Chile: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations

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Summary

Since its transition back to democracy in 1990, Chile has consistently maintained friendly relations with the United States. Serving as a reliable but independent ally, Chile has worked with the United States to advance democracy, human rights, and free trade in the Western Hemisphere. Chile and the United States also maintain strong commercial ties. Total trade has nearly tripled to over $17.9 billion since the implementation of a bilateral free trade agreement in 2004, and the countries signed an income tax treaty designed to boost private sector investment in February 2010. Additional areas of cooperation between the United States and Chile include investigating dictatorship-era human rights abuses, promoting clean energy technologies, and supporting regional security and stability.

Sebastián Piñera of the center-right “Coalition for Change” was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term in March 2010. Piñera’s election was the first for the Chilean right since 1958, and brought an end to 20 years of governance by a center-left coalition of parties known as the Concertación. Since taking office, Piñera has largely maintained the open economic policies and moderate social welfare policies of his predecessors while implementing reforms designed to boost economic growth and reduce poverty. Although his political coalition lacks majorities in both houses of the Chilean Congress, Piñera has been able to win support for several pieces of legislation, including his earthquake reconstruction plan, an education reform law, and a conditional cash transfer program. Piñera has also been forced to respond to a number of crises such as the earthquake that struck Chile just two weeks before his inauguration, the rescue of 33 trapped miners, and a series of high profile political protests over the administration’s indigenous and energy policies. Public opinion of Piñera’s performance in office is divided with 41% approving and 49% disapproving in a May 2011 poll.

With a gross national income of $164 billion and a per capita income of $9,470, Chile is classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income developing country. Successive governments have pursued market-oriented economic policies that have contributed to the development of what many analysts consider the most competitive and fundamentally sound economy in Latin America. This solid economic framework has helped the country weather recent shocks, such as the global financial crisis and the massive February 2010 earthquake. After a 1.7% contraction in 2009, the Chilean economy grew by 5.2% in 2010 and is expected to grow by 6.2% in 2011. Strong economic growth—paired with targeted social assistance programs—has also contributed to a significant decline in the poverty rate, which fell from 38.8% in 1989 to 19.4% in 2010.

Congress has expressed interest in a number of issues in U.S.-Chile relations in recent years. During the 111th Congress, both houses passed resolutions (S.Res. 431 and H.Res. 1144) expressing sympathy for the victims of the Chilean earthquake, and the House passed a resolution (H.Res. 1662) commending the rescue of the country’s trapped miners. The 112th Congress could take up issues such as the U.S.-Chile bilateral income tax treaty that was signed in 2010 and is awaiting submission to the U.S. Senate for ratification.

This report provides a brief historical background of Chile, examines recent political and economic developments, and considers current issues in U.S.-Chilean relations.
Figure 1. Map of Chile

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics.
Political and Economic Background

Located in the Southern Cone of South America, Chile is a politically stable, upper-middle-income, developing nation of 17 million people. The country declared independence from Spain in 1810 but did not achieve full independence until 1818. By 1932, Chile had established a mass electoral democracy, which endured until 1973. During much of this period, Chile was governed by presidents who pursued state-led development through import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and the political incorporation of the working classes. These policies were expanded following the election of Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiana, PDC) in 1964. President Frei’s reformist government took majority ownership of the copper mines, redistributed land, and improved access to education. Despite these actions, some Chileans felt more radical policies were needed.

In 1970, Salvador Allende, a Socialist and the leader of the leftist “Popular Unity” (Unidad Popular) coalition, was elected president in a three-way race with just over 36% of the vote. Allende accelerated and furthered the changes of the previous administration by fully nationalizing firms, expanding land reform, and generally socializing the economy. While Allende’s supporters pushed him to move more quickly, the political center, represented by the PDC, joined with the parties of the right to block Popular Unity initiatives in the legislature. This ideological difference prevented the Chilean government from addressing the faltering economy and served to further radicalize supporters on both ends of Chile’s already polarized society. When the situation continued to deteriorate following the indecisive 1973 legislative elections, the military intervened.1

Pinochet Era

On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military, under the control of General Augusto Pinochet, deposed the Allende government in a violent coup and quickly consolidated control of the country. The military junta closed Congress, censored the media, declared political parties in recess, and regarded the organized left as an internal enemy of the state. Within the first few months of military rule, over 1,200 people in Chile were killed or “disappeared” for political reasons, and some 18,000 were imprisoned or tortured. By the end of the dictatorship in 1990, the number of killed or disappeared had risen to at least 2,298 and the number of imprisoned and

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tortured reportedly exceeded 27,000. General Pinochet emerged as the figurehead of the junta soon after the coup and won a tightly controlled referendum to institutionalize his regime in 1978. Pinochet reversed decades of statist economic policies by rapidly implementing a series of changes that liberalized trade and investment, privatized firms, and dismantled the welfare state.

Pinochet won another tightly controlled referendum in 1980, which approved the constitution that continues to govern Chile today. The new constitution called for a plebiscite to take place in 1988 in which Chileans would have the opportunity to reelect Pinochet to another eight-year term or reject him in favor of contested elections. Although the Chilean economy enjoyed a period of rapid economic growth between 1976 and 1981, a banking crisis from 1981 to 1984 sparked widespread protests. Following these initial demonstrations, Chilean civil society groups became more active in criticizing the policies of the Pinochet regime. At the same time, political parties began to reemerge to challenge the government. In 1988, several civil society groups and political parties formed a coalition in opposition to Pinochet’s reelection. In the plebiscite, 55% of the Chilean people voted against another eight-year term for Pinochet, triggering the election campaign of 1989.

Return to Democracy and Concertación Governance

Two major coalitions of parties were formed to contest the elections of 1989. The center-left “Coalition of Parties for Democracy,” (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, Concertación) united 17 groups that were opposed to the Pinochet dictatorship, including the centrist PDC and the center-left Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia, PPD). The center-right “Democracy and Progress” (Democracia y Progreso) coalition included the center-right National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN) and the conservative Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI). Patricio Alwyn, a Christian Democrat and the candidate of the Concertación, won the presidency with 55% of the vote and the Concertación won majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and among the elected members of the Senate.

Presidents from the Concertación governed Chile for 20 consecutive years following the return of democracy to the country. In addition to the PDC and the PS, the Concertación currently includes the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS), and the Social Democratic Radical Party (Partido Radical Social Demócrata, PRSD). President Alwyn (1990-1994) was followed by Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle of the PDC (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos of the PPD (2000-2006), and Michelle Bachelet of the PS (2006-2010). Each of the Concertación governments pushed for reforms to the Pinochet-era constitution, successfully strengthening civilian control over the military, eliminating the institution of unelected senators, and reducing presidential terms from six years to four. They were unable to eliminate the binomial election system, however, which tends to

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3 For more information on the Chilean financial crisis, see CRS Report RS22961, The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons From Chile, by J. F. Hornbeck.


5 Ibid. Prior to a 2005 constitutional reform, former presidents served as “senators-for-life” and nine senators were designated by the armed forces and other governmental bodies.
To distribute power relatively equally between broad coalitions as a result of two-member districts that require a coalition to win by two-to-one margins in order to secure both seats.\(^6\)

Each of the Concertación administrations generally maintained the market-oriented economic policies of the Pinochet regime while implementing targeted social welfare policies. The Concertación administrations promoted export-led development and economic diversification through the pursuit of free trade agreements and the encouragement of new export sectors.\(^7\) In an attempt to ensure that the benefits of Chile’s economic growth benefitted a broad cross-section of society, President Lagos established *Chile Solidario*, a social protection system that provides family support, cash subsidies, and skills training to families in extreme poverty.\(^8\) Likewise, President Bachelet introduced a universal minimum state pension and extended free health care coverage for a number of serious conditions.\(^9\) Chile’s economy grew by an average of 5.1% annually during the two decades of Concertación rule, and per capita income increased from $1,770 in 1989 to $9,470 in 2009.\(^10\) Although income distribution remained virtually unchanged, the percentage of Chileans living in poverty fell from 38.8% in 1989 to 13.7% in 2006.\(^11\) The poverty rate has increased since then, reaching 19.4% in 2010 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and February 2010 earthquake.\(^12\)

**Political Situation**

**2009 Presidential and Legislative Elections**

On January 17, 2010, billionaire businessman Sebastián Piñera, a member of the National Renewal party (RN) and the candidate of the center-right “Coalition for Change” (*Coalición por el Cambio*, Coalición) was elected president in a second round runoff election. He defeated former President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), a member of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the candidate of the center-left Concertación, 52% to 48%.\(^13\) Piñera was forced to contest a runoff after he failed to win an absolute majority of the vote in a first-round election held on December 13, 2009. Piñera was the leading vote-getter in the first-round, winning the support of 44% of the electorate. He was followed by Frei at 30% and two Concertación dissidents, Marco Enríquez-Ominami and Jorge Arrate, at 20% and 6%, respectively.\(^14\)

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\(^7\) U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, *Background Note: Chile*, March 10, 2011.


A number of analysts contend that the election was not a rejection of the moderate social democratic policies of the Concertación, but reflected a desire for new leadership after two decades of governance by a coalition that had undergone little internal renovation. They note that outgoing Concertación President Michelle Bachelet remained extremely popular in the final months of her term, enjoying an 83% approval rating at the time of the election. Likewise, Piñera projected a moderate image throughout the campaign, emphasizing his 1988 vote against the continuation of the Pinochet regime, pledging to generally continue the policies of the Concertación, and proposing to extend Chile’s social protection network to the middle class.

**Figure 2. Coalition and Party Affiliation in Chile’s Senate and Chamber of Deputies**

Legislative Seat Distribution Resulting from the 2009 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concertación</td>
<td>PDC (19), PPD (18), PS (11), PRSD (5), PC (3), Ind (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalición</td>
<td>UDI (37), RN (18), Ind (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td>PRI (3), Ind (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** There are 38 seats in the Senate and 120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Although the PC is not a member party of the Concertación, it won its seats in the Chamber of Deputies as a result of an electoral pact with that coalition. See Table A-1 for political party acronyms.

Legislative elections for half of the seats in the Senate and the entire Chamber of Deputies were held concurrently with the first round of the presidential election. For the first time, the center-
right coalition of parties (currently known as the “Coalition for Change” or Coalición) surpassed the center-left Concertación as the largest bloc in the lower house. The Coalición holds 58 of the 120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 16 of the 38 seats in the Senate. The Concertación and the leftist “Together We Can Do More” (Juntos Podemos Más, JPM) coalition signed an electoral pact prior to the elections; together, they hold 57 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 19 seats in the Senate. The Communist Party (Partido Comunista, PC) is represented in the Chilean Congress for the first time since the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende, holding three of the Concertación-JPM seats. The remaining three Senate seats and five Chamber of Deputies seats are held by independents and members of the Regionalist Party of Independents (Partido Regionalista de los Independientes, PRI), who are unaffiliated with either of the major coalitions (see Figure 2).

Piñera Administration

Although Piñera’s electoral victory was the first for the Chilean right since 1958, his first year in office was marked more by continuity than change. The Piñera Administration has largely maintained the open economic policies and moderate social welfare policies of the Concertación while implementing reforms designed to boost economic growth and reduce poverty. Piñera must secure the support of unaffiliated or Concertación legislators in order to pass legislation since his political coalition lacks majorities in both houses of the Chilean Congress (see Figure 2). Substantial policy consensus among the major political parties and the political system’s tendency toward accommodation have aided in this effort, however, enabling Piñera to win legislative approval for his earthquake reconstruction plan, an education reform law, and the “ethical family income” conditional cash transfer program. These initiatives have left the Concertación divided, as centrist sectors such as the PDC have been inclined to work with Piñera and more left-leaning sectors have preferred to obstruct the administration’s agenda.

Despite his administration’s legislative victories, Piñera has struggled periodically with intra-coalition disagreements and high profile public protests. Within the Coalición, the UDI and other conservative sectors have questioned some of the Piñera Administration’s policy decisions, such as raising taxes to help fund earthquake reconstruction and placing considerable emphasis on social policies to reduce poverty. Other differences within the Coalición have arisen as a result of scandal allegations that led to the resignations of two UDI officials. Large scale protests have also put the Piñera Administration on the defensive over its policies. An 80-day hunger strike by Mapuche prisoners led the administration to reconsider its indigenous policies, and an uprising in southern Chile over a plan to increase gas prices forced the administration to abandon the proposal. The administration has also faced protests by Chileans unsatisfied with the pace of

earthquake reconstruction. With the exception of the period immediately following the rescue of Chile’s 33 trapped miners when Piñera’s approval rating reached 63%, the Chilean public generally has been divided in its opinion of the president. In May 2011, 41% of Chileans approved of Piñera’s performance as president and 49% disapproved.

Indigenous Activism

In recent years, Chile’s indigenous peoples have become more aggressive in advocating for their rights and concerns, leading to occasional confrontations with the Chilean government. Members of the Mapuche community, Chile’s largest indigenous group, have been the most militant; however, the Rapa Nui—ethnic Polynesian natives of the Chilean territory of Easter Island—have also engaged in increased activism. Although the Piñera Administration has offered some concessions to indigenous groups, activists have generally deemed them insufficient.

Mapuche

The Mapuches have long sought official recognition as a people, protection of indigenous rights, and restoration of full ownership of their ancestral lands. Primarily located in the central and southern regions of Biobío, Araucanía, Los Ríos, and Los Lagos (see Figure 1 for a map of Chile), the Mapuches comprise about 4% of Chile’s 17 million citizens and experience significantly higher poverty levels, lower education levels, and poorer living standards than the general Chilean population. Mapuche groups have pursued their goals through a variety of means. Some pushed for the ratification of convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on indigenous rights, which then-President Bachelet promulgated in September 2008. Others, such as the Arauco-Malleco Coordinating Committee (CAM), have employed more militant actions, occupying ancestral Mapuche lands and burning vehicles, machinery, and buildings on them—frequently targeting logging companies.

Successive Concertación governments were unable to improve relations with the Mapuches despite engaging in land transfers and other measures designed to reduce tensions. Concertación governments transferred some 650,000 hectares (1.6 million acres) of land to Mapuche communities between 1994 and 2009; however, many Mapuches considered the transfers insufficient as the lands represented only a fraction of their ancestral territory. As CAM steadily

23 “3 Mil Personas Marchan en Concepción en Protesta por Lentitud de Reconstrucción” La Nación (Chile), February 26, 2011.
26 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Chile, March 10, 2011; Raúl Zibechi, “Toward Reconstruction of the Mapuche Nation,” Center for International Policy, Americas Program, November 13, 2009.
29 According to CAM, the original land size of the independent Mapuche territory was 10 million hectares (24.7 million acres). “Chile: Bachelet Reacts to Challenge by Radical Activists,” Latin American Security & Strategic Review, January 2008; Raúl Zibechi, “Toward Reconstruction of the Mapuche Nation,” Center for International Policy, Americas Program, November 13, 2009; Daniela Estrada, “Chile: Mapuche Detainees Say They Were Framed,” Inter (continued...)

Congressional Research Service
increased its militant activities during the Bachelet Administration, the government responded more forcefully, raiding the homes of suspected CAM militants and prosecuting Mapuche activists under a Pinochet-era anti-terrorism law that has been condemned by human rights organizations. The anti-terrorism law allows suspects to be held for two years without being charged, enables prosecutors to withhold evidence from the defense and try suspects in both military and civil courts, permits the testimony of anonymous witnesses, and mandates punishments that are three times the normal criminal sentences for activities such as arson and illegal land occupation. The use of the anti-terrorism law—which Bachelet pledged not to employ against Mapuche activists during her 2005 electoral campaign—exacerbated the situation.

Relations between the Chilean government and the Mapuches have not improved under the Piñera Administration. In addition to disputes over Piñera’s claim that CAM members have received training from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC)—a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization—conflicts concerning the use the anti-terrorism law have continued. In 2010, dozens of Mapuche activists being held in prison under the anti-terrorism law went on an 80-day hunger strike. The hunger strikers demanded the dismissal of proceedings against them in military courts, the demilitarization of Mapuche territory, and an end to the use of the anti-terrorism law against Mapuches for actions they consider to be political activism. To bring an end to the strike, Piñera allowed the Catholic Archbishop of Concepción to mediate the dispute and negotiate an agreement with the prisoners. As part of the accord, the Chilean government adopted a series of changes to the anti-terrorism law and the military justice system, and began to reclassify the cases against the imprisoned Mapuches. Although these changes temporarily eased tensions, many issues remain unresolved. Land occupations have continued and the convictions and lengthy sentences of several CAM leaders in March 2011 sparked a new round of protests and hunger strikes.

**Rapa Nui**

Some Rapa Nui, ethnic Polynesians whose ancestors first inhabited the Chilean territory of Easter Island (also known as Rapa Nui), have begun employing methods similar to those of the Mapuches in opposition to Chilean government policies toward the island. Accounting for roughly 60% of Easter Island’s 4,000 residents, the Rapa Nui people are the only officially recognized Chilean indigenous group that still constitutes a majority of the population in its traditional homeland. Tensions between the Rapa Nui and the Chilean government have risen in recent years as national and international tourism have boomed and an increasing number of visitors have arrived on the island.

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continental Chileans have moved to the island, which is located nearly 2,200 miles west of the Chilean coast. Some Rapa Nui argue that the influx in population is weakening living standards by reducing employment opportunities, straining government services, and damaging the ecosystem.35

Frustrated by the lack of government response to their concerns, some Rapa Nui activists have engaged in land occupations. In August 2009, a Rapa Nui group blocked the airport for two days to demand greater immigration controls.36 Conflict erupted again in March 2010, when locals learned that the individual President Piñera appointed as governor of the territory had reportedly received his position as a result of his ties to a business group with intentions to acquire land the Rapa Nui had ceded to the government for public purposes. Since then, Rapa Nui activists have occupied lands and taken over buildings, demanding stricter immigration controls, the return of their ancestral lands, and a stronger role in governance.37 In February 2011, a number of Rapa Nui activists were injured when police forcibly removed them from a hotel that they had been occupying. In response, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called on the Chilean government “to immediately bring an end to the use of armed violence in the execution of State administrative or judicial actions against members of the Rapa Nui people, including evictions from public spaces or from public property” and “to guarantee that the actions of State agents in the framework of protests and evictions do not jeopardize the life or physical integrity of the members of the Rapa Nui people.”38 Although the Chilean government has promised increased investment in the island and engaged in dialogue on some issues of concern, the Chilean Congress has yet to pass bills to strengthen immigration controls and self-government and land disputes continue.

Economic Conditions

With a gross national income of $164 billion and a per capita income of $9,470 (2009), Chile is classified by the World Bank as an upper-middle-income developing country.39 Over the past several decades, the country has pursued market-oriented economic policies designed to support export-led development and economic diversification. Chile has signed more than 60 bilateral or regional trade agreements—including a free trade agreement with the United States—and encouraged the development of new export sectors such as forestry products, salmon, fresh fruit, and wine.40 Chile has also attracted significant amounts of foreign direct investment, which totaled $15.1 billion in 2010.41 As a result of these policies, Chile has established a diverse economy that is less reliant on its traditional copper exports and is considered by many analysts to be the most competitive and fundamentally sound in Latin America.42 In May 2010, Chile became

40 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Chile, March 10, 2011.
the first South American nation to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).43

Global Financial Crisis

Chile’s solid economic framework has enabled the country to weather recent shocks to the economy. The country’s economic growth slowed in late 2008 and gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 1.7% in 2009 as the global financial crisis took a considerable toll on the economy.44 The Chilean government was able to lessen the impact of the downturn, however, by implementing a $4 billion (2.4% of GDP) economic stimulus package that included temporary tax cuts for small businesses, increased transfer payments for poor Chileans, $700 million for infrastructure projects, and $1 billion for the state-owned copper company, Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre).45 This counter-cyclical spending was financed by drawing on the country’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund, one of two sovereign wealth funds (with a combined value of $17.3 billion, or 8.5% of GDP, in April 2011) in which the Chilean government invests windfall surpluses from copper revenues.46 As a result of the stimulus and other efforts the country began to experience quarter-on-quarter economic growth by the end of 2009.47

2010 Earthquake Recovery

Just as the Chilean economy was beginning to recover from the global financial crisis, the country was hit by an earthquake of magnitude 8.8 on February 27, 2010.48 Centered 70 miles northeast of Chile’s second-largest city, Concepción, the earthquake was the second-largest ever recorded in Chile and the fifth-largest recorded worldwide since 1900.49 The earthquake and subsequent tsunami devastated a substantial portion of the country. An estimated 1.8 million people were affected, with 524 people confirmed dead (31 remain missing) and some 220,000 homes destroyed or severely damaged.50 In addition to physical damages estimated at $29.7 billion (15% of GDP), the affected areas—which are home to portions of the wine, wood pulp, and fruit industries—are responsible for generating approximately one-sixth of Chile’s total GDP.51

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48 For more information on the Chile earthquake, see CRS Report R41112, Chile Earthquake: U.S. and International Response, by June S. Beittel and Rhoda Margesson.
49 In 1960, southern Chile was struck by a magnitude 9.5 earthquake. Jose Luis Saavedra, “Massive Earthquake Hits Chile, 214 Dead,” Reuters, February 27, 2010.
The Chilean government is implementing an $8.4 billion reconstruction plan, which is being combined with insurance payments and private sector support, to repair and rebuild what was damaged and destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami. The government is financing the reconstruction plan with a mix of temporary tax increases, sovereign debt issuance, and funds from the government’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund. The reconstruction effort is scheduled to conclude in March 2014; however, it is already over half complete. The government has repaired or rebuilt 70% of the schools, 85% of the hospitals, and 99% of the infrastructure damaged or destroyed by the disaster. Although Chile’s economy suffered in the first quarter of 2010 as a result of the earthquake, the reconstruction effort is now fueling growth. The Chilean economy grew by 5.2% in 2010 and is expected to grow by 6.2% in 2011. President Piñera has pledged to create one million new jobs and maintain annual economic growth of 6% over the course of his term.

Social Indicators

Over the past two decades, strong economic growth and targeted social programs have produced considerable improvements in social and development indicators in Chile, but challenges remain. As noted above, the percentage of Chileans living in poverty fell from 38.8% in 1989 to 13.7% in 2006. The poverty rate has since increased to 19.4%, however, as a result of the effects of the global financial crisis and 2010 earthquake. Chile has also made considerable progress toward meeting all eight of the U.N. Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The goals include eradicating extreme poverty, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating disease, ensuring environmental stability, and developing a global partnership for development. At the same time, Chilean policies have done little to reduce inequality, which some analysts contend is embedded in the country’s tax system and social and political structures, and is an important barrier to further poverty reduction.

President Piñera has pledged to eliminate extreme poverty—which affects 3.7% of Chileans—by the end of his term and lay the groundwork to end poverty in Chile by the end of the decade. His administration has introduced a number of new policies to support low-income Chileans. These include higher pensions, health care insurance payment exemptions, and an “ethical family

60 Ibid.
income” conditional cash transfer program, which provides direct income subsidies to some 130,000 families in exchange for ensuring that their children attend school and receive proper medical care.\textsuperscript{61} Piñera has also won congressional approval for policies designed to improve the quality of the education system, which a number of analysts identify as a source of inequality and a barrier to economic and social progress.\textsuperscript{62} Despite these social policy efforts, the Piñera Administration maintains that “social security networks are important but not sufficient” and that “growth and job creation are the only ways to overcome poverty permanently.”\textsuperscript{63}

Chile-U.S. Relations

Chile and the United States have enjoyed friendly relations over the two decades since Chile transitioned back to democratic governance. Serving as a reliable but independent ally, Chile has worked with the United States to advance democracy, human rights, and free trade in the Western Hemisphere. The countries also maintain close commercial ties, having signed a bilateral free trade agreement in 2003 and an income tax treaty in 2010. Other areas of U.S.-Chilean cooperation include investigations of human rights violations, promotion of clean energy, and support for security and stability in the hemisphere.

Since taking office, the Obama Administration has sought to maintain close ties with Chile and encourage its leadership in the region. Vice President Biden visited Chile in March 2009 during his first trip to Latin America, and then-President Bachelet met with President Obama in Washington, DC, in June 2009. Bachelet described her Administration’s close relations with the Obama Administration as “one of the most important events in U.S.-Chile relations in recent times.”\textsuperscript{64} Warm relations have continued since the inauguration of President Piñera. President Obama met with Piñera during the April 2010 Global Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., and again in March 2011 during his first visit to South America. During his visit to the county, President Obama commended Chile as “one of [the United States’] closest and strongest partners” and “one of the greatest success stories in the region.”\textsuperscript{65}

U.S. Assistance

Although Chile was once a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid, it currently receives only minor assistance as a result of its relatively high level of development. In an attempt to promote economic development and prevent the election of a communist government, the United States provided Chile with extensive assistance during the 1950s and 1960s. President Kennedy made Chile the centerpiece of his “Alliance for Progress,” providing the country with $1.7 billion (constant 2009 dollars) in economic assistance between 1961 and 1963.\textsuperscript{66} Assistance declined

\textsuperscript{65} White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Sebastian Piñera of Chile at Joint Press Conference,” March 21, 2011.
\textsuperscript{66} U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2009, (continued...)
following the 1970 election of Socialist President Salvador Allende and has generally remained low since then, increasing briefly during the early years of the Pinochet dictatorship and again following the transition to democracy. Chile received about $1.95 million in U.S. assistance in FY2010. The Obama Administration requested $2.21 million for Chile in FY2011 and $1.3 million in FY2012. The majority of U.S. assistance to Chile is focused on modernizing the Chilean military by improving its interoperability with U.S. forces and its capacity to participate in regional security and peacekeeping operations.67

In addition to annual bilateral assistance, the United States has provided emergency assistance to Chile in recent years. Following Chile’s massive February 2010 earthquake, the U.S. government provided the country with some $9.8 million in humanitarian assistance. This assistance included the deployment of a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) team to identify humanitarian needs; relief supplies such as satellite phones, emergency shelters, electric generators, and mobile water treatment units; and the deployment of two C-130 aircraft to transport emergency relief supplies to disaster-affected areas.68 Likewise, the Obama Administration dispatched a team of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) experts to Chile in August 2010 to assist the recovery of 33 trapped miners. The team of two medical doctors, a psychologist, and an engineer provided technical advice concerning human physiology and behavioral responses to emergencies.69

Commercial Ties

Trade Agreement

The United States and Chile signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) on June 6, 2003. Following the House and Senate passage of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Implementation Act, President Bush signed the bill into law on September 3, 2003 (P.L. 108-77). The FTA established immediate duty-free treatment for 85% of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products, increasing market access for both countries.70 Since the agreement went into force on January 1, 2004, bilateral trade between the United States and Chile has nearly tripled, totaling $17.9 billion in 2010. U.S. imports from Chile grew from $3.7 billion in 2003 to $7 billion in 2010, while U.S. exports to Chile grew from $2.7 billion in 2003 to $10.9 billion in 2010. Chile’s top exports to the United States are copper, edible fruit, seafood, and wood. The top U.S. exports to Chile are heavy machinery, oil, motor vehicles, and electrical machinery. In 2010, the United States was Chile’s top source of imports and the third-largest destination for Chile’s exports, while Chile was the 38th-largest source of U.S. imports and 24th-largest export market for U.S. goods.71

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67 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2012, April 8, 2011.


70 For more information on the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, see: CRS Report RL31144, The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Economic and Trade Policy Issues, by J. F. Hornbeck.

71 U.S. Department of Commerce and Servicio Nacional de Aduana (Chile) statistics, as presented by Global Trade (continued...)
the bilateral FTA, Chile and the United States are both participating in negotiations concerning the potential expansion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, an Asia-Pacific regional trade agreement.\(^\text{72}\)

**Intellectual Property Rights Protection**

Chile has been on the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Priority Watch List since 2007 as a result of insufficient efforts to protect intellectual property rights. Chile is only the second U.S. FTA partner to be placed on the Priority Watch List. According to USTR, Chile improved its intellectual property rights protection efforts in 2010 by implementing new copyright legislation and launching a ministerial-level interagency committee on intellectual property rights. Chile also ratified the Trademark Law Treaty and the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellites (Brussels Convention). Nonetheless, USTR recommends that Chile take additional actions to address a variety of outstanding intellectual property rights issues under the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement.\(^\text{73}\)

**Income Tax Treaty\(^\text{74}\)**

On February 4, 2010, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and then Chilean Finance Minister Andrés Velasco signed the “Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Chile for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital.” The treaty is designed to encourage private sector growth in both countries by providing certainty on the tax treatment of investors and reducing tax-related barriers to investment. Among other provisions, the treaty would reduce source-country withholding taxes on certain cross-border payments of dividends, interest, and royalties; establish rules to determine when an enterprise or individual of one country is subject to tax on business activities in the other; enhance the mobility of labor by coordinating the tax aspects of the U.S. and Chilean pension systems; foster collaboration to resolve tax disputes and relieve double taxation; and ensure the full exchange between the U.S. and Chilean tax authorities of information for tax purposes. The treaty, which has yet to be submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification, would be the first bilateral income tax treaty between the United States and Chile and only the second U.S. tax treaty with a South American country.\(^\text{75}\)

**Human Rights**

Progress in addressing Pinochet-era human rights abuses was rather limited during the Alwyn and Frei Administrations that followed the return of democratic governance in Chile. Recognizing the still delicate status of democracy, the Alwyn Administration allowed a 1978 amnesty law to

(...continued)


\(^{72}\) For more information, see CRS Report R40502, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement*, by Ian F. Fergusson and Bruce Vaughn.


remain in place while establishing a National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (the Rettig Commission) to investigate political disappearances and killings during the authoritarian period. The Rettig Commission’s recommendations led to the Chilean government awarding reparations to family members of those killed or disappeared. Nonetheless, it was only in 1998, when Pinochet finally stepped down as the head of the Armed Forces and was subsequently detained in the United Kingdom on an extradition request from Spain, that the government was able to place more emphasis on the discussion and prosecution of human rights abuses.\(^{76}\)

After slow progress during the first two Concertación administrations, attention to human rights issues accelerated during the Lagos and Bachelet Administrations. In 2003, Lagos established a National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (the Valech Commission), which awarded reparations to those who were tortured during the dictatorship. During the administration of President Bachelet—who was tortured by the Pinochet regime—Chile created an Institute of Human Rights, ratified the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and established a Museum of Memory dedicated to the victims of the dictatorship and those who struggled to promote and defend human rights.\(^{77}\) Since 2000, over 200 dictatorship-era officials and members of the military have been convicted of human rights abuses, with hundreds of others still under investigation.\(^{78}\) Although Pinochet died in 2006 before standing trial, those convicted include top officials such as former intelligence chief Manuel Contreras, who is serving multiple life sentences for his roles in myriad of dictatorship-era crimes, including the 1976 assassination of former Chilean Ambassador to the United States Orlando Letelier and his American associate, Ronni Moffitt, in Washington, DC.\(^{79}\)

President Piñera has been very cautious in dealing with dictatorship-era human rights issues, seeking to overcome the Chilean right’s historic association with Pinochet without alienating the portion of his political base that remains sympathetic to the former leader. Piñera largely selected politicians and private sector officials without major ties to the Pinochet regime when forming his government, and quickly replaced his ambassador to Argentina after the ambassador claimed that the majority of Chileans “were not affected” and “were relieved” by the country’s 1973 military coup.\(^{80}\) Likewise, Piñera has ruled out issuing a general pardon to retired members of the military convicted for violating human rights while remaining open to individual pardons for prisoners of advanced age or with terminal illnesses.\(^{81}\) Piñera has reopened the investigation into the 1991 assassination of Senator Jaime Guzmán, an influential member of the Pinochet regime that founded the conservative UDI party and was killed by members of the radical left-wing Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (*Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, FPMR*) after the return to democracy. The Piñera Administration has unsuccessfully sought the extradition of two former

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\(^{81}\) “Piñera Considera Incluir a Militares en Indulto para Aliviar Cárceles,” *Agence France Presse*, March 9, 2011.
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FPMR members that it believes to have been involved in the assassination that now reside in Argentina and Cuba. The Chilean judiciary is reexamining several other high profile cases, including the 1973 death of President Allende (1970-1973) and the 1982 death of former President Frei Montalva (1964-1970).82

Chile and the United States are currently working together to investigate unresolved human rights cases from the Pinochet era. During his March 2011 visit to Chile, President Obama said he would consider Chilean requests for classified information relating to human rights violations. Although tens of thousands of U.S. documents relating to Chile’s authoritarian period have already been declassified, many were heavily redacted and others have never been released. Many analysts believe that further declassification of U.S. documents could assist in the investigations into dictatorship-era crimes. President Piñera has announced that he will formally request the information from the U.S. government.83

According to the U.S. State Department, Chile continues to investigate the case of Boris Weisfeiler, a U.S. citizen who disappeared in the country in 1985. Although the Rettig Commission did not recognize Weisfeiler’s disappearance as a human rights violation due to lack of information in 1991, declassified U.S. documents84 released since then suggest that he may have been killed by the Pinochet regime. In March 2010, Weisfeiler’s family submitted his case to the Valech Commission, which was temporarily reestablished to look into cases that had not been fully investigated previously.85 The reestablished commission received some 32,500 cases and is expected to present its findings in August 2011.86 Two other U.S. citizens—Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi—were executed by Chilean security forces within weeks of the 1973 coup according to the Rettig Commission’s 1991 report.87

Energy Cooperation

As a result of Chile’s fast-growing economy and limited domestic energy resources, energy shortages have become one of the most critical long-term structural bottlenecks to the country’s economic growth.88 Chile’s demand for electricity has grown at an average of 6% annually over the past decade, spurred by strong economic growth, especially in energy-intensive sectors such as mining.89 The government estimates that energy demand will double over the next decade.90

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90 Eduardo Sepúlveda M, “Estamos Gobernando con Nuestras Ideas, No con Las de la Concertación,” El Mercurio, (continued...)
the same time, Chile’s traditional energy sources have come under pressure. Domestic demands have led Argentina to reduce its gas exports to Chile, and low rainfall has depleted the Chilean reservoirs used to generate hydroelectricity. The resulting energy shortages have forced blackouts and contributed to rising energy costs.\footnote{“Chile: Power Rationing Risk Shows Investment Need,” \textit{Oxford Analytica}, February 24, 2011.}

Chile’s efforts to address the shortfalls by encouraging reduced consumption and diversifying its energy supply have produced mixed results. A January 2011 proposal to increase gas prices in the Magallanes region of southern Chile sparked large, and sometimes violent, demonstrations that forced the government to largely back away from the idea.\footnote{“8,000 Chileans Protest Hike in Natural Gas Prices,” \textit{EFE News Service}, January 10, 2011; Miguel Sánchez, “Chile: Crisis del Gas Propina Derrota Política a Piñera (Analistas),” \textit{Agence France Presse}, January 19, 2011.} The government’s May 2011 decision to approve the environmentally controversial \textit{HydroAysén} hydroelectric project in the southern region of Aysén has also generated protests.\footnote{Steven Bodzin, “Chileans Protest Government Approval of Five Patagonia Dams,” \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, May 10, 2011.} Chile’s National Energy Commission has called for 20\% of the country’s energy to be generated from renewable energy sources by 2020. Only 2.7\% of Chile’s electricity generating capacity came from renewable sources in 2008, however, as a result of the financial and technical barriers to taking advantage of the country’s vast wind, solar, tidal, and geothermal energy potential.\footnote{“Chile: Medium-Term Electricity Supply Looks Secure,” \textit{Oxford Analytica}, April 23, 2009; “Chile: Renewable Energy Projects on the Increase,” \textit{Oxford Analytica}, May 4, 2010.} To offset its lack of domestic production, Chile now imports over two-thirds of its energy supply.\footnote{“Chile Industry: Energy Security Still Elusive,” \textit{Economist Intelligence Unit}, April 21, 2011.} Investments in liquefied natural gas terminals and coal-fired thermoelectric plants are diversifying the sources of Chile’s energy supply. At the same time, the coal-fired plants will contribute to increased carbon emissions, which could put Chile’s exports at a disadvantage if it were to enter into a global carbon market in the future.\footnote{“Chile: Coal Generation Raises Emissions Concerns,” \textit{Oxford Analytica}, August 19, 2009.}

In recent years, Chile and the United States have sought to cooperate on energy issues. At the Fifth Summit of the Americas\footnote{For more information on the Fifth Summit of the Americas, see CRS Report R40074, \textit{Fifth Summit of the Americas, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, April 2009: Background, Expectations, and Results}.} in April 2009, President Obama introduced an “Energy and Climate Partnership for the Americas” (ECPA) designed to foster regional cooperation on issues such as energy efficiency, renewable energy investment, and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.\footnote{White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “The United States and the 2009 Summit of the Americas: Securing Our Citizens’ Future,” Press Release, April 19, 2009.} Under the umbrella of ECPA, the United States and Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in clean energy technologies in June 2009. Through the MOU, the U.S. Department of Energy is providing technical support to Chile’s Renewable Energy Center and two solar plant pilot projects in the Atacama Dessert. Future collaboration is likely to involve biofuels, biomass, and wind and geothermal energy projects.\footnote{White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “The United States and Chile: Environment, Energy, and Climate Change,” Fact Sheet, March 21, 2011.} Chile and the United States signed another MOU during President Obama’s March 2011 trip to the country, (...continued)
agreeing to cooperate on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Through the MOU, the two
governments will work together on issues such as fuel design, nuclear safety and security, and
human resource and infrastructure development.100

Regional Security

Chile’s foreign policy traditionally has been based on respect for international law, peaceful
dispute resolution, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.101 Although
much of Chile’s foreign policy since the return to democracy has focused on forging trade and
investment linkages, Chile also has been an active participant in multilateral efforts to advance
peace and stability in the hemisphere. In recent years, Chile has contributed forces to the U.N.
mission in Haiti, collaborated on regional counternarcotics efforts, and engaged in diplomatic
efforts to resolve political crises in Bolivia and Honduras.102 Moreover, the United States and
Chile are currently working together under a “Trilateral Development Initiative” designed to
improve stability and prosperity in the hemisphere by strengthening health, security, and social
protection efforts in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Paraguay.103

Haiti Peacekeeping

Chile has worked with the United States as part of the multinational peacekeeping force in Haiti
since 2004. Chile agreed to send peacekeeping forces to Haiti immediately after receiving the
U.N. Security Council’s initial March 2004 request for assistance in stabilizing the deteriorating
situation in the country. As part of the Multinational Interim Force-Haiti (MIFH), Chilean soldiers
provided Haiti with urgently needed assistance while giving the U.N. time to prepare a broader
mission. Chile’s early presence in the MIFH also encouraged a number of other Latin American
countries to contribute to the broader U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
establishing an opportunity for regional political and military cooperation and integration. Chile
has committed more human and material resources to MINUSTAH than it has to any previous
peacekeeping mission.104 It currently has some 500 soldiers on the ground. In May 2011, the
Chilean Senate approved a one-year extension that will allow Chilean peacekeeping forces to
remain in Haiti until June 2012.105

100 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “The United States and Chile: Cooperation on the
101 Carlos Portales, “A Word from a Foreign Policy Maker,” Remarks at the Embassy of Chile’s "Chilean Bicentennial:
102 Patrick J. McDonnell, “Regional Summit Calls on Bolivians to Avoid Strife,” Los Angeles Times, September 16,
2008; “Bachelet No Acepta Legitimar los Golpes de Estado,” La Nación (Chile), December 1, 2009.
103 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “The United States and Chile: Trilateral
Development Cooperation,” Fact Sheet, March 20, 2011.
104 Enzo Di Nocera García and Ricardo Benavente Cresta, “Chile: Responding to a Regional Crisis,” in Capacity
Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti, eds. John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz, 66-90 (Dulles, VA: Potomac
105 “Senado Aprobó Prorrogar Permanencia de Tropas Chilenas en Haití,” La Nación (Chile), May 18, 2011.
Narcotics Trafficking

As a result of its long, difficult-to-monitor borders, Chile is a transshipment point for Andean cocaine destined for Europe and has recently become a source of precursor chemicals for methamphetamine processing in Mexico and cocaine processing in Peru and Bolivia. Chile recognizes the threat posed by illicit narcotics and has dedicated substantial personnel and financial resources to containing the problem. In 2010, Chile’s highly professional and competent law enforcement officials increased their counternarcotics operations, as well as their arrests for drug-related offenses and seizures of several forms of illicit narcotics. Through October 2010, Chilean officials reported seizures of approximately 2.3 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride, 5 metric tons of cocaine base, 5.6 metric tons of processed marijuana; and 222,260 units of illegal pharmaceutical drugs.  

The United States recognizes the government of Chile as a strong counternarcotics partner with which it works closely to reduce drug trafficking in Chile and elsewhere in the region. In FY2012, the Obama Administration requested $100,000 in counternarcotics assistance for Chile. The funds will support ongoing activities in areas such as anti-trafficking, border security, citizen security, and financial investigative techniques. Other bilateral U.S.-Chilean counternarcotics cooperation is focused on improving interagency collaboration and international drug trafficking investigations. In 2011, Chile and the United States intend to work together to support citizen security efforts in Central America.


## Appendix. Chilean Political Acronyms

### Table A-1. Chilean Political Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Political Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAM</td>
<td>Arauco-Malleco Coordinating Committee</td>
<td>Militant Mapuche organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPM</td>
<td>Together We Can Do More</td>
<td>Leftist coalition of parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>Lefist member party of JPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>Centrist member party of the Concertación_\textsuperscript{b}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>Party for Democracy</td>
<td>Center-left member party of the Concertación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Regionalist Party of Independents</td>
<td>Centrist party formed in a merger of regional parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Radical Party</td>
<td>Center-left member party of the Concertación.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
<td>Center-left member party of the Concertación.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>National Renewal</td>
<td>Center-right member party of the Coalición.\textsuperscript{c}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Independent Democratic Union</td>
<td>Conservative member party of the Coalición.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by CRS.

**Notes:**

a. The Mapuche are Chile's largest indigenous group.
b. The Concertación is a center-left coalition of parties.
c. The Coalición is a center-right coalition of parties.

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