Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary

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Summary

This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations. Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events. A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the troubled status of Pakistan’s domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns and U.S. foreign assistance programs for Pakistan are briefly summarized, and the report closes with an analysis of current U.S.-Pakistan relations.

In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy efforts. Global and South Asian regional terrorism, and a nearly decade-long effort to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan are viewed as top-tier concerns. Pakistan’s apparently accelerated nuclear weapons program and the long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir continue to threaten regional stability. Pakistan is identified as a base for numerous U.S.-designated terrorist groups and, by some accounts, most of the world’s jihadist terrorist plots have some connection to Pakistan-based elements.

While Obama Administration officials and most senior congressional leaders have continued to recognize Pakistan as a crucial partner in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to core U.S. interests have deepened considerably in 2011. Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding Pakistani’s perceived security interests. Top U.S. officials have offered public expressions of acute concern about Islamabad’s ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from Pakistani territory. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2011 and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $22 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.

This report will be updated periodically. For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary

Contents

Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Major Developments in 2011........................................................................................................... 4
  High-Profile Political Assassinations ......................................................................................... 4
  The Raymond Davis Affair ........................................................................................................... 5
  The Death of Osama bin Laden .................................................................................................. 6
  Attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station .............................................................................. 8
  Torture and Killing of Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad ........................................................... 9
  Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance ......................................................................... 9
  Persistent Furore Over UAV Strikes .......................................................................................... 10
The ISI and Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation ............................................................................. 11
Administration Assessments and Bilateral Diplomacy .................................................................. 13
  Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review II .................................................................................... 13
  Administration Assessments and FY2011 Certification .......................................................... 13
  Recent Bilateral Diplomacy ....................................................................................................... 16
Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency .............................................................................................. 18
  Persistent Turmoil in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ................................................................. 18
  Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations .................................................................... 20
  A Haqqani Role in Afghan Reconciliation? .............................................................................. 22
  Pakistan and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan ....................................... 23
  U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication ....................................................................... 24
Indigenous Islamist Militancy and Pakistani Military Operations .................................................. 24
Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals .......................................................................................... 26
An Increasing Pakistani Turn to China ............................................................................................ 27
Pakistan-India Relations ................................................................................................................ 29
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security .............................................................................. 30
Deteriorated Economic Circumstances .......................................................................................... 31
Domestic Political Instability ......................................................................................................... 32
Human Rights Issues ..................................................................................................................... 34
U.S. Assistance ............................................................................................................................... 35

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Pakistan ................................................................................................................ 7
Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas .................................................. 15

Tables

Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012 .......................................................................................................................... 38

Contacts

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 39
Overview

A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. Pakistan has been praised by U.S. leaders for its post-2001 cooperation with U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests are dramatically deeper in 2011. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgents and anti-India militants operating from its territory.

May 2011 revelations that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden (OBL) had found apparently years-long refuge inside Pakistan has led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship. In September, the top U.S. military officer issued unprecedentedly strong and public accusations that Pakistan was providing support to Afghan insurgents who attack U.S. interests, adding to already fraught relations. Anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remain rife among ordinary Pakistanis. Pakistan’s troubled economic conditions and precarious political setting combine with perilous security circumstances and a history of difficult relations with neighbors to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers.

After more than ten years of close U.S. engagement with Pakistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the answers to several key questions related to U.S. interests in the bilateral relationship remain unclear and incomplete, at best:

- To what extent is Pakistan genuinely committed to U.S. goals of combating militancy, stabilizing Afghanistan, and establishing an inclusive post-conflict government in Kabul?
- What leverage does the United States have to influence Pakistani policies?
- Is a major adjustment of current U.S. policies toward Pakistan needed given the trajectory of bilateral relations and in regional dynamics? What would be the potential risks and rewards of such a shift?
- Are U.S. foreign assistance programs in Pakistan making sufficient progress toward realizing their stated goals?
- Will Pakistan persist in distinguishing among Islamist militant and terrorist groups, maintaining links to some in the pursuit of perceived national interests?
- Will the Pakistani and Indian governments find ways to substantively reduce levels of tension and the potential for open conflict between them?
- Are Pakistan’s nuclear materials and technologies prone to leakage?
- Will Islamabad’s politicians and civilian institutions be able to wrest meaningful control over foreign and national security policies from the country’s historically dominant security services?

Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy concern. Its arguably growing influence hinders progress toward key U.S. goals, including the defeat of Al Qaeda and
Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary

other anti-U.S. terrorist groups, Afghan stabilization, and resolution of the historic Pakistan-India rivalry that threatens the entire region’s stability and that has a nuclear dimension. Long-standing worries that American citizens have been recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by Pakistan-based elements have become more acute. Upon the May 1, 2011, death of Osama bin Laden in a covert U.S. military operation in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, many in Congress began to more forcefully question the effectiveness of current U.S. policy. Some openly called for the curtailment or significant reduction of U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan.¹

Despite numerous and serious problems in the bilateral relationship, the Obama Administration continues to view continued close engagement with Islamabad as being necessary in pursuit of key U.S. national interests. Following a surprise, one-day visit to Islamabad in May, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate panel that her “very candid discussions” with Pakistani leaders conveyed to them a U.S. expectation that they “take concrete actions on the goals we share,” and that the United States “will never tolerate a safe haven for those who kill Americans”:

We’re going to continue making clear to them our expectations, we’re going to continue to try to work with them across the entire political spectrum, we’re going to demand more from them, but we are not going to expect any miracles overnight. This is a long-term, frustrating, frankly, sometimes very outraging kind of experience ... and yet, I don’t see any alternative if you look at vital American national interests.²

In his June announcement of a U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014, President Barack Obama said the United States “will continue to press Pakistan to expand its participation in securing a more peaceful future for this war-torn region” and “will insist that it keep its commitments” to neutralize terrorist safe havens in its territory. In August, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta openly acknowledged the complicating factors of Pakistan’s ties to anti-Afghan and anti-India terrorist groups, but still insisted that the United States “has no choice but to maintain a relationship with Pakistan.”³ Many, if not most, independent observers concur that continued engagement with Pakistan is the only realistic option for the United States, although some high-visibility analysts counsel taking an increasingly confrontational posture toward Islamabad.⁴

As part of the Administration’s strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan, its Pakistan policy has included a tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as the conditioning of U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating

¹ “Congress Turns Against Pakistan,” Politico, May 3, 2011. On May 3, 2011, H.R. 1699, the Pakistan Foreign Aid Accountability Act, was introduced in the House. The act would prohibit future foreign assistance to Pakistan unless the Secretary of State certifies that the Pakistani government was not complicit in hiding OBL.
² “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on Goals and Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcriptions, June 23, 2011.
⁴ Christophe Jafferelot, “What Engagement With Pakistan Can—and Can’t—Do,” Foreign Affairs (online), October 12, 2011. An example of the harder-line perspective comes from former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, who contends that if U.S. inducements to gain Pakistani cooperation continue to prove insufficient, Washington should curtail military aid, exert financial and diplomatic pressure, and ramp up its own military operations against Pakistan-based insurgents. If Pakistani intransigence persists, he urges the United States to maintain a robust security presence in Afghanistan and consider increasing ties with India as part of a “containment regime” against Pakistan, channeling future assistance in ways that empower Pakistan’s civil society. With September revelations of apparent ISI involvement in attacks on U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Khalilzad’s views only hardened (Zalmay Khalilzad, “How to Get Pakistan to Break With Islamic Militants” (op-ed), Washington Post, June 30, 2011; “Our Deceitful ‘Friends’” (op-ed), Newsweek, October 3, 2011)).
militancy and in further fostering democratic institutions. However, in July, the Administration suspended up to $800 million in planned security assistance to Pakistan and appears to be more rigorously evaluating Pakistan’s cooperation and progress before releasing further aid. Meanwhile, U.S. congressional committees have in 2011 voted for more stringent conditions on future assistance to Pakistan, and some Members have called for a significant or even total curtailment of aid. Congress appropriated more than $2.4 billion in direct aid for Pakistan in FY2011, placing it among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance.

Developments in 2011 have for many analysts only validated a preexisting view that Pakistani behavior is unlikely to change given the long-held geostrategic perspectives of decision makers there. If true, this means Pakistan will continue to tolerate safe havens for “friendly” militant groups regardless of U.S. aid levels or more overt threats. By many accounts, Pakistan’s apparently schizophrenic foreign policy behavior is a direct outcome of the Pakistan military’s perceived strategic interests. This leads some analysts to encourage full-throated U.S. support for Pakistan’s civilian authorities as the only viable means of reducing conflict both inside Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbors. The current U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, is among those who has in the past insisted that Pakistan requires a strong civilian government and that common U.S.-Pakistan successes can be achieved only “with a strong partner in Pakistan’s democratically elected government.”

Still, there are few signs that Pakistan’s current civilian leaders are willing and able to seriously address the outcomes of their country’s security policies and move them in the direction of moderation. Even in internal discussions these leaders continue to shirk responsibility for increased rates of extremism there, and they continue to place the bulk of blame on the United States. This perspective—apparently widespread among the Pakistani public, as well—arguably omits enthusiastic official Pakistani participation in supporting Islamist militancy in the region (including the provision of vital support to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime throughout most of the 1990s). By nearly all accounts, this support continues, albeit selectively, to date.

President Obama’s decision to travel to India in November 2010 without any stops in Pakistan created anxiety among Pakistani officials who see signs of a “pro-India” tilt in Washington destabilizing for the region. By refraining from direct engagement in the Kashmir dispute, moving forward with U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation, and seeming to sympathize with New Delhi’s perspective on the root sources of regional terrorism, the Administration’s current India policies may continue to make difficult any effective winning of hearts and minds in Pakistan. Moreover, Afghanistan’s October 2011 choice to establish closer and more overt ties with India, Pakistan’s primary rival, is grist for those figures—most especially within Pakistan’s security institutions—who argue that Pakistan increasingly is under threat of strategic encirclement by external forces that seek to weaken and perhaps dismember the country.

7 For example, in a speech at Pakistan’s July 2011 “National Seminar on De-Radicalization,” Prime Minister Gilani mentioned the United States only a single time, when finding the “genesis” of his country’s “security paradigm” in the “traumatic events of the U.S.-led Afghan jihad” and in the “inept post-cold war handling of Afghanistan by the West” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs transcript, July 6, 2011).
Within this geopolitical context, U.S.-Pakistan relations have become far more antagonistic in 2011. Although put on the defensive and subject to unusual domestic criticism since OBL’s death, a militant raid on a major Pakistani naval base, and other developments, Pakistan’s military remains the locus of power in the country, particularly with regard to the setting of foreign and national security policies. The wave of Pakistani public anger at the OBL raid reached even to the top levels of the military, where the sense of shock and betrayal was reported to be acute.

The Pakistan Army’s 11 corps commanders may have since become unified in believing that cooperation with the United States is a net liability for their institution, if not for the country itself, and Gen. Kayani’s authority could potentially be undermined if he does not maintain a tougher line with Washington. As such, many observers are unsurprised that Pakistan’s military has remain largely unmoved by U.S. demands for more energetic counterterrorism action. Some believe the unannounced mid-October visit to Islamabad (and Kabul) of a high-level U.S. delegation led by Secretary Clinton may have been an effort by the Obama Administration to present a united front in conveying to Pakistani leaders a continued willingness to support them along with a maximally stern message that Afghan insurgents finding haven in western Pakistan must be neutralized.

Major Developments in 2011

High-Profile Political Assassinations

On January 4, Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, was assassinated when a member of his own security team shot him 26 times in broad daylight while other bodyguards looked on. A senior figure in the national coalition-leading Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Taseer was among the country’s most liberal politicians, and he had incurred the wrath of Islamists and other conservatives with vocal criticisms of the country’s controversial blasphemy laws. His killer, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, has since been lauded as a hero by significant sections of Pakistani society, and numerous observers were disturbed by signs that even leaders of the country’s majority Barelvi Muslim sect, usually considered to hold moderate interpretations of Islam, were vocal supporters of the assassin. Taseer’s assassination, strongly condemned by Secretary Clinton, was viewed as a major blow to liberal forces in Pakistan. On October 1, an anti-terrorism court sentenced Qadri to death for the killing. The sentence elicited backlash from Qadri’s sympathizers and was subsequently stayed by the Lahore High Court.

Meanwhile, on March 2, gunmen ambushed the car of Minorities Minister Shabaz Bhatti—the federal cabinet’s only Christian member—and shot him to death. Bhatti had long campaigned for tolerance toward Pakistan’s religious minorities and had, like Gov. Taseer, openly called for reform of the blasphemy laws. His killers left pamphlets at the scene warning against such changes. Secretary Clinton expressed being “shocked and outraged” by Bhatti’s killing, calling it “an attack on the values of tolerance and respect for people of all faiths and backgrounds.”

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10 In addition to protest rallies, dozens of angry lawyers ransacked the courtroom of the trial judge, whose safety is now in question (“Backlash for Pakistan Judge Who Convicted Assassin,” Agence France Presse, October 4, 2011).
championed by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father.” Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani was the only senior government official to attend Bhatti’s funeral. President Zardari addressed the two assassinations with an English-language op-ed in which he contended that, “A small but increasingly belligerent minority is intent on undoing the very principles of tolerance upon which [Pakistan] was founded.” Despite such claims, the Taseer and Bhatti assassinations and subsequent events were widely seen as evidence that Islamist radicalism is increasing in Pakistan, especially given what many saw as corresponding evidence that the country’s more liberal- and secular-minded elite were being cowed into relative silence.

The Raymond Davis Affair

On January 27, Raymond Davis, an American working at the U.S. Consulate in Lahore, shot and killed two men who approached his vehicle in urban traffic. Davis contends he acted in self-defense when the men tried to rob him at gunpoint. However, Pakistani authorities accused Davis of murder and a court barred the government from releasing him despite insistence from top U.S. officials that diplomatic immunity shielded him from prosecution. President Barack Obama described Davis as being “our diplomat.” Some reports suggested that the two Pakistani men killed were intelligence operatives tasked with tracking Davis; other reports indicated that the men were common armed robbers who had committed other crimes earlier that day. The U.S. Consulate at first described Davis as “technical and administrative staff,” but provided no details of his duties. Only more than three weeks after the incident did the U.S. government admit that Davis, a former Special Forces soldier, was in fact a CIA contractor and member of a covert team that was tracking militant groups inside Pakistan.

The controversy around Davis’s legal status confounded Pakistani leaders, who privately recognized the requirements of international conventions while also having to face increasingly virulent public anger. Accusations of buck-passing led to open rhetorical clashes between federal coalition-leading PPP members and opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) figures whose party dominates the Punjab provincial government in Lahore.

The controversy led some in Congress to openly suggest that U.S. assistance to Pakistan might be reduced or curtailed if the case was not resolved in a satisfactory manner. The U.S. government postponed trilateral talks with Pakistan and Afghanistan scheduled for February in response to the Davis dispute. In mid-February, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Kerry traveled to Islamabad in an effort to reduce escalating tensions, taking the opportunity to express the “deepest sorrow” felt by top U.S. leaders at the loss of life. Also around this time, the Pakistani Prime Minister raised the idea that diyat, or “blood money,” could provide all parties

15 H.Res. 145 called for a “freeze” on all monetary assistance to Pakistan until such time Davis was released (the resolution did not emerge from committee).
with a face-saving resolution. This Koranic concept allows murder cases to be settled if the victims’ families forgive the accused and agree to financial compensation.17

On February 23, senior U.S. and Pakistani military officers held a daylong meeting in Oman. Although scheduled months before, the session’s central aim was believed by many to be resolution of the Davis affair, and the CIA soon after opened direct negotiations with the ISI in an effort to secure Davis’s release. Yet the case dragged on without resolution into mid-March, with the Islamabad government failing to instruct the Lahore court on Davis’s status, and that court moving ahead with plans for a murder trial in lieu of such clarification. Then, on March 16, after more weeks of closed-door negotiations, political pressure by Pakistani officials on the courts, and, finally, a pledge of $2.3 million in “blood money” for the victims’ families, Davis was freed and flown out of the country. Top U.S. officials denied there had been any quid pro quo arrangement related to Davis’s release or that the United States had provided the financial compensation. The U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan announced that the U.S. Justice Department would investigate the shootings.18 Still, the outcome left many Pakistanis feeling that their judicial system had been seriously manipulated, in large part by the U.S. government.

The Death of Osama bin Laden19

On May 1, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden was located and killed in the mid-sized Pakistani city of Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in a compound one-half mile from the country’s premier military academy, just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad (see Figure 1). The location and circumstances of OBL’s death exacerbated Washington’s long-held doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism, and brought calls to curtail U.S. assistance to Pakistan. The news of OBL’s whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistan’s role and potential complicity in his refuge. President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, told reporters it was “inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system” in Pakistan.20

For a wide array of observers, the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL left only two realistic conclusions: either Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive, or the country’s military and intelligence services were grossly incompetent in their search for top Al Qaeda leaders. In either case, after many years of claims by senior Pakistani officials—both civilian and military—that most-wanted extremist figures were finding no refuge in their country, Pakistan’s credibility suffered a serious blow.21

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17 *Diyat* is a tenet of Islamic law sanctioned by Pakistani jurisprudence and reportedly used in at least half of homicide cases there (“‘Blood Money' Tradition Might Help Resolve U.S.-Pakistani Row,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 13, 2011).

18 To date, it is unclear if such an investigation is underway (“Pakistan Seeks an Update on Raymond Davis,” *Washington Post* (online), October 5, 2011).

19 For broader discussion, see CRS Report R41809, *Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations*, coordinated by John Rollins.


21 A listing of some of the oftentimes categorical, high-profile Pakistani denials about OBL specifically are in “Osama bin Who?,” *Foreign Policy* (online), May 2, 2011.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence services came under rare domestic criticism for being unable to detect and intercept a foreign military raid deep inside Pakistani territory, and for ostensible incompetence in detecting the presence there of the world’s most-wanted terrorist. Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani warned that Pakistan would not tolerate any future incursions. The security agencies may have sought to deflect criticism by emphasizing a narrative in which the country’s sovereignty had been grossly violated and so focusing the people’s ire on external actors.\textsuperscript{22} There were signs that this tack was at least partially effective: Parliament subsequently

\textsuperscript{22} While Army Chief Kayani admitted to intelligence “shortcomings,” a May 5 release stated that any similar “violations of the sovereignty of Pakistan will warrant a review on the level of military/intelligence cooperation with the United States,” and also warned Indian leaders against undertaking any similar operations (see (continued...))
issued a strong condemnation of the U.S. raid and again called for a halt to U.S.-launched drone strikes in western Pakistan. It also threatened to close land lines of communication through Pakistan that are vital to supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, public demonstrations took a bellicose, anti-American cast.

The developments fueled bilateral distrust and acrimony unseen in the post-2001 period. Capitol Hill became the site of much pointed questioning of the wisdom of continued engagement with a national government that may at some levels have knowledge of OBL’s whereabouts; figures from both major parties expressed disbelief at Pakistan’s allegations of ignorance and called for greater oversight and accountability for future U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Still, senior Members tended to take a more measured view, with the House Speaker voicing the opinion that circumstances called for “more engagement [with Pakistan], not less.” Such sentiments tracked well with the view of many independent observers that—despite ample reasons for discouragement and distrust—the United States has had no good options other than continuing to engage Pakistan in what many analysts have described as “a bad marriage.”

President Obama and other top U.S. officials maintained a generally positive posture toward Pakistan in the weeks following the Abbottabad raid, while also noting that serious questions had arisen over the circumstances of OBL’s refuge. The U.S. government reportedly has no conclusive evidence indicating that official Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s whereabouts. Privately, senior Administration officials reportedly became divided over the future of the bilateral relationship, with some at an apparent loss for patience and advocating strong reprisals for perceived Pakistani intransigence. Senator Kerry—at the time the senior-most U.S. official to visit Pakistan after OBL’s death—told an interviewer, “In the Congress, this is a make-or-break moment” for aid to Pakistan, and said he would tell Pakistani leaders there needed to be “a real demonstration of commitment” to fighting terrorist groups in coming months.

**Attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Station**

On May 22, a team of heavily armed militants penetrated security barriers and stormed Pakistan’s premier naval base, the Mehran Naval Station near Karachi. Ten security personnel and four militants were killed in the ensuing 16-hour-long gun battle; two other militants are believed to have escaped before Pakistani commandos regained control of the base. The militants were able to destroy two U.S.-supplied P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in their hangar.

The attack, which the Pakistani Taliban claimed was taken in revenge for the killing of bin Laden, was the second major embarrassment of the month for the beleaguered Pakistani military, which seemed at a loss to explain how such a damaging breach could occur. The ability of a handful of attackers to wreak such havoc left the security services open to scathing criticism from the generally pro-military Pakistani media, and also brought into question the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials. Suspicions quickly arose that the base’s attackers had

(...continued)


inside help, given especially their ability to carefully avoid detection and take effective cover once inside. Within days a former Navy commando was arrested in connection with the case. Three navy officers, the base commander among them, are to be court-martialed on charges of negligence in connection with the attack, an unusual disciplinary action for the Pakistani military demonstrating the seriousness of the breach.  

Torture and Killing of Journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, is accused of ordering the torture and murder of investigative journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, who disappeared on May 29 just after penning an article suggesting that the Mehran attack was carried out because the Pakistan Navy was trying to crack down on Al Qaeda cells that had infiltrated the service. Shahzad, whose writing had riled the Pakistani establishment repeatedly in the past, reportedly had received numerous threats from the ISI. In a rare public statement, the ISI denied playing any role in Shahzad’s fate. A closed government inquiry into the death began in June; unnamed U.S. officials later said there was sufficient classified intelligence to conclude that senior ISI officials had directed the brutal attack on Shahzad in an effort to silence critics. Soon after, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen went on record with the claim that Shahzad’s killing “was sanctioned by the [Pakistani] government.”

Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance

In late-June testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Clinton told Senators that U.S. military aid to Pakistan could be slowed “unless and until we see some steps taken.” Two weeks later, the Obama Administration made some significant changes in its security-related aid policy. According to congressional and State Department sources, from $440 million-$500 million worth of scheduled counterinsurgency training and equipment for Pakistan was put under suspension due to the recently reduced U.S. military trainer presence there, along with obstacles to fulfilling other agreements between the two countries. Some of the equipment cannot be set up or used for training because necessary U.S. personnel are no longer in-country. In addition, Islamabad’s delays in processing U.S. visa requests led to the suspension of $300 million in planned FY2011 Coalition Support Fund reimbursements. Although the Administration presented the move as being necessitated by technical factors, observers saw it as a message and warning to Islamabad that key assistance spigots could close in lieu of improved cooperation.

A Pakistani military spokesman dismissed the development as having no effect on his organization’s ability to conduct future combat operations, and he repeated the Army Chief’s June suggestion that more U.S. security assistance be reprogrammed toward development projects in Pakistan. News that the United States would partially suspend military aid became the headline story in Pakistan, where media coverage was nearly unanimous in identifying the development as

(...continued)
a clear sign that bilateral relations were worsening. In the view of some observers, the Administration’s decision was more likely to elicit greater resentment than greater cooperation from Pakistani leaders, and could be taken as validation by ordinary Pakistanis who see the United States as a fickle and unreliable ally.  

Persistent Furor Over UAV Strikes

Missile strikes in Pakistan reportedly launched by armed American Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been a controversial, but arguably effective tactic against Islamist militants in remote regions of western Pakistan. By one assessment, 118 drone strikes occurred in 2010 alone, more than during the preceding six years combined. Sixty more strikes were reported through the first nine months of 2011. The accelerated missile strikes in western Pakistan reportedly have taken a significant toll on Al Qaeda and other Islamist extremist militants, but is also criticized as an extrajudicial measure that kills civilians and may also contribute to militant recruitment. The Pakistani government regularly issues protests over the strikes—and the perception that they violate Pakistani sovereignty fuels considerable anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani public—but most observers believe official Pakistan has tacitly allowed the strikes and at times provided intelligence for them.

Only one day after Raymond Davis’s March release, a reported U.S.-launched missile strike in North Waziristan killed 44 people. While U.S. officials suggested that militants were targeted, Pakistani officials said an open-air jirga (tribal council) of peaceful tribal leaders had been hit by four missiles in what the Foreign Ministry called “a flagrant violation of all humanitarian rules and norms.” Even more unusual was a vehement statement from Gen. Kayani himself, which said that “peaceful citizens” had been “carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard for human life.” In what appeared to some to be a high-visibility, nonverbal U.S. response to Pakistani complaints, reported U.S.-launched missile strikes killed six alleged Afghan militants in South Waziristan only two days later. In a further expression of anger, Islamabad announced that it would not participate in upcoming scheduled tripartite talks with the United States and Afghanistan. Imran Khan, the populist leader of a small opposition party, subsequently organized what was characterized as an anti-drone strike “sit in” that shut down a major highway near Peshawar used to ferry supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan. Following the death of OBL and renewed Pakistan rancor over reported drone strikes, press reports suggested the U.S. government ramped up pressure with this tactic—at least three strikes reportedly were launched in the ten days following OBL’s death—perhaps in an effort to take advantage of confusion within militant ranks.

Top Obama Administration figures reportedly differ on the wisdom of continuing UAV strikes in Pakistan, with some State Department and Pentagon figures urging the CIA to reduce the pace of its strikes. While there is said to be widespread agreement on the tactical effectiveness of UAV attacks, proponents of more judicious use of the tactic reportedly worry that an intense pace of strikes is aggravating an already troubled relationship with Pakistan and may risk destabilizing that country. Despite the apparent killing of many hundreds of militants and dozens of their...
commanders, violence in western Pakistan has hardly subsided as a result of missile strikes. Yet, in present circumstances, many commentators believe the U.S. government may have no better options than to continue employing the tactic. Some analysts suggest that increasing transparency and boosting Islamabad’s sense of partnership in UAV strikes could dampen Pakistani opposition.34

The ISI and Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation

Close U.S. links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence date back to the 1980s, when American and Pakistani intelligence officers oversaw cooperative efforts to train and supply Afghan “freedom fighters” who were battling the Soviet Army. Yet mutual mistrust has been ever-present and, in 2008, long-standing doubts about the activities and aims of the ISI compounded. U.S. officials repeatedly have fingered the ISI for actively supporting Afghan insurgents with money, supplies, and planning guidance. There appears to be ongoing conviction among U.S. officials that sanctuaries in Pakistan have allowed Afghan militants to sustain their insurgency and that elements of the ISI continue to support them. The ISI is also regularly linked to anti-India terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai in which some 165 people were killed, six Americans among them. As discussed below, recent attention has focused on ISI links with the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network of Afghan insurgents. Pakistani officials regularly provide assurances that no elements of the ISI are cooperating with militants or extremists. However, to many independent observers, Pakistan’s security services increasingly appear to be penetrated by Islamist extremists.35

Even before the Raymond Davis episode began, reports indicated that CIA-ISI relations were at a nadir, with American officials frustrated at the lack of expanded Pakistani military operations and at signs that elements within the ISI continue to provide backing to certain militant groups. The Davis affair sharpened Pakistani attention to—and acrimony toward—the presence of U.S. security officials and contractors in Pakistan. Revelation of Davis’s status as a CIA contractor led the ISI to demand an accounting of all such operatives working in Pakistan, but intelligence cooperation may have been frozen immediately upon the late January shooting. Just weeks before the OBL raid, Islamabad had ordered more than two dozen U.S. Special Forces military trainers to leave the country in an apparent response to the Davis case. The trainers had been working to improve the capabilities of Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps.36

In April, the ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, was in Virginia to meet with his counterpart, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta. Officially, the talks were said to have been productive, with the CIA-ISI relationship remaining “on solid footing.” However, many reports described Pasha as having made significant demands for greater control over covert U.S. action in his country, as well as calls for a steep reduction in the number of CIA operatives and Special Forces soldiers

35 “Infiltrators Worry Pakistani Military,” Washington Post, May 28, 2011. In June, a Pakistani brigadier general was arrested and four majors questioned due to their links with the Hizb-ul-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a nonviolent, but outlawed Islamist group that seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The general, whose brother may be a senior intelligence officer, is the most senior officer to face such allegations since 1995 (“Arrest of Pakistani Officer Revives Fears of Extremism Within Military,” CNN.com, June 22, 2011).
working in Pakistan, and a halt to drone strikes there. The demand to remove hundreds of American personnel was said to have come from Army Chief Kayani himself. While U.S. officials insisted there was no plan to end or restrict the CIA-run drone program, and denied that the CIA had been asked to withdraw any employees from Pakistan, the agency reportedly did agree to be more open with Pakistani authorities about such employees and their activities, as well as more cooperative when planning drone strikes.37

The circumstances of OBL’s death brought renewed and intensive focus on purported ISI links with Islamist extremism. Following the May 1 raid, Pakistan sought to crack down on its own citizens who were found to be working with the CIA.38 Islamabad also asked for further reductions in the U.S. military footprint and moved to close three joint “intelligence fusion cells” only recently established in Quetta and Peshawar. The top U.S. military officer called the cuts “very significant.”39 The Obama Administration reportedly pressed Pakistan to reveal the identities of senior ISI operatives as part of the investigation into how OBL was able to find refuge inside Pakistan for five years.40 Pressure was increased to allow American investigators access to bin Laden’s three widows in Pakistani custody. Such access was subsequently granted. One week after OBL’s death, a Pakistani newspaper seen as close to the country’s military and intelligence services published the purported name of the CIA’s Islamabad station chief. This was the second time in six months that the top covert American operative in Pakistan had been publicly named, and U.S. officials reportedly believe such disclosures were being made deliberately by the ISI to demonstrate its leverage and to express anger at U.S. policies.41

After the OBL raid, the ISI leadership was confronted more frequently—and more publically—with U.S. evidence of collusion between Pakistani officials and Afghan insurgents. Such evidence notably included instances in which the CIA alerted Islamabad about the existence of two bomb-making facilities in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), only to have Pakistani army units find the sites abandoned by the time they arrived. This led U.S. officials to assume that the targets had been tipped off about upcoming raids, a charge called “totally false and malicious” by the Pakistani military, which declared that some of the intelligence provided “proved to be incorrect.” Still, U.S. officials repeated the accusations after militants fled two other bomb-making facilities; these officials reportedly believed that Pakistan’s insistence on gaining permission from local tribal elders before entering the area allowed militants to escape.42

With Adm. Mullen’s unprecedented September statements linking the ISI to Haqqani Network attacks on U.S. targets in Afghanistan (see the “Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations” section below), questioning of CIA-ISI cooperation further intensified. Administration officials


38 A Pakistani army major who lived in a home adjacent to OBL’s Abbottabad compound reportedly was arrested on suspicion that he had been recruited by U.S. intelligence. By mid-June some three dozen Pakistani citizens had apparently been detained nationwide for their suspected cooperation with the CIA (“Arrest Indicates Pakistan Leaders Face Rising Pressure to Curb U.S. Role,” Washington Post, June 15, 2011).


reportedly have refused to sign a “memorandum of understanding” with Islamabad that would set a ceiling on the number of U.S. intelligence operatives allowed in the country and require Washington to notify Islamabad ahead of drone strikes, among other provisions. The two governments reportedly agreed on the number of U.S. forces that would be allowed in Pakistan; the maximum of 150 is a significant cut from previous levels, and the number of Special Forces trainers reportedly has been slashed from some 140 to less than 10.43

Concurrent with interagency discord, effective intelligence cooperation has continued. Just days after the OBL raid, a Yemeni national described as a “senior” or “midlevel” Al Qaeda operative was arrested in Karachi with the help of U.S.-provided intelligence. Mohammed Ali Qasim Yaqub reportedly had been a key courier between Al Qaeda’s top leaders, and his capture was seen as a good-faith Pakistani effort to mend relations with Washington. In another apparent effort to rebuild confidence, Pakistan pledged in June to grant more than three dozen visas to CIA officers. Most-wanted terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri was reported killed in an early June drone strike in South Waziristan, and the new Al Qaeda chief’s deputy and operational commander, Libyan explosives expert Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, was reported killed in an August drone strike in North Waziristan (successes in targeting militants in the FATA with unmanned drones likely come with intelligence from Pakistan). In early September, Pakistan announced having arrested three allegedly senior Al Qaeda operatives near Quetta with help from technical assistance provided by the CIA.

Administration Assessments and Bilateral Diplomacy

Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review II

The unclassified version of the Administration’s annual Afghanistan-Pakistan policy, released in December 2010, conveyed an unchanged overarching goal (disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda in the region) and claimed notable gains, especially what it called unprecedented pressure on Al Qaeda in Pakistan, resulting in its weakening. The review called for “greater cooperation with Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan” and acknowledged that effective development strategies are required to complement military means. While recognizing ongoing problems, it noted “significant progress” on combating Al Qaeda in Pakistan and “significant activity” by the Pakistani military to shut down sanctuaries used by Islamist militants in the border region. Senior Pentagon officials lauded what they called substantial improvement in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship during 2010, and a daily and measurable improvement in coordination of counterterrorism efforts.44

Administration Assessments and FY2011 Certification

The Administration’s biannual March 2011 assessment of Afghanistan and Pakistan policy determined that most indicators and metrics against key U.S. objectives had remained static during the reporting period (the latter half of 2010), notably excepting “significant progress” in

combating Al Qaeda in the region. On counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, it noted improved cooperation both within the Pakistani armed forces and between those forces and NATO, but found that the last quarter of 2010 “saw no progress on effectively executing the COIN cycle in KPk [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province] and the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]” (see Figure 2). It found that the Pakistan military was in early 2011 undertaking major clearing operations in the Bajaur agency for the third time in two years, indicating “the inability of the Pakistan military and government to render cleared areas resistant to insurgent return.” The assessment was particularly candid on Pakistan’s repeated failures to make progress in the COIN cycle: “[W]hat remains vexing is the lack of any indication of ‘hold’ and ‘build’ planning or staging efforts to compliment ongoing clearing operations. As such, there remains no clear path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan” [emphasis added].

In apparent conflict with such problematic U.S. government reporting on Pakistan’s progress was a March 18, 2011, certification by Secretary Clinton required under Section 203 of the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73). This certification, which allows the release of security-related FY2011 aid to Pakistan, included the Secretary’s confirmation that Islamabad was demonstrating “a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts toward combating terrorist groups,” had “made progress” on ceasing support to extremist and terrorist groups, as well as on preventing Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating on Pakistani territory, and in “dismantling terrorist bases” in the country. In the wake of revelations that Al Qaeda’s founder was living in plain sight in a Pakistani city, and top U.S. military officials persistently complaining that Pakistan has failed to take action against the Haqqani network in the FATA, the certification met with considerable skepticism and appeared to many observers to be driven primarily by political considerations rather than by ground realities.

The Administration’s September 2011 assessment—covering January-June with a preliminary assessment of July and August—brought little positive news beyond reporting “significant successes” against Al Qaeda, a key aspect of the first of several objectives related to Pakistan:

- On enhancing civilian control and stable government in Pakistan, indicators and metrics “remained static” for the entire reporting period, with political instability continuing, given the government’s inability to implement economic reforms, tackle corruption, or develop a coherent plan for improving infrastructure, especially in the power sector; extremist opposition to blasphemy laws; and uncertainty about the stability of the national ruling coalition.

- On developing Pakistan’s COIN capabilities, indicators and metrics remained static through the first quarter of 2011, then began to decline, with “continued negative trends” into the summer. This was attributed in large degree to the “Pakistan-directed” decrease in bilateral security cooperation—especially following the May OBL raid—which “dramatically reduced the U.S. ability to support Pakistan’s COIN and CT fight,” and a concurrent stalling of Pakistan’s own COIN efforts. Insurgent elements in western Pakistan were seen to have “gained momentum” and “even return to many areas previously cleared by the Pakistani military.” While the Pakistani military did undertake new COIN operations during this period, the offensives “did not, in the end, alter the overall balance between militants and the Pakistan military.”

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On involving the international community in efforts to assist in stabilizing Pakistan, the indicators and metrics were reported to have remained static, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-By Arrangement remaining on hold since August 2010 and only limited progress in funding the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the U.N. Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan.46

Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formally North West Frontier) Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

Recent Bilateral Diplomacy

President Obama has not traveled to Pakistan since taking office, and the bilateral Strategic Dialogue engaged by his Administration has not had a formal session since October 2010. However, high-level interactions, especially among military and intelligence officials, have continued to be frequent. Secretary Clinton’s surprise one-day visit to Islamabad in late May 2011 was described as being filled with tension, with Clinton, accompanied by Adm. Mullen, asking her interlocutors to take “decisive steps” against Islamist militants, a request reportedly met coolly. The senior U.S. officials also received a reported rebuff when they ask that Islamabad reverse its decision to shut down intelligence sharing centers in western Pakistan. However, in a sign that efforts at reconciliation were being made, the two governments were said to have established a new joint intelligence team to pursue most-wanted terrorist suspects in Pakistan.47

In addition to the several destabilizing developments discussed above, U.S.-Pakistan relations have been negatively affected by two other notable recent episodes. One issue of contention has been freedom of travel for U.S. diplomats in Pakistan. Incidents in which such diplomats have been prevented from moving between cities reportedly have amounted to “official harassment” from a U.S. perspective, but Pakistani officials insist that requiring “No Objection Certificates” for Americans leaving Islamabad are neither new nor U.S.-specific.48 Another was the July revelation that two U.S. citizens of Pakistani origin had for many years been working illicitly on behalf of the ISI in an effort to influence U.S. Kashmir policy.49 Moreover, the August kidnaping of Warren Weinstein, a 70-year-old American development expert, from his Lahore home alarmed observers, especially because Weinstein had lived in Pakistan for seven years and appeared to have been an active friend of Pakistani economic growth. To date, no group has taken responsibility and no ransom or other demands have been issued; his status remains unknown.

At the ministerial level, the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue appears to have been postponed indefinitely; formal talks including Secretary Clinton, originally slated for March, have not occurred. Yet engagement has continued at lower levels:

- The U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Tripartite Commission—established in 2003 to bring together military commanders for regular discussions on Afghan stability and border security—met for the 34th time in Islamabad in June.
- In July, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs William Brownfield was in Islamabad for working level discussions with Interior Minister Rehman Malik.

49 The men came under Federal indictment for failure to register as foreign agents. One of the accused remains at large in Pakistan, but the other, Virginia resident Ghulam Nabi Fai, was arrested for lobbying U.S. lawmakers and funneling campaign contributions to some in Congress over a ten-year period with at least $4 million in funds provided by the ISI. Fai, longtime director of the Kashmiri American Council—a Washington-based nonprofit group ostensibly dedicated to the cause of Kashmir self-determination—admitted receiving funds from the ISI but insisted his group maintained independence from its viewpoint. The timing of his arrest, coming on the heels of Pakistan’s arrest of a doctor charged with aiding the CIA operation against Osama bin Laden, led some to conclude that Washington was sending a message to Islamabad (see “Another Challenge to U.S.-Pakistan Ties,” Council on Foreign Relations Interview, July 21, 2011).
• The “trilateral core group” of the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, established in May to discuss Afghan reconciliation, met for the fourth time in Islamabad in August, when U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Amb. Marc Grossman joined the Afghan deputy foreign minister and the Pakistani foreign secretary. At a press briefing following the meeting, Grossman took the opportunity to “highlight the unique role and important role that Pakistan must play in supporting” the process.50

• In mid-September, U.S. Special Envoy for International Energy Affairs Carlos Pascal met with Minister of Water and Power Syed Naveed Qamar in Islamabad as part of the U.S.-Pakistan Energy Dialogue.

• Later in September, Deputy Secretary of State Tom Nides hosted Finance Minister Abdul Hafeez Sheikh for the fifth meeting of the Economics and Finance Working Group to discuss the “New Silk Road” initiative for the region.

• The SRAP was in Islamabad in mid-October for meetings with all of Pakistan’s top leadership. It was his fifth visit to Pakistan since taking the position in 2011.

Secretary Clinton met with her Pakistani counterpart, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in mid-September. Senior State Department officials commenting afterward provided little detail on the substance of the more than three-hour-long talks, but did acknowledge that the recent attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had “changed the nature of the meeting” and that “there are clearly actions that the Pakistani could take to go after the Haqqani Network.”51

In mid-October, the Obama Administration made a major show of diplomatic force when Secretary Clinton led a large, high-level delegation to Islamabad. Accompanied by CIA Director David Petraeus, new Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, Deputy National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, SRAP Grossman, and other senior officials, Clinton sought to impress upon the entire Pakistani civilian and military leadership that, while the Administration still seeks to build a strategic relationship with Islamabad, the United States will not tolerate the continued existence of militant safe havens in western Pakistan and will take action against them if the Pakistanis do not. The delegation also pressed Pakistani leaders to publicly endorse Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network participation in negotiations on Afghan reconciliation, and to help in creating a regional architecture that promotes stability and economic integration.52

51 “Senior State Department Officials Hold a Background Briefing on Secretary Clinton’s Meeting With Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar,” CQ Transcriptions, September 18, 2011.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary

Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency

Persistent Turmoil in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

It is widely held that success in Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan, and that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the long-standing animosity between Islamabad and Kabul. Despite some warming of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in 2010 and early 2011, Afghan officials still openly accuse Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. Pakistan’s mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory, the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani Network leading among these.

Islamabad is discomfited by signs that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is not long-term and that the international community may “abandon” the region in ways damaging to Pakistani interests, as was the case during the 1990s. Many analysts saw President Obama’s June 22 announcement of an impending U.S. military drawdown from Afghanistan as yet another signal to stakeholder governments and Taliban elements, alike, that the United States was most concerned with an exit strategy and may not make a long-term commitment to stabilizing the region. New restrictions on and reductions of U.S. aid to Pakistan only compounds such concerns in Pakistan.

The Islamabad government considers itself to be indispensable to successful Afghan peace talks. Pakistani leaders are in large part motivated by a desire to deny India significant influence in a post-conflict Afghanistan. In early 2010, the Afghan Taliban’s top military commander and key aide to Mullah Omar, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured in a joint ISI-CIA operation in Karachi. By some accounts, Pakistani elements “orchestrated” the Baradar arrest to facilitate talks with “willing” Taliban commanders and pave the way for reconciliation negotiations. Cynics contend that the ISI’s motives may simply have been to thwart any anticipated negotiations.

In June 2010, Pakistan launched an effort to broker a reconciliation between the Kabul government and the Haqqanis. This initiative sparked concerns that Islamabad will seek to exploit the political situation—both in the region and in Washington—to mold a settlement giving Pakistan maximal influence in a post-conflict Kabul. In October 2010, NATO facilitated the secret travel of at least three QST figures and a representative of the Haqqani Network from Pakistan to Kabul for meetings with senior Afghan government officials. It is unclear whether Pakistani officials were included in this process; some reports indicated they were not, others described ISI officials as having participated directly. In another clear indication that Islamabad has substantive influence over top Afghan insurgents, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan has suggested that Pakistan is hesitant to allow Taliban leaders to travel to Kabul for reconciliation talks. He asks that Pakistan support the process by allowing those willing to talk to be given the

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54 Members of Pakistan’s nongovernmental foreign policy “elite” are reported to maintain that Pakistan’s key objective is to see a pacific Afghanistan with an inclusive government and a limited Indian presence, even in the area of economic and social development. From this perspective, only significant power-sharing with Afghan Pashtuns will ensure a future Kabul government sensitive to Pakistani interests, to some extent leaving Islamabad’s decision makers “stuck with the Taliban” for the time being, insofar as the group is seen to represent Pashtun influence (see Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi, “Pakistan, the United States, and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 25, 2011).
opportunity to do so. Afghan President Karzai has echoed these complaints, saying insurgent leaders inside Pakistan are not sufficiently independent of Pakistani control to enter into negotiations on their own.\(^{55}\)

Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani interest. Islamabad strongly endorses current efforts to make peace with the Afghan Taliban and insists that the parameters for such a process should be set by the Kabul government. In April 2011, Prime Minister Gilani, Army Chief Kayani, and ISI Director Pasha all traveled to Kabul as part of an effort to upgrade the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission established in January and so accelerate the peace process. American observers were disturbed by reports that Gilani had used the meetings as an opportunity to wean Kabul away from its strategic partnership with the United States and instead move closer to Islamabad and seek greater support from China. According to the reports, Gilani criticized America’s “imperial designs” and contended that ending the Afghan war required Kabul and Islamabad to take “ownership” of the peace process.\(^{56}\) The new Joint Commission met for the first time in June, with Gilani and President Karzai expressing their commitment to an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” process. The two sides also produced a 23-point “Islamabad Declaration” pledging improved and deepened ties in a wide range of issue-areas.\(^{57}\)

Expressions of Pakistan-Afghanistan amity again proved fleeting and relations have deteriorated since. In the summer of 2011, increased incidence of “reverse infiltration” caused friction between Islamabad and Kabul, especially after more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers were killed in a June cross-border raid by up to 400 militants from Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Other episodes involving cross-border attacks on Pakistani territory by formations of hundreds of militants followed. The persistence of such attacks suggests that insurgent forces believed defeated in Pakistani operations in the FATA may have simply shifted to havens on the Afghan side of the Durand Line. Meanwhile, in late June, Afghan officials accused Pakistan of firing more than 760 rockets into the Kunar, Nangarhar, and Khost provinces over a period of six weeks, killing at least 60 people, including women and children. Pakistan rejected charges that its forces had been involved in any cross-border attacks. Some in Afghanistan see the barrages as part of an orchestrated and official Pakistani effort to “reshape Afghanistan as a Pakistani colony” after International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops draw down.\(^{58}\)

At the time of this writing, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are at a new nadir. On September 20, Afghan High Peace Council chairman and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in his Kabul home by a suicide bomber, dealing a major blow to hopes for reconciliation talks. Afghan officials suspect the ISI played a role in the murder, saying the attacker was Pakistani and the attack had been planned in Quetta. They also criticize Islamabad for its alleged failure to cooperate in the related investigation. Pakistani officials denied playing any part in the assassination, but the Afghan president has continued to accuse Pakistan of “using terrorism” as official policy. Most recently, in October, Afghan intelligence officials claimed to

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have halted a plot to assassinate Karzai himself and said the alleged culprits—an Egyptian and a Bangladeshi—were based in the FATA and affiliated with both Al Qaeda and the Haqqanis.59

Haqqani Network Attacks and U.S. Frustrations

The terrorist network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, based in the FATA, is commonly identified as the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan.60 Islamabad officials have consistently deferred on urgent and longstanding U.S. requests that the Pakistani military launch operations against the Haqqanis’ North Waziristan haven, saying their forces are already stretched too thin. Most observers believe the underlying cause of Pakistan’s inaction is the country’s decades-long relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and a belief held in the army and ISI that his group represents perhaps the best chance for Islamabad to exert Pashtun-based influence in post-ISAF Afghanistan.

In mid-2011, the Haqqanis undertook several high-visibility attacks in Afghanistan that led to a spike in frustrations being expressed by top U.S. and Afghan officials. First, a late June assault on Kabul’s Intercontinental Hotel by eight Haqqani gunmen and suicide bombers left 18 people dead. Then, on September 10, a truck bomb attack on a U.S. military base by Haqqani fighters in the Wardak province injured 77 American troops and killed five Afghans. But it was a September 13 attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul that appears to have substantively changed the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations. The well planned and executed assault sparked a 20-hour-long gunbattle and left 16 Afghans dead, five police officers and at least six children among them. Although U.S. officials dismissed the attack as a sign of the insurgents’ weakness, the ability of militants to undertake a complex raid in the heart of Kabul’s most protected area was seen by many as a clear blow to a narrative which has Afghanistan becoming more secure.

U.S. and Afghan officials concluded the Embassy attackers were members of the Haqqani network. Days after the raid, Adm. Mullen called on Gen. Kayani to again press for Pakistani military action against Haqqani bases. Apparently unsatisfied with his counterpart’s response, Mullen returned to Washington, DC, and began ramping up rhetorical pressure to previously unseen levels, accusing the ISI of using the Haqqanis to conduct a “proxy war” in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Secretary Panetta issued what was taken by many to be an ultimatum to Pakistan when he told reporters that the United States would “take whatever steps are necessary to protect our forces” in Afghanistan from future attacks by the Haqqanis.61 Then, during September 22 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mullen issued the strongest and most direct U.S. government statement on Pakistani malfeasance of the post-2001 era, saying,


60 A recent overview describes the network as interdependent with Al Qaeda, an enabler for other jihadi groups, and “the fountainhead of local, regional, and global militancy.” It is also called the “primary conduit” for Pakistani Taliban fighters to transit into Afghanistan and as the “central diplomatic interface” between the TTP and the Pakistani government. The report is pessimistic on the network’s potential to disengage itself from Al Qaeda (Dan Rassler and Vahid Brown, “The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of Al-Qa’ida,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Harmony Program, July 13, 2011). See also Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan,” Institute for the Study of War Afghanistan Report #6, October 12, 2010.

The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted that [September 13] truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy. We also have credible evidence they were behind the June 28th attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.... In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistan army and ISI, jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.... By exporting violence, they’ve eroded their internal security and their position in the region. They have undermined their international credibility and threatened their economic well-being. [emphasis added]62

Secretary Panetta, testifying alongside Mullen, took the opportunity to add, “I think the first order of business right now is to, frankly, put as much pressure on Pakistan as we can to deal with this issue from their side.”63 The statements of America’s two top military officials were widely seen to signal a new and more strident level of U.S. intolerance for Pakistan’s regional “double-game,” a posture perhaps spurred by recognition that U.S. military leverage in the region is a diminishing asset and that, given a persistently negative trajectory in bilateral relations in 2011, the United States has little to lose by ramping up pressure.64 Some analysts reacted to Mullen’s comments by calling for an immediate suspension of all assistance programs for Pakistan and a reversal of U.S. plans to withdraw from Afghanistan.65 In Pakistan, many braced themselves for an expected U.S. military incursion into the FATA.

Publically, the Obama Administration did not fully align itself with Adm. Mullen’s charges, which may have elicited internal criticism as being overstated, given an apparent paucity of intelligence evidence of ISI control over the Haqqanis. Yet the National Security Council reportedly had vetted the admiral’s written testimony and did not object to its content.66 President Obama himself later stated, “I think the intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly the [ISI-Haqqani] relationship is,” but he still insisted that the Pakistanis “have got to take care of this problem” in any case. In a subsequent press conference, the President acknowledged that successes in degrading Al Qaeda have come through important cooperation from Pakistan, but opined that Pakistan “has been more ambivalent about some of our goals” in Afghanistan and “there is no doubt” that Pakistan’s security services have connections “with certain individuals that we find troubling.”67 Later reporting called the Wardak truck bombing a “turning point” in hardening Secretary Clinton’s attitude toward the Haqqanis.68


63 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Iraq and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcripts, September 22, 2011.


65 See, for example, Lisa Curtis, “U.S. Should React Strongly to Pakistan’s Involvement in Attack on U.S. Embassy,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 3369, September 26, 2011.


Islamabad rejects claims that Pakistan is responsible for spates of violence in Afghanistan or that it supports or has control over the Haqqanis; one unnamed military officer was quoted as saying, “Instead of blaming us, [the United States and Afghanistan] should take action against terrorists on their side of the border.” A Foreign Ministry spokeswoman was unwilling to provide direct answers to questions about Islamabad’s relationship with the Haqqanis, but the Pakistani military called Mullen’s statements “very unfortunate and not based on fact,” and categorically denied conducting a proxy war or supporting the Haqqanis. A stern Foreign Minister Khar said that, with such allegations, the United States could “lose an ally” and “can’t afford to alienate the Pakistani people.” President Zardari, in an op-ed response in the Washington Post, said that “verbal assaults” against Pakistan are damaging the bilateral relationship: “It is time for the rhetoric to cool and for serious dialogue between allies to resume.”

In mid-October, Army Chief Kayani reportedly warned that the United States should “think ten times” before launching any future military raids on Pakistani territory.

A Haqqani Role in Afghan Reconciliation?

As noted above, Pakistani officials have for more than a year sought to facilitate a rapprochement between the Haqqanis and the Kabul government, but close Haqqani links with Al Qaeda have been a major sticking point (Al Qaeda figures are widely believed to enjoy sanctuary in Haqqani-controlled areas). Pakistan—especially through its military and intelligence agencies—is seen to wield considerable clout with the Haqqanis and may be the only actor able to prod them toward negotiations. Unnamed Pakistani military officials have in recent months claimed they can “deliver” the Haqqanis to a negotiating table and that this is the only viable policy option (on the assumption that a military assault on Haqqani bases would only engulf the region in a conflict the Pakistani military would likely be unable to win). However, by bringing the insurgent group into negotiations, Islamabad would be guaranteed a central role in the ensuing process, a development some in Washington and other interested capitals wish to avoid.

The Obama Administration has been considering formally designating the Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under U.S. law, especially with pressure to do so coming from some senior Senators, Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Carl Levin and Intelligence Committee Co-Chair Senator Dianne Feinstein among them. Seven Haqqani leaders have been under U.S. sanctions since 2008 and, in May, Secretary Clinton designated operational commander Badruddin Haqqani under Executive Order 13224. However, the potential decision on an FTO designation is complicated by the Administration’s apparent willingness to negotiate with the Haqqani leadership, something that has occurred at least once in the recent past (without result), and that Secretary Clinton has indicated may be necessary again in order to establish sustainable peace in Afghanistan.

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73 “Pakistan Says It Can Bring Haqqani to Peace Talks,” Associated Press, August 18, 2011.
75 “US Secretly Met Afghan Militants,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2011; “U.S. Open to Afghan Peace Deal (continued...)”
Pakistan and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan

Ammonium nitrate (AN) is widely-used fertilizer that also has commercial uses as a chemical explosives precursor. The great majority of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Islamist insurgents fighting in Afghanistan employ AN and, since the Kabul government’s January 2010 ban on the substance, nearly all illicit AN in Afghanistan is believed to arrive via transshipments from neighboring Pakistan.76 According to data from the Pentagon’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the summer of 2011 saw historic peaks in total IED “events” in Afghanistan. However, with improved detection and clearing capabilities—and a major increase in cache finds—the “effective” IED attack rate has declined.77

The U.S. government is urging Islamabad to adjust Pakistani national laws to restrict access to AN there or, short of that, to encourage Pakistani law enforcement and border security agencies to be more active and effective in efforts to prevent its movement into Afghanistan. Washington’s relevant efforts fall into three main categories: (1) diplomatic initiatives; (2) law enforcement initiatives; and (3) science and technology efforts. JIEDDO, the State Department’s SRAP staff, and staff of the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement office are engaged in these efforts. In addition, Operation Global Shield (also known as Project Global Shield) is an unprecedented multilateral law enforcement operation launched in late 2010 to combat the illicit cross-border diversion and trafficking of 11 chemical explosives precursors (including AN) by monitoring their cross-border movements. A U.S.-proposed collaborative effort of the World Customs Organization, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, and Interpol, the program has realized some notable successes to date.78

Pakarab Fertilizers Ltd., in the central Pakistani city of Multan, is the country’s largest fertilizer complex and has been in operation since 1979 (it was privatized in 2005). As reported by the Pakistani Ministry of Industries and Production, the Multan facility has produced well over 300,000 metric tons of AN annually since 2004.79 There is pending legislation in Islamabad that would adjust relevant Pakistani national laws to further restrict AN and other precursors. However, this “Explosives Ordinance” has remained in draft stage only, meaning that near-term changes are unlikely. The Islamabad government has established a National Counter-IED Forum in which all relevant Pakistani agencies can work together to develop an action plan. In the absence of an outright ban, the United States has had to rely on Pakistani police and border authorities who are vulnerable to corruption. During a July visit to Islamabad for the fourth meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Working Group, a senior State Department official reportedly was assured by Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik

(...continued)


77 Author interview with JIEDDO official, August 4, 2011.

78 Under Global Shield, more than 70 participating countries are currently sharing information with each other to ensure that imported chemicals are being used in safe and legal ways, resulting in 22 seizures of explosive precursors, over 33 metric tons of chemicals seized, and 18 arrests reported by participating countries through July 2011 (statement of Secretary Janet Napolitano, Homeland Security Department transcript, July 21, 2011).

that Islamabad would soon launch a U.S.-assisted program to train Pakistani officers in interdicting potential IEDs.80

**U.S./NATO Ground Lines of Communication**

NATO remains dependent upon ground and air lines of communication (GLOCs and ALOCs) through and over Pakistan to supply its forces in landlocked Afghanistan. The surface routes regularly come under attack by militants, and have at times been temporarily closed by the Pakistani government in apparent efforts to convey Islamabad’s leverage and displeasure with U.S. policies. In 2008, insurgents began more focused attempts to interdict these supply lines, especially near the historic Khyber Pass connecting Peshawar with Jalalabad, Afghanistan, but also to include the route from Karachi to Kandahar, which runs through Quetta and the Chaman border crossing. Such efforts have left thousands of transport and fuel trucks destroyed, and numerous Pakistani drivers dead. Sporadic interdiction attacks continue to date.

In response, the U.S. military began testing alternative routes, concentrating especially on lines from Central Asia and Russia. By mid-2010, this “Northern Distribution Network” (NDN) was carrying well over half of NATO’s total supplies, but only “nonlethal” cargo moves via the NDN. While senior U.S. defense officials reportedly prefer Pakistan as a logistics route, they continue to expand aerial and NDN routes, even if the former is some ten times as costly and the latter entails greater U.S. reliance on authoritarian regimes in Central Asia. The U.S. Army reports keeping 45 days worth of fuel on the ground in Pakistan so that severe supply line disruptions do not curtail operations. Sensitive and high-technology equipment is transported by airlift. The Pentagon’s goal is to eventually have three-quarters of shipments move via the NDN.81 At present, about one-third of supplies for NATO troops still move along Pakistani GLOCs.

**Indigenous Islamist Militancy and Pakistani Military Operations**

Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post-2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007, but the rate of attacks and number of victims may have peaked in 2009.82 The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reported a significant decline in terrorist incidents in 2010 as compared to the previous year. Nevertheless, the figures again placed the country third in the world on both measures, after Afghanistan and Iraq. Suicide bombing is a relatively new scourge in Pakistan. Only two such bombings were recorded there in 2002; that number rose to 84 in 2009, before dropping to 51 in 2010. Still, Pakistan accounted for more than 40% of all suicide bombing deaths worldwide last year. By the NCTC’s count, Pakistan suffered an average of more than 31 terrorist attacks and 47 related

82 In addition to widespread Islamist violence, Pakistan currently suffers from a serious and worsening separatist insurgency in its southwestern Baluchistan province, as well as rampant politically motivated violence in the megacity of Karachi which has left an estimated 1,300 or more people dead in 2011 to date.
deaths each week during the first half of 2011. In recent years, militants have made sometimes spectacular attacks targeting the country’s own military and intelligence institutions. Islamabad reports that terrorism and Islamist militancy have taken about 35,000 Pakistani lives since 2001, including some 5,000 security personnel, and cost the country up to $100 billion in material and financial losses.

The myriad and sometimes disparate Islamist militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of which have displayed mutual animosity in the past, have become more intermingled and mutually supportive since 2009 (see text box below). U.S. leaders remain concerned that Al Qaeda terrorists operate with impunity on Pakistani territory, although the group apparently was weakened in recent years through the loss of key leaders and experienced operatives. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged as a coherent grouping in late 2007. This “Pakistani Taliban” is said to have representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies, as well as from many of the “settled” districts abutting the FATA. The Haqqani Network is based in the North Waziristan and Kurram agencies of the FATA.

Islamist Militant Groups in Pakistan

Islamist militant groups operating in and from Pakistani territory are of five broad types:

- **Globally oriented** militants, especially Al Qaeda and its primarily Uzbek affiliates, operating out of the FATA and in the megacity of Karachi;
- **Afghanistan-oriented** militants, including the “Quetta shura” of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Umar, believed to operate from the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta, as well as Karachi; the organization run by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, in the North Waziristan and Kurram tribal agencies; and the Hizb-I Islami party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG), operating further north from the Bajaur tribal agency and Dir district;
- **India- and Kashmir-oriented** militants, especially the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM), based in both the Punjab province and in Pakistan-held Kashmir;
- **Sectarian** militants, in particular the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the latter closely associated with Al Qaeda, operating mainly in Punjab; and
- **Domestically oriented**, largely Pashtun militants that in 2007 unified under the leadership of now-deceased Baitullah Mehsud as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), then based in the South Waziristan tribal agency, with representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven FATA agencies, later to incorporate the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed in the northwestern Malakand and Swat districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Pakistan’s densely populated Punjab province is home to numerous Islamist militant groups with global and regional jihadist aspirations. Notable among these is the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a U.S.-designated terrorist group with long-standing ties to the ISI. There appear to be growing differences over the threat posed by LeT, with the United States increasingly viewing the group as a threat to its own security. The Raymond Davis affair may have exposed newly independent U.S. intelligence operations against the LeT in Pakistan.

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83 See the National Counterterrorism Center database at http://www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html.
84 Such attacks are ongoing: in February, a suicide bomber killed at least 27 soldiers at a military training center outside Peshawar; in March, a car bomb exploded near an ISI office in Faisalabad, Punjab, leaving some 32 people dead; in May, two suicide bombers killed at least 50 paramilitary cadets in the northwestern town of Charsadda. Later that month, militants raided Karachi’s Mehran Naval Station, killing ten and destroying two U.S.-supplied aircraft.
The Pakistan army has deployed at least 150,000 regular and paramilitary troops in western Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there, and the army has seen nearly 3,000 of its soldiers killed in combat. All seven FATA agencies and adjacent regions have been affected by conflict; 2009 offensives in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan were notable. Yet, as noted above, U.S. government assessments paint a discouraging picture of recent efforts, with Islamist militants successfully fending off or evading what remain limited Pakistani efforts to defeat them. The Pakistani army said in July 2011 that it had launched new offensive operations in the Kurram agency aimed at neutralizing staging areas for suicide bombers and also clearing the region’s main road connecting Kurram’s main city to the rest of Pakistan. Within days, a reported 28,000 people had fled the region.87

By many accounts the North Waziristan agency—home to the Al Qaeda- and Taliban-allied Haqqani Network and the TTP forces of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, among others—is currently the most important haven for both Afghan- and Pakistan-oriented militants. Pakistani officials have continued to demur on urgent U.S. requests that their military move into what many consider the “final” militant haven of North Waziristan, saying they need to consolidate the areas newly under their control.88 In other areas where Pakistani military offensives have taken place, the “clearing” phase of operations has met with some successes, but the “holding” phase has proven more difficult, and “building” is considered impossible to initiate so long as the civilian administration’s capacity is severely limited.89 Moreover, Pakistan’s military forces are new to counterinsurgency and demonstrate only limited capacity to undertake effective nonconventional warfare. Pakistani leaders have complained that the United States has been slow in providing the kind of hardware needed for this effort, but Islamabad’s recent ejection of U.S. military trainers has dramatically hindered U.S. efforts to bolster Pakistan’s COIN capabilities.

Pakistan, Terrorism, and U.S. Nationals90

Long-standing worries that American citizens were being recruited and employed in Islamist terrorism by Pakistan-based elements became more acute in 2010. In May of that year, Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin, attempted to detonate a large, but crudely constructed car bomb in New York City’s Times Square. The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attempted bombing, and the culprit himself confessed to having received bomb-making training in western Pakistan. Four months later, Shahzad received a mandatory life sentence in prison. Cases linking U.S. citizens and residents with Islamist extremism in Pakistan and terrorist plots against American targets are abundant.91

87 “Kurram Offensive Displaces 28,000,” Daily Times (Lahore), July 6, 2011.
88 When pressed by Senate Armed Services Committee members to explain why Pakistan was not going after the Haqqani Network and Quetta Shura, Centcom Commander General Mattis offered three key reasons: (1) “their difficult relationship with India” that compels them to maintain a hedge; (2) the difficult terrain of the FATA; and (3) the impact of mid-2010 flooding, which diverted Pakistani military resources away from counterinsurgency efforts (“Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Fiscal 2012 Defense Authorization Request for the Special Operations Command and the U.S. Central Command,” CQ Transcriptions, March 1, 2011).
89 See the White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, September 2011.
90 See also CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by Jerome P. Bjelopera.
91 In late 2009, Pakistani authorities arrested five young Americans reported missing from their homes in Virginia. The Muslim men are believed to have had extensive coded email contacts with Pakistan-based terrorist groups. A Pakistani court charged them with financing and plotting terrorist attacks and, in June 2010, the so-called Virginia Five were sentenced to ten years in prison for conspiring against the Pakistani state and helping to finance a militant (continued...)
At least one Pakistani-born American was complicit in the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai, India. In 2009, federal prosecutors charged David Coleman Headley, a Chicagoan convert to Islam, with traveling to Mumbai five times from 2006 to 2008 as scout for the attack by the Pakistan-based LeT terrorist group; he subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges. His case was perhaps the first in which a former Pakistani military officer was directly linked to terrorism suspects in the United States. Headley and another Pakistan-born Chicagoan, Tahawwur Rana (a Canadian national), are believed to have reported to Abdur Rehman, a retired Pakistani major suspected of being an LeT contact. Headley also interacted with Ilyas Kashmiri, a now-deceased former Pakistani special forces commando with close ties to Al Qaeda. The Indian government energetically petitioned Washington for direct access to Headley as part of its own investigative efforts. Access was granted with an extensive interrogation in 2010; Indian officials later said the information gleaned established an official Pakistani role in the Mumbai attack.

In May 2011, a Chicago court heard testimony in Rana’s trial (Rana was charged with material support of terrorism related to the Mumbai attack). Three senior LeT members were also indicted in the case—LeT chief Hafez Saeed among them—along with a purported ISI officer identified as “Major Iqbal.” Headley, the prosecution’s star witness, detailed links between the ISI and terrorism, and so added to already fraught U.S.-Pakistan relations and suspicions about official Pakistani involvement in supporting Islamist militancy. Rana subsequently was acquitted on charges related to the Mumbai attack, but was found guilty of aiding the LeT and of conspiring to attack a Danish newspaper.

An Increasing Pakistani Turn to China

Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Chinese companies and workers are now pervasive in the Pakistani economy. Beijing intends to build two new civilian nuclear reactors in Pakistan in what would be an apparent violation of international guidelines. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s December 2010 visit to Islamabad, the governments signed 12 Memoranda of Understanding covering a broad range of cooperative efforts and designated 2011 as the “Year of China-Pakistan Friendship.” Pakistani and Chinese businesses also signed contracts worth some $15 billion covering cooperation in oil and gas, mining, space technology, heavy machinery, manufacturing,

...(continued)
and other areas. This added to the nearly $20 billion worth of government-to-government agreements reached.\(^2\)

As U.S.-India ties deepen and U.S.-Pakistan ties appear to deteriorate, many observers see Islamabad becoming more reliant than ever on its friendship with Beijing. U.S.-Pakistan acrimony in the wake of OBL’s death appears to have increased Pakistan’s reliance on China as a key international ally. Pakistani leaders have become notably more and perhaps overly effusive in their expressions of closeness with China in 2011.\(^3\) Prime Minister Gilani’s May travel to China elicited no major new embrace from Beijing, but the Chinese government did insist that the West “must respect” Pakistan’s sovereignty, and it agreed to expedite delivery to Pakistan of 50 JF-17 fighter jets equipped with upgraded avionics (Islamabad is also negotiating with Beijing for the purchase of six new submarines for as much as $3 billion in what would be the largest-ever bilateral defense purchase). The Islamabad government suffered some embarrassment when its defense minister, upon returning from the same trip, claimed that the Chinese would assume control of the deep-water port at Gwadar that it had helped to build and, further, that Beijing would convert the port for military use. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed having no knowledge of the purported plans.

There were concerns among some in Congress and independent analysts that wreckage from a previously unseen “stealth” helicopter used by U.S. Special Forces in the OBL raid would be examined by Chinese officials, potentially providing them with valuable intelligence on secret U.S. military technology. Beijing apparently did express interest in examining the wreckage and, despite Pakistani assurances that no Chinese officials had been given access to it, U.S. intelligence sources reportedly believe that Chinese military engineers were, in fact, given access to the wreckage before it was returned to U.S. custody.\(^4\)

Pakistan appeared to react quickly and with purpose in August when Beijing publically blamed Islamist militants trained in Pakistan for terrorist activities in China’s western Xinjiang province. ISI Director Pasha was dispatched to Beijing with the apparent aim of assuaging China. Yet Beijing’s willingness to take Islamabad more fully under its wings appears limited. The hesitation is rooted at least partly in China’s concerns about the rise of Islamist extremism in Pakistan and some disappointment with progress in developing the Gwadar port, which suffers from a poor road network and geographical isolation. The Chinese government reportedly is unlikely to place itself in the middle of any U.S.-Pakistani rift, nor has it shown any desire to replace Washington as Islamabad’s primary foreign benefactor.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) For example, in Beijing in May, Prime Minister Gilani spoke of “the reality of this abiding friendship between our peoples, which is manifested in abundant goodwill, spontaneous affinity, inestimable love and affection, an enduring romance that transcends all other considerations” (“Remarks of the Prime Minister at the Reception to Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Pakistan and China,” Foreign Ministry transcript, May 20, 2011).


Pakistan-India Relations

Three full-scale wars—in 1947-1948, 1965, and 1971—and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked more than six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. The acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social development. A bilateral “Composite Dialogue” reengaged in 2004 realized some modest, but still meaningful successes, including a formal cease-fire along the entire shared frontier, and some unprecedented trade and people-to-people contacts across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). The dialogue is meant to bring about “peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”96 Yet 2008 saw significant deterioration in Pakistan-India relations, especially following the large-scale November terrorist attack on Mumbai, India, that killed some 165 civilians and left the peace process largely moribund. More broadly, militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved. In 2010, conflict over water resources has emerged as another exacerbating factor in the bilateral relationship.

Pakistani leaders, like many independent observers, believe that regional peace is inextricably linked to a solution of the Kashmir dispute. Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. government has continued its long-standing policy of keeping distance from that dispute and refraining from any mediation role therein. By some accounts, Pakistan and India are also fighting a “shadow war” inside Afghanistan with spies and proxies. Islamabad accuses New Delhi of using Indian consulates in Afghanistan as bases for malevolent interference in Pakistan’s western regions, although there is scant available evidence to support such claims. Following the 2008 Mumbai attack, the New Delhi government focused on holding Islamabad accountable for the existence of anti-India terrorists groups in Pakistan, some of them suspected of receiving direct support from official Pakistani elements, and India essentially refused to reengage the full spectrum of Composite Dialogue issues. Yet, with a February 2011 meeting of foreign secretaries, India agreed to resume peace talks without overt mention of the centrality of the terrorism issue. Days later, the two governments announced that high-level peace talks would be resumed after a hiatus of more than two years.

Following the brief “cricket diplomacy” of March—Prime Minister Gilani had accepted his Indian counterpart’s invitation to watch a match in India—bilateral talks between home secretaries produced an agreement to establish a “terror hotline” between the respective ministries, along with a Pakistani agreement “in principle” to allow a team of Indian investigators to travel to Pakistan to assist with issues related to the 2008 Mumbai attack. Under the resumed dialogue process, the two countries’ commerce secretaries met in April for talks on greater economic and commercial cooperation. A June meeting of foreign secretaries in Islamabad appeared unexpectedly positive to many, with the two officials agreeing to expand confidence-building measures related to both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as to increase trade and travel across the Kashmiri LOC.97

In July, Foreign Minister Khar was in New Delhi for talks with Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, who reaffirmed India’s intention to reduce the bilateral trust deficit and conveyed New Delhi’s desire for “a stable, prosperous Pakistan acting as a bulwark against terrorism, and at peace with itself and with its neighbors.” Khar raised some hackles in New Delhi—and an explicit expression of displeasure from Krishna—by meeting with Kashmiri separatists before seeing Indian government officials. Yet the resulting Joint Statement further loosened trade and travel restrictions across the LOC, and was widely taken as a successful representation of a peace process back on track after a more than two-year hiatus. Most recently, the two countries’ trade ministers met in New Delhi in September and agreed to take steps to further liberalize their relatively paltry bilateral trade (the necessity of moving exports through Dubai raises transaction costs, slows deliveries, and inflates prices). India also dropped its longstanding opposition to a proposed EU initiative that would waive duties on Pakistani exports from its flood-ravaged areas. Islamabad, for its part, vowed to grant India most-favored nation status by year’s end.

The circumstances of OBL’s death were relevant to the course of relations between Pakistan and India. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the killing “a significant step forward” and expressed hope that it would represent a decisive blow to AQ and other terrorist groups. At the same time, however, there has been apprehension in New Delhi that the development would hasten a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in ways that could be harmful to India’s foreign policy interests. New Delhi also saw the discovery of OBL in Pakistan as an opportunity to more energetically press its demands that Islamabad extradite the alleged perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba figures believed to be in Pakistan, as well as other most-wanted anti-India terrorists such as Dawood Ibrahim. The Indian government continues to express “concern and disappointment with Pakistan about the lack of progress in the Mumbai trial and bringing those responsible for this heinous terrorist attack to justice.”

When Afghan President Karzai made a long-planned trip to New Delhi in early October and inked a new “strategic framework” with India—Kabul’s first such 21st century agreement with any country—Pakistan’s fears of strategic encirclement became more acute, especially in light of the Afghanistan’s acceptance of future Indian assistance in training and equipping its security forces. Kabul’s floundering efforts to find rapprochement with the Taliban may be behind Karzai’s decision to link Afghanistan more closely to India. Although the Afghan President took pains to insist that the pact was not directed at any country, some analysts see it as a highly provocative development that could make it more difficult to wean Pakistan away from its apparent reliance on militant proxies in Afghanistan.

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security

The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, materials, and technologies continues to be a top-tier U.S. concern, especially as Islamist militants have expanded their geographic influence there. Pakistan has in the recent past been a source of serious illicit proliferation to aspiring weapons

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101 See also CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin.
states. While most analysts and U.S. officials believe Pakistan’s nuclear security is much improved in recent years, there is ongoing concern that Pakistan’s nuclear know-how or technologies remain prone to leakage.\(^{102}\) Moreover, recent reports indicate that Pakistan is rapidly growing its nuclear weapons arsenal, perhaps in response to recent U.S. moves to engage civil nuclear cooperation with rival India, which the Obama Administration wants to see join major international nonproliferation regimes.\(^{103}\) This comes at a time that China is planning to build two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan in apparent violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. The proposed deal poses a dilemma for the Obama Administration, which has requested that Beijing justify the plan and seeks its approval through international fora.

**Deteriorated Economic Circumstances**

Persistent inflation and unemployment, along with serious food and energy shortages, elicit considerable economic anxiety in Pakistan and weigh heavily on the civilian government. All of these existing problems were hugely exacerbated by devastating flooding in mid-2010 (according to the Finance Ministry, Pakistan’s economy suffered some $10 billion in losses related to this flooding). Corruption is another persistent and serious obstacle for Pakistan’s economic development, harming both domestic and foreign investment rates, as well as creating skeptical international aid donors.\(^{104}\) Foreign direct investment has plummeted from $5.4 billion in FY2008/2009 to under $2.2 billion in FY2010/2011. Most analysts identify increasing militancy as the main cause for the decline, although global recession and political instability in Islamabad are also major factors. In the assessment of international financial institutions, Pakistan’s economic priorities are addressing inflation, containing the budget deficit, reviving growth, and meeting the challenge posed by higher global oil prices.

A 2008 balance-of-payments crisis led Islamabad to seek multi-billion dollar loans from the IMF. The current IMF-supported program is a 34-month, $11.3 billion Stand-By Arrangement first approved in November 2008, augmented in August 2009, and extended by nine months in December 2010. Of the original $11.3 billion IMF SBA, $3.6 billion is yet to be disbursed; the program was placed on hold in August 2010 because Islamabad had failed to implement required revenue and power sector reforms. Any prospective second IMF program is likely to come with more stringent conditions, including restructuring of numerous public sector enterprises. Moreover, in May 2011, security concerns spurred the IMF to put off negotiations with Pakistani officials, further delaying disbursement of remaining support funds.\(^{105}\)


\(^{103}\) Pakistan is believed to be deploying upwards of 100 nuclear warheads and has significantly accelerated its production of uranium and plutonium. Analysts also suspect that Pakistan has begun construction of a fourth plutonium-producing reactor at its Khushab complex (“Pakistan Doubles Its Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Post, January 31, 2011; “Pakistan’s Nuclear Surge,” Newsweek, May 15, 2011).

\(^{104}\) For 2010, Berlin-based Transparency International placed Pakistan 143rd out of 178 countries in its annual ranking of world corruption levels (see http://www.transparency.org).

\(^{105}\) By some accounts, IMF officials are privately angry with Pakistani officials for making allegedly false claims about tax reforms (see, for example, “IMF Considers Pakistan Economic Teams Deceitful, Liars,” Daily Times (Lahore), April 26, 2011).
Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary

Repayment of IMF loans will place significant constraints on Islamabad’s federal budget, which is burdened by perpetually low revenue generation. For most observers, this is caused by what essentially is mass tax evasion by the country’s economic elite, and is exacerbated by a federal budget overemphasizing military spending. Secretary Clinton is among the U.S. officials critical of Pakistan’s 9% tax-to-GDP ratio, one of the lowest in the world. The government sought to implement a Reformed General Sales Tax initiative in 2011, but to date has been unable to win sufficient parliamentary support for what are considered modest changes. Meanwhile, struggles in Pakistan’s power sector puts a significant damper on commerce and everyday activities, causing factory shutdowns and rioting by those angry with price hikes and shortages. Shortfalls in electricity supply have led to unannounced outages of up to 20 hours per day in parts of the country. The government’s early 2011 effort to lower fuel subsidies spurred virulent reaction and led to political turmoil when an important PPP coalition partner withdrew its support.

Nearly half of Pakistan’s approximately $27 billion FY2011/2012 federal budget—released in June 2011—will go toward loan repayments. The budget cuts subsidies by more than half, which will raise prices for energy and other essential items, and increased tax revenues will likely spur further inflation. Planned defense spending was boosted by 12% over the previous fiscal year. A key aspiration for Pakistani leaders is to acquire better access to Western markets. With the security situation deterring foreign investors, exports, especially from the key textile sector, may be key to any future Pakistani recovery. Islamabad has continued to press Washington and European capitals for reduced tariffs on textile exports, especially following massive flood damage to Pakistan’s cotton crop. By some accounts, the textile sector directly employs 3.5 million Pakistanis and accounts for 40% of urban factory jobs. Pakistani officials and business leaders estimate that abolishing American tariffs, which currently average 17% on cotton apparel, would boost their country’s exports by $5 billion annually. Along with Pakistani leaders, the Obama Administration has continued to support congressional passage of a bill to establish Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in western Pakistan that could facilitate development in Pakistan’s poor tribal regions, perhaps to include textile manufacture.

Domestic Political Instability

Democracy has fared poorly in Pakistan, with the country enduring direct military rule for more than half of its existence. More than three years after Pakistan’s relatively credible March 2008 national elections seated a civilian government led by the PPP of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the country’s military establishment wields decisive influence over Pakistan’s foreign policy and national security policies. Meanwhile, the PPP-led coalition has

106 Secretary Clinton has called the issue “a real pet peeve” of hers, telling a House panel, “[I]t is very hard to accept helping a country that won’t help itself by taxing its richest citizens” (“House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Holds Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2012 Appropriations for the State Department,” CQ Transcriptions, March 10, 2011).

107 “Pakistan’s Economy Starts to Unravel,” Financial Times (London), October 13, 2011. Pakistan’s maximum power generating capacity is about 80% of peak demand. Chronic and severe electricity shortages are blamed on low government pricing, outdated transmission systems, and bureaucratic obstacles to completing new generation projects. Underinvestment in power stations and a deterioration of the distribution network during the 1999-2008 Musharraf era are also seen as having instigated the crisis (“Power Cuts Darken Mood in Pakistan,” Financial Times (London), May 25, 2011).

struggled to stay in power and has been unable to rein in the security agencies or enact other major reforms. Moreover, a judiciary empowered by the 2008 “Lawyer’s Movement” in support of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry has continued to do battle with the executive branch and seeks to pursue corruption charges against an array of politicians, including President Zardari himself.

President Zardari has never been especially popular among the Pakistani public, and his favorability ratings are only dropping: a May survey found only 11% of Pakistanis holding a favorable view of their president. It appears that the country’s most popular politicians are two opposition figures: Imran Khan, at 68% favorability, and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), at 63%. Khan, with a reputation as an uncorrupted straight-talker, is seen by many to have exploited anti-American sentiments to hugely increase his public support, especially among Pakistan’s youth. Yet his Tehreek-e-Insaf party has no seats in parliament and little infrastructure needed to support a national campaign, and his sometimes soft policies toward the Pakistani Taliban could be a liability in any future elections.

In late 2010, serious threats to the PPP’s majority status and to the very existence of its government have arose. In December of that year, the Jamaat Ulema Islami (JUI)—a small, but influential Islamist party—(withdrew its support for the ruling coalition, narrowing its National Assembly majority to only nine seats. Then, in January 2011, the Karachi-based Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) announced its withdrawal from the coalition in reaction to rising fuel prices, inflation, and perceived government mismanagement. The loss of the MQM’s 25 seats removed the coalition’s parliamentary majority, which could have led to government collapse. Yet most observers concluded that the move was an effort to extract maximum concessions in the form of greater administrative control for the MQM in its Karachi base. Days later, Prime Minister Gilani backtracked on recently enacted fuel subsidy reductions, mollifying opposition parties and clearing the way for the MQM’s quick return to the coalition (three MQM federal cabinet ministers were appointed in May), but also eliciting criticism from the U.S. government and the IMF as a reversal of progress made toward strengthening Pakistan’s economic base.

In February, Prime Minister Gilani dismissed his more than 60 cabinet ministers in a cost-cutting initiative. A new cabinet of only 21 ministers was appointed days later, with all major posts held by the same figures but for foreign minister. In early May, the PPP’s standing was strengthened through a new alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) faction, former parliamentary supporters of Pervez Musharraf. The PML-Q’s considerable support in the Punjab province and its agreement to contest the next general elections as PPP allies bolstered the ruling party’s status and could represent a threat to that of Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N.

In late June, the MQM again announced it was quitting the PPP-led coalition, joining the opposition, and would no longer work with the “dictatorial” government, but Prime Minister Gilani continued to claim the party was a coalition partner and, in early October, President Zardari was able to convince MQM leadership to formally rejoin the coalition and federal cabinet. In October, the PML-Q announced that it would withdraw from the ruling coalition because the PPP had failed to resolve the country’s energy crisis; President Zardari was likewise able to persuade the party to remain in the fold.

The circumstances of OBL’s death were hugely embarrassing for the Pakistani military and led to rare domestic criticism of that institution, traditionally the country’s most respected. This in turn created an opening in which Pakistan’s civilian leaders might wrest some modicum of control over the country’s foreign and national security policies. With the embarrassment of the Mehran naval base attack compounded by scandals involving apparent abuse of power and human rights, media criticism of the security establishment continued at unprecedented levels through the early summer. Yet, to date, there has been little sign that the civilians would take advantage of these openings; rather, they have rallied behind the security services and made no calls for the resignations of either the Army or ISI Chiefs. Parliament did seat a commission to investigate how bin Laden had found refuge in Pakistan and how American forces were able to penetrate Pakistani territory, but the body’s initial lack of focus and cohesion diminished expectations that its work could lead to greater civilian authority.111

Human Rights Issues

Pakistan is the setting for serious perceived human rights abuses, some of them perpetrated and/or sanctioned by the state. According to the U.S. Department of State, although Pakistan’s civilian government has taken some positive steps, the overall human rights situation there remains poor and includes abuses against women and minorities.112 Most recently, U.S. government attention to human rights abuses in Pakistan has centered on press freedoms,113 indefinite government detention of detainees related to anti-terrorism efforts and alleged extrajudicial executions perpetrated by the Pakistani military in conflict areas, and on religious freedoms threatened by Pakistan’s “blasphemy laws.” U.S. Ambassador Munter has also expressed concern about the rights of Pakistani women following the April 2011 action by the Pakistani Supreme Court acquitting five of the six men accused of gang-raping Muktaharan Mai in a 2002 case that gained international attention.114

Regarding “disappearances” and extrajudicial killings by Pakistani security forces, acute U.S. concerns were elicited in late 2010 by evidence of serious abuses. International human rights groups have pressed the Pakistani government to launch investigations into reports of summary executions and torture perpetrated by soldiers and police during counterterrorism operations, and have accused Pakistani authorities of making insufficient progress in resolving the cases.115 The Obama Administration has declared that it will abide by “Leahy amendment” provisions by withholding train and equip funding for several Pakistani army units believed to be complicit in


112 The 2011 annual report of Human Rights Watch highlighted the Pakistani security forces’ “routine” violation of basic rights in the course of counterterrorism operations, including detention without charge, convictions without fair trial, forced evictions, house demolitions, and extrajudicial executions. “Enforced disappearances” of Baloch separatists is an ongoing concern, and “violence and mistreatment of women and girls, including rape, domestic violence, and forced marriages, remain serious problems.”

113 Press freedoms in Pakistan are seen to be seriously constrained, despite the existence of booming news media. Watchdog groups rank Pakistan as one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists (“Pakistan Journalists Walk Razor’s Edge,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2011).


115 See, for example, “‘The Bitterest of Agonies’: End Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan,” Amnesty International, September 2011.
Concerns about violent state-sponsored repression heightened following the Shahzad murder earlier in 2011. Independent analyses regularly find the Pakistani state complicit in the persecution of and discrimination against the country’s religious minorities, which by most accounts has worsened in recent years. Among the recommendations of critics are repealing the blasphemy laws; criminalizing the advocacy of religious hatred or incitement to discrimination; ending the impunity enjoyed by prayer leaders who incite sectarian or communal hatred; reforming law enforcement and judicial bodies; and providing more inclusive school curricula, among others.

Laws prohibiting blasphemy in Pakistan are meant to protect Islamic holy persons, beliefs, customs, and objects from insult or defilement. They are widely popular with the public. Yet they are criticized by human rights groups as discriminatory and arbitrary in their use, which often arises in the context of personal vendettas, and can involve little or no persuasive evidence. The laws again came under scrutiny in late 2010 when a Pakistani Christian woman was sentenced to death for what seemed to many a minor offense. International human rights groups issued newly urgent calls for the law’s repeal, and President Zardari himself vowed to personally review the case. Yet the PPP-led government backed away from reform proposals after Islamist hardline groups, including some with links to terrorist organizations, were able to rally a host of protestors, including as many as 50,000 people on the streets of Karachi. As noted above, two of the most vocal government proponents of reforming the laws were assassinated earlier in 2011. The only other high-profile national politician pursuing reform efforts, National Assembly member Sherry Rehman, was forced to withdraw her legislative proposal after her PPP leaders announced that no reforms would be undertaken.

U.S. Assistance

In 2001, Congress renewed large U.S. assistance packages to Pakistan. By the end of FY2011, Congress had appropriated more than $13.2 billion in overt assistance, including nearly $7.5 billion in development and humanitarian aid, and more than $5.7 billion for security-related programs (see Table 1). In 2009, both chambers of Congress passed their own Pakistan-specific bills authorizing increased nonmilitary aid to Pakistan (to $1.5 billion per year for five years) and placing certain conditions on future security-related aid to that country. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009, also known as the “Kerry-Lugar-Berman” (KLB) bill for its main sponsors, became P.L. 111-73. Earlier that year, Congress also established a new Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) that is meant to enhance the ability of Pakistani security forces to effectively combat militancy. Moreover, since FY2002 Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan (and other nations) for its operational and logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. At nearly $9 billion, these “coalition support funds” have accounted for a large portion of all overt U.S. financial transfers to Pakistan.

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116 Sec. 620J of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, as amended), also known as the Leahy Amendment, states that “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.”

since 2001. In recent years, more careful oversight of such disbursements reportedly has led to a major increase in the rate of rejected claims.\footnote{118}{Pakistan reportedly has “routinely” submitted “unsubstantiated” or “exaggerated” claims, and denial rates climbed from less than 2% in 2005 to 44% in 2009 (“U.S. Balks at Pakistani Bills,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, May 17, 2011).}

The Administration’s congressionally mandated Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report, issued in December 2009, laid out the principal objectives of nonmilitary U.S. assistance to Pakistan (to help “in building a stable, secure, and prosperous Pakistan”), a general description of the programs and projects designed to achieve these goals, and a plan for monitoring and evaluating the effort. For FY2010-FY2014, it proposed to devote $3.5 billion—nearly half of the $7.5 billion of the aid authorized by the EPPA—to “high-impact, high-visibility” infrastructure programs, especially in the energy and agriculture sectors. The extensive damage caused by Pakistan’s mid-2010 floods required reconsideration of these plans, with significant funds being redirected toward disaster relief and reconstruction. In mid-2011, U.S. officials said 110 of 160 aid projects in Pakistan would be abandoned in an effort to focus on 50 high-visibility projects. Most recently, Washington is considering making grants to help the Pakistani government launch construction of the planned Diamer Basha dam in the country’s far northeast. The Asian Development is taking the lead on the roughly $12 billion project which, when completed in eight or more years, could generate 4,500 megawatts of electricity, enough to fill the country’s entire current shortfall.\footnote{119}{“US to Cut Pakistan Aid Projects,” \textit{Financial Times} (London), June 2, 2011; “Pakistan Inaugurates Huge Dam Project, Hoping U.S. Will Help With Funds,” \textit{ McClatchy News}, October 18, 2011.}

A February 2011 GAO report determined that, as of the end of 2010, only about $180 million of the some $1.5 billion appropriated for civilian assistance to Pakistan in FY2010 had been disbursed.\footnote{120}{See http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11310r.pdf.} The Administration reports having disbursed another $475 million in civilian aid funds during the first half of 2011, roughly half of which are distributed directly through Pakistani government institutions. Still, the majority of appropriated KLB funds have not been spent, in large part because of concerns about corruption and the capacity of Pakistan’s government and contractors to effectively oversee aid projects, and confusion over priorities. The delay serves to reinforce Pakistani perceptions that the United States cannot be relied upon to follow through on its promises.\footnote{121}{White House Report on Afghanistan and Pakistan, September 2011; “Aid Plan for Pakistan is Falling Short of Goals,” \textit{Washington Post}, August 5, 2011.}

Security-related U.S. assistance to Pakistan includes provision of extensive “train and equip” programs. Major U.S. arms transfers to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for counterterrorism operations, along with a number of “big ticket” platforms more suited to conventional warfare. Under multiple authorities, Pakistan has received helicopters, infantry arms, and a wide array of other equipment. Pakistani officials continue to complain that U.S.-supplied defense equipment, especially that most needed for counterinsurgency operations such as attack and utility helicopters, has been too slow in coming. Security assistance to Pakistan’s civilian sector is aimed at strengthening the country’s law enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group.

August press reports indicated that, soon after the OBL raid, the Obama Administration began keeping a “secret scorecard” of U.S. objectives with which to measure Pakistan’s cooperation and...
condition the release of future security assistance funds. The new approach is said to involve Director of National Intelligence James Clapper rating Pakistan's performance in four “baskets,” or issue-areas: (1) cooperation on exploiting intelligence from OBL's Abbottabad compound; (2) cooperation with the war in Afghanistan; (3) cooperation in conducting joint counterterrorism operations; and (4) cooperation in improving the tone of bilateral relations.\(^\text{122}\)

As noted above, the circumstances of OBL’s death and subsequent developments have had major impact on both Administration and congressional perceptions of the utility of current U.S. aid programs. A substantive reevaluation of aid levels—and of the bilateral relationship more generally—has been underway in 2011, and congressional figures have issued some of the strongest criticisms of Pakistan as a U.S. ally seen in decades.\(^\text{123}\) In what some observers view as a counterproductive approach, some in Congress are reported to seek cuts in development rather than security aid, the argument being that short-term U.S. interests in combating terrorism and Afghan insurgents trump longer-term interests in seeing Pakistan transformed into a more prosperous and democratic state.\(^\text{124}\) However, there appears to be a growing recognition among observers that U.S. military aid has done little to stem Islamist militancy in Pakistan and may even hinder that country’s economic and political development. Many of these analysts thus urge the U.S. government to emphasize targeted and effective nonmilitary aid, perhaps especially that which would strengthen Pakistan’s civil society.\(^\text{125}\)

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123 In June, the House Appropriations Committee approved a defense spending bill that would withhold three-quarters of the $1.1 billion appropriated for the PCCF until the Administration reports to Congress on how the funds would be spent. The panel also passed an amendment that would give Congress 30 days to review the report before determining if the funds should be released. In September, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to place new terrorism-related conditions on both military and nonmilitary aid to Pakistan. The Committee did not specify FY2012 aid levels for Pakistan—leaving it for the Administration to determine these—but one Senator was quoted as saying, “If the Administration wants to provide zero, that’d be okay with us.” Even energetic supporters of the KLB emphasis on nonmilitary aid reportedly are having second thoughts about the wisdom of providing more such funds to Pakistan (Senator Mark Kirk quoted in “US Senate Panel Votes Restrictions on Pakistan Aid,” Reuters, September 22, 2011; “Support Wavers for U.S. Economic Aid to Pakistan,” Reuters, September 28, 2011).

124 “Pakistan Military Aid Safer Than the Economic Aid,” The Cable (ForeignPolicy.com), May 11, 2011.

125 See, for example, Colin Cookman, et al., “The Limits of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan,” Center for American Progress, July 2011; Timothy Hoyt, “Pakistan, an Ally By Any Other Name,” Proceedings, July 2011. A May survey of 51 American “national security insiders” found a near-perfect split on the question of cutting U.S. aid to Pakistan. Of the half who supported cuts, most said they should come from the military portion only (“National Security Insiders Split Down Middle on Cutting Aid to Pakistan,” National Journal (online), May 22, 2011).
### Table 1. Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2012

(rounded to the nearest millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program or Account</th>
<th>FY2002-FY2005</th>
<th>FY2006</th>
<th>FY2007</th>
<th>FY2008</th>
<th>FY2009</th>
<th>FY2010 (est.)</th>
<th>FY2011 (req.)</th>
<th>Program or Account Total, FY02-11</th>
<th>FY2012 (req.)</th>
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<td>I206</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>288</td>
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<td>731</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>8,881</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>295</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCF/PCCF</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Security-Related</strong></td>
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<td>1,260</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>14,615</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>394d</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>1,292</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>413</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>103</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Economic-Related</strong></td>
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<td>540</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>7,472</td>
<td>1,362</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
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<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,703</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>3,041</td>
<td>4,462</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>22,087</td>
<td>2,965</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Sources:** U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development. Final obligation and disbursement totals are typically lower than program account totals.

**Abbreviations:**

- **I206:** Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163, global train and equip)
- **CN:** Counternarcotics Funds (Pentagon budget)
- **CSF:** Coalition Support Funds (Pentagon budget)
- **CSH:** Child Survival and Health (Global Health and Child Survival, or GHCS, from FY2010)
- **DA:** Development Assistance
- **ESF:** Economic Support Funds
- **FMF:** Foreign Military Financing
- **HRDF:** Human Rights and Democracy Funds
- **IDA:** International Disaster Assistance (Pakistani earthquake, flood, and internally displaced persons relief)
- **IMET:** International Military Education and Training
- **INCLE:** International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (includes border security)
- **MRA:** Migration and Refugee Assistance (also includes Emergency Migration and Refugee Assistance or
ERMA)
NADR: Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related (the majority allocated for Pakistan is for anti-terrorism assistance)
PCF/PCCF: Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund/Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCF overseen by the Pentagon; PCCF overseen by the State Department)

Notes:

a. This funding is “requirements-based”; there are no pre-allocation data.
b. CSF is Pentagon funding to reimburse Pakistan for its support of U.S. military operations; it is technically not foreign assistance.
c. Includes $220 million for FY2002 Peacekeeping Operations reported by the State Department.
d. Congress appropriated $1.6 billion for FY2011 and the Administration requested $1.75 billion for FY2012, in additional CSF for all U.S. coalition partners. Pakistan has in the past received more than three-quarters of such funds. FY2011-FY2012 may thus include billions of dollars in additional CSF payments to Pakistan.
e. These funds were appropriated in and became available on the final day of FY2009.
f. Congress authorized Pakistan to use the FY2003 and FY2004 ESF allocations to cancel a total of about $1.5 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
g. Includes $110 million in Pentagon funds transferred to the State Department for projects in Pakistan’s tribal areas (P.L. 110-28).
h. P.L. 480 Title I (loans), P.L.480 Title II (grants), and Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended (surplus agricultural commodity donations). Food aid totals do not include freight costs and total allocations are unavailable until the fiscal year’s end.

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