore, the dissidents base their decision to escalate to violence on their perception of the repressive capacity of the regime according to prior experiences of regime repression.

In order to capture the repressive capacity of the regime, I created a variable that measures the legacy of repression by the regime based on the previous experiences of the dissidents. In creating the *legacy_repression* variable, I used the information from the Human Rights Protection Scores dataset introduced in Fariss (2014) and Fariss and Schnakenberg (2014). The Human Rights

\(^{12}\) This variable represents a proxy for the escalation of violence. Although an escalation of violence can occur without the regime-dissident interaction resorting to the onset of civil conflict, the
Protection Scores dataset presents a continuous variable, \textit{latent_mean}, which provides a measure of the level of respect for physical integrity rights for a particular country in a specific year. The variable ranges from -3.18 to 4.82 and offers information regarding the respect for human rights for all countries from 1949 to 2010.\footnote{This dataset provides a significant improvement over other human rights dataset. The \textit{Political Terror Scale} (PTS) provides information on human rights from 1976 to 2014. The CIRI Human Rights Dataset provides information on human rights from 1981 to 2011. If either of these datasets were used, the study would lose a significant number of cases to test my hypotheses. The Human Rights Protection Scores dataset permits the researcher to account for the human rights record of countries from 1949-2011. Therefore, the number of protest campaigns listed in the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset remains largely intact.} This specifically provides a significant benefit over current human rights datasets as the temporal domain is extended by thirty years.

In creating the dependent variable, I used an average of the \textit{latentmean} variable during the particular temporal period of the variable. As noted above, the \textit{latentmean} variable represents an effort to compare human rights scores across various human rights sources over time. As the variable increases, it represents more respect and observation of international human rights laws; whereas, the lower the score, the regime demonstrates less respect for international human rights laws and instead engages in more human rights abuse (Fariss 2014; Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014). I observed the \textit{latentmean} variable score for 5, 4, 3, and 2 years and created an average of the scores over the particular temporal period. This variable therefore provides an estimate of the repressive environment that previous challengers to the regime faced in their opposition to the regime. Thus, less repressive authoritarian regimes exhibit higher scores for the \textit{latentmean} variable while more repressive regimes correspond with lower scores for the variable.

I also include dichotomous variables to represent authoritarian regime types in order to provide a baseline of comparison as well as to determine how the repressive capacity of a regime may influence the decision making of the dissidents. I gain this information from the Autocratic
Regimes Dataset (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014) in order to create variables representing single party regime, military regime, personalist regime, and monarchy. Each of these variables are dichotomous measures of the regime type corresponding with the particular authoritarian government. If one of the dichotomous variables measures “1”, the other authoritarian regime types will remain “0”.

Finally, I also included dichotomous variables to represent non-authoritarian regime types listed in the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset in order to account for the effects of these regimes. I created a dichotomous variable representing democracies listed in the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset, democracy, which is coded as “1” if the particular government in the given year is coded as a democracy in the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). The variable remains as “0” if the regime type of the country in a given year is not a democracy. Moreover, I created a dichotomous variable, other, which represents other non-authoritarian regimes such warlord governments, transitional governments, or colonies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). This variable is coded as “1” if the particular government structure is noted as a warlord government, transitional government, or colony in a given year. The variable remains as “0” otherwise.

3.4.5. Control Variables

In order to isolate the effect of other influences on the outcome of the dissident-regime interaction, I included four control variables. First, a country’s ethnic fractionalization (ef) is controlled for as the existence of ethnic fractionalization within a country may affect the likelihood of political violence. Previous studies argued that countries with more ethnic heterogeneous populations particularly an ethnic majority may have a higher probability to experience civil war (Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002b). The variable ranges from 0 to 1
and represents the probability of two random people within a country being from the same ethnic or religious group.

Second, I included the log of population (\( \ln{\text{pop}} \)) as a control variable. This variable represents the logged population of the respective country where the protest campaign arises and is collected from the final year of the protest campaign. This variable is measured by the Penn World Tables 6.2 and obtained from the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). It has been argued that a larger population may be correlated with a higher risk of the onset of civil conflict (Carey 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

Third, I included a variable to represent the state development of a country. I used a proxy measure of infant mortality rate (\( \ln{\text{imr}} \)) from the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank and finally created a log version of the variable. Infant mortality rate notes the number of children under one years of age who died out of one thousand births in a country per given year (World Bank 2014). This variable provides a view of the economic and state development of a country (Abouharb and Kimball 2007).

Finally, I included a control variable representing the coercive capabilities of a regime through a percentage change of military expenditures from one year to the next. Several studies have used a measure of military expenditures or military personnel in order to proxy for the coercive capacity of a regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Young 2013) in examining the onset of civil conflict. This variable is obtained from the National Material Capabilities Dataset through the Correlates of War Project (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987).
3.5. Results

Table 3.1. Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latent Mean Average</td>
<td>-3.124 – 1.858</td>
<td>-1.156</td>
<td>-1.364</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0 – 1</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.435 – 5.595</td>
<td>4.135</td>
<td>4.325</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.004 – 1</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (Log)</td>
<td>5.764 – 6866.88</td>
<td>14.294</td>
<td>10.021</td>
<td>165.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>1.73e+08 – 21288</td>
<td>-273536.5</td>
<td>6.633</td>
<td>6397335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE: The summary statistics for the latent mean average variable is based on the 5 year scores as reported in the duration model.

Table 3.1. on page 76 lists the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this model. Table 3.2. listed on pages 77-78 lists the results of the duration models with an average of the continuous measure of legacy of repression as the independent variable. In this study, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating the escalation to violence by the dissident protest campaign during interactions between a regime and dissidents. As the study attempts to determine the conditions which influence dissidents in a protest campaign to escalate to violence against a regime during these interactions, I use a Cox model to test the proposed hypotheses. A duration model is necessary for this study as I am attempting to determine when a dissident group shifts their protest campaign from a nonviolent approach to violent tactics targeted against the regime. An exponential duration model assumes a constant hazard rate over time or in other words, the risk of failure is independent of time; therefore, it assumes the risk of experiencing an event remains the same at all times despite prior interactions (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Hamilton 2006; Lee and Wang 2003). In this line of logic, the risk of a protest campaign resorting to violence against the regime in power remains the same throughout the dissident-regime
interactions regardless of the actions of either belligerent. Similarly, a Weibull model assumes that the hazard rate in the model rises monotonically over time, falls monotonically over time, or remains constant over time (Jenkins 2004). Thus, these types of duration models are not appropriate for this project. On the other hand, a Cox proportional hazard model does not assume a particular shape of the hazard rate over time. Furthermore, a Cox model permits me to observe how the risk of an escalation of an event changes over time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cleves et al. 2002). In this model, a Cox model provides the opportunity to analyze the effects of the independent variables on the hazard of a dissident protest campaign failing in a future time period. The failure in this study is measured as nonviolent protest campaign escalating to violence against an authoritarian regime.

In interpreting the results of a Cox model, I report the hazard ratios instead of coefficients. The hazard ratio indicates the effect of a one unit change in the covariates on the hazard ratio. As the baseline is 1.00, a hazard ratio over 1.00 suggests that the variable increases the hazard risk of the dissident campaign resorting to violent tactics against the regime. Conversely, a coefficient below 1.00 notes that the variable decreases the hazard risk of the dissident group escalating to violence (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cleves et al. 2002; Jenkins 2004).

3.5.1. Legacy of Repression Model:

Table 3.2. Cox Model: Legacy of Repression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Five Year Period</th>
<th>Model 2: Four Year Period</th>
<th>Model 3: Three Year Period</th>
<th>Model 4: Two Year Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy of Repression</td>
<td>.736 *** (.056)</td>
<td>.725 *** (.053)</td>
<td>.706 *** (.052)</td>
<td>.700 *** (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.47 *** (.181)</td>
<td>1.48 *** (.180)</td>
<td>1.46 *** (.176)</td>
<td>1.45 *** (.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.42 (.402)</td>
<td>1.35 (.372)</td>
<td>1.29 (.346)</td>
<td>1.26 (.336)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>1.00 (.039)</td>
<td>1.00 (.039)</td>
<td>1.00 (.039)</td>
<td>1.00 (.039)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the first model (Table 3.2.) on pages 77-78, the population of the cases includes all regime types including democracies, authoritarian regimes (single party regimes, personalist regimes, monarchies, and military regimes), and other types of regimes such as warlord governments, transitional governments, and colonies. For this model, I report the results of using a five year period for the legacy of repression using a continuous variable (latentmean) obtained by the Human Rights Protection Scores dataset (Fariss 2014; Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014) in order to determine whether the previous repressive actions of the regime influence the decision of the dissidents to escalate to violence after a protest campaign begins\(^1\). As noted earlier, I deliberately do not include the one year \((t-1)\) prior to the beginning of the protest campaign in order to isolate the possible causes of the protest campaign itself from the repressive legacy of the regime.

In Table 3.2., the hazard ratio for the legacy of repression variable is below 1 and therefore, predicts that the dissident campaign would refrain from escalating their opposition to violent tactics against the regime, which continues across all temporal periods. Specifically, this finding suggests that regardless of the type of regime opposed by the protest campaign, the dissidents are 26 percent less likely to escalate to violence against a repressive regime. In other words, within the five year period prior to the beginning of the protest campaign, the regime demonstrated its

\(^1\) I also conducted similar tests of this relationship using a 4, 3, and 2 year temporal period of the legacy of repression. Although I do not discuss these results in the analysis section, the results of these models are reported in Table 3.2.
willingness and capacity to repress challengers to its tenure. This demonstration has significant consequences as the regime displayed its ability to repress opposition challenging the regime and therefore, future dissidents are unlikely to escalate to violence in its opposition to the regime. The dissidents understand that they are likely to suffer a similar fate if they escalate to violence so they either remain nonviolent in their opposition to the regime or return home, ending the protest campaign. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 1 as I argued that dissident protest campaigns are less likely to escalate to violence when opposing regimes which demonstrated its willingness and capacity to repress. In other words, dissidents gain valuable information from previous challenges to the tenure of the regime, which influence the dissident decision calculus to escalate to violence in future iterations.

In addition, the control variable for infant mortality rate is also significant at the .01 level and the hazard ratio remains above 1, suggesting the escalation to violence is more likely. Specifically, dissidents opposing a regime with a higher infant mortality rate are 47 percent more likely to escalate to violence. The variable for infant mortality rate represents a proxy for the economic and state development of a country. In other words, if the economic and state development of country is higher, the opposition within a country are more likely to escalate to violence against the state. Although Abouharb and Kimball (2007) note that higher infant mortality rates may reduce the probability of civil conflict, they also indicate that other studies found higher rates of infant mortality may lead to conflict through demographic stress and other factors (Esty et al. 1998; Mason 2004; Urdal 2005).

The hazard ratio for ethnic fractionalization is above 1, suggesting that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization within a country lead to a higher likelihood of the escalation to violence; however, this variable is insignificant. The variable for the log of population also remains
insignificant in this model and the hazard ratio is 1, suggesting that the log of population has no effect on the escalation of conflict. Finally, the variable for military expenditures of a country is significant at the .01 level but the hazard ratio is 1 across the four temporal models. Several studies use military expenditures as a proxy for the coercive capacity of a regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Young 2013) in its relationship with the onset of civil conflict. In this model, despite its statistical significance, this suggests that higher levels of military expenditures within a country has no effect on the escalation to violence.

3.5.2. Regime Response Model

Table 3.3. Cox Model: Regime Type (Five Year Legacy Period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy of repression</td>
<td>.660 *** (.055)</td>
<td>.660 *** (.055)</td>
<td>.660 *** (.055)</td>
<td>.660 *** (.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>1.11 (.427)</td>
<td>.734 (.256)</td>
<td>1.28 (.473)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>1.51 (.352)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.74 *** (.358)</td>
<td>1.36 (.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Regime</td>
<td>.867 (.220)</td>
<td>.573 *** (.118)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.781 (.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.661 (.154)</td>
<td>1.15 (.293)</td>
<td>.901 (.346)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2.19 *** (.554)</td>
<td>1.45 (.284)</td>
<td>2.53 *** (.545)</td>
<td>1.98 (.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.20 (.489)</td>
<td>.791 (.284)</td>
<td>1.38 (.533)</td>
<td>1.08 (.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.189)</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.189)</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.189)</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.09 (.332)</td>
<td>1.09 (.332)</td>
<td>1.09 (.332)</td>
<td>1.09 (.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>.981 (.040)</td>
<td>.981 (.040)</td>
<td>.981 (.040)</td>
<td>.981 (.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>1.00*** (7.09e-06)</td>
<td>1.00 *** (7.09e-06)</td>
<td>1.00 *** (7.09e-06)</td>
<td>1.00 *** (7.09e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An (***)) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level.
An (**)) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level.
An (*) indicates statistically significant at the .10 level.
† The dependent variable (escalation is created from the intensity level (int) variable found in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).
In the second model for dissidents facing a regime with a repressive legacy (Table 3.3), I use the same population of authoritarian regimes included in the first model; however, I include several dichotomous independent variables representing the various types of regimes which are included in the sample population of protest campaign events. I use four different models and alter the baseline of comparison for each of the authoritarian regimes (military, personalist, single party, and monarchy) in order to determine the effects of the other regime type variables on the escalation of violence. Therefore, each model uses the baseline regime as the category of comparison when interpreting the results. For each model, I report the results of the five year period for the legacy of repression.15

3.5.2.1. Military Regime as the Baseline

The first column of Table 3.3. lists the results of the Cox model using military regimes as the baseline of comparison for the other variables. The variable representing the legacy of repression is significant at the .01 level and hazard ratio remains below 1 in all four models, suggesting this variable reduces the probability of the escalation of civil war. In other words, this suggests that dissidents facing a regime which had previously demonstrated its willingness and capacity to repress are 34 percent less likely to escalate to violence. Similar to the findings in Table 3.2., this suggests support for Hypothesis 1 as I argued that protest campaigns opposing regimes which had demonstrated its willingness and capacity to repress are less likely to escalate to violence.

15 The results for the models using a 4, 3, and 2 year temporal period of the legacy of repression are reported in Appendices A, B, and C on pages 154-159.
In my theory, I argued that certain regime types are dependent on preserving the political status quo in order for the regime to survive. Therefore, if faced with a violent challenge to its tenure, the regime will likely respond to this with violence in kind, which may lead to the escalation of civil conflict. In this model, the hazard ratios for the variables representing monarchies and personalist regimes are above 1, suggesting that interactions between dissidents and monarchies or personalist regimes are more likely to escalate to civil war. Despite this, the coefficients are statistically insignificant in this model.

In addition, in the models using 4, 3, and 2 year legacy of repression period listed in Appendices A, B, and C on pages 154-159, the variable for personalist regimes achieves statistical significance at the .05 level and the hazard ratio remains above 1. This suggests that compared to military regimes, interactions between dissidents and personalist regimes are more 55 percent more likely to escalate to civil conflict. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 2 as I proposed that interactions between dissidents and personalist regimes are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. Personalist leaders are dependent on keeping the current political institution intact in order to protect her control of political power. If a dissident group violently challenges the regime, the regime reacts with a violent response, leading to civil conflict.

The variable for democracy also presents an interesting finding in this model. Although I do not make an assumption about the behavior of dissidents facing a democracy, the hazard ratio for democracy suggests that compared to military regimes, interactions between dissidents and democracies are 1.19 times more likely to escalate to civil conflict. At first, the finding seems illogical as several studies have noted that democracies are unlikely to repress their domestic population (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Davenport 1996a, 1999, 2007b, 2007c; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport and Inman 2012; Poe and Tate 1994; Richards 1999); however, if the
democratic regime did not demonstrate its willingness and capacity to repress, the dissident campaigns see an opportunity to gain their preferred reforms and concessions by challenging the regime through the escalation of violence. With a violent challenge by dissidents, the democratic regime likely responds with violence as well, leading to civil conflict between the belligerents. Additionally, this finding may be driven by the inclusion of certain democracies within the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset, which had experienced longstanding violent conflicts with dissident campaigns.\footnote{Countries listed as a democracy within the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset include the Philippines, Israel, India, Colombia, Spain, Sri Lanka, and other countries which have longstanding violent conflicts with dissident campaigns.}

Similar to the model in Table 3.2., the control variable for infant mortality rate is significant in this model and hazard ratio remains above 1, suggesting a positive impact on the escalation of civil conflict. In other words, interactions between dissidents and a regime within a country with a higher infant mortality rate are 53 percent more likely to escalate to civil conflict. As noted above, the infant mortality rate serves as a control variable representing the economic and state development of a country. While certain studies argue that a higher infant mortality rate may serve as a deterrence to the escalation to violence, other studies note that higher levels of infant mortality may actually incite civil conflict (Abouharb and Kimball 2007; Esty et al. 1998; Mason 2004; Urdal 2005).

The hazard ratio for ethnic fractionalization is above 1, suggesting that a country with more ethnic and religious fractionalization is more likely to experience an escalation to violence by dissidents. Despite this, the variable remains insignificant in all versions of this model. In addition, the hazard ratio for the variable representing the number of individuals within the population remains below 1, suggesting that a country with a higher number of individuals is less likely to experience an escalation to violence by the dissidents targeting their regime. Despite this, the
variable does not reach statistical significance. Finally, the variable for military expenditures is significant at the .01 level in all forms of this model; however, the hazard ratio is 1. This suggests that the military expenditures of a regime has no effect on the escalation to violence by dissidents.17

3.5.2.2. Personalist Regime as the Baseline

The second column of Table 3.3. lists the results of the Cox model with personalist regimes serving as the baseline of comparison for the variables of interest. Similar to the results for the first model on Table 3.3., the legacy of repression variable is significant at the .01 level and the hazard ratio remains below 1. This suggests that the demonstration of the willingness and capacity to repress by a regime in previous challenges successfully deters the escalation of civil conflict. In this regard, interactions between dissidents and a repressive authoritarian regime are 34 percent less likely to escalate to civil conflict. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 1.

The hazard ratio for the variable representing monarchies is below 1 but does not achieve statistical significance. Moreover, this is an expected result as I argue that monarchies and personalist regimes operate in a similar manner when faced with a violent dissident challenge. On the other hand, the variable for single party regimes is significant and the hazard ratio remains below 1, suggesting that interactions between dissidents and single party regime are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. Specifically, the results suggest that these interactions are 43 percent less likely to escalate to civil conflict. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 3. As noted in Chapter 2, single party and military regimes are more likely to provide the desired concessions and reforms to dissidents if the protest campaign turns to violence. The change in tactics to

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17 The control variables for this study do not change between the four models. Therefore, I only provide an explanation of the results for the control variables in the discussion of the first model (military regime as the baseline).
violence provides the necessary stimulus for the regime to perceive some form of threat by the protest campaign and consequently, single party and military regimes are more likely to provide the preferred concessions of the dissidents. Therefore, it is unlikely that the regime-dissident interactions will escalate to violent civil conflict between the belligerents.

The variable representing military regimes operates in a similar manner to single parties in this model. The coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level and the hazard ratio remains below 1. This can be interpreted as that dissidents are unlikely to escalate to violence when facing military regimes. In comparison to personalist regimes, interactions between dissidents and military regimes are 38 percent less likely to escalate to civil conflict. Similar to the reasoning noted above, a military regime is more likely to give into the desired concessions of protest movements if the dissidents resort to violent tactics in their opposition to the regime. Therefore, the escalation to civil conflict is unlikely to arise between dissidents and a military regime because the dissidents likely gained their preferred concessions before the escalation to civil conflict. This finding also provides support for Hypothesis 3.

Finally, the variable for democracy proves to be insignificant in this model; however, the hazard ratio remains above 1. Although the variable is insignificant in the five year legacy of repression model, it achieves statistical significance at the .05 level in all other temporal models and suggests that compared to personalist regimes, interactions between dissidents and democracies are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. As I noted above, this finding may be driven by the particular democracies listed in the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset, which have notably been involved in longstanding violent disputes with dissidents. Moreover, previous literature noted that democracies are unlikely to engage in repression against opposition (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Davenport 1996a, 1999, 2007b, 2007c; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport and
Inman 2012; Poe and Tate 1994; Richards 1999), which provides significant information to the dissidents. Democracies are unlikely to demonstrate its repressive capacity or its willingness to use these tactics, which provides the dissidents an opportunity to gain their preferred goals if they pose a formidable threat to tenure of the regime.

3.5.2.3. Single Party Regime as the Baseline

In the third column, I change the baseline of comparison to single party regimes. In this manner, I can determine how certain regimes relate to the escalation of violence compared to a single party regimes, which I expect to be less likely to progress to civil conflict. As noted in the previous models, the variable representing a regime with a legacy of repression is significant at the .01 level and the hazard ratio remains below 1. Therefore, this suggests that dissidents are unlikely to escalate to violence against regimes which demonstrated its repressive capacity and its willingness to employ these measures. Specifically, compared to single party regimes, dissidents are 37 percent less likely to escalate to civil conflict against repressive regimes.

The hazard ratio for the monarchy variable remains above 1, suggesting interactions between dissidents and monarchies are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. Despite this, the variable remains statistically insignificant. The variable for personalist regimes, however, is statistically significant at the .01 level and the hazard ratio is above 1. This finding suggests that compared to single party regimes, interactions between personalist regimes and dissidents are likely to escalate to civil conflict. Specifically, the hazard ratio implies that interactions between personalist regimes and dissidents are 82 percent more likely to escalate to civil conflict. This provides support for Hypothesis 2 as I proposed that dissidents are more likely to escalate to violence when facing personalist regimes or monarchies.
The variable for military regimes is statistically insignificant but the hazard ratio remains above 1, suggesting that interactions between military regimes and dissidents are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. Despite this, the variable remains insignificant as it is in comparison to single party regimes, which I expect that the two regime types react in a similar manner to violent dissident challenges.

Finally, the variable for democracies is significant at the .01 level and the hazard ratio is above 1, suggesting compared to single party regimes, interactions between dissidents and democracies are more likely to result in civil conflict. As noted above, the democracies included in the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset have experienced longstanding violent conflicts, which may influence the results of this study. Despite this, democracies are theoretically less likely to engage in repression, which may provide important information to the dissidents. The failure to demonstrate its repressive capacity and willingness to repress threatening challenges may indicate to dissidents that prospects exist to gain their preferred reforms if they pose a challenge to the regime. This particularly provides an opportunity for the dissidents to escalate to violence, leading to civil conflict.

3.5.2.4. Monarchy as the Baseline

In the fourth column, I alter the baseline of comparison to monarchies in order to discover how certain regime types relate to the escalation to civil conflict compared to monarchies. Similar to the other models in this study, the variable for the legacy of repression remains significant at the .01 level but hazard ratio remains below 1. This suggests that interactions involving dissidents and repressive regimes are 37 percent less likely to escalate to civil conflict. Similar to the other models, this finding provides support for Hypothesis 1.
The hazard ratio for the variable representing personalist regimes remains above 1, suggesting that compared to monarchies, interactions between dissidents and personalist regimes are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. Despite this, the variable for personalist regimes is insignificant. This is expected as I predicted that the two regime types are likely to act in a similar manner when faced with protest campaigns.\textsuperscript{18}

The hazard ratio for the variables representing both single party and military regimes are below 1, suggesting that in comparison to monarchies, interactions between dissidents and these types of regimes are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. While this falls in line with the proposed relationships outlined in Hypothesis 3, both variables representing single party and military regimes are statistically insignificant.

Finally, the variable for democracies is insignificant and the hazard ratio is above 1; however, in the other temporal models, the variable achieves statistical significance at the .05 level. Similar to the other three models, this suggests that interactions between dissidents and democracies are more likely to escalate to civil conflict. Specifically, compared to monarchies, interactions involving democracies are 1.00 times more likely to escalate to civil conflict. As noted above, this finding cannot be taken as absolute since the democracies listed in the dataset likely drive the results to observe this finding. Although we cannot infer this finding pertains to all democracies, this result sheds light on how the failure to demonstrate the capacity and willingness to repress may influence the response of dissidents to escalate violence targeted at a regime.

\textsuperscript{18} In addition, there are only 10 monarchies listed in the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset with 26 total observations prior to the onset of civil conflict.
3.6. Conclusion

The study of civil war has advanced significantly over recent years from earlier studies concentrating on grievances and opportunity-based theories of civil conflict. More recent studies advocated an approach to understanding the onset of civil war by arguing that the dynamic relationship between dissidents and a regime during earlier periods of the contentious interaction (protest and repression) influence the progression to civil war. This study attempts to contribute to this strand of the literature by arguing that the decision making processes of the belligerents regarding the outcome of contentious disputes is influenced by prior interactions between them. I aimed to expand the understanding of contentious interactions and civil war by concentrating on the following questions: Why do certain contentious interactions between dissidents and regimes evolve into civil war while other interactions do not? What is the relationship between lower levels of contentious activity and civil war? More importantly, what accounts for the response of dissidents to the actions of the regime? In other words, why do certain protest campaigns fail to resort to violent tactics and the dissidents go home, satisfied or unsatisfied, while in other cases, the dissidents escalate the contentious challenge to higher levels of violence, which may evolve into civil war?

I proposed a theory suggesting how dissidents determine their decision making during contentious interactions with a regime, specifically whether the dissidents should escalate to violence in their opposition to the regime or continue a nonviolent approach. I argued that the dissidents operate in a world of uncertainty and incomplete information while the regime enjoys a significant advantage by understanding their capabilities and number of personnel. Therefore, in determining whether to escalate violence against the regime, they can only rely on what they have observed or experienced themselves, namely the history of regime repression. If the regime in
power demonstrated a low willingness and capacity for repression in prior experiences, this influences the perception and expectations of the dissidents by signaling that an escalation in threat via violence may prompt the regime to concede to the dissidents’ desired changes. While the regime will likely counter the dissident escalation to violence with a similar level of violence, the dissidents have not observed the regime’s repressive capacity and willingness to employ these tactics. Therefore, they believe that they may be able to survive the violent counter response of the regime and possibly gain their preferred reforms and concessions.

On the other hand, if the regime has demonstrated its willingness to use repression and its capacity to suppress opposition in the recent past, this provides critical information to future dissidents. As the regime showed that any challenge to its control of political power will be met with violence against the opposition, dissidents understand that if they attempt a violent challenge against the regime, they will likely meet a similar fate. If the dissidents decide to escalate to violence, they present a significant challenge to the regime, which will incite a violent counter response and the dissidents will be severely repressed.

Moreover, this study emphasizes that the institutional differences between authoritarian regimes influence the outcome of regime-dissident interactions. Certain authoritarian regimes possess institutional traits which provides the leadership to ability to survive in a post-reform environment. Single party and military regimes enjoy the ability to survive in a new political environment. If the regime provides concessions or reforms for the opposition that alter the political institution, a former single party regime can survive by becoming one of many political parties in the new political environment. In addition, the former single party leadership can run for political office in a multiparty election and influence policy making through an elected position. On the other hand, military regimes can survive in a new political environment by retreating back
to the military barracks, resume its primary military functions, and concentrate on national security issues rather than political issues. In Chapter 2, I found support for my proposal that when faced with a violent challenge, military and single party regimes are more likely to provide the desired concessions of the dissidents. Building off of this logic, I argued that interactions between dissidents and single party or military regimes are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. While political violence may arise on the part of one or both of the belligerents, the regime-dissident interaction is unlikely to escalate to civil conflict as the regime is more likely to provide the dissidents with their desired concessions or reforms prior to the onset of civil conflict. Therefore, neither the regime nor the dissidents have an incentive of resorting to escalating the violence to civil conflict.

Conversely, monarchies and personalist regimes do not enjoy this luxury of survival in a post-reform environment. While the winning coalition of these types of authoritarian regimes provide the necessary political insulation to keep the leader in political power under the current institutional framework, the regime leader will likely lose this important institutional feature if she gives into the concessions and demands of the dissidents. In other words, monarchies and personalist regimes are dependent on retaining the political status quo in order to keep political power. In Chapter 2, I found support for this contention. Namely, when faced with a violent challenge by dissidents, these regimes are unlikely to provide the desired concessions of the dissidents. Moreover, when faced with a violent challenge by dissidents, the regime is likely to respond in kind. Therefore, I proposed that interactions between violent dissidents and monarchies or personalist regimes are more likely to escalate to civil conflict.

The results of this analysis demonstrate significant support for the various aspects of the proposed theory. In the proposed hypotheses, I argued that dissidents are influenced by the prior
actions of the opposing authoritarian regime, which impacts how the dissidents will function in future contentious interactions. Moreover, I argued that the type of authoritarian regime targeted by the dissident influences the outcome of the regime-dissident interactions. Certain regime types are structured in a manner which allows for the institution to survive in a new political environment whereas other regimes do not enjoy this luxury and consequently, a violent dissident challenge poses a great threat to the survival of the regime. Therefore, these interactions are more likely to escalate to civil conflict.

In order to examine these proposed relationships, I used a duration model with the escalation to civil conflict as my dependent variable. As proposed in my theory, I found that dissidents are 26 percent less likely to escalate to civil conflict when opposing a regime that demonstrated its willingness and capacity to repress challenges to its tenure. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 1. The previous actions by the regime or lack thereof provide important information to the opposition regarding their decision calculus and the prospects for attaining their goals. Dissidents observe if the regime repressed previous challengers and anticipate a similar fate if they escalate to violence targeted at the regime. In the end, the dissidents see the escalation to violence as a significant risk and therefore, avoid this outcome by remaining nonviolent in their opposition to the regime.

Moreover, I examined the outcome of regime-dissident interactions and how the institutional framework of certain regimes impact whether the belligerents escalate the interaction to civil conflict. In Chapter 2, I argued that certain authoritarian regime types are dependent on retaining the political status quo and political insulation from the general population for institutional survival. State leaders over regimes such as monarchies and personalist regimes understand that their survival is contingent on maintaining the leader in power through a small
winning coalition which provides the necessary insulation from the influence of the public on decision making and policy creation. (Backstrom 2012). Therefore, if the regime faces a violent challenge from the opposition, it poses a significant challenge and the regime will likely employ violence in kind to ensure its continued survival. Therefore, the regime-dissident interaction ultimately escalates to civil conflict. When I examined this proposed relationship, I found significant support for Hypothesis 2 as two of the four models demonstrated this relationship for personalist regimes.\(^{19}\)

I also tested the relationship for other regime types which possess the institutional framework that permits the regime to survive in a post-reform environment. Single party and military regimes possess the institutional framework that permits the leadership to survive in a post-reform environment. Single party leaders can compete for political office and influence policy making in a new political environment, whereas the leaders of military regimes can retreat back to the military barracks and resume their focus on national security issues. Therefore, when faced with a violent dissident challenge, these types of regimes are more likely to give into the desired concessions and goals prior to the escalation to civil conflict. Therefore, I argued that interactions between dissidents and single party or military regimes are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. When I examined this relationship, I found significant support for Hypothesis 3 as the interactions between dissidents and single party or military regimes are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. In the end, the dissidents are likely to obtain their preferred goals while the regime remains in control of political power and the two belligerents avoid the escalation to civil conflict.

\(^{19}\) I did not find support for the Hypothesis when I observed monarchies. The lack of support may be attributed to the limited number of monarchies within the N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset as there are only 10 monarchies for a total of 26 observations.
While this study contributes to the dissent-repression nexus and civil war literature through theoretical explanations of why dissidents escalate violence against regimes, the study could be improved to illustrate further information and understanding into the decision calculus of the belligerents and how this influences the interaction between them. First, the number of observations could be increased to include more cases of protest campaigns. The N.A.V.C.O. 2.0 dataset offers unique and interesting yearly information regarding large violent and nonviolent protest campaigns; however, it restricts the inclusion of only protest campaigns which had 1000 or more members participating in the movement. It may be the case that the 1000 member restriction is too strict and the arbitrary number could be decreased. The actual size of the protest campaign may not be the central concept for being viewed as a regime crisis by the leader of the state. Instead, the violence incited by the dissidents, regardless of the size of the protest campaign, may be the central concept that defines a regime crisis. If this proves to be true, the selection effect of only observing those protest campaigns with 1000 members may prove to be a significant issue by possibly driving the statistical results. This could be overcome through relaxing the 1000 member restriction and possibly decrease the arbitrary number. Another way to overcome this issue to include additional protest campaigns into the overall sample, specifically those that target the regime through violence. Although a protest movement with 250 members versus one with 1000 members is different, we are attempting to concentrate on regime crises. Therefore, a protest movement with 250 members which employs violent tactics against a regime may be viewed as a regime crisis by the leadership. With a less rigorous qualification, the new dataset may reveal a new and larger number of observations as well as other possible relationships that have not been identified in this study.
Second, the dependent variable used in this study is a yearly dichotomous measure indicating whether a protest campaign escalated to civil conflict or if it remained a nonviolent protest movement. Conversely, this study could be improved with a more precise dependent variable that allows for the diversity of new developments or the various outcomes of the regime-dissident interactions. This study could not only determine the causes of the escalation of dissident violence annually but also the determinants of annual changes between the belligerents such as the successful repression of dissidents, the successful gain of dissident concessions, or the onset of civil war. A future study could use a competing risks model as it not only takes advantage of the duration of the protest campaign but also allows for a range of outcomes for the dependent variable. Therefore, while this study only concentrates on the escalation of dissident violence against regimes, this future study would focus on the determinants of all of the possible outcomes.

Third, I used a continuous measure of the primary independent variable, a legacy of regime repression, which provides an average of the latentmean variable during a particular temporal period. This variable represents whether a regime provided more respect for international human rights laws and less human rights abuses or if the state disregarded human rights laws and instead abused its citizens. While this measure provided support for Hypothesis 1 in this study, it may not provide the most effective proxy for a demonstration of a legacy of repression. The latentmean variable observes the human rights records of countries in general rather than specific types of human rights abuses as seen in human rights datasets such as the CIRI Human Rights Dataset. In this manner, we could observe whether certain types of human rights abuses may particularly influence the future decision making of dissidents. For example, a regime that arbitrarily arrested and tortured its citizens may impact dissident actions differently than a regime that engaged in mass killing of its opposition. Furthermore, the measure also examines the human rights record of
the regime during a particular year rather than an explicit observation of how the regime reacts to a significant challenge from the opposition. Therefore, while the variable provides insight into how regime acts in regard to human rights each year, it does not specifically demonstrate how the regime behaves when faced with an opposition. Finally, the measure fails to indicate whether there is a dominant demonstration of repression that impacts the decision calculus of future dissidents. For example, in 1982, Hafiz al Assad violently repressed an Islamist challenge in Hama, Syria, resulting in the deaths of 5,000 to 25,000 Syrians (Cleveland 2004; Seale 1988; Sorenson 2008). This event provided a paramount indication to future dissidents of his willingness to repress as well as the repressive capacity of his regime. While Assad continued to repress his population throughout his tenure, he did not resort to a similar display of repressive capacity because the demonstration in Hama deterred future dissident campaigns from using violent tactics in their opposition to the regime. Therefore, this measure of a legacy of repression may not completely capture this dynamic, which may influence future dissident campaigns.

While a great deal of progress has been made in the understanding of contentious interactions between belligerents, the field has made a significant advancement in explaining why regime-dissident interactions escalate to violent measures against certain authoritarian regimes while avoiding violence against others. My contribution to the study of contentious politics and civil war is twofold. First, I attempted to expand the understanding of the interactions of dissidents and a particular regime. Specifically, I proposed a theory of how different authoritarian regime types respond to conflict and how this may influence the prospect for civil conflict. Second, I attempted to expand the understanding of the decision calculus of dissidents during contentious interactions with an authoritarian regime. In doing so, this study reveals that dissidents look to the regime’s legacy of repression in order to determine future decision making particularly whether to
escalate violence against the regime. More importantly, this study demonstrates how the institutional framework of certain regimes allows for certain regimes to survive in a post reform environment as well as to avoid the escalation of conflict to civil war. On the other hand, the institutional framework of other authoritarian regimes does not provide this luxury and consequently, these regimes are more likely to experience civil conflict when violently challenged by dissidents.
CHAPTER 4

“MASTER OF PUPPETS”? A STUDY OF EGYPT AND SYRIA ON THE PATH TO THE ARAB SPRING

4.1. Introduction

This study concentrates on determining the theoretical justifications for the decision making conducted by both regimes and dissidents during regime-dissident interactions on the path to civil conflict. In Chapter 2, I concentrated on why regimes conduct themselves in a particular manner when faced with a dissident group targeting the tenure of the regime. I argued that the interaction of two elements, the institutional survival of the particular regime and the actual threat of the dissident challenge, influence the response of the regime to the rising opposition. Moreover, this decision calculus is influenced by certain institutional attributes that impact whether the regime can survive the liberalization or democratic transition. Single party and military regimes possess certain attributes which afford these regimes with the liberty to survive a transition to democracy or liberalization. Single party regimes already have experience with a political party determining political decision making and therefore, in a post-reform environment, the prior ruling single party becomes one of many political parties competing for political office. Furthermore, I argued that leaders of military regimes are not specifically concerned with retaining political office but rather they prefer stability and national security within the borders of the country. On the other hand, monarchies and personalist regimes do not possess this liberty to survive a transition to a democracy or liberalization. The survival of these regime types are contingent on retaining the institutional status quo. In other words, the institution depends on keeping the leader in power with
significant political insulation from the masses of the domestic population. This allows for the regime leader to retain political power through the insulation afforded by the small winning coalition and the leader rewards these members with private goods.

In Chapter 3, I concentrated on devising a theory to explain dissident decision making during regime-dissident interactions and how the response of authoritarian regimes in previous stages of the conflict influence the possibility of the escalation to civil conflict. First, I attempted to explain why opposition movements determine to escalate to violence against a targeted regime. Previous studies often approached this research question by concentrating on attributes of the targeted regime such as the gross domestic product of the country, the military expenditures of the regime, and the number of personnel within the military to indicate the coercive capacity of a particular regime (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Young 2013). Other studies noted that dissidents are unlikely to possess a significant understanding of the military or economic capabilities of the regime they target (Pierskalla 2009). I argued that while dissidents do not possess full and accurate information regarding the “coercive capacity” of the regime, they understand the “repressive capacity” of the regime. In this manner, the dissidents gained a significant understanding of the willingness and capacity of the regime to repress opposition to the tenure of the regime. This knowledge is gained through previous experiences of the dissidents firsthand through the repressive activity of the regime or through the observation of the repressive actions against other movements targeting the leader. These experiences provides significant information to the dissidents, which assists in their decision calculus and estimation of future activity of the regime by reducing their uncertainty of these actions. In the end, the dissidents are strategic actors and perform in a manner to ensure their survival and the attainment of their goals. If the regime demonstrated their willingness and capacity to repress any previous opposition
targeting the regime, the dissidents understand that the regime leadership will not tolerate a challenge to its tenure and will repress the uprising. On the other hand, if the regime did not demonstrate its willingness and capacity to repress opposition, the dissidents foresee an opportunity to gain their preferred reforms and survive a possible repressive counteraction by the regime. Therefore, the dissidents escalate to violence to challenge the regime.

Moreover, I argued that certain regimes are more likely to survive in the future if the regime provides the desired goals and reforms of the opposition. Single party and military regimes possess the institutional framework that permits the leadership to survive in a new political environment despite the change to the political environment. On the other hand, monarchical and personalist regimes are unlikely to survive in a new political environment as the regime leadership is dependent on retaining the existing institutional framework for its continued control over political power. If the regime provides for the desired reforms of the opposition, the leadership will likely lose access to political power and consequently, the leaders may face exile, imprisonment, or death (Geddes 1999). Therefore, I argued that regime-dissident interactions involving monarchical or personalist regimes are likely to escalate to civil conflict as the regimes depend on keeping the political status quo. On the other hand, I argued that regime-dissident interactions involving single party or military regimes are unlikely to escalate to civil conflict. These types of regimes can survive in a new political environment and when faced with a violent challenge by dissidents, they are more likely to provide the desired concessions, which reduces the probability of civil conflict.

The contentious interactions between dissidents and regimes which occurred during the Arab Spring provided a springboard for my original research puzzle regarding the relationship between political actors during contentious interactions as well as an inspiration for many of the
main theoretical arguments and propositions established in this work. Therefore, it was only appropriate to use case study examples from the Middle East region during this period in order to highlight and illustrate the theories and corresponding hypotheses identified in this study. Therefore, I use the examples of Egypt under the Hosni Mubarak regime and Syria under Bashar al Assad during the path to the outbreak of the Arab Spring as well as their actions during the uprisings.

Przeworski and Teune (1971) argue for a most similar systems approach in social science research as one can compare two similar entities and through the process of addressing the similarities between them, one can identify and analyze the various differences between them that generate a different response or outcome. In this manner, Egypt and Syria are similar in several ways as both countries were ruled under longstanding regimes which were led by a strong presidential figure. Mubarak controlled power in Egypt from 1981 until the end of his reign in 2011. Assad, on the other hand, did not gain control of Syria until 2000 when his father, Hafiz al Assad, died; however, his method of ruling Syria continues to be similar to his father’s approach and the passing of the regime from father to son had strong overtones of a ruling legacy. Moreover, each of the rulers took a somewhat similar approach to governing their respective country in an authoritarian manner; albeit, there were notably differences within their governments. Despite possessing the institutional infrastructure to provide equitable balance over the creation of policies and decision making in their respective country, both leaders practiced near complete control over all aspects of government and society. Throughout his tenure, Mubarak continued to exploit the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the legislative body of the People’s Assembly as well as the Egyptian military and security forces to ensure his unrelenting hold on power. On the other hand, Assad and his Alawite circle of power controlled Syria through the creation of patron-client
relationships by placing fellow Alawites in positions of power in the government, bureaucracy, and the military. Furthermore, Assad employed state security forces and the Syrian military to suppress any challenges to his consistent control of power.

On the other hand, there are several differences between the countries particularly certain factors of their respective Arab Spring uprising namely the actions of the military, the decision of the dissidents to escalate to violence, and the eventual outcome of the interaction. Egypt provides an illustration of a single party regime with a longstanding authoritarian leader who lost his position of power during the Arab Spring despite facing a peaceful, nonviolent dissident campaign. Conversely, Syria proved to be an example of a less tenured and arguably weaker leader who still continues to fight to maintain his political power as the dissidents escalated to violence, evolving into a civil war.

4.1.1. Expectations for Egypt in the Arab Spring

In regards to my proposed theories, Egypt provides a compelling demonstration of an interaction between dissidents and a single party regime. Although Mubarak retained presidential political power for over thirty years through the Emergency Laws established in 1981, the National Democratic Party (NDP) provided the primary vehicle for policy making, and bureaucratic advancement. With over one million members, the NDP allowed for Mubarak to maintain political power through five presidential elections. In accordance with the proposed theories, I expect that when faced with the nonviolent nature of the Egyptian Arab Spring uprisings, the Mubarak regime is unlikely to provide the desired concessions of the opposition. The nonviolent nature of the

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20 While Geddes, Wright, and Frantz code Egypt as a party-personal-military regime, the Mubarak regime used the National Democratic Party (NDP) as the primary mechanism for political policy making and advancement in the Egyptian bureaucracy. Moreover, the mass number of members within the NDP along with the Emergency Laws provided the necessary protection for Mubarak to retain his political power.
Egyptian uprising did not present a significant challenge to the survival of the regime and thus, it is less costly for the regime to not provide the desired concessions.

Moreover, the case of the Egyptian Arab Spring also demonstrates an interesting illustration of my theory proposed for the decision making of the dissidents. As noted in the human rights reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch below, the Mubarak regime engaged in various methods of human rights violations and the suppression of the Egyptian population. Therefore, with this extensive demonstration of his willingness and capacity to repress, I expect that the Egyptian population who engaged in protest against the Mubarak regime will remain nonviolent. The dissidents are strategic actors and operate in a manner to not only to attain their goals but also to maintain their survival. Since the Mubarak regime consistently demonstrated his repressive capacity, the Egyptian dissidents understand the ultimate outcome if they would escalate to violence against the government; therefore, they are more likely to remain nonviolent in their opposition to Mubarak.

4.1.2. Expectations for Syria in the Arab Spring

Syria also provides an interesting example of the theories regarding the interaction between dissidents and a personalist regime outlined in this work. While the Assad regime used the Ba’ath Party in Syria to ensure his continued control over political power, he only permitted a small number of members within the political party and instead relied on a small group of loyal supporters comprised of family members and other members of the Alawites to maintain his regime. In accordance to my proposed theories, I expect that the Assad regime would resist

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21 While Geddes, Wright, and Frantz code Syria as a party-personal-military regime, the Hafiz al Assad regime purged the Ba’ath Party of many members in 1970 and limited the party to a small number of members in comparison to the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt. Bashar al Assad continued this practice and used a small group of loyal supporters to maintain his control over political power through a personalist regime.
providing the dissidents with their preferred reforms and goals. The personalist regime controlled by Assad depends on the maintenance of the political status quo with a small number of loyal supporters ensuring the continued control of political power. If the regime provided the preferred reforms of the dissidents, it would motivate the destruction of the foundation the regime was constructed upon. Therefore, I expect that the regime will refrain from giving into the desired concessions of the dissidents.

Furthermore, the case of the Syrian Arab Spring provides a compelling illustration of my theory regarding the decision making of the dissidents. The human rights reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch indicate the Assad regime engaged in repression of the Syrian population; however, as noted by several studies, there were significant differences between the human rights record of Bashar al Assad regime and the human rights record his predecessor, Hafiz al Assad. While his father committed mass atrocities during his reign, Bashar al Assad was not as repressive and the overall environment was more free in comparison (Lesch 2007; Zisser 2005). Moreover, the “Damascus Spring” incited a period of political openness and the possibility of political and economic reforms. While the “Damascus Spring” was followed by the “Damascus Winter”, Bashar al Assad never achieved the same support and respect that Hafiz al Assad gained. In the end, the actions and inactions by Assad portrayed a weaker leader (Zisser 2005), which provided significant information to the dissidents. Therefore, with the period of inconsistent repression and decision making, the dissidents likely anticipated an opportunity to gain their preferred concessions if they presented a significant challenge to the regime. Despite the demonstration of the repressive capacity of the regime, Assad did not display a persistent willingness to repress any challenge to the regime. Thus, I expect that the Syrian dissidents were more likely to escalate to violence targeted at the regime to possibly gain their desired concessions.
As the Assad regime depends on retaining the current political institution to remain in political power, I expect that the regime would respond to dissidents with violence in kind, leading to civil conflict between the belligerents.

4.1.3. Overview of the Chapter

In each section, I begin with a brief overview of the various characteristics of the political regime and its political leadership as well as how prominent political regime datasets classify the particular regimes and its common traits and characteristics. I also discuss the political history of the country, their leaders and predecessors, and certain significant events which impacted the present-day regime as well as the current relationship between the general population of the respective country and the government. Moreover, I attempt to explain how the institutional arrangement of the government and regime influenced the responses of the regime to contentious challenges by the dissidents.

Next, I examine the legacy of regime repression and how this may influence dissident behavior of whether to escalate to violence or remain nonviolent during the contentious interactions in the Arab Spring. In order to conduct this analysis, I analyzed Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch country reports for a five year period one year prior to the beginning of the Arab Spring\(^{22}\), specifically 2005-2009. I then discuss the main events during the Arab Spring from both the perspective of the dissidents as well as the regime. Finally, I conclude the chapter

\(^{22}\) This is the same coding rule I use in the prior chapter “Legacy of Brutality” where I observe the human rights scores of countries in order to determine whether the particular regime demonstrated a legacy of regime repression prior to the outbreak of the specific dissident campaign. It is expected that if the regime has clearly demonstrated a willingness and capacity to repress any challengers to the tenure of the regime, the dissidents will comprehend that it has a minimal probability of surviving and will therefore, decide to remain nonviolent. On the other hand, if the regime failed to show its willingness and repressive capacity, it provides information to the dissidents that they have the opportunity to gain their desired concessions/changes. This is not to say that they believe that the regime will not counter a demonstration by using repression; instead, the dissidents perceive that they can withstand or eventually win against the regime if the regime has not demonstrated their willingness and capacity to repress.
by offering an analysis and discussion regarding the outcome of the contentious interactions between the political actors and how this corresponds with the proposed theories and hypotheses.

4.2. Egypt

4.2.1. Political Background of Egypt

The Arab Republic of Egypt under Hosni Mubarak was officially designated as a republican government. Stephan and Linz (2013) note that Egypt is an “authoritarian-democratic hybrid” as the regime demonstrates traits of both democratic and authoritarian regime types. On one hand, the regime provides certain aspects of democracy through elections; however, the regime also retains complete control of political power through authoritarian methods. Goldstone (2011) similarly argues that Egypt is a “sultanistic” regime and demonstrates attributes of both democracies and autocracies as it possesses certain democratic elements but the regime maintains its power using non-democratic means. Additionally, they created a patronage system through the military to ensure their continued control of political power.

In the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz dataset (GWF Autocratic Regimes 1.2 dataset), Egypt is designated as a triple-threat or hybrid regime, namely party-personal-military regime (Geddes et al. 2014). In this manner, the primary political party - the National Democratic Party (NDP) - was controlled by President Mubarak in a single party regime since it provided an avenue for legislation and bureaucratic influence as well as personal advancement. Moreover, while Mubarak

23 Geddes (1999) noted the same hybrid regime or triple threat for Egypt in her earlier work. Most of the other prominent regime type and political rights datasets demonstrate similar findings for Egypt. The Polity IV dataset ranks Egypt as “-6” from 1981 to 2004 on a scale of 10 to -10 with 10 being a full democracy and a -10 being a full autocracy. In 2005, the score changes to -3 likely because this is the first year that Mubarak and the NDP permitted a multiparty presidential election rather than relying on a parliamentary referendum (Marshall and Cole 2014). The Authoritarian Regimes Data set classifies Egypt during the Mubarak regime as a “limited multiparty” regime (Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Wahman et al. 2012). Finally, the Freedom House scores rank Egypt as “not free” for both political rights and civil liberties scores throughout the entirety of the Mubarak tenure (Freedom House).
controlled the primary political party, he also practiced significant influence over other aspects of the government to include the judiciary and the legislative branches. Finally, the military played a significant role in the country as Mubarak came from the military and it continued to offer loyal protection to the Mubarak regime (Deeb 2007).

The NDP played a significant role in government and politics as it serves as the channel or vehicle for political or bureaucratic advancement as well as benefits and privileges to its members and supporters. The NDP itself did not espouse a particular political ideology; however, its real power rested in its patron-client relationship with Mubarak as well as its supporters. Furthermore, this relationship is significant as first, it ensured that Mubarak remained in control of political power while the NDP and Mubarak gained patrons within the general population through the members of the NDP. Second, the NDP gaining a majority in the People’s Assembly projected an image of a democratic government; however, this is a façade as Mubarak controlled the ability to push through his policies via his control of the NDP as secretary general of the party. Since the beginning of his tenure, the People’s Assembly was designed to operate as a check on Mubarak’s powers but it only served as a rubber stamp for the president through the NDP maintaining a majority of members in the parliament. Finally, while the constitution notes that if the president rules through decrees during the emergency law period, his work must be ratified by the People’s Assembly after the emergency rule ends. Despite this, the emergency rule never ended throughout his tenure and the constitutional powers of the legislature were largely in name only as Mubarak always made the final decisions on legislation (Deeb 2007; Palmer 2007).
4.2.2. The Hosni Mubarak Regime

On October 6, 1981, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was killed by Islamists who were angered over his peace treaty with Israel. Mubarak was immediately promoted and sworn in as president of Egypt. While he released many of the political prisoners Sadat imprisoned, he immediately instituted the emergency laws in Egypt, which were in place until the end of his presidency during the Arab Spring in 2011. The emergency laws provide sweeping powers to the Egyptian president over the safety and security of the country through the suspension of constitutional rights and the expansion of state and police power. Thus, despite the country possessing a large legislative body with a limited independent judiciary, Mubarak wielded complete control over Egypt through a political system emphasized by an incredibly strong president (Deeb 2007; McDermott 1988; Palmer 2007; Sorenson 2008).

Throughout his tenure, Mubarak won the presidency five times and apart from the 2005 election, he was confirmed in a referendum for all terms. The 2005 election was the first multi-party presidential election during Mubarak’s tenure as president. Prior to the constitutional amendment that permitted this change in the presidential elections, Mubarak gained his position through a simple approve/reject referendum despite a significantly low turnout. Furthermore, he gained his appointment for the presidential position through possessing a majority that the National Democratic Party (NDP) gained in the People’s Assembly (Deeb 2007; Palmer 2007).

To ensure they gained a majority in the Egyptian legislature, Mubarak and the National Democratic Party employed various means. They practiced methods such as electoral fraud and manipulation of the electoral process (Deeb 2007; Kienle 1998; Thaubet 2006; Masoud 2011); mass imprisonment of opposition party supporters at rallies (Brownlee 2002a; Shahin 2005; Shahin 2012) or prior to voting (Kienle 1998); forcibly blocking opposition supporters from voting.
particularly the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (Brownlee 2002a; Palmer 2007); and the use of thugs loyal to the regime to create havoc and destroy polling stations (Kienle 1998).

In the 2000 parliamentary elections, Mubarak and the National Democratic Party faced a dire situation that could have influenced the outcome and behavior of the Egyptian presidency and parliament alike. During the first round of elections, the NDP candidates only gained a meager 39 percent of the total number of parliamentary seats (444), which would have failed to provide Mubarak the necessary rubber stamp on his policies and decisions (Brownlee 2002a; Deeb 2007). Although this electoral showing demonstrated that the public who actually voted did not prefer the policies of legislation of the NDP, 181 of the independent candidates who won in the first round of elections unexpectedly switched back to the NDP. Additionally, 35 independent candidates with no previous affiliation with the NDP also joined the NDP after winning their first round seat. This transition back to the NDP provided the party with 88 percent of the parliament seats and consequently, a majority in the People’s Assembly, which gave Mubarak the necessary power to push through his presidential decisions without legislative challenges (Brownlee 2002a).

In the 2005 presidential elections, Egyptians were finally given the opportunity to vote in a multiparty election when Ayman Nour, leader of the El Ghad political party, ran against Mubarak. Nour particularly challenged Mubarak when he publicly criticized him for the grooming of his son, Gamal Mubarak, as a future successor (Deeb 2007; Joffe 2011; Palmer 2007). During the election period, Nour was arrested twice for questionable charges with political overtones and remained imprisoned for five years after the second arrest. In the end, while only 23 percent of the voting age population actually casted a ballot at the polls, Mubarak won the election for his fifth term in the presidency (Deeb 2007; Joffe 2011; Palmer 2007). In the 2010 elections, this outcome continued as the NDP and Mubarak easily won again with 93 percent of the overall vote through
the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and election laws making it difficult for the opposition political parties to contest the election (Rutherford 2013; Shehata 2011). Furthermore, the new election rules also made it clear that Mubarak was creating an easier path for Gamal Mubarak to succeed him as president of Egypt (Shehata 2011).

4.2.3. Egyptian Human Rights Record (2005-2009)

In order to comprehend the atmosphere the Egyptian population faced prior to the Arab Spring, I consulted the Amnesty International Reports and Human Rights Watch World Report for Egypt during the five years prior to the uprisings in 2011.\textsuperscript{24} I combined the findings for the two organizations together for each year as the reports are highly similar. I discuss the various developments during the year including arbitrary arrest and detention; torture; restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly; and killings conducted by the state.

4.2.3.1. Egypt 2005

In 2005, Egypt continued to face a repressive Mubarak regime as little reform occurred during the year. The government continued to restrict the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly for the Egyptian population (Amnesty International 2006a; Human Rights Watch 2006a). In addition, the emergency laws remained in place, which was declared by Mubarak in 1981. The emergency law were utilized by Mubarak to ensure a parliamentary majority to retain political power as well as to suppress the constitutional rights and freedoms particularly to prohibit the outbreak of protests and demonstrations throughout Egypt (Deeb 2007; Palmer 2007).

\textsuperscript{24} I use the same logic from the “Legacy of Brutality: How Low Level Political Violence Evolves into Civil War” as I used the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports for the six years prior to the onset of the political unrest. I avoid using the reports for 2010 as this may be endogenous to the onset of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and therefore report the results from 2005-2009. The reports for each year are designated for the year prior.
During the 2005 presidential and parliamentarian elections, there were a number of reports of electoral irregularities, fraud, and manipulation. This marked the first contested presidential election in the history of Egypt as Ayman Nour opposed Mubarak in the election. During the elections, Nour was imprisoned on questionable charges of fraudulently obtaining signatures to legalize the al-Ghad party (Deeb 2007; Joffe 2011; Palmer 2007). Furthermore, violence associated with the elections broke out throughout Egypt as eleven civilians were killed and many more were wounded. The Egyptian security forces arrested several supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood while others were violently attacked by supporters of the National Democratic Party (NDP). During the violent outbreaks, the Egyptian police employed live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas into the crowds at the polling stations. In the end, the regime turned a blind eye to the violence committed by the supporters of the NDP (Amnesty International 2006a).

Egypt continued to arrest and detain individuals who opposed the regime. Reports note that 10,000 to 15,000 civilians remained detained in prison without official charges. This activity is permitted under the auspices of the emergency laws. Furthermore, in 2005, the State Security Investigation (SSI) of the Ministry of Interior conducted mass arbitrary arrests of 2,500 to 3,000 civilians in connection to a car bombing terrorist incident in October 2004. By April 2005, 2,000 of these individuals were still detained without charge according to the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) (Amnesty International 2006a; Human Rights Watch 2006a).

Throughout the year, Egyptian security forces and police employed torture against detainees particularly during interrogation in an effort to gain a confession. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) reported that seventeen individuals were killed while in custody of security forces and police during the period of May 2004 and July 2005. Furthermore, a ranking official in the Ministry of Interior reported that the Mubarak regime had not investigated
any of the SSI officials on the allegations of torture while the government did not impose any punitive measures against the officials over the previous nineteen years (Amnesty International 2006a; Human Rights Watch 2006a).

The Mubarak regime also restricted the freedom of association and expression for the Egyptian population. Under Law 84/2002, the government was granted the unlimited control over the actions of non-governmental organizations to include criminal punishments for unauthorized activity by political parties and unions. The Political Parties Law (Law 40/1956) was passed in July 2005, which authorized the Political Parties Affairs Committee (PPC) to reject any application for political parties. Moreover, the committee may suspend the political party if the national interest of Egypt dictates this action. Finally, the Law on Political Rights (Law 73/1956) provides for criminal punishment for journalists who are found to publish “false information” that may influence the results of elections. In 2005, twenty-two journalists were called upon by the government for writing work that was critical of Egyptian public officials (Human Rights Watch 2006a).

4.2.3.2. Egypt 2006

In 2006, the Egyptian government renewed the emergency laws for an additional two years despite the promise by Mubarak to allow it to expire in 2006. Mubarak instead argued that a renewal of the emergency laws were necessary since no other legislation existed that concentrated on and combatted against the issue of terrorism (Amnesty International 2007a; Human Rights Watch 2007a).

Mass and arbitrary imprisonment continued to remain an issue within Egypt in 2006. During the period between March and July 2006, the Egyptian security services arrested and
detained 792 Muslim Brotherhood members. The increase in arrests and detainment occurred during the rise of protests and demonstrations for free and fair elections as well as judicial independence in Egypt (Amnesty International 2007a; Human Rights Watch 2007a). Moreover, reports by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) estimated that 18,000 Egyptians were still being detained without a charge or trial. On the other hand, the Ministry of Interior denied this figure and reported that less than 4,000 individuals were detained by Egyptian forces (Amnesty International 2007a).

On December 30, 2005, Egyptian police forces were deployed to suppress 2,000 Sudanese refugees during a protest near the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Despite the presence of police forces, the demonstrations continued for three months. By the end of the three months, twenty-seven Sudanese nationals were killed including women and children while many others were detained. Furthermore, on April 24, 2006, Egyptian police officers dressed in plain clothes attacked human rights activists during a protest in support of a number of judges who criticized the 2005 election irregularities and called for greater judicial independence for Egyptian courts. During other related demonstrations, the Egyptian police officers wounded more than twenty-four protesters and detained hundreds of others (Human Rights Watch 2007a).

The use of torture and ill treatment of political detainees were commonplace throughout Egypt and these practices led to a number of deaths while the individuals were in custody (Amnesty International 2007a; Human Rights Watch 2007a). Reports noted that the Egyptian forces used various methods of torture to include electric shocks, beatings, hanging, and sexual abuse of those detained. Many of these torture methods were practiced while the Egyptian police were interrogating the individuals. Conversely, a number of police officers were tried by Egyptian courts
for the use of torture against prisoners; however, few allegations of torture were investigated by the authorities (Amnesty International 2007a).

In June 2006, the Egyptian government passed a new law regarding the judiciary, which was criticized by the opposition as well as pro-reform justices as the new law contained no provisions for judicial independence. Additionally, it provided no requirements for ensuring fair trials for defendants (Amnesty International 2007a). Furthermore, in July 2006, Mubarak signed a new Egyptian press law, which permitted the government to detain journalists accused of publishing news that may adversely affect the national interest of Egypt. Throughout the year, several journalists and publishers were beaten, detained, and imprisoned in cases of defamation, insulting the president of Egypt, and criticizing the government or judiciary (Amnesty International 2007a; Human Rights Watch 2007a).

4.2.3.3. Egypt 2007

In 2007, Egyptians witnessed the strengthening of the government and security forces at the expense of their constitutional and human rights. On March 21, 2007, the Egyptian government passed thirty-four constitutional amendments regarding the emergency laws. These new amendments provided the Egyptian police with widespread powers over the population by allowing security and police forces to arbitrarily detain individuals in question without formal charges and search their property if the case is related to terrorism. Furthermore, the individuals may face trial before exceptional courts or military tribunals if deemed necessary by the Egyptian president (Amnesty International 2008a; Human Rights Watch 2008a).

Throughout 2007, the Egyptian government arrested thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members while forty senior members were tried before military courts without the constitutional
rights of fair trial and access to representation. Moreover, reports estimate that 4,000 to 5,000 Egyptians still remain detained in prison without formal charges (Human Rights Watch 2008a). The regime also used the issue of terrorism to imprison an additional unknown number of Egyptian nationals who faced detainment and torture by security forces. There were widespread reports of the use of torture and ill treatment of individuals detained by security forces, which resulted in approximately twenty deaths while being detained. Moreover, these reports also noted that security forces used torture methods such as electric shock, hanging, threats of death, attacks on relatives of the detainees, and sexual abuse (Amnesty International 2008a; Human Rights Watch 2008a).

In 2007, there were several reports of discrimination against women specifically regarding the issues of marital and divorce rights, inheritance, and custody. Moreover, Egypt continued to lack punitive legislation and laws to deter domestic violence against women. The Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights (ECWR) reported an increase in 2007 in sexual harassment and violence directed at women as 247 women were killed in Egypt (Amnesty International 2008a). On the other hand, the Egyptian Ministry of Health issued legislation which criminalizing female genital mutilation within the country as this has continued to be a human rights issue in Egypt (Human Rights Watch 2008a).

4.2.3.4. Egypt 2008

In 2008, the Egyptian government renewed the emergency laws for an additional two years pending the creation of new terrorism legislation despite opposition by the overall population. New legislation targeting journalists were also passed by the regime. Under the new laws, journalists whose work harmed the national unity and public order in Egypt could face three years in prison (Amnesty International 2009a).
Throughout the year, there were several cases of Egyptian security forces infringing on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. In March 2009, it was reported that 711 Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested on the charge of membership in an illegal organization over the previous four months. Furthermore, during the period of April 5 and 6, 2009, the regime targeted journalists and political opposition groups specifically the Muslim Brotherhood during a nationwide strike. The government announced on April 5 that all demonstrations were banned throughout Egypt. The protests that did proceed were met with violent suppression by Egyptian security forces, resulting in three deaths and over twenty-four civilians wounded (Amnesty International 2009a; Human Rights Watch 2009a). Finally, there were several reports of journalists being targeted by security officers for their work which criticized Egyptian government policies and the human rights record of the Mubarak regime. Many of these journalists were detained and imprisoned for defamation and producing work that disrupted the public order (Human Rights Watch 2009a).

During 2008, there were widespread reports of torture and ill treatment of individuals by police forces and State Security Investigation Service (SSI) forces while detained at police stations and SSI detention centers. The police and security forces did not face punitive measures for their actions and many threatened those who filed complaints with further detainment or the arrest of their relatives. Moreover, there were several reports of death while in custody as a result of torture and ill treatment (Amnesty International 2009a; Human Rights Watch 2009a).

4.2.3.5. Egypt 2009

In 2009, the Egyptian government continued to operate under the emergency laws while devising a new anti-terrorism law, which many feared would permit widespread human rights
violations (Amnesty International 2010a). During the June elections for the Shura Council, there were several claims of electoral fraud and voter intimidation. Moreover, the elections for the People’s Assembly were generally viewed as flawed when Egyptian security forces arrested 487 Muslim Brotherhood members while campaigning for the members running as independents in the election. 288 of these Muslim Brotherhood members were detained on charges of membership in an illegal organization. The parliamentary elections were equally flawed as many individuals cited limited judicial supervision over the fairness of the elections (Human Rights Watch 2010a).

The Mubarak regime and security forces continued to infringe on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression throughout Egypt (Amnesty International 2010a; Human Rights Watch 2010a). In April 2009, the April 6 Youth Group led a peaceful protest demanding the end of the emergency laws, which was met with suppression by security forces. Over one hundred protesters were arrested while thirty-three of them were tried for attempting to overthrow the Egyptian regime. In June 2009, many more peaceful protests broke out in opposition to the killing of Khaled Said. The security forces countered this dissent by arresting and torturing over one hundred dissidents. Finally, in February 2009, the State Security Investigation Services (SSI) forces arrested sixteen senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood on charges of leading a violent organization against the Egyptian regime. Those arrested were released after two months of detainment (Human Rights Watch 2010a).

Torture and ill treatment were widespread and commonplace throughout Egypt in police stations and SSI detention areas. Four civilians died while in custody as a result of torture and ill treatment. Despite these developments, the forces responsible for the torture and killings were not punished by the Egyptian government (Amnesty International 2010a). Moreover, there were many
reports of disappearances of individuals detained by SSI forces. Several of these cases involved individuals associated with Islamic groups (Human Rights Watch 2010a).

4.2.4. The Egyptian Arab Spring

After the uprisings in Tunisia in December 2010 and January 2011, the sensation of revolution moved to Egypt where Mubarak regime and Egyptian dissidents encountered a series of actions and counter actions for two weeks and three days. Similar to the dissidents in Tunisia, the Egyptians demanded economic reforms, job creation, democratization and political rights, the end of the emergency law, the release of political prisoners, and a change in their government. Furthermore, the dissident opposition were composed of the youth of the society and labor organizations while the movement largely avoided being controlled by religious groups (Cinar and Gocer 2014; Gelvin 2012; Hasseb 2012; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011, Nepstad 2013; Shehata 2011)\textsuperscript{25}. The date of January 25, 2011 saw the beginnings of the Egyptian Arab Spring as Egypt witnessed a mass day of protest in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Immediately, the direct target of this uprising or the “Day of Anger” was President Hosni Mubarak and the dissidents demand that he resign from the office. During the course of the dissident activity, the Mubarak regime attempted to disrupt the protest by shutting down the internet and mobile telephone networks. On the following day, the Egyptian police countered the dissident activity and dispersed the protesters in Tahrir Square using repression measures specifically tear gas and beatings. Hundreds of individuals were detained including the protesters as well as journalists covering the events (Blight et al. 2012; Gelvin 2012; Hasseb 2012; Josua and Edel 2015; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013).

\textsuperscript{25} The Muslim Brotherhood became more involved in the dissent in the April 6 Movement. At this point, they demanded changes in the human rights record of the Egyptian government as well as a move toward democratization.
On January 28, 2011, the dissidents returned and occupied Tahrir Square while similar oppositional developments broke out with thousands of dissidents in Cairo, Suez, and Alexandria. The Mubarak regime initially responded with the interruption of internet service in Cairo and Tahrir Square. The Egyptian police were also deployed to suppress the dissidents but took a more violent approach as their tactics included tear gas, beatings with riot batons, and live ammunition against the protesters (Gelvin 2012; Hasseb 2012). Moreover, on January 29, 2011, the regime attempted to suppress the dissidents by changing its tactics through the promises of concessions and accommodation. For the first time in his thirty year tenure, Hosni Mubarak appointed a vice president and he chose Omar Suleiman, his longtime loyal intelligence chief. Additionally, he dismissed the Egyptian government and promised that a new cabinet would be formed; however, he adamantly stood steadfast against the idea of resigning from the presidency (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013). Finally, a televised interview of Wael Ghonim, the founder of the “We are all Khaled Said” movement on Facebook, aired on television, where he reported that he was kidnapped and imprisoned by the Mubarak regime for a period of ten days (Gelvin 2012; Joffe 2011; Josua and Edel 2015).

During this period, the Mubarak regime deployed state security forces and the Egyptian police in order to disperse the dissidents; however, the Egyptian military did not engage the dissidents. On January 31, 2011, the military officially stated that they would not fire on the protesters. On the next day, the Egyptian military refused to fire on the dissidents in Tahrir Square as ordered to by the Mubarak regime (Anderson 2011; Gelvin 2012; Ozekin and Akkas 2014; Shehata 2011). Seeing this, Mubarak attempted to suppress the dissident activity through concessions by promising that he would step down after the next presidential election to usher in

26 Khaled Said was beaten and killed by Egyptian police officers after he posted a video online of the officers taking money and drugs from a drug bust. (Joffe 2011; Josua and Edel 2015)
a new president; however, he argued that during the transition period, he would remain in office. Unfortunately for Mubarak, the dissidents were unimpressed with this promise and continued their demonstrations (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Hasseb 2012; Gelvin 2012; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013).

Mubarak had unsuccessfully attempted accommodation and concessions so he changed his approach to combat the lingering dissent. On February 2 and 3, 2011, the regime deployed thugs and loyal regime supporters to attack the Egyptian protesters in Tahrir Square. Using various weapons, they wounded a mass number of dissidents. During these days of violence, the military continued their refusal to operate against the dissidents and remained on the sidelines of the confrontations. Despite the number of individuals wounded in the demonstrations on February 2 and 3, 2011, the protesters returned to Tahrir Square on February 4, 2011 as hundreds of thousands of dissidents occupied the area during the “Day of Departure.” Despite this showing, Mubarak refused to step down and give up power of Egypt (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Gelvin 2012; Hasseb 2012; Shehata 2011).

During this period, the dissidents were not deterred by the repressive actions of the regime and continued to occupy Tahrir Square and other areas throughout Egypt. On February 7, 2011, Mubarak attempted another counter movement of accommodation. The Egyptian cabinet agreed to increase the salaries and pensions for public sector workers by 15 percent. The regime intended to detract the dissidents from their continued dissent; however, they held their ground and publicly announced that they wanted Mubarak to resign from the presidency. Finally, on February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned from the Egyptian presidency and the military took power over the government (Blight et al. 2012; Gelvin 2012; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013; Rutherford 2013). The dissidents gathered in Tahrir Square to celebrate the new development; however, in the
immediate aftermath, the Egyptian military announced that they would rule Egypt through martial law and the constitution would be suspended until future elections (Blight et al. 2012; Josua and Edel 2015).

The failure of the Egyptian military to intervene during the Egyptian Arab Spring has inspired much speculation into why they did not suppress the dissidents in Tahrir Square and other areas of uprising. Some scholars argue that the leaders in the Egyptian military actually believed in the spirit of the revolution or that the military was led by Egyptian patriotism (Masoud 2011). Others maintained a political and economic argument (Masoud 2011; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013). The Egyptian military did not agree with the power transition within Egypt as the NDP gained more power at the expense of the military (Masoud 2011). Furthermore, the new election laws clearly identified that Mubarak was moving toward giving presidential power to his son, Gamal Mubarak. It was no secret that Mubarak was grooming his son for the position and this succession could directly affect the military. During Mubarak’s tenure, he relied on the Egyptian military to maintain his executive power and to suppress any challenge to his regime. In return for his protection, he created a patronage relationship with the military as he permitted the military to gain control over aspects of the real estate industry as well as other assets. This amounted into the Egyptian military gaining control over approximately 40 percent of the economy in Egypt. With the possible introduction of Gamal Mubarak as president of Egypt, the military believed that he would alter economic policies and implement privatization policies which would negatively affect the military and their financial assets. In the end, there was an incentive for the military to not suppress the dissidents and allow for Mubarak to step down from power over Egypt (Dalacoura 2012; Josua and Edel 2015; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013; Rutherford 2013).
4.3. Syria

4.3.1. Political Background of Syria

Syria is officially designated as a republican government. Stephan and Linz (2013) classify Syria as a “sultanistic” regime since the Alawites have maintained control of political power in Damascus through two generations, namely Hafiz al-Assad and his son, Bashar. Furthermore, the Assad regime consistently wielded significantly strong control of the security element within the country and consequently, this permitted the Assad regime to maintain an unyielding grip on power. Goldstone (2011), on the other hand, groups Syria in the same category as Egypt as he categorizes the regime as “sultanistic” as these regime types demonstrate certain democratic and authoritarian traits. While the government may have a few democratic elements within its political system, the regime maintains its control of political power through authoritarian means, typically through the development of a patron-client relationship with the military to ensure continued rule of government.

In the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz dataset (GWF Autocratic Regimes 1.2 dataset), Syria is classified as a triple-threat or hybrid regime, specifically a party-personal-military regime (Geddes et al. 2014). Throughout the tenure of Hafiz al Assad as well as Bashar al Assad, the regime relied on two entities to ensure its continued control of political power: the Ba’ath Party and the Syrian military. The Ba’ath Party was tightly controlled by the Assad regime as the president serves as the secretary-general of the political party and therefore, controlled who gained influence.

27 Geddes (1999) notes a similar classification for Syria in her previous work. The other significant datasets on regime type and political rights report similar findings in their work. The Polity IV dataset ranks Syria as “-9” during Hafiz al Assad’s tenure from 1970 to 1999 while the Bashar al Assad regime ranks as a “-7” from 2000 to 2011. These scores are based on a scale of 10 to -10 with 10 being strongly democratic and a -10 being strongly autocratic. In 2011, the score changes to -9 due to the onset of the Syrian Arab Spring (Marshall and Cole 2014). The Authoritarian Regimes Data set classifies Syria during both Assad regimes as a “military one party” regime (Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Wahman et al. 2012). Finally, the Freedom House scores rank Syria as “not free” for both political rights and civil liberties scores throughout the tenure of both Assad regimes (Freedom House).
through politics and the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the majority of the officers in the Syrian military are Alawites who gained their position through patronage from the regime. Hafiz al Assad himself progressed through the military officer ranks before his political control of Syria and during his presidency, used the military to ensure stability within the country (Cleveland 2004; Lesch 2007; Palmer 2007; Seale 1988).

Similar to the National Democratic Party in Egypt, the Ba’ath Party played an important role in Syrian government and politics as it served as a vehicle for political or bureaucratic advancement as well as providing benefits and privileges to its supporters. Furthermore, the arrangement of the Ba’ath Party provided Assad with significant political insulation from the Syrian population as they had little to no influence of the actions of the government. While Assad introduced a new constitution in 1973 which provided for the creation of the People’s Assembly, the constitution also included extensive powers reserved exclusively for the Syrian executive. Moreover, Assad controlled the Ba’ath Party in his role as the secretary general and the legislature was completely controlled by the Ba’ath Party. Additionally, Assad gave key positions in the government, bureaucracy, and security to family members and those of the Alawite sect (Brownlee 2002b; Cleveland 2004; Droz-Vincent 2014; Heydemann 2013; Lesch 2007; Ozekin and Akkas 2014; Palmer 2007; Seale 1988). While the Assad regime did provide limited elements of democracy such as direct presidential and legislative elections, it never truly reflected a democracy. Throughout his reign of power in Syria, Hafiz al Assad won five unopposed elections with 99 percent of the vote. In addition, Assad ensured his perpetual control of Syria through Decree Number 51 or the Emergency Law, which permitted the regime to disregard the laws of the country during times of crisis in exchange for stability and security of Syria. Although the decree was originally introduced in 1963 as a measure to overcome the rising threat of Israel, the
The Syrian military also played a significant role in ensuring the maintenance of power for the Assad regimes. When Assad gained political power over Syria, he and his supporters removed the civilian wing of the Ba’ath Party and purged the military of 400 officers who remained loyal to the civilian wing. In order to ensure loyalty and stability, Assad filled the officer ranks with Alawites loyal to him as well as a small number of certain Sunnis in order to silence Sunni opposition to his rule. This was particularly important as he garnered little support in most of the country since he was a minority Alawite in a dominant Sunni population. Through this approach, most of the military officers owed him their rank and the benefits associated with these positions. As they preferred to continue to enjoy these benefits, they remained loyal to Assad and consequently, ensured that he retained control of power. By strengthening the military and filling the officer ranks with loyal Alawites, he created a patronage system and ensured his unfettered hold on power in Syria (Brownlee 2002b; Cleveland 2004; Droz-Vincent 2014; Heydemann 2013; Lesch 2007; Lesch 2013; Ozekin and Akkas 2014; Palmer 2007; Seale 1988; Stephan and Linz 2013).

Despite the loyalty of the Syrian military and the construction of the government, Assad faced internal challenges to his rule during the early years of his tenure. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood openly opposed the Assad regime while operating in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. In 1976, the Muslim Brotherhood escalated their opposition to violence through an approach of bombings and targeted assassinations against Alawite officials in the Ba’ath Party and the Assad regime. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations created an umbrella group called the Islamic Front, which pursued a violent effort to topple the Assad
regime and create an Islamic state in Syria. The group also unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Assad in 1980. While Assad attempted to suppress the uprising, the challengers continued their violent struggle and gained control over Hama. Assad responded to this development by deploying the Syrian military and security forces to the city and laying siege to the area. The forces destroyed much of the infrastructure of Hama and killed 5,000 to 25,000 individuals including Islamist opposition members as well as civilians living in the city. This event served as a symbol of the Assad regime and the great lengths the regime would resort to in ensuring the stability of the country and the continued control of power (Cleveland 2004; Droz-Vincent 2014; Gelvin 2012; Hasseb 2012; Lynch 2012; Seale 1988; Sorenson 2008).

4.3.2. The Bashar al Assad Regime

When Hafiz al Assad died while in office in 2000, his son, Bashar al Assad assumed control over Syria on July 17, 2000. He was a western educated ophthalmologist and many wondered if he would lead Syria to a new era with a more transparent government, which observed humanitarian international law. Furthermore, the expectations for the new regime were high in the eyes of many Syrians as Bashar emphasized economic reform and possible political changes for the future of Syria in his early speeches after assuming the presidency. The first year of Bashar’s reign came to be known as the “Damascus Spring”, which marked a possible watershed event in Syrian history as this period ushered in a stage of political openness. Assad released hundreds of political prisoners who were imprisoned by his father, Hafiz. Furthermore, he permitted and encouraged the Syrian population to openly assemble in groups to discuss and critique the potential for new political directions in the country. (Gelvin 2012; Lesch 2007; Lesch 2013; Lynch 2012; Rand 2013; Sorenson 2008; Zisser 2005)
Seeing this potential opening in the Syrian political system, the former loyal supporters of the Hafiz al Assad regime influenced Bashar by warning him of the possible negative effects of this new transformation in Syrian politics and government. The new direction in Syrian politics could have detrimental effects on their positions and personal benefits as well as the stability of the Assad regime. Therefore, the Damascus Spring quickly turned into the Damascus Winter by the fall season of 2001. During this new period, the political openness quickly closed as the Assad regime shut down private newspapers, detained many human rights and political activists, and suppressed any domestic criticism and influence of the Syrian government (Gelvin 2012; Landis and Pace 2007; Lesch 2007; Lesch 2013; Lynch 2012; Rand 2013; Sorenson 2008; Zisser 2005). Despite the suppression of the political openness in the Damascus Winter, the Bashar al Assad regime was significantly different from the Hafiz al Assad regime. In comparison, the new regime was less repressive than the former and the overall environment was freer. While he did not lead Syria to a more democratic environment, he did not employ the same suppressive tactics as the previous regime (Lesch 2007; Zisser 2005). Furthermore, the Bashar al Assad regime failed to gain the public support, legitimatization, and respect that his father established. He seemed to be a weaker ruler than his father and this may have been the influence of future dissent (Zisser 2005).

4.3.3. Syrian Human Rights Record (2005-2009)

In order to determine the environment the Syrian people faced prior to the Arab Spring, I consulted the Amnesty International Reports and Human Rights Watch World Report for Syria during the five years prior to the uprisings in 2011. I combine the findings together for each year.

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28 I use the same logic from the “Legacy of Brutality: How Low Level Political Violence Evolves into Civil War” as I used the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports for the six years prior to the onset of the political unrest. I avoid using the reports for 2010 as this may be endogenous to the onset of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and therefore report the results from 2005-2009. The reports for each year are designated for the year prior.
as the reports are highly similar. I discuss the developments during the year regarding arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, discrimination against minority ethnic groups, and killings conducted by the state.

4.3.3.1. Syria 2005

In 2005, Syria continued to endure a poor human rights record with no improvement from the previous year. The government continued to severely limit the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly for the Syrian population (Amnesty International 2006b; Human Rights Watch 2006b). In addition, the Emergency Law still remained in place, which was instituted by Hafiz al Assad in 1963. The Emergency Law was used by both Hafiz and Bashar al Assad to restrict and suppress rising domestic threats within Syria (Brownlee 2002b; Cleveland 2004; Lesch 2007; Palmer 2007; Seale 1988).

In March 2005, 312 political prisoners were released by the Assad regime and 190 additional political prisoners were released in November 2005 as an aspect of the reforms instituted by the Assad regime. Despite this display of goodwill, thousands of political prisoners particularly members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party remained detained in prisons throughout Syria (Amnesty International 2006b; Human Rights Watch 2006b). The Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) reported that many political prisoners died while in custody due to torture by Syrian forces (Human Rights Watch 2006b). Moreover, the Assad regime arrested over forty civilians for political issues while more than twenty individuals were imprisoned as prisoners of conscience. The Syrian regime continued to use the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC) and military courts to hear cases with civilians as defendants. The judicial system specifically the SSSC was criticized for lacking judicial independence and impartiality from the Syrian government. In
2005, over forty civilians faced trial before the SSSC and military courts. Many of these individuals were members or at least had an affiliation with banned political parties such the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizb al-Tahrir (Amnesty International 2006b).

Several reports note that the Syrian regime conducted widespread torture and ill treatment of political and criminal prisoners. Two individuals were killed as a result of the torture by the regime. Throughout the country, there were many allegations of the security forces carrying out torture against civilians; however, the regime failed to investigate these reports (Amnesty International 2006b). Moreover, forty-one students were detained at Tishrin University in Latakia, Syria, on charges on affiliation with the group, Sunna al-Hayat (Makers of Life). A number of these students reported they were tortured by Syrian security forces while being detained (Human Rights Watch 2006b). Finally, there were a number of reports that an unknown number of Canadian foreign nationals were detained and tortured in Syria. They were beaten with electric cable, burned, and hung by Syrian security forces. They also were forced to sign statements of confession without reading them (Amnesty International 2006b).

The Kurds in Syria continued to be discriminated against by the policies and activities of the Syrian government and security forces (Amnesty International 2006b; Human Rights Watch 2006b). While they represent less than ten percent of the overall population in Syria (Lesch 2007), the Kurds lack access to rights enjoyed by other Syrian nationals such as education, healthcare, employment and other rights. Moreover, they do not possess Syrian citizenship (Amnesty International 2006b; Human Rights Watch 2006b).
4.3.3.2. Syria 2006

In 2006, Syria did not observe an improvement in the human rights conditions throughout the country. The human rights record of the Assad regime remained poor and actually worsened in comparison to previous years. Furthermore, the Emergency Law remained in place despite the calls for repeal by critics. The government continued to restrict the freedom of expression, assembly, and association for the Syrian population (Amnesty International 2007b; Human Rights Watch 2007b).

The Syrian Human Rights Committee (SHRC) reported that 4000 individuals remained in detention as political prisoners. In 2006, forty individuals were arrested for various political issues to include twenty prisoners of conscience. Those arrested and detained belonged to various political groups, Islamist groups, ethnic groups (Syrian Kurdish Democratic Unity Party), and human rights organizations (Committees for the Revival of Civil Society). Furthermore, over forty Syrians faced trial in front of the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC) and military courts; however, reports note that these courts do not have respect for international standards for fair trials (Amnesty International 2007b). Furthermore, thousands of political prisoners particularly members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party were detained by Syrian security forces. Finally, many human rights activists were targeted, arrested, and detained by the Syrian government on false charges (Human Rights Watch 2007b).

According to Syrian human rights organizations, there were a number of torture and ill treatment cases including at least one Syrian-Canadian national while being held incommunicado by the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI). Moreover, despite the number of allegations of torture within the country, the Syrian governmental authorities did not investigate these claims (Amnesty International 2007b; Human Rights Watch 2007b).
The Syrian government and security forces continued to discriminate against the Kurds in Syria through official policies and activities. They still lacked rights within the country and failed to gain Syrian citizenship. Finally, on March 20, 2006, twenty-four to seventy-five Kurds were arrested by Syrian officials during Nowruz celebrations (Kurdish New Year). During the event, Syrian security forces used tear gas and riot batons to suppress those participating in the celebration (Amnesty International 2007b; Human Rights Watch 2007b).

4.3.3.3. Syria 2007

In 2007, Syrians continued to face an environment ruled under the emergency law where the Syrian security forces still possessed sweeping powers to arrest and detain individuals. The overall human rights record in Syria actually worsened in 2007 as a number of political and human rights activists were imprisoned and sentenced by the government for significant periods. Moreover, the freedom of expression, association, and assembly still remained severely restricted by the Syrian government (Amnesty International 2008b; Human Rights Watch 2008b).

The Syrian government continued to imprison a significant number of individuals for various offenses. 1,500 individuals were arrested for political issues including a number of prisoners of conscience. Hundreds of others who were arrested in previous years still remained in prison during 2007. Over 170 civilians were tried and sentenced by the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC) or military courts after the Syrian regime accused them of being Islamists. Over forty other Syrians were arrested for attending the meeting of the National Council of the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change. At the end of the year, seven of these individuals were still detained incommunicado by state security forces. Four to ten activists were arrested and sentenced to significant prison terms, ranging from three to ten years, for signing the
Beirut-Damascus Declaration, which called for the normalization of relations between Lebanon and Syria (Amnesty International 2008b; Human Rights Watch 2008b).

There were several reports of torture and ill treatment while those detained were in the custody of state security forces. While there were several allegations of torture during custody and detention, government authorities failed to investigate these cases. In June 2007, the SSSC convicted seven men to prison for sentences ranging from five to seven years for their involvement in creating a pro-democracy online discussion group. During the investigation, authorities gained confessions from several of the men through methods of torture. Five other individuals died while in custody as a result of torture and ill treatment (Amnesty International 2008b; Human Rights Watch 2008b). Finally, seven civilians were publicly executed by the state. During their trial before the Field Military Court, they were no afforded legal representation and did not possess the right to appeal the decision of the court. Two of these individuals were under eighteen years old (Amnesty International 2008b).

The Kurds in Syria continued to be discriminated against by the Syrian government and security forces. There were no changes regarding an improvement of social and economic rights as well as Syrian citizenship. In April 2007, eight Kurds were arrested and detained for over a week at the Political Security Branch in Damascus for wearing the colors of the Kurdish flag (Amnesty International 2008b). In addition, Kurdish political leaders were harassed and arrested by the Syrian authorities. One leader, Ma’rouf Mulla Ahmed of the Syrian Kurdish Yekiti Party, was held under incommunicado detention during the year (Human Rights Watch 2008b).
4.3.3.4. Syria 2008

During 2008, Syria continued to be ruled under the Emergency Law permitting Syrian security forces with the power to detain Syrians without arrest warrants. The human rights record in 2008 was overall poor in Syria and the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly were restricted throughout the country (Amnesty International 2009b; Human Rights Watch 2009b). On September 30, 2008, the Syrian government issued Legislative Decree 69, which gave immunity against the prosecution of political, security, police, and customs officials for any crimes committed while on duty (Amnesty International 2009b).

Over forty political activists were arrested by Syrian security forces after attending a meeting for the National Council of the Damascus Declaration. Twelve of these individuals were sentenced to thirty months in prison for “weakening the national sentiment” and “spreading false news affecting the country’s morale” (Human Rights Watch 2009b). Hundreds of others were arrested for various political issues including several prisoners of conscience. Over forty individuals were tried before the SSSC and military courts. Many of these individuals were arrested and tried for their affiliation or membership in Islamists groups (the Muslim Brotherhood), Kurdish groups (Kurdish Future Current), and political reform groups (Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change). A number of these individuals were held by security forces incommunicado for a significant period of time. Finally, during 2008, several journalists were detained for “weakening the national sentiment” and “spreading false information” regarding reports on relations between Syria and Lebanon (Human Rights Watch 2009b).

Several others reported that torture and ill treatment were commonplace as they were beaten and forced to sign false confessions (Amnesty International 2009b; Human Rights Watch 2009b). Eight individuals involved in the National Council of the Damascus Declaration reported
they were beaten by security forces (Human Rights Watch 2009b). Seven others died while in custody of security forces as a result of torture and abuse. Despite the claims of these events, the Syrian government did not officially investigate these torture allegations (Amnesty International 2009b).

In 2008, there were no changes in the economic and political status for the Kurds in Syria as they remained without rights enjoyed by other Syrian nations including state citizenship (Amnesty International 2009b; Human Rights Watch 2009b). On March 20, Syrian security forces opened fire on the Kurds in Qamishli while they celebrated Nowruz (Kurdish New Year). Three Syrian Kurds were killed during the shooting. Furthermore, fifty Kurds were sentenced to prison for demonstrating against the 2005 assassination of Sheikh Ma’shuq al-Khaznawi. Several other Kurdish activists were also detained throughout 2008 (Human Rights Watch 2009b).

4.3.3.5. Syria 2009

In 2009, the human rights record of the Syrian government deteriorated even more than in previous years. The Emergency Law remained in place, giving Syrian security forces sweeping powers of detainment and silencing any opposition. The Syrian regime continued to restrict the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly throughout the country (Amnesty International 2010b; Human Rights Watch 2010b).

Critics of the government, journalists, and political activists as well as members of human rights organizations were detained and sentenced to prison for significantly long periods. Many of these activists faced trial before the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC) and military courts for their offenses. Several human rights lawyers were arrested and remained imprisoned through the end of the year while members of Kurdish parties were also detained for significant periods
Many of these individuals were held incommunicado and reported that they were forced into signing false confessions after being beaten (Amnesty International 2010b). Over forty-five individuals were sentenced by the SSSC for being affiliated with or members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Kurdish activist groups, or unauthorized political groups.

During 2009, there were widespread reports of torture and ill treatment of Syrian civilians. A number of individuals reported that authorities gained confessions under duress while being tortured. Furthermore, seven individuals reported that they were abused while in custody of Syrian security forces. Despite this, the Syrian government did not investigate these allegations (Amnesty International 2010b). Finally, ten Kurdish activists reported that security officials tortured them while detained by Syrian authorities (Human Rights Watch 2010b).

In 2009, the status of Kurds in Syria did not change from previous years as they still did not enjoy political and economic rights as well as Syrian citizenship (Amnesty International 2010b; Human Rights Watch 2010b). The Assad regime continued to refuse to permit the expression of Kurdish identity and did not allow for the teaching of the Kurdish language in schools. In March 2009, Syrian security forces opened fire on a group of Kurds celebrating Nowruz (Kurdish New Year), which resulted in one death. Finally, in July 2009, a Syrian military court sentenced nine Kurds to prison for inciting sectarian conflict during the Nowruz celebrations in Raqqa. (Human Rights Watch 2010b).

4.3.4. The Syrian Arab Spring

One of the earliest acts of dissent against the Assad regime occurred on January 26, 2011. Hasan Ali Akleh protested against the Syrian government through self-immolation in a similar
manner to Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia, which sparked the Tunisian Arab Spring (Nepstad 2011). While this did not initially initiate the Syrian Arab Spring, more acts of dissent followed. On March 18, 2011, ten to fifteen children were detained and tortured in Daraa by the Syrian regime for spray painting graffiti calling for the overthrow of the Assad regime. The parents of the children protested and demanded the release of their children. This event provided the necessary spark for the Syrian Arab Spring, which led to tens of thousands of Syrians to join in the protests and demonstrations in other cities such as Banyas, Latakia, Duma, Homs, Hama, and Damascus (Blight et al. 2012; Gelvin 2012; Lesch 2013; Droz-Vincent 2014; Nepstad 2011).

On March 23, demonstrators returned to the streets of Daraa in protest of the Assad regime, which resulted in the deaths of six civilians by Syrian police. On the next day, thousands of Syrians protested during the funerals for those killed on the previous day. Syrian forces countered the demonstrations using various repressive tactics against the dissidents including water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets as well as live ammunition. Despite this action, the Syrian government publicly announced that it had no issue with the peaceful demonstrations but the dissidents incited the violence as they attacked the Syrian security forces (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Heydemann 2013). While the initial demonstrations were in response to the treatment of the imprisoned children, the underlying grievances and causes for the nonviolent protests in Syria were varied: high unemployment, declining standards of living, the human rights record of the Assad regime, and the policies and legislation of the Syrian government that suppressed the people and their freedoms specifically the Emergency Law (Cinar and Gocer 2014; Droz-Vincent 2014; Gelvin 2012; Lesch 2013; Lynch 2012; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013).

On March 25, 2011, the demonstrations spread to other Syrian cities such as Damascus, Homs, Hama, Latakia, and Aleppo. Thousands of Syrians joined together in these demonstrations
but were countered by the Syrian security forces as they opened fire on the demonstrations. Furthermore, counterdemonstrations erupted as a number of Assad regime supporters arrived in the streets. Clashes between the dissidents and the Assad supporters broke out, which resulted in the deaths of twenty-three to fifty-five Syrians (Blight et al. 2012).

Two days later, the Assad regime deployed the Syrian military to Latakia after protests erupted in the city. The Syrian military forces countered the protests by firing on the crowds, which ended in twelve deaths. The Syrian government blamed the deaths on armed individuals who attacked the dissidents; however, the protesters argued that the Syrian security forces were responsible for the killings. On the next day, 4,000 dissidents gathered in Daraa in response to the mounting frustrations of the slow progress of promised political reforms and the end of the Emergency Law. The Assad regime opposed the dissidents by deploying Syrian security forces who used live ammunition and tear gas against the demonstrations (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012).

On March 29, 2011, Assad altered his suppressive tactics by offering concessions to the dissidents through the dismissal of his cabinet. Despite this concession, he refused to publicly respond to the growing violence in Syria. He finally addressed the Syrian population on the next day but he blamed the violence and uprisings within the country on foreign interference. Furthermore, he failed to discuss the expectations and promises of political reform as well as the ending of the emergency laws. In response to Assad’s public address, thousands of dissidents assembled and demonstrated in Damascus, Latakia, Daraa, and various Kurdish areas on March 30, 2011. This day became known as the “Friday of Martyrs” as Syrian security forces open fire on the demonstrations, which resulted in three deaths and many more individuals wounded during the protests (Blight et al. 2012).
Three days later, thousands of dissidents occupied the streets of Damascus during the funerals for the Syrians who were killed in Damascus. The dissidents specifically targeted the Assad regime and called for the resignation of the Syrian leader. On April 8, 2011, thousands of dissidents returned to the streets throughout Syria in protest, calling for Assad to step down. Sources reported that twenty-two Syrians were killed by security forces during the demonstrations. Moreover, protesters gathered in Kurdish areas of Qamischli, Amouda, and Debsiyyeh. Assad had earlier attempted to provide concessions to the Syrian Kurds by giving Syrian nationality to 200,000 Kurds. Despite this attempt to suppress dissent through concessions, the demonstrators were not deterred as they called for more political rights and the lifting of the Emergency Law (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Droz-Vincent 2014; Gelvin 2012).

The demonstrations continued on April 11 and 12, 2011 as dissidents gathered in the streets of Banias and the Syrian military forces were deployed to suppress the protests. Three Syrians were killed while more than twenty civilians were wounded in the conflict. Additionally, several other demonstrations arose throughout Syria, which resulted in clashes between dissidents and security forces (Blight et al. 2012; Gelvin 2012). According to human rights organizations, thirty-seven Syrians were killed across the country during the clashes. Furthermore, this event marked one of the first occasions when members of the Syrian military forces refused to open fire on the Syrian dissidents. In response to this new development, the Assad regime instructed Syrian security forces to turn their weapons on the Syrian military troops who refused to repress the dissidents in Banias (Blight et al. 2012; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013).

On April 16, 2011, Assad made a speech to the Syrian cabinet and promised to lift the Emergency Law and initiate more political reforms. Despite these promises, the dissidents were unmoved and countered that the guarantees were not enough and too late to deter them.
Additionally, they demanded that political prisoners should be released and the Syrian security forces should stop committing mass human rights abuses. Three days later, on April 19, 2011, the Syrian government approved the end of the Emergency Law (Blight et al. 2012; Dalacoura 2012; Droz-Vincent 2014; Gelvin 2012). While he repealed the Emergency Law, Assad also created several presidential decrees that gave the regime significant powers that essentially replaced the Emergency Law such as giving amnesty to security forces members and made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a punitive offense. Furthermore, he created another law to grant the regime sweeping powers to protect the national security of Syria and combat terrorism (Gelvin 2012). Despite the end of longstanding suppressive law, 5,000 Syrians gathered in the streets of Homs, resulting in the Syrian security forces firing on the demonstrations. The public dissent continued on April 22, 2011 as tens of thousands of Syrian gathered together, calling for the end of the Assad regime and the introduction of new political reforms. The Assad regime deployed Syrian security forces, which resulted in the deaths of eighty-eight Syrians (Blight et al. 2012).

On the weekend of April 23-24, 2011, Syrian military and security forces opened fire against demonstrations throughout Syria, which amounted to the deaths of 120 Syrians during the two days of uprisings. On April 25, 2011, the Assad regime escalated the violent measures by deploying 3,000 troops and tanks to various cities throughout Syria in order to suppress the dissidents. By April 28, 2011, many of those within the Syrian government were displeased with the developments in Syria. Hundreds of Ba’ath Party members resigned from their positions in protest over the mass suppression of Syrian demonstrators. Moreover, human rights organizations reported that five hundred Syrians were killed throughout Syria during the two months of the Syrian Arab Spring. In addition, thousands of Syrians were arrested and many others were reported missing (Blight et al. 2012).
The contentious interactions between the dissidents and the Assad regime continued as the Syrian forces repressed the dissidents throughout the summer. Moreover, a new development in the Syrian Arab Spring arose during the summer of 2011. In April 2011, many members of the Syrian military refused to repress the protesters and the loyal Syrian security forces countered this by firing on the dissenting members. During the summer of 2011, many military members broke away from the Syrian military and defected to the dissidents. This marked a watershed event in the Syrian Arab Spring as the Assad regime faced dissent from two fronts. The regime not only continued to face nonviolent dissent from the Syrian masses but now also encountered a violent campaign from the military defectors. This period of the Arab Spring specifically marked the escalation of violence by the dissidents as this was the beginning of the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Free Officers, and other armed groups which employed a violent dissent approach against the Assad regime (Carpenter 2013; Droz-Vincent 2014; Gelvin 2012; Enders 2012; Hasseb 2012; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013). Despite the dispute over the actual number of defectors from the Syrian military, this development demonstrated that a negative aspect of the tactic approach of filling the rank and file positions within the Syrian military with Sunnis and other ethnic-religious groups while placing loyal Alawites into the military officer positions in the military. 29

By the end of December 2011, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, reported that 5,000 Syrians were killed since the beginning of the Syrian Arab Spring in March 2011. Furthermore, Pillay reported that over 14,000 Syrians were detained by the Assad regime (Blight et al. 2012).

29 Many studies argued over the exact number of defectors from the Syrian military as some argued that there were fewer military defectors than reported. Furthermore, they reported the majority of the dissidents in the Free Syrian Army were actually Sunni civilians (Carpenter 2013; Enders 2012; Nepstad 2011; Nepstad 2013).
4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to demonstrate the theoretical arguments offered in the previous chapters through a qualitative research approach using the case studies of Egypt and Syria during the time periods leading to the Arab Spring and the uprisings themselves. The cases of Egypt and Syria provide a unique illustration of the theories and hypotheses proposed in the previous chapters. While both of the countries have several similarities between them, there are significant differences between them that influenced the outcome of the two episodes of the Arab Spring. Both Arab countries were governed by longstanding regimes controlled by strong authoritarian rulers; however, there are significant institutional differences between the regimes. While Mubarak wielded near complete control over the Egyptian government and served as the leader of the National Democratic Party, the party itself played a significant role in the government and politics particularly in the People’s Assembly as well as concerning personal advancement into politics and bureaucracy as well as the influencing politics. In Syria, the political system is constructed in a similar manner to Egypt with a strong president at the center of the government; however, there are important differences. The Ba’ath Party is the ruling political party of the Assad regime; however, it plays much less of a role in government and politics in comparison. Assad and his small cadre of loyal supporters possess complete control over Syria with no conventional political rivals. There is no vehicle to use as for personal advancement and influence over policy. Simply put, Assad and the small winning coalition of Alawite supporters have no equals and there are no opportunities for those on the outside to influence politics in Syria.

In “Appetite for Destruction: Institutional Survival and Political Unrest”, I proposed that the decision of authoritarian regimes to provide concessions or repress oppositional challenges lies
in the interaction of two key elements. Certain authoritarian regimes such as single party and military regimes have a higher probability of institutional survival even if they give into certain concessions, leading to political liberalization. Conversely, other regimes such as monarchies and personalist regimes do not enjoy this latitude and therefore remain highly dependent on maintaining the political status quo. Moreover, the response of the regime to political unrest is shaped by whether the dissidents actually present a significant challenge to the regime itself, particularly through violence. I found support that certain regimes particularly single party regimes and military regimes are more likely to not give into the demands of the dissidents and in fact, repress the opposition if the demonstrations are nonviolent. Although single party and military regimes can survive through adaptation in a new political environment or retreating back to the barracks, the nonviolent demonstrations do not present a significant threat to the continued rule of the regime and consequently, the leader does not feel compelled to act on this\textsuperscript{30}. Moreover, the decision of the leader is driven by the costs and benefits to the regime as the response of repression costs much less than giving into the desired concessions of the dissidents.

During the Arab Spring, the Mubarak regime illustrates this finding as Mubarak found the response of concessions more expensive than repressing the dissidents. While the dissidents desired multiple changes and reforms, the Egyptian masses specifically agreed on the demand of ending the emergency laws and the removal of Mubarak himself after thirty years of power. Moreover, the tactic of the dissidents to remain nonviolent in their protest of the regime throughout the Egyptian Arab Spring played a significant role. As noted above, Mubarak employed a fluctuating approach of the promise of limited concessions and use of repression in an attempt to

\textsuperscript{30} This finding does not pertain to all authoritarian regimes. While I found that single party and military regimes are more likely to repress nonviolent demonstrations, I also discovered that personalist regimes and monarchies tend to give into the desired concessions of dissidents if they are nonviolent.
remain in power; however, he would not give into their targeted concessions until forced to do so at the end of his reign.

The Assad regime, on the other hand, faced two stages of dissidents during the Syrian Arab Spring. In the first five months, the dissidents took to the streets and demonstrated against the regime nonviolently. In the second stage from the summer months of 2011 to the present day, a number of the dissidents groups expanded their approach to an escalation of violence to oppose the Syrian regime. Similar to Mubarak, Assad employed a carrot and stick approach by promising limited reforms and accommodations as well as deploying the Syrian security forces to repress the dissidents. Once the dissidents escalated to violence, the regime was forced to counter the movement with violence. While the Assad regime has elements of a military and single party regime, the regime resembles a personalist regime with real power in Syria lying exclusively within Bashar al Assad and his small number of loyal supporters. Therefore, to ensure that the political status quo was not disrupted, Assad deployed the Syrian military, police force, and security forces to oppose the escalation of violence by the dissidents.

In “Legacy of Brutality: How Lower Level Political Violence Evolves into Civil War”, I analyzed why dissidents perform in a particular manner during contentious interactions and how the response of authoritarian regimes at earlier stages of the conflict influence the escalation of civil conflict. Simply put, why do dissidents escalate to violence at times and why do they continue with a nonviolent approach against the regime? Moreover, why do certain regime-dissident interaction escalate to civil conflict while the outcome of the other interactions fail to progress to civil conflict? I argued that the key factor in understanding this question lies in the repressive capacity of the regime. The dissidents look to their own experiences or those experienced by others within the country in order to determine the decision to escalate to violence. In other words, the
dissidents look to the regime’s demonstration of its willingness and capacity to violently repress the population in the recent past. If the regime has demonstrated its repressive strength, the dissidents comprehend that they will ultimately face a similar fate if they escalate to violence. Therefore, they are more likely to remain nonviolent in their opposition to the central regime. On the other hand, if the regime failed to demonstrate its resolve and capacity for repression, this indicates to the dissidents that they may have an opportunity to influence the regime by pressuring the leader through an escalation in violence.

Moreover, I argued that the response of the authoritarian regimes at earlier stages of the conflict influences the outcome of regime-dissident interactions, namely whether the interaction escalates to civil conflict. Certain authoritarian regimes possess the institutional attributes which permit the regime to survive in a new post-reform political environment. When faced with a violent dissident challenge, these regimes are more likely to provide the dissidents with the desired concessions, which permits the avoidance of civil conflict. Conversely, other authoritarian regimes depend on maintaining the political status quo to ensure the regime retains control of political power. When faced with a violent dissident challenge, these regimes are more likely to respond with violence, leading to the escalation of civil conflict.

In observing the human rights reports for Syria and Egypt, the regimes acted in a similar manner. In the periods leading up the Arab Spring, both Mubarak and Assad demonstrated that they had no reservations regarding the use of arrest, detention, and torture if challenged by an oppositional figure or group. Furthermore, the environment created by the leaders through the emergency laws permitted them to maintain a police state where the police and security forces possessed the power to suppress the population, if necessary to preserve the regime. Both of the regimes also did not afford the population the constitutional rights to assemble together or express
criticism of the regime. So this leaves us with the lingering question of why did the dissidents escalate to violence occur in Syria but not in Egypt?

The answer to this question is threefold. First, the dissidents in Egypt took to the streets in nonviolent protest for only approximately two weeks before Mubarak stepped down from power; whereas, the Syrian dissidents remained nonviolent for five months before they escalated to violence. In other words, the nonviolent demonstrations in Egypt worked and consequently, there was no need to alter their tactics to violent measures.

Second, one of the key differences in the outcome of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Syria lies within the militaries of the respective countries. The Egyptian Arab Spring was arguably expedited due to the Egyptian military remaining on the sidelines during the nonviolent uprisings. The inaction by the Egyptian military may stem from the notable differences between the countries regarding their militaries. Both regimes created an interrelated clientelist relationship between the leader and their respective military whereby the military had an incentive to ensure that the leader remained in power so they would continue to enjoy the fruits and benefits of their positions. Moreover, both leaders depended on their militaries to survive and provide insulation for them from the people; however, the relationship between the military and the leader was significantly different between the countries. Assad placed loyal Alawites into the military officer ranks who otherwise would not have gained their position through merit. Therefore, they had a strong incentive to maintain the political status quo with preservation of the Assad regime. On the other hand, Mubarak also generated a patron-client relationship with the military through incentives but in a different manner. He provided monetary incentives for the military to support the preservation of his regime by allowing them to gain financial holdings and assets throughout the country. Despite providing financial rewards for their continued support, the relationship between the
Egyptian military and the Mubarak regime was different than the relationship found in Damascus. Specifically, the loyalty of the Egyptian military to Mubarak was not as deep-rooted as the dedication of the military officers in Syria to the Assad regime. This particularly became an issue when the possibility of Gamal Mubarak becoming the new president of Egypt and the introduction of economic policies at the expense of the loyalty military and their financial assets and holdings. Overall, the military found a more rewarding outcome and reneged on their relationship with the Mubarak regime.

The military played the key role in determining the outcome of the interactions between the political actors in Syria as well. On one hand, a number of Sunni rank and file military members defected to the opposition, created the Free Syrian Officers and the Free Syrian Army, and consequently, directly influenced the escalation to violence by Syrian dissident groups. On the other hand, the majority of the Syrian military particularly the officer ranks of the Syrian military remained loyal to the Assad regime throughout the Syrian Arab Spring, which permitted the Assad regime to stave off the challenges by the dissident groups. Therefore, one aspect of the military directly led to the escalation of violence and consequently, civil war in Syria; whereas, the other aspect of the Syrian military provided the Assad regime with the military strength to continue their fight to maintain power.

Third, the Syrian opposition escalated to violence because they viewed an opportunity to gain their desired reforms and concessions. Although Bashar al Assad repressed the opposition in Syria, he failed to demonstrate that his willingness and capacity for repression in a similar manner to Hafiz al Assad. The event in Hama in 1982 clearly demonstrated that Hafiz al Assad would go to great lengths to maintain his control of political power. Furthermore, he exhibited his capacity to repress by killing 5,000 to 25,000 Syrian civilians when he was challenged by the Islamic Front
(Cleveland 2004; Droz-Vincent 2014; Gelvin 2012; Hasseb 2012; Lynch 2012; Seale 1988; Sorenson 2008). While Bashar al Assad repressed the Syrian population prior to the Arab Spring, the regime overall was less repressive in comparison to the previous regime (Lesch 2007; Zisser 2005). In the end, Bashar al Assad never gained the fear and respect of the Syrians as his father demanded and acquired.

This chapter provided an analysis of two case studies of contentious interactions between the authoritarian government and its dissident population. By observing the institutional frameworks as well as the human rights reports of Egypt and Syria, we were able to gain an understanding of why the Mubarak and Assad regimes and their respective dissidents acted in a specific manner during the Arab Spring. In the end, we found significant support for the theories and arguments presented in previous chapters through the observation of Egypt and Syria on the path to the Arab Spring.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This chapter offers a concluding discussion on the dissertation. In this chapter, I provide a summary of the findings in this work, discuss the contribution of my work to the scholarship on political violence, and offer opportunities for future research on this subject.

5.1. Summary

The overall objective of this project is to provide a theoretical justification for the decision making of belligerents during contentious interactions between authoritarian regimes and dissidents. Using the seminal literature on authoritarian regimes, contentious politics, and civil conflict, I examine why authoritarian regimes respond to nonviolent and violent dissident challenges in a particular manner, why dissidents escalate to violence against an authoritarian regime, and why certain regime-dissident interactions escalate to civil conflict. I argue that the interaction between dissidents and regimes is a dynamic relationship and the events of political violence are interrelated as belligerent responses at earlier stages of the contentious relationship influence the outcome of events at later junctures. This work demonstrates that there are significant institutional differences between authoritarian regimes which influences their responses to dissident challenges. The responses of the regime then shapes the outcome of regime-dissident interactions at later stages. Furthermore, this work demonstrates that the actions of regimes in response to previous opposition challenges provide important information to future dissidents, which impacts their decision calculus of whether to escalate to violence against the regime.
The empirical research presented in this dissertation offers three key findings. First, the institutional framework of authoritarian regimes is significant in understanding the decision calculus of the regimes when faced with targeted challenges by dissidents. This contribution is demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3. Certain authoritarian regimes possess institutional attributes which allow for the regime to survive in a post-reform political environment whereas other authoritarian regimes depend on maintaining the political status quo in order for the regime to survive. The institutional framework of these regimes directly influences decision making when faced with nonviolent and violent dissident challenges.

The institutional framework of single party and military regimes allows for the regime to survive in a post-reform political environment. Single party regimes can adapt to the new political setting and survive by becoming one of many political parties competing for political power and the opportunity to influence policy making. The leaders of military regimes can retreat back to the military barracks and resume their primary focus on issues of national security. Therefore, if faced with a violent dissident challenge, they can provide the desired concessions and reforms, which impacts the future escalation of civil conflict. As the dissidents gain their preferred concessions, the probability of civil conflict is avoided as the incentive to threaten the regime decreases.

On the other hand, the institutional framework of monarchies and personalist regimes do not allow for the regimes to adapt to a new political environment. These regimes specifically depend on the preservation of the current institutional arrangement while the introduction of a post-reform political environment would destroy the foundation of the regime. The leadership of the regime would lose control of political power through the loss of support of the selectorate and consequently face exile, imprisonment, or even death. Therefore, a violent dissident challenge presents a significant threat to the survival of the regime, which influences the decision of the
regime to offer the desired concessions or reforms to the dissidents. Since the regime cannot survive in a new political environment, the leadership is unlikely to give into the demands of the dissidents.

Second, the nature of the threat posed by the dissidents is significant to understanding the response of the authoritarian regime. This contribution is demonstrated in Chapter 2. If dissidents remain nonviolent in their opposition to the regime, this approach may not effectively challenge the regime. Single party and military regimes are more likely to determine that it is less costly for the regime to avoid providing the desired reforms. The nonviolent nature of the dissent does not challenge the survival of the regime and thus, the regime can ignore the demands. On the other hand, this work finds that monarchies and personalist regimes are more likely to provide these demands if the opposition remains nonviolent. This outcome concurs with the findings of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) as they note that the decision to repress nonviolent protest campaigns comes with significant costs with the loss of support of the domestic population and possible punitive repercussions from the international community.

If the dissidents pursue a violent approach in their opposition to the regime, all of the authoritarian regimes are effectively challenged; however, the institutional arrangements of the regimes influence the response of the regime to the unrest. A violent challenge targeted at a single party regime or military regime is more likely to produce a favorable response for the dissidents. This work finds that when dissidents violently challenge single party or military regimes, the regime is more likely to give into the desired concessions or reforms. On the other hand, a violent challenge targeted at a monarchy or personalist regime is less likely to produce favorable results for the dissidents. These regimes are more likely to avoid providing the preferred concessions if the dissidents challenge the regime using a violent approach. Moreover, as demonstrated in
Chapter 3, a violent challenge by dissidents targeted at monarchies and personalist regimes is likely to produce an escalation to civil conflict. The violent challenge poses a significant threat to these regimes and in order to preserve the current institutional arrangement, the regime is likely to respond with violence, leading to the escalation of civil conflict.

Third, the response of the regime to previous dissident challenges influence the nature of future dissident activity. Dissidents possess limited information on the coercive capacity of the regime; however, they understand the repressive capacity of the regime. Dissidents are familiar with how the regime has conducted itself in previous challenges by the opposition as they observed the repressive capacity of the regime firsthand or through the experiences of others. This reduces the uncertainty for the dissidents regarding the willingness of the regime to employ repressive measures against challenges to its tenure. With this knowledge, dissidents are unlikely to violently challenge regimes that previously demonstrated its repressive capacity and willingness to use this approach. Like regimes, the dissidents are strategic actors who desire to achieve particular goals through their actions. Therefore, if facing a regime which demonstrated its repressive capacity, the dissidents are more likely to remain nonviolent as they realize their likely future fate if they proceed violently. On the other hand, they are more likely to challenge a regime which neglected to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to repress. In this scenario, the regime did not repress previous challengers to the tenure of the regime so the future dissidents view an opportunity to gain their preferred concessions by posing a threat to the regime through violence. The dissidents are uncertain about the willingness of the regime to repress a challenge to its tenure; however, since the regime failed to demonstrate their willingness, the dissidents are more likely to escalate to violence in hopes that they can threaten the regime through violence and gain their preferred outcomes.
These contributions as a whole offer an illustration of an interrelated and dynamic relationship between regimes and dissidents. Dissidents can impact the decision making of regimes by choosing to challenge the regime through a violent or nonviolent approach. The decision making of the regime is equally related to the institutional arrangement of the regime and how to ensure its survival. Regimes, in turn, can influence the decision making of dissidents based on their responses to previous challenges to its tenure. Finally, the behaviors and decision making of both belligerents can contribute to the escalation to civil conflict.

5.2. Theoretical Contributions

This research makes two main contributions to the scholarship. First, this work builds on the theories and ideas identified in comparative politics and international relations as well as several subfields in political science. Therefore, this research provides a contribution to the study of authoritarian political institutions, political violence and civil conflict. Second, it provides an advancement in the understanding of regime-dissident interactions and how this relationship can evolve into civil conflict. This research identifies a spectrum of political violence and there is an important link between the different types of political violence. Additionally, this research identifies how the significant differences between the institutional frameworks of authoritarian regimes influence regime decision making when faced with a dissident challenge to its tenure.

5.3. Future Research

In the course of conducting research for this work, I identified several opportunities for future research in this field. First, there were several data limitations experienced during this research. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (N.A.V.C.O.) dataset 1.1 and 2.0
offered a significant advancement for the sample of observations of dissident campaigns that was used extensively in this study. While the dataset proved to be a benefit for case selection, future work may wish to consider relaxing some of the restriction imposed by the dataset. In order to be selected into the N.A.V.C.O. dataset, a campaign must be targeted at the regime in power and have 1000 or more members participating in the movement (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). If this restriction was relaxed, the overall number of campaigns observed would be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, this may open research up to new developments. This task is being undertaken by projects such as Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al. 2012) and other event level research projects. By approaching similar questions using these datasets, future research could identify new relationships between dissidents and regimes. Moreover, this research would continue to explore how the spectrum of political violence is interrelated at a lower level than identified in this work.

Second, in the future, the N.A.V.C.O. dataset will offer a new event level dataset, which will permit future exploration into this research. Future research may wish to undertake an event level project that permits a more granular approach to understanding regime-dissident interactions in the manner of the previous micro-level processes approach (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998, 2000; Shellman 2006a, 2006b) rather than using the outcome of the regime-dissident interactions as in this work. This will permit future research to undertake similar research questions on a global sample but at an event level analysis.

Third, this research restricted the outcome of interest to the provision of concessions in Chapter 2 and the onset of civil conflict in Chapter 3. Future studies could undertake a new approach by disaggregating the dependent variable into various outcomes such as successful repression, policy concessions, monetary concessions, retreat of the campaign, or the escalation to
civil conflict. A competing risks approach would provide further understanding of the responses of regimes to political unrest as well as the actual outcome of regime-dissident interactions.

In the end, there are many unanswered research questions regarding the overall subject of political violence and how the types of political violence are related. I attempted to provide insight into the black box of decision making for the belligerents involved in regime-dissident interactions and demonstrate how events of political violence are related. While this work sheds some light on why actors select certain behaviors over others, there are many questions regarding this relationship left open for new discovery.
APPENDIX A

COX MODEL: REGIME TYPES (FOUR YEAR LEGACY PERIOD)
### Cox Model: Regime Types (Four Year Legacy Period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy of repression</td>
<td>.647 *** (.054)</td>
<td>.647 *** (.054)</td>
<td>.647 *** (.054)</td>
<td>.647 *** (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>1.12 (.425)</td>
<td>.720 (.247)</td>
<td>1.29 (.471)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>1.55 ** (.355)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.79 *** (.363)</td>
<td>1.39 (.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Regime</td>
<td>.867 (.218)</td>
<td>.557 *** (.113)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.774 (.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.643 ** (.147)</td>
<td>1.15 (.291)</td>
<td>.893 (.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2.24 *** (.554)</td>
<td>1.44** (.267)</td>
<td>2.59 *** (.550)</td>
<td>2.00 ** (.722)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.18 (.478)</td>
<td>.761 (.273)</td>
<td>1.37 (.525)</td>
<td>1.06 (.506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.182)</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.182)</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.182)</td>
<td>1.53 *** (.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.05 (.309)</td>
<td>1.05 (.309)</td>
<td>1.05 (.309)</td>
<td>1.05 (.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
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<td>.983 (.039)</td>
<td>.983 (.039)</td>
<td>.983 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.73e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.73e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.73e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.73e-06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An (***)) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level.
An (**) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level.
An (*) indicates statistically significant at the .10 level.

† The dependent variable (*escalation*) is created from the *intensity level (int)* variable found in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).
APPENDIX B

COX MODEL: REGIME TYPES (THREE YEAR LEGACY PERIOD)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy of repression</td>
<td>.632 *** (.052)</td>
<td>.632 *** (.052)</td>
<td>.632 *** (.052)</td>
<td>.632 *** (.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>1.14 (.427)</td>
<td>.711 (.240)</td>
<td>1.29 (.464)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>.880 (.218)</td>
<td>.550 *** (.107)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.773 (.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Regime</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.625 ** (.140)</td>
<td>1.14 (.282)</td>
<td>.878 (.330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>2.23 *** (.557)</td>
<td>1.39** (.253)</td>
<td>2.53 *** (.531)</td>
<td>1.96 ** (.695)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1.19 (.474)</td>
<td>.743 (.264)</td>
<td>1.35 (.511)</td>
<td>1.04 (.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.50 *** (.178)</td>
<td>1.50 *** (.178)</td>
<td>1.50 *** (.178)</td>
<td>1.50 *** (.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
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<td>1.00 (.286)</td>
<td>1.00 (.286)</td>
<td>1.00 (.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population</td>
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<td>.987 (.038)</td>
<td>.987 (.038)</td>
<td>.987 (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.63e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.63e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.63e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (6.63e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An (***), (**) and (*) indicates statistically significant at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.

ǂ The dependent variable (escalation) is created from the intensity level (int) variable found in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).
APPENDIX C

COX MODEL: REGIME TYPES (TWO YEAR LEGACY PERIOD)
### Cox Model: Regime Types (Two Year Legacy Period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Military as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 2: Personalist as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 3: Single Party as Baseline</th>
<th>Model 4: Monarchy as Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legacy of repression</td>
<td><strong>.628</strong>* (.051)</td>
<td><strong>.628</strong>* (.051)</td>
<td><strong>.628</strong>* (.051)</td>
<td><strong>.628</strong>* (.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>1.11 (.408)</td>
<td>.702 (.233)</td>
<td>1.30 (.460)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
<td>1.58 ** (.345)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.85 *** (.358)</td>
<td>1.43 (.473)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Regime</td>
<td>.856 (.207)</td>
<td>.541 *** (.105)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.771 (.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.632 ** (.138)</td>
<td>1.17 (.283)</td>
<td>.901 (.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2.19 *** (.530)</td>
<td>1.39 (.248)</td>
<td>2.56 *** (.538)</td>
<td>1.97 ** (.691)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.12 (.455)</td>
<td>.705 (.260)</td>
<td>1.30 (.513)</td>
<td>1.00 (.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate</td>
<td>1.49 *** (.176)</td>
<td>1.49 *** (.176)</td>
<td>1.49 *** (.176)</td>
<td>1.49 *** (.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>1.00 (.281)</td>
<td>1.00 (.281)</td>
<td>1.00 (.281)</td>
<td>1.00 (.281)</td>
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<td>Log of Population</td>
<td>.983 (.038)</td>
<td>.983 (.038)</td>
<td>.983 (.038)</td>
<td>.983 (.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
<td>1.00*** (1.08e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (1.08e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (1.08e-06)</td>
<td>1.00*** (1.08e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An (***) indicates statistically significant at the .01 level.
An (**) indicates statistically significant at the .05 level.
An (*) indicates statistically significant at the .10 level.

† The dependent variable (escalation) is created from the intensity level (int) variable found in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).


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