EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON U.S. UNILATERAL MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CIVIL CONFLICTS

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This study focuses on how perceived security environment affect U.S. unilateral, military intervention in civil conflicts, using the concept of Bayesian learning to illustrate how threat perceptions are formed, how they change, and how they affect the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in civil conflicts. I assess the validity of two primary hypotheses: (1) the U.S. is more likely to intervene in civil conflicts with connections to a threatening actor or ideology; and (2) the U.S. is more likely to intervene in civil conflicts for humanitarian motives in a less threatening security context. To test these hypotheses, I compare U.S. military intervention in three temporal contexts reflecting more threatening security contexts (Cold War and post-9/11) and less threatening security contexts (1992-2001). Results of logit regression analysis reveal that a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is the most statistically and substantively significant determinant of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, both in more and less threatening security contexts. They also indicate that humanitarian motives are not a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, even in a more benign security environment. These findings imply that U.S. unilateral military intervention is reserved for more direct national security threats, even those that are less grave, and that the perception of the U.S. as “global cop” may be misleading, at least in terms of unilateral military intervention.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

At the dedication ceremony of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum on April 22, 1993, President Bill Clinton verbalized a growing sentiment within the international community concerning the responsibility of state leaders to protect humanity from genocide and other humanitarian violations. In his address, often referred to as his “never again” speech, Clinton called on the international community to impede the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, referencing the leaders of Yugoslavia, Iraq, among others: “So we must stop the fabricators of history and the bullies as well. Left unchallenged, they would still prey upon the powerless; and we must not permit that to happen again.”

Yet, there have been a number of instances of non-intervention in what appear to be situations of ethnic cleansing or other humanitarian crises, such as those in Rwanda and Darfur. This inconsistency in rhetoric and behavior highlights the need for better understanding of the conditions under which the U.S. is more likely to intervene militarily in the civil conflicts of other states. Several studies have addressed this question, yet this study focuses on a condition which appears to have received less attention, both theoretically and

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1 Clinton’s speech is accessible from the United States Holocaust Museum’s Web site: www.ushmm.org).
methodologically – how the perceived security environment affects U.S. unilateral, military intervention in civil conflicts. The particular question of interest in this study is how does security context constrain or encourage the likelihood of U.S. unilateral, military intervention in civil conflicts? Focusing specifically on U.S. unilateral, military intervention behavior contributes to our understanding of third-party military intervention more generally in three ways. First, the theoretical argument emphasizes threat perceptions, a political phenomenon not constrained solely to the United States. Using Bayesian learning as a guide, this study explains the development of threat perceptions, how they change, and how they affect a state’s foreign policy. This same theoretical argument could be utilized to explain the foreign policy of other states. In this sense, the study is generalizable, yet allows for the fact that states may perceive threats differently, and thus may behave differently.

Second, one can assess how any state in the international system might act were it to have greater military capacity to intervene in civil conflicts, making the U.S. an ideal example to begin to answer this question. Should the findings support the theoretical argument developed here, intervention behavior of other states could be similarly tested. Third, examining U.S. military intervention is in and of itself worthy of explanation given its hegemonic role and frequent intervention abroad. The rest of this section illustrates why it is important to consider threat context for explaining military intervention in civil conflicts after first justifying the focus on U.S. unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts.
The theoretical framework presented here has implications for a number of foreign policy behaviors, so it is worth explaining why the focus of this study is limited to U.S. unilateral, military intervention in civil conflicts as opposed to other forms of U.S. military (peacekeeping) and non-military (economic and diplomatic) intervention in civil conflicts. Military intervention includes sending troops, providing military advising, and/or granting military aid. It may be considered the most costly form of intervention because of the potential for loss of life in sending troops abroad, the materials and opportunity costs related to mobilizing troops, and the potential political costs associated with arming or aiding a party embroiled in civil conflict. The last point highlights the possibility of the U.S. being associated with atrocities committed by a party to the conflict, an outcome which can have both domestic political consequences and effects on perceived legitimacy in the international community.

Similarly, unilateral intervention is more costly than its multilateral counterpart. This is due to the fact that the U.S. must alone bear the material costs associated with intervention, must be entirely accountable for the outcome of the intervention, and must be subject to political costs associated with the perceived legitimacy of the intervention by the international community. By focusing on unilateral military intervention, one can better understand the conditions which encourage state leaders to make such costly decisions. This implies that conditions favoring unilateral, military intervention in civil conflicts may be distinct from other forms, providing the potential for this study to serve as
a basis for later comparison of cases of multiple types of intervention and their
determinants.

One may still question why intervention in civil conflicts is specifically
examined, and not other costly behaviors which might be explained by a
changing security environment, such as defense spending or military intervention
in international conflicts. Although it is worth examining the effect of the security
environment on each of these phenomena, doing so requires a very different
research agenda and methodical approach. By focusing on one particular
phenomenon, others are excluded not because they are unimportant, but
because a certain degree of reductionism is appropriate for testing hypotheses.
Notwithstanding this focus, explaining unilateral military intervention in civil
conflicts is important in its own right for the reasons described below.

According to the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (PRIO), civil conflicts are the most common form of armed conflict
in the contemporary world, yet less scholarly attention has been granted toward
civil than interstate war (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/). Given the link between civil
conflict and international conflict, the associated humanitarian suffering, and the
potential for contagion, some in the international community have perceived
military intervention as an important tool for alleviating this international security
problem (Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Finnemore 2003; Dowty and Loescher
1996). Assuming participants in a civil conflict are rational actors and fight based
on their perceived likelihood of success for achieving certain objectives (Mason
2004), then it is expected that one way to affect civil conflict dynamics is to alter the payoff structure – which determines the expected utility of fighting -- faced by combatants. Military intervention is such a means of affecting payoffs, and empirical studies have illustrated that military intervention affects civil conflict duration and settlement, though how intervention affects civil war dynamics is conditional upon a number of factors (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2008). If military intervention may be an important tool for affecting civil conflict dynamics, as well as its onset if one considers potential third-party intervention a deterrent, then it is worth enhancing our understanding of the conditions which make a third party, particularly one with significant capacity such as the U.S., more likely to intervene.

In order to identify these conditions, it is appropriate to consider the U.S. decision-making perspective, which is why this study emphasizes U.S. perceptions of security threats to explain its intervention, or lack thereof, in civil conflicts. As is argued in most of the foreign policy literature, domestic perceptions -- in the form of public opinion, psychology of the decision-makers, and bureaucratic structure -- are just as important as external factors for understanding foreign policy decision-making, including the decision of whether or not to intervene in a civil conflict (e.g., Rosenau 1969; Meernik 1996; Jentleson and Britton 1996; Ostrom and Job 1986). As will be argued, the security environment, and both its constraining and catalyzing effects on U.S. unilateral, military intervention should be more closely examined.
Changing Security Environment

Just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a number of scholars began to speculate about how world politics might change (Jervis 1991/1992), or possibly stay the same (Mearsheimer 1990), given the demise of the Soviet Union. Robert Jervis (1991/1992) in particular perceived the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for a shift in U.S. foreign policy and proposed a number of potential changes. Specifically, Jervis and others saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity for the U.S. to strive to achieve non-traditional security goals, as well as the value-based goals of global democracy, prosperity and peace (1991/1992, 64). “In the current era,” he argued, “the great trade-off is between America’s security and non-security interests. The reduced urgency of the former [allows] greater attention to the latter” (Jervis 1991/1992, 71). Scholars and political figures engaged in debates concerning the new U.S. role in the world. Some argued that it should take a lead role as global cop to enforce what President George H.W. Bush referred to as the “new world order.” Others expected the U.S. to take this opportunity to focus on domestic concerns and consider reallocating some government resources from the military toward socio-economic programs. This sentiment was illustrated by the election of William Clinton in 1992, whose campaign promised a greater focus on domestic issues and a reduction in military spending.

The U.S. participated in an increasing number of humanitarian, peacekeeping operations as a manifestation of its commitment to human rights
(though one might argue that its promotion of these values was not particularly consistent). Although some security issues remained, much talk centered on potential threats, such as a rising China, or non-traditional security concerns, such as global terrorism, food security, and the spread of civil conflict. Still, the U.S. government and its citizens felt largely safe from external threat, which, according to some, explains why it would devote military resources toward peacekeeping and intervening in the civil conflicts of other states for purely humanitarian reasons.

As is well remembered, this “threat deficit” period characterized by the lack of a credible and formidable security threat ended abruptly with the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th (Buzan 2006). These attacks were followed by not only a counter-attack on Afghanistan by the U.S. but, ultimately, a preemptive attack on Iraq. The light shone on one fairly new threat to U.S. security, an uncommon enemy and non-state actor known as Al Qaeda. This new enemy can be contrasted with the more familiar state rival of the Soviet Union. A counter ideology, Islamic fundamentalism, also received greater attention, replacing that of communism as a priority of national security. This is not to say that the former Soviet Union and the spread of communism were no longer of concern to U.S. officials, only that they were of less concern than the more obvious current threat of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist organizations. Nor is it to say that the U.S. was never concerned with terrorism on the part of Islamic fundamentalists before this point in time. It only
demonstrates that the 9/11 attacks highlighted the gravity of the threat posed by Al Qaeda in terms of the number of casualties and damage to infrastructure it could inflict. This transformed what was perhaps previously considered more of a nuisance into a top priority for national security (Nye 2006). Thus, the attention of U.S. government officials and a significant amount of resources were directed toward mitigating this threat, if it could not be destroyed altogether.

This end of the threat-deficit period and return to an emphasis on security reflects a quote by the timeless and ever controversial Samuel Huntington: “…liberalism can only thrive when security can be taken for granted” (cited in Kaplan 2001). Whereas the threat-deficit period experienced a decrease in military spending and more participation on the part of the U.S. in multilateral, humanitarian military interventions, the period following 9/11 experienced the opposite. Some attribute this to the hawkish nature of the George W. Bush administration, or the Republican Party in general. Although presidential personalities and party politics have been shown to partially determine policy (George 1979; Hermann 1980; Hermann 1984; Hermann 2001; Hermann 2005; Herrmann and Keller 2004; Howell and Pevehouse 2005), policy options are themselves constrained by context. History has shown that even Democratic presidents do not respond softly to a perceived security threat (Fordham 1998; Khong 1992). Jimmy Carter, for instance, whom some would consider a textbook example of an idealist, proclaimed his willingness to use military force to
counter any “attempt by an outside force…to gain control of the Persian Gulf region” (State of the Union Address, January 23, 1980).

Furthermore, with the election of Barack Obama, there has not been a complete about-face concerning the use of military force. Rather than directing military resources toward humanitarian crises such as Sudan, the current president prefers to direct them toward Afghanistan to further weaken terrorist strongholds there. Granted, this is a significant change from the previous administration in terms of re-directing troops from Iraq, but it is far from a complete overhaul of past policy.

This may be due to the possibility that, regardless of the administration, when faced with what is perceived to be a credible and significant security threat, a state’s leaders are more likely to use military resources toward addressing that threat than for other non-traditional security and value-based reasons. However, when not faced with such a perceived threat, state leaders may direct their military resources elsewhere. The key element is the perception of the threat rather than the true gravity of the threat, as the two may not be congruent. As will be argued, this perception is itself determined by leaders’ and their publics’ interpretations of the intentions and capabilities of others in the international system—perceptions which are updated in both “revolutionary” and “evolutionary” ways (Maoz 1996). The former refers to a manner of changing perceptions sharply within a short period of time following a significant shock. The latter
refers to a slow-changing process of change in perceptions following an accumulation of theory-contradicting observations.

This study examines both the formation of these perceptions of another, as well as the impact these perceptions have on foreign policy. In particular, the relationship between the existence of a grave and credible security threat -- a perception based on preexisting heuristic cues pertaining to another and observed aggressive behavior -- and U.S. unilateral, military intervention in civil conflicts is observed. The study aims to enhance our understanding of broad foreign policy change, as well as the impact a changing security environment based on the perception of threat, has on the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in the civil conflicts of other states. It does so by incorporating the concept of learning, particularly in the form of Bayesian inference, to explain collective perceptions and related behavior.

Security Threats as Dynamic in Both Substance and Prioritization

The expectation of Jervis and many others, that the U.S. would be more likely to pursue non-traditional security, purely economic, and value-based goals following the end of the Cold War, is guided by an underlying assumption that state leaders devote more resources to said goals when they are not faced with powerful and credible security threats, an assumption which is not left unchallenged (Keohane and Nye 2001). The implications of this assumption lead us to expect the more frequent use of foreign policy tools to attain non-security
goals where pressing security threats are largely mitigated. The first set of questions which must be addressed, then, pertain to: a) at what point one may determine security threats faced by a state have been sufficiently mitigated; b) whether this is indeed a dichotomous point or more a matter of degree; c) whether or not this point or degree can be objectively determined across states, or whether it is subjective such that each state has its own unique, satisfactory level of security; and d) whether political scientists can determine this point or continuum with an acceptable degree of intersubjective agreement.

The second set of questions pertains to how this level of security satisfaction determines foreign policy. That is, what would one expect to see when this level has been achieved as opposed to when it has not? Here it is assumed that the perceived level of security threat forms a context which both encourages and constrains certain state actions (Goertz 1994). In this study, I examine how a state’s perceived level of security satisfaction determines a particular type of policy, that of U.S. unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts. I contend that one such indicator of a context in which there is a high perceived threat to security is when a state is faced with a capable, aggressive actor.

I hypothesize that where state leaders are faced by an aggressive actor capable of inflicting a high number of casualties, they are more likely to intervene in civil conflicts in which the actor, or actor’s ally, is a party to the conflict. Accordingly, where the perceived security threat is significantly mitigated, state
leaders will be more likely than in a context characterized by high security threat to use their forces unilaterally to intervene militarily in civil conflicts for the sake of promoting their domestic values. That is, intervention for the promotion of domestic values is not automatic, but a threat deficit provides a greater opportunity for value-based intervention. The analysis of findings presented in Chapter 5 provide support for the importance of a capable and aggressive threat, though there is less support for the notion that domestic values -- in the form of humanitarian concerns -- are important for explaining U.S. unilateral military intervention. That is, the involvement of an actor deemed to be a significant security threat (or an ally to the actor) in a civil conflict is found to be both a statistically significant and substantive determinant of U.S. unilateral military intervention, while humanitarian factors are not, even within the context of a threat deficit.

Linking the Prioritization of Interests to Military Intervention

In order to link the broader notion of the prioritization of interests (i.e., security versus non-traditional and value-based interests) to the specific policy of intervention, I highlight the causal pathway between state interests and behavior through an exercise in theoretical deduction. The journey begins by explaining the formation of state interests and how they are prioritized, pointing to existing understandings of how national interests are defined (Rosenau 1971; Gilpin 1981; Maoz 1996). One may consider interest prioritization on the part of the
state as somewhat analogous to that of Maslow’s conception of an individual’s “hierarchy of needs” (1943). Just as Maslow argues that an individual’s primary concern will most likely be for survival and means for securing survival, a state leadership’s concern may be most basically for its survival, the likes of which are best secured by ensuring protection against both external and internal attack, as well as protection of access to resources. Only after these needs are met in a satisfactory way are other value-based goals pursued.

Thus, state leaders, similar to individuals, set up their own safety mechanisms to further secure the state against attack, as well as to secure adequate access to resources, and, finally, to ensure their own political survival. These elements make up the conception of security used in this study. Similar to the concept of national interest, what constitutes a security concern is somewhat based on perception (Maoz 1996; Gilpin 1981). This implies that the perception of national security may vary from one state to the next, and from one scholar to the next, with some emphasizing more traditional notions of security and others encompassing collective and human security within a broader scope of security. Without diminishing the value of a more expansive definition of security, in this study the concept of security is defined in a more traditional way. As such, in this study, actions to enhance collective security and human rights are treated as value-driven actions rather than security-driven actions so that the two may be compared. Were these to be conflated, it would not be possible to test the shortened versions of the following two complementary hypotheses examined
here: a) that value-driven behavior on the part of the state is more likely to be observed in a threat-deficit context, and b) that security-driven actions are more likely to be observed within the heightened threat context.

Returning to the question posed earlier concerning the identification of when a satisfactory level of security has been attained, I argue that this level of satisfaction is based on state leaders’ assessments of the severity of the threat posed by another state or non-state actor. The perceived severity of a threat posed by another is based on state leaders’ perceptions of both (a) the intentions of another, as well as (b) the potential damage another could inflict. Entities with higher levels of intent and capacity to inflict damage, that is, those with both the greatest “opportunity and willingness” (Most and Starr 1989), will be perceived as the greatest threats by state leaders, while those with either lower intent or capacity will be perceived to be less threatening. This relates to the broader argument presented in this study which indicates that given a low perceived threat to security, state leaders will be more likely to use state resources for non-traditional security threats. This is not to say that state leaders perceive no threat to security, only that they can be satisfied if they sense that the likelihood of attack and potential damage inflicted are low. I argue that state leaders assess this intention and capacity of another by observing the other’s behavior in the international arena, observations which are compared to state leaders’ preexisting theories concerning the intentions and capacity of the other; that is,
they engage in a rudimentary form of Bayesian inference and update their beliefs about the intentions of the other based on observable evidence.

Context as a Common Theme for Explaining
Foreign Policy Continuity and Change

As is argued, Maslow’s dynamic interpretation of individual interests serves as an analogy for illustrating the idea that state interests may be prioritized and that they can be satisfied (or “satisficed” in bureaucratic terminology). Once satisfied, one may observe behavior which serves non-security interests. Satisfaction of security interests may be determined by assessing what is being threatened as well as who is threatening. Regarding the former, threats to the homeland or to access of scarce resources may be perceived as greater threats to security than threats to maritime commerce off the coast of East Africa. Although the second example is of concern, the impact of piracy on U.S. national security is not grave. Regarding who is threatening, this pertains to another group’s perceived capacity to inflict harm, as well as the group’s intention of inflicting harm. Both capacity and intention are perceived in terms of a group’s observed past behavior, but intention may also be perceived by the ideological framework guiding the group, which itself serves as a heuristic cue. These factors taken together, which adhere to Most and Starr’s (1989) concept of opportunity and willingness, determine the degree to which a particular group is deemed a threat. Although Most and Starr identified these as conditions under which conflict is likely to take place, one may assume that state
leaders also attempt to assume the opportunities and willingness others have to attack them. In other words, they think strategically about what the other is likely to do and respond accordingly (Bueno de Mesquita 2006).

Using this continuous concept definition of security threat, it is assumed that state leaders use national resources to address these threats accordingly, and that where threats are minimal, state resources specifically geared toward foreign policy may be used for other non-security goals. As was previously mentioned, the perception of another as a threat is determined first by heuristic cues which form a state leaders’ theories about the other (what in Bayesian terms is known as a prior), along with observations of the other’s behavior. Thompson (2001) provides the basis for such an argument when he describes how an entity comes about being perceived as a rival as opposed to a neutral actor in the international arena:

Actors categorize other actors in their environments. Some are friends, others are enemies. Threatening enemies who are also adjudged to be competitors in some sense, as opposed to irritants or simply problems, are branded as rivals. This categorization is very much a social-psychological process. Actors interpret the intentions of others based on earlier behavior and forecasts about the future behavior of these other actors. The interpretation of these intentions leads to expectations about the likelihood of conflicts escalating to physical attacks. Strategic rivals anticipate some positive probability of an attack from their competitors over issues in contention. One side’s expectations influence their own subsequent behavior toward their adversary and the process continues from there. (Thompson 2001, 561-62)

In this sense a threat is understood as a state which represents the intention to inflict harm, one which is based on both interpretations of signals and observed behavior. Yet, there is little reason to believe that a non-state actor may not also
be considered a grave threat, especially where that actor has represented both
the willingness and capacity to attack.

Consider the threat posed to the U.S. by Al Qaeda. Contentious relations
between the two began initially in 1992 with Al Qaeda's attempt to bomb the
hotel where American soldiers were staying before these soldiers were to depart
to Somalia as part of Operation Restore Hope. This incident was later followed
by the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, U.S. embassy bombings in East
Africa, the USS Cole attack, and the September 11, 2001 attacks. This last
event signified to the U.S. that Al Qaeda was both a credible and capable threat,
and U.S. leaders have since responded. The perception of Al Qaeda as a
significant security threat can be is illustrated in the following statements from the
U.S. State Department regarding the terrorist enemy:

Terrorist networks currently pose the greatest national security threat to
the United States. The greatest threat and the most wanted terrorists
come from the al-Qaida (AQ) network, which includes a core al-Qaida
organization and numerous confederated extremist groups...AQ aims to
overthrow the existing world order and replace it with a reactionary,
authoritarian, transnational entity. This threat will be sustained over a
protracted period (decades not years) and will require a global response
executed regionally, nationally, and locally. (emphasis mine,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm#enemy)

As is demonstrated above, the U.S. perceives of the Al Qaeda network and its
fundamentalist Islamic ideology as the greatest security threat (greater than that
posed by another state), and this perception has led to the development of a
threat context which affects a number of foreign policy issue areas. If one
conceives of Al Qaeda as a perceived, enduring threat, this implies that in the
post-9/11 context, the U.S. will devote more of its military resources toward addressing this threat, and the threat posed more broadly by fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups.

Threat perception is exogenous in that the perception itself forms a contextual framework for developing national strategies (Nye 2006; Buzan 2006). As such, it behaves much like an institution in that once formed, it has some staying power, especially given a number of observed behaviors which crystallize the perception of a particular actor as a grave threat. It is proposed here that we should expect state leaders to allocate a greater share of resources, particularly military resources, toward mitigating the threat posed by an actor perceived to be capable of inflicting significant casualties and damage than for other less threatening security or non-security concerns. Only where no such threat exists, however, would one expect state leaders to devote greater resources, even military resources, to less-grave security threats and non-security concerns. The notion of a peace dividend reflects this idea; a peace dividend implies that when a state is not facing a significant threat, state leaders can decrease defense spending, reallocating those funds to other non-security needs. In this study, rather than examining the effects of the presence of a perceived threat on defense spending, I examine its effects on U.S. unilateral military intervention. That is, instead of experiencing a significant decrease in defense spending, perhaps the military is used for other purposes.
Linking Threat Perception as Context to the Specific Policy of Military Intervention in Civil Conflicts

The next step in the deductive process links national interest, defined within the context of a perceived threat, to military intervention in civil conflicts, one specific type of foreign policy. Patrick Regan’s work (2000; 2002) represents one of the most comprehensive studies examining the third-party decision to intervene in civil conflicts, and he employs a rational, expected-utility approach, treating each intervention as an independent event. That is, he assumes that when faced with the decision of whether or not to intervene in a civil conflict, leaders are primarily concerned with the future gains of such action, determined by the costs, benefits, and likelihood of success of intervention in a given conflict (Regan 2000; 2002). This rational-choice approach is simple and clear: it is assumed that states will intervene when it is ‘in their best interest’ to do so.

Yet, what constitutes these interests, and how these interests change, are not directly examined. In identifying the conditions which make U.S. unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts more likely, I contend, like realists, that states intervene for the purposes of enhancing national security. However, I also contend, like those outside the realist camp, that states may intervene for non-security reasons, as well, given that another more pressing threat to national security does not exist, or has a low perceived probability of being carried out or inflicting significant damage. That is, the purpose behind intervention can be traced to whether or not there is a grave security threat. Thus, when the U.S., is
faced by an actor posing a credible threat, it should be more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts, where it intervenes at all, for the purpose of alleviating the threat posed by the actor and its allies. This implies that the U.S. should also be less likely to intervene in civil conflicts for other purposes, as doing so limits the amount of resources that may be used for weakening the threatening actor. Where such a threat is significantly mitigated or ceases to exist, however, a greater opportunity exists for intervening for non-security purposes. Yet, even with this open opportunity, U.S. leaders may still decide not to unilaterally intervene in civil conflicts characterized by humanitarian crisis. The decision will largely depend on public sentiment and the perception that the venture will be successful. As is explained in later chapters, Bayesian inference provides a powerful framework for understanding why threat perceptions change and the effects these changes may have on foreign policy.

Conclusion

To reiterate, I argue that the beginning and end of a heightened threat context alter the prioritization of state interests, and, accordingly, state behavior. The specific state behavior examined here is that of U.S. unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts. When faced with an actor posing a credible security threat, states are primarily concerned with alleviating the threat, and this concern manifests in how states use their resources, particularly their military resources.
States would seem to allocate more of their military resources toward alleviating this threat than toward other non-security goals.

On the other hand, where such a threat does not exist, or is not as credible, one would be more likely to observe an increased share in the use of military resources for non-security purposes. This is not to say that where one actor ceases to be deemed a grave security threat states no longer have security concerns, only that where these security concerns are less grave, state leaders may use more of their military resources for addressing other concerns. As this relates to U.S. military intervention, we would expect when the U.S. is faced by an actor posing a credible threat, it will be more likely to intervene in civil conflicts for the purpose of weakening the threatening actor or its ally than for other purposes, indicating that when faced with a grave security threat, state leaders are more likely to use force for security purposes. Accordingly, when faced by a threat deficit, they may use their resources for other non-security purposes.

If such a theory is valid, it would contribute to our understanding not just of intervention behavior but would have broader implications for our understanding of international relations. First, the theory accounts for realist, liberal, and internationalist interpretations of state motivations and behavior. On the one hand, it supports the traditional realist perspective that security interests outweigh other concerns, at least as far as military intervention is concerned, when there is a threat posed by a capable and aggressive actor. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that when states are not faced with such a threat,
intervention behavior may reflect non-security interests; this observation
contradicts the realist depiction of an ever-preservation and dominance of security
concerns in the international system and supports the liberal notion that states
have myriad interests (Keohane and Nye 1977).

Second, the theoretical argument presented above would enhance our
understanding of foreign policy change and the dynamic relationship between
state interests and behavior by accounting for how and when contextual factors
change, which may in turn lead to changes in state interests and behavior.
Theories of foreign policy change provide some foundation from which to
examine the influence of contextual factors on state interests and behavior, with
much of the literature identifying both accelerators and inhibitors of state
adaptation to new contexts. Using existing ideas of foreign policy change as a
foundation, I explain how state interests change when a state becomes faced
with a new threat, and, accordingly, when a state is no longer faced with such a
threat. That is, both the genesis and the termination of a heightened threat
context represent shocks that lead to an alteration in state interests and
behavior.

The theoretical argument presented in this study differs from those of
previous intervention studies in three ways. First, it provides theoretical
justification for why third-party intervention decisions may follow a pattern given a
particular dyadic context. Thus, it differs from most other studies which generally
ignore such contextual factors, or where they account for them as control
variables, or do not account for them in a generalizable, theoretical way. The most obvious example is the Cold War as context. In this study, I argue that the context of the Cold War represents but one example of a broader concept – heightened threat context and its impact on state behavior (that of the U.S.), emphasizing the dyadic level of analysis rather than the structure of the international system (i.e., its polarity).

Second, this study differs from its antecedents because it examines the influence of threat context on the U.S. decision to intervene in civil conflicts, a relationship that has received scant attention in other intervention studies (with the exception of Fordham’s recent study published in the December 2008 issue of *ISQ*). Third, this study identifies not only continuity in intervention behavior but under what circumstances one would expect change in intervention behavior.

The rest of the study is organized as follows: I begin with a review of the literature concerning third-party intervention in civil conflicts, ultimately highlighting the insufficient attention to security context in explaining intervention behavior. This is followed by examining the literature which explains the formation of contexts, their influence on policy, as well as how contexts change and what impact this has on policy. This topic is addressed in the works of international relations, foreign policy, and political psychology scholars (Gilpin 1981; Goertz 1994; Rosati et al. 1994; Herrmann 1990; Tetlock 1991), all of which seem to share a common thread pointing toward a Bayesian depiction of learning.
The review of literature segues into the theoretical argument presented in this study, which emphasizes the role of security context and its impact on foreign policy, particularly that of U.S. unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts. It also explains how this security context changes and the subsequent impact of such changes on U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts. The theoretical section concludes by stating the primary hypotheses to be examined.

The research design describes the dependent and independent variables to be examined in the study, as well as how they are measured, and explanation of the quantitative methods used is described in detail in the analysis chapter. Results of the analysis indicate strong support for the argument that a heightened security context determined by a threatening actor substantially increases the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict which involves this actor as a party to the conflict or in which one of the parties to the conflict adheres to threatening actor’s ideology. These results also reveal that, overall, humanitarian factors are not statistically significant determinants of U.S. military intervention during a heightened security context.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review the literature pertaining to our existing understanding of state interests, how they change, and how continuity and change in interests have implications for continuity and change in policy, particularly that of military intervention in civil conflicts. Our current understanding of when state leaders decide to intervene emphasizes an expected-utility approach, focusing mostly on the costs, benefits, and the likelihood of success intervention poses for the third party.

Although this approach appears to be the most useful in terms of predicting behavior, it is not clear how a third party determines expected utility. That is, how do leaders assess the costs, benefits, and likelihood of success of intervening in a civil conflict? Do they focus on monadic, dyadic, or systemic factors in determining whether or not to intervene? From a monadic perspective, one might argue that leaders focus on the characteristics of the conflict and the target state. Intense, prolonged conflicts, for example, may signal a low likelihood of success in ending the conflict. One might emphasize dyadic factors, such as military or economic ties between the intervening and target state, where the benefits of preserving such ties might lead a third party to intervene to
maintain the status quo. In addition, one must consider the dyadic relations between the intervener and other states in the system and implications these may have for military intervention in civil conflicts. Finally, systemic factors, such as the polarity of the international system, may affect the decision calculus.

The challenge faced by the scholar is how to measure costs, benefits, and likelihoods from the leader’s perspective. Defining costs and benefits simply in terms of the monetary costs and potential human lives lost neglects the grander purpose intervention may serve, that of potentially enhancing long-term security and strategic interests. Similarly, if costs, benefits, and likelihood are measured objectively, one does not take into account variations in risk acceptance among leaders (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Thus, the problem concerns not whether an expected-utility approach is useful for explaining the decision to intervene, but how each level of analysis and determining factor is weighted in the decision calculus.

In this study, I emphasize the importance of the third party’s perceived security environment (whether more threatening or more benign). A more threatening security environment is determined by the presence of an identifiable, capable threat in the form of a state or nonstate actor. A more benign security environment would be one in which (1) threats are either not identified specifically or reflect more general security concerns (e.g., there are allusions to the threat of criminal organizations and terrorists, but less emphasis on a specific state or non-state actor); or (2) where threats posed by actors are
perceived to lack the capacity to, or are perceived to be unlikely to, inflict significant damage. The security environment determines broader strategic interests and thus is likely to affect a number of issue areas, including where a state directs its military resources. Thus, the literature review begins by examining the work of others who have examined intervention behavior, and follows with that of those who emphasize the role of context (such as security environment) in foreign policy, as well as the effects of change in context on foreign policy (Rosenau 1971; Herrmann 1990). This latter literature pertains to third-party military intervention given that intervention is a type of foreign policy (Rosenau 1971; Morgenthau 1967).

Among foreign policy scholars, some contend that foreign policy behavior is more continuous than sporadic, leading one to expect state leaders to generally continue the same policy unless encountering a shock (Herrmann 1990; Tetlock 1991). That is, foreign policy behavior follows a pattern which reflects national interests and shared perceptions of the world and the intentions of others. Thus, as this applies to military intervention or any other form of foreign policy, one would expect more continuity than change in this behavior. However, where change does occur, following either revolutionary or evolutionary learning, this will mark a new pattern of behavior. This broad conception of foreign policy continuity and change is addressed by international relations scholars (Maoz 1996; Goertz 1994) as well as foreign policy scholars (Hermann 1990; Hagan and Rosati 1994). Although their works identify factors
which bring about change, pointing to both external and domestic stimuli, the
process by which change is considered and subsequently implemented is not
clear. In this study, I integrate a particular notion of learning, that of Bayesian
inference, to illustrate which stimuli leaders may tend to ignore and which they
may tend to act upon.

Bayesian inference is familiar to social scientists, as it forms the basis for
which we accumulate knowledge, starting with preexisting theories, and finding
support for them (or lack thereof) through the accumulation of evidence. In this
section, I use the works of others to highlight the main characteristics of
Bayesian inference, and in the theoretical section, these characteristics are
applied to explain continuity and change in intervention behavior. I begin by
discussing our current understanding of the phenomenon to be explained –
military intervention in civil conflicts.

Military Intervention in Civil Conflicts

Numerous studies have strengthened our understanding of the decision
by third parties to intervene in the civil conflicts of other states. Because this
particular phenomenon has been granted so much attention over the years, I
provide an overview of these works, and sort the factors they emphasize into two
broad categories – external determinants of intervention and internal
determinants of intervention. External determinants are those which relate to the
international system, relations between states, and characteristics of the target
state and civil conflict. Internal determinants, on the other hand, refer to those related to domestic politics, institutions, and perceptions of the intervener. The purpose of this section is to pinpoint where this study fits within the broader existing intervention literature.

The determinants examined in each of the two categories described above correspond to a question posed by James Rosenau concerning intervention in general: “…what is the relative potency of individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables with regard to intervention as a form of foreign or international policy?” (1969, 165). In response to Rosenau, scholars have made laudable contributions to our understanding of the decision to intervene by identifying the “relative potency” of these factors. Before discussing these works, it is important to explain what is meant by the term intervention.

Rosenau’s (1969) work marks an important stage in the historiography of intervention studies in that he proposed a definition of intervention, for the specific purpose of enabling the creation of parsimonious theories and means for testing these theories empirically. Prior to Rosenau’s work, most studies of intervention were primarily normative and descriptive, providing thorough investigations of specific cases. The primary intent of these studies was to explain in detail a particular intervention, but rarely to compare it to that of other interventions on a large scale, or to develop a theory of intervention in general.
Calling for a more scientific approach, Rosenau developed a definition of intervention that could be utilized by other political scientists, making it more amenable to the development of general theory: interventionary behavior is that which is both “convention-breaking” and “authority-oriented in nature.” Convention-breaking implies change in the normal pattern of behavior between the intervening state and the target state, and this change in behavior on the part of the intervener must be intended to affect the authority structure of the target in some way. In all, the event must be both convention-breaking and authority-oriented for an act to be considered an intervention, and it can be employed using military, economic, or diplomatic means.

Providing further classification of intervention, it may be unilateral or multilateral in form, depending not on the number of parties intervening but on the number of parties making up the command structure. A unilateral intervention is one that is conducted under the leadership of one state, while a multilateral intervention is led by an international command structure. More specifically, where more than one state intervenes on the same side of a party to a civil conflict, the intervention is deemed unilateral for each state involved if they are not united under one command structure (Regan 2000, 2002). One other classification of intervention deserves discussion – whether it is deemed neutral or biased. Whereas multilateral interventions are often perceived as motivated by neutral interests, unilateral interventions are usually considered biased toward
one side or another, with the intervening state’s leadership hoping its favored side ‘wins.’

The depictions of intervention described above fall short of including more contemporary forms of intervention such as peacekeeping, which may be conducted by an international organization, ad-hoc group of states, or one state. Rost and Greig (2011) examine state-conducted peacekeeping in civil conflicts and define it as “the deployment of military personnel by a single state or an ad-hoc coalition of states to a conflict-affected country with the aim of monitoring, keeping or restoring peace, rather than the aim of helping one of the conflict parties to win or prevent its defeat” (5). As they point out, some of the same factors which determine military intervention also determine a third party’s decision to deploy peacekeepers to a conflict-affected country, particularly those pertaining to strategic interests. Other factors may also play a role in peacekeeping, including the urgency for intervention. The decision to deploy peacekeeping troops may incur costs similar to those for biased military interventions in terms of the opportunity costs associated with having to make trade-offs, as well as political costs associated with failed attempts.

Although there is also a plethora of literature explaining the effects of intervention, these works are not discussed, as the primary focus of this study is the decision to intervene rather than this decision’s effects on a number of other factors. Having presented a basic understanding of the concept of intervention, I now provide an overview of the field’s current knowledge concerning the decision
to intervene. Although this study focuses specifically on U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, I also examine works that pertain to intervention on the part of all states, as well as intervention in international conflicts and the U.S. use of force in general, as the theoretical arguments in such studies may also pertain to this study.

The most recent and comprehensive studies explaining intervention in civil conflicts take more of a “phenomenon-centric” or “actor-centric” approach (Findley and Teo 2006). Regan (2000; 2002) and others examine civil wars which are more likely to experience intervention by emphasizing characteristics of the conflict or target state, employing a more phenomenon-centric approach. Findley and Teo (2006) and others, however, focus more on the motives of the intervener, perhaps observing the potential interveners as the unit of analysis and focusing more on characteristics and perceptions of the intervener (Gent 2007, 2008, 2010). Yet other studies attempt to assess both by including factors relevant to the conflict, target state, and intervening parties (Rost and Greig 2011).

Any of these approaches may emphasize the expected-utility calculus of the intervening state’s leadership. Potential benefits of intervention include containing the spread of conflict, perhaps mitigating the loss of life and infrastructure in the target country, establishing or strengthening relations with the party being supported, and, related, having greater (or maintained) influence on the policy of the target state following the cessation of fighting. Potential costs
faced by an intervener pertain both to direct costs of intervention, such as loss of life and resources, as well as indirect costs, such as those related to political survival of the third party’s leadership, or loss of perceived legitimacy by the international community. Probability of success may be determined by the intensity of the conflict, parity of forces, duration of conflict, number of parties involved, among other factors. That is, a number of external and internal variables are considered by third-party leaders as part of the cost-benefits analysis associated with intervention. Scholars have addressed the influence of these determinants in their analyses of intervention, and each is described below.

External Determinants of Intervention

Characteristics of the Conflict and Target State

In conducting cost-benefits analysis pertaining to the utility of unilateral military intervention in a civil conflict, third-party leaders may consider both dynamic and fixed characteristics of the conflict and target state (Aydin 2010). Dynamic aspects of a conflict may pertain to intensity, the presence of a humanitarian crisis, its potential for spreading, the duration of the conflict, and government-rebel parity. “Fixed” characteristics of the state which may affect the decision to intervene pertain to the resource wealth of the state, its proximity to a third party, and level of economic development.
Expectations and findings regarding how these factors affect third-party intervention are framed in terms of how they weigh in the expected utility calculus of third-party interveners. More intense, prolonged conflicts may deter military intervention given that they signify high costs with less potential for success (Regan 2002; Aydin 2010). Regarding intensity, Regan contends that the leadership within potential intervening states assesses the likelihood of success of the intervention by observing the intensity of the conflict, indicated by the number of casualties per year. “A very intense conflict will generally take a substantial intervention to bring a halt to the fighting; the larger the intervention, the greater the costs of adopting such a policy. But also the more intense the conflict, the less likely it is that an intervention will be successful…making the expected utility from intervening low” (Regan 2000:49-50).

Regan finds empirical support for this claim, though it is interesting to note that while his analysis indicates a negative relationship between intensity and the likelihood of intervention, it indicates a positive direction between the number of casualties overall and the likelihood of intervention. Rost and Greig’s (2011) analysis also reveals a greater likelihood of peacekeeping deployment to civil conflicts with higher battle deaths, although this effect only seems to hold for peacekeeping on the part of major powers. Also, using a revised version of Regan’s dataset, Aydin (2010) finds that intense civil wars are more likely to experience third-party state intervention.
Conflicts which are characterized by humanitarian crisis or the potential for spreading may also be more likely to experience intervention, where benefits of intervention include preserving lives and maintaining regional stability. Following the end of the Cold War and the increase in the number of civil conflicts taking place in the international system, some perceived it a responsibility of the international community to intervene in such conflicts in order to prevent them from spreading, as well as to mitigate the loss of life and infrastructural damage incurred. More recent studies have supported the belief that conflict is contagious, emphasizing one conflict’s role in the onset of other civil and international conflicts (Leeds 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Moore and Shellman 2007). If one were to assume that the U.S. following the end of the Cold War began to pay more attention to collective security and containing the spread of conflict, one would correspondingly expect intervention to occur in civil conflicts that have a greater potential for spreading. Brands (1987) argues, for instance, that U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada is partially explained by the perception that these conflicts could spread and instigate broader regional instability. One indicator in quantitative studies which has been used to measure the propensity for a conflict to spread is the number of borders of the target state. Using such a measure, one would expect that the number of borders a state has would increase the likelihood of third-party intervention in order to prevent contagion. Regan (2000) finds, however, that
countries with a higher number of borders are less likely to experience intervention in their civil conflicts, a puzzling result.

Another indicator of the potential spread of conflict pertains to the refugee flows generated by a conflict, the likes of which may lead to political instability in neighboring countries. Dowty and Loescher (1996), for instance, argue that the potential for massive refugee flows makes it often too costly for major powers or international organizations not to intervene. They imply that if the international community were to intervene early in the civil conflicts of other states, they would experience lower costs in the long run than the costs of intervention in the short run. Pointing to the specific case of Rwanda, they highlight the cost of inaction with the following statement: “The international community spent 1.4 billion dollars in humanitarian relief in the nine months immediately after the genocide in Rwanda and will continue to pay for a long time in terms of protection of refugees and rehabilitation costs” (44). Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) find support for the claim that third parties are more likely to intervene in conflicts with high refugee flows in their analysis of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, noting a positive relationship between humanitarian crisis, partially measured by taking into account the number of displaced citizens, and U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict after the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Rost and Greig’s analysis (2011) indicates that refugee flows partially determine a state’s deployment of peacekeepers to a civil conflict, although this is only the case for non-major
powers. It is worth noting, however, that there is no statistical support for the relationship between genocide and peacekeeping in Rost and Greig’s study.

Another characteristic of the conflict which may affect the likelihood of third-party intervention pertains to other attempts at intervention. Where other attempts have failed, a third party may assume the conflict is less likely to be resolved. Conflicts in which previous interventions were unsuccessful are less likely to experience intervention, as potential interveners may learn from others’ mistakes (Aydin 2010). On the other hand, where parties to a conflict appear to be open to mediation, potential interveners may perceive a greater likelihood of a successful outcome. This expectation corresponds to Rost and Greig’s (2011) finding that more mediation acceptances attract peacekeeping deployments.

Yet another characteristic of a conflict which may affect the likelihood of intervention is the parity of government-rebel capabilities, as a change in government in the target state may have substantial effects for a potential intervener. As Gent (2008) contends (and his findings support), the more equal government and rebel forces, the greater the value-added of an intervention. Thus, when supporting the government, a third party is more likely to intervene in the “toughest” conflict cases, or those in which the government is faced with a more capable threat. Likewise, when supporting rebel forces, intervention is more likely where rebel forces have greater capabilities, as there is a greater perceived chance of winning.
Fixed characteristics also appear to strongly influence intervention decisions. Aydin (2010) finds that greater oil wealth and economic development both decrease the likelihood a civil conflict will experience intervention, while regime type appears to have no effect. Likewise, proximity to an intervening state may have a substantial influence on third-party intervention, as is indicated in Yoon’s study (1997) examining U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, as well as those of Findley and Teo (2006) and Kathman (2010). As Kathman argues, neighboring states are more inclined to intervene in the civil conflicts of proximate states given the greater posed threat to their own regional stability, as well as greater economic relations and ethnic ties with neighboring states.

Emphasis on the characteristics of the conflict and target state described above provides some insight into explaining third-party intervention. However, by focusing on the conflict and target state, such analysis excludes factors related to domestic politics and characteristics of the intervening state. Furthermore, by emphasizing the intervener’s perceived likelihood of success based on conflict and target-state characteristics, the decision to intervene is treated as an isolated decision, as if a potential intervener observes each civil conflict in a vacuum. This interpretation of decision making may be unrealistic in that it ignores collective historical and cultural factors affecting the decision-making process of the third-party state’s leadership, which determine larger strategic goals of the intervener.
Cost-benefits analysis on the part of potential interveners would most likely be clouded by perceptions of the conflict in grander strategic terms, as well as in historical and cultural terms. In fact, leaders may even intervene when the likelihood of success is not particularly high, with the effort itself weighing, from the perspective of the leader, more than the outcome. That is, a political leader may perceive high costs for not acting, even if the likelihood of success of a given venture is not particularly high. Considering the Vietnam War, how does one explain U.S. intervention in this conflict? According to an expected-utility approach emphasizing the characteristics of the conflict and target state, one would contend that the US leadership decided to intervene because they perceived a high likelihood of success. This may be the case, but it may also be that the goal of containing communism was a larger goal, one in which the U.S. leadership was willing to take more risks to achieve, given the ‘loss of China’ and other recent historical events. One may consider the following: had the Johnson administration been prudent and not sent troops to Vietnam, it might have incurred political costs for being soft on communism once the South Vietnamese regime fell. Furthermore, one could argue that intervening without a high likelihood of success may also act as a deterrent in that it signals to others in the international system that one is willing to take great risks, even appearing almost “crazy,” to achieve its goals (Dror 1971). This latter point implies that by focusing mostly on the characteristics of the target state and conflict, one neglects not
only the domestic politics of the third-party state, but also systemic and dyadic factors that are likely to play a role in foreign-policy decision-making.\(^2\)

This study differs from others emphasizing an expected-utility approach for explaining military intervention in at least two ways. First, it widens the focus from the characteristics of the target state to also include domestic politics within the intervening state, particularly emphasizing the effect security environment within a third-party state has on the decision to intervene in a civil conflict. Second, given both the psychological and strategic effect of security environment on intervention behavior, it is not assumed that state leaders only intervene when their perceived likelihood of success from intervention is high. They may intervene even when the perceived likelihood of success is fifty-fifty, or lower. A leader may perceive the opportunity to win an immediate victory with the public for addressing a security threat, even though in reality the long-term political costs of intervention to his political survival may manifest later. Overall, this study differs from some in that it treats intervention in civil conflict as largely determined by the third-party leadership’s perceptions of how a potential intervention might alleviate or exacerbate grander strategic goals associated with mitigating a perceived threat.

\(^2\) It is important to note that Regan includes a dummy variable which identifies conflicts taking place during the Cold War. That this particular variable was found to be statistically significant and positively related to intervention is telling, mainly because it supports the theoretical argument provided in this study emphasizing the role of context rather than one emphasizing perceived likelihood of success of an intervention. That is, the Cold War as dummy variable does not serve as an indicator that leaders were not paying attention to whether or not an intervention would be successful, but to grander strategic goals on the part of an intervening state, or systemic/dyadic factors.
Relations between the Third Party and Target State

Following from the last section, dyadic relations may influence the intervention decision, particularly those related to alliances and/or military ties between potential interveners and the target state. Huth (1998), for instance, finds that major powers are more likely to intervene militarily in an international crisis on behalf of a state with which it has military ties. Although Huth observes international crises rather than civil conflicts, the notion that a state is more likely to intervene in the affairs of another with which it has military ties could also be applied to civil conflicts. If an intervener has a stake in maintaining the current leadership of another state with which it has a military alliance, for instance, it may be more inclined to intervene militarily should the other state be engaged in civil conflict. In her study examining U.S. intervention in civil conflicts, however, Yoon (1997) does not find empirical support for the relationship between greater military assistance to a state and a greater likelihood of U.S. military intervention in the civil conflict of that state. Similarly, Rost and Greig (2011) find no statistically significant relationship between defense pacts with a target country and state-conducted peacekeeping. Findley and Teo (2006), however, find that an alliance with a target country increases a potential intervener’s hazard of intervention on the side of the government by nearly three times. Likewise, they find that rivalry with a target state increases a third party’s hazard of intervention on the side of the opposition by 108 times.
Aside from military ties, a state may also have economic ties with another that could theoretically make it more inclined to interfere in the target state’s civil conflict. While Yoon (1997) does not find empirical support for the suggestion that economic ties with a target state will increase the likelihood of intervention, Fordham (2008) emphasizes the indirect effect of economic ties. Specifically, he argues, although security interests weigh significantly in the US decision to intervene in civil and international conflicts, what constitutes a security interest is itself largely determined by economic interests. Fordham’s study indicates the need for more research on understanding the relationship between military intervention and economic factors. Also, Rost and Greig (2011) find that trade relations with a target state increase the likelihood a third party will send peacekeeping troops to a civil conflict, although this finding only seems to hold for non-major power interveners.

Other dyadic ties include shared ethnicity or cultural similarities between the intervener and populations within the target state (Horowitz 1985; Mitchell 1970; Pearson 1974; Blechman 1995; Carment, James and Rowlands 1997; Carment and James 2000; Saideman 2001; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Aydin 2010; Kathman 2010; Rost and Greig 2011). Such ties may also increase the likelihood of intervention, as leaders of ethnic groups in each are likely to have close ties, and both benefit from their particular ethnic group obtaining power over state resources. One may expect shared ethnicity to pertain more to minor-power intervention than to that of major powers, particularly among
contiguous states (Kathman 2010). Pearson (1974) finds, in fact, that minor powers are more likely to intervene in order to expand their existing territory and to support their ethnic group, while major powers are more likely to intervene in ideological conflicts. This latter finding pertaining to the major-power propensity to intervene in ideological conflicts supports the notion that the U.S. or another major power might also intervene in the civil conflict of another state in order to establish (or further inculcate) its own values in the target country (Meernik 1996; Enterline and Greig 2005). However, it should be noted that Rost and Greig’s (2011) study indicates both major and non-major powers are more likely to deploy peacekeepers to civil conflicts where they share religious or ethnic ties with the second largest religious/ethnic group in the target state. This finding suggests that third-party interveners may take on the role of protector of minority ethnic groups in other states.

The works described above account for the effect of dyadic relations between the third party and target state. Findley and Teo (2006), however, also account for the effects of dyadic relations between potential interveners in the international system. Incorporating an “actor-centric” approach to explaining intervention, they argue, “potential interveners (the actors) undertake evaluations of the changing civil war context (the phenomenon), which is constituted not only by ground conditions, but more importantly, the sequences of decisions by other third parties as well. This in turn informs if and when they will intervene” (2006, 829). Their findings support this argument, as they find that intervention by a
rival on the side of the government increases the hazard of intervention on the side of the opposition nearly 11 times. Likewise, intervention by a rival on the challenger’s side increases a third party’s hazard rate of intervention on the side of the government by approximately four times. Using game theory analysis, Gent (2007) also confirms with statistical evidence that third parties are more likely to intervene when another actor has intervened who has more divergent interests. Where other potential interveners share convergent interests, there tends to be a free-rider problem, potentially explaining the lack of unilateral intervention in some humanitarian crises. Finally, Gent’s (2010) more recent work uses both game-theoretic and historical analysis to illustrate that patterns of U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean correspond to a threat of external influence in the region. Gent’s analysis indicates that the U.S. has even intervened preemptively, not acting solely following intervention on the part of a competitor.

Similar to these works, this study accounts for the effect of dyads on intervention behavior, but it emphasizes the dyadic relationship between the intervener and another state or nonstate actor in the international system rather than that between the intervener and the target state. In particular, it considers the perception of another actor as grave threat as forming the basis of a heightened security environment, which in turn determines when and where a third party is likely to intervene. Fordham (2008) accounts for this effect, as well,
noting the impact of a rival intervention on a third party’s likelihood of intervention.

In this study, I argue that a threatening actor need not intervene first (or at all) for a third party’s leadership to intervene in a civil conflict. A third party could attempt to preempt the threatening actor’s intervention by intervening in a civil conflict first, or to hurt an existing (or potential) alliance between the target and competitor. In other words, I assume that the relationship between the U.S. and an actor deemed a credible threat to national security forms a context which guides behavior on when and where to intervene. Should a civil conflict be perceived as an opportunity for a threatening actor to form an alliance with the target state, the U.S. may be more likely to intervene in order to prevent the formation of such an alliance, whether or not the threatening actor had any intention of intervening in the civil conflict. Similarly, where a target state has an alliance with a threatening actor, and there is civil conflict taking place, it could be perceived by the U.S. as a ripe opportunity to assist a challenger in taking over the state apparatus, thus presenting an opportunity for the third party to form a strategic alliance.

World Systemic and Other Dyadic Relations

Having examined characteristics of the target state and the relationship between the target state and the potential intervener, I now turn to world systemic factors that may explain intervention and the use of force in general.
Balance-of-power theory has implications for intervention in that a state’s leadership might intervene in the civil conflict of a rising power in order to weaken it, or it may intervene in a civil conflict in which another third party is currently involved in order to weaken the other third party (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Furthermore, non-major powers may be more or less inclined to intervene in the conflicts of other states in anticipation of a response by one of the major powers.

Existing structural explanations of military intervention contain arguments that the U.S. was likely to intervene in certain conflicts during the Cold War due to its rivalry with the USSR and concern with the balance of power. Rosenau presents such a perspective:

> Pressure for or against interventions may not arise in the domestic environment, but developments in the foreign environment can be perceived to alter (or threaten to alter) the structure and/or functioning of the international system to such a degree that decision-makers and their organizations feel compelled to consider whether interventionary behavior is in order. (Rosenau 1969, 167)

In particular, Rosenau identifies three systemic variables which are likely to affect the propensity toward intervention: “the basic structure of the international system, the degree to which ideological rivalry sustains the structure, and the stability of the nations that comprise the system” (1969, 167-68). Other scholars have empirically tested the relationship between the bipolar nature of the world system during the Cold War and theories of enduring rivalries on intervention behavior (Lagon 1992; Yoon 1997; Regan 2000, 2002; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008). The common assumption is that U.S. intervention in civil
conflicts during the Cold War was driven largely by the security concerns of containment and the motivation to be more powerful than its rival, the USSR. In fact, Yoon (1997) finds that two factors constitute together the most substantial determinant of intervention by the U.S. in a civil conflict during the Cold War – if an ally to the USSR intervened and if one of the parties to the conflict was communist.3

The Cold War may be treated not just as a structural variable (focusing on the polarity of the international system), however, but also as a dyadic variable (relations between two specific states). Similarly, as previously mentioned, Fordham (2008) finds that dyadic relations are important for explaining US military intervention; specifically, whether or not an ally is a participant in a conflict, as well as whether or not a rival intervenes, both substantially increase the likelihood that the U.S. will intervene in either a civil or international conflict. Mullenbach and Matthews (2008), however, find no statistically significant relationship between adversary intervention and U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict, though they do find a positive statistically significant relationship between adversary and U.S. military intervention when examining only the Cold War years.

3 Note that whether the USSR intervened is not statistically significant in Yoon's study (1997).
Departure from Previous Studies Emphasizing Dyadic and World-Systemic Factors

This study is distinct from those presented above emphasizing world systemic and dyadic factors in a number of ways. First, by assuming that third parties will be more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts which pose a threat to collective security or pose a refugee crisis, domestic politics within third-party states are once again extenuated. Furthermore, emphasis on the notion of containing conflict does not indicate under what conditions state leaders are likely to act in the interest of international security. As is argued in this study, state leaders may devote their military resources toward collective security goals, but this is likely to be largely determined by the perceived security context. Where state leaders are faced by a more direct security threat, how likely is it that they will use their military resources to address collective security concerns, unless those concerns happen to converge with national interests? One of the main arguments presented in this study concerns how state leaders prioritize state goals and allocate military resources, contending that the conditions under which state leaders are most likely to use military resources for general collective security are largely driven by the perception of existing threats to national security.

Second, as was previously mentioned, although Fordham (2008) examines dyadic relations between states and thus further highlight the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, it is still limited. His treatment of rivalry is purely reactionary in that he emphasizes third-party
response to rival intervention in international or civil conflict. That is, he does not measure the effect of rivalry as part of a heightened security context, but only whether or not a rival intervened in civil conflict. This distinction is important because the rivalry context may guide the intervention decision process even if the rival did not intervene in the civil conflict in question. For instance, Yoon (1997) finds that the U.S. was more likely to intervene when an ally to the USSR was a party to conflict or when one of the parties to the conflict is communist, but she does not find statistical support for a relationship between U.S. intervention and whether the USSR intervenes. Overall, Yoon’s study indicates that our understanding of the impact of rivalry on the decision to intervene militarily in a civil conflict is not clear. Particularly, lack of support for a relationship between USSR intervention and subsequent U.S. intervention illustrates that a state’s leadership will not necessarily respond impulsively to counter a rival’s intervention in most cases. However, her findings of a statistically significant relationship between U.S. military intervention and whether a USSR ally intervened, as well as a relationship between U.S. military intervention and whether there is a communist party in the conflict, indicate that rivalry does matter for explaining intervention in civil conflicts. The question concerns how rivalry matters and what it should lead us to expect. First, a rival represents one type of threatening actor. A heightened security context formed by perceptions of a threatening actor or ideology may play an overarching role in that intervention in a civil conflict may present an opportunity to support the grander
strategy of containing a threatening actor even before it has the opportunity to intervene. Acting preemptively may also be perceived to be less costly than intervening after a threatening actor has done so. Comparing the findings of Fordham (2008), Mullenbach and Matthews (2008), and Yoon (1997) leads one to conclude that our understanding of the impact heightened security context (determined by the perception of a threatening actor or ideology) has on intervention behavior is far from clear.

Third, the studies of Fordham and others who emphasize the role of dyadic relations on intervention behavior do not incorporate the role of non-state actors in their arguments. As will be emphasized in this study, given that rivalry itself is based on the perceptions of state leaders and forms a heightened security context, it is possible threatening non-state actors may also form the basis of a more intensified security context. By neglecting the impact the effect that threatening non-state actors may have on the decision making of political leaders, including the decision to intervene in civil conflicts, we ignore what drives some of the more salient security concerns facing the United States today.

Internal Determinants of Intervention

The discussion thus far has focused largely on international factors for explaining intervention which stem from the external environment. Yet, within the field of international relations, greater attention has been granted to highlighting the two-level game of foreign policy (Putnam 1988; Bueno de Mesquita et al.)
2003). Because intervention is a means for achieving foreign policy goals, one must consider the domestic factors which might explain the decision to intervene in the civil conflict of another state.

Domestic Conditions of the Intervening State

A very basic understanding regarding intervention is that a state can only intervene in the civil conflict of another if it has the capabilities to do so. That is, though a third party might be willing to intervene, it might lack the capabilities and, thus, the opportunity (Most and Starr 1989). This serves as an obvious explanation for why the U.S. leads other states in the number of interventions; correspondingly, Rost and Greig (2011) find that major powers are 89 percent more likely to deploy peacekeepers to a civil conflict. It should be noted, however, that 60 percent of post-World War II interventions in civil conflicts were carried out by minor powers (Regan 2000, 2002). Despite having substantial capabilities, it is possible for a state to be stretched too thin, and one may assume that if a state is already involved in one conflict, it is less likely to intervene in yet another. Huth (1998) backs this expectation with empirical support, finding that state leaders are less likely to decide to intervene in others’ international crises when the potential intervening state is already involved in either an international or civil conflict.

Aside from the basic idea that capabilities matter, many scholars have linked military intervention, or the use of force in general, to the socio-economic
conditions of intervening states (Fordham 2002; Brule, Marshall, and Prins 2010; Mitchell and Thyne 2010). The main tenet of diversionary-war theory in particular is that leaders are more likely to use force when the nation is faced with dire economic problems or the leaders themselves are faced with personal scandals, hoping that mobilizing forces will divert the public's attention from domestic problems. Expecting a rally-'round-the-flag effect, leaders anticipate that external military ventures will increase public support for the administration and buy time for resolving economic problems or covering up scandals. Although Huth (1998) finds that the greater the prospect for electoral victory, the less likely a state is to intervene in the international crises of other states, overall empirical support for diversionary-war theory has been inconsistent (Ostrom and Job 1986; Lian and Oneal 1993; Leeds and Davis 1997; Meernik 2001; Clark 2003; DeRouen and Peake 2002; Fordham 2004). Gent (2009) provides an explanation for this inconsistency by claiming that the use of OLS, logit, and probit models for assessing the strength of diversionary war theory is misspecified. His study utilizes a strategic probit model, and this approach yields findings indicating that the relationship between diversionary incentives and war depends on the actor involved in the crisis. That is, diversionary incentives play a greater role in the attacking state's decision calculus, and appear to matter for defending states only when faced by an economic crisis.

Other explanations of the use of force address the audience costs of a particular action (Fearon 1997). Should a leader promise to protect national
interests in a heightened security environment, he may incur the costs of inaction by not following through, including failing to act preemptively. Similarly, one might argue that leaders who promise to protect human rights and prevent genocide may incur audience costs should they not intervene in humanitarian crises. This may explain why, following the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the frequency of humanitarian interventions (Dowty and Loescher 1996; Regan 2000; Weiss 2001; Talentino 2005; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008). Dowty and Loescher (1996) claim that in addition to the avoidance of the potential for refugee flows and the spread of conflict, changing international norms also explain third-party intervention in humanitarian crises.\(^4\) The heightened concern with humanitarian issues abroad is often linked to the growing public awareness of international affairs on the part of citizens in the intervening state. It is argued that citizens, bombarded by media images of human suffering, pressure political leaders to intervene, and political leaders act or suffer the political consequences (Fearon 1997). In fact, Regan (2000) finds empirical support for the relationship between greater media attention covering a country undergoing civil conflict and a greater likelihood of intervention. It is interesting to note that Rosenau (1969) would probably be surprised by such a finding, as he, and other political scientists of his time, did not expect domestic constituencies to be very concerned with events occurring abroad:

\(^4\) Dowty and Loescher admit, however, that the presence of a humanitarian crisis as an explanatory variable is more powerful when explaining multilateral interventions than unilateral interventions.
The principles of sovereignty and self-determination relieve publics of worrying about how and by whom others are governed and, in any event, foreign authority structures are too far removed from the daily concerns of citizens to warrant their sustained advocacy of convention-breaking behavior. (p. 166)

Domestic Political Competition within the Intervening State

Another explanation for intervention relates to domestic politics within the intervening state. As politicians attempt to distinguish themselves from their opponents, they may consider intervention (or not) with the primary purpose of taking the opposite route of an opponent. Such behavior implies that strategic behavior in the domestic realm trumps such behavior in the international realm. For instance, some argue that in the early years of the Cold War, Democrats were burdened with proving that they were not ‘soft on communism.’ Thus, they may have been more inclined to use military force to contain communism than Republicans (Record 2002). However, Regan (2000) finds no empirical support for the relationship between a change in administration and the likelihood of intervention. He does, on the other hand, find that a divided government decreases the likelihood of intervention. Mullenbach and Matthews (2008), however, find no statistically significant relationship between unified government and the likelihood of intervention.

Political competition as an explanation for behavior applies to not just individual political leaders, but to those who advise them. Some theories of decision-making point to the competition among bureaucratic agencies, and also
among presidential advisers, for influence (Allison 1971; Farkas 1996). Although no large-N study examining intervention in civil conflicts appears to incorporate bureaucratic competition as a factor (as such factors are more often examined in qualitative studies explaining intervention), bureaucratic competition has important implications for our understanding of the decision to intervene in civil conflicts: the decision to intervene might in fact be a result of this competition, with the chosen policy explained by whose argument was most persuasive.

Other models emphasize a more chaotic perspective of decision making in which actors are not quite aware of their preferences, and random events affect decision outcomes, referred to as the 'garbage-can' approach (March 1988).

These perspectives, which emphasize domestic politics, processes, structures, and personalities, highlight the complexity of decision-making, leading one to believe that simplistic explanations assuming rational behavior, as well as those focusing on higher levels of analysis, overlook the importance of domestic influences. As Rosenau argues:

…[I]nterventions are very much the product of perceptions, calculations, and decisions that occur within decision-making organizations and their leaderships…interventions are more exclusively a consequence of decision-making activity than any other type of foreign policy [and are] more subject to the whims of individual leaders and the dynamics of bureaucratic structures than the diplomatic, economic, military, and political policies through which nations conventionally relate themselves to the international system. (1969, 166)

This study differs from those described above in that it accounts for some degree of continuity in foreign policy and objectivity of goals between domestic leaders. Mainly, I follow Bueno de Mesquita’s lead (1981) in assuming both that
one leader acts as gatekeeper on foreign policy, thus making it unnecessary to account for the perspectives of all advisers, and that when given similar contextual parameters, leaders will behave somewhat similarly. Approaches which depict decisions as the processes of chaotic interaction of various factors, or which emphasize peculiarities among leaders for explaining decision outcomes, fail to take into account the possibility there may be some degree of objectivity in how leaders behave in a heightened security environment. One need only consider some of the similarities among presidents of different parties during the Cold War, as well as in the post-Cold War environment. In the former, both Republicans and Democrats alike focused on the need to contain communism, while in the latter, both George H.W. Bush and William Clinton emphasized the role of the U.S. in maintaining order in the international system. Similarly, Barack Obama has continued the focus on weakening Al Qaeda. This is not to say that there were not variations among the policies of these leaders, only that the effect of a threatening (or benign) security environment on each was significant.

This study also emphasizes the role learning has on the decision making of leaders and applies these ideas to the decision to intervene in civil conflicts. This is not the first study to do so, as is indicated by the number of studies described below. It does, however, take a different learning approach than that used by others, though this is described later in detail. First, other
studies utilizing learning approaches to the study of intervention behavior are examined.

Perceptions of Past Intervention Outcomes
Within the Intervening State

Aside from the socio-economic conditions and political competition within the intervening state, some have shown that collective memories of past interventions and learning from these events influence the likelihood of later intervention. Domestic perceptions regarding the appropriateness and likely success of intervention is affected by the observation on the part of an intervening state of how the use of intervention, or non-intervention, has led to satisfactory or unsatisfactory outcomes in the past. Not only are leaders driven politically by the collective memories of their constituents, leaders themselves use the past to serve as indicators of the likely success of using particular policies in the future (Tetlock 1991; Khong 1993; Vertzberger 1998; Vasquez 1976, 1993). Where past policies have failed, leaders are likely to question the tactics used. Furthermore, after persistent failure, state leaders may even question the underlying goals the policies are intended to promote (Tetlock 1991).

As this applies to military intervention, given past intervention failure, leaders are more likely to question the specific policy of military intervention rather than intervention entirely (i.e., they might conclude that other types of intervention are more appropriate in future situations). Despite this basic
understanding of learning, there exist different conceptions of how states and their leaders learn from the past and how this knowledge is applied in the decision-making process. There is also an underlying assumption that learning on the part of leaders is not necessarily efficient, with efficiency implying that leaders are more accurately matching policies to desired end-goals. The various learning approaches differ largely in their emphasis on rational versus psychological approaches and, correspondingly, in their focus on the state as collective entity versus the decision-making of individual leaders. When attempting to explain military intervention, several of these approaches have been utilized.

Considering the rational account of learning, scholars who incorporate this approach most often treat the state as unitary actor (e.g., Waltz 1979; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). The most basic conception of this type of learning is what is called adaptation, a conception found in much of the (neo)realist literature, where it is assumed that states (anthropomorphized) must adapt to events taking place in the international system in order to survive (Waltz 1979; see a discussion of adaptation as a form of learning in Tetlock 1991). Adaptation also occurs when leaders assess the success or failure of a given policy and adjust policy accordingly. Simply, where a policy fails to achieve a satisfactory goal, this policy is less likely to be used to achieve a similar goal in the future. As this relates to military intervention in civil conflicts, one would expect that if the outcome achieved following military intervention were satisfactory, military
intervention would more likely be used again in the future to achieve similar
goals; where it is unsatisfactory, it is less likely to be used. According to some,
adaptation is more appropriate for explaining change in the level of tactics, and
possibly operations and strategies, but less so for explaining change in end-goals
and collectively held beliefs (Tetlock 1991).

Others utilizing a rational approach focus less on the impact a single
outcome has on later policy than on what a number of outcomes may have on
policy. The underlying assumption in these studies is that state leaders are
unlikely to be greatly influenced by single events and that even the effects of
particularly vivid events wane over time (Nevin 1996; Pickering 2001, 2002;
Record 2002). These scholars argue that it takes a number of failures for a state
and its leaders to reconsider the use of a particular policy, such as military
find, for example, that states are less likely to intervene after encountering a
series of intervention failures rather than after only one failure.\textsuperscript{5}

There may be a number of reasons explaining why state leaders do not
respond to only one event. Some claim that, overall, state leaders behave as
social scientists would, using Bayesian inference, and thus would not discount a
well-established theory by observing just one contradiction of that theory. That
is, the occurrence of one instance that contradicts one’s beliefs can be written off
\footnote{Interestingly, Pickering (2001, 2002) finds a parabolic relationship between the number of
consecutive failures and the number of interventions in international conflicts. That is, after
reaching a threshold of failures, the direction begins to move in the opposite direction and third
parties then participate in more interventions in international conflicts.}
as an anomaly; this implies that only after the number of failures begins to
approach the number of successes are theories about the appropriateness of
given goals and their corresponding tactics reconsidered (Record 2002).
Similarly, those advocating evolutionary perspectives of state learning contend
that learning is a slow process whereby those advocating failed policies are
replaced by those advocating successful policies (Vasquez 1993, 207; Farkas
1996, 1998) and that this process, to the outside observer, makes states appear
to behave rationally.

Another strand of learning literature examines learning at a richer level,
aiming to assess how leaders, their advisers, and groups learn from past
events and apply what they have learned to later decisions. Much of this
literature utilizes a cognitive-psychological approach to learning, arguing that
individual leaders, not states, make decisions, and that such individuals are
bounded rationally, with experiences and preexisting beliefs serving as both
guides for and constraints on foreign policy decision-making (Jervis 1976;
Tetlock 1991). Such an approach has been applied by those connecting the use
of historical analogies by political leaders to the likelihood and form of
Vasquez 1976, 1993; Record 2002). Specifically, vivid memories of past
instances of intervention and non-intervention engrave lessons in the memories
of leaders and filter one’s perception of current conflicts. Khong (1991, 1993), for
instance, provides a detailed account of how Lyndon Johnson was both guided
and blinded by his perception of the Vietnam conflict as parallel to that which occurred between North and South Korea. Furthermore, Johnson formed part of the generation that believed acquiescing to aggression could lead to disastrous consequences, as Munich had demonstrated. Correspondingly, Vasquez (1993) states:

> it seems that in all societies [lessons from the past] are derived from the most traumatic experiences that society as a whole goes through. For most, this is the last major war. Subsequent events, particularly more limited wars, will affect those lessons, but for the generation that lived through the traumatic experience, only another major war will lead to an opportunity to rethink lessons. (207)

Although Vasquez is not necessarily referring to military intervention in civil conflicts, this concept theoretically applies to these as well, as the outcome of a military intervention can be traumatic for society as a whole (e.g., Vietnam). Although the effects of such events may wane over time and across generations, Vasquez contends that the socialization that takes place within government institutions make some lessons endure changes in leadership and generational turnover (1976, 1993, 208).

Aside from historical analogies, other scholars utilize a cognitive-psychological approach related to more abstract beliefs about the world. These scholars contend that the stickiness of preexisting beliefs stems from the cognitive schemata developed by individuals which are used as guides for making decisions on a number of issues (Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1991). Because

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Note that there is also a body of literature which emphasizes the “stickiness” of standard operating procedures within institutions (George 1969; Holsti 1977).
these schemata simplify the decision-making process, individuals are unlikely to change them frequently and are more inclined to make reality conform to these schemata than the other way around (Tetlock 1991). Such preexisting beliefs will affect one’s propensity to use military means to accomplish end-goals. This provides yet another reason why one particular event may not alter the underlying beliefs of individual leaders, as well as the collectively held beliefs of a group, concerning the appropriateness of military intervention in certain situations. This is particularly likely where outcomes cannot be defined simply as successes or failures, that is, where the outcomes are ambiguous, limiting the ability to draw clear lessons (Vasquez 1993, 210; Meseguer 2006).

Record (2002) makes such a claim when observing that in the years following U.S. withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, different figures within the government had different conceptions concerning the lessons of Vietnam, and their perceptions of why U.S. military intervention failed to keep South Vietnam democratic often depended on their a priori perspectives concerning the use of force in general. Many of those with more hawkish preexisting perspectives concluded that had the U.S. (1) used its overwhelming force to crush the enemy and (2) not been swayed by domestic politics, it could have achieved a more favorable outcome. On the other hand, those with more dovish preexisting perspectives perceived the failure in Vietnam to be related to the inappropriateness of military intervention in general. Record (2002) illustrates this point by presenting the varying viewpoints of particular bureaucrats and

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military officials following the war, as well as the different policies implemented by Carter and Reagan concerning the use of military intervention.

The emphasis on the rigidity of beliefs accords with Vasquez’s depiction of “hard-line” versus “accommodationist” beliefs and their persistence following ambiguous outcomes (1993, 201-204). Similarly, Tetlock contends, “Countries get [few] observations and…[often receive] ambiguous feedback that does not tell them why things are going wrong. This allows vested interests greater latitude to reinterpret the data in ways consistent with their biases” (1991, 12). Finally, Lavoy argues, “causal uncertainty limits the ability of state leaders to draw clear and accurate lessons from the past…Even when officials obtain enough evidence to calculate the outcome of possible courses of action, they must make difficult trade-offs when a decision involves multiple, competing values” (1991, 737-8).

Such cognitive-psychological interpretations of learning as those described above imply that the decision of whether or not to intervene militarily may be influenced by learning from the past on the part of the potential intervening state, but that this learning is not systematic or rational in the scientific use of the term. Thus, scholars who advocate such an approach to explaining military intervention often focus on the details of specific instances when leaders were faced with the decision to intervene and chose to do so (or not) based on their perceptions of past intervention outcomes (Record 2002; Khong 1991, 1993; Vertzberger 1998). As of yet, there have been few large-N
analyses of the effects of psychological interpretations of past intervention outcomes on later decisions to intervene (Nevin 1996; Pickering 2001, 2002). However, some scholars have provided examples of how the use of historical analogies specifically might be applied to foreign policymaking and the decision to intervene by examining the relationship between the cognitive complexity and policy expertise of leaders and their use of historical analogies (Dyson and Preston 2006).

One final approach to learning which can be applied to the use of military intervention is what is called causal-analytic learning. This approach focuses on learning that takes place within epistemic communities and within institutions, and how learning by these communities ultimately presents itself in discussions within the political leadership. This is a more efficient depiction of learning, as it represents the attempt by leaders to better understand the appropriate use of particular tactics in achieving end-goals (Tetlock 1991; Lavoy 1991). Applying this to military intervention, some equate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine following Vietnam as such a type of learning (Record 2002). Rather than arguing that military intervention should not be used following the failure in Vietnam, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine specified conditions for which future military intervention would be most appropriate and successful (Powell 1992). That is, leaders took into consideration that one policy may not be appropriate in all situations and that conflicts should be examined carefully to determine whether intervention is indeed likely to achieve its intended goal. Such an interpretation
would lead one to believe that state intervention behavior can also be affected by causal-analytic learning which takes place in consideration of past intervention outcomes, though the effects of this type of learning would be difficult to assess in a large-N study.

Whether using rational, cognitive-psychological, or causal-analytic approaches, those examining the relationship between past outcomes and the likelihood of intervention provide some insight into when and where the U.S. is likely to intervene militarily. Yet, how states learn and how this learning is applied to policymaking is still subject to debate. In recent history, for example, one would expect that the U.S. would be less likely to intervene in civil conflicts following Vietnam. What Yoon (1997) finds is the exact opposite: U.S. intervention in civil conflicts during the Cold War is more likely in the post-Vietnam era. Although she ultimately traces this to Reagan’s administration, this in and of itself is revealing. It illustrates the claim that preexisting beliefs are sticky and that learning at the state level may be rare, particularly where the lessons are ambiguous (Vasquez 1976, 1993; Record 2002; Jervis 1976). It may be that U.S. leaders learned not necessarily to stop intervening in general, but to use less overt forms of intervention. If this is what occurred, it supports the notion that learning is more frequent at a tactical level than at a strategic level. If learning from the past does play a significant part in the decision to intervene, however complex this relationship may be, such learning is likely to take place in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Still, it is unclear which events
matter and whether the end of the rivalry with the USSR would make some outcomes that occurred in the Cold-War context less applicable in the post-Cold War era.

As has been illustrated, there is an abundant number of works pertaining to the decision to intervene that could be applied to this study. However, none of these works provides adequate empirical evidence to answer the question posed here: how does security environment affect the U.S. decision to intervene militarily? More specifically, how are patterns of U.S. military intervention different during the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and the post-9/11 periods? In order to assess the differences in intervention patterns between these periods, one would need to first provide a theoretical reason for why there would be a difference. Although structural accounts lead us to believe that the polarity of the system and lack of a credible and powerful security threat would lead to changes in state behavior, it is unclear how state leaders adapt to this new environment. In fact, why not continue business as usual? I emphasize the notion that a ‘crisis’ or ‘external shock’ presents an opportunity for change (Hermann 1990; Thies 1991; Garrett 1991) and that the end of a heightened security environment, such as the end of the Cold War, represents such an opportunity (Jervis 1991/1992). In particular, assuming that U.S. leaders took advantage of this opportunity to redefine or reprioritize its goals, one would assume that the pattern of military intervention, a reflection of state goals, would also change. Similarly, the shock of the 9/11 attacks marked the return of a heightened security environment,
where focus has shifted to the threat by both state and nonstate actors adhering to the ideology of fundamentalist Islam. In the next section, I address existing explanations of foreign policy continuity and change and do this by first addressing interest formation and prioritization, as this literature also has implications for the decision to intervene in civil conflicts.

Identifying and Prioritizing State Interests

The notion in studies of international relations that leaders act on behalf of state interests appears to have two different roots. One is in the traditional conception of the national interest and another represents the economic conception of interests, the latter of which is best explained by economic theories and the rational-choice approach. The difference between these two rests primarily on whether or not interests are defined. Scholars emphasizing the traditional concept of the national interest concern themselves with the make-up of this concept, whether it is objectively or subjectively determined. Rational-choice scholars, on the other hand, present interests as determinants of behavior, without concerning themselves with the make-up or development of such interests. I address each of these in turn.

James Rosenau (1971) contends that although the concept of national interest has been used for centuries by political actors, it has only recently been utilized as an analytical tool for explaining state behavior. Scholars emphasizing this concept can be divided into two camps – “objectivists” and “subjectivists.”
According to Rosenau, objectivists represent those who believe that there is indeed an identifiable, objective national interest common to all states. For Hans Morgenthau (1951; 1954), and most other realist scholars, all states have one primary interest – power. Some neorealists temper this argument by stating that it is not necessarily a lust for power that drives state leaders, but the preference for maximizing security (Waltz 1979). Thus, state leaders are concerned with maintaining the balance of power within the international system, implying that a state leader who becomes power hungry may in turn invite attack (Waltz 1979). It is assumed that state leaders are driven by this common pursuit, either maximizing power or security, and that when they act in ways that hurt the national interest, whether intentionally or not, they will most likely suffer the consequences, the likes of which may be the survival of the state.

Subjectivists, on the other hand, argue that state interests cannot be objectively defined, as they are value-based and vary from state to state. Furthermore, the state is made up of individuals who themselves are influenced by their own interests. For subjectivists, it is the decision-making process that better explains state behavior rather than an objectively defined national interest: “…foreign-policy goals that a society sets for itself are considered to result from bargaining among the various groups claiming satisfaction of their needs and wants. If some interests carry greater weight than others, it is assumed that the differences will be recognized and accounted for in the policy-making process” (Rosenau 1971, 247). Subjectivists may also include those who contend that
states and societies have a number of interests, and such interests cannot be hierarchically ordered. For these scholars, security interests represent one of many concerns and are not necessarily more important than other interests (Keohane and Nye 1977).

The economic representation of interests is better known to political scientists as the rational-choice approach. This perspective can apply to both realist and liberal theories of international relations, as it does not define interests per se; it merely states that interests, whatever they may be, explain behavior. Robert Gilpin (1981), utilizing an expected-utility approach to explaining state behavior, contends that interests are numerous and that any given interest may partially explain the behavior of state leaders. According to Gilpin, state leaders act following a (subconscious) calculation of the costs, benefits, and likelihood of success that such actions will lead to desired end-goals. Aside from pointing to probability as a factor in the decision-making of state leaders, Gilpin also defines interests differently than traditional realists, accounting for the fact that a state has a number of interests.

Throughout history, states and ruling elites have sought a wide range of political, economic, and ideological objectives. During different eras the mix of objectives has varied in terms of the proportions of various sets of objectives. The ratio of security objectives to economic objectives, for example, may vary depending on internal and external factors. Objectives important in one age may be relatively unimportant in another…yet it is the mix and trade-offs of objectives rather than their ordering that is critical to an understanding of foreign policy. (Gilpin 1981, 22)

Gilpin assumes that there is no hierarchy of interests and instead utilizes the economic concept of the indifference curve to illustrate the numerous
interests held by a state. Thus, he assumes that state leaders, similar to individuals, pursue satisficing rather than maximizing strategies. That is, states do not maximize security at the expense of all other interests; they pursue a strategy that satisfies security needs while also addressing other issues, and these needs are “satisfied by any one of a large number of different combinations of the desired goals” (Gilpin 1981, 20). Given limited resources, there is a trade-off, or opportunity cost, in that the pursuit of some goals will limit the pursuit of others, where simultaneous increases in both are only possible with an overall increase in resources (i.e., a shift in the curve up or down, not a change in the slope of the curve).

Thus, unlike some realists, Gilpin does not assume that the pursuit of power is necessarily the primary goal of states. In fact, similar to the subjectivist perspective described by Rosenau, he argues that “the slope of the indifference curve (i.e., the satisficing mix of objectives) differs from one society to another, depending on the specific interests of ruling domestic elites and the international environment...Thus, it is impossible in general terms to determine what bundles of security, economic, or other objectives will satisfy states” (Gilpin 1981, 20-21, italics mine). On the other hand, similar to the Rosenau’s objectivists, Gilpin argues that “Whether these interests are power and security (as political realists argue), capitalistic profits (as Marxists allege), or welfare gains (as many contemporary theorists contend), every state desires to increase its control over those aspects of the international system that make its basic values and interests
more secure" (Gilpin 1981, 50). It is interesting to note that despite these varying interests, Gilpin argues that all state leaders aim to make their “basic values and interests more secure,” an idea that will be addressed in the next section. Overall, however, Gilpin treats interests exogenously, as a rational-choice scholar would, understanding that whatever they consist of, they influence foreign policy.

A similar approach to understanding the content and changing make-up of state interests is presented by Zeev Maoz (1996). He argues, similar to Gilpin and subjectivists, that each state has its own interests, determined by “an environment that it considers significant for its planning, actions, and calculations.” He refers to this environment as a state’s “politically relevant international environment (PRIE)” and defines it as:

the set of political units (state and nonstate units) whose structure, behavior, and policies have a direct impact on the focal state’s political and strategic calculus. This is the environment upon which decision makers, intelligence agencies, the media, and the public focus their attention on an almost daily basis…. (Maoz 1996, 138)

This environment represents a prioritization of state interests, as things taking place outside this environment are of little importance to the state. “This is so because developments in these units are perceived to have direct, immediate, and profound impact on one’s own state. The need to react to developments in the units making up the PRIE of a state is far stronger than the need to react to developments outside the PRIE” (Maoz 1996, 138).
Although Maoz allows for the prioritization of interests in the definition above, this becomes less clear once one considers his depiction of how a state leadership determines its PRIE. According to Maoz, the criteria for defining a state’s PRIE are contiguity and geopolitical status. The meaning of the former is obvious, and geopolitical status refers to a state’s “reachability.” Because of the “global reach capacity” of major powers, “the PRIE of major powers…consists of all states in the international system. Likewise, major powers with global reach capacity are part of the PRIE of each and every state in the international system” (Maoz 1996, 139, emphasis mine). Thus, according to Maoz, events taking place anywhere in the world are important to major powers.

This brief summary of existing literature concerning how state interests are defined illustrates that there is not a consensus on what is meant by the term “interests.” Realists view all state leaders to be equally concerned with power (or the relative balance thereof), as it is the ultimate safeguard of security. Liberals identify other interests, including potential economic ties which they claim are just as important as security concerns. In this study, I assume like others that a state’s leadership may have a variety of interests and protect or pursue them accordingly. However, I also assume that there is some degree of objectivity among state leaders, given that the state is not what one would consider a failed state. Most basically, state leadership will prioritize security where it seems to be threatened, particularly where the use of military resources are concerned. As security threats are mitigated, state leaders may be inclined to use existing
military resources to address non-security or collective security concerns. This has implications for military intervention in that it implies that military interventions for the sake of alleviating or mitigating a humanitarian crisis in a civil conflict is less likely when there is a heightened sense of security. That is, some interests may receive greater attention than others depending on the perceived security context. As will be observed in the next sub-section, there is no consensus in the existing literature regarding how interests change, and the respective effects this change has on policy. Following a discussion of this literature, I emphasize the notion of security context to describe how interests both persist and change.

Context: How Continuity and Change Explain State Behavior

Understanding change in social phenomena, both its genesis and its effects, has become a primary focus of social scientists, and in the field of political science, an increasing number of studies attempt to grapple with dynamics. In fact, change underlies one of the most fundamental tests of causality in social science—covariance. That is, for one variable to be said to determine another, change in one has to induce change in the other, though the degree of change in one does not have to be equal to the degree of change in the other (Geddes 1990). On the other hand, where one observes change in one variable with no change in the other, one would generally consider there to be a lack of a significant relationship between the two variables. This simplified depiction of one criterion for identifying a causal relationship between variables
emphasizes the importance of being able to explain change and its effects: understanding change is a first step in providing scholars with the power of explanation, and in some cases, prediction.

Yet, studying change is difficult because it entails defining the concept, identifying its catalysts, and describing its potential effects. Robert Gilpin presents five arguments for why the study of change in international politics had been neglected by most international relations scholars prior to his respective work on the subject in War and Change (1981). More than a decade later, Jerel Rosati and other editors of Foreign Policy Restructuring contended that Gilpin’s same five reasons explain the still inadequate understanding of change (1994, 5).

First, Gilpin emphasizes that international relations is a fairly young discipline, and that the first phase of a discipline probably should be to identify order before change. Accordingly, Rosati et al. argue, most foreign policy scholars have focused on “continuous patterns of foreign policy, as opposed to restructuring in foreign policy over time,” contending that the most obvious indication of the focus on continuity is the attention granted the policy of containment in U.S. foreign policy (1994, 5). Accordingly, they present the following quote:

Unfortunately, political scientists…spend so much time learning how to describe…they are often baffled by dynamics. This is probably why they are so much better at postulating hypotheses that relate variables to each other…than they are at building theories. (Rosati et al. 1994, 5, citing James Caporaso, Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley, James Rosenau, and Dina Zinnes 1987, 42)
Another reason provided by Gilpin for the lack of attention to the study of change is the decline of the pursuit of grand theory in international relations, a result of the ascent of behavioralism. Rosati et al. (1994) argue that “[a] similar movement away from grand theory occupied students of foreign policy…Such commitment to middle-range theory resulted in a proliferation of research into narrow questions and microphenomena, analysis not conducive to the broader study of foreign policy change” (5-6, see also Holsti 1971). Coupled with the decline of a search for a grand theory of IR, just as for Gilpin, Rosati et al. contend that the third reason for the neglect of the study of change also reflects Western bias, in which there is a “narrow focus in terms of foreign policy actors [major powers], scope [cold war policies], and time [post-World War II era]” (Rosati et al. 1994, 6).

In addition to these three reasons, Gilpin lists another challenge to the study of change as the largely held belief that explaining political change is a futile task. Before scholars began trying to incorporate dynamics in their explanations of political phenomena, it was believed that change was often the result of unique, unpredictable historical events, and that the effects of such change were equally unpredictable (Rosati et al. 1994, 6). Finally, Gilpin’s fifth cited obstacle to the study of change is based on the general ideology of Western social scientists. In the past this ideology was strongly influenced by the realist school which upheld a preference for “stability or at least a preference for orderly change” (Gilpin 1981, 6).
Despite these barriers to studying dynamics, Rosati et al. allege that the study of international change became the “predominant focus of international relations scholars” by the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in “an explosion of competing theories to explain the ‘dynamics’ of world politics: strategic hegemonic stability theory, long cycles theory, world systems theory, dependency theory, interdependence theory, international regimes theory, and so on” (Rosati et al. 1994, 7). Accordingly, they contend that there has been a similar increased focus of attention on change in the foreign policy literature, starting with Rosenau in the 1970s, and extending into the work of Kal Holsti, Kjell Goldmann, and Charles Hermann in the 1980s (Rosati et al. 1994, 8).

Thus, despite the challenges, a number of scholars have taken on the formidable task of explaining both change in international relations and change in foreign policy (Goertz 1994; Gilpin 1981; Rosati et al. 1994). Yet, the complex nature of dynamics has led most scholars to focus on either one level of analysis or one issue area, and often to have different conceptions of change. I discuss these differences in the next sub-section.

What Is Foreign Policy Change and How Do We Know It When We See It?

This study is concerned with both continuity and change in foreign policy; in particular, how a changing context based on a perceived threat to security affects the decision to intervene in civil conflicts. Where there is a persistent threat to security, or heightened security environment, one would expect a
continued pattern of intervention in that it would be used primarily for the purpose of alleviating the threat. On other hand, where this threat is significantly mitigated or ceases to exist, such a substantial change in perceived threat would likely lead to a substantial change in intervention behavior. The question concerns how we identify change and its corresponding effects. That is, how do we distinguish it from continuity?

Rosati defines foreign policy change as “foreign policy phenomena that experience broad alteration, ranging from more modest shifts to major foreign policy restructuring,” while defining foreign policy continuity as “broad patterns in foreign policy that tend to persist over time, encompassing more micro and incremental changes” (Rosati 1994, 225). Most studies of political behavior either concern themselves with continuity in behavior or change rather than attempting to address both. Continuity, for instance, is emphasized in historical theories which stress “the stability of behavior via metaphors like habit, inertia, custom, and tradition” (Goertz 1994, 185). Such theories allow for predictability in explaining behavior. Change, then, implies a discontinuity in behavior, and this forms the basis of what is to be explained by dynamic theories, such as those which examine arms races and power transitions (Goertz 1994). These studies of change observe and explain both what instigates change as well as its potential effects, though it is most often the former, as it is somewhat difficult to predict what will happen following change (Gilpin 1981).
What constitutes continuity and change is not as obvious as it may seem, however. First, there is not always a “sharp, or clearly defined, break with the past” due to the time in which it may take for change to manifest (Hagan and Rosati 1994, 267). Second, what appears as change at one level may in fact reflect continuity at a deeper level. Goertz provides the example of military spending to illustrate this point, emphasizing the importance of context for determining whether behavior is the same or not. He states that military spending may change in absolute values, implying that a society is more or less militaristic than it was in the past. Yet, when considering the historical, normative, or structural context, military spending may indeed be constant.

The point here is to emphasize that what appears to be a change in preferences may in fact represent behavior that corresponds to unchanged preferences, and that unchanged behavior may in fact reflect different preferences which achieve the same result. In this study, I contend that intervention behavior can be viewed in the same manner. For instance, it is commonly assumed that U.S. intervention behavior changed following withdrawal from Vietnam. That is, many assume that it made leaders more reluctant to intervene at all. Yet, we know that the U.S. did continue to intervene in civil conflicts over time, and empirical evidence has in fact shown that the U.S. was more likely to intervene in civil conflicts following Vietnam than in the period prior
(Yoon 1997). Some attribute this return to intervention as a result of fading memories and generational turnover, while others associate this behavior with changes in administration (Yoon 1997). Although both factors probably contribute to intervention behavior, I contend that U.S. intervention behavior largely remained unchanged. Following the Vietnam War, and up until the end of the Cold War, the USSR and its allies continued to pose a threat to the U.S., and where the USSR or its allies were involved in civil conflicts, the U.S. often intended to weaken or preempt its rival or rival’s allies by intervening. The U.S. contribution of military aid and advising to Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan during the 1980s is a primary example of this behavior. Therefore, though one might say that U.S. intervention behavior changed following the Vietnam War because the target of intervention was different, I contend that the heightened security context determined by rivalry with the USSR continued to play an influential role in intervention behavior, which made it somewhat the same. Mainly, the U.S. purpose of intervention remained largely unchanged, to weaken its rival and the rival’s ally, despite the significant failure of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. That is, change may have occurred at the tactical level, though not at the strategic level.

Having presented the difficulty faced by a researcher in differentiating between continuity and change, I now examine how other scholars have

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7 It should be noted that Yoon measures the effect of Vietnam with a dummy variable identifying pre- and post-Vietnam years. This relationship may not hold were it to be measured using a different method, such as interrupted time-series, to determine the impact of the Vietnam loss on the likelihood of military intervention in civil conflicts.
analyzed change, highlighting their emphasis on the level and scope of change, as well as the timeframe in which it takes place (Hagan and Rosati 1994, 269). Change is a matter of degree, an assumption that political scientists have long considered, whether studying revolutions, voting behavior, or other political phenomena. For foreign policy specifically, what defines the degree of change most often depends on the number of issue areas affected, how sharply the altered policy contrasts with previous policy, as well as the degree to which the new foreign policy is institutionalized (Hagan and Rosati 1994, 267). Yet another important aspect of change is whether it represents a shift in the direction of policy versus the genesis of entirely new policy (Volgy and Schwarz 1994). For the purpose of simplification and abstraction, a number of scholars have accounted for change as a matter of degree using the notion of a spectrum: One end of the spectrum constitutes minor changes in policy (adaptation), while the latter end represents more fundamental changes in policy, institutionalization, end goals, and/or beliefs (foreign policy restructuring or paradigmatic shifts) (Rosati et al. 1994).

Keeping this spectrum of change in mind, the most traditional conception of change is in the form of adaption. In international relations, it is most simply the notion that state leaders alter their behavior when confronted with changes in the international environment, changes in their own capabilities, and as a result of learning from the outcomes of past policies. According to the realist school, because the international system is a competitive realm in which only the fittest
survive, were state leaders to fail to adapt, they would risk the state’s very survival (Waltz 1979). Where previous policies have failed, they will be altered. Where they have succeeded, they will continue to be used. That is, state leaders are continually updating their behavior, and most changes are minor in form. According to Gilpin, this incremental nature of change in the international system is what allows an existing system to survive and its existing leaders to maintain their relative advantage:

The system may be described as being in a state of homeostatic equilibrium. Territorial, political, and economic adjustments among states in response to conflicting interests and shifting power relationships function to relieve pressure on the system, thereby preserving it intact. In brief, international political change takes place through the process of peaceful accommodation and limited conflicts at the level of interstate interactions. (Gilpin 1981, 45-46)

According to Gilpin, it is when the existing international system cannot accommodate a rising state’s changing preferences that more fundamental change is likely to take place, most likely brought about through world war.

Although Gilpin is describing change at the systemic level rather than at the state level, he does provide some insight into changing state behavior. Generally, for realists, changing state behavior is driven by changes in their relative capabilities rather than a fundamental change in preferences, as it is assumed that all state leaders have the same fundamental preference – national security, ensured by attaining the power to influence the behavior of other states. This influence is best guaranteed by having forces that are relatively stronger
than those of other states. Furthermore, where a state’s relative capabilities change (increase), realists expect that the state’s leaders will take this opportunity to be more brazen in pursuit of the state’s security, economic, and ideological interests. Note here that realists do not distinguish between the degree of change; states are expected to adapt by making the expected change in policy, regardless of how drastic this change is. Gilpin concedes, however, that change is not always undertaken so easily, as it faces a number of domestic and international challenges.

Foreign policy scholars, political psychologists, and those utilizing a different approach to understanding political behavior in general (i.e., those advocating liberal, institutionalist, or constructivist interpretations) may distinguish their understanding of change from the realist school in a number of ways. First, rather than presenting the state as unitary actor, a number of foreign policy scholars and political psychologists focus on sub-state actors, such as individual policymakers, coalitions, as well as bureaucrats and their corresponding institutions, all of whom may initiate or resist change. Skidmore states, for instance, that “[r]ealism cannot account for the surprising degree of rigidity in American policies” (Skidmore 1994, 60).

Among this sub-group of foreign policy and political psychology scholars focusing on domestic politics, there is a distinction between the approach

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8 Distinct from his realist colleagues, however, Gilpin acknowledges that states do not, in fact, pursue ever-increasing power, since after a certain point, the costs associated with maintaining such power lead to diminishing returns.
employed, whether rational or psychological. Rosenau (1981), for instance, assumes policymakers to be rational actors, stating that “[u]ltimately, ‘the connection between the adaptive behavior of a society and the consequences of that behavior for its essential structures exists primarily in the minds of foreign policy decisionmakers,’ who act to minimize costs and maximize opportunities based on their images of the world around them” (Rosenau 198, 50, cited in Rosati et al. 1994, 8-9). Common themes among the political psychology and decision-making literature, on the other hand, emphasize the shortcomings of rational approaches by pointing to the following: the variation in intellectual capacity and personalities of different leaders (Preston 2001; Schafer and Walker 2006), the resistance of leaders and groups to information that contradicts pre-existing beliefs (Tetlock 1991; Khong 1992; Jervis 1991), and the number of institutional obstacles to change (Allison 1971).

However, change in the prioritization of foreign policy goals is also driven by events taking place in the international environment. Goals may change given a number of failed attempts to accomplish a specific goal. Recall, for instance, that one or a number of failed intervention attempts has been shown to decrease the likelihood of later intervention, at least for a time (Pickering 2001, 2002; Nevin 1996; Khong 1993; Vertzberger 1998; Record 2002). In this scenario, state leaders may learn that a certain goal is unattainable (Hermann 1990), though lower-level, more specific goals tend to be discarded before higher-level, abstract goals.
Charles Hermann contends that changes in foreign policy goals (and this includes not just the substance of goals but the prioritization thereof) stem from both internal and external factors. Internal political change, such as turnover in leadership and bureaucratic personnel, as well as restructuring, all affect the foreign policy agenda, as different actors have different agendas (Hermann 1990, Allison 1971, Anderson 1991). Agenda-setting determines which issues are granted the most importance given a limited amount of resources (Keohane and Nye 2001). And, even in the case that existing foreign policy is achieving satisfactory results, a newly installed administration may wish to change some foreign policy so as to distinguish itself from the previous administration (Anderson 1991; Thies 1991).

These interpretations of foreign policy are distinct from the realist school in that they do not treat the state as unitary actor and note the conflicting forces influencing decision-making within the state apparatus and at the sub-state level. These forces may represent either instigators or obstructers of change. To account for these different actors, many foreign policy and political psychology scholars generally conceive of change as a continuous rather than dichotomous phenomenon (Rosati et al. 1994; Tetlock 1991). That is, they perceive of a spectrum of change which extends from no change to minor policy change, and less frequently, to fundamental change. This interpretation is

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9 It is important to note here that Robert Gilpin discusses the societal obstacles to foreign policy change in *War and Change*, but he does not include these factors as part of his larger theory, which focuses more on change in the international political system.
distinct from the realist school in that realist scholars do not generally discuss the different degrees of change. This is partly because of the realist reliance on two assumptions: 1) the state is a unitary and rational actor, and 2) the primary interest of states, city-states and empires throughout history has been state survival, attained by increasing one’s own power (or security for neo-realists) and relatively decreasing that of other states. Because the realist school provides no significant discussion of the degrees of change, it largely assumes that change occurs in a very mechanistic fashion, adapting to changing conditions with new policies where needed (Skidmore 1994).

Although foreign policy, political psychology, and learning scholars also use the notion of adaption, this term has a somewhat different meaning than it does for realists. Rather than indicating just any type of state response or change to a situation, these scholars often use it to refer to lower-level policy change, distinguishing it from higher-level change in fundamental beliefs and institutions (Hagan and Rosati 1994; Tetlock 1991; among others).

Adaptation and learning are two other important processes...Adaptation can be defined as a change in beliefs about the desirability of a given policy instrument or instrument setting without any corresponding change in beliefs about the desirability of a given policy goal. Learning entails a change in beliefs about the desirability of policy goals. To put it differently, adaptation can be thought of as a change in beliefs about “desirable means,” while learning can be thought of as change in beliefs about “desirable ends.” (Chwieroth 2008)

In other words, for these scholars, the term 'adaptation' connotes minor policy adjustments which face minimum resistance and are easier to implement. More
fundamental change in foreign policy must overcome a number of domestic hurdles, including established beliefs and institutions.

Hermann (1990), for example, views foreign policy change in terms of four graduated levels: adjustment changes (in the level of effort and scope of recipients), program changes (in means and instruments), problem/goal changes (in the ends and purposes), and international orientation change (in its global role and activities), noting how each category is distinguished by the weight of factors inhibiting change. A similar way of conceptualizing the differing degrees of change is in terms of micro- versus macro-level change, with the former indicating the most minor changes and the latter the most fundamental (Rosati 1994, 17). Rosati (1994, 236) identifies four possible outcomes of foreign policy patterns resulting from a period of transition:

1) *Intensification*: No or little change -- the scope, goals, and strategy of foreign policy are reinforced.

2) *Refinement*: Minor changes in the scope, goals, and strategy of foreign policy.

3) *Reform*: Moderate changes in the scope, goals, and strategy of foreign policy.

4) *Restructuring*: Major changes in the scope, goals, and strategy of foreign policy.

Fundamental change represents what authors in Rosati et al.’s edited volume refer to as “foreign policy restructuring” (1994), defined by Volgy and Schwarz (1994, 25-26) as “a major, comprehensive change in the foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a relatively short period of time, as manifested
through behavioral changes in a nation’s interactions with other actors in international politics.”

Examining Volgy and Schwartz's definition of foreign policy restructuring more closely, one may note that foreign policy restructuring is “comprehensive,” meaning that it covers a number of issue areas. In other words, change in only one issue area (e.g., economic relations) without change in another would constitute a lower degree of change than that of restructuring. Second, Volgy and Schwartz refer to behavior rather than intentions, implying that the rhetoric of political leaders of their intent to alter policy does not present enough evidence of change, as it is easier to talk of such change than it is to enact it. Furthermore, foreign policy restructuring is a type of change that, once enacted, generally endures across future administrations. One will also observe that in their definition of foreign policy restructuring, Volgy and Schwarz contend that radical change occurs within a short timeframe is and most often followed by some shock. This kind of change is specifically referred to by Maoz (1996) as “revolutionary” change and is associated with Thomas Kuhn’s depiction of a paradigmatic shift, or with the notion of “punctuated equilibria” (Krasner 1984; Skidmore 1994). Such change is explained in the work of Herrmann (1990), Goertz and Diehl (1998), (Krasner 1984, 1989), among others.

Yet, other scholars, including Maoz, contend that fundamental change in foreign policy does not necessarily have to take place in a short time frame; it may also occur over a longer period of time, incrementally rather than drastically,
though still fundamentally different from policy a certain number of years prior (Farkas 1996; Hagan and Rosati 1994). This type of change Maoz calls “evolutionary.” While revolutionary change is often the result of what some call a crisis or shock, evolutionary change is that which comes about from incremental adaptations to one’s environment or changes in leadership. In examining international political change at the systemic level, Maoz (1996) distinguishes between revolutionary and evolutionary change in the following manner:

...[S]ystem transformation can be seen as an abrupt shift in the characteristics of the system, or it can come through a gradual process that extends over a long period of time. In the first case, the before-to-after comparison can be done for very distinct periods, typically separated by a singular event, such as a global war. In the second case, the transition takes a long time to unfold, hence imposing considerable difficulties on the definition of boundaries of the before and after period as well as on identification of the precise point of transition...[B]oth [revolutionary and evolutionary] cases may represent significant shifts in the structure and characteristics of the system. (10)

Thus, regarding the degree of change, one would expect revolutionary change to be of higher magnitude, covering more issue areas, within a shorter period of time. Evolutionary change, though it may represent significant change over the long-term, occurs at an incrementally slow pace, and takes place in the form of lower-level changes that alone would not represent a major deviation from past behavior. Aside from the degree and timeframe in which change takes place, another factor which distinguishes revolutionary from evolutionary change is the difficulty with which each is realized. Overall, the general consensus is that it is easier for governments and systems to adapt in incremental ways than to
adopt fundamental changes in the beliefs guiding behavior (Gilpin 1981; Tetlock 1991; Jervis 1976; Goertz 1994, among others).

Tetlock emphasizes this point by stating that even in light of contradictory information, state leaders are more likely to adjust tactics rather than goals (see also Levy 1994 and Chwieroth 2008). Tetlock’s examples are illustrated in chapters, written by other scholars, in his volume with Breslauer which pertains to learning in foreign policymaking. The consistent theme throughout the volume is that states are slow to adjust their existing schemata (i.e., beliefs and corresponding goals; see also Jervis 1976), hoping to alter outcomes with changes in tactics first (Hermann 1990). This implies that there is a somewhat sticky nature to state goals.

Several lines of work suggest that foreign policy belief systems are organized hierarchically with fundamental assumptions and policy objectives at the apex of the system, strategic policy beliefs and preferences at the intermediate level, and tactical beliefs and preferences at the base of the system...Given the powerful cognitive psychological and political accountability pressures to demonstrate consistency in policies over time, a plausible hypothesis is that most learning takes place at the level of tinkering with tactics. Policy makers rarely have the time or the inclination to start questioning the fundamental premises of policy; they are, however, willing to make frequent tactical adjustments to cope with unforeseen events. (Tetlock 1991, 28)

It is made clear in the literature that, overall, higher-level goals are unlikely to change. Although it is typically assumed in the learning literature that tactics are

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10 One example provided by Tetlock in presented in Chapter 8 of his and Breslauer’s volume. In this chapter, Spiegel examines U.S. policy during the Cold War, pointing out that policy has remained largely unchanged, with minor tactical adjustments. Haslam (Chapter 13) and Thies (Chapter 6) provide other illustrations of responding to contradictory evidence with tactical adjustments before higher-level adjustments.
questioned before higher-level goals, some scholars question this assumption and contend that it is possible to change end-goals before the policies used to achieve them. Banning Garrett (1991), for example, contends in his analysis of U.S. relations with China,

…learning has not been primarily the result of repeated failures at the tactical level leading to a search for a new strategy or reconsideration of basic goals. On the contrary, a perceived need or opportunity for a change in goals and strategies has led to a willingness to engage in cognitive-structural learning – developing a more nuanced, differentiated, and integrated view of one’s environment – and then to consideration of tactical policy shifts as a means of implementing a new strategy or achieving new strategic objectives. (242, emphasis mine)

Note that, according to Garrett, the stimulus behind reconsideration of higher level goals is “a perceived need or opportunity” for such change. Under what circumstances would there be a perceived need or opportunity for change? Most likely, such an opportunity is brought on by a ‘crisis’ or ‘shock’. Thies, for example, argues that inertia can be overcome by one of three ways: “through the shock of a sudden and unexpected event, through the gradual accumulation of such a mass of evidence that the issue of policy change can no longer be put off, or through the prospect of substantial budgetary savings if policy is changed” (1991, 193). With that, once new beliefs (and their corresponding goals) are established, they will persist until other “powerful stimuli” come along that call them into question. “Once the policy machine has been set in motion, senior officials are often reluctant to go through the exertions required to formulate a new consensus by suggesting that strategy and/or supporting policies be

In this study, it is assumed that the end of a heightened security context (such as a rivalry), itself determined by perceptions, is marked by a crisis or shock. For example, the observation of the demise of the Soviet Union as empire immediately called into question existing beliefs regarding the USSR as a threat, marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War. As such, the goal of alleviating that threat, what had been a higher-level goal for 50 years prior, became a lower priority, as the threat itself diminished. This is not to say that U.S. national security as a goal diminished, only that containing the USSR, seen as the most obvious and powerful threat during the Cold War, was no longer the primary goal. Similarly, in his prediction of potential changes in U.S. foreign policy, Jervis (1991/1992) contends that the end of the Cold War presented fewer constraints on U.S. foreign policy:

…the U.S. is now free – and indeed is required – to think much more seriously about how to define its interests. Old questions of both ends and means which the Cold War answered or put in abeyance have returned. What does the U.S. want? What does it value, what does it seek, what costs is it to pay, and what methods are likely to be most efficacious? (64)

Such a moment of ‘self-reflection’ is what is often described in cognitive-structural depictions of learning. As this applies to U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, one would expect the pattern of such interventions to change following the end of the Cold War. That is, because the most substantive explanation of U.S. intervention in civil conflicts during the Cold War can be
attributed to the goal of containing communism, one would expect that U.S. military intervention would either diminish in its use overall, or be used for another purpose(s). The question is, for which purposes? Jervis (1991/1992) states,

Some threats to American security remain: nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union and other states, scarcity of economic resources, and non-traditional menaces such as migration and pollution. While they call for serious attention, however, they are not likely to narrow the range of American choice nearly as severely as the Cold War did. (62)

Thus, Jervis expects that U.S. foreign policy will be used in such a way to address these concerns. Overall, he argues, the U.S. “seeks a world composed of states that are liberal, democratic, prosperous, and peaceful both internally and in their foreign policies” (64). Accordingly, Jervis expects the U.S. to pursue goals related to the respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy, protecting the environment, encouraging domestic economic growth, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and “curbing if not eliminating war” (65-68).

These overarching goals have implications for U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts in that they determine under what circumstances the U.S. is most likely to intervene in a civil conflict. Given Jervis’ expectations, one would expect a shift in policy from intervening militarily in civil conflicts for the purpose of countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War to intervening militarily for the purpose of promoting human rights and democracy in the post-Cold War environment. However, Jervis says nothing of what may occur should there be a return to a heightened sense of a security threat. In this study, I argue that there
is the possibility for a heightened security environment to re-emerge, thus allowing for a return of security concerns to the forefront. Specifically, I contend that U.S. strategic interests and foreign policy following the 9/11 attacks reflect such an instance. Under a new heightened security context, value-based goals for intervention, such as promoting human rights and democracy, will most likely be eclipsed by salient security concerns, and this will most likely be observed in foreign policy behavior, including that of military intervention in civil conflicts.

This review of the literature began with a summary of the intervention literature, emphasizing closer examination of the relationship between security context and intervention in civil conflicts. Given that contexts lead one to expect continuity of behavior within the context, and change both at the formation and end of the context, it was followed by foreign policy literature depicting prioritization and change. This literature provides a foundation for understanding the concept of foreign policy change and when it is most likely. It is referred to in this study for emphasizing that intervention behavior, as a form of foreign policy, may also follow a pattern driven by security context, a pattern which may be disrupted following termination of this context.

In the next chapter, I present a theoretical argument which explains how security context influences policy, expecting that where the context remains largely unchanged, we should expect continuous behavior. Likewise, where the context changes, we should expect changes in policy behavior. I refer specifically to the perception of a threatening actor or ideology as forming a
heightened security context, and I consider its effect on a particular form of foreign policy, that of intervention in civil conflicts.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXPLAINING PATTERNS OF INTERVENTION IN CIVIL CONFLICTS

Introduction

In this chapter a theoretical framework is established which links the primary phenomenon of interest in this study – military intervention in civil conflicts – to the formation, prioritization, and change in interests. Specifically, it is argued that when faced with security threats, or threats to state survival or strategic interests, state leaders will grant more military resources toward alleviating these threats than for other purposes. However, where such threats diminish, state leaders have the opportunity to grant more resources toward other non-security interests.

The second aspect of the theoretical framework focuses on a context in which state survival and/or strategic interests might be threatened. It is argued that the existence of a competitor perceived to be willing and capable of inflicting a high number of casualties and infrastructural damage forms the basis of a heightened security context. Other threats would include those posed by non-state actors which have illustrated a willingness to attack the U.S., as well as states involved in an isolated attack on the U.S. It is assumed that the latter threat, given no later confrontation, would cease to be considered a serious threat.
when in an intensified security environment, a greater share of military resources will be directed toward alleviating threats, proportional to the perceived capabilities, demonstrated willingness, and ideology of the threatening actor(s). Once the threat is substantially mitigated, however, and assuming no other grave and credible security threats remain on the horizon, more military resources may be used to pursue other non-security goals.

Threats posed by identifiable, willing, and capable competitors create a context in which a pattern of foreign policy may be identified; that is, the use of certain policies are somewhat continuous within this context, give or take minor deviations (Goertz 1994; Goertz and Diehl 1998). However, both the beginning and end of a context mark opportunities for significant change in state behavior, leading one to expect that the beginning and end of a heightened security context represent such opportunities. Security context is largely defined by state leaders' perceptions, based on preexisting beliefs and empirical observation of the behavior of other actors in the international system (Goertz and Diehl 1998, Thompson 2001). Some reorganization occurs within governments with the purpose of addressing the capable threat. Because of this institutionalization of the security context and because of the often cognitive rigidity of state leaders and their publics, state leaders further solidify the security context, and their foreign policy behavior reflects these perceptions and beliefs. Using theories of learning and related theories of foreign policy change, it is argued that such contexts and their corresponding patterns of behavior are most likely to be
unraveled following external shocks which call into question the foundational beliefs supporting the endurance of this context.

The third aspect of the theoretical framework highlights how a more threatening or benign security context may explain a specific type of foreign policy behavior, that of military intervention in civil conflicts. It is argued that when involved in a more threatening security context, a state’s leaders will be more likely to intervene in a civil conflict which presents it with the opportunity to weaken a threatening competitor or its allies, or prevent this actor or its ideology from gaining influence in the target state, given that it has the military capacity to intervene. On the other hand, when in a more benign security context, state leaders will choose to intervene for other purposes, where they choose to intervene at all. Specifically, where grave, credible security threats are mitigated, third parties may intervene in civil conflicts to support non-security, such as value-based, interests. The role that security context plays in explaining military intervention in civil conflicts has not been adequately addressed in comprehensive studies of intervention.

An illustration of this theoretical framework is presented with an examination of U.S. security contexts and their impact on U.S. foreign policy behavior, specifically that of military intervention. Although the analysis of this study focuses primarily on U.S. military intervention during the Cold War and how it changed in the periods following, the strength of the theoretical connection between security and its influence on intervention behavior is presented by also
describing other security contexts in U.S. history. The impact that the rivalry with
the USSR had on state behavior within the international system is well studied,
with scholars often emphasizing the structural role that bipolarity has on the
leadership of states within the system. Although acknowledging the potential
importance of polarity in influencing state behavior, this study focuses more
attention on the dyadic relations between state and nonstate actors, how these
determine the perceived security context of each, and their corresponding foreign
policy behavior. This implies that the theory presented here is applicable not just
to the U.S.-USSR case, but to explaining the impact of other security contexts
and their effects on U.S. foreign policy.

Given that only intervention behavior of the U.S. is examined in this study,
one may question the applicability of this theoretical framework for explaining the
foreign policy of other states. The U.S. provides a unique combination of an
imposing military presence, messianic foreign policy, political and economic
liberalism, hegemonic status, and both the access and protection provided by
oceans hugging two borders. Although the U.S. may present a unique case, it is
argued that all state leaders attempt to mitigate perceived security threats. As
this pertains to intervention in civil conflicts, where states have the means to
intervene militarily, they will be most likely to do so when it presents an
opportunity to mitigate the threat posed by a competitor. When a state is not
faced by a threat (or a more benign threat), leaders have a greater opportunity to
use their forces for humanitarian reasons. Where the U.S. and other states will
differ is in how threats are constituted, as these are based on learning from observation and interaction with other state and nonstate actors in the international system. Thus, if the learning process of identifying threats – not what constitutes a threat – is similar for all states, it is possible to apply this process in attempting to understand the foreign policy of other states, as well. The general application of this study to the foreign policy of states other than the U.S. is described in more detail in the concluding chapter.

Identifying and Prioritizing State Interests

In attempting to answer the question under what conditions is the U.S. more likely to intervene unilaterally and militarily in the civil conflicts of other states, it is assumed here, as it is in a number of other studies, that third parties intervene when it is in their perceived best interest to do so. However, rather than treating these interests exogenously, the nature of these interests is assessed, as well as how they change. It is fundamentally assumed that state interests can be somewhat generalized. That is, although leaders from different states may have some idiosyncratic preferences, this does not prevent the possibility of identifying how state leaders prioritize their interests more generally. Relying on the idea that state leaders generally give greater priority to security interests, but unlike most offensive realists, I assume that state leaders attempt to satisfice rather than maximize security. In this way, I illustrate how state interests may change depending on the perception of security threats.
In the literature review, different scholars’ interpretations of national interest were examined and categorized into those who treated national interest endogenously, that is, those who attempted to define national interest (this group itself divided into objectivists and subjectivists), and those who emphasized the importance of national interest in decisionmaking but treated it exogenously (i.e., scholars employing a rational-choice approach). In this section, I argue that although the leadership and citizens of states have myriad interests, their resources for serving these interests are limited. Thus, state leaders must make trade-offs (Gilpin 1981). In determining the allocation of resources, state leaders most likely prioritize their interests. State interests can be represented hierarchically, where a state leadership’s basic concern is national security; that is, where national security is perceived as threatened, it will be of primary importance when considering the use of limited state resources, particularly those related to armed forces. Where such a threat is minimal, state leaders have the opportunity to use military resources to pursue other interests (though their willingness to do so depends on other factors). What follows is an elaboration of each of these assumptions.

It should be emphasized here that this does not necessarily conflict with the argument posed by Bueno de Mesquita (2003) which contends that state leaders are primarily concerned with political survival (rather than what is in the greater national interest). This is because a leader’s political survival is determined somewhat by his ability to mitigate national security concerns.
National interest is perhaps more the interest of the leaders in power, but it is possible to identify some common interests among different leaders when it comes to national security. First, it would be highly unusual for a leader not to care about national security at all. Second, variation in national security concerns may be less a reflection of idiosyncratic preferences among leaders than the fact that national security concerns are satisfied in some states and not in others. That is, just because a leader’s foreign policy behavior does not reflect a national security concern does not mean that leaders are not concerned with national security at all, as it could be that these concerns have been satisfied and have allowed the leader to focus on other issues. In this instance, national security is the classic scenario of the dog that did not bark.

A primary assumption of this study is that state interests are prioritized, reflecting a particular structural or interactive context, and that the decisions of state leaders (i.e., intervention) reflect this prioritization. It is argued that, in general, given the perceived existence of a threatening actor who is believed to be capable of inflicting significant loss of life or damage to infrastructure, security concerns trump other concerns when considering the use of military resources. Obviously, there are instances in which both security- and non-security interests can be served simultaneously. However, where a trade-off scenario exists, such as where to allocate military resources, security concerns are likely to receive greater attention when a state is experiencing a heightened security environment. This is not to say that state leaders do not use military resources
on behalf of non-security interests, only that where security threats loom, state leaders will spend more of their military resources alleviating these threats than for other non-security, such as humanitarian, purposes. On the other hand, where there is minimal threat to security, state leaders have a greater opportunity to use military resources for non-security purposes.

Prioritization of State Interests

In terms of objective interests, assume for a moment that given their fiduciary roles as protectors of the state, the highest priority for state leaders is state survival and the protection of citizens from external attack. One might argue that this assumption is problematic, pointing to leaders’ concerns for political survival, which may or may not make them concerned with the welfare of their citizens as a whole, but only with the welfare of the selectorate who keeps them in power (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). For democracies, this selectorate is larger than it is for autocracies. The latter partially explains why some repressive leaders seem far from concerned in protecting their citizens from harm, particularly when these leaders are also perpetrators of violence against citizens. Still, when protecting either a large or small selectorate from external attack, it is sometimes difficult to protect one group and not another, particularly where these groups are not geographically separated. After all, defense is a classic example of a public good. One may also think of the depiction of a repressive leader as wanting to maintain control over a particular area for its resources, whether or not
he cares of for the citizens who inhabit this area.

Extending beyond homeland security concerns, national security also includes strategic interests, as these represent a safety mechanism for preventing homeland security attacks and protecting access to resources. It is assumed that in promoting strategic interests, state leaders ‘satisfice’ rather than maximize, since safety can never be entirely ensured. Having satisfied survival and strategic concerns, state leaders may then decide to use their military resources for goals that do not directly affect national security or economic growth. Military resources may be used in collective security or humanitarian relief efforts, which may enhance a state’s recognition and legitimacy within the international community. It is important to emphasize, however, that just because security concerns are satisfactorily addressed does not imply that state leaders will automatically use military resources for non-security needs. It only means that they have the opportunity to do so. This will depend on how domestic leadership perceives the role of the state within the international system, how the domestic public perceives the state’s role in the international system, as well as incentives provided by the international community for intervention.

The main argument is that although political leaders may pursue different goals on behalf of the state, they will generally allocate fewer resources toward the pursuit of goals pertaining to legitimacy or the promotion of ideals and more

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12 Applied to the individual, Maslow (1943) also argues that individuals achieve satisfactory levels of safety rather than complete safety.
toward goals pertaining to survival and strategic interests where the latter are not satisfactorily met. This differs from an offensive realist depiction of state motives because it assumes that security concerns can be satisfactorily met, rather than assuming that they cannot, given the anarchic nature of the international system. By assuming that only in a system without anarchy can one’s security goals be completely satisfied, offensive realists ignore the possibility that state leaders attempt to achieve satisfactory levels of security, a level which can be attained despite the lack of a higher power in the international system. The idea presented here also differs from the defensive realist camp in that it does not assume that state leaders attempt to maximize security; rather they satisfice security goals.

One manner in which state leaders may identify whether or not their security goals have been satisfactorily met is by observing the foreign policy behavior of another state or nonstate actor in the international system. Interdependence and democratic peace, for instance, allow the leadership of some states to achieve a satisfactory level of certainty when considering the potential threat of another state (Keohane and Nye 1977; Russett and Oneal 1998). Such predictability in foreign policy behavior has allowed state leaders to allocate more resources to pursue other goals rather than continue to allocate surplus resources toward further ensuring security. This is not to say that all threats have been alleviated, as contentious relationships with other states remain. It is only to say that in the context of an interdependent and mutually
democratic dyadic relationship, a state's leadership can safely assume the other not to be a threat. Thus, once a security goal, such as mitigating the threat posed by another state, is satisfactorily met, it is no longer a motivator of behavior, unless the other state's leadership exemplifies threatening behavior, at which point the goal of minimizing this security threat will once again become a priority.

What Constitutes a Security Threat?

In terms of criteria for identifying a threat, one should consider what is being threatened and who constitutes the threat. In terms of what is being threatened, tangible interests (homeland, access to valuable resources, allies) would appear to receive priority over intangible interests (ideology), although these two are often intertwined. Using the image of concentric circles as an illustrative example, the center represents the homeland. I argue that protection of the center of the circle (homeland) from external attack is of utmost importance, while areas immediately surrounding the homeland would be of secondary importance, and importance would decrease as the concentric circles expand.

It is not just what is being threatened, however, as it is who is threatening. The perception of these two factors, combined, determines the degree of threat posed by another. Any actors in the international system demonstrating the capability and willingness to attack would be considered the most threatening,
but this assessment would also depend on what it is they intend to attack (the center – homeland – or further out), as well as the potential damage they can inflict. Capability may be determined by the lives lost, infrastructure damaged, and terror inflicted on the populace with an attack. The psychological impact of an attack can be very strong and drive political leaders to actions in an attempt to convince their distraught publics that the government is working to ensure their safety. It is argued here that state leaders use Bayesian inference, described in more detail later in the chapter, to determine who poses a threat as well as what is being threatened. Perception of another’s willingness to attack may be determined by observing another’s actions and where these actions took place, as well as taking into consideration whether or not the other is guided by an antithetical ideology. The implication is that an identifiable threat prompts state leaders to take measures to address the threat in the form of grander strategic initiatives. That is, the threat looms and forms a context which affects foreign policy decision making in a number of areas (security, economic, and political), as well as the formation and transformation of domestic institutions to address the threat. The genesis of this context and its effects are described in the next section.

Change and Continuity in State Interests: An Examination of Security Context

If one assumes both (a) that state interests are prioritized by the political leadership and (b) that it is possible to mitigate security concerns, the challenge
is then to identify when security concerns have been satisfactorily mitigated. A perceived threat is a matter of degree, with more serious threats forming the basis of a more heightened security context and less serious threats, a benign security context. Security contexts will most likely fall somewhere between these two extremes. These contexts are formed and dissolved depending on the perception of threat, which is itself determined by heuristics and observed behavior, as explained in the previous section.

In this section, I depict a state’s perception of a threatening and capable actor as a situation in which security needs are not satisfied, thus implying that military resources will be primarily directed toward weakening the threatening actor and its allies, as opposed to using such resources for other non-security concerns. That is, military intervention will reflect perceptions of what are perceived to be the greatest threats. Rivalry presents an example of such a significant threat to a state, because it creates

a strong expectation of future conflict..., and there is enough past competition that such interactions affect contemporary and future behavior. Thus, non-transitory national security decisions are conditioned by the competition; these will include decisions about alliance formation, weapon acquisition, troop deployment, and the like. (Diehl 1998a, 4-5)

Thus, “…given the history of periodic manifest threats, each state is likely to view the other as a primary security threat” (Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992, 483).

As depicted in the above quote, the perception of a threatening actor forms a context that influences state behavior-- behavior that may be observed as a pattern within the context. To explain the formation of security context, as...
well as the endurance and termination of a security context, I emphasize the role of a rudimentary form of Bayesian inference on the part of state leaders and use this learning concept to link psychological and rational-choice interpretations of how state leaders form their beliefs about another, as well as how they act on these beliefs. This Bayesian depiction of state learning in the international system implies that a high-level belief or theory formed by state leaders about the intentions of another often persists and is only replaced when a high number of empirical observations seem to contradict this belief, when it is altered incrementally through tiny adjustments (similar to a Lakatosian depiction of the accumulation of knowledge in the sciences), or when a shock of a certain magnitude calls the very basis of this belief into question (what Kuhn refers to as a paradigmatic shift). These higher level beliefs guide foreign policy, such as when and where to intervene militarily.

State leaders in the international system are confounded by the complexity within that system and are often forced to make decisions without complete information due to the sense of urgency often inherent in international politics. How, then, do state leaders make foreign policy? Given the lack of complete information inherent in the international system, and the sense of urgency to respond to certain events taking place, state leaders must form perceptions of the other based on incomplete information. These perceptions are formed based on observable actions on the part of another state’s leaders, as well as signals that may serve as indications of the intentions of the state’s
leadership where no action has yet been taken. Observable action includes a range of behavior, from rhetoric, to initiating cooperative endeavors, to attack. State leaders may learn from current behavior about another state or nonstate actor’s intentions, but they may also learn from the past behavior of these actors.

State leaders also use signals as prognostic tools to determine the likelihood another actor in the international system will engage in a particular future behavior. These signals, known to psychologists as cognitive heuristics, add to a state leadership’s perceptions of the other’s intentions. State leaders interpret signals as both the intended messages of the other, as well as indications of intentions they may be trying to hide. For instance, an economic sanction or military maneuver may be an intended signal on the part of one state’s leadership sent to another to indicate willingness to escalate a crisis if specific demands are not met. However, state leaders know there are numerous instances in which actors hide their true intentions. Thus, they must use static signals as cognitive heuristics, or “cognitive shortcuts” (Tetlock 1990), which may signify the other’s true intentions. Examples of such static signals in international relations include ideology and regime type.

Another actor’s adherence to an antithetical ideology would signal potential conflicting interests. Consider the opposing ideologies of communism and liberalism, or Islamic fundamentalism and liberalism. Communist regimes are autocratic (thus opposing political liberalism), opposed to capitalism and free markets, and anti-religious (contradicting the liberal principle of freedom of
religion). Likewise, extremist Islam is fundamentally anti-Western, or more explicitly, opposed to Western political openness, economic liberalism, and Christianity. Perceiving these divergent interests and both their real and potential impact on relations, state leaders may be inclined to perceive ideologically opposed actors as more threatening than those sharing a similar ideology, without yet considering actions on the part of these actors.

Leaders of a democratic state may perceive those of an autocratic state, just by the mere identification of the state as autocratic, as threatening because authoritarian leaders are historically aggressive (an instance of Bayesian inference based on previous observations of the behavior of authoritarian leaders). This threat may be alleviated somewhat, however, due to this state’s weaker capabilities or to an alliance agreement based on shared economic ideology. The main point here is to illustrate that perceptions of another are based on a combination of observable actions and identifier-type signals.

Through their observations of others in the system, state leaders learn of the intentions of others. A capable and ideologically opposed actor poses a grave threat particularly if it has exhibited aggressive behavior in the past. It is important to distinguish, however, that the acquisition of weapons and great economic strength are not enough to inspire significant action (though it may inspire concern); it is the capability of inflicting significant loss of life or damage to infrastructure, coupled with observations of threatening behavior on the part of
another, that inspire action. Where there are no such observations, a state or non-state actor will receive more verbal than resource-directed attention.

This implies that security is heightened following a particular event (i.e., observation) which itself indicates the hostile intentions of the other actor. Given such an event, there is more likely to be consensus for government action to respond. Yet, this shared concern for security fades over time, when another such event does not take place, much to the dismay of bureaucrats whose goal it is to ensure security. Although a strong military may be necessary to thwart future attacks, or respond to them efficiently, there is usually a rift among the public and their representatives concerning the allocation of resources toward the military during times of peace, as security threats seem somewhat distant. On the other hand, where there is a series of confrontational events, there is more likely to be continued support for military measures that appear to enhance security.

Without public support, the leadership is somewhat constrained in allocating resources toward what it perceives a probable threat. Furthermore, the less direct the threat, the greater the difficulty there is in maintaining continued support. A heightened security context signifies that another actor continues to manifest threatening behavior, whether in the form of rhetoric or the use of force. Because the other continues to illustrate threatening behavior, there is a continued heightened state of security in which state leaders are more likely to use different means to attempt to alleviate this threat. Yet, persistent
cooperative behavior on the part of others previously deemed threatening may begin to downplay the sense of urgency over time.

The discussion above depicts how perceptions of others are formed. These perceptions form contexts which guide policymaking. A threatening security context is determined by the perceived existence of a credible, willing, and identifiable threat, and in such a context, most military resources will be directed toward mitigating this threat. Yet, in a context where threats to security are deemed either weak or nonexistent, existing military resources may be utilized for other purposes, such as promoting humanitarian and liberal values.

The next section provides a discussion of how contexts change, specifically how they change from more to less threatening, and vice versa. As will be argued, context change reflects a change in high-level beliefs and thus reflects change at the strategic level. Such change has a substantial impact on the direction of policy and should be distinguished from lower-level, tactical change. Military intervention may be analogously perceived as a tactic used to achieve greater strategic goals. A change in security context will lead to a change in strategies, and the tactic of using military intervention will be a reflection of new strategic goals. The next section begins by explaining how context change (strategic belief change) takes place, using Bayesian inference as an analogy.

The Use of Bayesian Inference for Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Once perceptions are formed in the process described above, they are
consistently tested through observations of behavior and the (infrequently) changing characteristics of other states. Interaction between actors either supports or refutes existing beliefs within one state about the intentions of the other, though this is not necessarily done in automaton fashion, as will be explained. One assumes that another's aggressive actions further crystallize perceptions of the other as enemy, while a lack of aggressive action, or an increase in cooperative actions, may lead to the dissolution of such perceptions.

In this view, state leaders consistently adapt in a systemized way in response to environmental stimuli. Accordingly, it is only the obstruction of these stimuli (lack of information) that may sometimes keep state leaders from adapting. This approach to learning assumes that state leaders are consistently open to new information and update their beliefs accordingly.

However, state leaders in reality may behave more like prudent political scientists, only updating their beliefs or theories when encountered with numerous empirical observations which contradict these beliefs, or when faced with a significant shock which calls the very foundation of these beliefs into question. State leaders do not update their beliefs in response to one stimulus, as a single refutation may be treated as an anomaly. Through this form of Bayesian inference, state leaders alter their beliefs and corresponding behavior only when overwhelming evidence appears to contradict their theories of the other, as any reasonable scientist would be expected to do. This implies that continuity will be the norm, and change will be rare.
As this pertains to U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, one should be able to identify a pattern of intervention which reflects existing beliefs. Although some scholars contend that previous intervention outcomes will determine the likely use of intervention in the future (Pickering 2002; Nevin 1996), this does not necessarily reflect a change in beliefs, as it does a change in tactics. A failed intervention does not necessarily change strategic goals, and this is in fact extremely rare. Instead of altering beliefs following failure, leaders are more inclined to alter tactics. This may be observed in U.S. intervention behavior during the Cold War after the Vietnam Conflict. Although the collective memory of this costly failed intervention prevented the use of U.S. troops for some time, this lack of using troops does not reflect a change in beliefs pertaining to containing communism. U.S. leadership continued to use other tactics, or means, for alleviating the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the spread of communist ideology more broadly. These mechanisms were less direct forms of military intervention (including the use of military aid, advising, and logistical support, as well as the use of covert forces).

Thus, it is important to distinguish between changing behavior on the part of state leaders that takes place due to changed beliefs and that which is simply a response to a previous failed tactic, with the underlying beliefs guiding those tactics left unchanged. As was discussed in the literature review, scholars employing a psychological approach often argue that learning at the tactical level occurs more frequently than at higher levels (those of beliefs). That is, tactics
may change frequently, but beliefs often persist even in light of contradictory evidence. Explanations of change in foreign policy parallel those explanations of learning, which one would expect because learning is often associated with change in policy (or lack thereof where state leaders learn that a policy is working). A number of learning and foreign policy scholars observe that in reality, state leaders do not appear to adapt so easily to changes in the environment, and they provide psychological and organizational theories to explain that continuity is the norm while change, especially fundamental change, is very rare (Tetlock 1991; Hermann 1990; Maoz 1996; Hagan and Rosati 1994). One would then be led to believe that a security context emphasizing a particular threatening actor may endure not solely because of interactive aggressive behavior, but because of the enduring beliefs of one about the other, beliefs which are not easily replaced. In fact, learning and foreign policy scholars employing a psychological approach emphasize that individuals, and states as groups of individuals, often transform external information so that it fits within their preexisting beliefs. This is why security contexts may endure, though an objective outsider observer may point out instances of cooperative behavior that would seem to weaken the perception of the other as enemy.

Yet, most scholars acknowledge that state leaders base their policies on both rational and psychological factors. How can we account for both these influences on state behavior? One such integrative link is the concept of Bayesian inference. The description of psychological barriers induced by the
tendency of state leaders to hold on to their preexisting beliefs corresponds to this concept. Scientists as a collective group are encouraged not to update their most powerful theories based on the first sign of contradictory evidence, but to do so only with repeated signs of contradictory evidence accumulated through numerous studies. In addition, evidence alone is not enough to throw out the theory entirely, as any contending theories must be logically sound and explain that explained by the previous theory and then some. Yet, the objective acquisition of information, which state leaders employ a number of agencies to engage in, also forms a part in the making of policy. This also corresponds to the Bayesian inference concept of updating beliefs based on the acquisition of evidence which contradicts preexisting beliefs. Where the newly acquired evidence cannot be explained by another promising theory, however, state leaders are likely to fit such ambiguous evidence into their preexisting belief structures (Jervis 1968; Jervis 1982-1983).

Although beliefs are resistant to change, state leaders do appear to adapt their tactics in more automaton fashion. That is, where certain tactics are deemed successful, they will continue to be used, but where they fail, they will more than likely be replaced with other tactics. All such tactics, however, reflect higher-level strategies and even higher, more abstract beliefs. This is why policies may be substituted though the end goal itself is not called into question until a number of policies have failed (Tetlock 1990). Beliefs are also sticky not just because of cognitive rigidity, but because of the institutionalization of such
beliefs. Once formed, beliefs are further jelled with the creation of institutions which serve the purpose of devising policies reflecting those beliefs. Bureaucrats within the government also have a stake in the maintenance of such beliefs and the survival of corresponding institutions (Allison 1971).

The rivalry concept may be used to illustrate that simple conceptions of learning are not necessarily appropriate for explaining foreign policy behavior in the international system. Once a state has been labeled a rival, this label may endure even despite cooperative actions, as it is difficult to replace beliefs once they are formed and collectively accepted, and no better theory is offered (Thompson 2001; Jervis 1968; Tetlock 1991). Because of this, the genesis of the rivalry, especially one between states with symmetrical capabilities, marks the beginning of a context determined by fundamental beliefs about the other, a context which in turn guides foreign policy behavior. Thus, significant foreign policy change would be observed at the early stages of the rivalry in that resources would be re-directed to address the new threat. If the beginning of the rivalry context marks a change in foreign policy, one would expect change following termination of the rivalry context, as well. That is, termination of the rivalry creates another opportunity for significant foreign policy change, though this change may be slow to implement completely. Within the context of the rivalry, however, one would expect foreign policy to be somewhat continuous, save minor deviations (Goertz 1994). This has important implications for military intervention. It would lead one to believe that military intervention in the civil
conflicts of other states would be strongly determined by existing rivalries with other states, with the latter itself being determined by strategic interests.

As described above, rivalry provides a useful analogy for illustrating how security contexts are formed and change in light of a threatening actor. A rival is labeled as such because it is perceived to threaten either state survival or strategic interests or both, and the fact that not all states are perceived as rivals supports the idea previously mentioned that security needs pertaining to state survival and strategic interests can be satisfied. These are satisfied when Bayesian inference based on observation and signals leads political leaders to conclude that an actor no longer poses a threat. This change in beliefs about the other can occur over a long period of time, or following a shock which significantly alters the capabilities of the rival or the basic signal indicating its perception as a threat. Once state leaders no longer perceive an actor as a grave threat, the heightened security context will become benign, unless this threat is replaced by another. The contemporary democratic peace phenomenon provides examples of states that at one time perceived each other as grave threats but between whom there is no foreseeable future conflict (Russett and O'Neal 2001). In the next section, I illustrate how security contexts transition from heightened to benign, pointing to a change in beliefs about the threat posed by another, and follow with the subsequent impact on foreign policy behavior, such as military intervention.
Change in High-Level Beliefs

Because high-level beliefs tend to persist, even in light of contradictory evidence, most scholars argue that they can only be overcome through slow, evolutionary learning or change (i.e., generational turnover) or abrupt, revolutionary learning or change (i.e., change initiated by some external shock) (Maoz 1996; Farkas 1996; Hermann 1990; Tetlock 1991). Most agree with the latter conception of fundamental change taking place following a shock that seriously calls into question existing belief structures (see chapters by the following authors in Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson’s edited volume: Volgy and Schwarz 1994; Rosati 1994; and Skidmore 1994). Because security contexts, once formed, are based on beliefs and tend to persist, one may argue that it would take a significant shock to alter this belief, not just because of cognitive rigidities, but also because of institutional survival. Otherwise, as long as the threatening actor exists, and beliefs about the intentions of this actor pervade, not only within the government but among civil society, one can expect much of the nation’s military resources to be used toward alleviating this threat. That is, U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts will reflect attempts to mitigate the threat posed by the most dangerous actors. Intervention may continue to follow this pattern even following instances of cooperative behavior on the part of the threatening actor, as such behavior may be interpreted as a sign that aggressive policy has ‘worked’ rather than a sign that the actor does not have as bad intentions as was believed. What kind of shock is necessary to alter high-level
beliefs; specifically, what kind of shock is necessary to transform the security context?

One way the perception of another actor may shift from threatening to significantly less threatening is for the actor to become relatively weak such that it is no longer considered a viable contender. Another way is for the actor to change a specific characteristic that encourages perception of it as a threat to another; such a characteristic could be regime type. For instance, where a state becomes a democracy, or becomes further democratized, the leadership of another democratic state may perceive the newly democratic state as less of a threat. Such antagonistic relations based on strong ideological opposition are then undercut, as the ideological opposition no longer exists. Were a state to return to a non-democratic type of regime, however, it may return to its status as a threat. Both examples of how perception of another transforms from threatening to less threatening represent shocks, not because they are not anticipated, but because they violate the cognitive heuristics used by other state leaders to deem the other a threat. If a state’s leadership is a threat because it is characterized by opposing political and economic ideologies, once these ideologies change and converge with one’s own, beliefs about the other will likely be altered to fall in line with cognitive heuristics. Where the actors have convergent ideologies, the only conflict may then be of a non-military nature. This corresponds with empirical observation of the contemporary democratic peace among democratic, industrialized states. Heuristics are cognitive
shortcuts based on past learned information and so should not necessarily be
determined as irrational, as they can be understood as theories guiding Bayesian
inference. Thus, it is reasonable for state leaders to assume democracies to be
potentially less aggressive, as this assumption is based on past observations of
democracies being generally more constrained in their foreign policy choices
than non-democracies. This is partly explained by Bueno de Mesquita’s
selectorate theory (2003) in which he argues that the larger winning coalition in
democracies makes the use of resources for military purposes less likely (2003).

Consider, for example, the shock which constituted the end of the Cold
War. The Cold War came to an end both because of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the transition to democracy of Russia and its former satellite states.
Previous heuristics guiding the perception of the Soviet Union as a substantial
threat were clear and convincing: (1) the USSR was authoritarian and historically
expansive; (2) the USSR openly declared its animosity toward the U.S. and
capitalism, promoting an ideology which contradicted U.S. values and interests;
(3) the USSR was extremely powerful, having substantial nuclear and
conventional forces, as well as allies in strategically important areas of the world.
Soviet aggressive behavior abroad served to further crystallize these beliefs,
even after a period of détente.

All three of these heuristics were called into question when the Soviet
Union was shown to be too weak to prevent satellite states from declaring
independence, and subsequently transitioned from authoritarianism toward
political and economic liberalism. These events collectively represented a shock to existing beliefs about the Soviet Union as a credible, willing threat to U.S. national security. Such a shift in beliefs formed the basis of a new context, one in which the U.S. was the most powerful actor in the international system in terms of military capabilities. Likewise, this represented an opportunity for other U.S. goals to receive greater attention, and for policy to reflect these goals. In particular, the use of U.S. military resources for intervening in civil conflicts could now perhaps be more frequently utilized for humanitarian purposes.

Linking Heightened Security Context to Intervention Behavior

If security context has such an impact that it influences “alliance formation, weapon acquisition, troop deployment, and the like” (Goertz 1994), one would assume that “the like” includes military intervention in civil conflicts, among other types of foreign policy. As described above, the transformation of security context, or parameters of the context, mark points of “foreign policy restructuring,” or substantial, comprehensive foreign policy change which covers more than one issue area and is manifested through a state leadership’s behavioral interactions with the leadership of another actor in the international system. Because security context influences behavior, this would include where state leaders decide to use their military resources. Thus, as this pertains to a state leader’s decision to intervene in the civil conflicts of other states, general continuity in intervention policy may be observed within the parameters of a
heightened security context, with occasional minor deviations, while a significant change in intervention policy would be observed once the security context became more benign. That is, one should be able to observe a pattern of intervention behavior rather than isolated decisions to intervene, with the pattern determined by security context.

Accordingly, it is expected that the pattern of intervention for a state in a heightened security context would reflect a tendency to intervene in civil conflicts which present an opportunity to weaken a threatening actor or its allies, as “[a]ctors are apt to be especially sensitive to evidence of grave danger if they think they can take action to protect themselves against the menace once it has been detected” (Jervis 1968, 462). Because military resources are generally limited, this would mean that intervention to alleviate these security concerns would inhibit intervention elsewhere for non-security concerns. On the other hand, should these security concerns be satisfied to a certain degree, there is an opportunity for state leaders to expend more of their military resources toward non-security concerns.

If a heightened security context does indeed affect a third party’s intervention behavior in that it makes intervention more likely to reflect national security concerns than other less direct, value-based concerns, it would support the notion of a prioritization of state interests, at least in terms of using its military resources. In other words, it would support the parallel drawn earlier between how state interests are prioritized (and how they change).
Benign Security Context and Intervention Behavior

Unlike during a heightened security context described above, a less threatening or benign context provides the opportunity for value-based concerns, such as humanitarian concerns, to receive greater attention. It is not assumed that humanitarian concerns become paramount (i.e., of chief importance relative to other concerns), only that they are more important than during a heightened security context given the loosening of security constraints.

Some scholars, for example, have indicated that humanitarian issues would receive greater attention in US foreign policy following the end of the Cold War (Jervis 1991/92). Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) in particular have provided empirical evidence for humanitarian crises as a determinant of US military intervention in civil conflicts following the end of the Cold War. Unilateral intervention for purely humanitarian purposes is rare (Rost and Greig 2011), and where it does take place, it will most likely be when the intervener is not involved in heightened security context. Still, although a less threatening security context provides an opportunity for humanitarian concerns to receive greater attention, it does not necessarily mean that they will in the form of military intervention.

Within the context of a civil conflict, one might identify a humanitarian crisis as one in which the UN identifies genocide/politicide. Given the politics behind labeling an instance as such, a more objective measure is offered by Harff (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/), discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. Aside from a dichotomous interpretation of humanitarian crisis
(genocide/politicide or not), however, it can also be perceived as a matter of degree, determined by both quantity and the rate at which civilian human life is lost or displaced. Humanitarian crisis, then, can also be perceived in an ordinal manner, with most extreme crises being those in which civilian life/displacement is occurring at an alarming rate.

A military intervention in a civil conflict is one in which the US is using military means (in the form of military aid, training, advising, logistical support, air raids, and/or troops) to affect the duration and/or outcome of a civil conflict. Peacekeeping reflects a specific type of military intervention in which the primary purpose is to stop the fighting without taking sides, although the purpose for sending peacekeeping troops may still reflect strategic interests (Rost and Greig 2011). What distinguishes a humanitarian-based intervention is that the intervention is undertaken without some kind of direct security or economic benefit to the U.S. That is, it represents "moral" rather than "material" concerns. Distinguishing humanitarian-based interventions in civil conflict from others (security-based) is problematic because the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and because political leaders often point to humanitarian motivations in their rhetoric. In order to distinguish political rhetoric from behavior, one would know the U.S. was intervening for humanitarian purposes if it were intervening in conflicts characterized by a high number of casualties in a short period of time and/or a high number of refugees, controlling for other factors which may point to security or economic motivations behind the intervention.
For the sake of this study, it is important to distinguish between a humanitarian-based intervention and the provision of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian-based intervention is a concept used to distinguish those interventions which do not provide any direct security/economic benefit to the U.S., but are undertaken simply for the purposes of ending the fighting and thus further loss of human life. An intervention, then, has a goal that extends beyond that of providing humanitarian relief, and includes ending the fighting. Furthermore, one need only consider interventions which were undertaken for security purposes, but in which the U.S. military provided humanitarian relief. During the Vietnam War, for example, some platoons of Marines were tasked with providing local security to some Vietnamese villages as part of the Combined Action Program (CAP). Aside from security, they also provided medical services to villagers, addressing illnesses not at all related to those incurred in battle. That is, they provided humanitarian services, but it is commonly understood that this was not the primary purpose of intervention in Vietnam; the primary purpose was to contain communism, not provide humanitarian relief. Thus, the provision of humanitarian services does not define a humanitarian-based intervention; in this study, the primary purpose for which the intervention was undertaken determines whether it is a humanitarian-based intervention. This is assessed indirectly by observing the role genocide/politicide and the number of refugees play in U.S. military intervention.
Why would the U.S. (or any state) intervene in a civil conflict for purely humanitarian benefits? Both rational and constructivist approaches provide potential answers to this question. A rational approach implies that the U.S. may intervene in a crisis characterized by humanitarian crisis for the purpose of promoting ideas and/or enhancing international legitimacy. Note that a rational approach still allows for intervention without direct benefit to security or economic areas, as these are not the only rational reasons for intervention. That is, the U.S. leadership could decide to intervene in a civil conflict for potential political gain, using intervention as a means to enhance international political ends. A constructivist approach would differ from a rational approach in that it would depict intervention as a manifestation of the collective belief concerning the identity of the U.S. as protector of liberal values. Judeo-Christian influences and the messianic behavior of previous hegemons may lead U.S. leaders and citizens to perceive a responsibility to protect and instill liberal values elsewhere in the world, even if this calls for the use of force.

Having addressed reasons why the U.S. would intervene in civil conflicts characterized by humanitarian crisis with no direct security/economic benefit, this study attempts to identify conditions under which this would be most likely. As is argued, if any a time we should see humanitarian-based intervention, it should be in the interim period between the Cold War and 9/11, when potential threats to U.S. security were either less grave or ambiguous. Thus, this study addresses both whether humanitarian concerns matter in general for U.S. military
intervention in civil conflicts, as well as conditions which might make humanitarian concerns more prominent. The null is that humanitarian concerns are of no importance for explaining U.S. military intervention, when controlling for security/economic concerns. In the next section, I illustrate how the theoretical framework summarized above can be applied specifically to U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts by examining U.S. intervention behavior both inside and outside of a heightened security context.

U.S. Interests, Security Contexts, and Military Intervention in Civil Conflicts

The specific purpose of this study is to enhance our understanding of a specific type of foreign policy behavior – military intervention in civil conflicts – by linking foreign policy behavior more broadly to the prioritization of state interests. Thus far it has been argued that when state survival or strategic interests are threatened, state leaders will focus more military resources on addressing those threats, and thus less on other non-security interests. One such context in which survival and/or strategic interests are deemed threatened is when the state is faced by another antagonistic and capable state or nonstate actor in the international system. Given such a threat, it is assumed that state leaders will use more of their limited military resources toward addressing that threat than for other purposes not directly related to state survival or strategic interests, such as mitigating humanitarian crises. As threats to state survival and strategic interests are significantly mitigated, such as when a heightened security context
becomes more benign or when a domestic threat to survival is significantly mitigated, state leaders may choose to allocate more military resources toward the promotion of ideas which further enhance the state’s long-term interests and survival, ideas which would sustain its legitimacy and influence within the international system at lower costs. Intervention for the sake of alleviating humanitarian crisis may present such an opportunity to build legitimacy and influence within the international system.

A brief, overarching examination of U.S. foreign policy behavior over time and how it has changed given changing perceived threats to survival and strategic interests reflect the theoretical framework described above. In particular, U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts can be linked to the severity of domestic challenges to state survival and threats to strategic interests, with one manifestation of the latter being the perceived threat posed by an antagonistic, capable actor. When considering the history of the U.S. use of force, including military intervention in civil conflicts, weakening an enemy or its allies is a significant motivator. If the heightened security context itself is a significant determinant of foreign policy behavior, this would call into question our existing understanding of military intervention in civil conflicts, where the decision to intervene has been treated as an isolated instance of expected-utility calculation (Regan 2002), or where it is based on the past success or failure of previous interventions (Pickering 2002; Nevin 1996) without consideration of grander strategic goals. The impact of security context would indicate that these
intervention decisions are not in fact isolated decisions, but oftentimes the reflection of a security context, making the decision to intervene a nested game of sorts. Furthermore, the psychological impact of the security context on state leaders and citizens may lead the state to intervene militarily in conflicts that, were they to be considered outside of a security context, may be viewed as unwinnable and, therefore, not worth pursuing further. An examination of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts supports this notion.

When one thinks of potential heightened security contexts that may influence U.S. foreign policy behavior, particularly the use of military resources, the most obvious example is the Cold War, defined by the rivalry with the USSR. Numerous contemporary studies have highlighted the impact the Cold War had on both encouraging and restraining U.S. foreign policy, as well as how the end of the Cold War led to changes in such policy. Some scholars observed that following the end of the Cold War, the circumstances under which the U.S. was more likely to intervene changed, noting in particular increased involvement in multilateral and unilateral peacekeeping as well as different motivations behind intervention (Yoon 1997; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Dowty and Loescher 1996). That is, while most U.S. military interventions in civil conflicts during the Cold War can be traced to the objective of countering the USSR or its allies, those thereafter seem to be linked to the objective of alleviating humanitarian crisis. Yet, it appears in the studies cited above that security context is treated less as a determinant in and of itself than as an indicator of the polarity of the
system. Thus, in terms of level of analysis, it is not clear whether it is the international structure or the dyadic structure that is determining behavior. Although both may partially determine the behavior of states within the system, overemphasizing the influence of one may lead us to underemphasize the influence of another. In the case of the U.S. and USSR, these are one in the same, because the dyadic relations between these two preponderant powers are what determined the bipolar structure of the system. However, the same cannot be said for all states, especially when the international system is no longer bipolar, or when states are not allied with one side or another. By theoretically focusing on dyadic relations rather than the polarity of the international system, one can apply the same principles examined in the U.S.-USSR relationship to dyadic relations between other states, or states and non-state actors, and thus partially explain the behavior of these actors.

Considering U.S. intervention behavior in heightened security contexts which existed prior to the Cold War also supports this idea (Gent 2010). In particular, interventions in independence movements and civil conflicts abroad before the genesis of the Cold War, such as those in Latin America, the Pacific, and China, reflect heightened security contexts characterized by rivalries with Great Britain (1816-1904), Spain (1816-1898), Mexico (1821-1893), Germany (1889-1945), and Japan (1900-1945), as detailed historical accounts of the purpose behind these interventions reveal (Boot 2002; Davis 1995; Hook 2008; Gent 2010). Boot (2002), in fact, highlights the importance of the strategic
interests served by these interventions, emphasizing this reason over the more common explanation of U.S. intervention in these conflicts for the mere purpose of serving domestic business interests (Smith 2000). “In general,” Boot explains, “the government was using Wall Street at least as much as Wall Street was using the government. As veteran American diplomat Alvey Adee put it: ‘We are after bigger game than bananas” (2002, 139).

Changes in security context which reflect changes in who is deemed a threat explain corresponding changes in the purposes behind U.S. military intervention in the civil conflicts of other states. Although these interventions may initially seem to be the product of expected-utility calculus, when one more closely examines the details prior to U.S. intervention, it becomes clear that interventions may be driven by the psychological power of the security context itself rather than expected-utility calculus. Considering U.S. intervention in Vietnam, for example, this conflict was understood by a handful of those considering the expected utility of intervention there (Eisenhower in the 1950s and, later, George Ball in advising Lyndon B. Johnson) to be either of little direct interest to the U.S., indicating small benefits, or unwinnable, indicating low probability of success. Given the weight of the rivalry with the USSR and the effect this had on intensifying the security context, the decision was made to become embroiled in Vietnam. One might say that leaders’ expected utility calculus concerning the benefits, costs, and likelihood of achieving success with intervention in Vietnam were clouded by the overarching psychological impact of
the security context itself. This implies that, although security contexts, when
initially formed, represent the rational depiction of strategic interests, the context
itself takes on a life of its own, setting up a belief system that may lead to less
rational behavior (Derouen and Bercovitch 2008).

Accordingly, U.S. intervention behavior in the ten years following the end
of rivalry with the USSR reflects the significant mitigation of a threat. Other
threats continued to exist, but how did they compare to the USSR? The
perception of China as threat has been debated within U.S. political circles, given
that China’s both cooperative and confrontational actions have led to ambiguous
interpretations of its intentions. In terms of capabilities, China is a rising power
whose capabilities may reach or surpass those of the U.S. Yet, capabilities form
just part of the picture. If willingness is determined by perceptions of the other’s
behavior and ideology, one could argue that a ledger comparing cooperative to
conflicting behaviors of the Chinese leaves this perception ambiguous.13

In terms of ideology, unlike the Soviet Union (excluding the final years of
the Cold War under Gorbachev), China strengthened economic ties to the U.S.
and embraced some elements of capitalism. Concerning the use of force, China
has appeared more prudent than the Soviet Union, limiting its use of force
abroad. Unlike the Soviet Union, China did not encroach upon the U.S. sphere

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13 Consider that during the 1992-2001 years, China was never specifically mentioned in a State of
the Union Address, save positively in that of 1997 in which Clinton expressed the need to
“engage” China. In fact, in that specific address, Clinton states, “We face no imminent threat, but
we do have an enemy. The enemy of our time is inaction.” Compare this to the mentioning of Al
Qaeda in every Address since 9/11. The Soviet Union/communism was also mentioned in every
address through the end of the Cold War, sometimes as a threat and sometimes in terms of the
need for the U.S. to coordinate arms production.
of influence by providing military aid to leftist organizations in Latin America. Finally, unlike terrorist organizations, China represents a “rational” state actor, one which would most likely be deterred from attacking the U.S. due to potential nuclear retaliation (not to mention a likely collective response from the international community).

In summary, the threat posed by China seems less grave than that posed by the Soviet Union given the perceived ambiguity of its intentions. Still, it is inappropriate to ignore China entirely, and other actors, particularly those mentioned as security threats in State of the Union Addresses during that timeframe remained (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria). Yet, in all, this timeframe was characterized by a less threatening security context than during the Cold War, as is reflected in the rhetoric at the time. This allowed the opportunity for the U.S. to focus more of its military power toward achieving other goals.

In a speech given on February 26, 1999, what later came to be known as the Clinton Doctrine, President Clinton expanded the notion of U.S. security interests to include those of preventing the spread of conflict and the alleviation of humanitarian crises. The findings of Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) illustrate that the U.S. intervened for humanitarian purposes in the 1990s, illustrating that the Clinton Doctrine was not merely rhetoric. It also indicates the lack of a more pressing threat, given limited military resources. Were a more significant threat to exist, it would seem imprudent on the part of a state leader,
especially considering his fiduciary role, to use limited military resources for the alleviation of less direct threats.

The post-9/11 period represents a return to a heightened security environment given the threat posed by a new antagonistic and capable actor, al Qaeda, and its corresponding ideology, fundamentalist Islam. Given this organization’s demonstrated willingness and capacity to inflict significant property damage and loss of life on U.S. soil, al Qaeda meets the Bayesian criteria of what constitutes a credible and enduring threat. Al Qaeda, despite being a fractured terrorist organization, demonstrated the capability and willingness to attack the homeland. Although the organization is not monolithic from an objective, scientific perspective, it did have a significant impact on the minds of political leaders and their publics. Consider that in every State of the Union Address since 9/11, through 2011, Al Qaeda/Al Qaida has been named specifically as a threat, as well as other terrorist organizations associated with fundamentalist Islam. The fact that Al Qaeda is not a monolith does not diminish its treatment as a threat in political rhetoric, devotion of government resources, and the minds of the American public and leaders. On the contrary; the fact that it is not a monolith (or a “rational” state actor) may make it perceived to be even more dangerous, as the threat of U.S. retaliation may not have the same deterrent effect as it would on other state leaders. Correspondingly, Al Qaeda’s antagonistic ideology toward the U.S. serves as another indicator of its willingness to attack, as this ideology calls for a complete removal of U.S. and
Western influence in the region and jihad against those who support the West (including against civilians).

It is not just al Qaeda which poses a threat, but state sponsors of terror with links to al Qaeda, as well as other fundamentalist Islamist terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda is an umbrella group with ties to other fundamentalist Islamist actors, and this perception by U.S. leaders is stated clearly on the U.S. State Department’s Web page:

Terrorist networks currently pose the greatest national security threat to the United States. The greatest threat and the most wanted terrorists come from the al-Qaida (AQ) network, which includes a core al-Qaida organization and numerous confederated extremist groups...AQ aims to overthrow the existing world order and replace it with a reactionary, authoritarian, transnational entity. This threat will be sustained over a protracted period (decades not years) and will require a global response executed regionally, nationally, and locally. (emphasis mine, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm#enemy)

Thus, similar to communist ideology during the Cold War, fundamentalist Islam threatens U.S. interests both because it is antithetical to U.S. liberal ideology and because antagonistic, capable actors are willing to carry out this ideology.

Given the perceived threat posed by Al Qaeda and those adhering to fundamentalist Islamic ideology, one would expect U.S. military resources to be utilized primarily for the purpose of addressing this threat and less so for other (humanitarian) purposes. In terms of military intervention in civil conflicts, this implies that U.S. military intervention is more likely when it is directed at mitigating the threat of al Qaeda rather than for the purposes of alleviating humanitarian crises. More specifically, this would lead one to believe that military
intervention for humanitarian purposes should be less frequent and less likely in the period following the 9/11 attacks, as this period represents a heightened security context.

Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to provide a theoretical basis for explaining the formation and transformation of security contexts from threatening to benign, and their corresponding effects on U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts. As an initial test of their explanatory power, the next chapter is devoted to stating and analyzing testable hypotheses by examining U.S. intervention behavior both inside and outside heightened security contexts.

Summary of Theoretical Argument

In this section I provide a summary of the main propositions described above.

1) Leaders and other individuals within states have myriad interests. These interests are often defined and prioritized by one or more contexts. Given that states have limited resources, their leadership must make trade-offs in deciding where to allocate resources.

2) Interests are prioritized, and a state leadership’s most basic concern is survival and ensuring survival in the future, also known as its strategic interests. Where either of these is perceived to be threatened, military resources will be primarily devoted toward addressing the perceived threat(s). Where these
security concerns are satisfactorily mitigated, there is the opportunity for non-
security interests to receive increased military resources.

3) Although state leaders face a number of security threats, they vary
in their potential gravity and credibility; the more direct, credible, and grave the
threat, the more likely it will consume a state’s military resources. As survival
and strategic interests become more satisfied, state leaders may expand the
scope of their interests to include ideas which promote the longer term interests
of keeping the state in power without the use of force, such as actions to promote
one’s own ideology and increase international legitimacy.

4) The most direct, credible, and grave threats are those which are
represented by identifiable actors in the international system who are
antagonistic, capable of inflicting significant loss of life and infrastructure, and
who have opposing ideologies. These perceptions are based on both cognitive
heuristics and observations of the threatening actors' behavior in the international
system. State leaders will devote resources toward alleviating these threats. It is
argued in this study that the Soviet Union posed such a threat to the U.S. during
the Cold War: it was a highly capable, antagonistic foe which promoted an
ideology -- communism -- contradictory to fundamental values of the U.S.,
particularly that of political and economic liberalism. Thus, other communist
actors could have also posed a threat due to their contradictory ideology and
potential alliance with the USSR. In the post-9/11 context, fundamentalist Islam
and antagonistic, organized actors such as Al Qaeda pose the gravest threat to
U.S. national security, despite limited conventional military capabilities. Observation of Al Qaeda’s capability and willingness to inflict significant loss of life and infrastructure on U.S., as well as its aggressive ideology, have created a heightened security context within the U.S. – the “War on Terror” – which has had significant effects on U.S. foreign policy and its use of military resources.

5) A perceived threat forms a context which guides state behavior at the strategic level. One may observe continuous behavior within the parameters of a security context and changed behavior at the point where this context ends. Thus, one may observe a pattern of intervention behavior that reflects a heightened security context. Since context is perceived, change and continuity thereof reflect changes in beliefs about the other. It is argued that state leaders update their beliefs about the other using a rudimentary form of Bayesian inference. This implies that during the Cold War and post-9/11 contexts, one should be able to identify a pattern of U.S. military intervention in which the U.S. is most likely to intervene in civil conflicts in which one of the parties to the conflict has ties to a threatening actor or adheres to the threatening actor’s ideology.

6) Change in the perception of another as a significant threat will lead to the formation of a new context characterized either by the existence of another antagonistic, capable actor, or by lack thereof. Foreign policy, and military intervention specifically, will reflect the new context. Military resources will be devoted according to the threat posed to state survival and strategic interests.
Where these threats are minimal, military resources may be devoted to longer term interests pertaining to international legitimacy and the promotion of one’s ideas and institutions abroad. The use of unilateral, U.S. military intervention for purely humanitarian purposes is more likely in a less threatening context, such as that taking place from 1992 to 2001.

The propositions summarized above guide the formulation of the following list of hypotheses. The operationalization of the variables and methods used to test these hypotheses are further described in the Research Design chapter, as are a number of hypotheses reflecting control variables theorized or empirically found to be determinant of US military intervention by other scholars.

H1: The US is more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts in which one of the parties to the conflict is perceived as a threat, has ties to a threat, or promotes a threatening actor’s ideology.

H2: The US is more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts for humanitarian reasons in a less threatening security context than in a more threatening security context.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES

This section describes the research design utilized for testing the hypotheses listed at the end of the previous chapter. It begins with a discussion of the unit of analysis -- civil-conflict dyad – and the dependent variable – US unilateral military intervention. This is followed by a listing of the primary hypotheses of concern to this study, as well as hypotheses depicting expected relations with control variables. Each of these hypotheses is accompanied by a discussion of the theoretical reasoning for their inclusion, followed by a description of how concepts mentioned in the hypotheses are operationalized. Some attention is also devoted to explaining the decisions behind using certain datasets over others. This section concludes with a discussion of the methodology used to test the hypotheses.

Civil Conflict-Dyad as the Unit of Analysis

When examining the influence of various factors on the likelihood of U.S. military intervention, the primary unit of analysis centers on civil conflicts. The most common sources used for civil conflicts include the Correlates of War (COW) Project and the Uppsala Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset. One important distinction between these datasets concerns what
constitutes a civil conflict, or in the case of COW, a civil war. For COW, a civil war is included in the dataset if there have been at least 1,000 battle deaths, while for PRIO, as few as 25 battle deaths warrant inclusion in the dataset. In addition to these sources, some scholars have developed their own datasets of civil conflicts which reflect different thresholds. In his examination of third-party intervention in civil conflict, for example, Patrick Regan (2002) includes all civil conflicts which have a threshold of 200 battle deaths. Despite the differences among these various sources, the number of battle deaths one uses as a threshold is important for distinguishing between less organized riots and armed conflict between two or more political groups, with the latter presenting a greater challenge to an existing government.

Aside from battle-death thresholds, one may observe different units of analysis based on civil conflict, with variation centering either on time (e.g., civil conflict-year) or the level of aggregation (civil conflict-dyad). Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) go one step further by breaking conflicts into numerous phases: pre-crisis, crisis, pre-conflict, conflict, post-conflict, and post-crisis. This trend toward disaggregating civil conflicts has been promoted by some scholars who argue that doing so further enhances our understanding of the occurrence and dynamics of this phenomenon (see the August 2009 issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* which contains several articles assessing the importance of disaggregating civil conflicts). As is explained below, this study utilizes a dataset
developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) which disaggregates civil conflicts by dyad.

Dependent Variable: US Unilateral Military Intervention

The discussion above implies that when faced with numerous ways of measuring civil conflict, the choice for the scholar ultimately lies with which will best help her test derivations of the theory being examined; where more than one source is theoretically appropriate, it is sensible to select that which is most efficient (i.e., includes some of the same variables of interest). Given that the primary dependent variable in this study concerns U.S. unilateral military intervention, it seems most efficient to use a civil-conflict dataset which also contains a variable measuring third-party military intervention; selecting such a source would abet the comparison of this study’s results to those of other studies using the same dataset. Thus, the source of most of the data used in this study come from a data project implemented by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009).\textsuperscript{14} Cunningham et al. use PRIO civil-conflict data as the basis for their study, which is disaggregated into civil-conflict dyads, and they add other important variables, including information regarding third-party intervention. In their dataset, they not only identify the third party but also the type of intervention and whether it was on the side of the government or rebel forces. Intervention is categorized as follows: 1) whether support was given in the form of troops, other

\textsuperscript{14} These data can be found at \url{http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html}. 
forms of military support (arms, weaponry, bases, intelligence, etc.), non-military support, or endorsement. Thus, the two dependent variables in this study, U.S. military intervention (usmilint) and U.S. military intervention categorized by type (usmiltyp) reflect those instances in which the U.S. supported either the government (gtypesup) or rebels (rtypesup) with troops or other forms of military assistance, according to Cunningham et al. (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/eacd_codebook.pdf). Where the U.S. has intervened militarily in a civil conflict, the variable usmilint is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. In order to account for the difference between sending troops and less costly forms of military intervention, another dependent variable – usmiltyp – is also examined. This variable receives a value of 2 if U.S. troops intervened in the civil conflict, 1 for other military aid and advising short of sending troops, and 0 for no U.S. military intervention.

Because their dataset includes observations through 2003, civil conflicts taking place after that time are added using PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4, through 2008 (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/; accessed 7/30/09), and Mark Mullenbach’s Dispute Narratives (“Third-Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes,” accessible from Mullenbach’s Web site: http://www.uca.edu/politicalscience/TPI.php) are used to determine U.S. military intervention in the years from 2004 to 2008. Given that Cunningham et al.’s data are based on PRIO, the cases included in years after 2003 should hypothetically match those that would be included by Cunningham et al., were their dataset to
have included later years. As previously mentioned, US military intervention is
not identified by PRIO, and thus an alternative source of intervention (i.e.,
Mullenbach’s Dispute Narratives) was consulted for the years between 2004 and
2008. Despite the possibility that Cunningham et al. would have identified a US
military intervention where Mullenbach did not identify it in his Narratives, or vice
versa, these inter-coder differences are minimized for three reasons. First, in
both Cunningham et al.’s study and in Mullenbach’s Dispute Narratives,
*Keesing’s Contemporary Archives* are consulted to obtain information about civil
conflicts, including that related to whether or not the US intervened militarily.
Other sources are consulted as well, but in general, one would expect that where
*Keesing’s* mentions US military intervention, this would appear in both
Cunningham et al.’s study and in Mullenbach’s. Second, Mullenbach’s
Narratives are just that, narratives. Thus, there is no mismatch between the way
Cunningham et al. quantified a variable compared to Mullenbach, because there
simply is no numerical value in the latter. The potential for coding error of this
sort is that which may occur by my improperly reading Mullenbach’s Narrative,
possibly leading to the identification of an intervention where none occurred, or
vice versa. This type of error is minimal, however, when considering the third
point: only 23 observations (conflict-dyads) occur within the 2004-2008
timeframe, implying that even if there were some form of inter-coder error, it
would have a minimal impact on the study’s implications as a whole. Due to
missing data for some key variables in the years prior to 1960, the dataset
described above was limited to those civil conflict dyads taking place between 1960 and 2008, reflects a sample which contains a total of 490 observations.

Primary Independent Variable – Security Context

Each of the hypotheses listed at the end of the previous chapter are restated here, followed by elaboration of the argument, justification of their inclusion based on previous research, and how each variable in the hypothesis is measured.

H1: The US is more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts in which one of the parties to the conflict is perceived as a threat, has ties to a threat, or promotes a threatening actor’s ideology.

The theoretical framework described in this study leads one to believe that state leaders will make decisions regarding the use of their military resources based on the assessment of security threat. As has been argued, the existence of an actor which adheres to an antithetical ideology and engages in what is perceived to be aggressive behavior presents such a threat. The perception of this threatening actor affects collective decisionmaking regarding security strategy, where mitigating the threat posed by this actor becomes part of grander strategy. As such, resources are extended beyond addressing direct, aggressive behavior into indirect forms of mitigating the threat posed by said actor. This utilization of resources to address threats indirectly may be observed in the form of military interventions in civil conflicts. Military interventions are inherently
costly, and thus one should expect them to occur less rather than more often. However, where they do occur it is expected that they will largely be undertaken for the sake of mitigating the threat posed by another actor, rather than for some other purpose, as using military interventions for another purpose exhausts limited resources.

Other scholars (Yoon 1997; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) have found that one strong determinant of US military intervention in civil conflicts during the Cold War concerned whether one of the parties to the conflict was communist or had ties to the USSR. For the purposes of this study, each conflict-dyad was examined to determine if a party to the conflict (i.e., target state, challenger, or third-party intervener) promoted a communist ideology or had suspected ties to the USSR. Positive cases were coded under the variable threat as 1, and 0 otherwise. In Cunningham et al.’s dataset, there is a variable which indicates whether a conflict was fought over communist ideology (conflicttype). Aside from this variable, another variable was observed to determine whether a communist state intervened on either the side of the government or rebel forces. These variables were used to determine the values of the threat variable used in this study for conflicts taking place during the Cold War.

In the period following the end of the Cold War and prior to 9/11, it has been argued that this period could reasonably be characterized as a less threatening security context. As was previously described, some states are named specifically in State of the Union Addresses during this time period as
security concerns, including: Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Cuba. Although China is not mentioned negatively in any State of the Union Addresses, it represented a potential but ambiguous threat to the U.S., given its authoritarian political ideology, remaining communist elements, expanding economic and military capacity, and crises involving Taiwan. Civil conflicts in which Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Cuba, or China are parties to the conflict are coded as 1 for the threat variable, and 0 otherwise.

For conflicts taking place in the post-9/11 period, the threat variable includes civil conflicts in which one of the parties to the conflict is characterized by Islamic fundamentalism, has ties to Al Qaeda, or is deemed a state sponsor of terror. Including Islamic fundamentalism in its most extreme form (those groups which utilize terrorist tactics) takes into account the battle between ideologies which may take place between actors who perceive each other as enemies. One need only recall U.S. attempts to “contain communism.” These efforts were not purely ideological, as containing communism served the strategic interests of preventing potential alliances of target states with the USSR. Similarly, one would expect that potentially preventing Islamic fundamentalist groups from attaining power would prevent state support of Al Qaeda, or at the very least, “safe havens” for Al Qaeda. The U.S. State Department defines a safe haven not just in the physical sense – “failed/failing states, under-governed areas and sponsors who provide safe areas where terrorists train and organize” -- but in the ideological sense as well: “belief systems, ideas and cultural norms that enhance
the enemy's freedom of action. These include ethnic identities, religious attitudes and political cultures" (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm#enemy). This implies that if one of the parties to the conflict is considered Islamic fundamentalist, the U.S. may be more inclined to intervene in that conflict, either to prevent the fundamentalist group from coming to power, or to assist in its overthrow. The scope of Islamic fundamentalism is limited to those groups or states which are known to employ terrorist tactics, for the purpose of distinguishing them from other non-violent Islamic groups or states.

In order to determine whether any parties to the conflict are perceived to have ties to Al Qaeda or to be Islamic terrorist groups, each civil conflict-dyad is coded as 1 for the threat variable if it meets any of the following criteria:

a) One of the parties to the conflict is deemed a state sponsor of terror by the State Department;

b) One of the parties to the conflict is identified by the State Department as having links to Al Qaeda;

c) One of the parties to the conflict is identified by the State Department as both Islamic and as a “foreign terrorist organization.”

This information is accessible from the following State Department reports:

“Patterns of Global Terrorism” (for years 2001-2003) and “Country Reports on Terrorism” (for years 2004-2008).15 Appendix A provides a list of all the entities

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15 The “Country Reports” reflect the point in time when National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created and assumed primary responsibility for acquiring and analyzing terrorism data. The State Department changed the name of the reports in order “[i]nclude the inclusion of NCTC statistical data in the Department of State’s annual report and to avoid any confusion resulting
meeting the criteria listed above, per the sources described. The highlighted rows indicate those groups or states which were parties to civil-conflict dyads within the dataset.

H2: The US is more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts for humanitarian reasons in a less threatening security context than in a more threatening security context.

Humanitarian interventions are those in which the primary purpose is to mitigate a humanitarian crisis. These are driven by the desire of third parties and their publics to stop the killing and displacement of innocent civilians, rather than by a concern of a direct security threat to the third party. Hypothesis 1 reflects the idea that given the salience of containing communism, U.S. leaders would be less likely to use military resources for humanitarian reasons during the Cold War. Likewise, following the end of the Cold War, U.S. leaders would have a greater opportunity to use military resources for humanitarian purposes, as indicated by Hypothesis 2. As was previously argued, the perceived lack of a formidable threat toward which to devote military resources allows for the opportunity to use those resources for other purposes. Hypothesis 1 reflects the idea that once a security threat emerges anew, military resources will most likely be used to address this threat, implying that they will be less likely to be used for humanitarian purposes under this new security context. In Hypothesis 1, the concept of threat also includes those posed by non-state actors who have

from comparing current data with that generated before NCTC's participation, the name of the annual report was changed to *Country Reports on Terrorism* beginning with the 2004 document."
demonstrated both the capacity and willingness to inflict significant damage and loss of life.

The post-9/11 period represents U.S. perception of a non-state actor, al Qaeda, as a significant security threat. Given this organization’s demonstrated willingness and capacity to inflict significant property damage and loss of life on U.S. soil, it meets the Bayesian criteria described in the theoretical section of what constitutes a credible and enduring threat. Thus, one would expect military resources to be utilized primarily for the purpose of addressing this threat and less so for other (humanitarian) purposes. In terms of military intervention in civil conflicts, this implies that U.S. military intervention is more likely when intervention is directed at mitigating the threat of Al Qaeda or another Islamic terrorist organization rather than for the purposes of alleviating humanitarian crises. More specifically, this would lead one to believe that military intervention for humanitarian purposes should be less frequent and less likely in the period following the 9/11 attacks, as this period represents a heightened security context.

While the level of intensity of the conflict, a concept often referred to by other scholars as indicating the number of battle deaths or casualties within a given year, has been used as an indicator of humanitarian crisis (Regan 2002), the amount of refugee flows is also considered (Mullenbach and Matthews 2008). One might argue that conflicts which exhibit both a high level of intensity as well as a high number of refugee flows represent the most severe humanitarian
crises. Two caveats exist when using intensity as an indicator of humanitarian crisis, however. In terms of assessing the relative importance of strategic to humanitarian concerns, it is not possible to discern whether conflicts characterized by high intensity also make them more important strategically. That is, a very intense, violent conflict taking place in a strategically important location might incline a third party to intervene to end or prevent the spread of conflict. The motivation behind the intervention may not necessarily be to mitigate a humanitarian crisis so much as to preserve the status quo within the international system or in terms of dyadic relations between states.

The second caveat concerns the intensity measure itself, which is usually measured as the number of battle deaths or casualties within a given year. This measure does not distinguish between civilian and military lives lost. One might argue that the more severe humanitarian crises are those in which there is a greater loss of civilian life, and one in which civilians are intentionally targeted, particularly instances of genocide or politicide. By emphasizing the civilian loss of life, one may be better able to distinguish a civil conflict characterized by humanitarian crisis from other types of civil conflict. These tend to be the types of conflicts which draw media attention, and in turn, instigate a third-party’s constituents to call for intervention. Similarly, images portraying human suffering, such as refugees forced to migrate due to conflict, may also spur calls for intervention. Thus, it is perhaps more appropriate to consider a humanitarian crisis as one in which genocide or politicide is taking place, and/or in which there
is a high number of refugee flows. Measures for each of these concepts are described below.

Genocide/Politicide

Barbara Harff defines the concept of genocide/politicide as:

…the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. In genocides and politicides killings are never accidental, nor are they the acts of individuals. The key is that they are carried out at the explicit or tacit direction of state authorities, or those who claim state authority. (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/)

Based on this definition, Harff identifies 39 instances of genocide/politicide between the years 1955 and 2002 (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/).16

Using Harff’s list as a reference, the variable genocide is coded as follows: for each conflict-dyad, if a genocide/politicide took place in the target state during the years of conflict, I allocate a 1, and a 0 otherwise.

Using genocide/politicide as an indicator of humanitarian crisis, one would expect more US military intervention in conflicts characterized by genocide/politicide during the period following the end of the Cold War and prior to 9/11 than during the Cold War and post-9/11 periods.

16 A list of genocides/politicides, as well as Harff’s operational criteria for identifying instances of genocide/politicide can be found in Appendix B.
Refugees

The atrocities of war are most often conveyed in statistics depicting the casualties of war, either as a direct result of violence, or as a result of the indirect effects of war on infrastructure, the economy, and institutions tasked with providing public goods. This picture is incomplete, however, because it does not account for individuals who fled these war-torn societies and are living elsewhere. Unfortunately, fleeing war to a neighboring country does not necessarily alleviate the threats to human security faced by refugees. As described in the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)'s publication “The State of the World’s Refugees 1997: A Humanitarian Agenda,” these individuals continue to face potential death, hardship, or maltreatment by other individuals, or even their host-country governments (1997). Furthermore, physical refugee camps present not just social and health problems, but bases from which to plan and launch attacks on host governments or those of neighboring countries, such as has been the case with Rwandan refugees living in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The gravity of the refugee problem described drives the efforts of the UNHCR and other organizations in providing relief to these affected groups. However, some argue that for this aid to be effective, greater involvement on the part of UN country members is needed: “…[I]t has become all too clear that humanitarian action can play only a very limited role in protecting human rights and safeguarding human security in situations of ongoing conflict. As the tragic
events in Srebrenica and Zepa demonstrated in 1995, when the ‘safe areas’ established by the UN Security Council were overrun by Serb forces, more assertive forms of action are required to safeguard the physical security of vulnerable populations, especially when they are confronted by forces which flagrantly flout international opinion and humanitarian law” (UNHCR 1997, 18, italics mine). The remarks above imply that leaders of states with the military capacity to intervene to protect refugees, a particularly vulnerable population, should do so, and perhaps should take preemptive measures to prevent a current crisis from leading to massive refugee flows. Furthermore, these military resources may also be used to protect relief workers so that they may continue to improve the human security of refugees. In other words, the work of humanitarian aid is incomplete without a security force to ensure adequate delivery of goods and services, as well as the physical protection of refugees.

Given the humanitarian concerns presented by refugees, one would expect that if a third party were intervening for humanitarian purposes, it would be most likely to intervene in those instances in which there are a high number of refugee flows. To account for this motivation behind intervention, data concerning refugee flows are included in this study for each civil conflict-dyad. In particular, for each dyad, the average, annual number of refugees originating from the target country over the years of the conflict is calculated and expressed in thousands (refugeeth). The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) collects and maintains information concerning refugees in their database entitled “Total
Refugee Population by Origin, 1960-2008

(http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a0174156.html). For years in which the country-of-origin has no value for refugee flows, these are assumed to be zero (since this is not stated differently by the UNHCR).

Using refugee flows as an indicator of humanitarian crisis, one would expect more US military intervention in conflicts characterized by high refugee flows during the period following the end of the Cold War and prior to 9/11 than during the Cold War and post-9/11 periods.

Intensity

Although it was argued that intensity may not be the best indicator of humanitarian crisis, I maintain the intensity variable for the purpose of comparison with other studies. PRIO’s int variable is used in this study, and is coded as 1 for low intensity and 2 for high intensity, keeping PRIO’s original coding rubric. PRIO distinguishes between less and more intense conflicts,

17 According to the UNHCR, refugees include “individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or, those enjoying “temporary protection.”” (See the “Definitions and Scope” section of the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods, and Data Considerations, available at http://www.unhcr.org/45c06c662.html).

18 Four cases did not have values for intensity in the PRIO dataset, and this information was supplemented using Mullenbach’s Dispute Narratives. The cases are listed below, followed by the number of deaths and corresponding intensity value:

South Korea vs. Leftist Insurgents (4/1/1948-6/25/1950), 36,000 deaths, intens=2.
India vs. ABSU (3/16/1989-12/31/1990), 16 deaths, intens=1.
Algeria vs. FIS (1/1/1993-10/1/1997), 750 deaths, intens=1.
with the former consisting of those with between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year, and the latter consisting of those with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.

As expected, there is some association between the intensity of conflict and the average, annual number of refugee flows. A comparison of means reveals that less intense conflicts (coded as 1) have a mean refugee flow of 84,822 (SD 178,158), while more intense conflicts (coded as 2) have a mean refugee flow of 1,138,538 (SD 3,769,179). The correlation between intensity and refugee flows is 29.4. Similarly, one can observe that a greater proportion of conflicts with no genocide/politicide were also characterized by lower intensity (69%), and that a greater proportion of conflicts with genocide/politicide were characterized by higher intensity (66%). These descriptive statistics indicate that perhaps intensity, refugee flows, and genocide are all potentially valid measures of humanitarian crisis.

Other Factors

Studies have identified a number of other factors which affect the likelihood of intervention. Though not an exhaustive list of all potential factors which might affect the decision to intervene, these are included as controls because of their theoretical validity and empirical support in previous works. In the literature review, determinants for explaining intervention in civil conflict were

presented in two broad categories – external and internal factors. External factors include characteristics of the conflict and target state and relations between the third party and target state, while internal factors include domestic conditions of the intervening state and domestic political competition within the intervening state. Control variables are presented according to these categories.

Characteristics of the Conflict and Target State

It has been argued that potential interveners determine the perceived likelihood of success of a military intervention by taking into consideration characteristics of the target state and conflict. Perceived costs may be determined by the conflict’s distance.

Distance from Target State

Some point to the importance of geographic proximity of a target state, arguing that target states within a major power’s “sphere of influence,” or which serve as strategic stationing points by major powers, are more likely to experience third-party intervention in their conflicts (Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Smith 2000). What constitutes the sphere of influence depends on the frame of reference, as the meaning of this concept has changed since its introduction when major powers carved up spheres of influence in the developing world. The Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared that any European attempts to colonize or intervene in the affairs of states in the
Americas, marks the perception on the part of U.S. leadership of the Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence. During the Cold War, this term was also used to signify Soviet influence east of the Berlin Wall, and that of NATO to the West.

As is explained in *The Columbia Encyclopedia*, “The term in [its colonial] sense is no longer recognized in international law...Currently, it is used by the more powerful nations of the world to denote the exclusive or predominant interest they may have in certain areas of the globe, especially for the purposes of national security” (*The Columbia Encyclopedia* 2008). In this sense, the term is similar to Zeev Maoz’s conception of a state’s “politically relevant international environment (PRIE),” defined as

> the set of political units (state and nonstate units) whose structure, behavior, and policies have a direct impact on the focal state’s political and strategic calculus. This is the environment upon which decision makers, intelligence agencies, the media, and the public focus their attention on an almost daily basis... (Maoz 1996, 138)

Although Maoz argues that the “global reach capacity” of major powers implies that the PRIE of said powers consists of all states in the international system, one should note the two main criteria for defining a state’s PRIE -- contiguity and geopolitical status. Despite the fact that technology has decreased the cost of using force abroad, contiguity continues to remain important, for matters of both direct security as well as prestige of the major power in the international system. In terms of direct security, conflicts taking place in neighboring states may directly affect a major power through refugee flows or the spread of violence...
related to the smuggling arms and other illicit goods. Indirectly, intervention in the civil conflicts of less powerful neighboring states in some ways further solidifies the perception of the intervener’s capabilities and prestige.

The PRIE for the United States is expansive, but one would expect that conflicts occurring within the Western Hemisphere to be of particular importance. Interestingly, when controlling for the effect of communism, Yoon (1997) did not find distance from the U.S. to be a statistically significant factor in explaining U.S. military intervention. Mullenbach and Matthews (2008), however, find geographic proximity to be a very strong indicator of U.S. military intervention, illustrating that the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in a target state that is geographically proximate to the U.S. is more than twice as high as that of the baseline probability of U.S. intervention. The discrepancies between these findings may be most significantly linked to the difference in years examined; Yoon examines only the Cold War years, while Mullenbach and Matthews observe years through 2002.

Given the more recent findings, it seems pertinent to include geographic proximity as a control. A number of different variables have been used to determine the importance of geographic distance. Similar to Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) the variable sphere is assigned a value of 1 if the civil conflict dyad takes place within the Western Hemisphere, and 0 otherwise.
Borders and the Concern for Conflict Contagion

Homer-Dixon and Percival (1996, cited in Florini and Simmons 1998) argue, and the findings of Moore and Shellman (2007) indicate, that the potential spread of conflict warrants the attention of the international community. First, large refugee flows from a country experiencing civil conflict may lead to civil strife in states sharing a border with the target state. Second, the potential for international conflict may increase given shared ethnic ties between some groups across borders. Third, civil conflict might make target-state regimes more aggressive both domestically and abroad. Thus, in general, one would expect the U.S. to intervene in civil conflicts where the target state has greater potential for spreading (Leeds 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Moore and Shellman 2007). The variable border is coded by indicating the target state’s total number of shared borders with other states. These data are accessible from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).

Relative Capabilities between Government and Rebel Forces

Regan (2000; 2002) and Huth (1998) contend that a target state’s capabilities somewhat determine whether or not a third party intervenes. It is assumed that a third party is less likely to intervene in a civil conflict in which the target state has preponderant capabilities. If one intends to intervene on the side of the government, intervention is superfluous, in that it is unnecessary given the government’s likelihood of winning. Correspondingly, if one were to intervene on
the side of a challenger faced by powerful government forces, the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome is diminished. If third parties intervene where they hope to be most successful, it will be in instances where government and challenger capabilities are perceived to be more equal.

To assess the relative strength of rebel to government forces, the variable rebstrength from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s “Expanded Uppsala Armed Conflict Data” is used (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html). It codes the strength of rebel forces relative to government forces on a scale. For this study, the following values are assigned to the categories identified by Cunningham et al.:

1= much weaker
2= weaker
3= parity
4= stronger
5= much stronger

Because Cunningham et al.’s study includes data just through 2003, another source was consulted for relative capabilities for the years 2003-2007 (Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander & Peter Wallensteen 2008). From Cunningham et al.’s variable, a dichotomous variable is created for which the value of 1 indicates that rebel forces were at parity with government forces, and 0 otherwise.
Target State Regime Type

Aside from humanitarian concerns, the promotion of democracy is another principled belief which seems to be prevalent in U.S. foreign policy rhetoric. Some have argued that the observation that major democratic powers do not go to war in the modern era, and the theoretical justification of this phenomenon in the epistemic community, has made the promotion of democracy a higher priority for U.S. foreign policy (Meernik 1996; Florini and Simmons 1998; Enterline and Greig 2008). According to Meernik, state leaders may use preemptive force or intervene in civil conflict in order to promote democracy, with leaders basing this decision on the assumption that democracies do not go to war with one another, while autocracies tend to be more aggressive. That is, concerns for self-interest as well as regional or global peace motivate these actions. Regarding the former, the preemptive use of force for the purpose of promoting democracy in a particular state may prevent future attack from the said state, and may also lead to the establishment of a favorable regime which may be open not just politically, but also economically. From a collective perspective, if democratic peace theory is accurate (i.e., democracies do not go to war with one another), and assuming this is simply because they are democracies, then a world (or region) with more democracies should be more peaceful.

Perhaps civil conflicts present an opportunity for U.S. leaders to assist in establishing a democratic regime in a state which was autocratic before the outbreak of hostilities. Or, perhaps it is an opportunity for the U.S. to preserve a
democratic regime in a state undergoing conflict. The assumption that the U.S. intervenes in some civil conflicts to promote democracy is debatable. First, it defies numerous historical cases in which the U.S. intervened, either militarily or through endorsement, in order to overthrow a democratically elected leader, particularly during the Cold War. In such instances, preventing a target state’s leadership from forming an alliance with the Soviet Union appeared to outweigh the benefits of promoting democracy. Second, it assumes that U.S. promotion of democracy through the use of force is effective. This assumption is most likely based on the observation of such states as Japan and Germany after U.S. occupation and installed democracy. The results of Meernik’s (1996) study reveal, however, that “in the majority of cases, regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, the majority of US military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy” (400). Similarly, Enterline and Greig’s (2008) assessment of the prospects for democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan are far from certain, given findings which reveal variance in the survival of regimes in which democracy was imposed (Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Pickering and Peceny 2006).

Despite the possibility that the promotion of democracy may be mostly rhetorical, and have little potential for success, it has still been the most frequently cited justification by political leaders for U.S. use of force abroad. Even if this were the motivation behind some interventions, it is unclear in which conflicts the U.S. is most likely to intervene, those characterized by democratic or
autocratic states. On the one hand, one may argue that the US will intervene in a civil conflict with a democratic regime in order to preserve democracy, lest a challenger with autocratic intentions come to power. On the other hand, one might also argue that an autocratic state undergoing civil conflict presents an opportunity for the U.S. to implement the transition to democracy. Thus, it is not clear whether the U.S. is more likely to intervene in democracies or autocracies, as one could promote democracy by saving a fledgling democracy or assisting in the overthrow of an autocracy. Because of the debatable direction of the relationship between polity type and US military intervention in civil conflicts, two hypotheses are included for assessing the effect of regime type. The first reflects the idea that the U.S. may be more likely to intervene in a democratic state undergoing civil conflict in order to protect democracy, while the second indicates that the U.S. may be more likely to intervene in an autocratic state to promote democracy.

From Polity IV’s “Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions” dataset, the polity2 variable is used in this study to indicate the degree of democracy in a given state, on a scale of +10 to -10, with +10 indicating the

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19 Perhaps examining the regime type of the target state is not a good way to test whether or not democracy is the driving motivator behind US military intervention, given that the US may intervene in either democracies to preserve the status quo, or autocracies to transition. Furthermore, scholars often attempt to divorce ideological from strategic motivations, demonstrating that one matters more than the other under certain circumstances (Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992; Keohane and Nye 1993), yet the promotion of democracy is both ideological and strategic. Does any case exist in which it can be argued that the US intervened in a civil conflict for truly ideological purposes related to the promotion of democracy, with no strategic benefits? The two cannot be separated, as the promotion of democracy is itself partially strategic, driven by the logic that democracies do not go to war.
highest level of democracy and -10 indicating the highest level of autocracy (accessed from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm). The polity2 score is itself derived by subtracting a state’s autocracy score from its democracy score. The variable politlag contains the score for a civil-conflict dyad based on the polity2 score of the target state the year prior to the start of the conflict-dyad. This lag is incorporated in order to account for the political environment under which the challenger was forming an armed response, rather than the political environment given the civil conflict.

Target State Gross Domestic Product

The U.S. may be more or less inclined to intervene in a civil conflict depending on the target state’s level of development. One would expect a lower likelihood of U.S. military intervention in a state with greater GDP, given the little value-added of U.S. military intervention. A variable representing the target state’s GDP is included, lagged by one year prior to the start of conflict and factored into millions.

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20 The autocracy score is a composite based on the competition, selection, and openness of the executive, as well as the competitiveness and regulation of political participation. The democracy score is composed using the same criteria.

21 The Polity IV "User’s Manual for the Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset" indicates that cases of foreign “interruption” are treated as “system missing,” cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy, are converted to “neutral” and assigned a score of “0,” and cases of “transition” are prorated across the span of the transition (See Polity IV’s User Manual for “Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions” Datasets, available from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm).
Target State Population

A target state’s population size may affect the likelihood of U.S. military intervention, as a large population may signify a greater number of actors and a potentially longer duration. Thus, a variable for the target state’s population, lagged by one year prior to the start of conflict, is included in the model.

Relations between the Third Party and Target State

Economic Ties

One might argue that greater economic ties with a target state would make a third party more inclined to intervene in a civil conflict on the target state government’s behalf in order to preserve status quo economic relations. For example, if the target state contains a highly valuable resource, and the third party is a significant importer of this resource (under a trade agreement that may not be as favorable were circumstances to change), leaders within the third-party state may feel inclined to intervene on the governing party’s behalf in order to preserve the status quo. Third parties may also intervene on behalf of the challenger if they assume that the challenger would provide them with favorable trade and investments terms, where perhaps they are currently not as favorable under the existing government. The same arguments described above would hold if there was significant foreign direct investment (or the perception of an

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22 This latter scenario is more difficult to demonstrate empirically, as it requires measurement of the third party’s perception that economic relations with the target state would improve following support of a challenger in a civil conflict.
opportunity for more favorable FDI terms) in the target state. The domestic sources of these third-party motives could be from business interests as well as those who consider continued access to a particular resource pertinent for maintaining adequate security.

Some scholars have included economic factors in their analyses of intervention behavior. In her study examining U.S. intervention in civil conflicts, for instance, Yoon (1997) includes two variables which measure economic ties with the target state: the proportion of the sum of U.S. imports and exports for 3 years prior to the war to the sum of total U.S. imports and exports for the same time period, and the proportion of U.S. direct investment position in a country to total U.S. direct investment position abroad in the year preceding. It is interesting to note, however, that these variables are not found to be statistically significant determinants of US military intervention in civil conflicts.

Although there has been little empirical support for the claim that third-party intervention is driven by economic motives (relative to strategic motives related to addressing a security threat), a recent study conducted by Benjamin Fordham (2008) indicates that studies examining the impact of economics on intervention have been sparse. His empirical findings suggest that, although alliances and rivalries strongly influence intervention behavior in the short run, economic interests have a long-run effect in that they partially determine what is perceived as a security interest. These findings indicate that examination of the
link between these variables warrants further attention. Thus, the impact of economic factors, specifically trade relations, is included here as a control.

To account for economic ties (Intottrade) between the U.S. and the target state, the total of the following is calculated: the natural log of the sum of U.S. imports from and exports to the target state for one year prior to the conflict start date, in millions of current year US dollars. Data covering the years between 1960 and 2000 are accessed from Kristian Gleditsch’s “Expanded Trade and GDP Data,” version 4.1, accessible from http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html. Data for the years 2001 through 2008 come from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, which was used by Gleditsch when compiling his data (http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/).23

Another form of economic ties between the U.S. and a target state may be in the form of economic assistance. The provision of economic aid to another state may be perceived as an investment, one worth salvaging should the state become embroiled in civil conflict. The variable ecoassislag reflects U.S. economic assistance to the target state in constant U.S. dollars, lagged one year prior to the start of the conflict. These data are provided by the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), available from http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/.

23 Neither Gleditsch’s dataset nor the IMF DOT have data covering trade dyads for the years between 1944 and 1947.
Military Ties with Target State

Huth (1998) has found empirical evidence supporting a relationship between military intervention in international conflicts and whether or not the third party has military ties with the target state. Similarly, Fordham (2008) has found that an ally’s participation in a civil or international conflict quadruples the likelihood the U.S. will intervene in a civil conflict (746).

In order to take into consideration the effect of military alliance with the target state on US intervention behavior, I consult the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP), accessible at http://atop.rice.edu/data. Leeds et al. define alliances operationally as “written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict” (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long, 2002, 238, cited in the ATOP Codebook, 5). Specifically, I refer to their dataset which identifies military alliance dyad-years, focusing only on those between the US and other states. From this, the variable milally created for this study assesses whether or not the US had an alliance with the target country undergoing civil conflict in the year prior to the conflict start-date. Where there is no observation for a particular dyad-year in the ATOP dataset, this implies that there is no military alliance. Thus, the variable milally is coded

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as 1 if there is a military alliance between the US and the target state in the year prior to the start of conflict, and 0 otherwise.25

Domestic Conditions and Politics of the Intervening State

Diversionary War

Many scholars have linked intervention in civil conflicts to the socio-economic conditions of intervening states. Diversionary theory posits that leaders are more likely to use force in order to divert the public’s attention from domestic economic problems or political scandals (Clark 2003, DeRouen and Peake, Fordham 2004, Leeds and Davis 1997, Lian and Oneal 1993, Meernik 2001, Ostrom and Job 1986). Hoping for a “rally-'round-the-flag” effect, presidents expect that external military ventures will increase public support for the administration and buy time for resolving economic problems or political scandals.

In order to account for the potential effect of diversionary war as an explanation for intervention in civil conflicts, the president’s average approval rating for the 3 Gallup polls taken prior to the start date of conflict is considered. This calculated value is represented by the variable presappr. These data are available from the University of Connecticut's Roper Center Public Opinion Archives

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One may argue that the likelihood of U.S. intervention in civil conflicts abroad depends on the president in office. Personality attributes, leadership style, and particularly the president’s world view can impact his proclivity to use force. Regarding the last point, one may expect a Republican president to be more inclined to use force than a Democratic president, given that Republicans tend to be associated with greater defense spending. The variable party is included in order to account for such an effect, and it is coded as 0 if the administration for most the conflict is Democrat, and 1 if the administration for most of the conflict is Republican.

Methodology

In examining the motivations behind U.S. military intervention, focusing specifically on the effect of security context, one could test the hypotheses summarized in the previous chapter in a number of ways. In this study, I utilize a quantitative approach, as the purpose of this study is to ascertain any broad effects of security context on foreign policy behavior. I will briefly discuss other ways in which the theoretical argument proposed here could be tested qualitatively, acknowledging the potential utility of other methods. This
justification is then followed by a discussion of the appropriate statistical
technique – logistic regression -- for explaining military intervention in civil
conflicts.

Quantitative vs Qualitative

It is commonly understood that qualitative studies provide rich detail and
thus contribute more insight into decision-making processes and historical
idiosyncrasies. Utilizing such an approach for understanding the motivations
behind U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts would expose the factors
weighing heavily on the minds of political leaders at the time a course of action is
being decided. One could conduct a case study analysis of a particular decision
through careful examination of government documents, interviews, memoirs,
meeting minutes, and the like. Yuen Foong Khong conducted such a study in his
analysis of the decision-making process of the Johnson administration
concerning intervention in Vietnam (1991; 1992). Similarly, one could employ a
most-similar-systems design or most-different-systems design and compare the
decision-making processes of U.S. leadership which produced an intervention in
some circumstances and non-intervention in others, highlighting similarities
between those decision paths which led to intervention, and those which did not
(similar to a method used by Vertzberger in his 1998 work *Risk Taking and
Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions*). Using these same
designs, a comparative study may also reveal similarities and differences in the political structure of states which have implications for intervention behavior.

The purpose behind using such an in-depth approach is to gain a more thorough understanding of the complex interplay of factors and their relationship to a particular phenomenon, and to emphasize the causal linkages which may become lost in a less detailed, general, quantitative analysis. One can observe characteristics of the decision makers, their personalities, fiduciary roles, and political ideologies, while also incorporating historical, political, cultural, and socio-economic contexts. Furthermore, the nuanced differences of political structures and standard operating procedures may be more apparent in qualitative analysis. Finally, the findings of qualitative studies may be utilized in the theory and model development of quantitative studies, allowing the latter to more accurately model intervention behavior. In this study, qualitative works were utilized mostly in theory development, particularly in posing the argument that the prioritization of security is dynamic and reflects leaders’ rudimentary use of Bayesian inference to assess the gravity of various security threats.

The primary objective of this study, however, is to assess the broad impact of security context on intervention behavior. In order to assess any broad effects, this requires examination of more instances of civil conflicts over a larger number of years, particularly considering that a security context can endure for decades. This study incorporates quantitative methods in order to analyze a greater number of cases occurring over a greater number of years, while also
controlling for other factors. This bird’s eye view not only gives a more comprehensive perspective of U.S. military intervention, but also allows for the control of other factors, eliminates some problems associated with bias on the part of the researcher, minimizes the potential that any findings occur due to chance rather than a valid association, is easily replicated, and can be compared to other comprehensive studies of intervention behavior. Furthermore, quantitative analysis allows the research community to assess the findings of qualitative studies, solidifying our understanding of intervention where there are concurrent findings, and highlighting discrepancies which warrant further examination. The methods for pursuing this broad, quantitative analysis are described in more detail below.

Logistic Regression

In order to assess the effects of security context on U.S. military interventions in civil conflicts, I compare intervention between three different time periods: the Cold War, the period between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, and post-911. Specifically, I examine the likelihood of U.S. military intervention considering the factors described above, including the control variables.

Logistic regression seems the most appropriate method for the purposes of this study. First, logistic regression shares some characteristics of OLS, a procedure familiar to most social scientists employing quantitative analysis. These similarities are as follows: logistic regression assesses the effect of
independent variables by estimating an intercept and slope; it provides a standard error for the slope which allows the researcher to test hypotheses about the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, and it is flexible in that it permits the use of multiple independent variables of various types (Pollock 2009, 199).

Logistic regression, rather than OLS, is the appropriate method for this study due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (whether or not the U.S. intervened militarily in a civil conflict). The binary dependent variable highlights the primary difference between OLS and logistic regression: when using a dependent variable that can take on continuous values, one most often assumes a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variable, making OLS appropriate; however, one must assume a nonlinear relationship when examining a dichotomous dependent variable (Pollock 2009, 199). The nonlinear relationship reflects the diminishing effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable as the former increases. In order to be able to use a linear model, logistic regression estimates the effect of an independent variable on the logged odds of a dependent variable (rather than estimating the effects of change on probability). More specifically, logistic regression estimates the change in the log of odds in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable.

For determining the relationship between variables, one may examine the coefficient, which indicates the increase in the logged odds of intervention given
a unit increase in the independent variable. These logged odds can be translated into odds, providing a more meaningful interpretation, allowing one to state that each unit increase in the independent variable makes intervention \( x \) times more likely. In addition, the sign preceding the coefficients indicates the direction of the relationship between variables.

For determining the statistical significance of any relationship, logistic regression provides a standard error and computes the Wald statistic, which divides the regression coefficient by its standard error and then squares the result. A p-value can then be computed, which indicates the probability of obtaining the observed results assuming that the null hypothesis is correct. If the p-value is 0.05 or less, one can reasonably reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative.

In order to assess how well an independent variable (or all of the independent variables) explains the dependent variable, logit regression uses maximum likelihood estimation. Somewhat similar to proportional reduction in error for measures of association, MLE requires two processes. First, it determines the probability of observing a specific value (in this case, 1 or 0) within the sample and compares this sample-wide probability to the outcome for each individual case in the sample. The difference represents prediction error. Second, MLE assesses prediction error after introducing the independent variable (or variables). By introducing the independent variable(s), there may be
some reduction in error, the degree of which determines how well the model explains the phenomenon in question.

In order to determine how well a model explains the occurrence of the dependent variable, MLE compares the logged likelihoods of the model without introducing the independent variables (Model 1) to that with introduction of the independent variables (Model 2). The difference between these two values is then multiplied by -2 (which is why the change in logged likelihoods is referred to as -2LL), and this value is used as a chi-square test statistic to test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between Model 1 and Model 2.

This change in logged likelihoods is also used as the basis for an R-square-type measure (Cox and Snell or Nagelkerke), where this difference between models is divided by the logged likelihood of Model 1. Model 2's predictive power compared to that of Model 1 can be assessed by this calculation's proximity to 1. Where there is little to no difference between the models' predictive power, the value should be closer to 0, while greater differences in predictive power approach 1. If one's model is comprehensive in explaining U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, one would expect this value to be closer to 1 than to 0.

Just as with OLS, there are a number of assumptions associated with the use of logistic regression. Where these assumptions are violated, one should either question the use of logistic regression as a statistical tool, or provide a fix for the identified violation. One problem in particular concerns that of
specification error. One must determine that the logit function is the appropriate function to use, that all relevant (and no superfluous) variables have been included in the model, and that “the logit function is a linear combination of the predictors” (Chen, Ender, Mitchell, and Wells 2010). If any of these are violated, there is specification error.26

Having provided a brief description of logit regression and its applicability to this study, what follows is a description of each model analyzed in the study and the purpose for its inclusion.

Model 1 (Constrained): \[ L_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Threat}_i + \beta_2 \text{Genocide}_i + \beta_3 \text{Refugeeth}_i + \beta_4 \text{Intens}_i + \beta_5 \text{Sphere}_i + \beta_6 \text{Border}_i + \beta_7 \text{Rebstren}_i + \beta_8 \text{Politlag}_i + \beta_9 \text{GDPlagmil}_i + \beta_{10} \text{Poplagmil}_i + \beta_{11} \text{Lntottrade}_i + \beta_{12} \text{Ecoassislag}_i + \beta_{13} \text{Milally}_i + \beta_{14} \text{Presappri}_i + \beta_{15} \text{Party}_i \]

This first model is used as a baseline to examine the impact of each of the independent variables described above and their effect on the likelihood of intervention. It utilizes a dataset which covers the entire period between 1960 and 2008. This model will be compared to Model 2 below, which includes interaction variables meant to assess whether humanitarian factors (genocide

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26 According to Chen et al. (2010), the appropriate Stata command for detecting a specification error is “linktest,” issued after the logit command. A statistically significant linktest indicates specification error, or that a relevant variable(s) has been omitted. According to Chen et al. (2010), should this occur, the first task is to ensure that all relevant variables have been included, noting that interactions should be considered (only if they can be theoretically validated).
and refugee flows) are more important for explaining U.S. military intervention in the 1992-2001 time period. This comparison is necessary because when using interaction terms, one must also run a logistic regression without the interaction terms, and compare the difference between R-squares to account for the effects of the interaction (Garson 2010: “Multiple Regression” http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/regress.htm).

Model 2: \( L_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Threat_i + \beta_2 1992-2001_i + \beta_3 Genocide_i + \beta_4 Genocide_i \times 1992-2001_i + \beta_5 Refugeeth_i + \beta_6 Refugeeth \times 1992-2001_i + \beta_7 Genocide_i \times Refugeeth_i + \beta_8 Intensi + \beta_9 Sphere_i + \beta_{10} Border_i + \beta_{11} Rebstren_i + \beta_{12} Politlag_i + \beta_{13} GDPlagmil_i + \beta_{14} Poplagmil + \beta_{15} Lntottrade_i + \beta_{16} Ecoassislag_i + \beta_{17} Milally_i + \beta_{18} Presappri_i + \beta_{19} Party_i \)

Models 1a, b, c

Another approach is also used to analyze the effects of security context on US intervention in civil conflicts. Instead of using interaction variables, the original dataset is separated into three distinct datasets based on time period (Cold War, 1992-2001, and post-9/11), and analyzed separately using Model 1. Thus, it does not include interaction variables for each time period, as the data are already separated according to what are perceived to be more threatening security contexts (the Cold War and post-9/11 periods) and less threatening contexts (the 1992-2001 period). The results of the separate analysis of each
time period are then compared to assess any differences in statistical and substantive importance of particular variables in the three time periods. Specifically, it is again expected that intervention for the sake of mitigating humanitarian crisis is more likely in the 1992-2001 period than in the other periods.

The next chapter provides a more detailed description of the datasets, the methods used, and the results of the logit analysis of the models described above. Results from each of the methods and models are compared to note differences in statistical and substantive significance of individual variables, as well as model performance as a whole.
CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

As described in the previous chapter, four datasets are utilized to test the hypotheses depicted in the research design. The first dataset, which is referred to as “Total” because it includes civil conflicts covering all three time periods, initially included all civil conflict-dyads taking place between 1946 and 2008. This dataset was then purged of observations which contained variables with missing values, leaving a total of 490 observations and limiting the sample to civil-conflict dyads taking place between the years 1960 through 2008. The other three datasets each correspond to a specific time period – Cold War, 1/1/1992-9/10/2001, and Post-9/11 (9/11/2001-12/31/2008). As with the Total dataset, the other three are purged of cases with missing values. As a result, they each contain 193, 170, and 83 observations, respectively.

The purpose of using four datasets is to incorporate two different methods for assessing the effect of perceived security context on U.S. military intervention. One method entails using the Total dataset and includes interaction variables which account for the combined effect of a less threatening security

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27 The purpose of dropping cases with missing values was to enable likelihood-ratio tests: if comparing coefficients across models, samples must be the same or these tests cannot be computed. If one were to keep observations with missing values, once excluding certain variables in the constrained model of the likelihood-ratio test, one runs the risk that the full and constrained models will not contain the same observations (Long and Freese 2006: 79).
context and humanitarian crisis on U.S. military intervention, as it is argued that whether or not humanitarian concerns determine intervention depends on context. The other method compares the results of analysis of the three datasets which reflect the three distinct time-periods described above. The expectation using the latter method is that statistical and substantial effects of some variables will be distinguishably different across the three contexts. In particular, the security-related variables, such as those measuring a civil conflict's connection to a threatening actor or ideology, should have stronger effects on intervention than humanitarian-related variables (genocide/politicide and refugee flows) during the Cold War and Post-9/11 periods, while the humanitarian variables should be more statistically and substantially significant in the 1992-2001 period than during the Cold War and Post-9/11 periods.

In the sections that follow, I begin with the Total dataset, assessing the performance of the full model including interaction variables; this is followed by more detailed analysis of the effect of each individual variable included in the model. In order to examine model performance, I first conduct Wald and likelihood-ratio tests to determine whether the null hypothesis (all coefficients are equal to 0) can be rejected. These tests are followed by assessments of the full model's goodness of fit, using a set of tests formulated by Long and Freese (2008), as well as the predictive capability of the full model. The analysis of the full model using the Total dataset concludes with an examination of each variable's statistical and substantial significance. Results of the full model are
compared to those of the constrained model (which excludes interaction variables). Finally, the same procedures described above are conducted using the second method (analyzing three separate datasets), and those results are compared to those found using the first method.

Method I: Examining the Effects of High- and Low-Threat Contexts Using Interaction of Low-Threat Context with Humanitarian Variables

Assessing Performance of the Full Model Using Total Dataset

The first model analyzed includes all variables described in the research design, as well as variables which interact the 1992-2001 context with each of the humanitarian variables. Table 1 below illustrates the results of logit analysis.28 Cases with missing variables were excluded from analysis, and this decreases the total number of observations from 602 to 490.

Table 1 reveals the following variables to be statistically significant determinants of U.S. military intervention: connection to a threatening actor or ideology, parity of government-rebel forces, location in the Western Hemisphere, location in the Western Hemisphere,

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28 The analysis originally included a variable measuring GDP for the target state, lagged by one year and converted to millions. This variable had to be dropped, however, because it had over 246 missing values, meaning that these observations would have to be dropped from analysis. In addition, the GDP variable was highly correlated with three other variables: log of target state’s total trade with the U.S. (correlation of +0.5873), target state’s population size (correlation of +0.7941), and target state’s polity score (+0.5065). When conducting the logit analysis with this variable included, the total number of observations was reduced to 337, and the pseudo R-squared was 0.3845. Excluding this variable from the logit analysis produced a similar pseudo R-squared value (0.326), while also keeping more observations (490). Furthermore, 51 cases in which GDP values were missing were conflicts which experienced U.S. military intervention. These would have been excluded from the analysis, clouding interpretation of the results.
target state’s number of borders, U.S. total trade with the target state, U.S.
economic assistance to the target state, and the constant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Logistic Regression of Full Model, Total Dataset</th>
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<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatening Actor or Ideology**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-2001 Timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide/Politicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-2001*Genocide/Politicide</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees from Target State</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-2001*Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Genocide/Politicide * Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parity of Government-Rebel Forces*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target State Number of Borders**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Target State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Population (millions, lagged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Total Trade with Target State*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Military Alliance with Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Economic Assistance to Target**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Approval Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US President's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01

Number of obs = 490
LR chi2(19) = 167.960
Wald chi2 (19) = 95.08; Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -173.190
LR Test (excluding interactions) chi2(4) = 4.960; Prob > chi2 = 0.291
LR Test (excluding threat) chi2(5) = 39.720; Prob > chi2 = 0.000
In terms of model performance, the Wald test indicates that the null hypothesis stating all coefficients are equal to zero may be rejected. The likelihood-ratio test indicates, however, that the model including the interactions of humanitarian variables with the 1992-2001 time period does not perform better than that which excludes these interactions. This is to be expected, given that these interaction variables were not found to be statistically significant in the full model. One may note, however, that there is a statistically significant distinction between the performance of the model including the variable depicting a conflict's connection to a threatening actor or ideology (threat) and that excluding this variable, with the former having more explanatory power. This suggests that a civil conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is a substantial determinant of U.S. military intervention.

Assessing Model Fit and Model’s Predicted Probabilities Using Total Dataset

According to Long and Freese (2007), “assessing fit involves both the analysis of the fit of individual observations and the evaluation of scalar measure of fit for the model as a whole” (104). I begin by examining two scalar measures of fit, addressing the fit of individual observations in a later section.

Scalar measure-of-fit analysis results are mixed in terms of support for the full model over the constrained model. Although the full model has a higher adjusted count R2 (.327) than the constrained model excluding the humanitarian interaction variables (.299), the BIC for the constrained model is smaller than that
of the full model, providing very strong support for the constrained model (difference of 19.814). When comparing the full model to a constrained model excluding the threat variable, however, the full model performs better, having a smaller BIC value and providing very strong support for the full model (difference of 8.747). The scalar-measure-of-fit analysis indicates that including humanitarian variables interacted with the 1992-2001 time period does not enhance our understanding of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, and the fact that these variables were not found to be statistically significant further supports this idea.\(^{29}\) On the other hand, the analysis does find support for the hypothesis that a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is a significant determinant of U.S. military intervention.

Comparing lowess graphs of the full and constrained (excluding humanitarian interaction variables) models, Figures 1 and 2 reveal that fit is almost identical, with both models performing better in predicting lower than higher probabilities of intervention.\(^{30}\) The predicted probabilities of a positive outcome for each observation using the full model range from .000 to .952, with a mean probability of .218. Summary statistics for the constrained model are nearly identical, indicating a range of probabilities from .001 to .963, and the

\(^{29}\) Given the possibility of collinearity between the genocide and refugee variables, separate logit analyses were run assessing the effects of each of these variables, interacted with the 1992-2001 time period, on U.S. military intervention. When excluding the refugee variable, the interaction between genocide and 1992-2001 was still found to be statistically insignificant, and the same was found for the refugee variable when excluding genocide.

\(^{30}\) Comparing the performance of the full model compared to one excluding the threat variable, the full model is a better fit.
same mean value of .218. Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate the predicted probabilities for the full model and constrained model, respectively.

Figure 1. Lowess Graph for Full Logit Model using **Total Dataset**

![Lowess Graph for Full Logit Model](image1)

Figure 2. Lowess Graph for Constrained Logit Model using **Total Dataset**

![Lowess Graph for Constrained Logit Model](image2)
Figure 3. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Full Logit Model using Total Dataset

Figure 4. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Constrained Logit Model using Total Dataset
These graphs indicate that nearly three-fourths (71%) of observations have predicted probabilities of less than .25. This is what one would expect, since theoretical explanations of the expected utility of U.S. military intervention would lead one to assume a lower probability of military intervention in general, particularly given state leaders’ perceptions regarding the potential high costs of intervention, as well as uncertainty that such a course of action will achieve its intended outcome (Regan 2000).

In order to identify potentially deviant cases, observations for which no U.S. military intervention was observed but which had the lowest predicted probability of non-intervention (usmilint=0) are listed in Table 2. Likewise, those cases in which U.S. military intervention was observed, but which had the lowest predicted probability of U.S. military intervention (usmil=1) are listed in Table 331. Three cases appearing as least likely instances of non-intervention reflect conflicts in which one of the parties adhered to communist ideology: India vs. Naxalites/CPI, Nicaragua vs. FSLN, and Sri Lanka vs. JVP. There are three potential explanations for the lack of U.S. intervention in the Indian case: the U.S. was embroiled in the Vietnam conflict, where government forces were much weaker; Indian government capabilities far surpassed those of the Naxalites, lessening the need for U.S. intervention; and U.S. attempts to avoid disrupting

31 The constrained model reflects the same deviant observations as the full model, with the following exceptions: Peru versus MRTA 3/14/1989 - 12/31/1993 (usmil=0, though low probability of usmil=0) and Angola versus UNITA 9/1/1992 - 12/31/1992 (usmil=1, though low probability of usmil=1). Also, unlike the full model, Venezuela versus Military faction and Senegal versus MFDC were not included in the list of least likely cases.
the balance of power between India and Pakistan and the rest of the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Non-Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of No U.S. Military Intervention, Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| India versus Naxalites/CPI (Marxist) 05/25/1967-07/19/1972 | The "Naxalites," a group affiliated with the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist (CPI M-L), fought on behalf of peasants and the lower castes and was responsible for most of the fighting against the government in the 1960s. "The Indian government responded to the insurgency with violent repression and by 1973 armed conflict had largely ceased."
| Nicaragua versus FSLN 02/02/1978-07/17/1979 | Increasing repression on the part of the Somoza regime, a "declining economy, and a drop in domestic and international support for Somoza increased the opportunity for opponents of the regime to mobilize." The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) led the violent form of opposition using guerrilla warfare. "By 1979, the regime was overwhelmed and Somoza and his supports fled the country. The FSLN took power in Managua and its leader, Daniel Ortega, became President of the country in elections in 1984 that were endorsed by the international community as 'free and fair.'"
| Sri Lanka versus PLOTE 07/01/1983-12/31/1988 | The majority Sinhalese population in Sri Lanka is Buddhist and speaks Sinhalese, and the sizable Tamil minority is Hindu and speaks Tamil. In the late 1970s, Tamil-majority areas of northern Sri Lanka began pushing for greater autonomy, culminating in an armed campaign for secession in 1983 that was carried out by several insurgent groups: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). "[B]y the late 1980s the other organizations had largely dissolved and LTTE had established supremacy as the main armed representative of the Tamil cause."
| Sri Lanka versus JVP 1/1/1989-11/13/1989 | Maoist party Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) reemerged as a Sinhalese nationalist organization opposed to the Sri Lankan government's attempt to negotiate with and offer of autonomy to the Tamils, the group began a campaign of violent riots, strikes, and attacks against government positions in 1988, which eventually developed into full-scale warfare in 1989. "The conflict continued through 1990, but by the end of that year the government had killed many of the leaders and arrested many alleged supporters of the JVP and the conflict had for the most part ended."
| Israel versus PNA 9/25/1996-ongoing | "Israel....has experienced a high level of both external and internal conflict in its independent history...Internally,... members of both the Palestinian and Israeli populations claim the territory currently comprising Israel and the occupied territories, and the main issue of contention has been how and if that land would be divided. Throughout the conflict, the main Palestinian organization battling the Israeli state has been Fatah, the militant wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Yassir Arafat...The Palestinian National Authority is the recognized government of the Palestinian Authority."

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.'s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"
Table 3. Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of U.S. Military Intervention, Total

Angola versus UNITA 09/1/1992-12/31/1992
Following independence from Portugal in 1975, a number of rebel groups fought for power within in Angola. The Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) "emerged as the strongest rebel group with the financial backing of the Soviet Union and military support from Cuba. The Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) quickly gained access to support from South Africa and from Zaire (who was heavily supported by the United States)." In the early-1980s, the intensity of the conflict increased as UNITA increased its military capacity. A peace agreement was signed in 1991, paving the way for national elections in 1992. MPLA defeated UNITA…but UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi refused to recognize the elections and the group returned to war...In the initial period after the election UNITA was able to gain control of much of the country," marking the end of this conflict-dyad in 1992. After recuperation of MPLA forces, fighting continued into 2002.

Iraq versus PUK 01/01/1976-12/31/1990
"The Kurds make up a majority of the population in northern Iraq. Since the 1960s, the government of Iraq has faced an insurgency led by Kurdish groups seeking greater autonomy...The two dominant groups throughout the insurgency have been the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These groups have battled each other, as well as the Iraqi government. From the 1960s to the late 1980s the conflict continued at a moderate level of intensity. The Kurdish insurgents did not represent a real challenge to the Iraqi government, however, and were unable to project power outside of Kurdistan. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, however, when an international coalition led by the United States launched an attack aimed at forcing Iraq to pull out of Kuwait, Kurdish leaders saw an opportunity to escalate the conflict against a weakened government. The attempt was unsuccessful, however, and the Kurdish uprising was brutally suppressed. The conflict between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish groups continued into the mid 1990s but has been dormant since 1996."

Iraq versus PUK 01/01/1991-12/15/1993
See above.

Senegal versus MFDC 09/01/1990-ongoing
The Casamance, the southern region of Senegal bordering Guinea-Bissau, is primarily composed of the Diola ethnic group "and is substantially ethnically different from the general Senegalese population." The Diola have been systematically politically excluded in Senegal in its independent history. In 1947, the Movement of the Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) was formed to push for independence for the region. Following violence on the part of state security forces after organized political protests, the MFDC began responding with force. Throughout the last twenty years a series of armed clashes have occurred between the MFDC and the state security forces. Of a long string of negotiations which produced several cease-fires, none has been implemented. "The conflict persists at a low-level equilibrium, with alternating violence and negotiations and no sign of an impending resolution."

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.'s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"
The case of Nicaragua reflects the human rights agenda of the Carter administration. Although the U.S. had supported the Somoza regime for years, this came to an end when Carter withdrew support due to human rights abuses committed by the Nicaraguan government. The lack of U.S. intervention in the case of Sri Lanka vs. JVP, as well as that of Sri Lanka vs. PLOTE, is most likely explained by a lack of strategic interest in Sri Lanka. A lack of U.S. military intervention in the case of Israel versus PNA may be explained by the fact that the U.S. is already a regular contributor of military aid to Israel, and that Israeli government capacity far surpasses that of Palestinian rebels.

The conflict between Angola and UNITA in 1992 reflects a case of least likely U.S. intervention, particularly given the end of the Cold War. A reasonable explanation for U.S. intervention may be precedent of intervention in years just prior. For the case of Iraq vs. PUK, the model may have predicted U.S. intervention given that Iraq is not considered a much of a threat just prior to its invasion of Kuwait. The case of Senegal versus MFDC is more intriguing. Since the 1980s, the U.S. has strengthened relations with Senegal in an effort to support its continued democratization, strengthen its military through training programs and aid, and ensure access to Dakar’s port and international airport (McCoy 1994). Although the U.S. and Senegal were not formal allies (according to ATOP) in the year prior to the onset of this civil conflict, their strong relations, and Senegal’s support during the Gulf War and in some peacekeeping operations, may indicate the reasoning behind U.S. military intervention.
Assessing the Significance of Individual Variables in the Full Model Using Total Dataset

Having examined the performance of the full model as a whole, I now assess the effects of each independent variable included in the model. First, logit results reveal which variables reached statistical significance and are worthy of more detailed analysis. Second, of those which were found to be statistically significant, I examine their individual predicted probabilities and marginal effects.

Recall from logit analysis presented in Table 1 that the following variables were found to be statistically significant: the presence of a threatening actor or ideology, parity of government-rebel forces, target state’s number of borders, log of U.S. total trade with the target state, U.S. economic assistance to the target state (lagged by one year prior to the start of conflict), and the constant. Note, also, that the coefficients of those variables included in interaction variables – those depicting genocide/politicide, refugees, and the 1992-2001 time period -- cannot be interpreted in an informative way, as they become meaningless with inclusion in the model of the interaction terms which contain these variables (Braumoeller 2004). First, I discuss findings pertaining to the variables which are of particular importance to the theoretical argument presented in this study: connections to a perceived security threat, and the interactions of the humanitarian variables with the 1992-2001 time period.
Threatening Actor or Ideology

Results of the full model reveal that a civil conflict which has connections to an actor or ideology perceived to be a grave threat to U.S. security interests is a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts (coefficient=1.821, SE=.340, p-value=0.000). Of the 490 conflicts ultimately included in the logit analysis, only 157 (32%) exhibit these characteristics, yet of all the variables included in this study, this variable is the strongest predictor of U.S. military intervention. The predicted probability of U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict which is connected to an existing security threat is 30.0 percent (CI: 0.1751, 0.4257). One may compare this to the 6.5 percent probability of intervention in a conflict which does not exhibit such characteristics.32

Recall from the theoretical argument that a heightened security context is determined by the presence of a perceived threat, and that civil conflicts with connections to this threatening actor and/or ideology are those most likely to experience U.S. military intervention. Thus far, the effect of a perceived heightened security context appears to be a strong determinant of U.S. military intervention, as illustrated by statistical analysis, providing support for hypothesis 1. The findings do not reveal support for the second hypothesis which expects humanitarian variables to be important in the 1992-2001 time period.

32 The predicted probability of the U.S. sending troops is .009 when a conflict has connections to a threatening actor or ideology, and the probability of the U.S. sending troops is .002 for conflicts which do not exhibit these characteristics. STATA output for this analysis is available upon request.
Interactions of the Humanitarian Variables with the 1992-2001 Timeframe

The theoretical section presents the expectation that U.S. military intervention for humanitarian purposes is more likely to take place during the 1992-2001 (deemed a less threatening security context) than during the Cold War and post-9/11 timeframes (more threatening security contexts). Logit analysis reveals, however, that neither the interaction of the genocide variable with the 1992-2001 timeframe, nor the interaction of the refugee variable with the 1992-2001 timeframe is found to be statistically significant (p-values equal .980 and .316, respectively). This implies that the null hypothesis indicating no relationship between these interaction variables and U.S. military intervention must be accepted and suggests two possible conclusions: when predicting U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts, humanitarian variables may matter little when accounting for other factors (regardless of context), or humanitarian variables may matter across all contexts (making interaction variables accounting for differences between contexts insignificant).

In order to assess the impact of humanitarian variables, one must examine results of the constrained model (excluding the interaction variables). The constrained model also excludes any variable depicting timeframe. Results of the constrained model indicate that conflicts characterized by higher refugees are
more likely to experience intervention (p-value=.035). The variable depicting genocide/politicide is not a statistically significant indicator of U.S. military intervention in the constrained model, however (p-value=.710).

Although one might expect the findings described above to be the result of a high correlation between the genocide and refugee variables, these variables share a weak correlation of 0.2722. Given the two possible conclusions one may deduce above, this grants some support to the finding that humanitarian variables matter and are not constrained by context, at least in terms of refugees, though not genocide/politicide. Observation of predicted probabilities (using the constrained model) reveals that a conflict characterized by a greater number of refugees is 11 percent more likely to experience U.S. military intervention. This value stays at 11 percent whether there are little under 3,000 refugees (25th percentile) or 185,000 refugees (75th percentile). These findings from the constrained model would lead one to believe that perhaps humanitarian factors are significant determinants U.S. military intervention in general, and are not constrained by security context. It is important to note, however, that most of the cases experiencing U.S. military intervention that also exhibit higher refugee flows (those with values of the 75th percentile or higher) contain a threatening actor or ideology. These conflicts are those which took place in Afghanistan and Angola during the Cold War, and Somalia and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era. When presented with these details, one is inclined to assume that the U.S. intervened militarily in these cases primarily to confront a threatening
actor/ideology rather than to protect refugees. However, it could also be that the U.S. is more likely to intervene in conflicts which exhibit both characteristics.

**Concern for Contagion**

A variable indicating the target state’s number of borders was used to determine if concern for contagion was a likely motivator for U.S. military intervention, with the expectation that the higher the number of borders, the greater the likelihood of intervention. Results indicate, however, that the higher the number of borders, the less likely a target state will experience U.S. military intervention (coefficient= -.369, SE=.074, p-value=0.000). The number of borders has a diminishing effect on the probability of U.S. intervention; for example, the probability of intervention in a target state with three borders is 19.1 percent, and 3 percent for one with nine borders.

This finding calls into question the argument that intervention is more likely in civil conflicts which have the potential for spreading. Some explanations for this unexpected finding point to the operationalization of the contagion effect, and differences that may arise when examining unilateral U.S. military intervention compared to that of multilateral intervention. First, perhaps a more precise measure of the effect of contagion (rather than the number of borders) should be used.

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33 When examining the sending of U.S. troops, the number of borders is also found to be a statistically significant deterrent to sending troops.

34 This diminishing effect is also observed when examining the probability the U.S. will send troops, with a .0050 probability of sending troops to conflicts with three borders, and a .0007 probability of sending troops to conflicts with nine borders.
considered, such as whether ethnicity of one group extends beyond the border to neighboring countries. A cursory expectation is that the majority of conflicts which spread tend to be those in which a party to the conflict in one state shares some identifying factor with a party in a neighboring state. Using such an indicator, one may find support for the contagion-containment argument.

Furthermore, number of borders may also be an indicator of a country with limited ocean access. One could reasonably argue that the U.S. is less likely to intervene in a target state which is land-locked, or with limited ocean access, since these states may be less strategically and economically important to the U.S. (excepting those with high oil reserves). Finally, it may be possible that the contagion effect is more pertinent to multilateral intervention than unilateral U.S. intervention, making the findings of this study less relevant for explaining the former.

_Log of Total U.S. Trade with Target State_

Logistical analysis indicates that there is a statistically significant, positive relationship between the level of U.S.-target state trade and U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict (coefficient=0.161, SE= 0.068, p-value=0.019). The predicted probability of U.S. military intervention given the logged total trade valued at 3.664 (25th percentile) is 0.085, while this probability increases to 0.110
and 0.151 for logged trade values of 5.464 (50th percentile) and 7.765 (75th percentile), respectively.\textsuperscript{35}

These probability statistics reveal the importance of trade for explaining U.S. military intervention, a notable finding considering there has been little empirical support for economic factors in analyzing determinants of intervention (save Fordham’s 2008 study). Recall that in her comprehensive study of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts during the Cold War, Yoon (1997) did not find a statistically significant relationship between trade (total of imports and exports between U.S. and target state) and U.S. military intervention, nor did she find a significant relationship between U.S. foreign direct investment in a target state and U.S. military intervention.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{U.S. Economic Assistance to the Target State}

U.S. economic assistance is a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict (coefficient=0.001, SE=0.000, p-value=0.000). The predicted probability of U.S. military intervention does not change substantially for values at the 25th through the 75th percentiles, as these probabilities are 0.090 and 0.107, respectively. The probability of U.S. military

\textsuperscript{35} The probability of sending U.S. troops is 0.002, 0.003, and 0.004 for each increasing percentile value of trade.

\textsuperscript{36} The following scholars do not account for trade in their examinations of use of force and/or intervention: Regan (2002), Howell and Pevehouse (2005), Findley and Teo (2006).
intervention does increase substantially when economic assistance is at the 95th percentile (0.210).37

Method II: Comparing Significance of Variables in High- and Low-Threat Contexts

Another method for assessing whether U.S. military intervention is distinguishable in heightened and less threatening security contexts is to compare the logistic analysis results for those contexts, noting which variables are statistically and substantively significant. This method is applied here by dividing the original dataset covering years 1960-2008 into three datasets, each reflecting a heightened or less threatening context: Cold War (1960-1991), Post-Cold War/Pre-9/11 (1992-2001), and Post-9/11 (2001-2008). Results of the logistic analysis for each of these contexts are presented in turn.

Cold War

Per Table 4 below, the following variables are found to be statistically significant: connection to a threatening actor or ideology, average number of refugees from the target state, polity score of the target state, logged total U.S. trade with the target state, and the constant.38 The Wald test indicates that the

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37 The probability of sending U.S. troops does not vary much between the 25th and 95th percentiles (0.002 and 0.006).

38 Because it predicted failure perfectly, the dummy variable depicting the parity of government-rebel forces had to be replaced with the original rebel-government capacity variable based on a 5-point scale (how rebel strength compared to that of government, with 5 indicating rebel capacity much greater than that of government).

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null hypothesis stating all coefficients are equal to zero may be rejected, and the likelihood-ratio test indicates that the model including the threatening actor/ideology variable performs better than that which excludes this variable. As with the first method analyzing all cases in the 1960-2008 timeframe, analyzing only cases taking place during the Cold War suggests that a civil conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is a substantial determinant of U.S. military intervention.

Table 4. Logistic Regression of Full Model, Using Cold War Dataset

| Variable                                | Coef.  | Std. Err. | z      | P>|z| | 95% Conf. Interval |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|-----------|--------|------|------------------|
| Threatening Actor or Ideology**         | 1.349  | 0.479     | 2.820  | 0.005| 0.410 - 2.287    |
| Genocide/Politicide                     | 0.403  | 0.497     | 0.810  | 0.417| -0.571 - 1.377   |
| Refugees from Target State*             | 0.000  | 0.000     | 1.930  | 0.053| 0.000 - 0.000    |
| Intensity of Conflict                   | -0.289 | 0.473     | 0.610  | 0.542| -1.216 - 0.639   |
| Relative Rebel Capacity                 | -0.408 | 0.284     | 1.440  | 0.151| -0.965 - 0.149   |
| Western Hemisphere                      | 1.012  | 0.739     | 1.370  | 0.171| -0.436 - 2.460   |
| Target State Number of Borders          | -0.073 | 0.112     | 0.650  | 0.516| -0.292 - 0.147   |
| Polity Score of Target State*           | -0.099 | 0.042     | 2.370  | 0.018| -0.182 - 0.017   |
| Target Population (millions, lagged)    | -0.009 | 0.008     | 1.140  | 0.253| -0.023 - 0.006   |
| US Total Trade with Target State**      | 0.483  | 0.175     | 2.760  | 0.006| 0.141 - 0.826    |
| US Military Alliance with Target        | 0.422  | 0.633     | 0.670  | 0.506| -0.820 - 1.663   |
| US Economic Assistance to Target        | 0.001  | 0.001     | 1.220  | 0.221| -0.001 - 0.003   |
| US Presidential Approval Rating         | -0.006 | 0.012     | 0.490  | 0.626| -0.030 - 0.018   |
| US President's Party                    | 0.094  | 0.497     | 0.190  | 0.850| -0.880 - 1.068   |
| Constant*                               | -3.388 | 1.680     | 2.020  | 0.044| -6.680 - 0.096   |

*p<.05; **p<.01

Number of obs = 193
LR chi2(14) = 75.570
Wald chi2 (14) = 41.92; prob > chi2 = 0.000
LR Test (excluding threat) chi2(1)=8.50; prob > chi2=0.0035

Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.326
Log likelihood = -75.164
Scalar measure-of-fit analysis for the Cold War dataset indicates positive support for the full model – that which contains the variable depicting whether a threatening actor or ideology is connected to the conflict -- over the constrained model – that which excludes the variable depicting connection to a perceived threat. The adjusted count R-squared for the full model is 0.373, while that for the constrained model is 0.333. Also, the BIC is smaller for the full model, indicating positive support for it over the constrained model.

Figures 5 and 6 are the lowess graphs for both models. Neither model appears to predict intervention as well as the model used which analyzed all years. This is notable, given that one would expect the full model containing the variable depicting a threatening actor or threatening ideology to have greater predictive power in the Cold War years, where this variable would account for the involvement of the USSR/USSR ally or communist ideology. As will be discussed when examining the effects of individual variables, the substantive strength of the variable accounting for whether a threatening actor or ideology is connected to a conflict surpasses that of all other variables. Thus, the poor fit of the lowess graph may be explained either by the exclusion of a pertinent variable in the model, or perhaps by the low number of observations (193, excluding GDP and rebel parity).
Figure 5. Lowess Graph for Full Logit Model using Cold War Dataset

Figure 6. Lowess Graph for Constrained Logit Model using Cold War Dataset
The predicted probabilities of a positive outcome for each observation using the full model range from .000 to .913, with a mean probability of .264. Summary statistics for the constrained model indicate a range of probabilities from .000 to .894, and a mean of .264. (Note the 0.046 difference between these values and the probabilities for the “Total” dataset: .218) Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the predicted probabilities for the full model and constrained model, respectively.

Figure 7. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Full Logit Model using “Cold War” Dataset
In order to identify potentially deviant cases, observations for which no U.S. military intervention was observed but which had the lowest predicted probability of non-intervention (usmil=0) are listed in Table 5 below, and those cases in which U.S. military intervention was observed, but which had the lowest predicted probability of U.S. military intervention (usmil=1) are listed in Table 6.
Table 5. Non-Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of No U.S. Military Intervention, Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
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| Angola versus FLEC        | 06/01/1991-12/31/1996 | "There has been an armed struggle between various factions of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) [pushing for independence of the Cabinda region] and the Angolan government, although this conflict has been greatly overshadowed by the conflict with UNITA. "Cabinda is a small area containing a majority of the oil reserves found in Angola [and is also geographically cut off from the rest of Angola by the Democratic Republic of Congo]…The conflict [became more intense in the 1990s], and a long series of negotiations…failed to produce a comprehensive peace agreement or serious cease-fire agreement…Despite the increased effort, the government has not, as of the end of 2003, been able to completely defeat the FLEC."

| Peru versus MIR           | 10/01/1965-01/15/1966 | "In 1965, the Peruvian government faced guerilla insurgencies from two separate leftist organizations: the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The organizations had mobilized peasants throughout the 1960s in protest of the high level of disparity of wealth in the country. The groups initiated conflict in rural areas of the country in July 1965. However, they were well overpowered by the government and the conflict had ended in the utter defeat of the rebels by the end of the year."

| Peru versus ELN           | 10/01/1965-01/15/1966 | See above.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

| Peru versus Sendero Luminoso | 08/22/1982-1/10/1994 | Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) began a terror campaign against Peruvian governmental officials in 1980, hoping this would lead to a military takeover of democratic institutions and subsequent civil war. The Peruvian military stayed within its traditional role, however, fighting the insurgency "largely within the constraints of a (mostly) democratic political system." Conflict continued into the 1980s until Alberto Fujimori seized power in 1992 in a military-backed coup [and] escalated the conflict against the guerillas, ultimately resulting in the capture of Abimael Guzmán an end to the fighting (with the exception of the break-away Sendero Rojo).

| Nicaragua versus FSLN     | 2/2/1978-7/17/1979  | See entry in Table 2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.'s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"
Table 6. Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of U.S. Military Intervention, Cold War

|--------------------------|------------------------|
| The Hutu make up approximately 85% of the population, and the Tutsi, about 14%. "The Tutsi have been dominant politically, socially, and economically since Burundi gained independence in 1962...Since 1990 the country has been embroiled in a large civil war between various Hutu groups and the Tutsi-dominated government. Conflict broke out in 1990 when armed Hutu groups organized in refugee camps in Tanzania and Rwanda began launching attacks into Burundi...As of the end of 2003, the power-sharing government was still in armed conflict with two groups: the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (PALIPEHUTU-FLN)."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cambodia, Vietnam versus FUNCINPEC/ANS</th>
<th>01/01/1982-12/31/1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In 1979, the Vietnamese/KUFNS (Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation) force seized Phnom Penh from the Khmer Rouge and a government led by the KUFNS was established. In the early 1980s three separate rebel groups formed an alliance to challenge the new government. One of these groups was the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). The FUNCINPEC/ANS and other groups continued to challenge the government throughout the 1980s without much success. [Following the end of the Cold War,] the international community increased the pressure on the parties to negotiate. A peace agreement was signed in 1991 and a new power-sharing government led by FUNCINPEC was formed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chad versus Islamic Legion</th>
<th>12/31/1988-12/31/1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| "The population of Chad...is divided between north and south, with the northern population primarily Muslim and Arabic and the southern population primarily Christian or Animist and African. Chad has been immersed in civil war for nearly its entire independent history. The conflict broke out primarily over historical animosities between the north and the south. The 1980s and 1990s saw several rebel groups challenging the government of FAN and its successor government, that led by the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), which seized power in 1990. This conflict has been incredibly complex, with a large number of rebel groups opposing subsequent Chadian governments, and the conflict experienced a high level of external intervention with France and Libya in particular supporting various factions of the conflict. The Islamic Legion was a military organization based primarily in Libya and did not represent a Chadian political opposition."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chad versus MPS</th>
<th>03/31/1990-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 12/02/1990 | See above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senegal versus MFDC</th>
<th>ongoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9/1/1990- | See entry in Table 3.

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.’s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"
With the exception of Nicaragua vs. FSLN, most of the non-intervention cases listed for conflicts taking place during the Cold War years are distinct from those which appeared as least likely cases of non-intervention when using the Total dataset. This is most likely due to the fact that in the analysis of the Cold War cases, only conflicts taking place during the Cold War are analyzed. Three cases involve Peru; a lack of U.S. involvement in these conflict-dyads may be best explained by greater Peruvian capabilities relative to insurgents, and involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam during two of the conflict-dyads. A lack of U.S. intervention in the case of Angola vs. FLEC may be a reflection of the fact that the U.S. had focused its attention in Angola on assisting UNITA, as well as the fact that the Cold War ended in the early years of this conflict-dyad.

Burundi vs. Palipehutu is one of the first cases listed in which the U.S. was not expected to intervene. The U.S. role in this conflict is unclear, after having consulted a number of sources. There does appear to have been a small increase in U.S. military aid to Burundi from 1990 to 1991 (from $0.4 to $0.7M). The reasoning behind this small increase in military aid is unclear, except as part of AFRICOM. Intervention in the Cambodian civil conflict most likely reflects Vietnamese support of the government, while U.S. military intervention on the side of the government in Chad most likely reflects a response to Libyan intervention on the side of insurgents.
Assessing the Significance of Individual Variables Using the Cold War Dataset

Logit results presented in the previous section indicated statistical significance for the following variables: whether the conflict was connected to a threatening actor or ideology, average refugees from the target state, target state polity score, logged total trade between the U.S. and target state, and the constant.\textsuperscript{39} A conflict-dyad exhibiting connections to a threatening actor or ideology has a predicted probability of U.S. military intervention of 0.27 (CI: 0.1151, 0.4198). This may be compared to the probability of U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict with no connection to a threatening actor or ideology (0.09, CI: 0.0179, 0.1552).\textsuperscript{40}

Although the average number of refugees from the target state was also found to be a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention, the probability of U.S. military intervention remains roughly the same despite significant increases in refugees. For example, a conflict taking place during the Cold War which has an average of 60 (25\textsuperscript{th} percentile) refugees over the course of the conflict has a 14.9\% probability of experiencing U.S. military intervention, while that which has an average of 1,299,609 refugees (95\textsuperscript{th} percentile) has a probability of 17.0\%. Note that the only cases which experience average refugee

\textsuperscript{39} These same variables are also found to be statistically significant when running ordinal logit analysis examining the likelihood of U.S. military intervention by type (0=no intervention; 1=military aid/advising; 2=troops).

\textsuperscript{40} The probability of U.S. intervention with troops is 0.015 in cases with connections to a threatening actor or ideology, and .004 in cases with no such connections.
flows at the 95th percentile value or higher are those taking place in Afghanistan and Ethiopia.  

Another finding is that during the Cold War, the U.S. was more likely to intervene militarily in target states with lower polity scores. The probability of U.S. military intervention in the most autocratic states in the dataset (polity score = -9) is 0.28, and in the most democratic states (polity = 10), 0.05. The probabilities become progressively smaller with each unit increase in polity score, but the greatest differences are among the autocratic regimes, with the marginal effects being smaller between values of democratic regimes. This implies that during the Cold War the U.S. was more likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts which presented an opportunity for regime change from autocracy to democracy. It is important to note, however, that most cases included in the analysis are autocracies. Likewise, most cases included in the analysis that were autocratic and experienced U.S. military intervention were also characterized by having a connection to a threatening actor or ideology (79%). An interesting finding concerns that regarding trade: the higher the logged total trade between the U.S. and the target state, the greater the likelihood of U.S. military intervention. This contradicts findings of Yoon (1997) who found no

41 During the Cold War, the probability of the U.S. sending troops to a conflict-dyad with average refugee flows at the 25th percentile value is 0.007, while the probability is 0.009 for a conflict-dyad with average refugee flows at the 95th percentile value.

42 These findings following a similar pattern for when the U.S. sends troops, indicating that the U.S. is more likely to send troops into civil conflicts with autocratic regimes (0.014 for those with a polity score of -9) than democratic regimes (0.004 and 0.003 for those with polity scores of 6 and 10, respectively). That is, the probability of sending U.S. troops becomes progressively smaller with each unit increase in polity score.
statistically significant relationship between trade and U.S. military intervention when examining conflicts taking place during the Cold War. Consider that the probability of U.S. military intervention in a target state with which the U.S. has a total logged trade value of 3.71 (25th percentile) is 0.09, while the probability is 0.26 for a logged trade value of 6.42 (75th percentile) and 0.51 for a trade value of 8.61 (95th percentile).43

Summary of Cold War Findings

Overall, the findings of the logit analysis of conflicts taking place during the Cold War years reflect support for hypothesis 1. First, a civil conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is a strong determinant for explaining U.S. military intervention, and this is to be expected given the findings of previous scholars. (This is despite the fact that numerous cases were thrown out due to missing values for some of the variables.) One unexpected finding is that average refugee flows is a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention during the Cold War. It is important to note, however, that of the 30 cases with average refugee flows greater than the 50th percentile value which experienced U.S. military intervention, all but five were characterized as having a connection to a threatening actor or ideology. The next section examines the findings of analysis of conflicts taking place during the period following the end of

43 This same relationship holds for when the U.S. is most likely to send troops, with probabilities of 0.004, 0.008, and 0.014 for trade values at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively.
the Cold War and prior to 9/11, when humanitarian variables are expected to be more important than they were during the Cold War.

1992-2001 Period

It was argued that the 1992-2001 period should be considered a less threatening security context than that of the Cold War and post-9/11 contexts. Given that some state actors were specifically mentioned in State of the Union Addresses during this time period – Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea – and that China is considered to be a rival, civil conflicts in which one of these states was a party were coded as having connections to a threatening actor or ideology (i.e., threat=1). It was expected that during this less threatening context, humanitarian motivations for intervention -- genocide/politicide and average annual refugees reported abroad – should be more influential during this context than during the Cold War and post-9/11 contexts.

Table 7 below indicates that the following variables are statistically significant determinants of U.S. military intervention during the 1992-2001 period: whether the civil conflict had connections to a threatening actor or ideology, the target state’s number of borders, and U.S. economic assistance to the target state (lagged). Most importantly, the two humanitarian variables are not found to be statistically significant indicators of U.S. military intervention.\footnote{Although the U.S. did send troops to the former Yugoslavia as part of a NATO operation in the years between 1998-1999, there were no \textit{unilateral} U.S. interventions in civil conflicts in which the U.S. sent troops, according to Cunningham et al.}
Table 7. Logistic Regression of Full Model, Using 1992-2001 Dataset

| Variable                              | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | 95% Conf. Interval |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|-----|-------------------|
| Threatening Actor or Ideology**       | 2.199 | 0.821     | 2.680 | 0.007 | 0.589 - 3.808     |
| Genocide/Politicide                   | 0.005 | 0.918     | 0.010 | 0.996 | -1.794 - 1.804    |
| Refugees from Target State            | 0.000 | 0.000     | -0.090| 0.932 | -0.001 - 0.001    |
| Intensity of Conflict                 | -0.570| 0.698     | -0.820| 0.414 | -1.938 - 0.799    |
| Rebel-Government Parity              | -0.821| 1.168     | -0.700| 0.482 | -3.111 - 1.469    |
| Western Hemisphere                   | 1.047 | 1.123     | 0.930 | 0.351 | -1.153 - 3.247    |
| Target State Number of Borders**     | -0.717| 0.213     | -3.360| 0.001 | -1.135 - 0.299    |
| Polity Score of Target State         | -0.086| 0.070     | -1.230| 0.218 | -0.223 - 0.051    |
| Target Population (millions, lagged) | -0.002| 0.002     | -0.870| 0.384 | -0.007 - 0.003    |
| US Total Trade with Target State     | 0.307 | 0.162     | 1.890 | 0.059 | -0.011 - 0.625    |
| US Military Alliance with Target     | 0.763 | 0.904     | 0.840 | 0.398 | -1.008 - 2.535    |
| US Economic Assistance to Target**   | 0.003 | 0.001     | 2.640 | 0.008 | 0.001 - 0.005     |
| US Presidential Approval Rating      | 0.035 | 0.029     | 1.190 | 0.234 | -0.022 - 0.092    |
| US President's Party                 | 1.217 | 0.702     | 1.730 | 0.083 | -0.159 - 2.592    |
| Constant                              | -3.164| 2.247     | -1.410| 0.159 | -7.567 - 1.240    |

*p<.05; **p<.01

Number of obs = 170
LR chi2(14) = 66.5
Log likelihood = -42.808
Wald chi2 (14) = 29.93; prob > chi2 = 0.008
Pseudo R2 = 0.437
LR Test (excluding threat) chi2(1)=7.16; prob > chi2=0.007

These findings correspond to those found when analyzing the Total dataset using interaction variables to account for the importance of humanitarian variables in the 1992-2001 period. As with those findings, the null hypothesis stating no relationship between this period and intervention for humanitarian purposes must be accepted. If any context, the 1992-2001 period is one in which humanitarian factors would seem to play a greater role in the decision to
intervene, given no other pressing security threat. However, the findings indicate that humanitarian factors do not play a significant role in the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in a civil conflict, at least when controlling for other factors.

An assessment of scalar fit of the full and constrained models, the latter of which excludes the variable indicating whether a civil conflict has connections to a threatening actor or ideology, indicates positive support for the full model. The adjusted count R-squared value for the full model is 0.357, while that for the constrained model is 0.321. The BIC is also smaller for the saved model when compared to the constrained model (with values of -710.433 and -708.406, respectively). Furthermore, the lowess graphs for both models (Figures 9 and 10) indicate that the full model is a better fit than the constrained model.

Figure 9. Lowess Graph for Full Logit Model using Rival-Free Dataset
The mean predicted probability of a positive outcome for each observation is identical for both models: 0.164. One may observe that this value is lower than the probabilities for the “Total” and Cold War datasets: .218 and .264, respectively, indicating a lower probability of unilateral U.S. military intervention during the 1992-2001 time period than during the Cold War. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the predicted probabilities for the full model and constrained models.
Figure 11. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Full Logit Model using 1992-2001 Dataset

Figure 12. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Constrained Logit Model using 1992-2001 Dataset
In order to identify potentially deviant cases, least likely cases of U.S. military intervention and non-intervention for the 1992-2001 time period are listed in Tables 8 and 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8. Non-Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of No Intervention, 1992-2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bangladesh versus JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chittagong Hill Tribes, a minority ethnic group, resides largely in the Chittagong Hill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tracts region of southeastern Bangladesh. In the 1970s, government encouragement of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migration into the area enraged Chittagong Hill Tribes members. As a result, the Jana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samhati Samiti (JSS) was formed in 1972, and its armed counterpart, the Shanti Bahini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SB), in 1975, began waging guerrilla warfare to pressure for greater autonomy. Low-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intensity conflict continued into the 1980s until in 1992, when a new democratic government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offered a policy of negotiating with the rebels. This was followed by a ceasefire on the part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of JSS/SB. Negotiations were finally able to produce a comprehensive peace agreement in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel versus PNA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/25/1996-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sri Lanka versus LTTE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1/1991-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Venezuela versus Military Faction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1992, a series of strikes and violent protests took place in Venezuela following</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation of economic austerity policies by President Carlos Andrés Pérez. Two failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military coups were attempted by a faction of the military led by Hugo Chávez Frías (the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second was attempted by his supporters while he was in prison).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yemen versus Democratic Republic of Yemen</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;North and South Yemen, two separate states during the colonial and Cold War period,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>merged in 1990 to form one state of Yemen. North and South Yemen maintained a separate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>militaries even after the merger, and &quot;in late 1993 a political crisis emerged over a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispute between the President of Yemen, who was from the north, and the Vice President, who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was from the south. The conflict escalated through political assassinations until in April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 the two armies clashed with each other. The southern Yemenese politicians seceded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and declared an independent Democratic Republic of Yemen in what had been South Yemen,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>but the southern army was soundly defeated by the north in July 1994.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.’s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"
For the cases of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, a lack of U.S. military intervention most likely reflects little strategic interest in these countries. The U.S. most likely did not intervene in Venezuela given the short duration of the military coups, that they were unsuccessful at the time, and the Venezuelan government did not appear to have requested U.S. involvement. No U.S. intervention in the Yemeni conflict may have been a result of the lack of a need, as the north’s capacity appeared to strongly overpower that of the south. As indicated, all the cases listed in Table 9 were previously discussed.

Assessing the Significance of Individual Variables in the Full Model Using 1992-2001 Dataset

Logit analysis of cases taking place during the 1992-2001 period indicates that three variables are statistically significant determinants of U.S. military intervention in the 1992-2001 period: whether the civil conflict had connections to a threatening actor or ideology, the target state’s number of borders, and U.S. economic assistance to the target state (lagged). A conflict that has connections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9. Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of Intervention, 1992-2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola versus UNITA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi versus Palipehutu-FNL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq versus PUK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal versus MFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to a threatening actor or ideology has a 0.29 probability of experiencing U.S.
military intervention (CI: 0.0192, 0.5577). This may be compared to the
probability of U.S. military intervention for a conflict which does not have
connections to a threat: 0.04 (CI: =0.0011, 0.0850). The cases driving this
finding include those which took place in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Turkey, and Nepal.

In Egypt’s civil conflicts with al Jihad and Tala-i-al Fath, Iran provided
support to rebel forces, while the U.S. provided military aid and advising to Egypt.
In four civil conflicts involving Israel, the U.S. provided military aid and advising to
Israel, while Iran and Syria (among others) provided support to rebel forces.
Likewise, U.S. military aid and advising to Turkey corresponded with support
from Iran and Syria for rebel forces. The case of Nepal reflects the only civil
conflict in which China intervened, yet the U.S. and China intervened on the
same side, supporting the monarchy which was being challenged by a
communist insurgency.

These findings support the idea that the U.S. is more likely to intervene in
a civil conflict which has connections to a threatening actor or ideology, however,
it does not support the hypothesis that humanitarian intervention was more likely
appears to have been driven by security factors just as it was during the Cold
War, though the focus shifted to different threats. Perhaps humanitarian motives
were more obvious in U.S. participation in multilateral interventions, though this
form of intervention is not examined in this study.
During the 1992-2001 period, one may also observe that U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict was less likely the greater the number of borders of the target state. There is a noticeable decrease in the probability of U.S. military intervention given an increasing number of borders: for 3 borders the probability is 0.21 (CI: 0.0799, 0.3422); for 5 borders (the mean), it is 0.06 (CI: 0.0096, 0.1103), and for 6 it is 0.030 (CI: -0.0046, 0.0650). These findings correspond to those found using the Total dataset, and the explanation provided for that analysis related to either: (a) the possibility that a greater number of borders signals potential spread and, thus, a long, intense, costly conflict; or (b) the possibility that states with a greater number of borders indicate those with minimal access to waterways, thus making them less strategically important to the U.S.

U.S. economic assistance to the target state in the year prior to the start of conflict is found to be a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention during the 1992-2001 period. Between economic assistance values of $0.7M and $116.9M (25th and 75th percentile values), the probability of U.S. military intervention ranges from 0.04 to 0.06. There is a substantial increase in the probability of U.S. military intervention when this value is $618.3M (95th percentile value) to 0.21.
Summary of 1992-2001 Findings

Despite the expectation that 1992-2001 could be considered a period of minimized security threat, findings reveal that, as during the Cold War, a civil conflict's connection to a threatening actor or ideology is the primary explanation of U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts during this period. In addition, there is no support for humanitarian variables when examining U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts taking place during this time period. These findings imply that, when examining unilateral U.S. military intervention behavior (as opposed to rhetoric), humanitarian variables are of little importance when controlling for other factors. There is, however, another possible explanation. This study only examines U.S. unilateral intervention and does not take into account participation in multilateral efforts. Where the U.S. participates in a multilateral effort, it is unlikely that it will simultaneously intervene unilaterally in the same civil conflict. Likewise, participation in a multilateral effort could lower the probability of other unilateral interventions more broadly, given limited resources. Finally, multilateral efforts may be more appropriate for intervening in humanitarian crises, so as to silence any claims of ulterior motives for U.S. intervention in a civil conflict. These alternative explanations are worthy of further examination in a future study examining U.S. participation in multilateral intervention efforts.

The next section presents the results of logit analysis of civil conflicts taking place in the post-9/11 time period. Expectations are that the threat posed
by Al Qaeda and fundamentalist Islam are of primary importance for explaining
U.S. military intervention in civil conflicts. Given the attention to these threats,
the U.S. is less likely to intervene militarily in civil conflicts for humanitarian
reasons alone.

Post-9/11 Period

Logistical analysis of civil conflicts taking place in the post-9/11 timeframe
reveals the following statistically significant determinants of U.S. military
intervention: whether the conflict had connections with a threatening actor or
ideology, and the target state’s number of borders (see Table 10 below).45
These findings appear to support both hypotheses 1 and 2. First, as expected, a
civil conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology increases its
likelihood of U.S. military intervention, as expected in hypothesis 1. Second,
humanitarian variables are not expected to be a significant to determine of U.S.
military intervention in a heightened security context such as the post-9/11
period.

45 The variable depicting party of the U.S. president had to be dropped due to lack of variability
(the years between 2001 and 2008 were characterized by a Republican administration only).
Also, the dummy variable measuring parity between rebel and government forces had to be
replaced with one using a scale of relative rebel-government forces due to a lack of variability
(only three positive cases of parity). Finally, when conducting ordinal logit analysis of U.S. military
intervention, distinguishing between troops and other forms of military intervention, two additional
variables are found to be statistically significant determinants of U.S. military intervention. These
include: whether the conflict takes place in the Western Hemisphere, and U.S. economic
assistance to the target state.
Table 10. Logistic Regression of Full Model, Using Post-9/11 Dataset

| Variable                                      | Coef.   | Std. Err. | z      | P>|z|   | 95% Conf. Interval |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------|-----------|--------|------|-----------------|
| Threatening Actor or Ideology*                | 4.603   | 2.253     | 2.040  | 0.041| 0.188           |
| Genocide/Politicide                           | 0.705   | 3.225     | 0.220  | 0.827| -5.616          |
| Refugees from Target State                    | 0.008   | 0.007     | 1.090  | 0.274| -0.006          |
| Intensity of Conflict                         | -1.396  | 1.435     | -0.970 | 0.331| -4.207          |
| Relative Rebel-Government Capacity            | 0.369   | 1.218     | 0.300  | 0.762| -2.019          |
| Western Hemisphere                            | 3.631   | 3.241     | 1.120  | 0.263| -2.721          |
| Target State Number of Borders*               | -1.048  | 0.469     | -2.230 | 0.026| -1.968          |
| Polity Score of Target State                  | 0.277   | 0.255     | 1.090  | 0.278| -0.223          |
| Target Population (millions, lagged)          | 0.000   | 0.005     | 0.010  | 0.990| -0.010          |
| US Total Trade with Target State              | -0.232  | 0.384     | -0.600 | 0.546| -0.986          |
| US Military Alliance with Target              | 1.117   | 1.747     | 0.640  | 0.522| -2.307          |
| US Economic Assistance to Target              | 0.002   | 0.002     | 1.060  | 0.291| -0.002          |
| US Presidential Approval Rating               | 0.025   | 0.053     | 0.470  | 0.638| -0.079          |
| Constant*                                     | -0.319  | 7.210     | -0.040 | 0.965| 14.451          |

Number of obs = 83                            Prob > chi2 = 0.000
LR chi2(12) = 66.22                            Log likelihood = -13.835
Wald chi2(13) = 12.19; Prob > chi2 = 0.5121    Pseudo R2 = 0.705
LR chi2(1) = 7.33; Prob > chi2 = 0.0068

Although results of the Wald test reveal that the null hypothesis (all coefficients are equal to 0) cannot be rejected, likelihood-ratio analysis indicates that the full model performs better than the constrained model which excludes the variable depicting a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology. These disparate assessments of model performance may be the result of the small number of observations in the post-9/11 dataset (83 civil-conflict dyads), as will be discussed following the results of other analyses.

Assessment of the scalar measure of fit provides positive support for the
full model, as indicated by the smaller BIC value. As with previous analysis, Figures 13 and 14 provide a visual depiction of the scalar measure of fit and, contrary to expectations, reveal that the constrained model appears to be a better fit than the full model.

Figure 13. Lowess Graph for Full Logit Model using Post-9/11 Dataset

Figure 14. Lowess Graph for Constrained Logit Model using Post-9/11 Dataset
This finding is puzzling, given the statistical significance of the variable depicting a conflict’s connection to a threat. This may be a result of the low number of observations or biased estimation, but it could also be due to the very low probability of U.S. military intervention in general during this period (see Figures 15 and 16).

Figure 15. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Full Logit Model using Post-9/11 Dataset

Figure 16. Predicted Probability of U.S. Military Intervention for Constrained Logit Model using Post-9/11 Dataset
Given the mixed results described above, the fit of both the full and constrained models is unclear. Tables 11 and 12 below list the least likely cases which may have affected the results of the assessments of fit. Each of these cases is discussed below.

Table 11. Non-intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of Non-intervention, Post-9/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea vs. EIJM-AS</td>
<td>01/01/2003-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) aims to overthrow the existing Eritrean government and establish an Islamic government in Eritrea. It is believed to be supported by Sudan. This group engages primarily in terrorist tactics against the Eritrean government and foreigners, and it is also believed to have links to Al Qaida. (Source: Shinn, David H. 2004 &quot;Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn&quot; Foreign Service Journal. September: 36-42.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel vs. PNA</td>
<td>9/25/1996-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia vs. LURD</td>
<td>01/01/2000-08/18/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This conflict stems from Charles Taylor's original challenge of President Samuel Doe's regime, which resulted in years of fighting, the capture and killing of Doe, and the election of Taylor to the presidency in 1997. The election did not end the fighting, however. Supporters of former President Doe continued to violently oppose Taylor’s presidency as part of ULIMO-J. “In the subsequent years, additional insurgent groups arose to challenge Taylor’s hold on power, the most prominent of which was Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a group led by Liberian dissidents based in Guinea. The conflict continued at a low level of intensity through 2003 when the attacks against Taylor’s government increased. In 2003, LURD and other rebel groups launched attacks into Monrovia, and negotiations in June 2003 in Accra, Ghana, produced a peace agreement. Taylor agreed to leave Liberia and go into exile, and the international community agreed to send peacekeepers in 2004.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia vs. SRRC</td>
<td>5/12/2001-12/31/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 2001, a set of opposition groups formed a new rebel group, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), to challenge the new Transitional National Government (TNG). Low-level fighting took place until October 27, 2002, when a cease-fire was signed between the TNG and the opposition groups. Although as of 2003 the conflict was not entirely resolved, “there is not enough fighting to label it a civil war either.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka vs. LTTE</td>
<td>04/01/1991-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See entry in Table 2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.'s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"
Table 12. Intervention Cases with Lowest Probability of Intervention, Post-9/11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi vs. Palipehutu-FNL</td>
<td>1/1/1997-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines vs. MNLF (faction)</td>
<td>11/19/2001-01/31/2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal vs. MFDC</td>
<td>9/1/1990-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia vs. ARS/UIC</td>
<td>10/24/2006-ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey vs. PKK/Kadek</td>
<td>08/15/1984-ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See entry in Table 6.

Philippines vs. MNLF (faction)
The Moros in the Mindinao region of the Philippines are overwhelmingly Muslim, unlike most of the Filipino population. The Mindinao region is the poorest in the Philippines and has been the site of both a communist insurgency and a secessionist movement. Formed in 1968 following discrimination and repression, the Mindinao National Liberation Front (MNLF) launched an armed struggle for secession in 1972. After years of fighting and negotiation attempts, in 1996, an agreement was signed that incorporated the MNLF leadership into the government of an autonomous Mindinao region. In 2001, however, a faction of the MNLF rejected the agreements and resumed the armed struggle. Conflict between the government and those groups is still ongoing. In recent years, the Filipino government “has gained from the United States-led War on Terror because the U.S. army has begun conducting joint exercises with the Filipino army, particularly against Abu Sayyaf.”

Source: Unless otherwise indicated, conflict summaries are quoted and paraphrased from Cunningham et al.'s "Uppsala Conflict Data Expansion, Non-state Actor Information, Codebook"

One would expect U.S. military intervention in Eritrea, given that one of the parties to the conflict adhered to fundamentalist Islam, and was even believed to be linked to Al Qaeda. However, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad
Movement (EIJM) does not appear to be strong, having engaged in sporadic terrorist activities. The lack of U.S. military intervention in Somalia vs. SRCC may be explained by the very low intensity of this conflict. Most importantly, during both these conflicts, the U.S. has been heavily involved in Afghanistan, and in Iraq during the Eritrean conflict. The Liberian case most likely appears on the list of least probable non-interventions due to the number of refugees the conflict generated. As with some other conflicts, there may have been little perceived utility in intervening in Liberia, and after one and one-half years of fighting, the U.S. experienced the 9/11 attacks, perhaps making this conflict even less of a priority. U.S. military intervention in the Philippines vs. MNLF and the Somalia vs. ARS/UIC cases may be explained by the fact that both insurgent groups are made of Muslim members. Intervention in Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds reflects the strategic importance of Turkey to the U.S., particularly after the invasion of Iraq.

The next section analyzes the effect of specific individual variables more closely – whether or not the conflict is connected to a threatening actor or ideology, and the target state’s number of borders, as these are the variables found to be statistically significant indicators of U.S. military intervention.

*Assessing the Significance of Individual Variables in the Full Model Using Post-9/11 Dataset*

As in the analysis of the Total and Cold War datasets, a civil conflict’s connection to a threat is a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military
intervention in civil conflicts in the post-9/11 timeframe (see Table 10). This not only demonstrates the importance of a heightened security context for explaining third-party intervention in civil conflicts, but also demonstrates this context may be driven by the perception of the threat posed by both state and non-state actors. A conflict-dyad which exhibits ties to a threat has a probability of 0.546 (CI: -0.2272, 1.3199) of experiencing U.S. military intervention. This may be compared to the probability of U.S. military intervention given a conflict’s lack of connection to a threat: 0.0119 (CI: -0.0274, 0.0513).46

The impact of the number of borders is similar to that found in other analyses: the higher the number of borders, the lower the likelihood of U.S. military intervention. The probability of U.S. military intervention decreases with each additional border; the greatest difference occurs between the effects of a target state having four borders versus five, with 0.1241 and 0.0473 probabilities of experiencing U.S. military intervention, respectively.47 In analysis of other datasets, this was explained by the possibility that states with a high number of borders may signal the potential for increased involvement by border states (potentially indicating a prolonged, costly war) or the potential lack of strategic importance of the state given limited ocean access (although the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq make such an argument questionable).

46 The probability of sending U.S. troops to a conflict with a connection to a threatening actor or ideology is 0.014, while the probability of sending U.S. troops to a civil conflict without such a connection is 0.0004.

47 When examining when the U.S. sends troops to a civil conflict, the greatest difference between the probability of sending troops is also observed between four and five borders (with probabilities of 0.003 and 0.001).
Summary of Post-9/11 Findings

Although the performance of the model as a whole for the 9/11 dataset is unclear, logit analysis of individual variables indicates support for hypotheses 1 and 2. As with the Total, and Cold War datasets, a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is both statistically and substantively significant, while humanitarian variables are not. These results provide support for both the inclusion of non-state actors within the concept of who is perceived as a threat, as well as inclusion of a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology in models predicting U.S. military intervention.

Comparing Results Using Different Methods

Table 13 lists the variables contained in each dataset and indicates which were found to be statistically significant. This table reveals that the variable depicting a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is a statistically significant indicator of U.S. military intervention in all applicable datasets. Interestingly, the only humanitarian variable ever found to be statistically significant is the average number of refugees, and this was only found significant for those conflicts taking place during the Cold War. As was previously explained, of the thirty cases with the highest average refugees taking place during the Cold War, all but five were also characterized by having a connection to a threatening actor or ideology. These findings validate the use of both methods, given that they produce similar results, and also demonstrate strong
support for hypothesis 1. There is no support for hypothesis 2, however, which states that humanitarian intervention is more likely in a less threatening security context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13. Comparison of Statistically Significant Variables by Dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatening Actor or Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-2001 Timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide/Politicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-2001*Genocide/Politicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees from Target State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-2001*Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genocide/Politicide * Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parity of Government-Rebel Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target State Number of Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score of Target State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Population (millions, lagged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Total Trade with Target State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Military Alliance with Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Economic Assistance to Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Presidential Approval Rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US President's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next chapter discusses how the findings of this study contribute to our understanding of U.S. unilateral military intervention, the formation of security threats and their potential impact on various foreign policy behaviors, the relationship between economic factors and military intervention, as well as the
effect of humanitarian factors on U.S. unilateral military intervention. Ideas for future studies are provided, as well as specific policy prescriptions regarding the use of unilateral military intervention in civil conflict.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The narrow purpose of this study has been to account for the effects of both security context and humanitarian factors on U.S. military intervention. Expectations regarding the relationship between these variables reflected the broader theoretical argument proposed which contends that, generally, when considering the use of unilateral U.S. military resources, security factors trump humanitarian factors.

As was argued, however, one would expect that when security concerns are substantially mitigated, there is an opportunity for humanitarian factors to become more important. This does not imply that humanitarian issues automatically come to the forefront, only that the mitigation of security factors allows such an opportunity. Given that intervention is costly, there is still the possibility military intervention will not take place, even when no grave security threats loom on the horizon.

Findings in the previous chapter indicate support for the hypothesis stipulating that a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology is both a statistically significant and substantive determinant of U.S. military intervention. They also reveal, however, that humanitarian factors do not manifest as statistically significant determinants of U.S. military intervention, except when examining the effects of refugees during the Cold War. As was explained,
however, nearly all Cold War conflicts with the highest number of refugees are also connected to a threatening actor or ideology (25 out of 30). The more important finding is that humanitarian variables were expected to be of greater importance during the 1992-2001 period, when the U.S. appeared to experience a less threatening security environment. Instead, the strongest determinant of U.S. military intervention was a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor, as was the case for conflicts taking place in the Cold War and post-9/11 security contexts. This finding calls into question the expectation that the U.S. would devote more of its military resources toward humanitarian goals following the end of the Cold War. Instead of shifting attention from security to humanitarian concerns, U.S. leaders appeared to shift military resources toward new (although less grave) security threats.

There is mixed support for the importance of economic factors, as trade is statistically significant when examining the Total and Cold War datasets only, and U.S. economic assistance is statistically significant for the Total and 1992-2001 datasets only. This may be due to the selection effect of examining only countries embroiled in conflict; perhaps if other countries with substantial economic ties to the U.S. were experiencing conflict, the U.S. would be inclined to intervene. Furthermore, U.S. likelihood of intervention in trading partners’ conflicts may be partially determined by the importance of the commodity traded. This is addressed again later when discussing potential future studies.
One of the most intriguing findings concerns that related to the target state’s number of borders: the higher the number of borders, the less likely the U.S. is to intervene militarily. As discussed, this may be related to the perception that a country with many neighbors signals the potential for many interveners, and thus a long, intractable war. Another explanation pertained to the potential lack of strategic importance of a country with limited ocean access. More importantly, this finding indicates that U.S. unilateral military intervention is not used for containing conflicts, if one assumes that the number of borders suffices as a measure of the potential for contagion. Perhaps multilateral intervention is deemed the more appropriate tool for containing conflict, as contagion is an international rather than national security interest.

Given the findings described above, the next few sections describe specific contributions this study makes toward our understanding of U.S. unilateral military intervention, the perception of security threats in the U.S., the dynamic nature of security threats, the relationship between economic factors and unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts, and humanitarian motives of military intervention. These are followed by indications of how this study may be used as the basis for future studies pertaining to these phenomena.

Contribution toward Understanding U.S. Unilateral Military Intervention

Unilateral military intervention is one foreign policy tool which leaders may use to influence the outcome of a conflict, and perhaps promote ideals beyond
strategic interests. However, in the case of the U.S., it appears that unilateral military intervention is primarily used to protect strategic interests, despite the fact that U.S. military capacity far surpasses that of other major powers. That said, perhaps different means are utilized for different purposes, and multilateral interventions are considered by U.S. leaders as more appropriate for humanitarian crises. One would need to examine the unilateral intervention behavior of other major powers to determine if the U.S. is unique in this regard, or if this behavior – reserving unilateral intervention for national security interests and multilateral intervention for humanitarian crises -- may be more generalized.

More importantly, the findings contradict those of others, such as Mullenbach and Matthews (2008), who find humanitarian factors to be a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention following the end of the Cold War. This discrepancy is most likely due to the fact that they do not account for the effects a perceived security threat may have on U.S. unilateral military intervention. The findings also contradict the expectation that the U.S. would serve as “global cop” in a less threatening security environment, as the U.S. appears to refrain from becoming unilaterally involved in other conflicts unless the conflict is connected to a threatening actor or ideology. The cop analogy implies unbiased enforcement of international law pertaining to crimes against humanity; the results of this study indicate that such an analogy is inappropriate.
Contributions toward Understanding the Perception of Security Threats

The primary theoretical argument presented in this study contained the assumption that security threats could be mitigated to the point of allowing the use of military resources as tools for minimizing humanitarian crises abroad. However, it appears that even in a substantially mitigated security environment, the U.S. continued to use unilateral military resources primarily for U.S. security interests. This implies that U.S. leadership attempts to identify potential security threats and prevent their development into larger threats, rather than redirecting military resources toward addressing humanitarian concerns. One may consider that after 9/11, for example, even a non-state actor such as Al Qaeda was able to garner enough attention for the U.S. to allocate trillions of dollars toward mitigating the threat posed by this organization and fundamentalist Islam more generally. Knowing that some within the U.S. leadership will consistently be on the look-out for potential threats to address, one may expect that it is very unlikely unilateral U.S. military intervention in a civil conflict will be used in the future for purely humanitarian purposes.

Contributions to Understanding National Security as a Dynamic Concept

One of the primary theoretical arguments presented in this study emphasized the dynamic nature of security interests, supporting the notion that both the substance and prioritization of security concerns may change. Recall that this contradicts the realist depiction of all states as equal threats, and also
allows for the incorporation of non-state actors as security threats. It was argued that whether or not one is deemed a threat is determined by perceptions which are the end-product of a combination of observed behavior and prior beliefs (Bayesian learning) on the part of the observer. Once these perceptions of another gain traction and are collectively accepted, they in turn determine foreign policy. Thus, studies pertaining to foreign policy change may incorporate the notion of security threat to illustrate context and its effects on foreign policy.

Given that security context is based on perception, this contradicts realist assumptions that all states pose a threat, whether actual or potential. Instead, it not only illustrates that some states (and non-state actors) are perceived as greater threats than others, but also that perceptions are subject to change. Were an actor to refrain from engaging in seemingly aggressive behavior, the perception of it as a threat would diminish over time and with generational turnover, reflecting evolutionary learning and change. Or, were the threat to be eliminated, or weakened substantially in capacity, this would also divert attention from the entity previously perceived as a threat, reflecting paradigmatic learning and change.

This illustration of learning presents another method for identifying threats, one which may incorporate both priors (existing beliefs) and behaviors. In order to account for their dynamic nature, future models which examine their exogenous effects of security contexts should perhaps reflect a two-stage form,
where both identification of a threat and its subsequent effects on other phenomena are incorporated.

Contributions toward Understanding the Effects of Economic Factors on Intervention

One interesting finding of this study revealed that for the Total and Cold War datasets, trade relations are a statistically significant determinant of U.S. military intervention. In addition, U.S. economic assistance to target states is a significant determinant of U.S. military intervention for the Total and 1992-2001 dataset. These findings are particularly important given the lack of statistical support for the relationship between economic variables and intervention in civil conflicts in previous studies, save that of Fordham (2008). Returning to the analogy of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, this implies that economic factors may trump humanitarian factors, at least as far as unilateral U.S. military intervention is concerned.

Contribution toward Understanding Humanitarian Motives of Intervention

This study does not find support for the argument that humanitarian concerns are of greater importance in the post-Cold War environment, at least in terms of U.S. unilateral military intervention. Given that their data are not yet publicly available, it is difficult to determine why the results of this study differ from those of Mullenbach and Matthews (2008). One possible explanation is that they cover a different time period (ending in 2002) and do not account for some
of the same factors, such as a conflict’s connection to a threatening actor or ideology. Without accounting for connections to threats, humanitarian factors may appear prominent. Likewise, their analysis does not extend into the post-9/11 timeframe and thus, they do not account for the effects of the threat posed by Al Qaeda. Finally, Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) divide civil conflicts into phases, while this study divides conflicts into dyads, which may lead to differences in findings.

This study highlights the necessity of including security threat context in any analysis of U.S. military intervention, lest mistaken conclusions be drawn concerning motives behind intervention. However, as was previously argued, it is also important to note that this study only examines unilateral military intervention and neglects multilateral forms. The role of the United Nations as peacekeeper has gained in prominence over the years, so a more precise assessment of whether humanitarian factors matter for a state would include examining a state’s role in UN peacekeeping efforts, or other multilateral military interventions (such as those of NATO). An increasing role in these types of interventions may explain results depicting a lack of importance of humanitarian motives for unilateral intervention.

Aside from incorporating multilateral interventions, there may also be more precise measures of humanitarian-based intervention than those used in this study. Recall that in order to account for the importance of humanitarian crisis in explaining intervention, this study included two indicators: whether or not the
conflict was characterized by genocide/politicide, and the average number of refugees reported abroad during conflict years. Perhaps a more precise measure of motives behind intervention would be to examine government documents and conduct interviews with officials involved in the decision-making process. By doing so, one could identify reasons why some conflicts receive more attention, and why some may ultimately experience intervention.

Also, just as with ideological and economic factors, it could be that those civil conflicts which represent both humanitarian crises and security concerns for a third party could be those most likely to experience intervention. That is, it may be the combined effect of these factors rather than one alone which drives intervention, an effect which could be assessed in a future study.

Future Studies

Military Intervention in Civil Conflicts

Although the dependent variable in this study was restricted to unilateral military intervention in civil conflicts, the ideas presented here may also be extended to other types of intervention (diplomatic and economic), as Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) have done, but even the concept of military intervention may be worthy of further disaggregation, such as expanding each conflict-dyad into conflict-dyad-years.

Second, one can also expand the existing study to include unilateral intervention on the part of other states, beginning with other major powers.
Unilateral intervention behavior of major powers could then be compared in order to identify distinct behaviors unique to certain states, or more general patterns of behavior. Including other states in a study examining the relationship between security context and military intervention in civil conflicts would require a systematic method for identifying a heightened security context. Goertz and Diehl (1998; 2000) have developed such an objective, systematic method for identifying rivals across states, and this may be used as a starting point. However, one must keep in mind that their measure may also be problematic in that rivals are only identified ex post facto. That is, rivalries are included in the dataset only after a certain number of armed incidents. This method misses the beginning formation of the perception of another as a security threat, a phase which occurs before armed conflict manifests, as argued by Thompson (2001).

Third, given the increasing importance and frequency of multilateral military interventions, one should also examine the effects security context may have on a state’s participation in multilateral interventions. In particular, does involvement in a heightened security context affect participation in multilateral military interventions? Aside from affecting participation, does it affect the number of troops devoted, the type of assistance provided, and the cases in which the state is more likely to provide assistance? Despite the lack of broad support for humanitarian factors in this study, these factors may manifest as motives when examining multilateral interventions, particularly where security concerns are mitigated.
Hypotheses explicit in this study in its existing form could be extended to include multilateral interventions, with some possible additions. Two primary hypotheses would be depicted as follows:

H1: The US is more likely to participate in a multilateral military intervention in a civil conflict in a less threatening security context than in a more threatening security context.

H2: The US devotes more troops to a multilateral military intervention in a civil conflict in a less threatening security context than in a more threatening security context.

It is important to account for multilateral interventions given that most humanitarian interventions are conducted multilaterally. Examining this type of intervention may provide support for the notion that outside the security context, third parties are more likely to intervene in civil conflicts for humanitarian reasons, potentially illustrating that they are more likely to do so as part of a multilateral effort rather than unilaterally.

Expanding the Concept of Security Threat

The findings of this study not only demonstrate the importance of a perceived security threat in explaining foreign policy, but also that scholars should not limit perceived threats to states. Non-state actors and their effects on states should be accounted for given the nature of contemporary conflict. The field of international relations is progressively adapting to account for the role of non-state actors, and the notion of a security threat represents yet another concept worthy of adaptation or refinement. As previously mentioned, one may
use existing methods for identifying rivals as a model for identifying security threats, or a potential future study may develop a new method of identifying such threats, perhaps incorporating content analysis of political rhetoric and government documents. For example, State of the Union Addresses serve as a good starting point for identifying state and non-state threats which are collectively perceived by U.S. governing elite. These analyses could be coupled with an examination of government resources devoted toward understanding and addressing the perceived threat. In order to make the study generalizable beyond the U.S., one would need to identify political rhetoric representing the equivalent of State of the Union addresses, as well as means for identifying the allocation of government resources toward understanding and addressing perceived security threats.

Aside from its impact on military intervention in civil conflicts, this study also provides the foundation for studies which may examine the effect of perceived security threat on other phenomena, now incorporating the effect of non-state actors. For example, previous studies which examined the effect of rivalry on defense spending, arms control, and the like may be replicated with an expanded concept of security threat, and including more recent years.

Examining the Relationship between Economic Factors and Intervention

As Fordham has argued, security and economic factors both determine and are determined by one another. If one were to attempt to distinguish their
effects, it would require closer examination of economic factors to identify specifically what matters. Instead of examining overall trade, for example, imports and exports should be separated to distinguish differences in their effects. Likewise, one would want to incorporate measures of trade agreements, foreign direct investment, and debt owed. First I will discuss why distinguishing between imports and exports, and why identifying the types of commodities being imported and exported, could be important.

Protecting the flow of imports implies that the target state has a commodity of particular importance, worthy of military intervention to prevent any (extended) disruption in the flow of this commodity to the third party. The extended disruption of oil imports, for example, would most likely affect the standard of living of citizens and the ability to mobilize forces should the need arise. Yet, in this case it is unclear whether economic (standard of living) factors matter more than security (mobilization of forces) factors. Perhaps it is the combination of both that is of particular importance. That is, perhaps a state is more likely to intervene in the civil conflict of a target state from which imports substantially affect both the standard of living of citizens in the third-party state, as well as third-party security interests, indicating that some commodities are more important than others and that a future study should distinguish between different types of commodities.

If such a study distinguishing between imports and exports were to reveal that the total value of exports was a more significant determinant of military
intervention in civil conflicts, this would imply that economic factors are granted more weight than security factors. Namely, the third party is protecting access to an existing export market (and perhaps opening new markets), indicating that the driving force behind third-party military intervention in civil conflicts would be the protection of domestic industries rather than enhancing strategic interests. This type of intervention may seem anachronistic, but it is also possible that intervention for these purposes never ceased, and that they now take place under the guise of protecting security interests.

Despite the potential for more closely examining the impact of economic factors on military intervention in civil conflicts, recall that in this study, economic factors only became prominent in some datasets. Thus, one may question whether more detailed analysis of economic factors is warranted, given that they may not reach statistical significance when controlling for security factors such as security threats. It could be, however, that perceived security threats reflect conflicting economic goals between state and nonstate actors, as is argued by Fordham (2008). Consider the case of the U.S. and USSR. Although some depict this competition as the struggle between democracy and autocracy, the fundamental struggle was between capitalism and communism. This is obvious given the U.S. preference, in terms of preferred characteristics of other states, for a pro-capitalist, authoritarian regime to a socialist, democratic regime. Likewise, one may perceive of struggle between the U.S. and Al Qaeda as a war of ideas, religion, or civilizations per Samuel Huntington (1993), while others may argue
that this struggle pertains more to protecting Western interests in the Middle East, particularly access to highly valued commodities and trade routes.

Whether or not these economic factors are indeed the primary impetus behind the use of force requires further examination. As previously stated, there is the possibility that it is the combined effect of economic, security, and ideological factors which drive the use of force, and that one alone is rarely sufficient. Assessing these combined effects could be accomplished in another study.

Policy Prescriptions

Based on the findings of this study and existing knowledge pertaining to intervention in civil conflicts, this section provides potential policy prescriptions which may be enacted by the international community through international organizations such as the UN, as well as policies which may be incorporated within states. The primary assumption underlying these prescriptions is that, in general, unilateral interventions tend to have more negative rather than positive outcomes, particularly because they tend to be biased, are inconsistent in frequency, and tend to prolong conflict duration (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). On the other hand, there are some instances in which unilateral intervention may be preferred to multilateral intervention, particularly in terms of efficiency and timely response. Thus, policy prescriptions based on the potential for positive outcomes from unilateral intervention are also presented.
Means for the International Community for Preventing Unilateral Military Intervention

Given the role of third parties in catalyzing and exacerbating conflict, one might suggest that the international community sanction unilateral intervention, whatever the motives and intentions claimed by the intervening party. Incorporation into international law, such as an amendment to the UN Charter, could deem unilateral military intervention as illegal (and perhaps extend this to the provision of arms to parties involved in civil conflict). Violators would be subject to diplomatic and economic sanctions on the part of the international community. Such a development might minimize the occurrence of biased, unilateral intervention, while still allowing for its neutral, multilateral, peacekeeping form.

Implementing such a law would face a number of challenges, however. The first set of problems relates to monitoring and enforcement of a law prohibiting unilateral intervention. First, unilateral intervention is sometimes difficult to monitor, especially in instances where the intervener does not want to draw attention to its involvement. Interveners may disguise themselves as native insurgents, or my provide arms and training to insurgents. Not only could these potential interveners avoid monitoring, the very law could be used politically by state leaders to enact revenge on rivals.

Second, enforcing such a law in terms of identifying appropriate punishment for its violation would be problematic. Diplomatic and economic sanctions present one possible response, but the record for sanctions of this sort
is mixed, if not poor, in terms of altering state behavior. A coercive approach may be more effective, at least when preventing the intervention of minor powers. For example, one may perceive of a special unit of Blue Helmets trained to intercept, or identify and expel, intervening forces. Such a force would be a standing unit supported by continuous funding, ready to mobilize when the situation arises. In instances such as Rwandan intervention in the DRC, this special unit of Blue Helmets would be mobilized to intercept incoming Rwandan forces, monitor refugee camps (where some insurgency activity is organized), and expel existing forces. This implies the possibility (perhaps probability) of armed engagement between UN and Rwandan forces. Although one may shudder at the thought, perhaps the mere possibility of armed engagement with an international force would act as a deterrent.

Yet, expand the imagination further and consider an instance when the third-party intervener is not a minor but a major power such as the U.S. This situation is less clear. First, any mobilization of a special unit of Blue Helmets to counter the U.S. would most likely meet with U.S. resistance within the UN itself. Should such procedural and bureaucratic resistance be overcome, there could be the possibility of an armed confrontation between U.S. forces and Blue Helmets, a deplorable (and unlikely) outcome. Other outcomes are more likely: (1) UN members might be pressured into acquiescing to U.S. demands, allowing for U.S. unilateral intervention in a particular case, and thus supporting the notion that the institution is nothing but a tool of hegemony employed by existing
powers; (2) knowing it may encounter UN resistance (either procedural or armed), the U.S. might be deterred from intervening unilaterally in civil conflicts, given that the political costs of intervention are now exacerbated significantly.

A second set of problems pertains to the fact that many third-party interventions take place at the request of parties to the conflict, particularly governments attempting to hold on to power. If a regime were not able to legally call on its friends for assistance (with unilateral intervention being outlawed), it would be inclined to call on the international community to intervene to prevent the state from falling into prolonged civil war, or being overtaken by insurgent forces. This procedure of submitting a request for intervention to the international community would be less efficient in a number of ways: first, the regime would be subject to political and procedural barriers within the institution that may prevent intervention; second, should such a decision be approved, timeliness and efficiency would be called into question. Prevention of an insurgency from gaining ground requires a timely response, both in terms of the decision to mobilize forces, and the logistics associated with mobilization itself. Delays may affect the success of such an operation.

Issues pertaining to efficiency in the latter set of problems could be addressed early on by developing standard operating procedures within the UN to address crisis scenarios such as potential state collapse or takeover, using current peacekeeping operations as starting point. As previously mentioned, there could also be forces standing by, ready for mobilization when called upon.
Yet, the composition of these forces and funds dedicated to their training and maintenance present a third set of problems. Specifically, from which states will these committed forces be composed, and who will bear the costs of their training and mobilization? Within the current system, domestic political pressures sometimes push state leaders to withdraw forces. An institutional mechanism could prevent such a withdrawal, allowing state leaders to demonstrate to their publics that their hands are tied, yet one may question whether state leaders (and their publics) would vote in support of a mechanism encroaching on sovereignty in the first place.

The distribution of costs associated with maintaining such a force would also need to be explicit. One can imagine that even if delegates were able to establish a budget detailing the contributions of each state, economic hardship in one of the contributing states would present the possibility (and probability) of defection. This would not only affect the efficiency of this special force of Blue Helmets, but call into question the credibility and legitimacy of the institution itself.

Given the issues described above, it is unclear whether efforts to expand international law to condemn unilateral interventions in civil conflicts and to provide an efficient multilateral intervention force are feasible. One possible solution for addressing these issues may be to couple international efforts simultaneously with domestic efforts to outlaw unilateral intervention. Specifically, perhaps there should be a call for UN members to prohibit unilateral
military intervention within their own legal systems. This and other potential domestic policy prescriptions are described in the next section.

Means for States to Refrain from Engaging in Unilateral Military Intervention

In the previous section, it was suggested that state leaders should perhaps tie their own hands in preventing unilateral interventions. In the U.S., for instance, a bill may be introduced which prohibits the use of U.S. military and covert forces for the purpose of intervening in civil conflicts, unless part of a multilateral effort approved by the United Nations. One may question why a state’s leadership would tie its hands in such a way, and an explanation follows.

The greatest impediment to a legal restriction on unilateral military intervention is that some will highlight the strategic benefits of intervention of this type. The purpose of such intervention, one might argue, is to protect strategic interests. Yet, I will argue that this is conflating end-goals with means for achieving said goals. First, intervention in a civil conflict is an indirect way of protecting U.S. interests and is thus plagued with uncertainty. No matter what may be accomplished in the short-run, in the long-run, the U.S. must ultimately rely on a strong and complicit government within the target state to protect its interests, as it has done in the past. As has been observed, supporting regimes is risky, as today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy, demonstrating the myopia of this perspective. In all, without the support of the international community, the costs of a unilateral military operation are largely taken on by the U.S., with
uncertain long-term benefits. Thus, one may argue that the best means for protecting U.S. strategic interests is to enhance its perceived legitimacy in the international community rather than engaging in actions which not only hurt this legitimacy, but also damage long-term strategic interests.

There are other reasons why unilateral intervention may be more costly in the long run for intervening states, and these relate to the fact that in the competitive mindset of countering a threatening actor or ideology, state leaders might be quick to intervene in conflicts with little potential for a successful outcome. The discussion in the previous paragraph assumed state leaders are rational and strategic when deciding to intervene in the civil conflicts of other states. However, as was presented in chapter 3, the perception of a threatening actor or ideology drives foreign policy which is aimed at diminishing that perceived threat. However, perceptions are both rationally and psychologically determined. The collective perception of a threat posed by another actor or ideology may take on a life of its own, making leaders and their citizens decide impulsively, or inclining them to engage in any possible opportunity to confront a threatening actor or ideology. That is, the security context formed by the perception of a threat may warp perceptions of the expected utility of intervention, making leaders exaggerate benefits, downplay costs, and take greater risks. Consider U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Outside of a heightened security context in which the USSR and communism were deemed threats, would the U.S. have paid much attention to a civil conflict taking place in
southeast Asia, particularly in an area representing little strategic interest? Likewise, would the costs of intervention in Vietnam have been downplayed as they were by the Johnson administration, despite George Ball’s efforts to consider the French experience?

Understanding the psychological impact of perceived security threats may actually assist both political leaders and citizens in making and supporting more prudent policy. Using cognitive therapy in psychology as an analogy, if one understands that he or she has some degree of control over his or her own perceptions, this may alter one’s behavior. Likewise, a state should be structurally designed to allow for regular assessment of security threats, not solely to identify new threats, but also to assess whether the gravity of existing threats has diminished. This does not mean that the state leadership will discontinue attempts to mitigate these threats -- only that perhaps leaders can proceed carefully in addressing the threat, rather than allowing its existence to bring about a zero-sum mindset. Allowing a heightened security context to permeate all foreign policy issue areas exaggerates the capabilities of the threatening actor, and leads to the neglect of other important issues, with little value added. Regular, systematized assessments of threats, which attempt to identify both aggressive and cooperative behavior of others, may lead to more prudent policy. It may be that existing assessment mechanisms appear devoted to identifying only aggressive behaviors.
One may argue that prudence in the use of force may be perceived by some as weakness within the international community, and that there are times when demonstrating a willingness to use force with little provocation may serve as a deterrent. There is some strategic benefit to acting “crazy” (Dror 1971), some may argue. Such strategies are short-sighted, however, in that they ignore the costs to the intervening state and its society of responding to slight provocation. They also ignore that publics may not be supportive of such actions the longer they endure, and duration of these interventions is never known in advance.

Can Unilateral Military Intervention Be Used for Good?

The policy prescriptions presented thus far were based on the assumption that, overall, unilateral military intervention has more negative than positive consequences for both the target state and third-party intervener. However, is it possible for unilateral military intervention to be used for collective security, and that unilateral efforts might be preferred to multilateral efforts?

Some militaries have greater capacity than others, and are by far more efficient. Multilateral efforts are often logistically complicated and less efficient due to confusion regarding command structure, little time for building rapport among participating soldiers (who may not speak the same language), and variation in skills. States with larger budgets and longer histories of military prowess have a greater capacity to devote resources to training their forces and
toward acquiring the best military technology. Military technology aside, resources allow for combat soldiers and pilots to spend hours honing their skills, and for garrison soldiers to devote hours to perfecting procurement and logistics procedures. These developed skills and procedures could be utilized on behalf of the international community were they recognized for their potential benefits. Furthermore, forces could also be used for beginning the process of building infrastructure in post-conflict societies, as has been proposed by Colonel Garland Williams (2005), while transitioning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

Yet, there are several problems with using one force for military intervention. The first concerns who will bear the cost of training and developing such a force. Were it to be used for the global public interest, one would expect it to be internationally funded. However, state leaders may fear that by funding the military of one state, they may be helping build a force which could be used against them later. Second, there would be societal costs for the state which provides this international force, as long and multiple deployments may wreak havoc on the families of soldiers. Third, this state may become the scapegoat for global ire at the individual level, despite having the approval to intervene on the part of state leaders at the international level. This anger may ultimately transform into terrorist acts against the state. Finally, such a state may become attached to its role as international enforcer, thus devoting more resources to maintaining its perception as such, and perhaps less to other issue areas.
Ultimately, the decision of how to effectively use intervention (should it be used at all) to bring about and maintain peace in societies is a struggle between efficiency and legitimacy. Even multilateral interventions may be perceived as illegitimate, as a tool used by the existing major powers to bring about their desired ends, despite claims of protecting human rights abroad. Furthermore, the paradox of military intervention is that, even with the best intentions, by protecting the lives of some, other lives will potentially be lost. To escape this paradox, those in developed states must ask: is it worth utilizing existing vast military resources to protect innocent life, or is it best not to meddle, allowing history to take its course, as awful as it may be? Our best intentions to protect may lead to the worst outcomes, after all. This second option, though logically sound, ignores that people of the developed world are moved by the desperate pleas of the innocent victims of civil conflict for protection. Although it is a normative question, one wonders whether those with greater power have a responsibility to intervene to protect the innocent, as we would protect innocent children from bullies. Rather than neglect this perceived duty because of uncertainty regarding the outcome, perhaps major powers should utilize their vast resources to identify ways to achieve the best possible outcome.
APPENDIX A

STATE SPONSORS OF TERROR AND ISLAMIC FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
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APPENDIX B

BARBARA HARFF’S LIST OF GENOCIDES AND POLICIDES

(Source: http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/)
Algeria, 7/1962-12/1962
Myanmar (Burma), 1/1978-12/1978
Burundi, 10/1965-12/1973
Burundi, 8/1988-8/1988
Burundi, 10/1993-12/1993
Cambodia, 4/1975-1/1979
Chile, 9/1973-12/1976
China, 3/1959-12/1959
China, 5/1966-3/1975
Congo-Kinshasa, 2/1964-1/1965
Ethiopia, 7/1976-12/1979
Guatemala, 7/1978-12/1990
Indonesia, 10/1965-7/1966
Indonesia, 12/1975-7/1992
Iran, 6/1981-12/1992
Iraq, 6/1963-3/1975
Pakistan, 3/1971-12/1971
Pakistan, 2/1973-7/1977
Philippines, 9/1972-6/1976
Rwanda, 12/1963-6/1964
Sudan, 10/1956-3/1972
Sudan, 9/1983-10/2002
Syria, 4/1981-2/1982
Uganda, 2/1971-4/1979
South Vietnam, 1/1965-4/1975
REFERENCE LIST


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