Runtime Detection of C-Style Errors in UPC Code

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Abstract

Unified Parallel C (UPC) extends the C programming language (ISO C 99) with explicit parallel programming support for the partitioned global address space (PGAS), which provides a global memory space with localized partitions to each thread. Like its ancestor C, UPC is a low-level language that emphasizes code efficiency over safety. The absence of dynamic (and static) safety checks allows programmer oversights and software flaws that can be hard to spot.

In this paper, we present an extension of a dynamic analysis tool, ROSE-Code Instrumentation and Runtime Monitor (ROSE-CIRM), for UPC to help programmers find C-style errors involving the global address space. Built on top of the ROSE source-to-source compiler infrastructure, the tool instruments source files with code that monitors operations and keeps track of changes to the system state. The resulting code is linked to a runtime monitor that observes the program execution and finds software defects.

We describe the extensions to ROSE-CIRM that were necessary to support UPC. We discuss complications that arise from parallel code and our solutions. We test ROSE-CIRM against a runtime error detection test suite, and present performance results obtained from running error-free codes. ROSE-CIRM is released as part of the ROSE compiler under a BSD-style open source license.

1. Introduction

A 2002 NIST study on the economic impact of software flaws (bugs) [18] reports that about half of a software project’s budget is spent on testing. The same study estimates that software bugs cost the US economy 59.5 billion dollars (0.6% of 2002’s GDP) annually. Software flaws cause programs to behave in undesirable ways. They originate from oversights and human misjudgments in the software development life cycle. Software flaws also arise from operations exhibiting undefined or unspecified behavior. Such behavior describes operations where the language designer deliberately did not specify the behavior. While software frequently contains flaws, the size and complexity of modern software makes the detection of such flaws difficult.

Reducing the number of software flaws is an effort that permeates all stages in software development. For example, adopting rigid coding standards and restricting programming languages to a safe subset can eliminate error-prone coding techniques. Static and dynamic code analysis tools code are also used to reduce software flaws. Static analysis tools utilize source code (style) analysis or formal analysis techniques such as dataflow analysis, abstract interpretation, and model checking. Static analysis tools do not influence the running programs but often state space, implementation techniques, and language semantics make precise analysis intractable. Dynamic analysis tools find bugs by observing the behavior of running programs. This is typically accomplished by code instrumentation (source or binary) or by replacing (built-in) library functions (e.g., malloc) with custom implementations. Dynamic analysis operates with concrete values and is not prone to combinatorial state explosion. The downside of dynamic analysis tools is that monitoring running programs impacts performance. The quality of the results depends on the tests’ input data and covered program paths.

Unified Parallel C (UPC) [22], an extension of the C programming language for parallel programming, is prone to vulnerabilities inherited from its C ancestor (e.g., array out of bounds accesses, dereferences of dangling pointers, the use of uninitialized variables, arithmetic overflow and underflow, string termination, etc.) and vulnerabilities introduced by parallel programming (e.g., race conditions, dead locks, etc.). While safer programming language, compiler, and tool support are desirable, economic, performance, compatibility, and portability reasons prevent safety mechanisms from receiving more attention.

In this paper we present an extension of an existing dynamic analysis tool, ROSE-CIRM, for UPC. The previous ROSE-CIRM tool [20] monitors ISO C and ISO C++ programs and detects runtime errors. In this work, we extend ROSE-CIRM to find similar C-style errors in UPC code. The presented tool is able to identify uninitialized memory accesses, dangling pointers, erroneous heap allocation/deallocation, and out of bounds array accesses in parallel programs using UPC’s shared memory space. We tested our tool for its accuracy and overhead using the RTED benchmark test suite [14] for UPC and a few error-free sample programs [7].

The contributions of this paper include 1) a first monitored execution environment for UPC, 2) compiler-based automatic code instrumentation of UPC source code, 3) a runtime library to record and check UPC programs’ state, 4) evaluation based on a runtime...
error benchmark suite, and 5) analysis of the runtime monitor’s overhead and optimizations that reduce its overhead.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: §2 provides background information on the Unified Parallel C (UPC) language and ROSE-CIRM for C/C++. §3 describes our extensions to ROSE-CIRM for UPC. §4 discusses the programs tested by our tool and obtained results. §5 gives an overview of other dynamic tools for detecting bugs. §6 concludes the paper and provides an outlook on future improvements.

2. Background

This section provides background information on the UPC language, on the ROSE compiler, and on our ROSE-based runtime error detection tool implementation for C and C++.

2.1 Unified Parallel C

The PGAS programming model offers a global memory space with localized partitions to each thread. UPC extends the ISO C programming language with parallel constructs for the partitioned global address space. Fig. 1 depicts a typical memory layout for a UPC program.

![UPC memory layout](image)

**Figure 1.** UPC memory layout

A UPC program consists of THREADS number of threads. Each thread contains its own stack and heap, where it has exclusive access. In addition, each UPC thread owns a portion of the global address space (shared heap memory). Any thread can access the entire shared heap using random reads and writes.

To control which data is private and which data can be accessed from other UPC threads, UPC introduces a new type qualifier (shared). For arrays, UPC allows the specification of a blocking factor, that determines how many consecutive elements are stored within the shared region. Consider the following example:

```c
// a[1] is initialized by the thread owning a[1]
int a[THREADS];

thread t = thread_number();
a[t] = rand();
```

The first declaration allocates a single integer variable in the shared space (within Thread 0). The second declaration defines an array of integers with 4 THREADS elements (The built-in constant THREADS returns the number of UPC threads). Each thread owns four elements of the array. The blocking factor is 2, thus the first and second element are located in Thread 0, the third and fourth in Thread 1, and so on.

UPC offers three kind of pointers: 1) C-style pointers (private to private) point to an address within an UPC’s local address space, including its local portion of the shared space; 2) pointers to shared memory (private to shared) can address the entire global space (usable only by the owning thread); and 3) shared pointers to shared memory (shared to shared) can be used by any UPC thread. Example UPC pointers are shown below:

```c
int* private_to_private;

int* private_to_shared;

int* shared_to_shared;
```

Three functions in UPC are available for dynamically allocating memory in the shared space. upc_alloc allocates all memory within the shared memory of a single thread, upc_global_alloc distributes the memory according to a specified blocking factor (the following code snippet prints the blocking factor in blue), and upc_all_alloc is a collective version of upc_global_alloc.

A locking mechanism is provided by UPC to protect critical regions. UPC defines the opaque type upc_lock_t, together with operations to enter (upc_lock, upc_lock_attempt), exit (upc_unlock), allocate (upc_global_lock_alloc and the collective version upc_all_lock_alloc), and deallocate (upc_lock_free).

UPC threads can be synchronized with upc_barrier. UPC also provides the pair upc_notify/upc_wait implementing a split phase barrier. Split phase barriers help writing code that overlaps computation and communication. Memory consistency can be controlled using upc_fence. In addition, UPC can control the memory consistency of files, scopes, and objects using pragmas and qualifiers.

UPC provides a parallel loop statement (upc forall). upc forall’s syntax extends C’s for loop syntax with a fourth argument (the affinity expression) controlling which UPC thread will execute a specific loop iteration. Fig. 2 shows three versions of a upc forall loop initializing all elements of a globally-declared shared array with random values. Each array element is written exactly once. In the first version, the thread whose shared memory owns a[i] executes the assignment. In the second version, the thread is determined by the result of the modulo division i THREADS. In the last version, the loop counter is incremented in steps (THREADS). On the omission of an affinity expression, all threads execute each loop iteration. Note MYTHREAD returns the UPC thread number.

2.2 The ROSE Compiler Infrastructure

ROSE [19], developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is an open source compiler infrastructure to build both source and binary program transformation and analysis tools for large-scale Fortran 77/90/2003, C, C++, OpenMP, and UPC applications. As shown in Figure 3, ROSE can process both source code and binary executables (x86, Power-PC, ARM instruction sets) as input with help from source parsers (EDG [6] and Open Fortran Parser [4]) and binary disassemblers (such as IDA Pro [10]). Leveraging the EDG C++ frontend, ROSE currently supports all UPC constructs as defined in UPC 1.2, and non-standard Berkeley UPC extensions (defined in the UCB bupc_extensions.h).

Internally, ROSE generates a uniform abstract syntax tree (AST) as its intermediate representation (IR) for both source and binary input. Sophisticated compiler analyses and transformations are

![Rose Compiler Infrastructure](image)

**Figure 3.** ROSE compiler infrastructure

```c
1 shared[2] int arr[4+THREADS];
2 shared const int len = sizeof(arr)/sizeof(arr[0]);
3 // a[i] is initialized by the thread owning a[i]
4 upc_forall(int i = 0; i < len; ++i) a[i] = rand();
5 // a[i] is initialized by Thread (i % THREADS)
6 upc_forall(int i = 0; i < len; ++i) a[i] = rand();
7 // all threads execute the loop body
8 upc_forall(int i = 0; i < len; i+=THREADS, ) a[i+MYTHREAD] = rand();
```
Saves data about the structure of arrays allocated
entering memory, and places where functions are invoked, etc. At these locations, the runtime functions are inserted to record the system state and/or check if there are any errors. Using source code instead of binary code allows the checking mechanism to utilize high level type informations such as array bounds.

The code instrumentation phase is implemented through the transformation of an input’s program AST. ROSE-CIRM uses the top-down AST traversal mechanism in ROSE to visit all nodes. Depending on a node’s type and its context, source locations where instrumentation is needed will be identified and corresponding function calls will be inserted.

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2.3 ROSE-CIRM Tool

ROSE-CIRM [20] is a dynamic analysis tool that consists of a source code instrumentation tool built using ROSE and a runtime library. Fig. 4 illustrates the workflow of using ROSE-CIRM, including instrumentation, compilation, and monitored execution.

During code instrumentation, ROSE-CIRM identifies a program’s source locations that require interaction with the runtime monitor and inserts calls to the runtime library. Such locations include statements declaring and accessing variables, places where scopes are entered and exited, locations allocating and deallocating memory, and places where functions are invoked, etc. At these locations, the runtime functions are inserted to record the system state and/or check if there are any errors. Using source code instead of binary code allows the checking mechanism to utilize high level type informations such as array bounds.

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Fig. 5 illustrates the elementary mechanism: transformations are implemented by an InstrumentationVisitor. The example shows operations on ROSE basic blocks (i.e., a statement sequence enclosed by {}) and variable references. Basic block entries and exits are instrumented to keep track of local variables’ lifetime. Variable references are instrumented to keep track of uninitialized variables. Hereby, the function readWriteContext determines whether a variable is used in a read or write context.

```
struct InstrumentationVisitor {
    ...  
    void handle(SgBasicBlock& block) {
        instrument_block_entry(block);
        instrument_block_exit(block);
    }
    void handle(SgVarRefExpr& var) {
        Context ctx = readWriteContext(var);
        if (ctx) instrument.variable.access(var, ctx);
    }
};
```

Figure 5. Instrumentation pass

Table 1. Representative runtime-monitor interface for UPC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cirmAllocMem</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Saves data about a heap allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmFreeMemory</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>Checks memory deallocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmCreateVariable</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Keeps track of variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmInitVariable</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Marks a memory location as initialized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmAccessVariable</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Checks that a memory location exists and is initialized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmInterScope</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Record a new scope context (upon function or block entry).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmExitScope</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>Deletes a scope context and all memory associated with it. Check for dangling pointers to disappeared memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmCreateArray</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Saves data about arrays allocated on the stack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmAccessArray</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Checks if the access is within array bounds. It also optionally checks if location has been initialized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmMovePointer</td>
<td>UC</td>
<td>Validates a pointer update.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmRegisterTypeCall</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Saves data about the structure of user defined data types.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmClose</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Closes the runtime monitor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The instrumentation inserts calls to the runtime monitor. Table 1 shows the runtime monitor’s interface supporting dynamic analysis of dynamic memory, stack memory, arrays and pointers, functions, etc. The first column of Table 1 shows function names and the last columns shows function descriptions. The second column indicates whether the function is a notification on a system state update (“U”), a runtime check (“C”), or both (“UC”). Calls to state-updating functions are usually inserted after the state update operation. Calls to runtime checking functions are often inserted before the potentially harmful operation executes.

The code in Fig. 6 demonstrates how the code instrumentation embeds interaction with the runtime monitor (displayed in italic) in user code. For illustration purposes, the code omits some details such as how ROSE-CIRM tracks type information, location information, and loop variables. The code uses a function (compute at line 3) to elements of a dynamically allocated array. Then the function sum (at line 14) calculates and prints the sum of all elements. Note that the implementation contains a bug in line 6: Variable i is initialized to 1 instead of 0. The value of values[0] remains undefined. Function sum uses this undefined value later on.

Instrumenting compute adds calls to cirm_EnterScope and cirm_CreateScope to keep track of the creation and destruction of variables and parameters (e.g., at lines 4 and 11). The call to cirm_CreateVariable notifies the runtime monitor on the creation of an (initialized) parameter.

The call to cirm_AccessArray in line 7 checks whether the index i is within array bounds (i.e., whether the locations values[0] and values[1] belong to the same innermost array). The call to cirm_InitVariable in line 9 notifies the runtime monitor that location values[i] has been initialized. sum’s instrumentation in line 18 keeps track of variable res, which was initialized. Before res is read, cirm_AccessVariable checks that it was initialized (line 20). Line 21 checks that the array access is within bounds and that the element was initialized (i.e., cirmRead). Line 29 allocates heap memory for it values. The call in Line 30 notifies the runtime system on the memory allocation. Line 30 notifies the runtime system on the memory allocation.
```c
#define N 8
2 void compute(int (*values)[N]) { /* Compute values of array elements */
4 cirn_EnterScope();
6 cirn_CreateVariable(&values, sizeof(values), cirnStack, cirnInitialized);  
8 for (int i=1; i<N; ++i) { /* scope and variable instrumentation omitted */
10 cirn_AccessArray(&(*values)[0], &(*values)[i], cirnRead);  
12 cirn_InitVariable(&(*values)[i], sizeof(*values));  
14 cirn_Write();  
16 cirn_InitVariable(&res, sizeof(res), cirnStack, cirnInitialized);  
18 for (int i=0; i<N; ++i) { /* scope and variable instrumentation omitted */
20 cirn_AccessArray(&res, sizeof(res));  
22 cirn_Read();  
24 cirn_Write();  
26 printf("sum = %s", res);  
28 }  
30 int main() { /* scope and call instrumentation omitted */
32 cirn_AllocMem(values, sizeof(values), akCHeap);  
34 cirn_CreateVariable(&values, sizeof(values), cirnInitialized);  
36 compute(values);  
38 }  
40 Figure 6. Instrumented sequential source code about the declaration and initialization status of variable values.
ROSE-CIRM aborts the program and reports an error message,
when the uninitialized element value[0] is accessed (line 19).
Using the combined instrumentation and runtime support,
ROSE-CIRM for C/C++ is able to detect errors including erroneous
deallocations, accesses of unallocated memory, out of bound errors,
accesses to uninitialized memory, dangling pointers, unreachable
heap memory, mismatched function arguments, etc.
We have used the RTED benchmark [13, 14] to evaluate ROSE-
CIRM for C and C++. ROSE-CIRM passes most (96%) test pro-
grams of the respective RTED benchmark (excluding floating point
errors).

3. Extending ROSE-CIRM for UPC
In this section, we will discuss errors in UPC programs and the
challenges that UPC’s notion of a shared memory parallelism posses
for a ROSE-CIRM extension.
3.1 Errors in UPC Programs
UPC inherits vulnerabilities from C and shared memory parallel
programming. We group runtime errors according to their origin:
C style errors occurring in the private memory space of a UPC
thread do not involve parallelism. The ROSE-CIRM functionality
for C/C++ can handle such problems.
In UPC, similar (C style) errors involving the global shared
address space can occur. This includes array subscripts where the
index is out of bounds (e.g., p[expr1] when p is a pointer to
shared), reading through a dangling pointer (e.g., when another
thread free the memory region), and reads of uninitialized values
(potentially initialized by other threads) from the shared memory
space. The presented extension for ROSE-CIRM addresses these
problems.
Similar to the C library, the UPC library functions specify pre-
conditions on arguments. Since UPC systems are not obliged to de-
tect precondition violations, programmers must ensure that a spe-
cific argument tuple is valid. The current ROSE-CIRM implementa-
tion does not address these problems (although similar checks for
C library calls could be extended to handle UPC library calls).
Concurrency-induced vulnerabilities refer to problems such as
deadlocks, livelocks, and races. Detecting these problems is beyond
the scope of this paper.

3.2 State Updates in a Partitioned Global Address Space
The implementation of a monitored execution environment for
UPC programs poses several new challenges. First, state updates
of the shared space must be made observable by other threads.
For example, a shared variable initialized by one thread must be
seen as initialized by other threads. Whether this is implemented
by a single shared or multiple distributed data structure is a design
choice. Our approach uses a separate runtime monitor for each UPC
thread. The runtime monitors exchange messages on state updates.
Fig. 8 shows the design. Each UPC thread has its own runtime
monitor. The instrumented code notifies the runtime system on state
updates and requests the validation of unsafe operations before they
are carried out. Unsafe operations are tested using the information
that the runtime system has available. Any update of the global
memory space’s state is communicated to the other runtime mon-
tors through message queues. Each thread has its own message
queue, where other threads can send their state updates.
Consider the compute/sum program from §2.3. Fig. 7 shows a
classified version of function compute. Thread 1 executes line 7
(e.g., values[1]=7) which writes to the global address space. Af-
fer the assignment, the instrumentation notifies runtime monitor 1
about the state update (cirn_InitVariable in the code and black
solid arrow in the diagram). Since the memory location was pre-
viously uninitialized, the change of state must be shared with the
other runtime monitors. This is done by allocating memory for a
message in the memory partition of each receiving thread (using
upc_global_alloc). Then the sender (runtime monitor 1) copies the
message (values[1]=7 and green dotted arrows) to each receiver
and enqueues the message into the receiver’s queue (enqueue and
dequeue use locks). The order of messages can differ in each queue.
The sending thread’s local portion of the allocated memory is uti-
```
lized as counter keeping track of how many receiving threads have not processed the message (1 unread in Fig. 8).

We have modified ROSE-CIRM’s interface functions (Table 1) to process the messages from the message queue whenever the run-time monitor gets called. After a thread has processed (blue solid arrow) the incoming message, it decrements the unread counter. The diagram shows a program state where all but Thread 0 have read the message, thus the counter is 1. The last thread frees the memory and lock associated with the message.

In code prone to race conditions (where one thread writes and the other thread reads a variable), the reading thread might receive the notification too late. This data race scenario is discussed in §3.3.

The presented design assumes that state updates to global address space are rare among all operations. Runtime checks can be carried out without delays, because each runtime monitor has all information available. Having separate runtime monitors in each thread that communicate with each other also gives us control over the time when those messages are processed (i.e., when a FGAS state modifying operation becomes visible to a validation call). By delaying the processing of runtime messages until the next thread synchronization, some potential race conditions can be identified.

The downside of replication is that any global state modifying operation needs to be broadcast to all other UPC threads. Consider image convolution, where the pixel of a new image is calculated from a pixel and its eight neighbors. Assuming each write operation is a state update, each thread in our approach receives pixels \( \frac{\text{pixels}}{\text{threads}} \) update messages (one for each pixel written by other threads) and sends pixels \( \frac{\text{pixels}}{\text{threads}} \) messages (one for each pixel that the thread writes).

### 3.3 Runtime Error Detection and Race Conditions

Another challenge for runtime monitoring of parallel programs is dealing with race conditions [16]. By race condition, we mean that the outcome of an operation depends on the runtime order with respect to another operation executed by a different thread.

We distinguish three kinds of race conditions:

- **Early release problem**: Some thread releases dynamic memory and another thread writes to that location.
- **Data race**: One thread writes to a memory location and another thread reads from or writes to the same location.
- **Atomicity violation**: Two operations, such as setting a value and checking it, must be carried out indivisibly.

While ROSE-CIRM does not detect these hazards, the runtime monitor has to prevent race conditions in the original code from erroneously allowing an unsafe operation. To execute such operation combinations safely, we impose a runtime order on them. In an effort to balance synchronization overhead and safety, we allow ROSE-CIRM to err conservatively. ROSE-CIRM never allows unsafe operations, but it may spuriously report an error, if the monitored program contains a race.

**Early release problem**: Consider the following code being executed by more than one thread:

```c
shared int* p = upc_all_alloc(THREADS, sizeof(int));
```

```c
2 if (p) return;
4 if[MYTHREAD] = 0;
6 /* useful work using p is omitted here */
8 ... 
```

```c
if (MYTHREAD == 0) upc_free(p);
```

Line 1 collectively allocates shared memory with a size of \( \text{THREADS} \times \text{sizeof(int)} \) bytes. Each thread stores the beginning of the allocated memory in a private-to-shared pointer variable p. If the allocation was successful, line 4 zero-initializes each integer value for each thread. In line 7, Thread 0 frees this memory. The code is vulnerable to a race. Without synchronization between the memory initialization and the deallocation, Thread 0 might free the memory before all other threads have initialized and used their local values in useful work.

All threads start in the quiescent zone. In this state, they do not participate actively in any program operation (threads wait, or perform runtime monitor initialization/termination operations). In order to enter the safe zone, threads check that no other thread performs (or waits to perform) a destructive update (i.e., calls to upc_free). Once a thread enters the safe zone, all non-destructive operations are allowed. Before a thread can carry out a destructive heap operation it signals its intent to the other threads and waits until all other threads have exited the safe zone. At any point in time there can only be one thread that signals. Then, the thread proceeds to carry out the unsafe operation, broadcasts the state update, and clears the destructive zone. Threads can enter to the safe zone when there is no other thread in or waiting for the destructive zone. Before a thread enters a state where it cannot react to a signal, it also has to exit from the safe zone. This includes blocking operations (e.g., upc_barrier, upc_lock) and thread exits.

Checking whether another thread intends to conduct a destructive operation is performed upon entry of runtime monitor functions. Entering in the destructive zone is implemented by adding two functions (cirmBeginDestructive, cirmEndDestructive) to the runtime monitor interface. The instrumentation phase wraps destructive operations. The following code snippet shows the instrumented line 7 from the previous example.

```c
1 if (MYTHREAD == 0) {
3   cirmBeginDestructive();
5   cirmEndDestructive();
7 }
```

In order to avoid deadlocks in our safe work zone scheme, all threads entering a potentially blocking state (e.g., all collective operations, upc_lock) have to exit the safe zone. We have implemented this approach by adding two runtime monitor functions cirmExitWorkzone and cirmEnterWorkzone. The instrumentation phases makes sure that threads exit and enter the work zone when executing a blocking operation.
3.4 Address Handling

To access the global address space, UPC provides the notion of shared variables and pointers. *Pointers to shared memory* encode the thread number, the address in the global address space, and the phase (the offset within the current block). In addition, the local partition of the global address space can also be accessed using regular C pointers. Shared memory addresses can be cast to C-style pointers, but not vice versa.

To deal with local and global addresses uniformly, the ROSE-CIRM runtime system uses an address abstraction with two fields in forms of `<thread_id, local_address>` or `<thread_id, address_offset>`. The runtime monitor uses the former to locate the state information and the latter to communicate state updates. The `thread_id` indicates the owning UPC thread. The `local_address` points to a valid address within the address space of the current thread. When the `thread_id` indicates a remote address, the local address field denotes the location in the remote thread projected on the current thread’s global address space range. The `address_offset` denotes an address offset within the current thread’s global space range.

Consider two UPC threads, Thread 1 and Thread 2. In their own address space, the global shared space starts at address `0x40` (local global address base) and `0x60` respectively. A shared array that starts at local address `0x50` in Thread 1 would start at local address `0x70` in Thread 2. To keep track of the memory state in a uniform way, addresses in the global address space are communicated in terms of offset from the shared memory base address. When Thread 1 receives an update notification (e.g., `cirmInitVariable`) on location `<Thread 1, 0x50>` (addr_offset = global_addr - local_global_addr_base) to Thread 2. Thread 2 translates the address offset back to its own local address space by adding back its shared memory base. The address becomes `<Thread 1, 0x70>`.

For pointer checking, the runtime monitor has to dereference an address. If the address resides in the shared space, our address representation has to be converted into a shared-to-shared pointer in order to utilize UPC’s dereference implementation. This conversion depends on the particular shared pointer format in a UPC compiler and runtime system.

The fact that C-style pointers can point to locations into the local shared address space makes it impossible to use type information to decide whether an operation modifies the shared heap. As illustrated in Fig. 11, we test instead whether an address falls within the shared heap boundary. This technique also depends on the particular memory layout used by a UPC compiler and runtime system.

3.5 Bounds Checking

For regular C code, bounds checking is trivial. A memory access is valid if a memory location lies within a specified address range. In UPC, the order of two relative addresses depends on the specified blocking factor. We illustrate the problem with an array layout for a two-dimensional array depicted in Fig. 12:

The diagram shows the memory layout for a two-dimensional character array in an UPC program with four threads with bounds four (the number of UPC threads) and eight respectively. Each array component is drawn in a different color. The number in each cell denotes the linearized offset within the defined array. (The four white cells at offset 32 to 35 belong to padding bytes). The array `chararr[0]` ranges from address (actually, the offset in each threads shared memory) `0x50` to address `0x51` in Thread 2. The blocking factor (3) determines how many elements are consecutively allocated to a thread. Thus address `0x51` in Thread 1 is within `chararr[0]` and its relative order is before address `0x51` in Thread 2’s. Since, in this example, the blocking factor is not a divisor of the total array size, the allocated space is larger than the array. The first two threads host nine elements, the Thread 2 eight elements, and Thread 4 six elements. The unused space (white cells 32-35) are padding bytes.

Other blocking factors produce different mappings from addresses to linearized offsets within an distributed array. For exam-
Table 2. UPC related functions added to the runtime monitor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cirmExitWorkzone</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Stops operating in safe mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmEnterWorkzone</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Starts operating in safe mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmBeginDestructive</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Waits until other threads have left the safe workzone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmEndDestructive</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Ends the destructive operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmEnterSharedPtrOp</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Starts a shared pointer to shared operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmExitSharedPtrOp</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Ends a shared pointer to shared operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Evaluation

This section evaluates our tool for its accuracy and overhead using the RTED benchmark suite [13, 14] and a few error free codes. Table 3 summarizes the system configuration of our evaluation.

Table 3. Test system configuration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hardware</th>
<th>Intel X5680 (6x2 cores) clocked at 3.3Ghz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>24GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Red Hat Enterprise Linux Client 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C++ compiler</td>
<td>g++ (4.1-2.50) Red Hat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC compiler</td>
<td>GCCUPC (4.5.1.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We compiled the test codes without optimizations and linked them to the compiler optimized ROSE-CIRM runtime library. Depending on the test, we employed between 2 and 12 UPC threads. We report the average run-time of ten runs in seconds.

4.1 Accuracy of Dynamic Analysis

The RTED benchmark suites [13, 14] test whether certain defects of C, C++, Fortran, and UPC programs are detected and properly reported by compilers, runtime systems or third party tools. Each test suite contains programs exhibiting a specific software defect. For each test, the suite defines an expected output of a software error message.

The RTED suite is organized in several error categories. For example, the RTED C suite tests the following runtime error categories: memory allocation/deallocation, array index out of bounds, floating point, IO related, memory leaks, pointer, string, function invocation, uninitialized variables, and C99 specific defects. The RTED UPC test suite contains the following additional error categories: deadlocks, races, out of bounds indices, out of bounds pointer accesses, out of bounds accesses involving UPC functions,
Table 4. RTED UPC benchmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of tests</th>
<th>Correctly Identified (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Out of bounds accesses (indices)</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>685 (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of bounds accesses (pointers)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>150 (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uninitialized memory reads</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62 (97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic memory handling related</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. N-Queens: runtime monitoring overhead

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach / Threads</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Un-monitored (s)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSE-CIRM orig. (s)</td>
<td>141.8</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSE-CIRM opt. (s)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead ratio - orig.</td>
<td>484.4</td>
<td>516.9</td>
<td>561.4</td>
<td>625.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead ratio - opt.</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. N-Queens: profile

The entries in the first section are roughly related to N-Queens’ recursive function implementation. More than 22.5% of the overhead is related to variable creations. cirmEnterScope cleans up all variables associated with the scope, thus its share on the overhead is larger than cirmEnterScope. Approximately half of the overhead is spent on updating and checking the status of memory (cirmInitVariable and cirmAccessVariable).
Since the overhead is significant, we assessed by how much simple (non UPC specific) intraprocedural static analysis can improve performance. We manually performed the following optimizations:

- reaching definitions: If the use of a local variable has a reaching definition, we can eliminate calls to cirmAccessVariable.
- simple escape analysis: If the address of a variable (or parameter) was not taken, no accesses are local. If there is no cirmAccessVariable call on the variable, we can eliminate cirmInitVariable and cirmCreateVariable calls. Moreover, if a scope does not track any variables we can eliminate the calls to cirmEnterScope and cirmExitScope.
- array bounds checking: ROSE-CIRM’s bounds checks are expensive because arrays are treated like pointers. Each call to cirmAccessArray retrieves the information based on the base address. Then the two addresses are linearized §3.4 and checked whether they belong to the same innermost array. If the array bounds are statically known (e.g., the subscript operator operates not on a pointer), we can check all but the last array subscript operation with a simple value comparison. Assume an array declaration int arr[4] [3] and an array access arr[2][3]. Here we can replace the call to cirmArrayAccess(&arr[0], &arr[2]) with a simple bounds check 0 <= x && x < 4.

In the N-Queens code, these optimizations eliminate the checking of all local variables. Table 5 shows that, on average, runtime overhead decreases from 547 to 42.

The heat conduction program [7, pp 54–62] models heat transfer. Values are stored in a globally defined four dimensional grid.

```
shared [BLOCKSIZE] double grids [2][N][N][N];
```

The first dimension, containing two elements, stores the initial values and the results for each time step. In odd-numbered time steps, grid[1] is computed from grid[0], and vice versa for even-numbered time steps. Each element is calculated by considering its six neighboring elements. In addition, the heat conduction code globally defines a shared array where each processor stores the local transferred heat maximum. The iteration stops when the global maximum falls under a predetermined limit. UPC (like C99 and C++) zero initializes data that has static lifetime. By default, ROSE-CIRM treats global data as uninitialized. To allow informed programmers to rely on the standard behavior, ROSE-CIRM offers a switch to change the initialization status of global variables.

We tested the code using a block size of one, a grid with 80 elements per dimension, and the code running on eight UPC threads. We varied the number of iterations from 10 to 40. Table 7 shows the obtained results. For each test we timed the grid initialization, the first iteration, the last iteration, and the total time. The time is stated in seconds.

Grid initialization and the first loop iteration is the only code portion that incurs overhead due to runtime monitor synchronization. There is no message exchanged after the first iteration has completed. grid[0] has been initialized upfront; grid[1] and the array storing the locally transferred maximum have been computed during the first iteration. Every subsequent iteration runs faster (see the last iteration data).

The overall performance penalty of the runtime monitor is a factor of 146 for 10 iterations. The performance penalty decreases as the number of iterations increases because the synchronization overhead can be amortized over more iterations. The lower bound for the program overhead can be derived from the overhead of the last iteration (about a factor of 120 and 50 for the unoptimized and optimized code respectively). The two major performance impacting factors are: (1) synchronization overhead, as each thread replicates the initialization state for the entire grid. This overhead becomes more dominant in the optimized code. (2) bounds checking, as the inner loop of each iteration, contains 32 bounds checks (eight array accesses times four dimensions). The overhead in column labeled Last can be almost exclusively attributed to bounds checking.

Table 8 gives an overview of how much of the overhead can be allocated to each function. Functions with an overhead share of less than 5% are not displayed. The overhead to synchronize data with the other runtime monitors is shown at the bottom of the table. Note that sending overhead is incurred across all state updating functions. The receive overhead is incurred across all functions, as each of them processes incoming messages.

```
Table 7. Heat transfer: runtime monitoring overhead
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Init</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Last</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 iterations</td>
<td>20 iterations</td>
<td>40 iterations</td>
<td>60 iterations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un-monitored (s)</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSE-CIRM orig. (s)</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>33.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSE-CIRM opt. (s)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>19.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```
Table 8. Heat transfer : profile
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share 10 iterations</th>
<th>Share 20 iterations</th>
<th>Share 40 iterations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable Access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmAccessArray</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmAccessVariable</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.13%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cirmInitVariable</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication overhead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>send</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>&lt; 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>receive</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>&lt; 1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Related Work

UPC compilers and runtime systems offer support for runtime error detection to a varying degree. In our tests with the Berkeley UPC system, we found that it can report invalid pointers to shared memory locations. The developers of the RTED UPC test suite [14] report that the tested compilers and runtime systems (Berkeley, HP, GCCUPC, to some degree Cray) do little to prevent harmful operations and report the responsible source code location. We are not aware of other dynamic bug finding tools for UPC.

A number of dynamic analysis tools exist that work on source code level. ParasoFts Insure++ [17] is a runtime analysis and memory error detection for multi-threaded C and C++. IBM’s Purify [21] is a dynamic software analysis tool to help memory debugging and memory leak detection. Both tools are proprietary software and performed well on the RTED benchmark suites for C and C++ [15].
Intel Inspector [11] (formerly Intel Thread Checker) is a runtime analysis tool for sequential and multi-threaded Windows and Linux applications. Dmalloc [1] is an open source memory debugger C library for finding memory allocation errors. Programs to be analyzed must be recompiled to use Dmalloc memory functions.

Dynamic analysis can also be operate on binary codes. For example, DynInst [2] is a runtime code-patching library that is useful in developing dynamic programming analysis tools. Valgrind [3] is an open source instrumentation framework for building dynamic analysis tools. Pin [5] is a dynamic instrumentation tool for binary executables. Compared to source level tools, binary tools can see the whole program but they often lack of high level type information, which makes it hard to find all errors.

6. Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we have presented ROSE-CIRM for UPC, a dynamic analysis tool that reports C-style runtime errors in UPC code. ROSE-CIRM for UPC uses the combined compiler instrumentation and runtime support to monitor the execution of UPC programs and identify C-style errors within a partitioned global address space. Our evaluation indicates that our tool can spot 95% to 100% of UPC runtime errors for the covered categories of the RTED benchmark suite. Our tests also indicate that the runtime overhead introduced by the monitored execution environment can be prohibitive for larger size software. However, even simple static analysis techniques may dramatically reduce the runtime overhead. ROSE-CIRM’s source code is distributed together with ROSE with a BSD style license. It can be downloaded from rosecompiler.org.

ROSE-CIRM for UPC can be improved to find more bugs related to concurrency, such as race and dead lock detection. The instrumentation and runtime monitor can be improved to handle a larger variety of UPC programs. In particular, this includes programs relying on UPC’s library functions, code that accesses shared memory regions with varying block sizes (by means of pointer casts), and complex array subscript expressions.

Performance issues in C/UPC/C++ can be addressed by integrating with ROSE’s existing static analysis tools (e.g., Compass [19]). Large scale parallel systems will benefit from improvements to the runtime monitor design. The runtime monitor relies on a simple queue implementation, thus concurrent PGAS state modifying operations serialize at the communication infrastructure. Broadcasting and replicating the information in each thread diminishes parallelism. Two alternative approaches may be used to maintain the system state across runtime monitors consistent: query/response style communication mechanism and a single shared data structure.

Instead of relying on a simple message system, the runtime systems in each thread could use a query/response approach. Each thread would query other threads for information that is not locally available. While such an approach is more complex to implement, it would scale better. On massively parallel systems, programmers minimize remote shared memory accesses by storing memory that is frequently accessed together in the same address space partition (blocking). These optimizations would also benefit the query/response based approach because reducing remote shared memory accesses automatically reduces the number of remote state queries.

Using a shared data structure to store the (global) state would dispense with explicit message exchanges. An implementation based on shared maps (i.e., red-black trees) and hash tables requires protection mechanisms to ensure data consistency. Using a coarse-grain lock to control access to the data structure would serialize all update operations (reader-writer locks would allow at least concurrent reads). Integrating fine-grained locks that protect only portions of the shared data structure or relying on non-blocking synchronization [9] is a non-trivial effort.

Acknowledgments

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References