The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response

Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs

Lauren Ploch
Specialist in African Affairs

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Summary

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, is a small, dispersed armed group in central Africa that originated 24 years ago in Uganda. Its infliction of widespread human suffering and its potential threat to regional stability have drawn significant congressional attention. Campaigns by U.S.-based advocacy groups, using social media and other methods, have also spurred policymakers’ interest. Despite its Ugandan origins, the LRA currently operates in remote regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. When the LRA was based in northern Uganda, the United States provided humanitarian relief and other aid for the war-torn region. As the LRA has moved across central Africa, the United States has taken on a more expansive role in countering its impact. Since 2008, the United States has supported regional operations led by the Ugandan military to capture or kill LRA commanders. The United States has also extended humanitarian aid, pursued regional diplomacy, and pushed for “early-warning” systems and multilateral programs to demobilize and reintegrate ex-LRA combatants. Growing U.S. involvement may also be viewed in the context of Uganda’s role as a key regional security partner. The LRA is on the State Department’s “Terrorist Exclusion List,” and Kony is a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.”

In May 2010, Congress enacted the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act (P.L. 111-172), which required the Obama Administration to submit to Congress a “strategy” to “guide future United States support ... for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability” posed by the LRA. The Administration’s policy response, submitted in November 2010, emphasizes the protection of civilians, the “removal” of top LRA commanders, the promotion of LRA desertions, and the provision of humanitarian relief. On October 14, 2011, the President reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that he had authorized the deployment of approximately 100 U.S. military personnel to serve as advisors to “regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield.” The Administration has portrayed this decision as consistent with congressional intent as expressed in P.L. 111-172 and subsequent consultations.

The U.S. approach to the LRA raises a number of policy issues, some of which could have implications far beyond central Africa. A key question, for some, is whether the response is commensurate with the level of threat the LRA poses to U.S. interests, and whether the deployment of U.S. military personnel could lead to unintended consequences. More broadly, decisions on this issue could potentially be viewed as a precedent for U.S. responses to similar situations in the future. Other issues for Congress include the timing and rationale for U.S. action; the role and likely duration of U.S. deployments in the region; the benchmarks for success and/or withdrawal of U.S. forces; funding levels for counter-LRA activities and for potential future humanitarian aid and related commitments; and the relative priority of counter-LRA activities compared to other foreign policy and budgetary goals. Other possible policy challenges include regional militaries’ capacity and will to conduct U.S.-supported operations, and these militaries’ relative level of respect for human rights. Congressional oversight may also focus on the appropriateness of the Administration’s LRA policy approach, as outlined in November 2010; the status of its implementation; interagency coordination; and the role of other donors. Related draft legislation includes H.R. 4077, H.R. 895, H.Res. 465, H.Res. 583, S.Res. 402, and S.Res. 412. Provisions relevant to U.S. counter-LRA efforts are also included in P.L. 112-74 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012) and P.L. 112-81 (National Defense Authorization Act of 2012).
Overview and Key Questions

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a small yet vicious armed group that originated in northern Uganda 24 years ago but currently operates in the remote border areas between the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA is tiny in number, but its actions—which include massacres, mass abductions, sexual assault, and looting—have caused significant human suffering and instability (see “Background on the LRA” below). These atrocities have unfolded in a region marked by other complex security and humanitarian challenges. The repeated failure of regional and multilateral efforts to end the LRA and address its impact led some U.S. policymakers, including Members of Congress, to call for greater U.S. action. In May 2010, Congress passed the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-172; “the Act”), which states that it is U.S. policy “to work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict,” and authorizes and calls for a range of U.S. humanitarian, security, and development responses. The bill, which followed more than a decade of congressional activity related to the LRA (see “Previous Legislation” below), passed with 201 House cosponsors and 64 Senate cosponsors.¹ In early 2012, a widely viewed internet video produced by a U.S.-based advocacy organization, which expressed support for the deployment of U.S. military advisors (see below) and other aspects of the U.S. response, spurred a new wave of interest in the LRA issue among policymakers and members of the public.²

On October 14, 2011, the Obama Administration announced the deployment of about 100 U.S. military personnel to central Africa to act as advisors in support of regional military efforts to capture or kill senior LRA leaders. They are focusing these efforts on the Ugandan military, known as the UPDF (Ugandan People’s Defense Force), to which the United States has provided significant logistical support for counter-LRA operations beyond its borders since late 2008. Continued U.S. assistance to these UPDF operations has contributed to, and been justified by, the Obama Administration’s view of Uganda as a key regional security partner. Several governments in the region and a number of human rights organizations have welcomed the Administration’s decision to deploy U.S. advisors. Members of Congress have been divided on the merits of the deployment, with some expressing support while others pointed to concerns about its duration, cost, and potential outcomes, and the precedent that it might set. Recently, several Members have introduced new legislation expressing support for U.S. involvement in counter-LRA efforts.

The Administration and some Members have portrayed the counter-LRA deployment as consistent with congressional intent as expressed in P.L. 111-172, and in subsequent consultations. The President stated in October that “there has been strong bipartisan support and a coalition ... who have said it is an international obligation for us to try to take [the LRA] on.”³

¹ The bill passed with unanimous consent in the Senate, and on a motion (agreed to by voice vote) to suspend the rules and pass the bill in the House.
² The video, produced by the group Invisible Children, has been alternately praised and criticized from a variety of viewpoints, including by Ugandan officials and northern Ugandan civilians living in areas formerly affected by the LRA. See, for example, Angelo Izama, “Kony Is Not the Problem,” The New York Times, March 20, 2012; Sarah Margin, “A Partial Defense Of Invisible Children’s Kony2012 Campaign,” ThinkProgress, March 8, 2012; and Joshua Keating, “Joseph Kony is not in Uganda (and other complicated things),” ForeignPolicy.com, March 7, 2012. For Invisible Children’s response to much of this criticism, see http://www.invisiblechildren.com/critiques.html.
While the Act does not specifically authorize U.S. troop deployments, it directs U.S. policy to provide “political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts ... to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield.” The Administration’s approach to the LRA, submitted to Congress in November 2010 as required under the Act, is organized around four broad objectives that closely respond to provisions of the legislation, including “apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders” (see “P.L. 111-172: Impact and Implementation” below, for further discussion). More broadly, the Administration has expressed a commitment to preventing and responding to “mass atrocities,” including in its 2010 National Security Strategy and a Presidential Study Directive (PSD-10) issued in August 2011.

Regional governments, United Nations (U.N.) agencies and missions, the African Union, and others have devoted resources to responding to the LRA, and the U.N. Security Council has recently called for greater international engagement on the issue. The United States, however, has been the primary donor, to date, to facilitate regional military operations. Many analysts believe that a “decapitation” strategy—that is, one focused on removing the top 5 to 10 LRA commanders—is necessary and perhaps sufficient to defeat the LRA. Still, it is difficult to assess whether such an approach would work, or if, in such a scenario, certain factions could retain internal cohesion, others could assume leadership in a power vacuum, or combatants could turn to new forms of violence. Additionally, although the UPDF is regarded as the most effective of the regional forces active in counter-LRA operations, some observers have questioned its capacity and commitment. Indeed, the governments of LRA-affected countries in central Africa each face other, arguably more vital, priorities with regard to their domestic security and to each other.

U.S. policymakers and observers who follow the activities of the LRA agree that it is a vicious, brutal group that has wreaked great human suffering across an impoverished swath of central Africa. They also agree that efforts by local governments and multilateral entities in the region, including two U.N. peacekeeping missions, have been insufficient to end the LRA’s humanitarian toll. Where some disagree, however, is over the extent to which the LRA poses a threat to core U.S. interests, if at all, and over the appropriate level and tactics of the U.S. commitment. Key questions, some of which could have implications far beyond the LRA itself, include:

- What is, or should be, the relative priority of counter-LRA activities compared to other foreign policy, national security, and budgetary goals? What is the impetus for U.S. action, when compared to other security and humanitarian issues?
- What is the appropriate level of funding for LRA-related activities, both military and non-military?
- What is the role and likely deployment duration of U.S. forces in the region? What are the benchmarks for success and/or withdrawal of U.S. forces?
- Are the elements of the Administration’s approach to the LRA coherent, realistic, consistent with congressional intent, and likely to end the threat posed by the

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group? What more, if anything, should be done to advance civilian protection, support the demobilization and reintegration of LRA combatants, provide humanitarian aid, and achieve other goals laid out in P.L. 111-172?

- To what extent, given U.S. support, are regional militaries willing and able to defeat the LRA? What is the likely impact of a “decapitation” approach on the LRA’s activities and the humanitarian situation in affected areas?

- What are the potential unintended consequences, if any, of U.S. support to the Ugandan military, in terms of regional relations and U.S. diplomatic influence?

**Figure 1. Primary Areas of LRA Activity in Central Africa**

![Map of Central Africa showing primary areas of LRA activity](source)

*Source: ReliefWeb, altered by CRS.*

*Note: LRA activity has also been reported to the west and north of Haut-Mbomou in CAR, and north of Western Equatoria in South Sudan. In 2010, LRA members reportedly traveled as far north as Darfur, Sudan.*
Background on the LRA

The LRA emerged in northern Uganda in 1987, the year after Yoweri Museveni, a rebel leader from southern Uganda, seized power, ending nearly a decade of rule by northerners. Following Museveni’s victory, Alice Lakwena, an Acholi spiritual leader, emerged as a key figure among northern rebel factions seeking to overthrow the government. Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) was defeated by the Ugandan military in 1987, and Lakwena fled to Kenya. Joseph Kony, a reported relative of Lakwena then in his early 20s, emerged and laid claim to Lakwena’s legacy. Kony’s LRA began to target civilians in northern Uganda and sought support and protection from the government of Sudan (see “Sudan and the LRA” below). In the late 1980s, the Museveni government recruited Acholis into government-backed civilian defense forces, which led to escalated LRA attacks against Acholi civilians and contributed to deep distrust between the government and northern communities.

Some analysts contend that President Museveni initially had little interest in defeating the LRA, either because his administration and the UPDF were able to exploit the conflict for political and economic gain, or because the conflict was perceived as a way to further marginalize the Acholi population, which prior to Museveni had dominated the Ugandan armed forces since the colonial period. Others, however, dispute this interpretation and point to the Ugandan military’s eventual success in pushing the LRA out of the country. Since 2006, the Ugandan military has prevented the LRA from operating inside Uganda, and LRA leaders have shifted their focus to South Sudan, DRC, and CAR. The LRA’s current area of activity is vast, roughly equivalent in size to the state of California, and characterized by an extremely minimal government influence and a very limited international humanitarian presence. LRA factions appear to be constantly on the move.

The LRA has periodically laid out vague political demands, and in some ways its emergence and duration in northern Uganda can be understood as a product of long-standing northern grievances against southern political domination and economic neglect. The LRA’s early endurance was also fostered by proxy struggles between regional powers, notably Sudan and Uganda. Yet the group does not have a clear political or economic agenda, and its operations appear to be motivated by little more than the infliction of violence and the protection of senior leaders. The LRA has a cult-like dimension: Kony claims to receive commands from traditional spirits, and has also at times cloaked his rhetoric in Christian and messianic terms. LRA commanders are infamous for mutilating and brutally killing their victims, and they rely on the mass abduction of children, who are subsequently brutalized and forced to commit atrocities, to replenish their ranks.

The LRA’s numbers have reportedly greatly declined in recent years, from thousands of fighters in the late 1990s and early 2000s to a reported 150-200 “core combatants,” traveling on foot and equipped with small arms. They travel in small bands, along with hundreds of former abductees.

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8 For background on north-south tensions in Uganda, see e.g. Ogenga Otunnu, “Causes and Consequences of the War in Acholiland,” Conciliation Resources, 2002.
10 White House, LRA Strategy, op. cit. See also Resolve and Invisible Children, LRA Crisis Tracker, at http://www.lracrisistracker.com/
11 International Crisis Group, Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, April 14, 2004; see also Resolve, From Promise to Peace: A Blueprint for President Obama’s LRA Strategy, September 2010
who are forced to act as porters, scouts, sexual slaves, and potentially junior fighters. While senior command positions appear to remain in the hands of Ugandan Acholis, the group’s lower ranks presumably increasingly reflect other ethnic groups from affected areas of CAR, DRC, and South Sudan. The level of command and control linking LRA leaders to each other and to the fighters they oversee is uncertain, and little is known about the ties that bind the network together.

LRA fighters nevertheless continue to inflict significant atrocities against civilian communities. The LRA reportedly killed over 2,400 and abducted over 3,400 people between 2008 and mid-2011 alone. During 2011, an estimated 465,000 people in CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan were displaced or living as refugees as a result of the LRA threat. The conflict has consistently eluded a military or negotiated solution, resulting in widespread insecurity and worsening humanitarian conditions.

### The LRA’s Impact in Northern Uganda

Relative security has been established in northern Uganda since 2006, and nearly all of the region’s formerly displaced persons have returned home. The area’s economy remains depressed, however, in part due to the lasting impact of the conflict, and widespread civilian trauma and loss continue to plague local populations. In total, over 20,000 northern Ugandan children were reportedly abducted by the LRA between 1987 and 2006 for use as child soldiers, servants, or sexual slaves. Nearly 2 million people—virtually the entire affected population in the north—were displaced, with many coming to reside in internationally assisted internally displaced person (IDP) camps. Mass displacement was caused both by fear of LRA attacks and a controversial strategy by the Ugandan government to deprive the LRA of potential abductees by moving residents into the camps, which were widely criticized for poor living conditions. Tensions between northern and southern Uganda persist, despite the government’s efforts, supported by donors such as the United States, to support reconstruction and development in the region.

### International and Regional Efforts to End the LRA

The Ugandan government’s approach to the LRA in the 1990s included a combination of counterinsurgency operations and support to local anti-LRA militia groups. Uganda also sought to target LRA rear bases in southern Sudan, which were established with reported Sudanese government support. In 2002, Sudan allowed Ugandan troops to conduct counter-LRA operations in the south, in an apparent shift from Khartoum’s earlier policy. Ugandan-led military operations continued through 2005, with the support of southern Sudanese regional authorities, across an expanded area of southern Sudan and northern Uganda.

In 2005, following a request by the Ugandan government, the International Criminal Court (ICC) unsealed warrants for five LRA commanders. Two have since reportedly died, leaving Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen reportedly alive and at large. In January 2006, Guatemalan peacekeepers serving under the U.N. peacekeeping mission in DRC entered DRC’s Garamba National Park with the goal of capturing then-LRA deputy Vincent Otti and eliminating LRA bases there. The operation was unsuccessful, and eight peacekeepers were killed in a firefight. For the next two years, the LRA and the Ugandan government engaged in internationally backed peace talks mediated by the then-semi-autonomous Government of

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13 State Department, *U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord’s Resistance Army*, October 14, 2011.
Southern Sudan. This was known as the Juba peace process. As part of the process, LRA combatants were offered amnesty and senior leaders were given security guarantees. The government also committed to providing increased development aid, security, and participation in government for northern communities.

The talks broke down in 2008 when Kony refused to sign a final agreement. The ICC warrants, which Kony wanted repealed, were seen by some analysts as a key stumbling block in the negotiations. Others, however, doubted Kony’s sincerity. As one analyst has noted, “the commitment of the LRA to finding a peaceful solution to the crisis has always been questionable. Kony appears to engage in peace talks sporadically as a tactic to reduce military pressure on the LRA and garner time and space to regroup his forces.” The LRA at one time had a civilian wing, which called itself the Lord’s Resistance Movement and framed its demands as ethno-regional socioeconomic and political grievances, but its influence and ability to make commitments on Kony’s behalf appeared limited.

In late 2008, the UPDF, with the support of Congolese and Southern Sudanese authorities, initiated “Operation Lightning Thunder” (OLT), a campaign intended to capture or kill senior LRA leaders in northeastern DRC, where they had established bases. The United States provided equipment, intelligence, and logistical assistance to the UPDF prior to the launch of the operation. The operation failed to kill or capture Kony; instead, it caused the

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**Sudan and the LRA**

Starting in the early 1990s, the Sudanese government was widely reported to have provided supplies and shelter to the LRA, partly in apparent retaliation for Uganda’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a southern Sudanese-led rebel group. The LRA used Sudanese territory to launch attacks in Uganda and also targeted local civilians. In 1999, Sudan and Uganda agreed to cease hostilities and not to support rebel elements from each other’s territories. However, LRA attacks soon re-escalated and the Ugandan government accused Khartoum of bad faith. In 2002, Sudan allowed Ugandan troops to conduct anti-LRA operations on its territory. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, between the government of Sudan and the SPLM, further changed the strategic environment for the LRA. The SPLM assumed regional authority and conducted counter-LRA operations in conjunction with the UPDF. Under assault, LRA leaders moved to northeastern DRC.

The State Department currently reports that there is no evidence to corroborate allegations of continued Sudanese support for the LRA. In 2010, several reports suggested that Kony or other LRA leaders had crossed into northern Sudan and had traveled to Darfur. In November 2010, the U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC described a reported meeting between an LRA delegation and Sudanese authorities, part of an apparent LRA effort to request assistance, including safe passage and asylum for Kony. The effort appears to have been unsuccessful. Rights advocates continue to express concern over the LRA’s potentially destabilizing impact on the newly independent Republic of South Sudan.

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17 Previous negotiation efforts included an initiative led by former Ugandan government minister Betty Bigombe, an ethnic Acholi, in the mid-1990s and again in 2004-2005 on behalf of President Museveni. These efforts were stymied by LRA intransigence, but were also characterized by Ugandan government fluctuation between seeking negotiations versus a military end to the conflict.
23 ICC involvement was controversial, particularly with regard to whether the LRA warrants could or should be repealed in the interest of reaching a final negotiated settlement. For further background on this debate, see CRS Report RL34665, *International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues*, coordinated by Alexis Arieff; and *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army*, by Tim Allen. Zed Books: 2006.
LRA to splinter into small groups and prompted brutal LRA reprisals against civilians. Uganda was stridently criticized by human rights groups for alleged poor planning, intelligence leaks, and failure to protect civilians in the operation’s aftermath.25 The UPDF subsequently remained in DRC and deployed to LRA-affected regions of South Sudan and CAR, with local authorities’ permission and ongoing logistics support from the United States. This enlarged regional campaign is viewed as the continuation of OLT. While the UPDF has since succeeded in capturing or killing several LRA commanders, questions over the UPDF’s capacity, will, and ability to coordinate effectively with other regional forces persist.26

In addition to military operations, Uganda has sought to encourage LRA defections through information operations, internationally assisted disarmament and reintegration programs, and the passage of an Amnesty Act in 2000, which applies to nearly all LRA combatants. According to the United Nations, over 26,000 ex-combatants have been granted amnesty under the law.27 Former LRA combatants are eligible for a small economic and reintegration assistance package, although many reportedly remain in poverty and subject to trauma and rejection from their communities. Some ex-combatants are recruited by the UPDF to assist with operations.28

Uganda has also passed legislation designed to enable it to try senior LRA commanders for war crimes—part of a long-term effort to reassert jurisdiction over individuals sought by the ICC. The first such trial opened at the newly created War Crimes Division of Uganda’s High Court in July 2011. However, judges dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiff was eligible for amnesty. Some rights advocates had viewed the trial as a potential hindrance to long-standing efforts to persuade LRA combatants to lay down their arms, while others see the amnesty provisions as a guarantee of impunity that could pose a threat to long-term stability.29 Ugandan officials and northern civic leaders have called for traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms to help end the conflict and reintegrate LRA abductees and ex-combatants into their communities of origin.

The LRA is present within the areas of operation of two U.N. peacekeeping missions, in DRC and South Sudan. These have contributed to counter-LRA efforts, although the LRA is not the primary focus of their mandates. The U.N. Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) has supported Congolese military units in counter-LRA operations and has facilitated regional military and intelligence coordination. Also key among MONUSCO’s efforts are its disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) programs for ex-LRA combatants. Many analysts believe that such programs are crucial for the encouragement of LRA desertions. While the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has not been as highly engaged in

28 See Ledio Cakaj, Too Far from Home: Demobilizing the Lord’s Resistance Army, Enough Project, February 2011. The report states, among other things, that ex-LRA fighters are often “pressured into joining the Ugandan army to fight against the remaining LRA with no training and no salary,” and are sometimes ordered to report to their own former commanders. If true, this raises potential questions concerning human rights implications; such pressure could also constitute a violation of Uganda’s amnesty act and could jeopardize demobilization and reintegration efforts.
counter-LRA activities, its mandate calls for participation in regional LRA-related coordination and demobilization efforts.30

**U.S. Policy**

During the LRA’s two-decade presence in northern Uganda, the United States provided humanitarian assistance and aid aimed at supporting the social and economic recovery of the war-torn area. The United States has increased its engagement in recent years, as the LRA’s regional presence has expanded. The current U.S. programmatic response to the LRA includes humanitarian assistance for affected areas in central Africa; reconciliation, recovery, and development initiatives in northern Uganda; regional diplomacy; and support for regional military efforts, notably operations led by the UPDF in LRA-affected regions of nearby countries.

U.S. involvement in efforts to counter the LRA is largely premised on the group’s infliction of widespread human suffering, its threat to regional stability, and the role of Uganda as an increasingly important regional security partner (see “The Role of Uganda” below). Interest in the LRA, including within Congress, the Obama Administration, and previous administrations, has been spurred by advocacy by constituents, human rights groups, and other non-governmental actors. The State Department has included the LRA on its “Terrorist Exclusion List” since 2001.31 In August 2008, the Treasury Department added Kony to its list of “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” under Executive Order 13224 (signed by President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001), enabling the freezing of assets under U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with U.S. persons.32

**P.L. 111-172: Impact and Implementation**

On May 24, 2010, Congress passed the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-172). The bill stated that “it is the policy of the United States to work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict in northern Uganda and other affected areas,” including by furnishing humanitarian assistance and by supporting multilateral efforts to provide civilian protection, capture Kony and other LRA top commanders, and disarm and demobilize remaining LRA fighters. The bill also required the President to develop and submit to Congress “a strategy to guide future United States support across the region for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability” posed by the LRA.

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31 State Department, “Statement on the Designation of 39 Organizations on the USA PATRIOT Act’s ‘Terrorist Exclusion List,’” December 6, 2001. The list, which was mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), was aimed at strengthening the United States’ ability to exclude supporters of terrorism from the country or to deport them if they are found within U.S. borders.
32 State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department Under E.O. 13224,” updated December 7, 2010. Kony is not thought to have such assets or to engage in such transactions.
Previous Legislation on the LRA

P.L. 111-172 followed over a decade of congressional activities related to the LRA. Congressional interest has been motivated by a variety of factors, including concerns over the group’s use of child soldiers (an issue on which Congress has sought to legislate); the LRA’s impact on regional security and stability; and reports, since the late 1990s, that the government of Sudan was providing support and safe havens for LRA commanders. In addition to a number of pieces of draft legislation, several bills expressing concern over the LRA and calling for U.S. action to help end the conflict were enacted into law. These include:

- the Defense Department Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-262; see Section 8128), which found that the LRA was among “the most egregious examples of the use of child soldiers,” cited reports of (North) Sudanese support for the LRA, and expressed the sense of Congress that the President and Secretary of State should “support efforts to end the abduction of children by the LRA, secure their release, and facilitate their rehabilitation and reintegration into society”;
- the Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act [2004] (P.L. 108-283), which, among other things, expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should support efforts to resolve the LRA conflict, urged the Ugandan government and international community to do more to protect affected civilians and renew the economy in northern Uganda, called for improved human rights monitoring in the north, criticized reported Sudanese support for the LRA, and required a range of State Department reporting on the matter;
- the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-344), which predicates the lifting of sanctions on the government of Sudan on presidential certification that Sudan is “acting in good faith” to fully cooperate with efforts to disarm, demobilize, and deny safe haven to members of the Lord’s Resistance Army”; and
- the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-161), which was accompanied by a committee report directing the Secretary of State to submit a report “detailing a strategy for substantially enhancing United States efforts to resolve the conflict” between the LRA and the Ugandan government, including direct U.S. participation in confidence-building measures; increased diplomatic pressure on the DRC and on Sudan; a U.S. role in brokering direct negotiations between the Ugandan government and LRA leaders; and financial support for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts.

In addition, several resolutions expressing concern over the LRA were agreed to by either the House or Senate. These include H.Con.Res. 309 (105th); S.Res. 366 (109th); S.Con.Res. 16 (110th); and H.Con.Res. 80 (110th).

On November 24, 2010, as required under the Act, the Administration released a policy document labeled “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army.” It lays out four “strategic objectives”:

1. the increased protection of civilians from LRA attacks;
2. the apprehension or “removal” of Kony and other senior LRA commanders;
3. the promotion of defections from the LRA and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA combatants; and
4. the provision of humanitarian relief to LRA-affected communities.

The Strategy, which is characterized as “multi-year,” emphasizes that the United States will “work with national governments and regional organizations” to accomplish these goals. At the same time, it acknowledges that governments in the region have competing priorities and that “the capabilities of national, regional, and multinational forces to provide protection against the LRA are limited.” The agencies involved in implementation, which is being coordinated by the National Security Council, are the State Department, the Defense Department, and USAID, with support from the intelligence community.

33 The White House, Strategy, p. 10.
To achieve the above objectives, the Administration is implementing a wide range of programs. These include:

- continuation and/or expansion of certain previously existing U.S. efforts, including logistical and intelligence support to the UPDF, regional humanitarian aid, and foreign assistance programs in northern Uganda;
- initiation of certain new programs, such as support for communications infrastructure and early-warning systems among affected civilian communities, and support for infrastructure construction and for new disarmament and demobilization programs;
- increased diplomatic outreach to regional governments and multilateral missions aimed at enhancing focus and coordination on LRA issues; and
- deployment of U.S. troops in an advisory role in support of regional military efforts to capture or kill senior LRA commanders (see below).

As part of its approach, the Administration has pressed regional governments, other donors, and multilateral entities, such as U.N. missions and the African Union, to prioritize LRA-related efforts. In addition, U.S. diplomacy has sought to mediate and de-escalate disputes between host countries and the Ugandan military over the duration and purpose of UPDF deployments.

The following sections will address selected key elements of the Administration’s approach to the LRA conflict.

**Deployment of U.S. Forces**

On October 14, 2011, President Obama reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that he had authorized the deployment of approximately 100 military personnel “to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield.”34 The President noted that Congress had “expressed support for increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA,” citing P.L. 111-172. Senator Russ Feingold, the bill’s original Senate sponsor, stated that “our legislation did not authorize the use of force by American troops anywhere,” but noted that the bill “did call for a comprehensive approach in dealing with the Lord’s Resistance Army, which includes military, intelligence, diplomatic, and development components.”35

According to the President, U.S. forces are providing “information, advice, and assistance to select partner nation forces.” With host nations’ approval, the U.S. forces have deployed to Uganda, and to forward operating sites in LRA-affected areas. Their focus is on assisting the Ugandan military, but they are supporting the military forces of CAR, South Sudan, and DRC that are engaged in counter-LRA operations. The President’s report emphasized that although some U.S. forces are combat-equipped, they will not directly engage LRA forces “unless necessary for self-defense.” It added that “all appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their deployment.”

34 “A Communication from the President of the United States, Transmitting Notification That Approximately 100 U.S. Military Personnel Have Been Deployed To Central Africa To Act As Advisors To Partner Forces Against The Lord’s Resistance Army And Its Leader” (H. Doc. No. 112-64); see Congressional Record, p. H6975, October 14, 2011.
According to the State Department, “this is not an open-ended commitment; we will regularly review and assess whether the advisory effect is sufficiently enhancing our objectives to justify continued deployment.” Initial Defense Department estimates indicated that the operation would cost approximately $4.5 million per month, not including salaries and other personnel costs. Previously, in July 2011, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) deployed liaison officers to U.S. embassies in Kinshasa and Bangui to assist host government officials and Ugandan military commanders who are working to counter the LRA. The State Department has also deployed a field representative to “augment” this regional engagement.

The War Powers Resolution: Implications

The War Powers Resolution (WPR, P.L. 93-148, passed over President Nixon’s veto in 1973) was intended to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions that may involve the United States in hostilities. It states that the President’s powers as Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific statutory authorization; or (3) national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its forces. It requires the President in every possible instance to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities unless there has been a declaration of war or other specific congressional authorization. It also requires the President to report any introduction of forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, Section 4(a)(1); into foreign territory while equipped for combat, Section 4(a)(2); or in numbers which substantially enlarge U.S. forces equipped for combat already in a foreign nation, Section 4(a)(3). Once a report is submitted “or required to be submitted,” Congress must authorize the use of forces within 60 to 90 days or the forces must be withdrawn. It is important to note that since the WPR’s enactment, every President has taken the position that it is an unconstitutional infringement by Congress on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. The courts have never directly addressed this question.

This is the sixth report President Obama has submitted to Congress as a result of the WPR. At issue for Congress is whether it legally triggers the WPR, and thus the reporting and withdrawal requirements therein. Should Congress opt to challenge the continued deployment of U.S. forces, the report provides a starting point.

Logistical Support for the Ugandan Military and Other Regional Forces

The Obama Administration, like that of former President George W. Bush, views the UPDF as the United States’ primary partner in military operations against the LRA. Since late 2008, the

36 Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, December 7, 2011, op. cit.
37 Administration response to CRS query, November 2011.
38 State Department, “U.S. Support to Regional Efforts To Counter the Lord's Resistance Army,” March 23, 2012.
39 War powers have been at issue in multiple overseas engagements. For further information, see CRS Report RL33532, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, by Richard F. Grimmett, from which material in this section is drawn.
40 Presidents have submitted at least 132 reports to Congress as a result of the WPR; these reports serve as formal communication to the Congress. President Obama has submitted multiple reports detailing the deployment of “various combat-equipped forces to a number of locations” in the areas of operation of various combatant commands, including U.S. Africa Command, in support of anti-terrorist and anti-Al Qaeda actions. For a summary of reports, see CRS Report R41199, The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years, by Richard F. Grimmett, and CRS Report RL33532, War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, by Richard F. Grimmett. The President submitted a similar report to Congress in March 2011, after U.S. military operations commenced in Libya. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a memorandum, “Authority to Use Military Force in Libya,” detailing advice provided before President Obama commenced operations. It was the OLC’s opinion that “prior congressional approval was not constitutionally required to use military force in the limited operations under consideration.” The full text of this opinion is found at http://www.justice.gov/olc/memoranda-opinions.html.
41 U.S. military assistance to Uganda was terminated in 2000 as a result of the Ugandan incursion into DRC during that country’s five-year civil war. Following the June 2003 UPDF withdrawal of troops from DRC, the United States restarted limited military aid programs. Military assistance has since expanded significantly, and Uganda is currently a major beneficiary, within Africa, of U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs.
United States has supported UPDF-led regional operations aimed at countering the LRA beyond Uganda’s borders, largely through logistical (airstrip, fuel, and trucks) and intelligence assistance. The State Department has allocated over $45 million over the past three years for nonlethal supplies, equipment, and logistics support through its Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. Equipment has included satellite phones and other communications equipment, tactical equipment such as night vision goggles, signaling devices, personal hydration packs, and compact pickup trucks. The State Department also provides contract air support and fuel for UPDF helicopters. The U.S. embassy in Uganda plays a key role in implementing and overseeing U.S. support to UPDF operations in the region. According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, “We have continued to provide logistical support for [UPDF] operations on the condition that they remain focused on the mission, cooperate with the other regional governments, and do not commit abuses. They have lived up to those commitments.”

The State Department has also provided support to the CAR, DRC, and South Sudan militaries for their participation in counter-LRA efforts. U.S. assistance to these forces in the context of the LRA has been limited (although broader U.S. engagement with the South Sudan and DRC militaries is significant), with the exception of a Congolese light infantry battalion that received significant U.S. training and nonlethal equipment in 2010. (The training program was not initially associated with counter-LRA efforts.) The battalion—which, State Department officials indicate, displays greater respect for human rights and operational procedures than other Congolese forces—has deployed to Dungu, a base of counter-LRA operations in DRC, where it is conducting joint operations with U.N. peacekeepers targeting the LRA. State Department-funded advisors are providing ongoing support to the battalion. However, the battalion has extremely limited capacity to pursue the LRA or rapidly react to reported attacks.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has committed increased military assistance resources to counter-LRA efforts in FY2011. In June 2011, DOD notified Congress of its intent to provide $4.4 million in “Section 1206” funding for training, combat engineer, and communications equipment to the UPDF to build its capacity to conduct operations against the LRA. The FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-82) authorizes the Defense Department, with State Department concurrence, to provide “not more than” $35 million annually in FY2012 and FY2013 for logistical support to the Ugandan military and other regional forces engaged in counter-LRA operations. Such funding, if allocated, may be expected complement and potentially expand the State Department-administered logistics support package described above. The provision prohibits the participation of U.S. personnel in combat operations in connection with such support, except for self-defense or the rescue of a U.S. citizen.

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43 Information on U.S. counter-LRA support for the UPDF draws from information provided to the authors by the State Department Bureau of African Affairs on October 28, 2011, and State Department congressional notifications.
44 U.S. support for the UPDF is provided through an indefinite delivery/ indefinite quantity contract known as AFRICAP, which provides training and advisory services, equipment procurement, and logistical support and construction services to African countries.
45 Remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace, December 7, 2011.
46 Authorization under Section 1206 is premised on the classification of the LRA as a “terrorist” group; Section 1206 authority extends to training and equipping foreign military forces for counterterrorism capabilities. See CRS Report RS22855, *Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress*, by Nina M. Serafino.
Humanitarian Relief

According to the State Department, between FY2002 and FY2011, the United States provided more than $560 million in humanitarian assistance “specifically benefiting LRA-affected populations in Uganda, CAR, the DRC, and Sudan.” The United States provided over $34 million in humanitarian aid to LRA-affected populations in DRC, CAR, and South Sudan in FY2010, and over $18 million in FY2011. Additional U.S. assistance has been provided by the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and through bilateral programs run by USAID’s missions in DRC and Sudan. (USAID does not have a bilateral mission in CAR.) The United States may also seek to rehabilitate critical transportation infrastructure in LRA areas, particularly in CAR and DRC, which would aid the distribution of humanitarian supplies.

Support for Early Warning Mechanisms and Encouragement of Desertions

The State Department and USAID are funding efforts to increase communication between and among rural communities affected by LRA raids and attacks, including by providing high-frequency radios and cell phone towers in LRA-affected areas of DRC. Similar programs are being initiated in CAR and South Sudan. The United States is also working with U.N. peacekeeping missions, the African Union, and regional governments to facilitate the return, repatriation, and reintegration of those who desert the LRA's ranks. According to the Administration, in FY2011, USAID provided “nearly $2 million to support the rehabilitation of former abducted youth in CAR and the DRC and their reunification with their families.” USAID is also funding a Community Radio Correspondents Network in CAR to increase the availability of accurate information on LRA activities and general livelihoods for citizens.

The conference report on the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74) directed the allocation of “up to” $10 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for “peace and security” in LRA-affected areas, citing “programs to improve physical access, telecommunications infrastructure and early-warning mechanisms and to support the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former LRA combatants, especially child soldiers.”

Support to Regional and Multilateral Efforts

The Obama Administration has provided support to a wide range of multilateral and regional efforts related to the LRA, including efforts to provide humanitarian relief, coordinate the regional response to the LRA, facilitate early warning mechanisms, and provide for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-LRA combatants. Notably, the Administration has used its voice at the U.N. Security Council—and clout as a major contributor of funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions—to push for greater action by the U.N. Stabilization Mission in the DRC.

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48 Information provided to CRS by USAID, August 2011; and State Department, “U.S. Support to Regional Efforts to Counter the Lord's Resistance Army,” October 14, 2011.
49 PRM-administered aid is generally allocated for large, grant-based programs and thus cannot easily be disaggregated for LRA-affected populations.
50 The White House, LRA Strategy, p. 23.
(MONUSCO), which it sees as the “most engaged” of regional peacekeeping missions in countering the LRA.\(^ {52}\) The Administration has encouraged MONUSCO to undertake greater efforts to protect civilians in LRA-affected areas, pursue policies and programs that encourage LRA desertions, and provide protection for humanitarian relief operations. In addition, the Administration has sought to encourage greater involvement by regional U.N. political missions. For example, the U.N. Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), inaugurated in March 2011, is developing a plan for greater U.N. coordination on the LRA.\(^ {53}\) The Administration is also pressing the U.N. Integrated Bureau in CAR (BINUCA) to play a more prominent role in responding to the LRA.

The Administration has also encouraged the African Union (AU) to take a more proactive stance toward counter-LRA efforts. In October 2010, AU members organized a high-level summit in Bangui, the capital of CAR, where they agreed on a number of joint military and communications initiatives. Participants also agreed to appoint a special envoy on the LRA and to designate the LRA as a “terrorist” group, though the latter’s practical ramifications are unclear.\(^ {54}\) Francisco Madeira, a former Mozambican official, was subsequently appointed as the AU envoy. In March 2012, the AU announced that the militaries of the four LRA-affected countries would contribute a total of 5,000 troops for a counter-LRA offensive. The AU force would be commanded by—and presumably largely composed of—the UPDF.\(^ {55}\) Other components of the initiative include a “Joint Coordinating Mechanism” comprising defense ministers from affected countries that will “coordinate all political and strategic activities, and enhance military cohesion” and a “Joint Operations Center” made up of 30 officers responsible for “integrated planning and operation.”\(^ {56}\) The implications for already deployed UPDF soldiers, the logistics of the AU command structure, the extent of AU resources for implementation of the initiative, and the likelihood of a full 5,000 personnel deploying are uncertain. (Current figures on UPDF deployments are not publicly available, but most independent estimates place the total at 1,000-2,000 personnel.\(^ {57}\))

**Aid to Northern Uganda**

One component of P.L. 111-172 and of the Administration’s approach is the continuation of substantial post-conflict reconciliation and development aid programs in northern Uganda. These are aimed at addressing the impact the LRA has had on the region’s economy and society during its two-decade presence. The focus on northern Uganda also stems from the recommendations of

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\(^ {52}\) The White House, *LRA Strategy*, p. 4. The Mission’s most recent mandate reauthorization also welcomes “information sharing and coordination with those conducting military operations against the LRA” and “encourages MONUSCO to continue to keep close contacts with LRA-affected communities and keep under review the deployment of its available resources to ensure maximum effect.” (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1991 (2011).) MONUSCO maintains a forward operating base in the LRA’s area of operation in DRC, in the town of Dungu (Haut Uele). However, MONUSCO patrols outside the town itself are extremely limited, and the mission is not currently present in Bas Uele district. Indeed, fewer than 5% of MONUSCO personnel were deployed in LRA-affected areas of DRC as of June 2011. (HRW, “DR Congo: Strengthen Civilian Protection Before Elections,” June 9, 2011.)


\(^ {57}\) E.g., Resolve, *Peace Can Be*, February 2012.
analysts who contend that the LRA is rooted in deep-seated socio-political divisions between northern and southern Uganda.\textsuperscript{58} The United States provided about $102 million in FY2011 to support programming in health, education, water and sanitation, infrastructure, local governance and peace and reconciliation in northern Uganda; such aid totaled $168 million in FY2010 and $165 million in FY2009.\textsuperscript{59} In FY2011, total aid to northern Uganda was estimated at $148.5 million, including $102.2 million administered by USAID.\textsuperscript{60} U.S. military civil affairs teams have contributed to post-conflict recovery and development efforts in the region.\textsuperscript{61}

**Selected Issues for Congress**

The deployment of U.S. military personnel in support of regional counter-LRA efforts may raise questions related to whether, and in what form, explicit congressional authorization is required. Several other potential issues for Congress are outlined below.

**Funding**

Decisions regarding the level of financial resources, if any, that Members may decide to authorize or appropriate to counter the LRA, along with the allocation of such resources, are among the primary LRA-related matters under consideration by Congress. A key question for Members may be the relative importance of LRA-related policies compared to other strategic, humanitarian, and regional foreign policy goals. P.L. 111-172 did not appropriate any funding in support of its objectives. The Administration, in its FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, did not request a specific amount of funding for LRA policy implementation, other than to suggest that a portion of $9 million in State Department PKO funds requested for the “Africa Conflict Stabilization and Border Security” program would support regional counter-LRA efforts (along with a number of competing Africa security and aid priorities).

P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, states that, “Funds appropriated by this Act should be made available for programs and activities in areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army.”\textsuperscript{62} The conference report, as mentioned above, directs “up to” $10 million in ESF funds for assistance to non-military counter-LRA efforts. Neither the bill nor the report includes language on PKO allocations, which have been used to fund U.S. logistical support to Ugandan military operations. Also as mentioned above, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-82) authorizes the Defense Department, with State Department concurrence, to provide “not more than” $35 million annually in FY2012 and FY2013 for logistical support to the Ugandan military and other regional forces in counter-LRA operations. This funding is separate from the cost of the deployment of U.S. military advisors to assist the

\textsuperscript{58} E.g., Resolve, From Promise to Peace, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{59} State Department, “U.S. Support to Regional Efforts....,” March 23, 2012; The White House, LRA Strategy, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{60} Information provided to CRS by USAID, August 2011. Others administering aid to northern Uganda include the Centers for Disease Control (an estimated $10.2 million in FY2011), the Defense Department ($567,000), the State Department ($544,000), and the Department of Agriculture ($35.0 million).

\textsuperscript{61} For example, civil affairs teams from U.S. Africa Command’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) have worked with USAID to reconstruct schools in LRA-affected areas of northern Uganda.

\textsuperscript{62} Division I, Title VII, Sec. 7043 (h).
UPDF and other regional forces. Regarding the latter, recent reports have referenced possible gaps in available surveillance equipment to support the Defense Department’s support efforts.\(^{63}\)

### Strategic Objectives

Debate over the strategic justification for the deployment of U.S. forces is ongoing amid broader discussions related to the global projection of U.S. military force, foreign policy priorities, and federal budget priorities. Members may seek to determine strategic benchmarks and a timeframe for success for counter-LRA efforts, judge whether such benchmarks have been achieved, decide the relative prioritization (if any) of the various aspects of the U.S. response, and/or weigh LRA-related activities against competing policy goals and resource constraints. Members may also seek to determine whether the Administration’s policy toward the LRA, as described in its November 2010 submission to Congress, represents a comprehensive “strategy” as called for in P.L. 111-172, as well as a realistic and coherent approach. As noted above, the Administration’s “strategy,” defined as “multi-year,” includes a number of programs, some of which were already ongoing when P.L. 111-172 was enacted. The approach calls for the “simultaneous” conduct of a number of activities, both security-related and humanitarian. It also does not seek to define the LRA issue’s relative importance compared to other U.S. policy initiatives and priorities, although it does note that “the extent to which the United States is able to engage in the full range of objectives described in the strategy is dependent on the availability of resources.”\(^{64}\)

The Administration has stated that its LRA policy is concordant with the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2010 as well as other U.S. policy priorities in central Africa. At the same time, prioritizing certain elements may affect other policy goals related to Uganda and the region. With regard to multilateral engagement, for example, policymakers may weigh LRA-related goals against other tasks assigned to U.N. peacekeeping missions, such as protecting civilians in conflict-ridden eastern DRC and assisting South Sudan’s internal stability. With regard to Uganda, policymakers may consider the relative priority of other operations in which Ugandan forces are engaged, as well as the potential impact of additional U.S. military support for Uganda on U.S. human rights and democracy promotion efforts (see “The Role of Uganda” below).

### Donor Coordination

As mentioned above, governments in the region and multilateral entities have devoted resources to addressing problems created by the LRA, some in response to U.S. diplomatic outreach and financial support. Administration officials stress that implementation of the anti-LRA strategy will include close coordination with other potential donors and partners, in order to ensure that efforts are not duplicative and to encourage greater involvement and burden-sharing. Some progress in this domain may be exhibited by increasing attention to the LRA's regional impact at the U.N. Security Council and within the African Union; the United States and European Union also co-chair a recently created International Working Group on the LRA. Some bilateral donors, notably France, have provided limited support for regional counter-LRA operations,\(^{65}\) while most

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\(^{64}\) The White House, *LRA Strategy*, p. 2.

\(^{65}\) France, which has a military presence in CAR, a former colony, has supported the deployment of about 300 CAR soldiers to the east of the country since November 2010 as part of efforts to improve the army's capacity to combat the (continued...)
European countries appear to prefer civilian-oriented aid under an AU umbrella. Still, the current level of coordination, particularly in the field, is unclear. Moreover, U.S. relationships with other possible donors and actors are characterized by competing priorities.

The Role of Uganda

U.S. efforts to empower the UPDF and other African security forces to play a greater role in responding to regional crises correspond to an emphasis in U.S. national security policy in recent years on strengthening the capacity of partner countries to defend against internal and external threats and promote regional security. The UPDF is widely viewed as the most effective of the region’s military forces, and its role in counter-LRA operations has been positively characterized by human rights advocates. Still, the UPDF appears to have withdrawn troops from LRA-affected areas relative to mid-2010, and support within Uganda for prolonged deployments to neighboring countries may be limited. As one analyst has noted, while the Ugandan army may be “essential, because no one else is prepared to send competent combat troops to do the job,” it is also a “flawed and uncertain instrument for defeating the LRA.”

Some might also question whether ongoing U.S. support to the Ugandan military could have unintended consequences for U.S. policy and the region. For example, persistent tensions between the four African countries affected by the LRA have highlighted regional dynamics that could be inflamed by the UPDF’s role in counter-LRA operations (see “Regional Coordination and Capacity” below). In addition, increased U.S. reliance on the UPDF may impede U.S. diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the Ugandan government’s domestic record on democracy, good governance, and human rights, which the State Department recently characterized as “deteriorating.” Uganda is the largest troop contributor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which the Administration views as critical to countering an insurgency led by Al Qaeda-affiliated forces. Uganda has received increasing U.S. security assistance in recent years and also benefits from regular military-to-military contacts and joint exercises. Some critics also question whether U.S. and international support for the UPDF’s engagement in multiple regional missions has encouraged a small country to maintain an otherwise unsustainably large military.

(...continued)

LRA. Material support has reportedly included fuel for vehicles and air transport, as well as telecommunications and other equipment. See Small Arms Survey, “Lord's Resistance Army Update,” November 18, 2011.


68 On U.S. security assistance to Uganda and the role of AMISOM, see CRS Report R41473, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response, by Lauren Ploch.

69 Several of these programs also aim to foster respect for human rights among the country’s security forces and support Uganda’s ability to prosecute abuses. As noted above, U.S. security assistance to Uganda was restricted in the 2000 in response to Uganda’s military intervention in the DRC. Some human rights groups have expressed concerns with abuses reportedly perpetrated by the UPDF elsewhere and in the past, and caution that security assistance should be predicated on continued efforts by Uganda to prosecute such abuses. At the same time, advocates report that the UPDF’s human rights record in the anti-LRA campaign has been relatively good. For recent analyses and criticism of the UPDF’s human rights record, see, e.g., Amnesty International, “Uganda: Failure to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations in Karamoja Region Guarantees Impunity,” November 1, 2010; and U.S. Department of State, “Uganda,” 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, April 8, 2011.
Uganda’s capacity and will to pursue counter-LRA operations should be viewed in context with its other competing security priorities. These include Uganda’s commitment to maintaining troops in Somalia; concerns related to the potential for unrest in neighboring South Sudan; ongoing insecurity in Uganda’s volatile Karamojong area; and domestic political upheaval since elections in February 2011 returned President Museveni to office, further extending his 25-year tenure and inflaming some political opposition groups.70 The advocacy group Resolve recently stated that since 2008, “Uganda’s commitment [to regional counter-LRA deployments] diminished as it achieved its core security goals, as well as when the political benefits of defeating the rebel group faded and the difficulty of tracking LRA commanders increased.” Resolve has also reported growing unease among civilian communities regarding the UPDF’s continued presence.71

Regional Coordination and Capacity

The U.S. policy of supporting regional military operations relies on an assumption that local partners are willing and able to take potentially costly and risky steps to end the LRA conflict. In addition, operational and intelligence coordination between the UPDF and host country forces and civilian communities may be key to success. However, despite efforts by affected countries and multilateral entities to foster regional cooperation, the issue is seen as a significant stumbling-block, and a potentially thorny diplomatic issue.72 This is due to a variety of factors, including a lack of capacity among regional governments and militaries; competition for external financing and technical assistance; language and communications gaps; civilian communities’ distrust of UPDF capacities and motives; and distrust among governments that is linked to recent history, such as Ugandan incursions into DRC during that country’s 1998-2003 civil war and suspected UPDF involvement at the time in regional natural resources smuggling.73 The U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC has noted that the inability of regional operations to neutralize transnational armed groups “continually tests the level of trust between the regional Governments.”74

Tensions between the Congolese and Ugandan militaries have repeatedly erupted, and since late 2011, UPDF forces have been prohibited from conducting operations within DRC territory. Congolese officials have repeatedly alleged that there are no LRA left in DRC, that the LRA is being used by the UPDF as an excuse to plunder Congolese resources and benefit from international military aid, and that Ugandan troops are uninterested in defeating the LRA.75 Such accusations point to Congolese sensitivities over Uganda’s regional role, its related ability to benefit from U.S. assistance, and its troubled history in DRC. Negotiations aimed at easing DRC-Uganda frictions are ongoing. Similar tensions have, at times, surfaced in CAR, as have civilian-military tensions, which may have hindered UPDF operations there.76

70 On political tensions in Uganda, see ICG, Uganda: No Resolution to Growing Tensions, April 5, 2012.
71 Resolve, Peace Can Be, op. cit.; see also BBC Monitoring, “Ugandan Defense Budget Increased,” July 29, 2011.
72 ICG, LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony, April 28, 2010; Resolve, Peace Can Be, op. cit.
75 E.g., Mike Thomson, “Who Can Stop the LRA?” BBC Online, February 16, 2011.
76 CRS interviews with Ugandan and CAR officials in Bangui and Obo, CAR, March 2011.
As noted above, the State Department is providing limited assistance to the CAR, DRC, and South Sudanese militaries for their participation in regional counter-LRA operations. In part, this approach may be motivated by efforts to contain resentments by host governments over U.S. support to UPDF deployments on their soil. At the same time, the armed forces of DRC, CAR, and South Sudan suffer from limited capacity and competing security priorities. Although all three forces are ostensibly engaged in regional anti-LRA operations, they have displayed extremely limited operational capacity and will to make significant progress. All three, and particularly the Congolese military, are also dogged by human rights problems. Some policymakers may see a need for options for responding to potential human rights abuses by Ugandan and other partner militaries, particularly if U.S. forces are providing support.

Outlook

In addition to overarching questions identified at the outset of this report, additional questions for U.S. policy include:

- What is the ultimate end-game of U.S.-supported regional military efforts? What possible scenarios need to be considered?
- How might potential allegations of human rights abuses against partner military units affect the U.S. deployment or U.S. support for regional military operations more broadly? How will the Administration ensure that U.S. assistance does not contribute to human rights abuses by partner forces?
- What are the practical and operational challenges associated with the area of operations for U.S. military advisors, and are U.S. policies and precautions sufficient to address them? What types of intelligence assets are needed, and are such assets available?
- If regional operations are successful, what is the appropriate level of funding, if any, for future humanitarian, post-conflict recovery, and development assistance?

Some of the issues inherent in the U.S. response to the LRA have implications far beyond the fate of the group itself. These include the timing and impetus for U.S. involvement and troop deployments; the relative priority of counter-LRA efforts compared to other policy priorities; the allocation of resources in the context of broader policy debates related to the size and scope of the federal budget; and the definition of criteria for success and/or withdrawal of U.S. forces. Even for those who contend that the removal of the LRA is a priority for humanitarian and foreign policy reasons, the relative application of means to ends may be the deciding factor in whether U.S. actions are ultimately considered successful.

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Author Contact Information

Alexis Arieff  
Analyst in African Affairs  
aarieff@crs.loc.gov, 7-2459

Lauren Ploch  
Specialist in African Affairs  
lploch@crs.loc.gov, 7-7640