American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

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Summary

From May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR—and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity from May 2009 to October 2011 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.

The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.

There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings, observations, and policy considerations for Congress.
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Executive Summary

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorist activity and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities.

The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners, such as the airline bombing attempts by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the perpetrators of the Transatlantic Airliners plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid (December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremists inspired by right-wing or left-wing ideologies and environmental, animal rights, or anti-abortion causes.

Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytic findings. A full description of each of the post-9/11 cases is provided in Appendix A of the report. The report also offers policy considerations for Congress.

Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem

“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that there have been 53 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11). As part of a much-discussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks. Most of the 2009-2011 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Homegrown violent jihadists, some say, possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,
preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that can develop quickly.

How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?

Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic. “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist beliefs. This activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to become full-fledged terrorists.

Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks, virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent jihad, as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.

Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to CRS analysis, the 53 plots since 9/11 exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities among the plots.

- **Endgames:** Sixteen plots involved individuals exclusively interested in becoming foreign fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad. Fifteen plots exclusively intended to use explosives or incendiary devices. Three exclusively intended to use or did use firearms. Nineteen attacks and plots incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the 53 violent plots since 9/11, other schemes intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their jihadist colleagues.
- **Suicide or Martyrdom:** According to publicly available information, only nine plots included individuals who clearly professed interest in killing themselves while engaged in violent jihad.
- **Success of Lone Wolves:** Lone wolves conducted all four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11.
- **Divergent Capabilities:** Among the 53 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverged greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced.
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists

The spate of recent arrests should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of ideas. The second context is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots—largely involving secretive illegal activity—and the police work used to dismantle them. The latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas.

Preventive Policing

In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future.

In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and disrupted. At the federal level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s investigations and make them more proactive, has at its heart a new investigative tool, assessments. These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without factual predication. The new guidelines have, however, generated some controversy among civil libertarians.

Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to e-mail and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or e-mail communications to build cases against defendants in at least 22 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet to be a uniformly permissive environment.

2 The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement efforts for this report.
State and Local Authorities

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. Ten years after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to help coordinate federal, state, and local investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. NSI is in the process of being implemented throughout the country.

Investigative Approaches

To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism investigations. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown terrorism, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and civil libertarians.

Trust and Partnership

Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim American communities. From the community angle, several Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian American community groups have formed partnerships with government officials.

Balancing Security and Liberty

Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law
enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community members to be unfairly targeting law-abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights.

The recruitment and management of informants—essential to many law enforcement investigations—may, however, pose an obstacle to successful community engagement efforts. Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots. There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicate that confidential informants or undercover operatives were used in at least 25 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism cases. In some of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

Issues for Congress

Many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities. In 2011, the Obama Administration articulated two broad strategies that address violent homegrown jihadist activity. The administration recognized the significance of the homegrown threat in its June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Additionally, in August 2011, the Obama Administration released a strategy for combating violent extremism (CVE). It revolves around countering the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. As such, it covers the radicalization of violent jihadists and focuses on outreach, building trust, and fostering partnerships with U.S. Muslim communities. In addition to these two new strategies, some critics have suggested that the United States has to develop a more cohesive domestic intelligence program drawing on local policing efforts. Additionally, critics contend that the CVE strategy is largely philosophical and light on guidelines for implementation. These areas—domestic intelligence and the implementation of the CVE strategy—may merit oversight from Congress.

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Introduction

As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhamim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR—produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and never more than six occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after April 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—are susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ in their opinions. In May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman emphasized that it is, “difficult to be complacent when an average of one plot is now being uncovered per month over the past year or more—and perhaps even more are being hatched that we don’t know about.” By contrast, a recent academic study of domestic Muslim radicalization supported by the National Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism” and concludes that “homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.” Another study has suggested that the homegrown terrorist threat has been exaggerated by federal cases that “rely on the abusive use of informants.” Moreover, the radicalization of violent jihadists may not be an especially new phenomenon for the United States. Estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s in

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5 For this report, “homegrown” or “domestic” describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. “Jihadist” describes radicalized Muslims using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via violent means. Jihadists largely adhere to a variant of Salafi Islam—the fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and adhere to the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.

6 See Appendix A for a summary of publicly available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The summary is presented in reverse chronological order. The two attacks between 9/11 and May 2009 involved Hasan Akbar and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar. On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. On March 3, 2006, Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people.


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Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. More broadly, terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins notes that during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since 9/11.” Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by jihadist ideas.

But as Dr. Hoffman’s comments suggest, the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, which killed 13, and the other plots and arrests in 2009, 2010, and 2011, are worrying. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano has said that authorities are “just beginning to confront the reality that we have this issue ... and that we really don’t have a very good handle on how you prevent someone from becoming a violent extremist.” A single successful attack can incur scores of casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption. Regardless of their novelty, frequency, or lethality, violent attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized in the United States remain a security concern.

The bulk of the 2009-2011 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant terrorist groups. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer who writes about terrorism, has noted a global shift in terrorism toward decentralized, autonomously radicalized, violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home countries. Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist networks to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes in locations far from their bases of operation. A senior counterterrorism official told the Los Angeles Times that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are moving “away from what we are used to, which are complex, ambitious, multilayered plots.”

Homegrown Violent Jihadists

This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely

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within the United States. These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on foreign targets. They can have operational ties to foreign terrorist groups, but most of the plots after April 2009 have not. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially either come from Muslim immigrant communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown violent jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There have been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material support to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone themselves—to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist conflict, such as the fighting in Somalia or Afghanistan.

Shortcomings and Strengths

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with extensive rosters and greater resources. Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally structured than international organizations. A former CIA case officer recently commented that the threat posed by self-radicalized “lone” bombers lacking support networks, “even those who have been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”

These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale suicide strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning and preparation, such as assaults using firearms.

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16 Others have used similar definitions. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian define homegrown as “extremist violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens. See Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States, Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2010, p. v, http://csis.org/publication/growing-terrorist-threat. Hereinafter: Nelson and Bodurian, A Growing Terrorist Threat? For further discussion of definitions of homegrown terrorism, see Sam Mullins, “Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol 1, no. 3 (2007), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/p/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12&Itemid=54. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use the term “homegrown violent extremist” instead of homegrown violent jihadist. They define “homegrown violent extremist” as “a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.” This definition appears to differ from the one used in this report by 1. largely focusing on whether or not an individual was directed by a foreign organization and by 2. including all sorts of terrorists, not just violent jihadists. See DHS and FBI, Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics,” August 16, 2011, p. 3.


19 Ibid.

20 On November 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury (continued...)
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Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such homegrown lone wolf terrorist plots. In March 2010, As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media wing, released an English language video titled “A Call to Arms” featuring American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan as a “trailblazer” who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on conspirators. Gadahn encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable targets that are familiar to them and have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—resonance. In an early June 2011 English language video message titled “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself,” Al Qaeda’s American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn even more clearly emphasized lone wolf operations. In the video he suggests possible weapons,

Let’s take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check, and most likely without having to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?

Gadahn stresses “targeting major institutions—after a clip showing the logos of such firms as Exxon, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America—and ‘influential public figures.’” At about the same time as this video was released, users of jihadist websites apparently began posting potential targets and developing hit lists.

In the same vein as Gadahn’s video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) has issued an English language propaganda magazine titled Inspire. The magazine has encouraged homegrown violent jihadist activity in the West, focusing on smaller scale strategies such as using a vehicle to run over victims. It has featured articles attributed to three prominent violent jihadist propagandists with strong American ties: Gadahn, radical U.S.-born imam Anwar al-Awlaki, and Saudi-born American citizen Samir Khan. In September 2011, the latter two died in a widely reported U.S. air strike in Yemen.

(...continued...)
This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008 foiled New York City subway bomber Najibullah Zazi received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and co-conspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States. U.S. authorities allege that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow plotters. Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned the attack. The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot may have actually exposed it to greater law enforcement scrutiny. Authorities likely learned of the plot while monitoring a known Al Qaeda e-mail account.

The conventionally perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may actually pose some challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to terrorism analyst Steve Emerson, “The smaller cells tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they are harder to detect…. When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for the FBI…. The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.” Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in 2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly generated schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.

According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and foreign countries. While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations, conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and...
foreign cultural contexts.\footnote{ Ibid.} English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture, society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes.\footnote{ Michael Kenney, “Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,” National Institute of Justice Journal, no. 265 (April 2010), p. 19.} Three recent cases involving alleged or actual homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate terrorist plotting:


In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Intelligence and Analysis warned, “probable terrorist perception of success in challenging the U.S. even through failed attacks, suggest[s] Al Qaeda and associated groups will try to conduct operations in the United States with increased frequency.”\footnote{ DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Note, IA-0291-10, “Evolution of the Terrorist Threat to the United States,” May 21, 2010, p.1.} It appears that for the foreseeable future, American citizens...
and legal permanent residents of the United States radicalized within the nation’s borders will continue to pose a sizeable violent jihadist threat.44

Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do not mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of individuals to ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist viewpoints.45 Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and behavior to justify intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific, closely held ideas.46 Still others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action, as in this working definition by the DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”47

But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism” as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views (i.e., they move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially supporting, or executing terrorist activity) then the nation’s public safety and security interests are activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:

- “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist, or jihadist beliefs.
- “Violent extremism,” for this report, describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.”

From Radicalization to Violent Extremism

As the terrorist threat becomes increasingly homegrown, a key way to fight it is to develop an understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent the radicalization from morphing into violent extremism.48 In 2007, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s)

48 See Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
Intelligence Division released a study of domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely circulated within the law enforcement community.

The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism. First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam. Next, they go through self-identification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafist views. The study indicates that, typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack. At this point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own four-stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.

This model and the process it describes—though useful—should, however, be read with caution, according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes. Brian Michael Jenkins has suggested that

There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in the arc of one’s life.

Some experts have warned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyer belt,” somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence. The NYPD report itself acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who begin this progression become terrorists. Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety of factors.


51 Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors, p. 7.


53 Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, pp. 10, 19.

54 Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007, p. 5.
Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists

What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty, alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or terrorist activity. The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife.

Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global community of Muslims (the *Ummah*), or even waging war against it may also spur radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals. CRS analysis of the 53 plots since 9/11 suggests that 22 of them included converts to Islam (Figure B-1).

As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms. Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define themselves.” Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they identify with others; and they desire revenge.”

Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism. These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons.

Intermediaries

Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al

56 The Quran uses the term *ummah* to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual communities, great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of believers. See Richard Hooker, *World Civilizations*, Glossary, 1996, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM.
57 Ibid.
Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face discussion groups) or in online forums. Some recent terrorist plots have included an intermediary. In some cases a key intermediary may be a government informant or undercover agent. Four charismatic U.S. citizens have played especially prominent roles in international jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other intermediaries can be difficult.

Anwar al-Awlaki was a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles prior to being killed in an alleged U.S. air strike in Yemen in September 2011. Awlaki allegedly served as a leader in the terrorist group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He was a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and had been linked to a number of domestic jihadist plots. He had also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt. However, according to publicly available sources, his exact connections to these individuals are largely unclear. Accused of propagandizing for Al Qaeda, Awlaki was associated with the group’s Arabian Peninsula offshoot. Before his alleged November 5, 2009, gun rampage at Fort Hood, TX, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan purportedly exchanged e-mails with Awlaki. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan. After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.

The imam also likely influenced people involved in other violent homegrown jihadist plots. In December 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, in a plot to bomb an Armed Forces recruiting station. A sting operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ensnared Martinez. He allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a bomb. During the course of his plot, he also allegedly praised Awlaki. Naturalized U.S. citizen Farooque Ahmed was arrested in October 2010 for attempting to assist people he believed to be terrorists in planning the bombing of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations. Ahmed allegedly possessed a

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61 For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
62 For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
64 For details on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy, coordinated by John Rollins.
biography of Awlaki and listened to his online sermons. Also apprehended in October 2010, U.S. citizen Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who allegedly tried to join overseas extremist groups such as the Taliban, modeled one of the jihadist websites he managed after Awlaki’s teachings. The website offered hyperlinks to Awlaki’s online lectures. Shehadeh also discussed Awlaki’s ideas with an individual he tried (and failed) to recruit for violent jihad. Zachary Chesser, who allegedly tried to join al-Shabaab as late as July 2010 and propagated online, e-mailed Awlaki. The cleric responded twice, according to court documents. In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr., pled guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed Awlaki’s online pronouncements and developed an “execution” hit list that included 15 people Rockwood believed had desecrated Islam. According to court documents, Shaker Masri encouraged an FBI cooperating source to “review speeches” by Awlaki. Arrested in June 2010 while allegedly trying to join al-Shabaab, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos of and listened to sermons by Awlaki.

According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City’s Times Square on May 1, 2010, cited Awlaki and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal from Jamaica, as key influences on him. Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually convicted of plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an Awlaki lecture.

U.S. officials believe Awlaki also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. In October 2011, when he pled guilty to his involvement in the plot Abdulmutallab stated, “I was greatly inspired to participate in jihad by the lectures of the great and rightly guided mujahedeen who is alive, Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, may Allah preserve him and his family and give them victory, Amin,”

and Allah knows best.”

A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s sensitivity, told The Washington Post that Awlaki was the first U.S. citizen added to a list of suspected terrorists the CIA is authorized to kill.

Samir Khan—before he was killed in the same alleged airstrike as Awlaki—served as the editor of Inspire magazine, launched in 2010 by AQAP. Inspire has been described as “a slick magazine for jihadists ... that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular.” The magazine is intended to attract would-be jihadists in the West.

The Saudi-born Khan lived in Queens, NY, and Charlotte, NC. He radicalized after the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, and moved with his parents to Charlotte in 2004. He left Charlotte in 2009 and joined AQAP in Yemen. Prior to leaving the United States, Khan had gained some notoriety as a jihadist blogger and as creator of the online magazine, Jihad Recollections—Inspire’s forerunner.

Reportedly, Khan and his online publications may have influenced homegrown jihadists. In July 2011, U.S. Army private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area. Abdo intended to kill soldiers near the same place where Army Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 individuals in 2009. Federal officials noted that Abdo also possessed an article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items. The article was from Inspire.

In November 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation, moments after he tried to detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square. According to DOJ, Mohamud wrote articles for Khan’s first magazine, Jihad Recollections. Aside from editing Inspire Khan also contributed to it. Additionally, the magazine...
included commentary from Awlaki and another American Al Qaeda propagandist, Adam Gadahn.86

Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the organization’s videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California, Gadahn converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in California, Gadahn was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended. One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States, and in another dispatch he urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a recent video, posted on June 20, 2010, Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama describing him as, “treacherous, bloodthirsty, and narrow-minded.”87

Omar Hammami, also known as “Abu Mansour al-Amriki,” is originally from Daphne, AL. He has emerged as a key international intermediary for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab. The son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he has been featured in propagandist videos distributed by the group. In one he instructs recruits in urban warfare. Zachary Chesser saw Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami’s adoption of “al-Amriki” (the American) as part of his own jihadist name—“Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee.” Somali officials tie Hammami to al-Shabaab recruitment and financial management. He may also have led battlefield skirmishes. On August 5, 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding indictment against him.88

As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, he led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salafism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in Canada, he


married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia pursuing violent jihad.89

Social Networks

Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well. Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual’s personal experiences.90

Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups.91 According to The New York Times, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani, while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s. Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain. The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when in 2007 Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal. The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group’s camps for training in 2009.92

Intermediaries within Networks

Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic leaders. Daniel Boyd and six other North Carolina residents were indicted on terrorism charges in 2009. In June 2010, another individual, who was living in Mitrovica, Kosovo, was charged in a criminal complaint linked to the case.93 This small social network included Dylan and Zakariya Boyd, sons of Daniel Boyd. A charismatic leader, the elder Boyd allegedly led a conspiracy from November 2006 to 2009 to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men interested in overseas terrorism. The conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of material support to terrorist groups. Using stories of his supposed past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to FBI courtroom testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and

89 Ibid.
Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan. In 2011, the Boyds pled guilty to charges related to the case.

**Jihadi Cool**

Recent plots suggest that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and romanticized notions of revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A desire to protect the Ummah against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more important to Faisal Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric. Terrorist recruiters are also promoting “jihadi cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the Web. In 2007, Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab, enticed young Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories. According to federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of brotherhood he had experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerrilla combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.

“Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan. Muslim leaders from Alexandria, VA, indicated that they had no inkling of radicalization among the five. Abroad, as early as 2006, Dutch officials noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in the Netherlands and a perception that jihad was “cool.”

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96 Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.


The Internet

The Web may also play a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it does in the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking sites, message boards, video hosting sites, and e-mail blurs the lines between readership and authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers, and newsletters. This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such forums to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual readers or online spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual propagandizing, financial support, or joining a terrorist network.

The Web’s impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. One author asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development of a “self-starter” phenomenon and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described as a “de-formalized” radicalization experience. “Self-starters” are groups that lack ties to major international terrorist networks and do not receive orders from such organizations. However, instances of solely virtual radicalization without face-to-face interaction seem to be rare. Most radicalization apparently requires experience with real-world social networks.

In other instances, terrorist “wannabes” may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct violence and face-to-face contact with hardcore terrorists. Simply, individuals interested in violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even play a much more profound, “cathartic” role, “allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence.” In essence, online activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.

Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably serves to spur radicalization in three ways. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and...

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interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normalizes behaviors considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.” Terrorists publish rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.

Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides.

Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist groups. Before he died, Anwar al-Awlaki circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own popular Facebook page and blog. The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010, in Pakistan on terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking websites, according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.

Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston suburb, was arrested on terrorism charges in October 2009. Among other alleged activities, Mehanna and co-conspirators translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism and posted them on jihadist websites. They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away from core members of Al Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-starting terrorists. The Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist organizations no longer seem necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training abroad. (Mehanna, himself, allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) Sam Rascoff, a former New York Police Department terrorism specialist, notes that “there is a sense that these guys are radicalizing on their own.”

Frank J. Cilluffo notes that the Web has supplanted mosques as a recruitment venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into their organizations.

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110 Ibid.
116 Murphy, February 1, 2010.
Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers terrorists operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{117} Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular structures of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect intelligence about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot soldiers, provide training, raise funds, and communicate operational direction.\textsuperscript{118}

### Jailhouse Jihadism

In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in jihadist prison radicalization.\textsuperscript{119} But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed by radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes that jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”\textsuperscript{120} Experts have sounded warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in U.S. jails.\textsuperscript{121}

Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.\textsuperscript{122} This is at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism, according to a study involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional systems.\textsuperscript{123} The Federal Bureau of Prisons acknowledges the possibility of inmate radicalization but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting in federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.\textsuperscript{124} Based on CRS analysis of the 53 violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11, only one involved radicalization in prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom

\textsuperscript{117} Weimann, \textit{Terror on the Internet}, pp. 56.

\textsuperscript{118} Weimann, \textit{Terror on the Internet}, pp. 111-140.


found only seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual’s radicalization process.\textsuperscript{125}

The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as some experts may fear. One of the recent cases, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot, included at least two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains unclear whether they radicalized behind bars, and whether the plot itself took form outside of jail.\textsuperscript{126}

The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison implicated the group, Jamiiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the “Authentic Assembly of God”). Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.

According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document titled the “JIS Protocol.” In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the United States and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action[,]’ a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met Washington in prison while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, CA, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.\textsuperscript{127} One study has pointed out that James’ radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly


driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father had been a member of the Black Panther Party.\textsuperscript{128}

## Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks

Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.\textsuperscript{129} Another study found only broad trends among domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds of them are younger than 30 years old.\textsuperscript{130} As the above discussion may suggest, generalizing about the individuals involved is problematic.

Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African American of a happy childhood who converted to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammed; David Headley, who was born Daood Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother, with Talib Islam, who was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek Mehanna, with the Somali American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in first- and second-generation Muslim American immigrants and native-born Americans who converted to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators. Some plots were aspirational. Others appear to have been pushed along by government informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until uncovered by intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see Appendix A for details on the cases).

**Figure B-1** provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in domestic jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. **Figure B-2** documents the specific plots and attacks, including the intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or fight abroad), target (within/outside the United States), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting.

## Overarching Themes

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example, conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above, homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since 9/11, 32 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 18 focused on foreign ones, and three conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 30

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\textsuperscript{128} Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” pp. 581-582.
\textsuperscript{129} Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{130} Schanzer, et.al, *Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans*, p. 10.
involved intent or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 53 homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots.

A Variety of Endgames

Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their brethren.

Foreign Fighters

Sixteen of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals exclusively seeking to become foreign fighters with terrorist groups entangled in insurgency-type conflicts. Al-Shabaab-related cases concerning young men leaving the United States to fight in Somalia are the paramount example. Other cases include the following:

- In a case mentioned elsewhere in this report, five men from Northern Virginia (Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in Sarghoda, Pakistan, in December 2009. They purportedly traveled there hoping to join jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010, they were convicted of terrorism charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court. Prosecutors say the five men also began planning attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant and an air base and other targets in Afghanistan and “territories of the United States.”

- In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, OH—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq. On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material support to terrorists.

Explosives and Firearms

Fifteen of the 53 homegrown jihadist plots targeting the United States since 9/11 exclusively involved explosives or incendiary devices. Suspects at least discussed the use of bombs, hand grenades, or missiles in these cases. From a broader perspective, 27 cases involved plotting

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134 This includes one case involving a surface-to-air missile (to be supplied by an undercover agent).
revolving around explosives or incendiary devices coupled with another endgame—either the use of firearms or plans to become foreign fighters. Historically, most terrorist incidents in the United States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database, about 83% of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007—including violent jihadists as well as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary devices. Roughly 9% involved firearms.135

The Zazi case (as mentioned elsewhere) and the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square stand out as examples of plots incorporating explosive or incendiary devices. On May 1, 2010, investigators discovered fireworks, clocks, wiring, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer that Shahzad had rigged for explosion in his vehicle.136 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan helped facilitate the failed attack by training Shahzad and sending him $12,000 in funding.137

Three plots intended to use firearms exclusively, while 16 plots involved in whole or in part the use of firearms. The three plots that focused on firearms include two of the successful post-9/11 attacks. The deadlier of the two attacks was the shooting at Fort Hood, TX, on November 5, 2009. U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was charged in the attack which killed 13 and wounded or injured 43 others.138 Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009, in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, that killed one soldier and wounded another.139 The third case that centered on firearms involved six men. They were arrested in May 2007 in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan focused on firearms and included attacking and killing soldiers. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder.140


Multiple, Unclear, or Unique Tactics

In total, 19 attacks and plots incorporated multiple or unique tactics or the tactics were not clear from the public record. One attack involving multiple tactics occurred abroad but targeted members of the U.S. Armed Forces at a base. In that attack, which occurred on March 23, 2003, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar used hand grenades (explosives) and his military-issued M-4 rifle to kill two fellow U.S. servicemen and wound 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait.\(^\text{141}\) Other examples of multiple, unique, or unspecified tactics include the following:

- Members of the plot involving Daniel Boyd allegedly attempted to travel abroad to engage in jihad as *foreign fighters* and also likely prepared to attack a domestic site—the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, VA, using *firearms*.\(^\text{142}\)

- Bryant Vinas, who plotted to blow up (*explosives*) the Long Island railroad in New York, admitted to U.S. officials that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses.\(^\text{143}\) In September 2008, as a *foreign fighter* he took part in a rocket attack targeting a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.\(^\text{144}\)

- Even though the plotters discussed using *explosives*, the four individuals tied to JIS and arrested in 2005 used *firearms* in robberies to generate funding for their scheme.\(^\text{145}\)

- In a case involving unspecified tactics, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, scouted targets in Washington, DC, in 2005.\(^\text{146}\)

- In an attack that did not feature guns or bombs, on March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized U.S. citizen, crashed his SUV into a crowd near the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. No one was seriously injured in the attack, and he pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. The assailant allegedly hoped to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that he believed were caused by the United States.\(^\text{147}\)


\(^{144}\) Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore.”


Material Support

Although this report largely focuses on radicalization and violent jihadist plotting, there is at least one other illegal method for individuals to assist terrorists. Radicalization may lead people to help terrorist organizations by illegally providing them material support unrelated to specific violent jihadist plots. How frequently this has occurred since 9/11 is difficult to discern, because material support charges are often part of the illegal activity in violent plots. DOJ has publicly released information on unsealed terrorism convictions between September 11, 2001, and March 18, 2010. CRS analysis of this information indicates that homegrown jihadists unconnected to any specific violent plots were prosecuted for materially supporting terrorists in at least six schemes. The six schemes supported violent jihadist or jihadist-linked groups such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and Lashkar-e-Taib (LeT). They included the following:

- **Rahmat Abdhir**: A U.S. citizen living in San Jose, CA, Abdhir was indicted in 2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli Abdhir, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah based in the Philippines. The U.S. government accused


150 For this measure, 1) Homegrown jihadists were convicted under either section 2339A or 2339B of U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, and no other “Category I” (see definition below) conviction charges were tied to their cases. 2) The scheme or the radicalization of the individuals involved had to have largely occurred after 9/11. 3) The scheme was jihadist in nature, eliminating material support cases involving non-jihadist terrorist groups. 4) The scheme did not include a violent plot as reported publicly. So, for example, the August 2004 Albany, New York plot implicating Yassin M. Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain in an FBI sting involving material support to a Pakistani terrorist group is not included among the six material support cases. This is because the case involved a scheme to launder through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan’s United Nation’s envoy.

American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Rahmat of sending to his brother more than $10,000 in supplies, including chocolates, underwear, knives, guns, and radios.151

- **Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed:** According to DOJ, during a routine traffic stop in Goose Creek, SC, on August 4, 2007, law enforcement officials found explosive materials (PVC pipe containing potassium nitrate and kitty litter as well as about 20 feet of fuse) during a consensual search of the trunk of the Toyota Camry Mohamed was driving. A laptop retrieved from the car yielded a video produced by Mohamed depicting how components from a remote controlled toy car could be used to fashion a detonator for an explosive device. Mohamed had uploaded the recording to YouTube. Although no specific terrorist group was linked to Mohamed, he did admit that he intended the recording as instruction to “suiciders” on how to spare themselves in attacks. An Egyptian resident of Tampa, FL, Mohamed entered the United States on an F-1 student visa.152

- **Tarik Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent:** In an investigation stretching back at least to December 2001, the FBI infiltrated a group of acquaintances interested in supporting international jihadist terrorist organizations. Shah and Brent pled guilty to material support in 2007 and Sabir was convicted of the charge the same year. In 2005, Shah, a Bronx, New York City, jazz musician and martial arts instructor, had sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda in the presence of an FBI agent who posed as a recruiter for the group. He had also allegedly offered to train Al Qaeda fighters in hand-to-hand combat. Shah purported to have been interested in traveling to Afghanistan in 1998 to attend terrorist training camps.153 Sabir, a doctor from Florida, swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in the same ceremony as his friend, Shah. Sabir also offered his medical skills to treat injured Al Qaeda fighters.154 Brent, a Washington, DC, cab driver, traveled to Pakistan in 2002 to attend a Lashkar-i-Taiba training camp.155 A fourth individual was arrested in the investigation but did not get convicted of material support.156

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• **Ronald Grecula:** In an FBI sting operation, Grecula negotiated to build and sell an explosive device with individuals he believed were tied to Al Qaeda.\(^{157}\)

• **Ilyas Ali:** In a drugs-for-arms case, Ali, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India, admitted to conspiring in 2002 with two Pakistanis to supply Al Qaeda with anti-aircraft missiles bought using proceeds from the sale of heroin and hashish.\(^{158}\)

• **Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson:** In February 2005, the duo from New Orleans pled guilty to conspiring to sell false Mississippi Driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, and birth certificates to undercover informants they believed were members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.\(^{159}\)

Aside from the convictions derived from the DOJ’s list covering the period between 9/11 and March 18, 2010, several material support cases have come to light recently. It is unclear what accounts for this recent flurry of arrests. It may be a parallel to the uptick in violent jihadist plotting. Some of the cases include the following:

• In May 2011, FBI agents arrested **Hafiz Khan** (a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of Miami) and two of his sons **Izhar Khan** and **Irfan Khan** (both naturalized U.S. citizens). They were allegedly involved in efforts to provide financing and other material support to the Pakistani Taliban. The trio was assisted by three other indicted individuals at large in Pakistan. This second group included **Amina Khan**—Izhar Khan’s daughter—and her son, **Alam Zeb**, as well as an individual named **Ali Rehman**. Hafiz and Izhar Khan are imams in South Florida mosques.\(^{160}\)

• **Nima Ali Yusuf:** A permanent resident of the United States living in San Diego, Yusuf was arrested on November 12, 2010, on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Shabaab and for making false statements to a government agency regarding an international terrorism matter.\(^{161}\)

• **Mohamud Abdi Yusuf, Abdi Mahdi Hussein, and Duwayne Mohamed Diriye** participated in a scheme to provide material support to al-Shabaab, according to an indictment unsealed November 3, 2010. Yusuf, a resident of St. Louis, MO, is accused of sending funds to people tied to the terrorist organization in Somalia,


- Syed Hashmi: A Pakistan-born U.S. citizen, Hashmi pled guilty to material support charges on April 27, 2010. He admitted that while he was a graduate student in London, he allowed a roommate to store in his apartment ponchos,
sleeping bags, and waterproof socks destined for Al Qaeda. Hashmi also loaned the individual $300 to travel to Waziristan, Pakistan, to deliver the goods.  

- **Raja Lahrasib Khan:** On March 25, 2010, Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was charged with providing material support (in the form of money) to Al Qaeda. The criminal complaint alleges that Khan accepted $1,000 from an undercover agent and assured him that the money would be used to purchase weapons and possibly other supplies.  

- Between November 2007 and March 2010, U.S. citizens **Wesam El-Hanafi** and **Sabirhan Hasanoff** allegedly engaged in a scheme to, among other things, provide computer expertise to and purchase seven Casio digital watches for Al Qaeda.  

### Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom

Few of the terrorist conspiracies examined in this report clearly contained suicidal or martyrdom overtones. Two terrorist plots clearly had suicide missions as core elements. Najibullah Zazi and his associates planned their attack on New York’s subways as suicide missions. Also, some Americans recruited into al-Shabaab have reportedly committed suicide attacks. On October 29, 2008, al-Shabaab recruit Shirwa Ahmed became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous assaults that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others. The FBI also identified Farah Mohamed Beledi as a suicide bomber who died as he tried to detonate his suicide vest in a May 2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia. According to media reports, al-Shabaab has claimed that Abdisalan Hussein Ali purportedly blew himself up while attacking African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011. Reportedly, the FBI is also investigating whether a Seattle man was responsible for a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 17, 2009, that killed 21 peacekeepers and himself.  

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Eight others clearly expressed a willingness to perform a suicide mission. For example, Daniel Maldonado told authorities that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.\textsuperscript{177} Al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen Bryant Neal Vinas wanted to become a suicide bomber but was rebuffed by the group.\textsuperscript{178} In e-mails intercepted by law enforcement authorities, Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”) wrote that she was prepared to be a martyr. And, in recordings of his conversations with an informant, Shaker Masri stated that he would be willing to walk up to a group of U.S. Army soldiers and blow himself up as a martyr.\textsuperscript{179}

The Success of Lone Wolves

Lone wolves (Nidal Hasan, Abdulhakim Muhammad, Hasan Akbar, and Mohammed Taheri-Azar) have conducted the four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. Three other plotters acted alone. The remaining disrupted or failed plots have involved two or more participants in a group or network of one type or another. Three of the four lone wolf attacks involved firearms and they targeted U.S. military personnel.

It is difficult to generalize from such a small pool of cases. However, the success of four solo actors may highlight two contrasting points. First, law enforcement may face significant challenges in identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists involved in technically uncomplicated plots unconnected to terrorist groups. Second, U.S. Law enforcement has been successful in disrupting and dismantling homegrown terrorist groups or networks since 9/11. Bolstering this point, undercover agents or cooperating witnesses infiltrated and monitored groups involved in 14 of the plots.

Varied Capabilities

Among the 53 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced. For instance, long before Derrick Shareef was apprehended in 2006, he likely intended to commit terrorist acts. However, he appears not to have possessed the capability to do so on his own until he was approached by an undercover FBI informant.

Shareef, a Muslim convert and 22 years old at the time of his arrest, plotted to set off hand grenades at a shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois. FBI informant William “Jamaal” Chrisman played a central part in the plot. At the behest of authorities, Chrisman befriended Shareef in September 2006 while the latter was working in a video store and had nowhere to live. Chrisman invited the young man to move in with him and began reporting to his law enforcement handlers regarding Shareef’s jihadist tendencies.\textsuperscript{180} Shareef was unaware that Chrisman secretly recorded


their conversations. The duo talked about violent jihad against civilians, public buildings, and a judge in DeKalb, IL.181 They concocted a plan to attack a local shopping mall. Chrisman told the young jihadist of a friend who could procure weapons for them. Unknown to Shareef, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.182 On December 6, 2006, the duo met the undercover FBI agent in the mall’s parking lot where Shareef attempted to trade stereo speakers for hand grenades and was arrested.183 Shareef, who pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, was sentenced in September 30, 2008, to 35 years in prison.184

Conversely, two of the homegrown jihadist terrorist plots appear to stand out for the capability their plotters. Both came to public attention in 2009. Both involved homegrown jihadists who had strong ties to foreign terrorist organizations. Attorney General Eric Holder characterized one of those plots—Najibullah Zazi’s plan to blow up explosives on the New York City subway—as one of the most serious terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001, and were it not for the combined efforts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, it could have been devastating. This attempted attack on our homeland was real, it was in motion, and it would have been deadly. We were able to thwart this plot because of careful analysis by our intelligence agents and prompt actions by law enforcement.185

While a complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process is not publicly available, some details regarding his plot have emerged. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman Halimi, an imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in the same Queens building.186 Regardless, Zazi pled guilty on February 22, 2010, to a number of terrorism charges. As mentioned above, the young man admitted to receiving Al Qaeda training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2008. There, he learned about explosives and discussed specific targets with Al Qaeda members. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Denver. He also traveled to New York to discuss the timing for the attacks with a network of conspirators. In July and early September in Denver, he gathered materials for detonator components and assembled them based on the detailed training he had received in Afghanistan. Zazi admitted to bringing the explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) into New York on Thursday September 10, 2009. He intended to finish bomb construction over the weekend and planned to target New York’s subway lines early the next week.187

(continued...)
On March 18, 2010, David Headley pled guilty to terrorism charges. He admitted that he helped plan two plots for the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba (LET)—the November 2008 Mumbai attack and an un-executed conspiracy targeting a Danish newspaper. He received training from LET and claimed membership in the organization. Headley attended the group’s training camps five times between 2002 and 2005. These stints in Pakistan provided him with weapons training, indoctrination in jihad as well as instruction in close combat, survival skills, and counter-surveillance, among other things.

Between 2005 and 2008, he received extensive direction from LET members and engaged in reconnaissance for the group in preparation for its Mumbai attack. To provide cover for his surveillance activity, Headley encouraged a co-conspirator in Chicago, who owned an immigration services business, to open a satellite office in Mumbai.188 Headley conducted video surveillance of potential Mumbai targets for LET, and using a global positioning system device, he pinpointed landing sites for a waterborne assault. At the behest of LET, Headley also conducted reconnaissance of the offices of the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten. Representatives of both LET and Al Qaeda schemed with him to strike the newspaper after it had published unflattering cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.189

### Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities

The Obama Administration has recognized the significance of the homegrown jihadist threat in its June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.190 The strategy focuses on Al Qaeda, its affiliates (groups aligned with it), and its adherents (individuals linked to or inspired by the terrorist group).191 John Brennan, President Obama’s top counterterrorism advisor, publicly described the strategy as the first one, “that designates the homeland as a primary area of emphasis in our counterterrorism efforts.”192 The Strategy states:

(...continued)

Release, February 22, 2010. For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”


189


191 Ibid, p. 3.

We know al-Qa’ida and its affiliates continue to try to identify operatives overseas and develop new methods of attack that can evade U.S. defensive measures. At the same time, plots directed and planned from overseas are not the only sort of terrorist threat we face. Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa’ida have engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are likely to try to follow their example, and so we must remain vigilant.193

The spate of recent arrests and other counterterrorism successes should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism efforts exist within two broad contexts. Many of the legal behaviors associated with radicalization occur in the open marketplace of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of free speech. Conversely, the operational aspects of violent jihadist plots largely involve illegal activity. In this secretive realm involving criminality, law enforcement pursues terrorists in a real-world version of hide-and-seek.

The divergent nature of these two contexts may imply a distinct wall between the public realm and the secretive operational realm. In reality, the barrier is far from distinct. What happens operationally has significant impacts in the marketplace of ideas (Figure 1). The success of terrorist plots may spur radicalization, while effective policing may make terrorism a less popular option for radicals. High levels of radicalization may expand the potential pool of terrorist recruits.

**Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context**

Source: CRS

**Intelligence Approaches**

A group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist conspiracies, identify and head off future terrorist attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly

193 *National Strategy*, p. 11.
investigate when terrorist incidents do occur requires human intelligence.” The DOJ and FBI operate 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States—69 created since 2001. These interagency entities include more than 4,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.” As this suggests, their operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots.

JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and local law enforcement with the U.S. Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009.

A significant dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence officials who straddle the public realm of ideas and the secretive realm of terrorist operations is how to sift the law-abiding, non-violent radical attracted to jihadist rhetoric from the would-be terrorist who merits targeting. The vast amount of terrorist-related material available on the Internet in a relatively anonymous setting attracts homegrown individuals open to radicalization. Many of these individuals may show great interest in radical content, engage in radical discourse, but not become terrorists. A growing pool of those who view jihadism as “cool” and engage in online “talk” may make it harder for police to identify actual terrorists.

**Preventive Policing**

Since the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement has taken a more proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its investigations. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty described the Justice Department’s aggressive, proactive, and preventative course as

the only acceptable response from a department of government charged with enforcing our laws and protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s

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194 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.
security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—prosecutions.\textsuperscript{199}

One observer has described intelligence gathering in this context as “driven by a theory of preventive policing: in order to anticipate the next terror attack, authorities need to track legal activities…. It focuses not on crime, but on the possibility that a crime might be committed at some future date.”\textsuperscript{200}

The FBI and DOJ emphasized their forward-leaning approach with its September 29, 2008, revision of the \textit{Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations} which they claim “make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by providing simpler, clearer, and more uniform standards and procedures.”\textsuperscript{201} This revision went into effect on December 1, 2008.

In large part, the guidelines sprang from the post-9/11 national security context in which the FBI surmised that it could not simply react to crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal, counterintelligence, and terrorist threats to the homeland.\textsuperscript{202} In 2008, as then FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni stated in congressional testimony:

\begin{quote}
We believe that this will allow the FBI to take additional necessary steps to becoming a more proactive organization. One of the key issues that we think the FBI needs to be able to do is assess potential risks and vulnerabilities. Having these additional techniques available at the assessment level, we think, will be key to the FBI’s ability to efficiently and effectively answer those questions and assess risks.\textsuperscript{203}
\end{quote}

The 2008 guidelines represent a consolidation of several other previously stand-alone documents that had governed FBI investigations. The FBI’s document governing the bureau’s implementation of the ideas embodied in the guidelines is the 2008 \textit{Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG)}. The DIOG has been modified recently.\textsuperscript{204}

\begin{itemize}
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The most prominent changes embodied in the 2008 guidelines and DIOG concern “assessments” that agents and analysts may now use outside of investigations. Investigations require some level of factual predication, while an assessment does not. However, assessments are to follow a specifically articulated purpose. The guidelines have established six authorized purposes:

- check leads on individuals or activities,
- check leads on groups or organizations,
- collect information to analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities,
- gather information for intelligence analysis or planning,
- vet and manage the agency’s confidential human sources (informants), and
- collect foreign intelligence.

Assessments are not to be based on “arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an assessment be based solely on the exercise of First Amendment protected activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject.” Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety of techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to penetrate conspiracies.

Civil libertarians and Muslim community organizations have voiced broad concerns about the new guidelines. According to media reporting, Farhad Khera, executive director of the nonprofit Muslim Advocates, has suggested that the Attorney General Guidelines are invasive and based on “generalized suspicion and fear on the part of law enforcement, not on individualized evidence of criminal activity.” The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has criticized the FBI’s amassing of racial and ethnic data based on the new guidelines. As written, the guidelines

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205 Ibid. Factually predicated investigations include preliminary and full investigations. Preliminary investigations can be opened with “‘allegation or information’ indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.” Opening a full investigation requires an “‘articulable factual basis’ of possible criminal or national threat.” See DIOG, redacted, pp. 76, 85.
206 According to the DIOG, “Although difficult to define, ‘no particular factual predication’ is less than ‘information or allegation’ as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation. For example, an assessment may be conducted when there is a basis to know: (i) whether more information or facts are required to determine if there is a criminal or national security threat; and (ii) there is a rational and articulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that information on the other. Regardless of whether specific approval or specific documentation is required, an FBI employee should be able to explain the purpose of an assessment and the reason for the methods used to conduct the assessment. Those FBI employees who conduct assessments are responsible for assuring that assessments are not pursued for frivolous or improper purposes and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion of the subject of the assessment.” DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
208 DIOG, redacted, p. 39.
allow for the collection of information about ethnic or racial communities and justify the
gathering of such information for proactive purposes. The guidelines state that it should be done
if it “will reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist
domain awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”213 One ACLU official has
described this as “racial profiling of entire communities.”

Detecting the Shift from Radical to Violent Jihadist

A major challenge for law enforcement is to gauge how quickly and at what point individuals
move from radicalized beliefs to violence.215 Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single
radicalization roadmap on their way to executing plots, U.S. law enforcement also faces the task
of discerning exactly when radicalized individuals become real threats.

Among the tools employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social
networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National
Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to e-mail and Internet
use from Internet Service Providers.216 In addition, according to an internal Justice Department
document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
law enforcement agents may also go undercover into social networking sites with false online
profiles to exchange messages with suspects, identify a target’s friends or relatives, and browse
private information such as postings, personal photographs and video clips.217 The Obama
Administration is seeking approval from Congress to expand FBI authority to obtain records
related to the context of e-mails and other Internet-based communications without first obtaining
a warrant from a judge. “The proposal would add ‘electronic communication transaction
records’—like e-mail addresses used in correspondence and Web pages visited—to a list of the
categories of information that FBI agents can demand.”218

A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveal that the FBI has
exploited the Internet and/or e-mail communications to build cases against defendants in at least
19 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the

(...continued)

fbi_defends_guidelines_on_eve_of_senate_testimony/

213 DIOG, redacted, p. 32.
214 Michael German, “Three Faces of Racial Profiling: Profiling Communities is Bad Law Enforcement,” ACLU Blog
of Rights, October 24, 2011, http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/three-faces-racial-profiling-communities-
bad-law-enforcement.
215 Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of US Terrorists,” Associated Press, in
216 For a discussion of the use of National Security Letters, see Laura K. Donohue, The Costs of Counterterrorism:
217 Richard Lardner, “Break the Law and Your New ‘Friend’ May Be the FBI,” Associated Press cited by
Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will not find the Internet a uniformly permissive environment.

The case involving Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte highlights the complexities in detecting transitions from radicalization to violent extremism. Investigators arrested the duo on June 5, 2010, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) in New York as they allegedly tried to fly to Egypt. They hoped to eventually link up with the Somali terrorist organization, al-Shabaab.\(^{219}\) The case started with an e-mail tip to the FBI on October 9, 2006, which stated,

> every time [Alessa and Almonte] access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist videos about the Islam holly [sic] war and where they kill US soldiers and other terrible things…. They keep saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than Islamic followers are their enemies … and they all must be killed.\(^{220}\)

This statement suggests that in 2006, the two young men engaged in radical behavior, perusing jihadist websites and discussing terrorist activity.

Between 2006 and 2010, investigators monitored the duo’s actions as their beliefs arguably morphed into something more dangerous. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad.\(^{221}\) In 2006 and 2007, investigators debated the level of threat posed by Alessa and Almonte. A key shift occurred when law enforcement discovered after the fact that the duo had travelled to Jordan in 2007 but failed to get recruited as mujahedeen fighters. This helped convince authorities of the two plotters’ actual intent to do harm. By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.\(^{222}\)

The U.S. government’s criminal complaint against Alessa and Almonte lays out the alleged overt activities marking the duo’s change from radicals to terrorist suspects worthy of arrest. Back in New Jersey, Alessa and Almonte supposedly trained for jihad by lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns. The government claims that they gathered equipment, including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots. The pair also purportedly saved over $7,000 to fund their foreign violent jihad. The criminal complaint describes how the two discussed violent jihad and downloaded jihadist rhetoric. For example, Almonte is said to have kept a lecture by radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on his cell phone. The U.S. government contends that Alessa viewed a video including scenes of Al-Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn praising Nidal Hasan, the alleged Ft. Hood shooter. Also, according to the criminal complaint, Almonte possessed computer files of violent jihadist documents authored by Osama Bin Ladin and his second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. For the government, Alessa and Almonte’s


transformation from radicals to terrorists likely culminated when the two allegedly booked reservations for separate flights to Egypt scheduled for June 5, 2010.223

Two successful plots emphasize the difficulty of discerning when radicals become terrorist threats. Even if a suspect comes to the attention of law enforcement, evaluating the person’s intent and capability remains challenging. Prior to the Fort Hood shooting, over the course of several months, Nidal Hasan allegedly sent a number of e-mails to Awlaki (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The e-mail exchange was assessed by investigators to be in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus, presumably protected speech.224 In retrospect it appears Hasan’s intentions were far more menacing.

Prior to Abdulhakim Muhammed’s arrest for the June 1, 2009, shooting incident in Little Rock, Arkansas, the FBI interviewed him on several occasions. Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While there, he married a woman from the southern part of the country. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic during his time in the country. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay. He also supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa.225 Yemen deported him to the United States in January 2009.226 The FBI is reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in prison in Yemen and then again in Nashville soon after he returned.227 According to law enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary investigation by the FBI and other American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was inconclusive, leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or put him under surveillance.228

The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement

A terrorist attack in the United States, whether committed by homegrown or foreign terrorists, will occur in a community within a state or tribal area. Since the plotting and preparation for domestic terrorist attacks (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities, preventing such attacks is not only a federal responsibility but also a state, local, and tribal one. In 2010 testimony to Congress, Brian Michael Jenkins says that

The diffuse nature of today’s terrorism threat and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism challenge the presumption that knowledge of terrorist plots will come first to federal

223 Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.
225 Ibid.
Every day, officers at over 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies collect and document information regarding behaviors, incidents, and other suspicious activity associated with crime including terrorism.\(^{230}\) A joint study by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and senior law enforcement officials concluded that “[t]he gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity is critical to preventing crimes, including those associated with domestic and international terrorism.”\(^{231}\) A former police chief observed that

> On the beat or mobile, cops are sensitive to things that do not look right or do not sound right … Remember, it was a rookie cop on a routine check that resulted in the arrest of Eric Robert Rudolph in North Carolina despite the enormous commitment of federal resources.\(^{232}\)

Another example is the case of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. He was arrested after a traffic stop when Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger noticed that McVeigh’s yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis had no license plate.\(^{233}\) Using his home state as an example, a former U.S. Attorney maintains that “evidence of a potential terrorist threat or organized criminal enterprise is far more likely to be found in the incidental contact with the 10,000 police officers in the state of Washington than by the less than 150 FBI agents assigned to the Seattle Field Division.”\(^{234}\)

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important considering the challenges noted elsewhere in this report in detecting terrorist lone wolves. The four successful homegrown jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred

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\(^{230}\) *Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support and Implementation Project, Final Draft*, June 2008, p. 6. The SAR Support and Implementation Project was a joint effort of DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, and DHS to develop recommendations to be used by law enforcement agencies to improve identification and reporting of suspicious activity and the sharing of that information with fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. See pp. 1-2. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mccarecommendation-06132008.pdf.

\(^{231}\) Ibid, p. 2.


\(^{233}\) Trooper Hanger had no reason to suspect a connection between McVeigh and the bombing in Oklahoma City. But, the trooper’s suspicions were raised when the driver looked at his bumper when told why he had been pulled over. Says Trooper Hanger: “I thought if he knew he didn’t have a tag, why did he look at the back of the car like that? It just didn’t seem right.” In addition, McVeigh was unable to provide proof of insurance and a bill of sale for the vehicle and then disclosed that he had a firearm. Trooper Hanger arrested McVeigh for five misdemeanors and took him into custody. McVeigh was awaiting arraignment when the FBI connected him to the bombing. See National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial at http://www.nleomf.com/TheFund/programs/OOM/hanger_oct01.htm.

since 9/11 were all committed by lone wolves. Jenkins believes that preventing future terrorist attacks requires effective domestic intelligence collection that is best accomplished by local authorities.  

Integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. After the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., “connecting the dots”) as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks several efforts were made to improve the sharing of terrorism information between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies:

- States and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers. Congress has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”

At the end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) fusion centers.

- In the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458), Congress mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (commonly known as the “ISE”) to provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.

- Congress made information sharing a priority of the new DHS intelligence organization, requiring it “to disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal government with responsibilities related to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local government and private sector entities, with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.”

- Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). DHS supports these centers through its State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center

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237 For a full discussion of fusion centers, see CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, by John Rollins. For an informative discussion of one of the earliest efforts at local law enforcement collaboration and intelligence fusion and analysis, see John Sullivan and Alain Bauer, Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group, published by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2008.
239 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center; Tallahassee, Florida; November 4, 2009.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid., §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146.
Initiative by providing operational, analytic, reporting, and management advice and assistance; training; information technology systems and connectivity; and intelligence officers and analysts.\textsuperscript{244}

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Specifically, it is a framework to support the reporting of suspicious activity—from the point of initial observation to the point where the information is available in the information sharing environment.\textsuperscript{245} It is a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.\textsuperscript{246} The intent is for this locally generated suspicious activity reporting to be combined in a systematic way with other sources of intelligence at the federal level to uncover criminal activity, including terrorism.

Investigative Approaches

To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.”\textsuperscript{247} The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as well as surveillance (especially in and around mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities.

The Capone Approach

As mentioned, the Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. This approach fits within a preventative mode of counterterrorism prosecution and has received media scrutiny.\textsuperscript{248} Experts have noted that immediately after 9/11, DOJ often leveled lesser charges against terrorist suspects to preemptively squelch potential attacks. However, according to the Center on Law and Security

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid. 121 STAT. 319. Amends Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding §210A(b) and (c).
\textsuperscript{245} NSI Project Overview Briefing by Russ Porter, Chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.
at New York University School of Law, DOJ has moved toward trying suspected terrorists as terrorists instead of leaning heavily on lesser charges. In 2001 and 2002, 8% of defendants labeled as terrorists in the media were charged under terrorism statutes, this figure rose to 47% by 2006 and 2007.249 Regardless, the Capone approach is still used in terrorism cases.

Lying to an FBI Special Agent is one of the violations reminiscent of the Capone approach.250 A recent example stands out. On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI. Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s case. By early 2010, while living in King Salmon, AK, Paul Rockwood had developed a list of 15 people he planned to kill, believing that they had desecrated Islam. He had also researched explosives and shared with others ideas about mail bombs or using firearms to kill his targets. It appears that prosecutors could not pursue a case based on more substantive terrorism charges and opted to neutralize a threat—someone apparently preparing to kill people—by using the Capone approach.

The utility of this preventative technique coupled with actual terrorism charges was exhibited by the FBI in its case against Najibullah Zazi. As mentioned above, Zazi arrived in New York on September 10, 2009, with explosive material and plans to detonate bombs in New York’s subway system. Zazi feared authorities had caught up to him and returned to Denver on September 12. Between September 10 and 19, the FBI monitored his activities and bolstered its case with searches of a vehicle and locations linked to him in New York and Denver. Zazi also agreed to interviews with the FBI in Denver. On September 19, Special Agents first arrested Zazi in Aurora, CO, for knowingly and willfully lying to the FBI. Presumably this was done because he might flee. Four days later, a grand jury returned a more substantive one-count indictment against him on weapons of mass destruction charges.251

DOJ used similar charges against Ahmad Wais Afzali, an imam from Queens. He was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the FBI’s investigation. On March 4, 2010, Afzali pled guilty to lying to federal officials. He admitted that he warned Zazi that the FBI had asked about him. Afzali also stated that during the phone conversation he simply cautioned Zazi not to “get involved in Afghanistan garbage.”252 He stated in court that he misled the FBI about a telephone conversation he had with Zazi. Afzali claimed that by lying to investigators he had hoped to protect himself, not Zazi. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New York City investigators in the past.253

In another instance of the Capone approach, in 2008 the federal government charged Tarek Mehanna for lying to FBI agents regarding his relationship to Daniel Maldonado, subsequently convicted and jailed for terrorism-related offenses. Mehanna’s 2008 arrest occurred at Boston’s

Logan International Airport as he was preparing to leave the country, according to news reports. He was subsequently released on bail. His defense attorney claimed that the FBI wanted Mehanna to become an informant, and his refusal precipitated his 2009 indictment and re-arrest on terrorism charges.  

### Agent Provocateur Cases

Agent provocateur cases rely on expert determination by law enforcement that a specific individual or group is likely to move beyond radicalized talk and engage in violent jihad. The ultimate goal is to catch a suspect committing an overt criminal act such as pulling the proverbial trigger but on a dud weapon. By engaging in such strategy, investigators hope to obtain ironclad evidence against suspects.

Three recent FBI investigations exemplify the utility of this approach. On November 26, 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested after he attempted to set off what he believed was a vehicle bomb at an annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR. Mohamud thought he had plotted with terrorists to detonate the bomb. In actuality the device was a dud assembled by his co-conspirators, FBI undercover operatives. Mohamud offered the target for the strike, provided components for assembly of the device, gave instructions for the operation, and mailed passport photographs for his getaway plan to FBI undercover operatives.

On September 24, 2009, a Jordanian immigrant named Hosam Smadi was arrested for attempting to detonate what he thought was a car bomb in the parking lot of a 60-story skyscraper in Dallas, TX. On May 26, 2010, he pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Smadi’s apprehension resulted from an FBI operation including at least three undercover employees. The operation duped Smadi into believing he was planning an attack with Al Qaeda operatives. It ended with Smadi driving a truck he believed to contain a live bomb into the underground garage of 60-story Fountain Place in Dallas, TX. He used a cell phone to try and trigger the dud.

The same day of Smadi’s arrest, the FBI apprehended Michael C. Finton in Springfield, IL, on similar but unrelated charges. Finton’s case also relied heavily on undercover FBI personnel. Allegedly they supplied him with a van Finton believed contained almost one ton of high explosives. According to the DOJ, he drove and parked the van near the Paul Findley Federal

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Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield. FBI Special Agents arrested Finton after he tried to detonate the bogus bomb using a cell phone.\(^{258}\)

Initially, the FBI appears to have just tracked the activities of Finton and Smadi. How Mohamud’s case played out is less certain, based on publicly available information. However, the investigations—particularly the Finton and Smadi cases—likely reached tipping points encouraging the bureau to initiate much more proactive agent provocateur-type operations. Finton had converted to Islam while in prison on aggravated robbery and battery charges. According to court documents, he was released in 2006 but in 2007 was re-arrested and returned to prison because of a parole violation. At the time, a search of Finton’s vehicle revealed passages he wrote that championed martyrdom as well as attempted correspondence with John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen who pled guilty in federal court to serving in the Taliban army and carrying weapons. In 2008, after Finton was released from prison for his parole violation, members of the FBI’s Springfield JTTF interviewed him. The JTTF also used an informant to monitor Finton, who engaged in radical rhetoric after his release. In January 2009, the informant reported that Finton planned to travel to the Gaza strip to fight Israelis. At this juncture in the investigation, the FBI allegedly initiated its agent provocateur strategy to nab Finton.\(^{259}\)

The tipping point in the Smadi investigation is a little less specific. He allegedly had come to the agency’s attention because the jihadist sentiment he displayed among an online group of extremists supposedly “stood out.”\(^{260}\) Investigators claim Smadi exhibited “vehement intention to conduct terror attacks in the United States and ... zealous devotion to Osama Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda.”\(^{261}\) As a result, an FBI undercover employee communicated with Smadi. More than 10 exchanges between the two emphasized Smadi’s desire to conduct violent jihad on behalf of Al Qaeda. Thus, the FBI determined he was a “legitimate threat,” introduced him to another undercover employee who posed as a senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell, and ostensibly set the sting in motion.\(^{262}\)

The tipping point in the Mohamud investigation is even less clear due to ambiguity in the publicly available information regarding the timeline of the case. At some point, someone from the local Muslim community alerted the FBI to Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. Media reports have suggested that a family member, perhaps Mohamud’s father, relayed concerns about the young man to officials.\(^{263}\) According to DOJ, in December 2009 Mohamud communicated with an individual the U.S. government believed to be a terrorist located in Pakistan. The duo allegedly discussed Mohamud traveling to Pakistan to prepare for violent jihad.

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\(^{260}\) U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.


\(^{262}\) U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.

When exactly the FBI learned this information is unknown. However, after Mohamud was not allowed to board a flight from Portland to Kodiak, Alaska, on June 14, 2010, the FBI interviewed him. He purportedly told the FBI that he planned to take a fishing job in Alaska for the summer and that he had previously wanted to travel to Yemen but had neither purchased tickets nor obtained a visa. According to court documents, shortly thereafter, on June 23, an FBI undercover employee professing to be an associate of the Pakistan-based terrorist e-mailed Mohamud. It is unclear whether or not Mohamud’s attempt to travel to Alaska and his interview precipitated the undercover operation.264

Court documents in the Smadi, Finton, and Mohamud cases allege that FBI undercover employees tested the suspects to ascertain the depth of their intent to do harm. The FBI evaluated Mohamud’s resolve on a number of occasions. Two stand out. Mohamud’s first meeting with an undercover FBI operative entailed a discussion in which the would-be violent jihadist was told that he could help “the cause” in “a number of ways … ranging from simply praying five times a day to becoming a martyr.” The young man responded, saying that he wanted to become “operational” and needed help in staging an attack. When in a following meeting Mohamud suggested the Christmas tree lighting ceremony as his intended target, an FBI undercover employee noted that children attend such events. Mohamud responded by saying that he wanted a large crowd “that will ... be attacked in their own element with their families celebrating the holidays.”265

In the Smadi and Finton cases, the suspects received reassurances that if they quit the schemes, they would face no repercussions from their fellow (sham) plotters. FBI undercover operatives repeatedly tried to discourage Smadi’s violent jihadist sentiments. In July 2009, an undercover employee (the fictitious senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell), offered Smadi a way out of the plot. The mock Al Qaeda operative counseled Smadi by saying that different types of jihad existed, and he did not have to follow through on the plot if he was uncomfortable with it. He reassured Smadi by stressing that if he backed out, he would remain part of Al Qaeda’s “brotherhood.” Regardless, Smadi steadfastly believed in the plot and refused to quit.266 Like Smadi, Finton was given at least one opportunity to abandon his scheme. He allegedly understood that, “anytime he felt uncomfortable, he could walk out the door and still be a brother.”267

The “Bind” for Law Enforcement

Not all agent provocateur cases appear as thorough in their efforts to reveal the harmful intent of suspects. Some cases have raised controversy about the extent to which government informants or agents have entrapped suspects and/or supported or pushed along terrorist plots. These instances illustrate what Philadelphia Inquirer reporter and author, Stephan Salisbury, describes as the “bind” the FBI finds itself in. “On one hand it is being charged by the Justice Department to go out and stop this stuff [terrorism] before it happens. But on the other, it is getting criticized for the techniques it is using to do that.”268 The 2008 Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI

266 U.S. v. Smadi, Affidavit.
267 U.S. v. Finton, Affidavit.
Operations address the same competing forces, and as mentioned their implementation has spurred concerns among civil liberties groups.

Investigations of the so-called Newburgh Four and Liberty City Seven plots illustrate this bind. In each, law enforcement has been criticized for its use of undercover informants. To counter this, in both cases, officials emphasized the importance of prevention—neutralizing threats posed by the groups involved. For example, in a press conference related to the Newburgh plot, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg reassured the public by stating that the plotters did not have ties to a larger terrorist organization. However, he went on to stress the preemptive aspects of the case, “I’ve always thought of our police department’s primary job, not as first responders but as first preventers.”

Cognizant of criticisms that the Liberty City men neither were competent nor their plotting viable, former Attorney General Gonzalez cautioned that

our philosophy here is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we don't know what we don't know about a terrorist plot ... it’s dangerous for us to make an evaluation case by case ... well, this is a really dangerous group, this is really not a dangerous group. And we felt that the combination of the planning and the overt acts taken were sufficient to support this prosecution.

Newburgh Four

The Newburgh Four case has kindled controversy regarding the use of an agent provocateur. In the investigation, an FBI informant allegedly offered plotters $250,000 and a luxury car, among other inducements to trigger explosives near a synagogue and to shoot down military aircraft. On June 14, 2010, the federal judge hearing the trial delayed its start, because prosecutors may have failed to provide to defense attorneys relevant case information. Days earlier the defense received an FBI document suggesting that the lead plotter, James Cromitie, was not a threat. News accounts suggest the plotters may have been heavily influenced by the FBI’s informant. They have also raised questions about the informant in the case, alleged to be a man named Shahed Hussain. According to the Village Voice, Hussain duped the Newburgh Four into their...
plot. The Voice suggested that the quartet of smalltime felons had no grand terrorist ambitions, and Hussain had plied them with cash and suggestions.275

The Newburgh Four were arrested in May 2009. They purportedly had attempted to detonate explosives near a synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx in New York City. The federal government asserts the plotters also planned to shoot down military airplanes at the New York Air National Guard Base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, NY. Hussain allegedly passed himself off as a member of a Pakistani terrorist organization, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and provided the four suspects with inert C-4 explosives and an inactive Stinger surface-to-air missile.276 The Newburgh Four were found guilty of the plot on October 18, 2010.277

According to other news reports, Hussain, a Pakistani immigrant, became an FBI informant in 2002 to win leniency and avoid deportation on fraud charges. They stemmed from when he worked as a translator for the New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Hussain pled guilty to production and transfer of false government identification documents—illegally helping immigrants obtain licenses. He had also served as the key informant in the 2003 and 2004 FBI sting operation implicating Mohammed Hussain and Yassin Aref in a plot to launder money related to the sham sale of surface to air missiles to terrorists.278

**Liberty City Seven**

Like the Newburgh Four case, the Liberty City Seven investigation also generated questions regarding informant use by the FBI. Seven Miami-area men were arrested in 2006 for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower (now called Willis Tower) in Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Defense attorneys called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming that the men had neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes.279 An FBI informant posing as an Al Qaeda member in the case, offered the men $50,000 as part of their plot. He also obtained warehouse space for the group’s activities, a ceremony in which the conspirators swore allegiance to Al Qaeda, gave the group video cameras for surveillance activities, and suggested targeting Miami’s FBI offices.280

275 Graham Rayman, July 8, 2009.


One of the two FBI informants in the investigation, Abbas al-Saidi, was jailed after reportedly
having extorted $7,000 from a friend who raped his girlfriend and then, after accepting the
money, beat her up.\textsuperscript{281} The other informant, Elie Assad, also had a domestic battery charge on his
record. According to FBI agents, Assad failed a polygraph test administered while he was
working for them on a previous case in Chicago. A 35-year veteran of the FBI, who was hired as
an expert witness by the Liberty City defense team, stated that Assad never should have been
authorized to work on the [Liberty City] case at all. However, at trial, the former FBI agent was
not allowed to testify nor did the judge permit the testimony about Assad’s failed polygraph
test.\textsuperscript{282} After juries in the first two trials failed to reach a verdict, six of the seven Liberty City
men were convicted at a third trial and sentenced to long prison sentences.

**Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership**

Scholars who have studied the circumstances that are associated with voluntary cooperation by
Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing efforts have identified strong evidence that when
authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules and decisions are more likely to be
accepted.\textsuperscript{283} Engagement is one strategy by law enforcement to build trust and enhance
community perceptions of legitimacy.

In August 2011, the Obama Administration released a strategy for combating violent extremism
(CVE).\textsuperscript{284} It revolves around countering the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. As
such, the radicalization of violent jihadists falls under its purview. Federal CVE efforts often
depend on government agencies cooperating with local groups. In fact, the Obama
Administration’s national CVE strategy highlights a “community-based approach” for the federal
government, and much of the activity it describes will take place in the “marketplace of ideas”
described in Figure 1. To this end, the federal government most effectively acts as a “facilitator,
convener, and source of information.”\textsuperscript{285} As this may suggest, to date, the bulk of federal-level
CVE work has revolved around community engagement.

**Engagement with Communities**

The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community
policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s, and community

\(\text{(...continued)}\)

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{282} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{283} Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq, “Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism
http://lsr.nelloe.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=nyu_plltp.

\textsuperscript{284} Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011, p. 1,
Partners.

\textsuperscript{285} Empowering Local Partners, p. 3.
policing is mentioned in the Administration’s CVE strategy. Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. “Embedded within these communities,” notes Professor Deborah Ramirez, “are the linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify suspicious behavior. In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the need to build bridges required for effective communication with these groups.” At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like all Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack.

A study by the Homeland Security Institute found that “[c]ommunity policing has been applied with notable success in places such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and San Diego, and has been widely adopted (at least in name) throughout the United States.” A Homeland Advisory Council (HSAC) working group chaired by Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley found that Community-Oriented Policing works:

> Effective public-private partnerships, designed to enable civic engagement, problem-solving, and violent crime mitigation provide the foundation for efforts to prevent, protect against and respond to violent criminal activity—including that which may be motivated by ideological objectives.

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286 Ibid., pp. 3, 6. The Justice Department defined community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.” One of its key features is the establishment of collaborative partnerships between law enforcement agencies and individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police. See DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Community Policing Defined*. April 3, 2009., p. 3, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf.


288 Ibid.

289 Rosemary Lark (Task Lead), Richard Rowe, and John Markey, *Community Policing Within Muslim Communities: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature*, Homeland Security Institute, December 27, 2006, p. iii. This study, prepared for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, sought to identify the literature that examined community policing initiatives underway within Muslim Communities in the U.S., and the extent to which they were successful in achieving the objectives of (1) inclusiveness, promoting integration, and potentially minimize the disaffection that can lead to radicalization, particularly among Muslim youth; (2) serve as early warning to identify incipient radicalization or terrorist activities; and (3) open a new channel of communication with individuals who can navigate the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam, providing needed context to inform intelligence analysis, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/hsireports/Task_06-99_Community_Policing_within_Muslim_Communities.pdf.

290 The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The chair of the council is Judge William Webster, former Director of the CIA and Director of the FBI. Other members include leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia. The Countering Violent Extremism Working Group originated from a tasking by Secretary Napolitano to the HSAC in February 2010 to work with state and local law enforcement and relevant community groups to develop and provide recommendations on how DHS can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically. See Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 2.

Federal Activities

Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies engage and partner with Muslim American communities. Some of the efforts by DHS, DOJ, and FBI are detailed below.

Department of Homeland Security

DHS has stated that public outreach to local communities plays a major role in the department’s mission.292 Engagement activities are centered in its Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), which began its outreach in 2003.293 Its work involves counterterrorism and CVE-related matters but is broader. The office is also responsible for294

- advising DHS leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and civil liberties issues;
- communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by DHS activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within DHS to their experiences and concerns; and
- investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public.

CRCL has a Community Engagement Section. Recent domestic CVE-related295 outreach events coordinated by CRCL and its Community Engagement Section include the following:

- **Community Roundtables.** DHS describes these as “the core of CRCL’s engagement efforts.” These “regular location-based” meetings include representatives from federal, state, and local government agencies as well as individuals from the private sector and community leaders “whose communities have civil rights concerns.”296 In the past, these roundtables have focused on leaders from the American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sikh communities, but in 2010, CRCL broadened them to include other immigrant communities.297 Some of the roundtables discussed how local communities could

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295 Much like CRCL, the Section’s mission involves more than CVE. It reaches out to other communities whose issues are not necessarily tied to radicalization.
297 According to CRCL, “Regular roundtables were held in FY 2010 in Washington, DC; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; Boston, MA; Detroit, MI; Columbus, OH; and three new cities that were added in late 2010—Seattle, WA; Atlanta, GA; and Minneapolis, MN. In addition, special meetings were held in Tucson, AZ; Fremont, CA; San Diego, CA; San Jose, CA; Hartford, CT; Tampa, FL; Portland, ME; Raleigh, NC; Albuquerque, NM; New York, NY; Cleveland, OH; Portland, OR; Kingston, RI; Dallas, TX; and San Antonio, TX.” See ibid.
partner with government in CVE efforts. Between January and September 2011, CRCL had conducted more than 150 roundtables and similar events.

- **The Somali-American Initiative.** This initiative has involved DHS officials engaging Somali communities and organizations in Columbus, OH; Seattle, WA; and San Jose, CA. Issues discussed in these meetings included fighting in the Horn of Africa and other items relevant to the local Somali communities.

- **Special Issue-Focused Engagement.** Efforts in this area have included meetings about policing, civil rights, and engagement held with leaders of national-level interest groups such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council.

- **Youth Programs.** For one event in this area, DHS led a meeting in Los Angeles, California that included American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Somali youth and discussed civil rights issues and CVE.

- **The Incident Communication Coordination Team (ICCT).** The ICCT provides a venue for government officials and community leaders to work together to exchange information and resolve issues immediately after terrorist attacks or other significant incidents. ICCT members include officials from DHS, the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense. Also involved are FBI representatives and leaders of the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Middle Eastern, Somali, and South Asian American communities. When an incident occurs, the ICCT is assembled via conference call. It has been activated numerous times since its establishment including after the Fort Hood shootings in November 2009 and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight #253 in December 2009.

### Department of Justice

DOJ’s CVE-related engagement activities largely appear to come from the Civil Rights Division, the Community Relations Service, and United States Attorneys. DOJ has stated that its engagement efforts:

have two central components. First [DOJ] seek[s] to build trust by working with Muslim elders to find out how we can better serve the community on issues like civil rights enforcement to anti-bullying efforts. In addition, we work to equip and empower local

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298 Ibid.
300 CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 15.
301 CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 16.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid., p. 17. See CRCL Engagement Team, August 14, 2009. DHS also provides law enforcement training related to CVE in the United States. With DOJ, DHS has instructed more than 46,000 “front line officers” on suspicious activity reporting. As of September 2011, CRCL has taught over 2,000 law enforcement officials in the area of CVE. CRCL CVE training highlights topics such as understanding violent radicalization, cultural awareness, and community engagement. The training was developed “in response to concerns from attendees at community roundtables.” See DHS, Fact Sheet, “The Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism,” http://www.dhs.gov/files/fact-sheet-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism.pdf; CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, pp. 18-19; CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 19; CRCL, *Newsletter*, vol. 1, no. 8 (June 2011), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36057.
Muslim elders to help them guard against violent extremists who are targeting young people in their communities for recruitment to misguided, violent causes.304

According to its website, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Civil Rights Division of DOJ has prioritized prosecution of bias crimes and discrimination against Muslims, Sikhs, and persons of Arab and South-Asian descent, as well as individuals perceived to be members of these groups. These types of incidents are commonly referred to as “backlash.” The division has also educated people in these communities about their rights and available government services.305

Senior Civil Rights Division officials have met with Muslim, Sikh, Arab, and South Asian community leaders regarding backlash discrimination issues. The division has also provided convention speakers and participated in other community events. It hosts a quarterly meeting that brings together leaders from these communities with officials from a variety of federal departments and agencies including DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Transportation to address civil rights issues.306

Like the Civil Rights Division, DOJ’s Community Relations Service is involved in outreach. Since 9/11, the service has held more than 750 meetings around the country to address backlash-related issues.307 For example, in March 2010, it brought together the U.S. Attorney and leaders from Muslim and Arab communities in the Seattle, Washington area to address racial tensions.308 Also, the service has employed conflict resolution specialists in more than 50 communities to “alleviate tensions in the wake of backlash incidents.”309 In addition, the Community Relations Service does the following:310

- Provides technical assistance and targeted training efforts toward establishing dialogue between government officials and Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities in the United States.
- Runs the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Program for law enforcement officials, and has offered this training to well over 500 law enforcement departments and agencies across the country.
- Conducts train-the-trainer programs, often in conjunction with the Cultural Awareness Program, to train volunteers from the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities. These volunteers then conduct trainings for law enforcement officials and first responders, providing them with an understanding of Arab,

306 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
Muslim, and Sikh cultures that will enable them to more effectively work in these communities.

- Trains law enforcement officials on racial profiling to identify best practices to prevent illegal discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs and to improve daily contact and strengthen mutual trust and effective policing practices in these communities.

- Posts on its website two films it developed for law enforcement officers: *The First Three to Five Seconds - Law Enforcement Roll Call Training Video on Arab and Muslim Cultural Awareness*, and *On Common Ground - Law Enforcement Training Video on Sikhism.*

Also, Attorney General Eric Holder has pushed the U.S. Attorneys to enhance their outreach efforts to Muslim, Sikh, and Arab American communities. U.S. Attorneys are “the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.” Within their districts across the country, U.S. Attorneys have met with Muslim communities regarding specific situations and trends. For example, in September 2011, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon and Attorney General Holder met with Arab and Muslim community representatives Portland, OR. In a similar vein, the District of Minnesota has established the Young Somali-American Advisory Council. This responded to al-Shabaab’s recruitment of young men within the greater Minneapolis-St. Paul’s Somali community. The council includes more than a dozen people between the ages of 18 and 30. Among the outreach activities tied to the council, the U.S. Attorney’s office instructed council members on civics issues. Comparable outreach has been pursued by other U.S. Attorneys. For example, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez met with Muslim and Arab leaders in Miami in February 2011. In November 2010, an alleged jihadist terrorist plotter was arrested for purportedly attempting to bomb a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR. In its wake, the state’s U.S. Attorney repeatedly met with local Muslim leaders.

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The FBI has publicly suggested that since 9/11, it has been formulating an “extensive program” to bolster its relationship with Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities in the United States. In March 2010, the Chief of the Community Relations Unit of the FBI’s Office of

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311 Ibid.
314 DOJ, *Ten Years Later.*
315 DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets.”
316 A terrorist group in Somalia.
317 DOJ, “Arab and Muslim.”
Public Affairs testified to Congress that the primary purpose of the agency’s outreach program was “to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI.” This involves fostering a positive image of law enforcement among U.S. organizations that have condemned terrorism and violent radicalization.

The FBI relies on programs at the field office level to foster interaction with a wide variety of local groups. As the chief of the FBI’s Community Relations Unit stated to Congress in 2010:

> It is very important to make sure that we engage with a number of different communities, because terrorism really is just fear, and that fear comes in different shapes, forms and fashion depending on what environment that you’re—that you’re looking at. So whether you’re talking about gang activity, whether you’re talking about Klan activity, the bottom line—it’s terrorism. And that’s one of the things I—we do at the FBI. We take a look at the various communities. And it—I would say it’s a customized outreach program. What I mean by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again, across this country, and they have to tailor their outreach efforts based on the demographics of the area of responsibilities that they serve. That’s the only effective way to do engagement, because there is not one shoe fits all.

In 2003, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) established one such program, the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council (AMSAC), to create transparency and stronger communication between its office and multiple religious communities. According to the WFO, on a quarterly basis its officials and AMSAC executives share cultural, linguistic, and contextual expertise and work to prevent hate crimes by building relationships with community members who are not afraid to come forward with information.

An outreach program developed by the Community Relations Unit at FBI Headquarters is the Specialized Community Outreach Team (SCOT). It is described as an effort to, “engage communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of law enforcement exist.” The SCOT was piloted with Somali American communities in Minneapolis; Denver, CO; Columbus, OH; San Diego, CA; Seattle; and Washington, DC. This effort helped the FBI address a Somali-linked threat to the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, and in this instance SCOT outreach in Columbus facilitated FBI investigative work.
Aside from the FBI’s inclusion of Muslim Americans in broad outreach programs, some FBI field offices have formally interacted with local Muslim communities regarding specific cases. One case involved the agency’s top official at the New York Field Office meeting with 40 community leaders regarding Najibullah Zazi, who has confessed to plotting to bomb subway trains in New York City. Other field offices have held town hall meetings to interact with the communities. At the national level, FBI headquarters representatives have engaged in liaison with Arab and Muslim American advocacy groups and have regular issue-focused conference calls with community leaders. The FBI is also a member of the Incident Coordination Communications Team managed by DHS CRCL. Finally, CRS discussions with Muslim community leaders revealed that the FBI has partnered with community members in specific cases where the FBI has detected radicalization in an effort to prevent those individuals from transitioning to acts of violent extremism.

State and Local Government Activities

In addition to federal engagement efforts, state and local governments also engage with Muslim communities. Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN, stand out as examples. The cities and surrounding region have the largest Somali American community in the United States. Since 2007, numerous people have been charged in an ongoing Justice Department investigation into the recruitment of Somali American youth from the Minneapolis area by al-Shabaab. Recognizing that youth violence—not just terrorism and radicalization—is a public health epidemic that requires a holistic, multi-faceted response, Minneapolis has promoted an “enterprise-wide” approach to the challenge. Drawing on a mix of law enforcement and public health strategies, the city, in partnership with a host of community stakeholders, created the “Blueprint for Action.” The Blueprint’s goals are to

- connect every youth with a trusted adult,
- intervene at the first sign that youth are at risk for violence,
- restore youth who have gone down the wrong path, and
- unlearn the culture of violence in the community.

The Minneapolis Police Department is actively involved in community outreach initiatives and has full-time liaisons to the Somali and Latino communities. In addition, in 2009, the city established the Neighborhood and Community Relations Department staffed with outreach

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326 Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.

327 Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.

328 Discussions with CRS held on May 12 and 18, 2010.


330 Ibid.

331 Ibid.
specialists who speak several East African languages. An example of this department’s outreach work was its participation in a community forum on December 1, 2010. Hosted by the British Broadcasting Corporation’s “BBC Somali,” a popular radio service among Somalis, the discussion was prompted by a spate of high-profile crimes involving young Somali-Americans, including the November 26, 2010, arrest of a 19-year-old Portland, OR, resident accused of plotting a bomb attack in that city’s Pioneer Courthouse Square. At the meeting, broadcast to a worldwide audience, about 40 mothers, fathers, and community leaders spoke passionately about the challenges of raising kids in the United States.

The St. Paul Police Department began its engagement with local Somalis in 2004. Much of this effort eventually morphed into the department’s African Immigrant Muslim Community Outreach Program (AIMCOP). In 2009, AIMCOP received funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance. AIMCOP involves meetings between the St. Paul Police Department and local Somali community leaders as well as youth-oriented programming such as after-school study programs, gym activities, arts and crafts programs, and camping trips. Additionally, the city’s Police Athletic League has more than 300 Somali American youth participating in soccer, flag football, softball, and volleyball. The league relies on city police officers as coaches, referees, and organizers.

### Muslim Community Activities

As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated publicly, “Members of the American Muslim community have been—and continue to be—strong partners in fighting this emerging threat of terrorism. They have regularly denounced terrorist acts and those who carry them out. And they have provided critical assistance to law enforcement in helping to disrupt terrorist plots and combat radicalization.” One of the most important benefits of trusted partnerships,” says Alejandro Beutel of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, “is the ability of community members to feel comfortable enough to step forward and provide critical information to prevent any crime, including terrorism.” In an October 2011 background paper, he documents 19 instances since 9/11 in which Muslims provided information to U.S. government authorities regarding terrorist plots tied to Al Qaeda.

A partial list of community initiatives to tackle the problem of violent extremism includes the following:

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336 Ibid.
339 Ibid, p. 12. Some of these plots did not involve homegrown jihadists.
• Muflehun. Describing itself as an “independent think-and-do tank,” Muflehun seeks to use faith-based values for empowerment and continued integration of the Muslim community within the larger society. It focuses on two main research areas: radicalization prevention in the United States, and horizon scanning for emerging trends within the Muslim American community.340

• The Straight Path Initiative. Founded by The Muslim American Society, the initiative seeks to engage all components of the Muslim American community, with a special focus on youth ages 15-30. It seeks to pinpoint the roots of extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to address these challenges, including an honest and open dialogue about radicalization and extremism in Muslim American communities; research to pinpoint the root causes of radicalization and extremism among Muslim American youth in particular; engagement with the Muslim American community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on vulnerable members of the community.341

• National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism. An initiative of The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), it seeks to (1) [raise] religious awareness and education to create a strong Islamic environment that does not allow terrorism to be considered as a form of struggle in Islam; (2) control the inter-mosque environment and activities to prevent intruders and unauthorized, unknown persons from exploiting the open environment of [mosques]; and (3) acquire skills to detect any potential criminal activity to be able to thwart them.342

Risks and Challenges

Although there is considerable support among public officials for community engagement, some experts warn of significant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. A study of policing in Arab American communities sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, for example, highlighted four key obstacles hindering outreach between U.S. Arabs (Christian and Muslim) and law enforcement: “Distrust between Arab communities and law enforcement, lack of cultural awareness among law enforcement officers, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status and fears of deportation.”343

Terrorism expert Marc Sageman cautions that engagement can be a sign of government focus on Muslim communities when instead it should be stressed that Muslims are Americans just like

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everyone else. He sees another challenge arise when engagement on the government side is led by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. “It can send the message that we are only interested in Muslims because they are potential law breakers. No other foreign or religious communities in the United States get this type of scrutiny.”

Mohamed Elibiary, the President of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, a Muslim community group based in Carrollton, TX, has told Congress that “while the government has publicly claimed a desire for ‘partnership’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ‘inform’ on community members of concern.” He argues that this “securitization” of government interactions with Muslim American communities would be counterproductive.

Outreach may be most effective when U.S. Muslim communities initiate it and community-government contact revolves around countering the extremist messages popular among homegrown violent jihadists. Marc Sageman suggests it would be more appropriate for local authorities, such as a mayor’s office, to perform the engagement role because they know these communities better than federal officials. An important role at the federal level is to lead efforts to combat discrimination against Muslim-Americans, an activity in which the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice is currently engaged.

The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities

An inherent challenge to building trust and partnership involves law enforcement investigative activities and tactics that can be perceived to unfairly target law-abiding citizens or infringe on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights. One expert has noted that “counter-radicalization is not about intelligence-gathering nor is it primarily about policing.” The HSAC Countering Violent Extremism Working Group found that there can be tension between those involved in law enforcement investigations and those collaborating to establish local partnerships to stop violent crime. Community policing can be impeded if other enforcement tactics are perceived as conflicting with community partnership efforts.

This challenge is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants. One Muslim community leader who has published widely on domestic terrorism, states that “many

344 Discussion with CRS, April 7, 2010.
345 Ibid.
348 Discussion with CRS, April 7, 2010.
350 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization, p. 19.
Muslim Americans fear that paid FBI informants specifically target impressionable youth and that law enforcement agents coerce community members to become informants themselves to avoid complications with immigration procedures.\(^{352}\)

Community leaders report numerous attempts by the FBI to recruit Muslims as informers. In virtually all cases, the Muslims in question had immigration and other legal problems or were applying for green cards according to Shakeel Syed of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, an umbrella organization of 68 area mosques. Syed said the FBI told Muslims, “We will make your problems vanish if you cooperate.” He goes on to say that “For some individuals who have refused recruitment, there is startling evidence that the FBI has actually retaliated against them.”\(^{353}\)

Two cases that are often cited to support these allegations are those of Foad Farahi and Yassine Ouassif. Farahi is an imam at a mosque in North Miami Beach, FL, who has lived in the United States since 1993. Although an Iranian citizen, he does not speak Farsi because he grew up as a Sunni Muslim in Kuwait speaking Arabic. He applied for political asylum in the United States in 2002 after it was determined that he could be removed from the country because he had failed to maintain his student status. He sought asylum based upon a fear of persecution if deported to Iran because he is a Sunni Muslim and Iran is overwhelmingly Shia.

In 2004, when he was first approached by the FBI, Farahi said he told them that he was willing to work with them, but the relationship would need to be public. He claimed the FBI wanted him to be a secret informant instead and promised him residency and money for school.\(^{354}\) But Farahi declined saying “People trust you as a religious figure, and you’re trying to kind of deceive them. That’s where the problem is.”\(^{355}\)

In the summer of 2007, Farahi declined a second request from the FBI to become a secret informant. The consequences for this followed later that year at a hearing on his asylum case. Four Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, armed and wearing bullet proof vests, followed him into the Miami Immigration Court. They allegedly told his attorney they had a file with evidence that he was supporting or involved in terrorist groups and gave him an ultimatum: Drop the asylum case and leave the United States voluntarily or be charged as a terrorist. Farahi reported that these threats led to the involuntary and coerced withdrawal of his asylum application before the Immigration Court.\(^{356}\)

According to Farahi’s attorneys, the government has never shared any information or evidence that he was involved in terrorism, nor has the government charged him for any terrorist offenses. He has appealed the withdrawal of his asylum application to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Farahi


\(^{355}\) Ibid.

\(^{356}\) Ibid.
believes that “People have two choices. Either they end up working with the FBI or they leave the country on their own. It’s just sometimes when you’re in that situation, not many people are strong enough to stand up and resist and fight—to reject their offers.”

Farahi’s assertion that the government tried to coerce him to become an informant cannot be verified independently because the FBI won’t comment on his case. When asked by a journalist who has written on the case, a Miami FBI Special Agent stated: “It is a matter of policy that we do not confirm or deny who we have asked to be a source.”

In a case reported by The Wall Street Journal, a 24-year-old Moroccan, Yassine Ouassif, was stopped in November 2005 and questioned for several hours by immigration officials as he crossed into New York from Canada. His legal permanent resident card was taken from him and he was told to contact an individual when he returned home to San Francisco. Ouassif complied with the immigration officials’ instructions and the individual he contacted turned out to be an FBI agent. The agent told him that he had been monitoring Ouassif and his friends for many months.

According to Ouassif, the FBI agent offered him the opportunity to become an informant and regularly report to the FBI on what his Muslim friends in San Francisco were saying and doing. In exchange, his legal permanent resident card would be returned and he could resume his education, bring his Moroccan wife to America, and pursue his dream of buying a car, moving to Sacramento, and becoming an engineer. If he refused, according to an account written by Ouassif soon after the meeting, the FBI agent told him, “I will work hard to deport you to Morocco as soon as possible.”

According to the Los Angeles Times, “this account of Ouassif’s ordeal is based largely on interviews with him and his lawyer, as well as his own written chronicle. Immigration officials declined to comment, since no formal action was taken against Ouassif. FBI officials also declined to discuss the investigation, saying it is classified.”

Two cases involving one FBI informant have roiled the Muslim American community in Southern California. The bureau employed a convicted con man, Craig Monteilh, as an informant in an investigation called “Operation Flex.” Monteilh claimed in interviews and court documents that he served the FBI as a paid informant from July 2006 to October 2007 and used concealed audio and video equipment to record thousands of hours of conversations with Muslims in homes, restaurants and mosques in Irvine, Tustin, Mission Viejo and elsewhere. Monteilh, who has a

357 Ibid.
358 Aronson, October 8, 2009.
360 Ibid.
lawsuit pending against the FBI, has also claimed that he signed a non-disclosure agreement with
the FBI in exchange for $25,000. The Washington Post reports that an FBI letter to Monteilh’s
attorney on file in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana says Monteilh signed the non-disclosure
agreement in 2007. Additionally, the ACLU of Southern California and the Los Angeles
chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which describes itself as an
“Islamic advocacy group,” have filed a lawsuit against the FBI regarding Monteilh’s
activities. The lawsuit alleges Monteilh’s activity at the behest of his FBI handlers violated the
religious freedom of people he monitored.

While working for the FBI, Monteilh allegedly posed as a new convert and arrived at the Irvine
Islamic Center in 2006. He purportedly wore robes and a long beard and used the name Farouk
al-Aziz. Monteilh had a criminal record that included serving 16 months in state prison on two
grand theft charges. Members of the Islamic Center of Irvine were reportedly alarmed about
Monteilh and his talk of jihad and plans for a terrorist attack. The local chapter of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations reported him to the Irvine police and obtained a three-year
restraining order against him.

Monteilh’s role as an FBI informant was first revealed in a bail hearing for Ahmadullah Niazi, a
U.S. citizen born in Afghanistan, who was accused in a February 2009 indictment of lying about
ties to terrorist groups on immigration documents among other charges. Much of the evidence
was FBI testimony about Niazi’s recorded conversations with an FBI informant, who sources say
was Monteilh. On September 30, 2010, prosecutors summarily moved to dismiss the case
against Niazi, and a judge agreed. The U.S. attorney’s office in Los Angeles cited the lack of an
overseas witness and “evidentiary issues.” Sources familiar with the decision said Monteilh’s
role—and his potential testimony for the defense—was also a factor.

An editorial in the Orange County Register, the largest circulation newspaper in the Southern
California county where Monteilh’s activities occurred, made the following points:

Everyone understands the need for legitimate undercover activities in response to credible
evidence. But we cannot fathom the justification for fishing expeditions and entrapment. Muslims are afraid to talk about politics or civil liberties issues within their mosques or even among their friends because of fear that it will draw attention from undercover agents … there should not be a presumption of guilt among an entire community.

Jerry Markon, “Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI,” Washington Post, December 5, 2010,


Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” The Public Eye, Summer
Movements to Mosques.”

Markon, December 5, 2010.

Ibid.

articles/fbi-18893-ocprint-fear.html.
The use of informants can be a controversial issue, especially those with criminal records who may be working on behalf of authorities in exchange for reduced jail time. According to open source reports, confidential informants or undercover agents were used in 20 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. The use of informants poses the following risks:

Informants do not merely observe and collect data. They make things happen…. Informants can cause confusion and dissatisfaction among members of groups and communities they infiltrate, discrediting leaders, and fostering factionalism as people wonder if any of their colleagues are spies. Their handlers’ structure of incentives—raises, promotions, transfers, financial rewards, waived jail time—creates a system where informants consciously or subconsciously create and then destroy terrorist threats that would not otherwise exist. These pressures can push them from passive observer to aggressive actor, with serious consequences for constitutionally protected free speech. Another unplanned result: government loses legitimacy and support in the eyes of targeted communities, if they feel they have been manipulated.372

Acknowledging the challenge, FBI Director Robert Mueller said in 2009, “Oftentimes, the communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these communities that we ... must redouble our efforts.”373 Then-FBI spokesman John Miller has said the agency values its relationships with Muslims and has worked hard on outreach efforts that range from town hall meetings to diversity training for FBI agents.374 Miller said there is no factual basis for claims the FBI infiltrates mosques or conducts blanket surveillance of Muslim leaders. “Based on information of a threat of violence or a crime, we investigate individuals, and those investigations may take us to the places those individual go.”375

Former FBI agents and federal prosecutors note that informants are “still one of the government’s best weapons to thwart terrorists and that the benefit to national security is likely to far outweigh any embarrassment to the agency.” They claim that “although the law places almost no constraints on the use of informants, the agency takes sending an informant into a mosque very seriously and imposes a higher threshold for such requests.”376 Former FBI counterterrorism chief Robert Blitzer, states that “What matters to the FBI is preventing a massive attack that might be planned by some people ... using the mosque or church as a shield because they believe they're safe there. That is what the American people want the FBI to do. They don't want some type of attack happening on U.S. soil because the FBI didn't act on information.”377

Maher Hathout from the Muslim Public Affairs Council counters by saying that “People cannot be suspects and partners at the same time. Unless the FBI’s style changes, the partnership with the Muslim community will not be fruitful.”378 The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s

372 Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques.”
375 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Watanabe and Esquivel, March 1, 2009.
Countering Violent Extremism Working Group also cautions that “Law enforcement should be sensitive to the fact that perceptions regarding enforcement actions and intelligence gathering can impact community-oriented policing goals.”

In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a choice in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

The Obama Administration’s national CVE strategy mentions the Building Communities of Trust Initiative (BCOT) as a study that can serve as a model for alleviating tension between enforcement and engagement activities. BCOT offers guidance for fostering relationships among three sets of actors—fusion centers, law enforcement, and the communities in which they operate. The initiative’s recommendations included items such as:

- training of fusion center analysts in cultural sensitivity so that they can distinguish behavior that is constitutionally protected from criminal or terrorist activity;
- encouraging law enforcement to “embrace” community policing by “emphasizing partnerships and problem solving”; and
- encouraging communities to view information sharing with fusion centers and law enforcement as key to crime prevention and counterterrorism.

**Policy Considerations for Congress**

**Implementing the Administration’s CVE Strategy and Developing a Cohesive Domestic Intelligence Program**

“The United States has made great strides,” says one federal counterterrorism official, “in what might be called tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the streets, and disrupting cells and their operations ... an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond this ... to address the threat of violent extremism.” With the announcement of the CVE strategy, the Obama Administration has begun to address this concern. Additionally, in spite of the progress in “tactical counterterrorism” suggested by the official, some critics have noted that the United States has to develop a more cohesive domestic intelligence program. These areas—CVE and domestic intelligence—may merit oversight from Congress.

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381 Ibid.
Implementing the CVE Strategy

The Administration’s CVE strategy lacks specifics. The strategy’s domestic focus includes general philosophical statements about the importance of protecting civil rights, federal cooperation with local leaders in the private and public sectors, and the insistence that the strategy does not center solely around fighting one particular radical ideology. However, the eight-page document does not detail programs. One radicalization expert described the U.S. strategy as “very aspirational.” By comparison, the unclassified United Kingdom’s counter-radicalization strategy, known as “Prevent,” describes specific programs and is over 100 pages long.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, federal CVE activity emphasizes engagement with Muslim communities across the country. Beyond recognizing this as a key component of CVE, the strategy does not suggest specific initiatives to combat radicalization. Because of this, a number of areas may call for oversight from Congress.

Intervention with At-Risk Individuals

There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene with people vulnerable to radicalization. Such an intervention effort, the Channel Program, has been a key element of the United Kingdom’s counter radicalization strategy since 2007. The British government describes Channel as a “multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation” and involvement in “all forms of terrorism.” Channel “relies on close collaboration between police, partners and other key stakeholders ... and where necessary, provides an appropriate support package tailored to an individual’s needs.” Channel may be too “aggressive” of a government program to be adopted whole-cloth for the American context. However, it is unclear whether the Obama Administration considers some variant of Channel workable or even necessary in the United States.

The U.S. CVE strategy does cite the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Comprehensive Gang Model as an example of “locally-based initiatives that connect communities and government to address community challenges through collaboration and the development of stakeholder networks.” OJJDP—a component of DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs—describes the model as “one of the few approaches to gangs that encompasses a multidisciplinary response to gangs on multiple levels.” The preventative model is intended as

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384 Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils.” For more on what a counter-radicalization strategy for the U.S. should broadly entail see Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization.


386 Prevent Strategy, p. 54.


388 Neumann, Preventing Violent Radicalization, p. 41.

389 Empowering Local Partners, p. 4.

a blueprint for organizing local counter-gang efforts that do not necessarily result in law enforcement-driven outcomes, such as investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. For intervention, it targets young adult and teen gang members, not entities such as hate groups, prison gangs, or ideologically driven gangs consisting of adults. The model involves five strategies:

- Community Mobilization: Involvement of local citizens, including former gang members and community groups and agencies, and the coordination of programs and staff functions within and across agencies.
- Opportunities Provision: The development of a variety of specific education, training, and employment programs targeting gang-involved youth.
- Social Intervention: Youth-serving agencies, schools, street outreach workers, grassroots groups, faith-based organizations, law enforcement agencies, and other criminal justice organizations reaching out and acting as links between gang-involved youth and their families, the conventional world, and needed services.
- Suppression: Formal and informal social control procedures, including close supervision or monitoring of gang youth by agencies of the criminal justice system and also by community-based agencies, schools, and grassroots groups.
- Organizational Change and Development: Development and implementation of policies and procedures that result in the most effective use of available and potential resources to better address the gang problem.

The model is designed to focus on youth active in gangs or those who exhibit factors indicating potential gang involvement. It also advocates engagement with the families of such youth. Among its many suggestions, the model discusses interventions such as job training, employment, family counseling, academic tutoring, and anger management classes for young people at-risk. It also calls on law enforcement agencies and courts to move beyond traditional roles in the suppression of gangs—urging them to consider more intervention-oriented activities such as referring youth to social service programs.

The CVE strategy provides little detail about how the Comprehensive Gang Model may be applied to keep vulnerable people from radicalizing and becoming terrorists. Congress may wish to consider examining the utility and feasibility of developing a CVE intervention model for the United States.

Identifying Programs and Federal Contacts to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts

The Administration’s CVE strategy stresses that “The best defenses against violent extremist ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions.” Determining and explaining how local entities—whether public or private—should interact with

391 OJJDP, Comprehensive Gang Model, p. 6.
392 National Gang Center, “About the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model,” http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Comprehensive-Gang-Model/About. “Suppression” was not emphasized in the Obama Administration’s national CVE strategy’s description of the Comprehensive Gang Model. The other components of the model were mentioned. See Empowering Local Partners, p. 4.
393 OJJDP, Comprehensive Gang Model, p. 6.
394 Empowering Local Partners, p. 2.
federal partners may pose quite a challenge. For example, what existing federal grant programs can be harnessed by local actors to develop a CVE intervention program? A publicly available comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not exist. Congress may be interested in asking the Obama Administration to formalize a roster or designate a clearinghouse available to local entities to identify such programs.

Even more fundamentally, when radicalization arises as an issue in a locality or a particular community, to which government officials or offices should citizens turn? As mentioned elsewhere in this report, DOJ has pushed the U.S. Attorneys to become larger players in community outreach. Is it appropriate to have the nation’s principal litigators be key players in the federal government’s CVE outreach efforts? Can the same people responsible for prosecuting terrorism cases effectively broker trust among community members who may be wary of federal law enforcement? More broadly should particular government agencies or officials coordinate counter-radicalization efforts at the state and local level? Congress may wish to explore these questions with Administration officials.

At the national level, it may be of value to have a single federal agency in charge of the government’s CVE efforts. One expert has stated as much:

> The White House should designate a single agency that serves as the principal hub for collecting, disseminating, and evaluating information on counter-radicalization. Its main function would be to collect, analyze, and share best practices with a wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors, including community leaders and non-profits.  

Congress may wish to consider developing legislation that designates a CVE lead, if the Administration does not.

**Countering Extremist Ideas**

As the United Kingdom has clearly stated in its counter-radicalization program, extremist ideologies play a role in radicalization. Furthermore, the National Security Council’s Quintan Wiktorowicz has stated that “We will push back against the full scope of different violent ideologies with an inclusive, positive narrative.” However, in the United States, mere belief in these notions, no matter how reprehensible they are, is not necessarily illegal. The ACLU’s Michael German has stated that the ACLU is “deeply concerned about the potential for government censorship of Internet content based on the [CVE] strategy’s proposal for countering violent extremist propaganda.” The task of countering extremist ideas raises a number of questions regarding the implementation of the CVE strategy that may be of interest to Congress. Should the federal government determine which ideologies are dangerous? If so, which agencies should participate in this effort? If the development of a counter-narrative challenging terrorist ideologies is necessary, how should the federal government partner with state and local

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396 *Prevent Strategy*, p. 7.
397 Temple-Raston, “White House Unveils.”
government and civilian counterparts? How do government entities keep a counter-narrative from being publicly viewed as propaganda?

**Measuring Input and Results**

In an era of budgetary constraint, Congress may wish to question the Administration about the levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts. Are there mechanisms to track federal expenditure in this area? Which federal body is responsible for this? On the other side of these budgetary questions, how will the Administration evaluate the effectiveness of federal CVE efforts? The British have struggled with measurement issues related to their Prevent Strategy. U.K. officials have made “progress ... in measuring outputs but not always in measuring outcomes.” In other words, counting the number of engagement events is one thing. It is quite another evaluating their impact.

**Enhancing Domestic Intelligence**

The production of timely and actionable intelligence is essential to the effort to combat violent extremism. This is important if one considers the concerns of a group of terrorism experts and former and current intelligence and law enforcement officials:

> Despite the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the proliferation of fusion centers, the United States still lacks a coherent national domestic intelligence collection effort. There is no national estimate of domestic terrorist threats. Creating one could admittedly be a politically perilous undertaking, but without all parts of the federal government having a common understanding of the threat, domestic intelligence efforts will continue to flounder. There is no national, as opposed to local or regional, domestic intelligence-collection plan, no national domestic intelligence collection requirements, no priorities, no national or regional coordination. A national domestic intelligence effort seems unlikely to emerge in the absence of some central direction.

These experts believe that local police are in the best position to collect domestic intelligence and so their role in the national effort—as well as that of federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS—needs to be carefully delineated. The results they say would be “a more coordinated, better connected national domestic intelligence effort [that] would better protect the nation against a continuously morphing jihadist foe, possible surges in terrorist capabilities, and potential future domestic terrorist threats from other directions.” A recent study drove these issues home by stating that aside from large jurisdictions such as New York City, “local police departments remain all but absent from the counterterrorism efforts of America’s intelligence community.”

Congress, therefore, may also wish to consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to examine whether and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part of a unified strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.

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399 Prevent Strategy, p. 36.

400 America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate, June 2010.

401 Ibid.

In Appendix A that follows, details about each of the 40 post-9/11 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks are provided in chronological order.
Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots

Rezwan Ferdaus—Plot to Attack U.S. Capitol and Pentagon—September 2011

On September 28, Rezwan Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen from Ashland, MA, was arrested on terrorism charges. He allegedly plotted to attack the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol with explosives-laden remote-controlled airplanes. According to DOJ, he also planned a ground assault in conjunction with his aerial attack, intending to use firearms and to involve six conspirators in this phase of his plot. Ferdaus also purportedly attempted to provide Al Qaeda with modified cell phones he believed would be used as detonators for improvised explosive devices intended to harm U.S. soldiers abroad. As described by DOJ, FBI undercover employees acting as members of Al Qaeda supplied Ferdaus with money, fake explosives for the airplanes, firearms, and hand grenades. In turn, (among other things) Ferdaus provided the cell phone detonators to these phony Al Qaeda recruiters as well as a training video on how to construct them.

Ferdaus supposedly began plotting in 2010. In January 2011, he discussed his plans with an FBI informant. In May 2011, he visited the Washington, DC, area to conduct surveillance of his targets and view the site from which he intended to launch his remote-controlled airplanes. According to the FBI, Ferdaus believed that one of his airplanes could collapse the Capitol dome. It appears that Ferdaus did not view his domestic plot as a suicide mission. The FBI stated that in April 2011, it recorded Ferdaus discussing his desire to go abroad once he completed his attack in the United States. Aside from the undercover aspects of the sting operation, the bureau also relied on Ferdaus’s e-mail and telephone records to build its case.

Agron Hasbajrami—Plot to Fight in Pakistan—September 2011

On September 6, 2011, Agron Hasbajrami was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City as he tried to board a flight to Turkey. Hasbajrami, a legal permanent resident in the United States and an Albanian citizen, allegedly planned to join a jihadist fighting group in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. He also purportedly sent more than $1,000 to Pakistan to support the efforts of a militant with whom he communicated.
Naser Abdo—Plot to Attack Targets Near Fort Hood—July 2011

On July 27, 2011, U.S. Army Private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area—near the same place where Army Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 individuals in 2009. The circumstances surrounding Abdo’s plot remain somewhat unclear. Abdo, described in the media as a Muslim soldier in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY, was supposedly absent without leave from the Army after applying for conscientious objector status.\(^{408}\) A November 2011 superseding indictment charged Abdo with one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, one count of attempted murder of officers or employees of the United States, two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime of violence, and two counts of possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a federal crime of violence.\(^{409}\)

Abdo allegedly purchased gunpowder, shotgun ammunition, and a magazine for a semi-automatic pistol at a gun store near Fort Hood.\(^{410}\) An employee at the gun store supposedly brought Abdo to the attention of law enforcement officers. Federal officials have noted that Abdo also possessed a .40 caliber handgun, bomb making materials, and an article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items. The article was from *Inspire*, an English-language magazine produced by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.\(^{411}\)

Emerson Begolly—Plot to Encourage Jihadist Acts in the United States—July 2011

On July 14, 2011, Emerson Begolly, a U.S. citizen from New Bethlehem, PA, was indicted for allegedly attempting to encourage jihadists to commit acts of terrorism within the United States and distributing information related to explosives online. In August 2011, he pled guilty to “soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the United States and to using a firearm during and in relation to an assault on FBI agents.”\(^{412}\) According to DOJ, Begolly posted “links to a 101-page document that contain[ed] information on how to set up a laboratory, conduct basic chemistry, and manufacture explosives.” Begolly had also allegedly bitten two FBI agents attempting to execute search warrants in January 2011. Reputedly, during the altercation, he was in possession of a concealed firearm.\(^{413}\)


\(^{413}\) DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Man Indicted for Soliciting Jihadists to Kill Americans,” July 14, 2011, (continued...)
Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh—Plot to Attack Seattle Military Processing Center—June 2011

On June 22, 2011, Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh, were arrested on terrorism and firearms charges for plotting to attack a Seattle military processing center. Law enforcement first learned of the duo’s plotting from a citizen who reported their activities. An FBI sting operation apprehended the two as they took possession of machine guns they had purchased for the plot. The firearms had been rendered inert as part of the sting operation. Assistant Attorney General for National Security Todd Hinnen described the plot as, “driven by a violent, extreme ideology.”414 While the two reportedly had not worked out all of the details of their plot, they allegedly were frustrated by “American war policies” and hoped for an attack that would garner wide attention.415

Yonathan Melaku—Plot to Shoot Targets in Washington, DC, Area—June 2011

On June 23, 2011, DOJ announced that Yonathan Melaku, an Ethiopian native living in Alexandria, VA, had been charged with destruction of property and firearm violations. These charges stemmed from five shootings at military installations in Northern Virginia between October and November 2010. No one was harmed in the shootings.416 It is unclear to what extent Melaku, a Marine Corps reservist, was driven by jihadist motivations; however, investigators linked Melaku to a “spiral notebook with numerous Arabic statements referencing the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, ‘The Path to Jihad,’ as well as a list of several other individuals associated with foreign terrorist organizations.”417 Law enforcement officials also found a video when they searched Melaku’s bedroom. It reportedly depicted “Melaku in an automobile driving near what appears to be the U.S. Marine Corps Heritage Museum and repeatedly firing a handgun out the passenger-side window.” In the video, he allegedly states, “that’s my target. That’s the military building. It’s going to be attacked,” and then he shouts, “Allahu Akbar.”418

(...continued)


417 DOJ, “Alexandria.”

418 Ibid. Because the publicly available information about this case is incomplete, it is not counted as a successful attack in this report. It is unclear whether Melaku wanted to harm anyone.
American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh—Plot to Attack New York City Targets—May 2011

On May 12, 2011, Ahmed Ferhani (an Algerian native living in Queens, NY) and Mohamed Mamdouh (a naturalized U.S. citizen from Morocco) were arrested for plotting to blow up a synagogue as well as churches in New York City. However, the duo had not chosen a specific target. New York City officials alleged that Ferhani was “driven by a hatred of Jews and a belief that Muslims are mistreated the world over.” He and Mamdouh allegedly had purchased firearms and a hand grenade from an undercover detective posing as a gun dealer. The two were charged under a New York state terrorism statute and do not face federal charges.  

Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari—Plot to Bomb U.S. Targets—February 2011

On February 23, 2011, FBI agents arrested Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and resident of Lubbock, TX. He was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. He also allegedly plotted to purchase material to make an improvised explosive device and had researched potential U.S. targets. A chemical supplier provided information to the FBI about a suspicious attempted purchase by Aldawsari. Prosecutors have also stated that Aldawsari documented his interest in violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal. Allegedly among the targets Aldawsari researched were “the names and home addresses of three American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.” Aldawsari’s lawyers have indicated that they plan to use an insanity defense in the case.

Antonio Martinez—Plot to Attack an Armed Forces Recruiting Station in Maryland—December 2010

On December 8, 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, with the attempted murder of federal officers and employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against federal property. Caught by the FBI in a sting operation, Martinez allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a bomb. In late September 2010, Martinez had allegedly ...
posted a statement on his Facebook account, “calling for violence to stop the oppression of Muslims.”425 During the course of his plot, he also allegedly tried to recruit others to join him, discussed martyrdom, and praised the now-dead radical U.S.-born imam, Anwar al-Awlaki, among other things.426

**Mohamed Osman Mohamud—Plot to Detonate Van Packed with Explosives in Portland, Oregon—November 2010**

Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested on November 26, 2010, moments after he tried to detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square. The square was crowded with thousands of people who had gathered for an annual Christmas tree lighting event.427

According to federal officials, Mohamud came to the attention of the FBI after a tip from the Muslim community. This led officials to discover an e-mail exchange that occurred in 2009 between Mohamud and an unindicted associate located in Pakistan. The two communicated regularly and in December 2009 it is alleged that they discussed the possibility of Mohamud traveling there to prepare for violent jihad428 presumably targeting U.S. troops.

The FBI subsequently developed a “sting” operation that involved recorded meetings between Mohamud and undercover FBI operatives beginning in the summer of 2010. In an August 19, 2010, meeting with two FBI undercover operatives, Mohamud stated that “he had been thinking of committing some form of violent jihad since the age of fifteen.”429 As part of the sting, the undercover agents went along with Mohamud’s plotting for a terrorist attack. This included a “trial run” where Mohamud and the undercover operatives detonated a bomb in a backpack in a remote Oregon location. In addition, Mohamud bought various bomb components and mailed them to the undercover agents.430

During another meeting with an undercover operative, Mohamud identified Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square Christmas lighting event as a potential target for a bomb. When the undercover operative pointed out that “there would be lots of children at such an event …

(...continued)


425 Ibid.

426 Anti-Defamation League, “Baltimore Man Arrested for Attempting to Bomb Army Recruiting Center,” December 9, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Antonio_Martinez.htm. Anwar al-Awlaki is a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles. He is a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and has been linked to a number of domestic jihadist plots. He has also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.


429 Ibid, p. 3. Mohamud was 19 years old at the time of his arrest.

Mohamud replied he was looking for a ‘huge mass that will … be attacked in their own element with their families celebrating the holidays.’

On November 26, undercover operatives showed Mohamud a white van with a dummy explosive device inside that was actually supplied by the FBI. He was reported to have said the device looked “beautiful.” They later drove the van to Pioneer Courthouse Square where Mohamud allegedly attempted to detonate the device on two separate occasions using a cell phone. After the second attempt he was taken into custody. Officials stated that at no time did the device pose a danger to the public.

At a hearing in Federal District Court in Portland on November 29, 2010, Mohamud plead not guilty to the charges. His lawyers suggested that the government might be “manufacturing crime” and accused authorities of timing the plot for maximum publicity and effect. Attorney General Eric Holder was quoted as saying of the case, “I am confident that there is no entrapment here, and no entrapment claim will be found to be successful.”

Farooque Ahmed—Plot to Bomb Washington, DC, Subway Stations—October 2010

Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was arrested on October 27, 2010, and charged with conspiring with others he believed to be al Qaeda operatives to bomb subway stations in Washington, DC. In fact, his co-conspirators were really undercover law enforcement officers. They provided Ahmed with a Quran with code words for locations of future meetings which were held in various hotel rooms in the Northern Virginia area and recorded by the FBI. In April 2011, Ahmed was sentenced to 23 years in prison for his plotting.

The allegations against Ahmed were contained in an indictment unsealed on October 27, 2010. According to the indictment, between April and October of 2010, Ahmed met with individuals he thought were representatives of a terrorist organization at several Northern Virginia hotels. At these meetings, Ahmed agreed to conduct surveillance and assess the security of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations in the Arlington County area. He allegedly wanted to “kill as many military personnel as possible.” Ahmed later gave to undercover operatives posing as terrorists a thumb drive containing video images of some of the stations as well as sketches of the stations.

431 U.S. v. Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, p. 4.
433 Markon, November 28, 2010.
435 Ibid.
He also discussed at these meetings the best time and location for an attack in order to cause the most casualties.  

According to court documents, Ahmed told undercover operatives that “he wished to fight in jihad himself, and has trained to do so using various firearms.” He also claimed to have studied martial arts for four years and learned knife, gun, and disarming techniques. He is alleged to have said that he planned to travel to engage in jihad after his upcoming trip for the Hajj pilgrimage. Court documents allege that Ahmed also “discussed his desire to provide financial assistance” to jihadists fighting abroad.

Ahmed immigrated with his family from Pakistan in 1993. He graduated from the College of Staten Island in New York. He is a married father of one who was working for a telecommunications company in Northern Virginia at the time of his arrest. The FBI and White House have said the public was never in danger because FBI agents had Ahmed under tight surveillance before the sting began and until his arrest. Law enforcement officials have also said that the tip that led the FBI to Ahmed came from a source in the Muslim community.

**Abdel Hameed Shehadeh—Travel Abroad to Wage Jihad—October 2010**

Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, a U.S. citizen born in New York City to a Palestinian American family, was arrested on October 22, 2010, in Honolulu, HI. Among the accusations against him was that he tried to join the U.S. military so he could be deployed to Iraq but would desert and fight with anti-American insurgency forces.

A criminal complaint unsealed on October 25, 2010, accused Shehadeh of making false statements in a matter involving international terrorism. According to the complaint, in early 2008 Shehadeh devised a plan to travel to Pakistan in order to join the Taliban or a similar fighting group. In furtherance of his plan, on June 13, 2008, Shehadeh flew on a one-way airline ticket from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, to Islamabad, Pakistan. Upon landing in Pakistan, Shehadeh was denied entry into the country by Pakistani officials and he returned to the United States. He was questioned by FBI agents and New York Police Department (NYPD) detectives on multiple occasions about the purpose of his trip to Pakistan. He told them that he had traveled to Pakistan in order to visit an Islamic university and to attend a friend’s wedding. The complaint alleges that Shehadeh subsequently admitted to FBI agents in Hawaii that the true purpose of his trip to Pakistan was to join a fighting group such as the Taliban.

According to the complaint, several weeks after Shehadeh was denied entry to Pakistan, he attempted to enlist in the U.S. Army at the Times Square recruiting station in New York City. Shehadeh’s application was denied when it was discovered that he had concealed his prior trip to

439 Ibid.


Pakistan. Although Shehadeh claimed that he attempted to enlist for career opportunities and benefits, the complaint alleges that his true motive was to deploy to Iraq, where he intended to desert and fight against the U.S. military alongside Iraqi insurgent forces.443

In addition, the complaint alleges that Shehadeh created and administered multiple websites dedicated to spreading violent jihadist ideology. The content of these websites included, among other things, speeches from known Al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In December Shehadeh was indicted for lying to FBI agents.444

The New York Times reported that relatives of Shehadeh were surprised by the charges. Although he seemed “confused and lost,” according to one relative, he was nevertheless aware, as was the whole family, that he was being tracked by investigators. “He was trying to outsmart the FBI,” said the relative, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He thought it was a game.”445 A federal court in Brooklyn, NY, ordered Shehadeh held without bail.446

Omar Hammami—al-Shabaab Figure—August 2010

In an indictment unsealed in August 2010,447 Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Daphne, AL, was accused of supporting al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization.448 According to public reports, Hammami has appeared in several propaganda videos on behalf of al-Shabaab that have been distributed worldwide. One shows him allegedly instructing recruits in urban warfare. Somali officials believe he is involved with al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy and financial management. He is also believed to be a ranking member of the al-Shabaab organization with operational responsibilities.449

443 Ibid.
448 Al-Shabaab is a group on the Department of State’s list of designated terrorist organizations. It is waging an insurgency in Somalia.
As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his American mother and the Muslim beliefs of his Syrian-born father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salafism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where the American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the web for information on jihad. While in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia in pursuit of violent jihad.450

**Jehad Mostafa—Attempted Travel to Somalia to Fight—August 2010**

Few details are publicly available about Jehad Mostafa, a U.S. citizen who grew up in San Diego, CA, and allegedly left the United States to fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The indictment in Mostafa’s case mentions little specifically about his alleged terrorist activity but ties him to al-Shabaab between March 2008 and June 2009. News sources suggest that he left the United States in December 2005.451

**Shaker Masri—Attempted Travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to Fight—July 2010**

Shaker Masri, a U.S. citizen born in Alabama but raised abroad, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on August 3, 2010, just before he was allegedly planning to travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to join either al-Shabaab or Al Qaeda. The FBI used a cooperating source who met Masri in November 2008 and subsequently consensually recorded conversations with him for the investigation. According to court documents, Masri encouraged the cooperating source to “review speeches” by Anwar al-Awlaki.

**Zachary Chesser— Attempted Travel to Somalia to Fight, Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens—July 2010**

On July 21, 2010, Zachary Chesser, a U.S. citizen from Fairfax County, Virginia, was arrested on terrorism-related charges. According to DOJ, Chesser told FBI agents that on two occasions he tried to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. In his last attempt, Chesser allegedly brought his infant son with him to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City to potentially disguise his intentions.453

450 Ibid.
Three months later, on October 20, 2010, Chesser pled guilty to charges that he communicated threats against the writers of the South Park television show, solicited violent jihadists to desensitize law enforcement, and attempted to provide material support to al-Shabaab. According to court documents filed with his plea agreement, “Chesser maintained several online profiles dedicated to extremist jihadist propaganda ... took repeated steps in April 2010 to encourage violent jihadists to attack the writers of South Park for their depiction of Muhammad ... solicited others to desensitize law enforcement by placing suspicious-looking but innocent packages in public places ... and twice attempted to leave the United States and travel to Somalia for the purpose of joining al-Shabaab and engage in violent jihad as a foreign fighter.”

Federal investigators have linked two others to Chesser’s activities. His wife, Proscovia Kampire Nzabanita, pled guilty to making a false statement to an FBI agent during the course of the bureau’s investigation of her husband. In May 2011, Jesse Curtis Morton (aka Younus Mohammad), a onetime Brooklyn resident and co-founder of the extremist group Revolution Muslim, was also charged with threatening the writers of South Park online. He and Chesser allegedly cooperated in drafting an “clarification statement” regarding Chesser’s initial postings targeting the writers of South Park. In court documents, DOJ argues that the “clarification statement” was actually a threat. Morton was reportedly arrested by Moroccan officials in May 2011.

According to the DOJ affidavit, Chesser first showed interest in Islam in 2008 and developed a fascination with extremist views, sending Anwar al-Awlaki e-mails and receiving two replies from the radical cleric. He also started his own YouTube.com account and operated his own blog where he promoted violent jihad.
Paul Rockwood, Jr. and Nadia Rockwood—Plot to Kill People on a Hit List—July 2010

On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI in connection with a terrorism investigation. On the same day, Rockwood’s wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s case.

According to DOJ, Paul Rockwood, Jr. converted to Islam in late 2001 or early 2002 while living in Virginia and followed the teachings of radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. They allege that after he moved to Alaska in 2006, he visited websites to research explosive components, construction of remote triggering devices, such as cell phones, and construction of bombs to be delivered by common mail carriers. Authorities also said that in late 2009, he began discussing using mail bombs and possibly killing targets by gunshot to the head. They said that by early this year, he had formalized his list of targets for execution.

Paul Rockwood received the maximum sentence of eight years in prison, consistent with his plea agreement. His wife was allowed to return to the United Kingdom and serve five years of probation there and may not return to the United States without prior approval.

Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte—Attempted Travel to Somalia To Fight—June 2010

On June 5, 2010, two New Jersey residents Mohamed Alessa (a U.S. citizen from a Palestinian American family) and Carlos Almonte (a Dominican American and Muslim convert) — were arrested at JFK in New York prior to boarding separate flights to Egypt. Authorities allege the two had hoped to eventually link up with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The following day, they were charged with conspiracy to kill Americans abroad. They are alleged to have vowed to “slice up” troops in “a thousand pieces,” according to the criminal complaint which cites conversations secretly recorded by a NYPD undercover officer. In March 2011, the duo pled guilty to conspiring to murder individuals overseas on behalf of al-Shabaab.

Law enforcement interest in Alessa and Almonte began when an e-mail tip was received by the FBI on October 9, 2006. It suggested that the two young men were engaged in radical behavior, perusing jihadist websites, and discussing terrorist activity. They were then monitored by authorities for the next four years. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad. However, in 2007, the two traveled to Jordan where they wanted to be recruited to fight in Iraq, but were rejected and “were upset at the individuals who failed to recruit them.” By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.

In the criminal complaint, the two allegedly participated in several activities that had officials concerned that they were moving further from radicalization to violent extremism. This included lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns, and gathering equipment, including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots, among other things. According to officials, when the duo booked separate flights in June 2010 to Egypt, they were arrested because they were preparing to leave the country to fight overseas.

Faisal Shahzad—Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square, New York City—May 1, 2010

On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad—a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan—parked his Nissan Pathfinder sport utility vehicle (SUV) containing a crude incendiary device along West 45th Street near Times Square in New York City. A t-shirt vendor in the area observed smoke coming from the vehicle and alerted police. The device within the SUV did not explode or ignite and was subsequently rendered safe by the New York City Police bomb squad.

Shahzad was arrested three days later at JFK after he had boarded an Emirates Air flight bound for Dubai. At a news conference to announce the arrest, Attorney General Eric Holder stated “[i]t was clear that the intent behind this terrorist act was to kill Americans.” Law enforcement officials reported that the information that led to Shahzad’s arrest centered on evidence gathered about the sale of the Nissan Pathfinder that was used in the attempted attack. Police discovered that Shahzad had purchased the vehicle through an Internet listing. Although he gave the seller a false name, police were able to trace back to him a disposable cell phone number that he also gave the seller.
On June 21, 2010, Shahzad pled guilty to 10 terrorism charges that were contained in a superseding indictment handed down by a grand jury in New York and which added five additional counts to the original May 5, 2010, indictment. He was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, use of a destructive device in connection with criminal violence, transporting and receiving explosives, and damaging and destroying property by means of fire. Since his arrest, DOJ reports that Shahzad has not only admitted his role in the plot, but continued to cooperate with authorities, and provided valuable intelligence.

Shortly after the failed attack, the Pakistan Taliban group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility in a message on an audiotape posted on the Internet. Days later, U.S. officials said that investigators had developed evidence to support the TTP claim. Pakistani authorities have arrested or detained at least 13 people in Pakistan in connection with the case. One of those arrested was reported to have provided an “independent stream” of evidence that the Pakistani Taliban was behind the attempt and has admitted to helping Faisal Shahzad travel into Pakistan’s tribal belt for bomb training.

In the courtroom where he pled guilty, Shahzad admitted to having received explosives training from the TTP at a camp in Pakistan’s Waziristan region. However the device found inside the Nissan Pathfinder was crudely constructed. It consisted of three 20-gallon propane tanks, 152 M-88 (consumer-grade) fireworks, one 4-foot by 2-foot metal gun locker filled with 250 pounds of urea-based fertilizer, and two alarm clocks connected by wires. The fertilizer was inert and not usable as an explosive. Had the device been viable, police say it could have produced a “significant fireball” and sprayed shrapnel with enough force to kill pedestrians and knock out windows in the crowded theater district in midtown Manhattan.

It has been reported that no plea deal in exchange for Shahzad’s guilty plea was made by the U.S. government in the case. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York released a letter sent to Shahzad’s attorneys making it clear that there was no plea deal and that their client would...
face a mandatory life term, the maximum sentence in this case. Shahzad is scheduled to be sentenced in October 2010.\footnote{Weiser, June 21, 2010.}

Two other individuals have been indicted in connection with this terrorist plot:

- **Mohammad Younis**, of Long Island, NY, was arrested in September 2010 and accused of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business which provided funds to Faisal Shahzad. There are no allegations, however, that Younis was aware of the intended use of the money. In the indictment, he was charged with operating an unlicensed money transfer business between the United States and Pakistan and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transfer business. In August 2011, he pled guilty to the former charge.\footnote{Chad Bray, “Plea in Bomb-Link Case,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, August 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053119035396904576516790620314306.html; U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Long Island Man with Engaging in Hawala Activity That Funded Attempted Times Square Bomber,” September 15, 2010, http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo091510a.htm.}

- **Aftab Ali**, a Pakistani citizen residing in Watertown, MA, was charged in a criminal complaint in November 2010 with immigration fraud and making false statements.\footnote{DOJ Press Resease, “Pakistani Man Charged with Immigration Fraud and False Statements,” November 16, 2010, http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/bs111610.htm} The complaint alleges that Ali entered the United States in August 2009 and began working at a gas station without obtaining a work permit. It also alleges that Ali provided $4,900 to Shahzad in February 2010 as part of a \textit{hawala}\footnote{Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to ‘traditional’ banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction of western banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system used around the world The components of hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike traditional banking, Hawala makes minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money take place based on communications between members of a network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers. See Interpol, “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering, January 2000, http://www.interpol.int/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/hawala/default.asp.”} transaction in which Ali’s family in Pakistan received an equivalent amount of money in Pakistan. The complaint does not allege that Ali was aware of the intended use of the $4,900 by Shahzad. In April 2011, Ali pled guilty to charges of unlicensed money transmitting and immigration document fraud. He was sentenced to time served and ordered to be deported.\footnote{DOJ Press Release, “Pakistani Man Sentenced on Unlicensed Money Transmitting and Immigration Fraud Charges,” April 12, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/pakistani-man-sentenced-on-unlicensed-money-transmitting-charges-and-immigration-fraud.}

**Colleen LaRose ("Jihad Jane")—Conspiracy to Kill and Material Support to Terrorism—March 2010**

On March 4, 2010, a Pennsylvania woman, Colleen LaRose, was charged with providing material support to terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder outside the United States, lying to federal agents, and transferring a U.S. passport for the purposes of facilitating a terrorist act.\footnote{\textit{United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose}}, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of (continued...)
was arrested in October 2009, but her case was kept under seal. She is alleged to have used the Internet to recruit others to “wage violent jihad” where she was known by the aliases, “Jihad Jane” and “Fatima LaRose.” She has also been tied to a plot to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist who depicted the prophet Muhammad atop the body of a dog.\(^{489}\) In February 2011, LaRose pled guilty to guilty “to all counts of a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements, and attempted identity theft.”\(^{490}\)

Three others have been publicly linked to the case. In March 2011, a Colorado woman, Jamie Paulin-Ramirez, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.\(^{491}\) According to the indictment, LaRose recruited Paulin-Ramirez to join the plot to kill the Swedish cartoonist and invited her to Europe to attend a “training camp.”\(^{492}\) Mohammed Khalid—a citizen of Pakistan, a U.S. lawful permanent resident, and a minor at the time of his reported arrest—also allegedly conspired with LaRose as did Algerian national Ali Damache. Damache resided in Ireland at the time of his arrest.\(^{493}\) As part of his alleged support role, Khalid hid a U.S. passport that LaRose had stolen and was purportedly asked by Damache to recruit supporters online. DOJ further asserts that “Paulin-Ramirez married Damache on the day she arrived with her minor child in Europe to live and train with jihadists, even though she had never met Damache in person.”\(^{494}\)

**Five Northern Virginian Men Convicted of Terrorism Offenses in Pakistan — December 2009**

Five men from Northern Virginia were convicted of terrorism charges on June 24, 2010, by a special Pakistani anti-terrorism court and sentenced to 10 years in prison.\(^{495}\) They were arrested in Sarghoda (near Lahore), Pakistan, in December 2009, where they are alleged to have traveled hoping to work with jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Prosecutors say they

(...continued)


\(^{494}\) DOJ Press Release, October 20, 2011.

were in the planning stages of attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant, an air base, and other targets in Afghanistan as well as “territories of the United States.” Police reportedly recovered jihadist literature, laptop computers, and maps of parts of Pakistan when the men were arrested near Lahore. The maps included areas where the Taliban train.

The story of the five men from the Alexandria, Virginia area—Uman Chaudhry, Ramy Zamzam, Ahmad A. Minni, Waqar Khan, and Aman Hassan Yemer—became public when the Council on American-Islamic Relations got their families in touch with the FBI after the five left the United States without telling their families. The men were arrested at the home of Chaudhry’s father, Khalid Farooq Chaudhry, and the terror allegations began immediately.

Attorneys for the men mounted an aggressive defense contending that the five were tortured by Pakistani jailers. In addition, they allege that police in Pakistan fabricated incriminating evidence.

The motives for the group’s trip to Pakistan are unclear. Zamzam claimed in a Pakistani court that the young men were in the country for jihad, not terrorism, and wanted to provide medical and financial assistance to Afghan Muslims. The group reportedly met with representatives from two militant organizations, Jaish-e-Muhammad (tied to Al Qaeda) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. They were arrested in a house allegedly tied to Jaish-e-Muhammad after failing to link up with any terrorists. It has been reported that the two groups they approached rejected them because they lacked references from other trusted terrorists. According to a news report citing Pakistani investigators, the five communicated online and visited websites that included footage of reputed terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Families, neighbors, and friends of the five young men are reported to have had difficulty believing that the five had tried to link up with terrorist groups.

Al-Shabaab Minnesota Recruits—2007-2011

“Operation Rhino,” is an ongoing FBI investigation of al-Shabaab-related recruitment of individuals in Minnesota—the Minneapolis area has the largest community of Somali Americans

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497 Ibid.

498 Ibid.


503 Baldor, December 12, 2009.
in the United States. Reportedly, some of individuals indicted in the case began their terrorism-related activities in 2007, around the time al-Shabaab stepped up its insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters. The Minnesota recruits who traveled to Somalia received weapons training alongside individuals from other countries, including Britain, Australia, Sweden and Canada. The indicted American recruits face a variety of accusations including recruiting and raising funds for the trips, engaging in terrorist acts in Somalia, and perjury. Nine individuals have been arrested by U.S. or foreign law enforcement. Five defendants have pled guilty to charges.

Documents associated with the ongoing federal investigation into the recruitment of these individuals from the Minneapolis area reveal the importance of a local al-Shabaab support network that provided the organization financing and foot soldiers. It included older individuals who helped in the radicalization process and aided in supplying the young men with equipment and money to go to Somalia. At least five individuals appear to have played important roles:

- **In July 2011, Omer Abdi Mohamed** pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to a conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim abroad. Among his activities, he helped some recruits obtain airplane tickets.

- **In October 2011, two women, Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan**, were convicted as part of a scheme to raise money for al-Shabaab by soliciting funds door-to-door and via teleconferences. According to DOJ, in some instances, Ali raised money by misleading donors into believing the funds were destined for “the poor and needy.” Ali and Hassan are both naturalized U.S. citizens from Somalia.

- **Mahamud Said Omar** is a Somali citizen who was granted permanent U.S. resident status in 1994. He is accused of providing money to young men to travel from Minneapolis to Somalia to train with and fight for al-Shabaab. He also allegedly visited an al-Shabaab safe house and provided hundreds of dollars to

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510 Ibid.
fund the purchase of AK-47 rifles for the men. Omar was held in a high-security Dutch prison after his arrest at the request of the U.S. government in November 2009. In May 2010, a Rotterdam District Court ruled that Omar may be extradited to the United States. He appeared in U.S. federal court in August 2011.

- **Abdiweli Yassin Isse** is a legal resident of the United States. An October 9, 2009, criminal complaint charged Isse with encouraging others to travel to Somalia to fight Ethiopians. At a gathering of co-conspirators, he purportedly described his plans to wage jihad against Ethiopians. He also raised money to buy airplane tickets for others to make the trip to Somalia for the same purpose. In raising that money, he allegedly misled community members into thinking they were contributing money to send young men to Saudi Arabia to study the Quran.

- **Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax** is a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. An affidavit filed in support of an October 9, 2009, criminal complaint states that in the fall of 2007, Faarax attended a meeting with co-conspirators at a Minneapolis residence, where he encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight and told them how he had experienced true brotherhood while fighting a jihad in Somalia. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.

There is some suggestion that interest among young U.S. citizens in joining al-Shabaab may be waning from a high point in 2007-2008 as reports of recruits who had died in terrorist actions reached U.S. Somali communities. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center has told Congress that at least seven Americans have been killed in fighting in Somalia. In October 2008, Shirwa Ahmed, 27, a college student from Minneapolis, became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous attacks that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others. Additionally, Farah Mohamed Beledi was identified as a suicide bomber who died as he tried to detonate his suicide vest in a May 2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also, according to media reports, al-

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515 Ibid.
Shabaab has claimed that Abdisalan Hussein Ali purportedly blew himself up while attacking African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011.521

Nidal Malik Hasan—Fort Hood, Texas, Shooting—November 5, 2009

A mass shooting took place on November 5, 2009, at the Soldier Readiness Center at the U.S. Army’s Fort Hood, located outside Killeen, TX. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded or injured.522 In July 2011, Fort Hood’s commander ordered a court-martial for Hasan, who may also face the death penalty if convicted of premeditated murder and attempted premeditated murder charges.523

The accused perpetrator is Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major who was serving as a psychiatrist. He is reported to have fired 100 rounds at soldiers processing through cubicles in the center. He was seriously wounded in an exchange of gunfire during the incident. Hasan was armed with an FN Five-seveN® 5.7 millimeter pistol524 and an older model Smith and Wesson .357 revolver. However, law enforcement officials do not believe the latter gun was fired by Hasan.525

Hasan is the son of Palestinian immigrants and was born and grew up in Virginia.526 He is reported to have expressed radical beliefs on several occasions during his Army career. In a 2007 presentation to Walter Reed physicians, Hasan said that the Army should allow Muslim soldiers to claim conscientious objector status to forgo fighting other Muslims. However, there is no record of disciplinary action having been taken by the U.S. Army nor did they ever consider him unfit for duty or a security threat. A Pentagon review found that officers failed to comply with applicable policies in Hasan’s career evaluations.527

(...continued)


524 The FN Five-seveN® single-action autoloading pistol is designed and manufactured in Belgium by FN Herstal. It fires the low-recoil 5.7x28mm cartridge.


The FBI discovered e-mail correspondence between Hasan and Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Imam accused of recruiting for Al Qaeda. Over the course of several months, Hasan sent 16 e-mails to Awlaki (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The e-mail exchange was assessed by investigators to be in line with the psychiatrist’s research into Muslim U.S. soldiers’ reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing him a hero but denying that he had incited Hasan.

David Headley—Plots to Attack Offices of Newspaper in Copenhagen and Support Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—October 2009

On March 18, 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty to numerous criminal charges including a plot to attack employees of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark; helping plan the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack; and providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a militant Pakistani Islamist group. As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors would not pursue the death penalty against him if he cooperates with law enforcement and intelligence officials.

Headley was born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington, DC, to a Pakistani father and an American mother. He reportedly changed his Muslim name to a Judeo-Christian name to hide his Muslim identity. Arrested in October 2009, Headley allegedly attended LeT terrorism training camps in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 and also conducted extensive surveillance for both the Copenhagen and Mumbai plots. In late 2005 a LeT handler and another LeT-linked individual conspired with Headley to have him perform advanced surveillance and scouting for the Mumbai attacks. The LeT personnel discussed the idea of opening an immigration office in Mumbai as cover for his scouting activities. Using the sham office as cover, between September 2006 and July 2008, Headley made five trips to the city, photographed and videotaped potential targets following the instructions of LeT. He also received an additional $3,000 and a GPS device from LeT. In November 2008, LeT attacked Mumbai targets killing 164 individuals.

Headley was also involved in a plot to attack the facilities of Danish newspaper, Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten. The plot involved attacking an editor and a cartoonist involved in the publication of controversial editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad which sparked protests throughout the Muslim world. Headley met with an LeT member in Pakistan in 2008 to discuss surveillance of the newspaper. In January 2009 he cased the newspaper and met with its editors.


representatives. In July and August 2009, he met in Europe with contacts of Ilyas Kashmiri, a member of a terrorist organization in Pakistan, to conduct additional surveillance.\textsuperscript{532}

Three others alleged to have collaborated with Headley have been charged by U.S. authorities in the Mumbai and Copenhagen plots:

- **Tahawwur Hussain Rana** is a Canadian citizen who immigrated from Pakistan, was trained as a physician, and resided in Chicago until his arrest in October 2009. According to Headley’s plea agreement, he shared with Rana—a longtime friend—details of his trips to Pakistan and his association with LeT.\textsuperscript{533} In turn, Rana helped Headley disguise his surveillance activity in India.\textsuperscript{534} Rana also provided cover for Headley’s reconnaissance work in Denmark.\textsuperscript{535} In June 2011, Rana was convicted of conspiracy in the Danish plot and for providing material support to LeT. However, he was acquitted of involvement in the Mumbai plot.\textsuperscript{536}

- **Ilyas Kashmiri** was killed in June 2011, reportedly in a missile strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle.\textsuperscript{537} He had been a leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami a terrorist organization in Pakistan and was believed to be in contact with Al Qaeda leaders. In February 2009, he allegedly met with Headley in Waziristan. He also purportedly reviewed Headley’s Denmark surveillance footage and suggested the use of a truck bomb. According to DOJ, he met with Headley again in May 2009 and directed him to link up with his operatives in Europe. He also advised cutting out LeT from the operation. LeT reportedly agreed.\textsuperscript{538} Kashmiri was charged in the plots.

- **Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed** is a retired major in the Pakistani military and is alleged to have coordinated Headley’s travel to Denmark and helped plan the attack. He connected Headley with Kashmiri.\textsuperscript{539} Like Kashmiri, Syed has been charged in the plot but is not in U.S. custody.

Apparently Headley’s life swung widely between the strictures of conservative Islam and the wide-open excesses of the West. Born in 1960 in Washington, DC, he is the son of a Pakistani father, Syed Saleem Gilani, who worked at the Pakistani Embassy. Headley’s mother, Serrill Headley, a Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania native, also worked at the embassy. Soon after David/Daoood was born, the family moved to Pakistan. But Serrill left Syed and Pakistan in 1968,
because she could not abide by their conservative views of married women. She returned to Philadelphia in the early 1970s and opened up a bar called Khyber Pass.

In 1977, after Pakistan suffered a military coup, Headley’s mother brought David/Daood back to the United States. He struggled to fit in, at times espousing extremist views while developing a heroin habit. In 1985, his mother made him manager of the bar she owned. He reportedly failed at this role and his mother was forced to sell the bar. That same year, he married a bartender whom he divorced in 1987 because of cultural differences. His wife at that time said that David/Daood was torn between two cultures—calling Indians “infidels,” for example. A Khyber Pass employee remembered him discussing infidels and Islam taking over the world. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nabbed him twice (1988 and 1997) on heroin smuggling charges, and he worked as an informant for them and served prison sentences.540

Tarek Mehanna—Plot to Assassinate Politicians and Attack Shopping Malls—October 2009

Tarek Mehanna, a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen,541 from the Boston suburb of Sudbury, MA, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on charges that he plotted to kill two prominent U.S. politicians and shoot people at American shopping malls. He was accused of conspiring with two other men—Ahmad Abousamra, a friend from childhood who authorities say is now in Syria, and an unnamed man who is reported to be cooperating with authorities.

Mehanna graduated from the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy in 2008 where his father is a professor. Mehanna and his co-conspirators were said to have found inspiration in the 2002 Washington, DC, sniper attacks.542 Mehanna taught math and religion at a Muslim school in Worcester, MA.543

Abousamra is the son of a physician who worked at Massachusetts General Hospital for 21 years and was president of the Islamic Center of New England before moving to the Detroit area in 2007. Abousamra was named in an FBI affidavit filed on October 21, 2009, in federal court in Boston as a conspirator with Mehanna, but was not charged. He allegedly fled to Syria three years ago after being questioned by the FBI. The FBI affidavit alleges Abousamra tried to join a terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, but was rejected by the Taliban because of a “lack of experience.”544


543 Denise Lavoie, October 21, 2009.

Much of the case against Mehanna involves material support to terrorism. According to DOJ, “Beginning in or about 2001, and continuing until in or about May 2008, Mehanna conspired with Ahmad Abousamra, and others to provide material support and resources for use in carrying out a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country and extraterritorial homicide of a U.S. national.” Specifically, the complaint affidavit alleges that Mehanna and co-conspirators discussed their desire to participate in violent jihad against American interests and that they would talk about fighting jihad and their desire to die on the battlefield. The complaint further alleges that the co-conspirators attempted to radicalize others and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and distributing jihadi videos.

At the time of his 2009 arrest Mehanna was free on bail from an earlier arrest that occurred in November 2008, at Logan International Airport in Boston. In the prior incident, he was charged with lying to federal investigators during a 2006 interview about his ties to Daniel Maldonado, who subsequently pled guilty to participating in terrorism training in Somalia. Maldonado is serving a 10-year prison sentence on that charge. According to the complaint affidavit, the conspirators had multiple conversations about obtaining automatic weapons and randomly shooting people in a shopping mall, and that the conversations went so far as to discuss the logistics of a mall attack, including coordination, weapons needed and the possibility of attacking emergency responders. It is alleged that the plan was ultimately abandoned, because of their inability to obtain the automatic weapons they deemed necessary to effectively carry out the attacks.

Hosam Smadi—Plot to Bomb a Dallas, Texas, Skyscraper—September 2009

On September 24, 2009, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian citizen who is reported to have remained in the United States illegally for one year after his visa expired, parked an SUV packed with what he thought were explosives outside Fountain Place, a 60-story office tower at Ross Avenue and Field Street in Dallas, TX. When Smadi dialed a cellphone that he thought would detonate the “truck bomb,” he was arrested by undercover FBI agents who had been posing as fellow anti-American terrorists.

The arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after an agent, monitoring an online extremist website, discovered Smadi espousing jihad against the United States. Smadi was charged on October 7, 2009, with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, reported that “The Criminal complaint alleges that Hosam Smadi sought and attempted to bomb the Fountain Place office tower, but a coordinated undercover law enforcement action was able to thwart his efforts and ensure no one...”

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545 U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2339A. For more information on this statute, see CRS Report R41333, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B, by Charles Doyle.
547 Ibid.
548 Murphy and Valencia, October 23, 2009.
549 DOJ, “Massachusetts Man.”
was harmed.”\textsuperscript{550} Undercover FBI agents, posing as members of an Al Qaeda “sleeper cell” were introduced to Smadi, who repeatedly indicated to them that he came to the U.S. for the specific purpose of committing “Jihad for the sake of God.” Smadi clarified that he was interested in “self-jihad” because it was “the best type of jihad.” The investigation determined Smadi was not associated with other terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{551}

DOJ also claims that “undercover FBI agents repeatedly encouraged Smadi to reevaluate his interpretation of jihad, counseling him that the obligation of jihad can be satisfied in many ways. Every time this interaction occurred, Smadi aggressively responded that he was going to commit significant, conspicuous acts of violence as his jihad.”\textsuperscript{552}

In late August 2009, while meeting with one of the undercover FBI agents in Dallas, authorities allege that

Smadi discussed the logistics and timing of the bombing, stating that he would have preferred to do the attack on “11 September,” but decided to wait until after the month of Ramadan, which ended on September 20, 2009. At the conclusion of the meeting, Smadi decided that a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) would be placed at the foundation of the Fountain Place office tower. Unbeknownst to Smadi, the FBI ensured the VBIED contained only an inert/inactive explosive device which contained no explosive materials.\textsuperscript{553}

Dallas Mayor Tom Leppert said local authorities were notified of the operation before it happened. “We were clearly communicated to that there was not going to be danger to anybody.”\textsuperscript{554}

On May 26, 2010, Smadi plead guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced on October 20, 2010, to 24 years in prison.\textsuperscript{555}

**Michael Finton—Plot to Bomb the Springfield, Illinois, Federal Building—September 2009**

On September 23, 2009, Michael C. Finton, who had converted to Islam and changed his name to Talib Islam, was arrested after he drove a van he thought was loaded with explosives—but was actually provided to him by the FBI—to the Paul Findley Federal Building in Springfield, IL. Prosecutors say he parked and locked the vehicle, then moved a few blocks away before twice making cell phone calls he believed would trigger a blast that would kill or injure people inside


\textsuperscript{551} Ibid

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid.


the building. In May 2011, he pled guilty to attempting to bomb the building and was sentenced
to 28 years in prison.556

Finton reportedly had converted to Islam while in an Illinois prison from 2001 to 2006, serving a
sentence for aggravated robbery and aggravated battery. He came to the attention of federal
authorities in August 2007 when a search of his vehicle turned up a letter about his dreams of
being a shahid, or martyr.

According to the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, “after his arrest it was
discovered that Finton had written a letter to John Walker Lindh, an American who was captured
fighting for the Taliban and is imprisoned on terrorism violations. In a January 2008 interview
with the FBI after his release from prison on a parole violation, Finton allegedly explained that he
idolized Lindh. The affidavit further alleges that, in March 2008, Finton received funds from an
individual in Saudi Arabia that he used to travel to Saudi Arabia the following month. He returned
to the United States in May 2008.”557

In February 2009, Finton was introduced to an undercover FBI special agent posing as a low-
level Al Qaeda operative. Finton expressed his desire to receive military training at a camp and to
fight in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, or other locations. The undercover agent told Finton
several times that it was Finton’s decision and that he could walk away from the decision
anytime. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated that he was excited and had no second
thoughts about attending a camp.”558

In the ensuing months, the affidavit alleges that Finton discussed possibly targeting locations in
the United States and ultimately suggested the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in
downtown Springfield as a primary target. He conducted surveillance of the building and
proposed a remotely detonated car bomb for the attack. Further, according to the affidavit, Finton
observed that U.S. Congressman Aaron Schock’s office, located at the corner of East Monroe and
6th Streets, would be a secondary target.559

On September 1, 2009, Finton met with the undercover FBI officer and was told the vehicle for
the attack would be carrying close to one ton of explosives. According to the affidavit, Finton
indicated an awareness that the bomb would cause civilian casualties, but expressed his view that
such casualties were justified. Unbeknownst to him, the FBI ensured that the vehicle for the
attack contained no actual explosive materials.560

556 DOJ Press Release, “Illinois Man Admits Plotting to Bomb Federal Courthouse and Is Sentenced to 28 Years in
Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees Vehicle Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid.
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid.
Najibullah Zazi—Plot to Bomb the New York City Subway—September 2009

Najibullah Zazi, a citizen of Afghanistan and a legal resident of the United States, has admitted that he plotted to bomb New York City subway trains in September 2009. Zazi told investigators that he and two friends planned to strap explosives to their bodies, board trains at the Grand Central and Times Square stations—two of the busiest in New York City—and explode their bombs during the crowded rush hour.\(^{561}\)

On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. There is no complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process, but there are details regarding his plot. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman Halimi—an Imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in the same Queens building.\(^{562}\) Zazi has admitted that he and others agreed to travel to Afghanistan to join Taliban forces. In August 2008, he and others flew from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan, and instead of training with the Taliban, Al Qaeda recruited and trained them in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda asked Zazi and his companions to return to the United States and engage in suicide operations.\(^{563}\)

While training, Zazi received instruction on explosives, discussed specific targets, and took detailed notes. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Colorado, taking a job driving a shuttle bus at Denver International Airport. Between July and early September, he and others purchased chemicals at beauty supply stores in Denver. Investigators suggest that Zazi used the same hotel suite twice to try and produce bomb-making chemicals using handwritten bomb making notes developed while in Pakistan to guide his production of triacetone triperoxide (TATP).\(^{564}\) He even supposedly called an individual for production guidance. In the hotel’s ventilation system, the FBI gathered residue from the chemicals Zazi had heated. Beauty store surveillance footage also recorded Zazi’s activities.\(^{565}\) He also searched the website of a Queens store that carried muriatic acid, which can be used to develop TATP.

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\(^{563}\) Ibid.

\(^{564}\) TATP (also known as acetone peroxide) has been used by suicide bombers in Israel, as a detonator by the thwarted “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, and as the explosive in the July 7, 2005 London public transport system bombings. TATP is relatively easy to make compared to other explosives. Although it is highly susceptible to heat, friction, and shock, it can be prepared in a basement lab using commercially available materials obtained from hardware stores, pharmacies, or stores selling cosmetics. See *GlobalSecurity.org*. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm, and Philippe Naughton, “TATP is suicide bombers’ weapon of choice,” *Times Online* (London), July 15, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article544334.ece.

On September 8, 2009, Zazi rented a car and departed for New York the next day. Upon arriving in New York City on September 10, Zazi’s car was stopped by Port Authority of New York Police at the behest of the FBI as he crossed the George Washington Bridge. It has been reported that to avoid tipping him off, the police pretended the stop was a random drug checkpoint. Authorities initially stated that they found nothing incriminating. However, court papers indicated that law enforcement subsequently found a laptop in the car containing an image of nine pages of handwritten notes on how to make and handle bombs. When FBI agents interviewed Zazi, he claimed that he drove to New York from Aurora, CO, to deal with an issue involving a coffee cart business his family operated in Manhattan. He then falsely stated he had never seen the notes. Zazi has subsequently admitted that he planned to finish bomb construction over the September 12-13 weekend, and then target New York’s subway lines on September 14, 15, or 16. However when he suspected that the police were on to him, he claimed he shut down the operation.

During this time, the NYPD was showing Zazi’s photograph to people in his old neighborhoods in Queens and, at one point, the police towed Zazi’s car. The New York Times reported that with their interest exposed, “law enforcement agents feared that some part of a plot they had not yet uncovered might be aborted and evidence destroyed. They moved fast, raiding four homes in Queens beginning late in the night on Sept. 20.” Zazi was arrested and charged on September 24, with one count of conspiring with others to use weapons of mass destruction, including bombs or other explosives.

Others arrested in this case are

- **Mohammed Wali Zazi**, Najibullah Zazi’s father, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested in the Fall of 2009 for lying to investigators. On February 1, 2010, he was indicted for conspiring to dispose of his son’s bomb-making materials and chemicals. In a new eight-count superseding indictment unsealed on November 29, 2010, he was also charged with obstruction of justice, witness tampering, making false statements, and visa fraud. In July 2011, the elder Zazi was found guilty in federal court on one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice and one count of obstruction of justice.

- **Ahmad Wais Afzali**, a Queens Imam, was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the FBI investigation. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New York law enforcement.

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568 Ibid.


570 Ibid. Zazi was originally arrested on the charge of making false statements to the FBI.


York City investigators in the past. On March 4, 2010, Afzali, pled guilty to lying to federal officials. He stated in court that he lied about a conversation he had with Zazi tipping him off to the FBI’s investigation. Afzali hoped to protect himself, not Zazi. Afzali claimed that during his phone conversation with Zazi, he simply cautioned him not to “get involved in Afghanistan garbage.” During sentencing on April 15, 2010, Afzali told the judge, “Honest to God, it was never my intention to help those idiots for what they do in the name of Islam.” On July 5, 2010, he left the United States as specified in his plea agreement. He may not return without special permission.

- **Naqib Jaji**, Zazi’s uncle, was secretly arrested in the case. In 2010, he pled guilty to obstructing justice in the investigation.

- **Zarein Ahmedzay** and **Adis Medunjanin**, who were classmates of Zazi’s at Flushing High School in Queens, NY, were also indicted in the case. They allegedly accompanied Zazi on a flight from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan, in late August 2008 where it is claimed they received military-style training from Al Qaeda. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin, both U.S. citizens, were charged in a five-count superseding indictment unsealed on February 25, 2010, with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property in the United States. Specifically, they are charged with conspiring with Zazi to conduct an attack on Manhattan subway lines that would have taken place on Sept. 14, 15, or 16, 2009. On April 23, 2010, Ahmedzay pled guilty to the charges. On August 6, 2010, Medunjanin pled not guilty to charges in the plot and an additional charge of “trying to take out another car in a desperate suicide bid on the Whitestone Expressway when authorities tried to arrest him in January 2010.”

- In March 2011, DOJ announced the unsealing of an indictment charging **Ferid Imam**—a Canadian citizen—with aiding in Zazi, Ahmedzay, and Medunjanin’s receipt of training from al Qaeda when the three men traveled to Pakistan in 2008.

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578 Dye, “Zazi’s Father.”
On July 7, 2010, DOJ announced the indictments of four additional men in the plot and revealed that it was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, and was related to a scheme by al-Qaeda plotters in Pakistan to use Western operatives to attack a target in the United Kingdom. The superseding indictment charged Adnan El Shukrijumah, Abid Naseer, Tariq Ur Rehman; and a defendant known as “Ahmad,” “Sohaib” or “Zahid” with several terrorism offenses.

It is alleged that the plot was organized by el-Shukrijumah and two others—Saleh al-Somali and Rashid Rauf, who were described as leaders of Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program dedicated to terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western countries. The Saudi-born, El-Shukrijumah, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has been sought for several years by U.S. authorities who have offered $5 million for information leading to his capture. Specifically he is alleged to have recruited Zazi and Zazi’s co-conspirators, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. Al-Somali and Rauf are believed to have been killed in U.S. drone attacks.

Abid Naseer, a British citizen, is alleged to have exchanged coded e-mails with the same account that “Ahmad” was using to communicate with the Zazi cell. He and Tariq Ur Rehman were arrested in Britain in April 2009. A search of their residences yielded large amounts of flour and oil in addition to surveillance photos and maps of public areas of Manchester, England.

Betim Kaziu—Plot to Join Foreign Jihadist Groups—August 2009

In July 2011, Betim Kaziu, a U.S. citizen from Brooklyn, NY, was convicted on charges related to his attempts to join Al Qaeda-linked groups. In February 2009, Kaziu and a friend named Sulejah Hadzovic (also a U.S. citizen and Brooklyn native) traveled to Cairo, Egypt, where they planned to link up with either al-Shabaab or other terrorist organizations operating in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Believing he had made a mistake, Hadzovic returned home and cooperated with federal officials. Kaziu journeyed to Kosovo where he was apprehended by the Kosovo Police Service in August 2009.

(...continued)


583 The indictment also includes charges related to Medunjanin’s attempt to cause an accident on the Whitestone Expressway, mentioned above.

584 Ibid.


Daniel Boyd and Others—Plot to Attack Quantico Marine Base and Conspiracy to Commit Murder Abroad—July 2009

In 2009, Daniel Patrick Boyd, members of his family, and others residing in North Carolina were charged with plotting to attack the U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, VA, and for providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder persons abroad.

On July 22, 2009, a federal grand jury in North Carolina indicted the following eight individuals, charging them with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad:

- **Daniel Patrick Boyd**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Hysen Sherifi**, a native of Kosovo and a U.S. legal permanent resident located in North Carolina;
- **Anes Subasic**, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Zakariya Boyd**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Dylan Boyd**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Ziyad Yaghi**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina; and
- **Jude Kenan Mohammad**, a U.S. citizen, believed to be in Pakistan.

The indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd is a veteran of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan who conspired with others to recruit and help young men travel overseas in order to kill.\(^{589}\)

According to the indictment, during the period from 1989 through 1992, Daniel Boyd traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received military-style training in terrorist training camps for the purpose of engaging in violent jihad. Following this training, he allegedly fought in Afghanistan. From roughly November 2006 through at least July 2009, the indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd and the other defendants conspired to provide material support and resources to terrorists, including currency, training, transportation, and personnel. The defendants also conspired to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad during this period. The object of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was to advance violent jihad, including supporting and participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping, or maiming persons abroad.\(^{590}\) The indictment also alleges that Daniel Boyd obtained a variety of weapons in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder persons overseas and provide material support to terrorists.

In a superseding indictment unsealed on September 24, 2009, additional charges were made against Boyd, his son Zakariya, and Hysen Sherifi. They are accused in a plot to attack the

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\(^{590}\) Ibid.
Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. Charges included conspiracy to murder U.S. military personnel, possession of weapons in furtherance of a crime of violence, and providing weapons to a convicted felon. The superseding indictment alleges, among other things, that as part of the conspiracy, Boyd undertook reconnaissance of the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, and obtained maps of the base in order to plan an attack. It also alleges that Boyd possessed armor piercing ammunition, stating it was “to attack the Americans.”

In an April 19, 2010, criminal complaint unsealed in June 2010, a ninth person, Bajram Asilani, was charged with being a member of the conspiracy involving the above defendants. He was arrested by authorities in Kosovo on June 17, 2010, at the request of the United States, which sought his extradition to Raleigh, NC, to stand trial. However, a Judge of the European Union Rule of Law Mission denied the extradition request, ruling that Kosovo does not have an extradition treaty with the United States.

In February 2011, Daniel Boyd pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons in a foreign country. In June 2011, Zakariya Boyd pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. In September 2011, Dylan Boyd pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting a conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.

Abdulhakim Muhammad—Shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas, Military Recruiting Center—June 1, 2009

On June 1, 2009, Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, that killed one soldier and wounded another. The police recovered from Muhammad’s sport utility vehicle (SUV) a Mossberg rifle with a scope and rifle sight, an SKS assault rifle, and a Lorcin L380 semiautomatic handgun. The Little Rock resident and Muslim convert who changed his name from Carlos Leon Bledsoe, was charged with capital murder, attempted capital murder, and 10 counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm. In

592 DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar.”
597 The Russian-designed Simonov SKS (Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova) is a gas operated, self-loading, semiautomatic rifle that fires the 7.62 mm cartridge.

Muhammad called the June 1, 2009, shooting another “Jihadi Attack.” “I wasn’t insane or post traumatic nor was I forced to do this Act,” he stated in a January 12, 2010, handwritten note to the presiding judge in his court case. In the letter, he claimed ties to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and dubbed himself a soldier for them. His father is a Memphis businessman who doubts that his son had ties to AQAP but could have been radicalized in Yemen.\footnote{601 Ibid.} His sister, who was stunned by the shooting, has stated publicly that a week before the shooting he seemed upbeat. In press reporting, his family has described Muhammad as a “happy-go-lucky” teen who had become a “deeply observant Muslim in college.”\footnote{602 James Dao, “A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial, and Many Questions,” New York Times, February 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html. Hereinafter: Dao, February 16, 2010.}

In seven handwritten letters he sent to the Memphis, TN, Commercial Appeal newspaper between May-October 2010, Muhammad provided insights into his motivation for the June 2009 shooting:

It’s a war against Islam and Muslims and I’m on the side of the Muslims point blank….The U.S. has to pay for the rape, murder, bloodshed, blasphemy it has done and still doing to the Muslims and Islam. So consider this a small retaliation the best to come Allah willing. This is not the first attack and won’t be the last.\footnote{603 Kristina Goetz, “Muslim Who Shot Soldier in Arkansas Says He Wanted to Cause More Death,” knoxnews.com, November 13, 2010, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/nov/13/muslim-who-shot-soldier-arkansas-says-he-wanted-ca/.
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Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While he was in the country, he married a woman from South Yemen. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic while there. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay, and he also supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa.\footnote{604 Ibid.} Yemen deported him to the United States in January 2009.\footnote{605 Dao, January 22, 2010.}

The FBI is reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in prison in Yemen and then again in Nashville soon after he returned.\footnote{606 See Dao, February 16, 2010; and Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen,” National Public Radio, June 8, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523.} According to law enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary inquiry by the FBI and other American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was inconclusive reportedly leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or place him under surveillance.\footnote{607 James Dao and David Johnson, “Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen,” New York Times, June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html.}
The Newburgh Four—Plot to Bomb Bronx, New York, Synagogue and Jewish Center, and Attack Stewart Air National Guard Base—May 2009

On May 20, 2009, the FBI and the NYPD arrested four men for plotting to blow up a Bronx synagogue and Jewish Center while simultaneously shooting a plane out of the sky. The men allegedly parked car bombs wired to cell phones outside the Riverdale Temple and nearby Riverdale Jewish Center in the Bronx. They were also heading to Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, NY. However, the explosives in the car bombs and Stinger missile they intended to use in the attack were phony. The explosives had been supplied by undercover agents posing as Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda. The four “were petty criminals who appeared to be acting alone, not in concert with any terrorist organization,” according to the New York City Police Commissioner.

The suspects were three U.S.-born citizens—James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta Williams (no relation to David)—and one Haitian immigrant, Laguerre Payen. At least three of the four were said to be jailhouse converts to Islam and were reportedly angry about the deaths of Muslims in Afghanistan.

An FBI cooperating witness played a key role in the quartet’s efforts to obtain the explosives and missile components for the planned attacks. According to the indictment in the case,609 the four defendants met with the cooperating witness repeatedly beginning in October 2008 and discussed attacking military aircraft at the Air National Guard base. Starting in April 2009, the four selected the synagogue, the Jewish community center, and the air base as targets. They cased their targets, taking photographs and developing plans. Together with the cooperating witness, they purchased cell phones and a handgun for the operation. The cooperating witness also helped them obtain three improvised explosive devices (IED) containing fake C-4 explosives and gave the group an inactive stinger missile, informing them that it came from Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group.

Some questioned whether the Newburgh Four were actually capable of pulling off the terrorist plot without the involvement of the cooperating witness, a Pakistani man named Shahed Hussain, who agreed to work for the FBI to obtain leniency after he was arrested in 2002 for fraud.612 One commentator has described the Newburgh Four as a group of struggling, disaffected petty criminals, who bonded at a Newburgh mosque over having spent time in prison and were taken in by a Pakistani immigrant looking to win leniency for a crime of his own. “There’s little doubt the bumbling would-be bombers went far enough with the plot to demonstrate that they had the

intention to commit terror, and for that they'll pay the price. But the whole tale comes off perhaps more as a sad glimpse into the lives of a loose group of aimless and obscurely embittered Americans than as a dire illustration of the threat of home-grown terrorism.”

Graham Ravman, writing in the *Village Voice*, suggests that the Newburgh Four were smalltime felons who had no grand terrorist ambitions until Hussain plied them with cash and suggestions. Moreover, this was not the first time [Hussain] went undercover to help the government. “He played a similar role four years ago in an Albany case, in which he helped the FBI arrest a man named Mohammed Hossain, a cash-poor pizzeria owner, and his Imam, Yassin Aref, after persuading them to launder $50,000 in a made-up plot to bring a missile to the United States and assassinate a Pakistani prime minister [the target of the invented plot was actually against the Pakistani United Nations Representative]…. In both cases, it is claimed that [Hussain] did not stumble upon active terror cells plotting to bring destruction on American soil [rather he] needed long periods of time to recruit his Muslim contacts, spin elaborate tales about his terror contacts, and develop solid plans of action, all the while providing the defendants with large amounts of resources and cash incentives.”

The trial of the four began on August 24, 2010. It had been delayed earlier in the summer by the federal judge in the case saying prosecutors had failed to turn over information that should have been given to the defense. In June 2010, prosecutors turned over to defense attorneys a 2008 memorandum from the FBI written by the lead agent on the case. The agent reportedly wrote that he had told officials at Stewart Airport that James Cromitie, the alleged leader of the Newburgh Four, would be looking over the airport for a potential attack but that he would pose no danger without the assistance of the informant. U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon said the memorandum should have been turned over to the defense months earlier.

Defense attorneys at the trial argued that the case crossed the line into entrapment. But the jury rejected the entrapment defense and convicted the four on October 18, 2010.

**Bryant Neal Vinas—Plot to Bomb Long Island Railroad, Rocket Attack on U.S. Base in Afghanistan—September 2008**

In a November 22, 2008, sealed indictment (unsealed on July 22, 2009), Bryant Vinas, an American Muslim convert who grew up on Long Island, NY, was charged with conspiracy to

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614 Ravman, July 8, 2009.


617 United States v. John Doe, Cr. No. 08-823, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, November 22, 2008, (continued...)
murder U.S. nationals, providing material support to Al Qaeda, and receiving military-type training from Al Qaeda. He pled guilty to all three counts on January 28, 2009.618

The charges stem from Vinas’ activities in Pakistan from his arrival in the Fall of 2007 until his arrest by Pakistani police in November 2008 following a tip provided by U.S. authorities. Vinas was subsequently extradited to the United States and has cooperated extensively with counterterrorism officials.619 Vinas has admitted that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses focused on weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or propelled weaponry.620 In September 2008, he took part in firing rockets at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan. He told officials, “Although we intended to hit the military base and kill American soldiers, I was informed the rockets missed and the attack failed.”621 Vinas also testified in court, “I consulted with a senior Al Qaeda leader and provided detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Railroad system, which I knew because I had ridden the railroad on so many occasions ... the purpose of providing information was to help plan a bomb attack on the Long Island Railroad system.”622 This led U.S. officials to issue a security alert in November 2008 and beefed up security on the New York area commuter rail system.623

The arrest of Vinas was kept secret until his indictment was unsealed in July 2009 probably because of the significance of the information he has provided to U.S. counterterrorism authorities. That information has reportedly helped U.S. forces target Al Qaeda camps with drone attacks and understand how Al Qaeda provides its members with training in assassinations, poison, kidnappings, forgery, and advanced bomb-making.624 Vinas has also submitted a witness statement that was entered into evidence in the trial of an alleged Belgian Al Qaeda cell in Brussels.625

Vinas is the son of immigrants from Peru and Argentina, who was raised as a Catholic and loved to play baseball. After 9/11, he joined the Army but was discharged before completing basic training. Reportedly dispirited after returning to Long Island, he met the relative of a friend who was a Muslim convert. Shortly thereafter, Vinas also converted. He eventually began visiting extremist websites and was reported to have become increasingly influenced by another religiously conservative acquaintance. One of the websites led Vinas to the Islamic Thinkers

(...continued)

621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
624 Ibid.
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Society, an extremist group in New York reportedly supportive of Al Qaeda. His deeply religious acquaintance was already a member and Vinas began to move within its circles.626

Mitch Silber, the director of intelligence analysis for the NYPD, has expressed the belief that “there has been an acceleration in radicalization in the United States.” He notes that “Vinas is almost a poster child for the process, the unremarkable nature of the people who might go through this process and frankly the potential to link up with Al Qaeda and the danger that presents.”627

Vinas is reported to be in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service at an undisclosed location in the state of New York.628

Plot to Bomb Jet Fuel Artery at Kennedy International Airport in New York—June 2007

On June 2, 2007, authorities announced they had broken up a plot by four men to blow up a jet fuel artery that runs through residential neighborhoods to the JFK Airport in New York. Russell Defreitas, a U.S. citizen originally from Guyana, was arrested as the ring leader of the plot. Defreitas had worked as a cargo handler at JFK until 1995, but was described as hapless and episodically homeless and whom friends say supported himself by selling incense on street corners and collecting welfare.629 According to court documents filed on January 5, 2010, Defreitas allegedly admitted to being the “brain of everything.”630

The others charged in the plot are Abdul Kadir, a citizen of Guyana and former member of its parliament, Kareem Ibrahim, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago; and Abdel Nur, a citizen of Guyana.631 The latter three were arrested in Trinidad and eventually extradited to the United States in June 2008. All four were indicted with conspiracy to cause death, serious bodily injury and extensive destruction.632

The FBI said the alleged plot never got beyond the planning stages633 and there is some dispute over how serious any attack against the 40-mile pipeline would have been. The pipeline originates in Linden, NJ, crosses Staten Island, and goes underwater to Brooklyn traveling mostly

626 Ibid.
627 Ibid.
632 “Four indicted in terror plot to blow up JFK airport,” Newsday, June 29, 2007.
along the Long Island Rail Road right-of-way to the airport. Because of their thickness and safeguards, such pipelines are difficult to damage, an official said.  

However, at a news conference announcing the arrests, U.S. Attorney, Roslynn Mauskopf called it “one of the most chilling plots imaginable. Had the plot been carried out, it could have resulted in unfathomable damage, deaths and destruction.”  

But safety experts have criticized the government’s description of the plot’s danger. John Goglia, a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board, describes the plot as a “fantasy,” saying, “You could definitely reach the tank, definitely start a fire, but to get the kind of explosion they were thinking they were going to get … this is virtually impossible to do.”  

The Washington Post reported that the alleged conspirators were initially detected via information gathered by the CIA in South America and the Caribbean. That led federal and local authorities in the New York region to launch a 16-month sting operation focused on the activities of Defreitas. According to the complaint filed in the case, Defreitas conducted surveillance of the airport four times in January, focusing on fuel tanks, noting security precautions and reviewing an escape plan.  

Defreitas was apparently unaware that one of the plotters with him much of the time was a law enforcement informant who recorded much of what he said. It has been reported that Defreitas said in one recorded conversation, “Any time you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the United States…. To hit John F. Kennedy, wow … they love John F. Kennedy like he’s the man … if you hit that, this whole country will be mourning. You can kill the man twice.”  

According to The Smoking Gun, which obtained and posted on its website a copy of the criminal complaint in the case, a paid “confidential source” was credited with infiltrating the terror cell and gathering critical information on the alleged plot—via tape recordings, documents, videos, and photographs. The government informant is a longtime New York City drug trafficker who began cooperating with federal investigators after NYPD detectives arrested him on a Bronx street and charged him with possession of about $2 million in cocaine. A footnote in the criminal complaint notes that the source had two prior drug convictions and was, through his cooperation, seeking leniency in sentencing on the drug trafficking charge.  

In opening arguments for the July 2010 trial of two of the defendants—Defreitas and Kadir—Defreitas’ attorney accused prosecutors of being “overzealous.” The government, he said, took a “poor lonely, bitter old man that talked big game,” and, through an informant, nudged him into incriminating himself. “Without the government, Russell Defreitas is nothing. His words were ‘all

sizzle and no steak.” After five days of deliberation, however, the jury convicted both men of five counts of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism.

In December 2010, Kadir received a life sentence for his involvement in the plot. In February 2011, Defreitas was also sentenced to life in prison. Nur, who had pled guilty to a separate charge of material support to terrorism, received a 15-year sentence in January 2011. Kareem Ibrahim, was tried separately and was convicted of involvement in the conspiracy. He awaits sentencing.

### Plot to Attack Soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey—May 2007

Six men were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder. Four received life sentences without parole and the other received a 33-year sentence. A sixth man pled guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. As far as is known, the group had no connection to any foreign terrorist organization.

The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The investigation began in January 2006 with a tip from an electronics store clerk in Mount Laurel, PA. Two men dropped off an 8-millimeter tape and wanted it converted to a DVD. The tape showed the defendants firing rifles and shouting Islamic battle cries. The clerk called police. FBI agents and two paid informants who had criminal records spent the next 15 months shadowing the suspects, recording conversations and searching their computers. During the investigation, authorities recorded hundreds of conversations with the defendants with help from the two informants.

The plotters and verdicts in their cases:


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• **Dritan “Tony” Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.\(^{645}\)

• **Eljvir Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, not guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy and guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.\(^{646}\)

• **Shain Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.\(^{647}\)

• **Serdar Tatar**, a Turkish-born legal permanent resident of the United States. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel and not guilty of attempted murder. Sentenced to 33 years in prison.\(^{648}\)

• **Agron Abdullahu**, a Kosovo-Albanian who arrived with his family as a refugee from Kosovo (ironically, first arriving in the United States at a refugee center at Fort Dix). He was charged with letting the brothers Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka shoot various weapons at a firing range in Pennsylvania. The indictment states that the weapons used were an SKS semi automatic rifle, a Baretta Storm semi automatic rifle, a Mossberg 12-gauge pump and a 9mm Baretta handgun. These were all firearms that Abdullahu owned legally. However, it is a crime for illegal immigrants like the Duka brothers to possess guns. He pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced March 31, 2008, to 20 months in prison.\(^{649}\)

**Daniel Maldonado—Training with Al Qaeda in Somalia—February 2007**

An indictment unsealed on February 14, 2007, charged Daniel Joseph Maldonado with receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device outside the United States. According to a Justice Department official, “This case represents the first

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\(^{645}\) Ibid.

\(^{646}\) Ibid.

\(^{647}\) Ibid.


criminal prosecution of an American suspected of joining forces with Islamic extremist fighters in Somalia.”

Maldonado had been captured by the Kenyan military on January 21, 2007, as he fled into Kenya to avoid Ethiopian and Somali forces. He was turned over to American authorities the following month. On April 19, 2007, Maldonado pled guilty to receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization in exchange for prosecutors agreeing not to file any more federal charges against him. In June 2007, Maldonado was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

According to DOJ, Maldonado admitted that in November 2005 he had traveled from Houston, TX, to Africa, eventually making it to Somalia in December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and elements of Al Qaeda to fight “jihad” against the Somali Transitional Federal Government. While in Somalia, authorities say Maldonado was provided an AK-47, equipped with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms and explosives training all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were present at the training camps. The ICU and Al Qaeda worked together to train fighters in the camps to fight jihad to establish an independent Islamic state in Somalia.

The criminal complaint in the case alleges that Maldonado admitted that while training at camps in Somalia, he watched and learned techniques for manufacturing small explosive devices. He also admitted to participating in the interrogation of a spy who was later killed—a flight attendant who had a cell phone camera and was observed taking pictures of jihadis as they arrived by airplane in Kismaayo, Somalia. Maldonado also admitted that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.

Derrick Shareef—Plot to Attack Shopping Mall in Rockford, Illinois—December 2006

On December 6, 2006, Derrick Shareef, an American Muslim convert, was arrested in Rockford, IL, after he attempted to swap two stereo speakers for four (non-functioning) hand grenades, a

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653 Following the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990’s, a group of Sharia Courts functioned as quasi-governmental entities. In the late 1990’s, they united to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Until the end of 2006, they controlled most of southern Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu. In December 2006, they lost several battles and were driven from Mogadishu by Somali forces supporting the TFG and the Ethiopian army which intervened to support the TFG against the ICU. Hardline Islamists broke ranks from the ICU and formed other militant groups, such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, to continue the war against the government. The less-militant members of the ICU went into exile.


9mm handgun, and several rounds of (non-functioning) ammunition with an undercover FBI agent posing as a weapons dealer. Prior to his arrest, Shareef had plotted to set off hand grenades in a garbage can at the CherryVale Shopping Mall near Rockford on the Friday before Christmas 2006. Shareef was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against persons and property and with attempting to maliciously damage and destroy, by means of fire and an explosive, a building and real and personal property used in interstate commerce.656

The case began in September 2006, when the FBI assigned a cooperating witness, William “Jamaal” Chrisman, to befriend Shareef. Chrisman had converted to Islam in prison where he served time for armed robbery and car theft convictions.657 Chrisman claimed that he decided to help the government because “after 9/11 Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said that it was incumbent on Muslims to stop terrorists.”658 They met at the video store where Shareef was working and hours later moved into Chrisman’s home. According to Chrisman, “He was supposed to move in with his manager. I told him he was better off staying with me, a Muslim staying with a Muslim.”659

Shareef was unaware that Chrisman was secretly recording their conversations which included his confiding to Chrisman that he wanted to commit acts of violent jihad against civilians. Shareef also discussed shooting a judge in DeKalb, IL, and attacking local buildings including city hall, the federal courthouse and the shopping center.660 Shareef also told Chrisman that he wanted to obtain weapons to commit violent jihad. Chrisman said he had a friend who could do so and would introduce them. However, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.661

On November 30, and December 1, 2006, Shareef and Chrisman cased the CherryVale mall and allegedly plotted a grenade attack. The following day, Shareef and Chrisman made video tapes that included a last will and testament for each. On the video, Shareef again mentioned jihad and said, “This is a warning to those who disbelieve, that we are here for you and I am ready to give my life.”662 On December 6, 2006, Shareef and the undercover agent met in the mall parking lot to exchange the speakers for four dud grenades and the handgun and ammunition. After the exchange, Shareef was arrested.

During an FBI interview on December 7, 2006, Shareef told FBI agents that he had been “pushing himself to conduct the attack on the mall” and that “no one could have stopped” him, “not even his mother.” He believed “it was the right jihad.” But he also told the agents that he

659 Ibid.
662 Thomas and Ryan, December 8, 2006.
“viewed his arrest by the FBI as a blessing from Allah because the FBI stopped him from doing something that Allah would have chastised him for.” Aware that “he does not have the authority to speak on behalf of Islam,” Shareef asserted that he would “rather spend the rest of his life in jail than live with the torment of having killed innocent people and having acted against Allah’s desires.”

On November 28, 2007, Shareef pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced on September 30, 2008, to 35 years in prison.

**Houston Taliban Plot—November 2006**

In November 2006, the government alleged that four men—Kobie Diallo Williams, an American Muslim convert; and three foreign national students, Adnan Baber Mirza, Syed Maaz Shah, and Shiraz Syed Qazi—conspired to support the Taliban, unlawfully possess firearms, and to train with firearms to prepare to join the Taliban “to engage in battlefield jihad.” Specifically they were accused of meeting at shooting ranges and camp sites in Texas on at least eight occasions in 2005 and 2006 “for the purpose of conducting firearms and paramilitary training to hone their skills with weapons and to assist fighters engaging United States forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.” They were also accused of making a contribution of goods and services to the Taliban.

The government used two informants to build the case against the four. One of the informants told federal agents he was concerned that some of the men were preparing for armed conflict overseas. A 2005 camping trip was part of a government setup using the informants to catch the men.

- **Kobie Diallo Williams**, a former University of Houston student, pled guilty soon after his arrest to conspiring to unlawfully possess firearms and supporting the Taliban. On August 7, 2009, he was sentenced to 4-1/2 years in prison.
- **Syed Maaz Shah**, a Pakistani national studying at the University of Texas, Dallas, was convicted on May 24, 2007, on firearms charges, was sentenced to six years in prison, and will be deported after he has served his sentence.
- **Shiraz Syed Qazi**, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston Community College, was convicted on January 21, 2007, on a firearms charge.

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667 Ibid.

and sentenced to 10 months in prison. He was released in September 2007 after credit for time served.  

- **Adnan Baber Mirza**, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston Community College but had overstayed his student visa, was convicted on May 27, 2010, of two conspiracy counts and seven firearms violations. He faces up to five years in prison on each conspiracy count and 10 years on the weapons counts when he is sentenced.

### The Liberty City Seven—Plot to Bomb Sears Tower in Chicago—June 2006

On June 22, 2006, seven men—Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine—were arrested for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Five of the men are U.S. citizens, Abraham is a legal permanent resident from Haiti, and Lemorin is a Haitian national illegally present in the United States. Each were charged with four counts: conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization, namely Al Qaeda; conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists; conspiracy to maliciously damage and destroy buildings by means of an explosive device; and conspiracy to levy war against the government of the United States.

The indictment alleges that Batiste intended to recruit and supervise individuals to organize and train for a mission of war against the United States, which included a plot to destroy by explosives the Sears Tower in Chicago, IL.  

It also alleges that Batiste and his co-conspirators attempted to obtain the support of Al Qaeda for their plot. The indictment further alleges that Batiste detailed (to an FBI informant posing as an ‘Al Qaeda representative’) “his mission to wage a ‘full ground war’ against the United States in order to ‘kill all the devils we can,’ in a mission that would ‘be just as good or better than 9/11,’ beginning with the destruction of the Sears Tower.”

The arrests resulted from an investigation involving two FBI informants and recordings and videotapes of the conspirators discussing their plot. The Washington Post cites court papers that indicate that one of the informants took a key role in the plotting. “Not only did government informants provide money and a meeting place for Batiste and his followers, but they also gave them video cameras for conducting surveillance, as well as cell phones, and suggested that their

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669 ADL, May 27, 2010.


673 Ibid, p.4.

674 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
first target be a Miami FBI office. Both informants were paid for their services and one was given approval of his petition for political asylum in the United States.

Defense attorneys for the Liberty City Seven men called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming they had neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes. In 2007, the jury in the first trial of the defendants acquitted Lygelson Lemorin of all charges, but could not reach a verdict on the others. Lemorin was subsequently taken into immigration custody and was ordered deported in 2009. A second trial was held in 2008 and again the jury failed to reach verdicts against the six remaining defendants.

A third trial was held in 2009. The jury in that trial acquitted Naudimar Herrera of all charges, but convicted alleged ringleader Narseal Batiste on all four counts; Patrick Abraham on three counts; and Stanley Grant Phanor, Burson Augustin, and Rotschild Augustine on two counts each. In November 2009, Narseal Batiste was sentenced to 13-1/2 years in prison. Burson Augustin and Rotschild Augustine were sentenced to six and seven years, respectively. Stanley Phanor and Patrick Abraham were sentenced to eight and nine years, respectively. In November 2011, a federal appeals court upheld the convictions of all five men.

**Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed—Plot to Attack Buildings in Washington, DC—April 2006**

Two men living in Atlanta, GA—Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, were charged in April 2006 with conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and lying to the FBI. Prosecutors alleged that in 2005, when Ahmed and Sadequee were ages 18 and 20 respectively, they discussed violent jihad on several web forums which later grew into an active conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Specifically, they were accused of traveling to Canada to discuss potential terrorist targets with members of the “Toronto 18,” a group alleged by the government of Canada to be members of an Islamic terrorist cell that had plotted a series of attacks against targets in Ontario until their arrests in June 2006.

According to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service informant, the two Americans also discussed with the group whether they would be able to hide in Canada if they were to carry out attacks in the United States. Sadequee and Ahmed were also alleged to have videotaped

675 Pincus, September 2, 2006.
potential targets in the Washington, DC, area including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank headquarters, the Masonic Temple, and a fuel farm. Later, Sadequee sent several of the videos to Younis Tsouli, a propagandist and recruiter for Al Qaeda and Asbid Hussein Khan, a facilitator for Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of whom are serving prison sentences in Great Britain for terrorism-related offenses.683

The two men pled not guilty to the charges, but were convicted in separate trials in August 2009. In December, Sadequee was sentenced to 17 years and Ahmed to 13 years in prison.684

Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar—Attempted Vehicular Murder at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill—March 2006

On March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck several people, although none were injured seriously. Taheri-Azar was charged the next day with nine counts of attempted murder.

It was reported that police found a letter in Taheri-Azar’s apartment that said he wanted revenge for the deaths of Muslims overseas that he said were caused by the United States. He said he rented a Jeep Cherokee because it was better equipped for what he planned to do.685 The chief of the University’s police department confirmed that Taheri-Azar told investigators that he wanted to “avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world.”686

Taheri-Azar pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. On August 26, 2008, he was sentenced to 33 years in prison.687

Toledo, Ohio Plotters—Travel Abroad to Kill Americans—February 2006

On February 21, 2006, three residents of Toledo, OH—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and Wassim I. Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon, were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq.688 The indictment alleges several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. These acts included meeting another individual called “the trainer” (who was actually (...continued)
an undercover informant) to discuss and plan violent jihadist training. Following those meetings, the informant engaged in an instructional session on the construction and use of improvised explosive devices and timing devices, sought explosives, and participated in weapons training and practiced target shooting on several occasions.\footnote{Ibid, p. 4.}

During a news conference announcing the charges, the agent in charge of the FBI’s Cleveland office credited the Muslim and Arab American community for passing along the information that ultimately led to the arrest of the three. He said individuals within Toledo’s Muslim community contacted the FBI about what he termed the “violent and radical views” the suspects were articulating.\footnote{“Toledo’s Arab Community Called “Crucial” to Terrorism Investigation,” wtol.com, February 21, 2006, http://www.wtol.com/Global/story.asp?S=4533250.}

On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and providing material support to terrorists. On October 21, 2009, Amawi was sentenced to 20 years in prison, El-Hindi to 12 years in prison, and Mazloum to 8 years, 4 months in prison.\footnote{Anti Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” adl.org, October 21, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.}

Two cousins from Illinois, \textbf{Zubair Ahmed} and \textbf{Khaleel Ahmed}, who had connections to the three Toledo men, pled guilty on January 15, 2009, to one count of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to terrorists. It was alleged that Marwan Othman El-Hindi introduced the two men to the undercover informant known as “the trainer.” During this meeting, the cousins allegedly discussed sniper tactics and surveillance techniques, and said they were willing to travel abroad to carry out terror attacks.\footnote{Anti Defamation League, “Chicago Cousins Plead Guilty in Terrorism Case,” adl.org, January 26, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/ahmed_cousins_guilty.htm.} In 2004, both had traveled to Cairo hoping to eventually go to Afghanistan or Iraq, but returned home after Zubair’s father, Haris Ahmed, learned of their intentions. On July 12, 2010, Zubair Ahmed was sentenced to 10 years in prison, while Khaleel Ahmed received an 8-year, 4-month sentence.\footnote{Richard A. Serrano, “Cousins Sentence in Ohio on Terrorism Charges,” latimes.com, July 12, 2010, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/se-sc-0713-ohio-terror.-20100712,0,6294758.print.story.}

\textbf{Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Plot to Attack Targets in Southern California—August 2005}

Kevin James, Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, and Hammad Riaz Samana, were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their involvement in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport, U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.\footnote{Anti-Defamation League, “Two Sentenced in Los Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions,” adl.com, August 24, 2008, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm.}
Kevin James, the apparent leader of the terror cell, pled guilty to conspiring to levy war against the United States and was sentenced on March 6, 2009, to 16 years in prison.  

Levar Washington pled guilty to levy war against the United States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 22 years in prison. He was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison on August 25, 2008, on related robbery and weapons charges.  

Gregory Patterson pled guilty to conspiracy to levy war against the United States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.  

Hammad Samana, a legal U.S. resident from Pakistan, conducted Internet-based research of the targets and was the getaway driver for at least one of the gas station robberies (see below), according to a U.S. federal judge. He was later convicted and sentenced in August 2009 to 70 months in prison.

In 1997, James founded Jam‘iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Arabic for Assembly of Authentic Islam—a group based on his interpretation of Islam, according to court documents. James’ views are apparent in several documents he wrote in prison, including a 104-page document titled the JIS Protocol. In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the U.S. and describes “Jihad [as] the only true ‘anti-terrorist action’ [,] a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism.” The document also advocated the killing of “lawful targets,” including non-Muslims.

James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at Los Angeles International Airport, and a fourth defendant, Hammad Riaz Samana, at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as “mujahideen,” according to court documents.

According to the indictment, in July 2005, the men engaged in firearms training and physical training at a park in Los Angeles in preparation for the attacks. In addition, the defendants purchased weapons or otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist conspiracy and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations. The indictment alleges that eleven times beginning on May 30, 2005, the defendants—armed with shotguns—robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in several cities and towns in Southern California, including Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista, and Fullerton.

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695 Ibid.  
696 Ibid.  
697 Ibid.  
698 Ibid.  
699 Ibid.  
700 Ibid.  
701 Ibid.
Part of the funds obtained in these robberies was directly linked by the FBI to Patterson’s purchase of a .223 caliber rifle. The men were arrested by the Torrance police after Patterson dropped his cell phone at the scene of one of the robberies in July 2005. Police were able to connect the robberies to the larger terror plot after authorities searched Washington and Patterson’s apartment and discovered various Jihadist documents.\textsuperscript{702}

**Lodi, California, Case—The Hayats—Travel to Terrorist Training Camp—June 2005**

In Lodi, CA, \textbf{Umer Hayat} and \textbf{Hamid Hayat}, a Pakistani immigrant and his American son, were arrested on June 5, 2005, after allegedly lying to the FBI about the son’s attendance at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The son, Hamid Hayat was found guilty on April 25, 2006, of one count of providing material support or resources to terrorists, and three counts of making false statements to the FBI in matters related to international/domestic terrorism.

Prosecutors alleged that between October 2003 and November, 2004, Hayat attended a jihadi training camp in Pakistan and ultimately returned to the United States with the intent to wage violent jihad upon receipt of orders.\textsuperscript{703} Hayat confessed to FBI agents that he had attended a terrorist training camp but his attorneys later argued that his admissions were fabrications intended to appease the federal agents he hoped would let him go home. The nine-week trial was reported to rely on that contested confession and conversations secretly taped by an FBI informant who had been paid $200,000 to infiltrate Lodi’s large Muslim community after the 9/11 attacks.\textsuperscript{704}

DOJ issued a press release stating:

> According to evidence adduced at trial, between March, 2003 and August, 2003, defendant Hayat, during the course of numerous recorded conversations with a cooperating witness, pledged his belief in [violent] jihad, indicated that jihad was the duty of every Muslim, indicated that he had knowledge of jihadi camps including Jaish-e-Muhammed camps in the Balakot/Manshehar area, pledged to go to a jihadi training camp, and indicated that he, in fact, was going to jihadi training after Ramadan in 2003 (which was to occur at the end of November, 2003).\textsuperscript{705}

In his closing comments to the jury, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated: “Hamid Hayat had a jihadi heart and a jihadi mind.”\textsuperscript{706} In interviews, several jurors said Hayat’s confession and evidence of what the jury foreman called “un-Americanism” convinced them that he posed a danger.\textsuperscript{707} In September 2006, Hamid Hayat was sentenced to 24 years in prison.

\textsuperscript{702} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{706} Bailey, September 11, 2007.

\textsuperscript{707} Ibid.
Umer Hayat, Hamid’s father, was tried by a separate federal jury in early 2006 for two counts of making false statements to the FBI about having first-hand knowledge of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and that his son had attended a jihadist training camp in Pakistan. That proceeding ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Umer Hayat later pled guilty to making a false statement to the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection about his attempt to carry $28,000 into Pakistan. He was sentenced to time served.\(^{708}\)

**Albany, New York, Mosque Plot—August 2004**

Two Albany, NY, residents, **Yassin M. Aref**, an Imam at the Masjid As Salam mosque in the city, and **Mohammed Mosharref Hossain**, a pizzeria owner, were convicted of conspiring to aid a terrorist group and provide support for a weapon of mass destruction, as well as money-laundering and supporting a foreign terrorist organization. They were sentenced to 15 years in prison. Aref is a refugee from Iraqi Kurdistan and Hossain is an immigrant from Bangladesh who has lived in the United States for over two decades.

The case was the result of a sting operation by the FBI which had been watching the Masjid As Salam mosque since 2002 after one of its founders had been deported following the 9/11 attacks. The FBI had an undercover informant befriend Hossain, a member of the mosque who was reported to be having financial problems with his pizza business. The informant was a Pakistani immigrant facing a long prison sentence and deportation after he had pled guilty to one felony count of engaging in the production and transfer of false government identification documents. After a period of time, Hossain asked the informant for a loan. The informant proposed a scheme to launder through Hossain’s pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan’s United Nation’s envoy.\(^{709}\)

According to court records, the Kurdish Imam, Yassan Aref, was not approached by the informant. Rather, Aref was enlisted by Hossain to witness the transactions under Muslim tradition.\(^{710}\) However, federal authorities admitted that Aref was the “ultimate target” of the sting operation. Two months after the sting began, American military forces found Aref’s name and phone number in a notebook at a bombed out encampment in Iraq that the government contended was occupied by “terrorists.”\(^{711}\) The notebook was said to contain a reference in the Kurdish language to Aref as “commander” which led prosecutors to believe that Aref might be connected to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. It was also cited by the judge in the case as grounds for denying bail to the defendants.\(^{712}\)

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Later, however, federal prosecutors admitted to making an error and acknowledged that the word in question could be translated as “brother,” rather than “commander.” The U.S. attorney for the Northern District of New York was quoted as saying that the translation discrepancy was not terribly significant. He said the heart of the case had to do with Mr. Aref’s and Mr. Hossain’s failure to turn away from the fake plot even after they knew the intentions of the government informer.713

Aref and Hossain were arrested on August 5, 2004, on a 19-count indictment charging them with money laundering. The government subsequently added more charges, including allegations the men conspired to provide material support to a Pakistani terrorist group.714

The case was not without controversy. Aref and Hossain maintained their innocence throughout their trials. Defense attorneys claimed the two were entrapped. Pakistan angrily protested to Washington over the FBI sting operation describing it as “a bizarre mission.”715 Albany’s two main daily newspapers—the Albany Times Union and the Schenectady Daily Gazette—ran editorials at the time of the sentencing asking for extreme leniency.716 Two of the columnists who had followed the trial closely were also very critical of the prosecution.717 And several inmates at the Rensselaer County Jail, where Aref and Hossain were being held, wrote letters to the judge in the case vouching for the defendants’ good character and benign influence.718

After the indictment, an article in The New York Times quoted government officials as saying that Aref’s case resulted from evidence gathered by the warrantless National Security Agency domestic wiretapping program. On January 5, 2006, defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment as the fruit of illegal surveillance.719 The district court denied that motion in a sealed ex parte opinion based on a sealed ex parte submission by the government. In July 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York affirmed the district court’s ruling.

Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay—Plot to Bomb Herald Square Subway Station in New York City—August 2004

Days before the 2004 Republican National Convention, which was held in New York City, James Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, and Shahawar Matin Siraj, a Pakistani immigrant, were arrested for plotting to bomb the Herald Square subway station in New York City. The station, near Madison Square Garden, is the third busiest in the city’s transit system. The investigation was largely

713 Ibid.
714 Lyons, January 5, 2006.
716 The FBI responded by running an op-ed piece in the Daily Gazette upholding the sting operation as legitimate.
conducted by the NYPD’s Intelligence Division which used a paid informant, Osama Eldawoody, an Egyptian-born nuclear engineer. Eldawoody testified that he volunteered to troll the city’s mosques and Muslim communities out of patriotism and a desire to show that violent extremists are the exception rather than the rule in Islam.\(^{720}\) Prosecutors at the Siraj’s trial played tapes secretly recorded by Eldawoody in which Siraj discusses the plot to bomb the subway station “at length and with great zeal.”\(^{721}\)

James Elshafay immediately agreed to cooperate with the government and pled guilty to involvement in the plot. Elshafay testified against Siraj at the latter’s trial. He acknowledged taking medication for depression and schizophrenia and described the delusions that landed him in a psychiatric ward just months before he conspired with Siraj to bomb the subway station.\(^{722}\) Elshafay was sentenced to five years in prison.

Siraj rejected a plea agreement and went to trial. His attorneys argued that he was entrapped by the police informant, Osama Eldawoody. They also attacked the credibility of the informant on the grounds that he was paid a total of $100,000 by the police. However, prosecutors called an undercover detective who testified that he had had frequent conversations with Siraj long before he met Eldawoody. “The conversations, the detective said, were filled with Mr. Siraj’s approval of suicide bombings and Osama bin Laden.”\(^{723}\) The jury rejected the defense argument of entrapment and convicted Siraj on four counts of conspiracy, including plotting to bomb a public transportation system. He was sentenced in January 2007 to 30 years in prison.

**Iyman Faris—Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge—June 2003**

Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir, Pakistan, and living in Columbus, OH, pled guilty on May 1, 2003, to casing the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City for Al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to Al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets. According to DOJ, “Faris admitted that in April 2002, he researched “gas cutters”—the equipment for severing bridge suspension cables—and the New York City bridge on the Internet. Between April 2002 and March 2003, he sent several coded messages indicating he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the necessary equipment. Faris admitted to traveling to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge, and said he concluded that the plot to destroy the bridge by severing cables was unlikely to succeed because of the bridge’s security and structure. In early 2003, he sent a message that “the weather is too hot”—a coded message indicating that the bridge plot was unlikely to succeed.\(^{724}\) He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

*Time Magazine* reports that government officials were led to Faris by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the high-ranking Al Qaeda operative and alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks who is in U.S. custody. Reportedly, after Mohammed’s capture in Pakistan, agents discovered the coded, “the weather is too hot” e-mail sent from the U.S. to one of his associates. The e-mail was

\(^{722}\) Ibid.  
one of the factors that helped investigators pull Faris’ name out of Mohammed during his interrogations by U.S. authorities. Faris was then secretly detained two weeks later. Faris acknowledged that he wrote the e-mail and was referring to the impossibility of an Al Qaeda plot to bring down the sturdy, well-guarded Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its suspension cables.\footnote{Daniel Eisenberg, et al., “The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man,” \textit{Time Magazine}, June 30, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1005104,00.html.}

Sometime in March 2003, according to DOJ officials, FBI agents persuaded Faris to cooperate with the government. \textit{Time Magazine} quotes law-enforcement officials who say that he was brought to a safe house in Virginia. “Faris sent messages to his bosses via cell phone and e-mail. ‘He was sitting in the safe house making calls for us,’ says a senior Administration official. ‘It was a huge triumph for law enforcement.’”\footnote{Ibid.}

\section*{Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—Plot to Assassinate President Bush—June 2003}

Abu Ali, an American-born Muslim raised in Northern Virginia, was convicted on November 22, 2005, on nine terrorism charges, including conspiracy to assassinate President George W. Bush, conspiracy to commit air piracy, and providing material support to Al Qaeda. Ali was originally arrested by Saudi Arabian authorities in June 2003, while he was studying at the Islamic University of Medina.\footnote{Larry Abramson, “Jury Finds Abu Ali Guilty on Terrorism Charges,” \textit{National Public Radio}, November 22, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5024013. Hereinafter: Abramson, \textit{National Public Radio}, November 22, 2005.} The arrest came one month after an Al Qaeda attack on three residential compounds in Riyadh had killed 27 foreign workers. He was held in Saudi custody for 20 months without charges or access to an attorney. U.S. officials did not request extradition; however, FBI agents participated in some of the interrogations.\footnote{Spencer Ackerman, “Suspect Policy,” \textit{The New Republic}, March 14, 2005, http://www.tnr.com/article/suspect-policy-0.}


The government’s case against Abu Ali was based primarily on evidence gathered by Saudi authorities which included a videotaped confession. Although the assassination and hijacking plots never got past the talking stage, it was alleged that between September 2002 and June 2003, Abu Ali had met with several unnamed co-conspirators, two of whom were later revealed to be leaders of an Al Qaeda cell in Medina—Sultan Jubran Sultan al-Qahtani, and Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faq’asi al-Ghamdi.\footnote{United States v Abu Ali, No. 06-4334 and No. 06-4521, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jun 6, 2008, http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/064334.P.pdf.} Among the discussions with the co-conspirators were “options for assassinating President Bush: (1) an operation in which Abu Ali would get close enough to the President to shoot him on the street, and (2) an operation in which Abu Ali would...
detonate a car bomb.” At trial, Abu Ali’s attorneys countered that while in Saudi custody their client had been beaten and whipped repeatedly until he agreed to confess. But, the judge, jury, and appellate court rejected that argument. A juror said after the trial that Abu Ali’s videotaped confession was “chilling” and showed no sign of coercion.

Abu Ali was originally sentenced to 30 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction and sent the case back for resentencing. The U.S. District judge increased the sentence to life in prison which he is serving at the federal “Supermax” prison in Florence, CO.

**Virginia “Jihad” Network—June 2003**

Eleven men from Northern Virginia were charged on June 27, 2003, with a variety of offenses including weapons counts, providing material support to terrorist groups, and for violating the Neutrality Act of 1939, which prohibits U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at peace. The men were accused of being part of a jihadist network whose objective was to wage holy war against nations deemed hostile to Islam. They were dubbed by some in the media as the “Paintball” terrorists because they were alleged to have used paintball games in the woods near Fredericksburg, VA, in 2000 and 2001 as military training.

After the indictment, 4 of the 11 men pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In a superseding indictment on September 25, 2003, additional charges were levied against the 7 remaining defendants, including conspiracy to support terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) a Kashmiri-based group that has been designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization. Two of these remaining defendants pled guilty in January 2004.

In 2004 and 2005, charges were brought against two additional Northern Virginia residents. The alleged spiritual leader of the group, Ali al-Timimi, was indicted in September 2004 for counseling and inducing several of the other defendants to conspire to levy war against the United States along with other charges. He was found guilty on April 26, 2005, on 10 counts and sentenced to life in prison.

*The Washington Post* reported that the heart of the government’s evidence against al-Timimi was a meeting he attended in Fairfax, Virginia five days after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Timimi told his

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followers that ‘the time had come for them to go abroad and join the mujaheddin engaged in violent jihad in Afghanistan,’ according to court papers. Defense lawyers claimed his rhetoric merely reflected his right to free speech. After seven days of deliberation, the jury rejected that argument. At sentencing, the judge said she was satisfied that the case did not “violate any of al-Timimi’s First Amendment rights. This is not a case about speech. This is a case about intent.”

On September 15, 2005, prosecutors also charged Ali Asad Chandia as part of the Virginia Jihad Network conspiracy. Chandia, a former teacher at a Muslim school in Maryland, was accused of assisting an LeT operative, Mohammed Ajmal Khan, in procuring military-purpose equipment for use against India. Evidence was presented at trial that Chandia made a three-month trip to Pakistan in 2001-2002 where he met and allied with Khan who is currently serving a nine-year sentence in Britain for his terrorist activities. Chandia was convicted on June 6, 2006, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

The following is a summary of the disposition of all of the accused defendants:

- **Ali Al-Timimi—an Iraqi American U.S. citizen, was convicted on April 26, 2005, and sentenced to life in prison for soliciting treason, counseling and inducing others to wage war against the United States, and using firearms and explosives in furtherance of those offenses.**

- **Ali Asad Chandia—a Pakistani American U.S. citizen, was convicted on June 6, 2006, and sentenced to 15 years, for providing material support to the LeT.**

- **Masaud Khan—a Pakistani American U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to wage war against the United States, providing material support to LeT, and using automatic weapons in furtherance of crimes of violence.**

- **Seifullah Chapman—a U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to 85 years (later reduced to 65 years) in prison for conspiring to provide material support to LeT, violating the Neutrality Act of 1939, using firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence, and using an automatic weapon in furtherance of crimes of violence.**

- **Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen, was acquitted of all charges on February 20, 2004.**

- **Randall Royer—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in January 2004 and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and of aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony.**

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739 Ibid.


Ibrahim Al-Hamdi—a Yemeni national, pled guilty in January 2004, and was sentenced to 17 years in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm, possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and carrying an explosive—specifically, a rocket-propelled grenade—during the commission of a crime.

Yong Ki Kwon—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Korea, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, 6 months for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, and transferring a firearm for use in a crime of violence.

Sabri Benkhalil, a U.S. citizen, was acquitted in March 2004 of charges related to the original June 2003 indictment. He was then granted statutory immunity and testified twice before the grand jury, and submitted to interviews with the FBI. He was subsequently convicted in February 2007 of making materially false statements in 2004, both in his grand jury appearances and to the FBI. He was sentenced to 10 years, 1 month in prison.

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Khaja Mahmood Hasan—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, 3 months in prison for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence.

Muhammed Aatique—a legal resident from Pakistan, pled guilty in September 2003, and was sentenced to 10 years, 2 months, for aiding others in commencing a military expedition against a friendly nation and using and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.

Hammad Abdur-Raheem—a U.S. citizen (and no relation to acquitted defendant Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem), was convicted on March 4, 2004, and was sentenced to 52 months in prison for conspiring to provide material support to LeT and violating the Neutrality Act of 1939.

Donald Thomas Surratt—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to three years, 10 months for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce with reason to know a felony would be committed with it.


On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Akbar shut off the generator that lit the camp, then tossed grenades into three tents where officers were asleep or preparing for bed. He is reported to have yelled, “We are under attack.” As soldiers rushed outside, he opened fire with an M-4 automatic rifle.742

Akbar was born Mark Fidel Kools in 1971. His mother said she changed his name to Hasan Akbar after she remarried when he was a young boy. The family into which she married were

members of the Nation of Islam. In 1988, Akbar enrolled at the University of California, Davis, with a double major in aeronautical and mechanical engineering. He graduated nine years later with a bachelor’s degree and joined the Army in 1998.\textsuperscript{743}

The attack has been attributed to various motivations. Military criminal investigators reported that Akbar had been recently reprimanded for insubordination and was told he would not join his unit’s push into Iraq. An Army spokesman said Akbar had been having “an attitude problem.” Another spokesman stated that the motive in the attack “most likely was resentment.”\textsuperscript{744}

At his April 2005 court martial, Akbar’s attorney argued that Akbar was concerned the invasion of Iraq would result in the deaths of Muslims and that U.S. soldiers would rape Iraqi women. He said the prosecution’s depiction of Akbar as a cold-blooded killer ignored that the defendant was sufficiently mentally ill—though not insane—to be confused and fearful about the impending invasion of Iraq.\textsuperscript{745}

Writing of his fellow soldiers in a diary entry dated February 4, 2003, he stated:

I suppose they want to punk me or just humiliate me. Perhaps they feel that I will not do anything about that. They are right about that. I am not going to do anything about it as long as I stay here. But as soon as I am in Iraq, I am going to try and kill as many of them as possible.

I will have to decide to kill my Muslim brothers fighting for Saddam Hussein or my battle buddies. I am hoping to get into a position so I don't have to take any crap from anyone anymore.\textsuperscript{746}

On April 22, 2005, after two and one-half hours deliberation, a military jury at Fort Bragg convicted Akbar of two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of attempted premeditated murder. He was sentenced to death one week later. Akbar is the first American since the Vietnam era to be prosecuted on charges of murdering a fellow soldier during wartime.\textsuperscript{747}

\section*{Lackawanna Six – Training at Al Qaeda Camp – September 2002}

Six American citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested on September 13, 2002, and later charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization. The press dubbed the six suspects—Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Shafal Mosed, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, and Mukhtar al-Bakri—the “Lackawanna Six” (also the “Buffalo Six” or “Buffalo Cell”) because five of them were born and raised in Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, NY.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item [745] Akbar Convicted of Murder,” April 22, 2005.
\end{footnotesize}
Prosecutors alleged that in the spring of 2001, the men traveled to Afghanistan, where they attended Al Farooq training camp. Three of the men—Taher, Galab, and Mosed—traveled in one group in April 2001, going from Canada to Pakistan via London and the United Arab Emirates. The four others—Alwan, Goba, al-Bakri, and Elbaneh—allegedly traveled from New York to Pakistan in May 2001. Once in Pakistan, they allegedly crossed over the border in Afghanistan to attend the training camp. The men stayed for five to six weeks, except for Alwan, who left after 10 days.748 The men later admitted to authorities that while at Al Farooq camp they were trained in the use of automatic weapons, including Kalashnikovs, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and explosives. They also met Osama bin Laden.749

The Lackawanna Six first came to the attention of authorities in the spring of 2001 when the FBI received an anonymous, handwritten letter apparently from someone in Lackawanna’s Yemeni community. The letter said that a group has traveled to “meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for training.”750 Subsequently, the FBI interviewed one of the men, Sahim Alwan, when he returned from abroad. Alwan, however, told the FBI that he only traveled to Pakistan for religious training.

Another member, Mukhtar Al-Bakri, came under increased surveillance after the U.S. government reviewed and analyzed an e-mail he sent while traveling in Saudi Arabia. The e-mail referred to an upcoming “big meal” that authorities interpreted as a code for an impending terrorist attack.751 Additional intelligence information was later received that suggested the Lackawanna suspects were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation.752 In the tense atmosphere after the 9/11 attacks, this led to concerns that the group may be a sleeper cell.753

When the FBI learned that al-Bakri had traveled to Bahrain to get married, they asked authorities there to detain him. During an interview with an Arabic-speaking FBI agent, a-Bakri admitted to having attended Al Farooq camp and named the other members of the Lackawanna Six, who were then subsequently arrested on September 13, 2002.

In their joint report, “Chasing the Sleeper Cell,”754 The New York Times and Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS’s) Frontline summarized the disposition of the Lackawanna Six and others associated with the case:

- Sahim Alwan was a college-educated, married man with three children. After he arrived at Al Farooq camp, Alwan claimed he quickly had a change of heart and begged the camp authorities to let him return home. He was allowed to leave, but first was taken to a personal meeting with bin Laden, in which Al Qaeda’s leader

751 Ibid.
752 Ibid.
asked about the status of Muslims in the United States. He was also asked by a bin Laden associate to deliver two copies of a videotape showing the bombing of the USS *Cole* to a contact in Pakistan, which he did. After being confronted with information obtained from the arrest and interrogation of Mukhtar al-Bakri, Alwan confessed to the FBI and in April 2003, pled guilty to material support of terrorism. He was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison.

- **Yahya Goba** did not grow up in Lackawanna. He was born in The Bronx, was raised for a while in Yemen, and moved to Western New York in the late 1996. In his March 2003 guilty plea, Goba admitted having trained to use firearms, including a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, as well as explosives. He also said that Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp of men “willing to become martyrs for the cause.” In December 2003, Goba was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

- **Shafal Mosed** pled guilty in March 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.

- **Yasein Taher** pled guilty in May 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.

- **Faysal Galab** was the first of the Lackawanna Six to pled guilty to material support of terrorism in January 2003. In his plea, he admitted to traveling to the camp, knowing that the trip was illegal, and receiving weapons training. He also acknowledged Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp. He was sentenced to seven years in prison.

- **Mukhtar al-Bakri** was arrested on his wedding night in a hotel room in Manama, Bahrain. During his FBI interview, he was the first to admit that the group had not attended religious training in Pakistan, but rather traveled to the terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. His confession paved the way for the FBI to bring charges against the Lackawanna men. He also admitted that he trained in the use of weapons and explosives at an Al Qaeda camp. In June 2003, he was the last of the six to pled guilty to material support and was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Three other men were also implicated in the Lackawanna Six case. Authorities believe the three played roles in the recruitment of the Lackawanna Six:

- **Kemal Derwish** was born in Buffalo and raised in Saudi Arabia. He reportedly had trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought with Muslims in Bosnia. U.S. intelligence sources say the Saudi government deported Derwish in 1997 for alleged extremist activities. He spent a year in Yemen before heading back to his hometown of Lackawanna in 1998 where he began giving informal talks at a local mosque. The group met in his apartment, where he reportedly told them that attacks on Muslims around the world obligate them to train for jihad to defend their Muslim brothers. Authorities believe that the trip by the group to Afghanistan grew out of religious discussions led by Derwish. He was reportedly killed in 2002 by a CIA Predator drone that was tracking Qaed Salim Sinan al Harethi, known as “Abu Ali,” and believed to be one of the planners of the USS Cole bombing.\(^{755}\)

\(^{755}\) Ibid.
Juma Al Dosari is described as a Muslim fighter and itinerant Imam from Saudi Arabia, who is believed to have fought with Derwish in Bosnia. Upon his arrival in Lackawanna, the reportedly charismatic Al Dosari gave a sermon railing against Arab governments who do nothing while Muslims die on a daily basis. According to people in the community, the leaders of the Lackawanna mosque were so troubled by Al Dosari’s militant tone that he was not invited back. Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Al Dosari left Lackawanna to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He was captured sometime in the fall of 2001 and declared an enemy combatant. He was subsequently sent to the special prison camp at the U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His interrogation there led to the information that the Lackawanna Six were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation. In 2007, after five years of the detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he was released to Saudi Arabia, with no charges against him.756

Jaber A. Elbaneh, a Yemeni American also attended Al Farooq training camp with al-Bakri, Alwan and Goba. At the camp, Elbaneh told Alwan that he wanted to fight with the Taliban and was willing to become a martyr. He never returned to the U.S. after his trip to Afghanistan and eventually fled to Yemen. In May 2003, the U.S. government unsealed an indictment charging him with providing material support to Al Qaeda. The FBI also put him on its list of world’s most wanted terrorism suspects.757 It has been reported that he is in Yemeni custody, but because there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Yemen, it is not clear whether he will be returned for trial.758

Jose Padilla—Alleged “Dirty Bomb” Plot—May 2002

Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and convert to Islam, was arrested on May 8, 2002, at O’Hare Airport in Chicago for suspicion of planning to explode a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb” (an explosive containing radioactive material) in the United States. A month later, he would become the first American citizen arrested on U.S. soil to be declared an “enemy combatant,” and then was held indefinitely without trial or charging him with a crime. This led to a legal confrontation between the Bush Administration and Padilla’s attorneys as well as various civil liberties groups that lasted several years and reached all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The constitutional issues involved the extent to which the President, as commander-in-chief, has the authority to take extraordinary measures for the security of Americans even if those measures infringe on an accused citizen’s access to legal counsel and relief from unlawful detention (habeas corpus).759

The government’s initial suspicions about Padilla were based on information provided to interrogators by Abu Zubaydah, a senior official of Al Qaeda who was in American custody at an undisclosed location overseas. He did not name Mr. Padilla but described him physically and referred to him as a Latin American man who went by a Muslim name. Intelligence agents then

756 Ibid.
757 Ibid.
were able to link the name given by Abu Zubaydah to “an Arab alias not mentioned by the
detainee.” That “alias” led the agent to Mr. Padilla’s Florida driver’s license. The photo on that
license was shown to “a detainee,” presumed to be Abu Zubaydah, who confirmed that Mr.
Padilla was the “Latin American” he had been describing.\textsuperscript{760}

Padilla remained in custody for one month after his arrest in May 2002 on a material witness
warrant. But, Justice Department officials faced a deadline to release him pursuant to laws that
protect U.S. citizens from indefinite detention. They were also confronted with the challenge of
making a case against Padilla that would stand up in court without bringing Abu Zubaydah or
other captured Al Qaeda officials into an American courtroom.\textsuperscript{761} Instead, on June 9, 2002,
President George W. Bush approved Padilla’s reclassification as an “enemy combatant,” which
would not entitle him to trial in civilian courts. He was transferred after midnight to the brig of a
South Carolina naval base, where he was held incommunicado, not even allowed visits from his
attorney, for over 3-1/2 years, most of which was spent in solitary confinement.\textsuperscript{762}

In announcing Padilla’s May arrest, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced at a June 10,
2002, news conference, “We have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States
by exploding a radioactive dirty bomb.” He added that the government’s suspicions about
Padilla’s plans came from “multiple, independent, corroborating sources.”\textsuperscript{763}

But shortly thereafter, CBS News reported that FBI sources were “backing off” Ashcroft’s
assertion that there was a specific, developed, and real plan to use a “dirty bomb” in the United
States. According to one law enforcement official speaking on condition of anonymity, “FBI’s
investigation has produced no evidence that Padilla had begun preparations for an attack and little
reason to believe he had any support from Al Qaeda to direct such a plot.”\textsuperscript{764}

Dale Watson, who was then FBI’s executive assistant director for counterterrorism, read the
complete file on Padilla and later said, “My recollection was that this was a rather weak case.
There was some information, but it needed a lot more work on the investigative side to flesh out
all the facts.”\textsuperscript{765}

On June 1, 2004, DOJ responded to a written request by Senator Orrin Hatch, then the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “asking the Department of Justice and the Department of
Defense to supply whatever information [they] could about American citizens being held as
enemy combatants here in the United States.”\textsuperscript{766} In addition, then-Deputy Attorney General James
Comey held a news conference where he laid out a detailed summary of the government’s case

\textsuperscript{760} Deborah Sontag, “Terror Suspect’s Path From Streets to Brig,” \textit{New York Times}, April 25, 2004,
2004.

\textsuperscript{761} This factor was acknowledged by then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey. See “Transcript of News

people/p/jose_padilla/index.html.

08/27/attack/main519996.shtml.

\textsuperscript{764} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{765} Sontag, April 25, 2004.

\textsuperscript{766} Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.
against Padilla. The case was largely derived from statements made by Padilla himself while he was interrogated in military custody, but which Comey claimed was substantiated by other sources. At the news conference, Comey traced Padilla’s travel through Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He identified Al Qaeda officials he met, which included not only Abu Zubaydah, but Al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He also described the training Padilla received and terrorist plots discussed including one to blow up apartment buildings in the United States using natural gas as well as an attack using a dirty bomb.767

Comey also noted that the government could not make a case against Padilla through the criminal justice system when he was originally arrested two years before “without jeopardizing intelligence sources.”768 But, he went on to say that the questioning of Padilla was not undertaken to try and make a criminal case against him. “It was done to find out the truth about what he knew about Al Qaeda and threats to the United States.”769

Soon after Padilla was declared an enemy combatant, his appointed counsel filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that Padilla had filed his habeas petition in the wrong court. In 2004, Padilla’s counsel filed a new habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina. The District Court ruled that Padilla’s detention had not been authorized by Congress and was therefore unlawful. The government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, VA, reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the president was authorized to detain enemy combatants under the Authorization of Use of Military Force passed by Congress in the wake of September 11. Padilla then filed a petition for certiorari770 in the United States Supreme Court.771

In November 2005, while the Supreme Court was considering Padilla’s petition for review, the Bush Administration suddenly announced that criminal charges had been filed against him in federal court in Miami. The new indictment made no mention of the dirty bomb or most of the other original charges. Instead, Padilla was charged with being part of a “North American support cell” that worked to support violent jihad campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas from 1993 to 2001.772

The government then asked the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate its decision upholding Padilla’s confinement.773 The Fourth Circuit refused to vacate its order or approve of Padilla’s transfer from military to civilian custody. In an opinion by Judge J. Michael Luttig, the Fourth Circuit worried about “an appearance that the government may be attempting to avoid

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767 Ibid.
768 Ibid.
769 Ibid.
770 Certiorari is the name given to certain appellate proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior appeals court.
773 For more information on this case, see CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.” Judge Luttig also “chastised the administration for using one set of facts to justify holding Padilla without charges and another set to persuade a grand jury in Florida to indict him.”

Padilla’s attorneys, in the meantime, sought to have the criminal charges against him dismissed on the grounds that the psychological damage he suffered during his confinement from abuse and extreme isolation had left him incompetent to stand trial. The judge in the case denied the motion, without ruling on the merits of the defense accusations of abuse. The criminal trial began in September 2006.

Padilla was convicted on August 16, 2007, along with two co-defendants, Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi, of conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people in a foreign country. In January 2008, Padilla was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months in prison while his co-defendants were given shorter sentences. In September 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Atlanta vacated his sentence, deeming it too lenient.

Portland Seven—Attempted Travel to Afghanistan to Support the Taliban—October 2001

In the days following the 9/11 attacks, six men reportedly met at various times in the Portland, OR, area, where they made plans to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Armed Forces of the United States. They also conducted weapons training on two occasions at a gravel pit in Washougal, WA. A seventh person, October Martinique Lewis, admitted that she transferred funds for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband who was one of the conspirators. The group, who came to be known as the “Portland Seven,” called themselves, Katibat al Mawt—“The Squad of Death.” They were

- Habib Abdulla Al Saoub, a Jordanian-born man and reputed militant jihadist, was considered to be the de facto leader of the group.
- Patrice Lumumba Ford is a U.S. citizen who converted to Islam during a trip to China. He has been described as an intelligent, gentle, exemplary young man, well-known in Portland’s African American community. But prior to the events of 9/11, was so upset by this country’s Middle Eastern policy that he sent an e-mail

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775 McGough, Jan 2, 2006.
777 Ibid.
779 Ibid.
to Portland Mayor Vera Katz’s office that was troubling enough in its anti-Semitism to be forwarded to the police.

- **Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal** and **Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal** are American-born brothers of Saudi descent.
- **Jeffrey Leon Battle** is a former cosmetics salesman who moved to the Portland area from Houston.
- **Maher “Mike” Hawash** is a software engineer and naturalized American citizen from the West Bank who grew up in Kuwait.
- **October Martinique Lewis**, Battle’s ex-wife, moved with him from Houston.

Al Saoub, Ford, and Battle first came to the attention of law enforcement authorities on September 29, 2001, after they were seen engaged in shooting practice in a gravel pit in Skamania County, Washington, near Washougal. The group was discovered by a deputy sheriff who was acting on a tip from a neighbor who had heard gunfire in the pit. Deputy Mercer let the men go after taking their names and reported the incident to the FBI.781

Sometime after February 2002, the FBI reportedly linked a confidential informant with a member of the group, Jeffrey Battle. The informant was reported to be Khalid Mustafa, a small-time criminal who agreed to become a confidential FBI informant after being charged with drug and weapons offenses. Mustafa befriended Battle at the mosque where he prayed and then secretly recorded numerous conversations with Battle that included details about the group’s trip to China. Battle is also recorded on tape talking about retaliating against Jews in Portland, “So if every time they hurt or harm a Muslim over there, you go into that synagogue and hurt one over here.”782

Hundreds of e-mail exchanges between Battle and other members of the Portland Seven provided further evidence of the conspiracy. The e-mails were reportedly obtained through provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) that allow prosecutors access to the data files of Internet service providers. In court documents, prosecutors acknowledged having taped at least 271 conversations and obtained 31 separate orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court.783

In October 2002, five of the men were indicted on multiple charges of aiding or attempting to join Al Qaeda. Maher Hawash was arrested in March 2003 on a material witness warrant and initially held without charges. He was subsequently charged with conspiring with the others to travel to China and join the Taliban. Lewis, the ex-wife of co-defendant Jeffrey Battle, was charged with money laundering.

Hawash pleaded guilty on September 6, 2003, to conspiracy to provide material support to the Taliban and agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors. At his sentencing in February 2004, he said, “I do not blame anyone else but myself. This action was done by me, based on a misguided judgment at the time, a high emotional time for me in my life.”784 He was sentenced to seven years in prison and was released in early 2009.

781 Ibid.
782 Howlett, July 24, 2005.
783 Ibid.
784 Ibid.
Muhammad and Ahmed Bilal, pled guilty on September 18, 2003, to conspiracy to contribute services to the Taliban, as well as federal weapons charges. They received 8- and 10-year sentences respectively.

October Martinique Lewis pled guilty on September 26, 2003, to six counts of money laundering for transferring money from the United States to a place outside of the country for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband, Jeffrey Battle, in willfully supplying services to the Taliban. She received a three-year sentence.

Jeffrey Battle and Patrice Lumumba Ford pled guilty on October 16, 2003, to the first of a 15-count indictment, a charge of conspiracy to levy war against the United States. Both defendants admitted that they and the other defendants flew to China in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry into Pakistan, en route to Afghanistan. They also admitted in their plea that the purpose of the conspiracy was to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban against American and allied forces. They were each sentenced to 18-year prison terms.

Habis al Saoub reportedly joined an Al Qaeda cell and was killed by Pakistani forces in Afghanistan in October 2003.

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Appendix B. Figures

**Figure B-1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Terrorist Profile and Training**

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<tr>
<th>Plots and Attacks*</th>
<th>Lone Wolf</th>
<th>Muslim Convert(s)</th>
<th>Suicidal or Sought Martyrdom</th>
<th>Radicalized in Prison</th>
<th>Intended or Actual Plotting or Training Abroad</th>
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<td>Ferhani and Mamdouh</td>
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<td>Alessa and Almonte</td>
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<td>Faisal Shahzad</td>
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<td>Colleen LaRose</td>
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<td>Northern Virginia Five</td>
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<td>al-Shabaab Recruiting</td>
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<td>Ft. Hood (Nidal Hasan)</td>
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<td>David Headley</td>
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*May 2006 - October 2011
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**Source:** CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks after 9/11 through October 2011.

**Notes:** a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in **bold and Italic**.
### Figure B-2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools

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<th>Investigation Tools*</th>
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**Source:** CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks after 9/11 through October 2011.

**Notes:** a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in **bold and Italics**. b. As indicated in open source reporting. It is possible that the use of these tools in some cases remains classified information and thus is not reflected in this figure.

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### Acknowledgments

Mark A. Randol, former CRS Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism, was one of the original authors of this report.