THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA IN
WORLD DIPLOMACY SINCE 1933

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CHAPTER I

COMPARISON OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Two of the world's largest countries, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) with an area of over 8,000,000 square miles, one sixth of the earth's dry land,\(^1\) and the United States with an area of more than 3,022,387 square miles, more than a seventeenth of the earth's dry land, have much in common.\(^2\) Both are composed of political units, the U.S.S.R., sixteen republics,\(^3\) and the United States, forty-eight states. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the new title of Russia.

Both of these great countries lie in the northern half of the world with their greatest distances running east and west. The vastness of Russia is proved by the fact that the summer sun never sets on the vast extent of it.\(^4\)

The climate of Russia has more extremes than that of the United States, for its northern section lies within the Arctic Circle. The continental climate is characterized by


\(^{3}\)Vera Michele Dean, *The United States and Russia*, p. 72.

\(^{4}\)Strong, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
a hot, short summer and a very severe and long winter. The United States enjoys a variety of climates from a subtropical along the Gulf of Mexico to the winter cold in the Dakotas.\(^{5}\)

The United States, like Russia, may be divided into highlands and plains. The Mississippi Basin which extends across the center of the continent from the Appalachians on the east to the foot of the Rockies on the west is one of the world's largest and most fertile plains. East of the Appalachians lies the other plain that aided in the first permanent settlements in America. The three Russian plains, Russian, West Siberian, and Turkestan are separated from one another by low mountains, the Urals, the hilly region of Kazakhstan, and the high mountainous regions to the south and east.\(^{6}\)

The characteristic land-locked or Arctic Sea drainage has been influential in the development of Russia. The continent is watered by some of the largest rivers in the world, the Volga, Obi, Irtysk, Yenissey, Lena, and the Amur.\(^{7}\) These rivers run either to land-locked or Arctic Seas. The Volga, which is a great highway, ends in the Caspian Sea which has no outlet. The Don and Dnieper flow into the land-locked Black Sea. The Siberian Rivers, the Obi, Yenissey, and the Lena are frozen most of the year.\(^{8}\)

\(^{5}\)Welles, op. cit., p. 238.

\(^{6}\)Malesky Malevitch, Russia U.S.S.R., p. 72.

\(^{7}\)Welles, op. cit., p. 238.

\(^{8}\)Ibid., p. 111.
The United States is more fortunate in the possession of navigable rivers that run into the open sea. The Mississippi, Missouri, Rio Grande, Columbia, and Colorado are navigable for hundreds of miles, and the largest part of the river system flows southward.\(^9\)

The melting pots of the world are the United States with a population of over 145,340,000 in 1948,\(^10\) and Russia with 192,655,000 inhabitants that include over one hundred distinct nationalities.\(^11\) The great potential population difference involves the neighbors of the two countries, for within a distance of less than a thousand miles from its Russian land frontiers, more than half of the human race resides.\(^12\) The neighbors of the United States are not so numerous and tensions are not so predominant. Canada, on the north, could easily support more than her 11,812,000 people, for much of her land is untouched.\(^13\)

The population of the U.S.S.R. is scattered over a larger area and is less dense than in the United States. Russia has forty large cities with a total population of 20,000,000, or less than ten per cent of her population.


\(^11\)Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.

\(^12\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.

\(^13\)Welles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 151.
The United States has a similar number of cities with
40,000,000 inhabitants, representing the very heart of the
industrial empire and the cream of the skilled workers and
technicians. They include New York, Washington, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh and Cleveland.¹⁵
Russia has no such widely scattered large cities as the United
States, for most of her industries are concentrated in a
triangle which extends from Leningrad and the Ukraine on the
west to the new industrial regions of Central Siberia. This
is only a fraction of Russia's total area, but it is the
main source of her economic development. Totally away from
any industrial or productive area live some 50,000,000
Russians who are so thinly dispersed in remote regions that
they are lost in the vast forests and tundras.¹⁶ The density
of population before World War II was 12.5 per square mile.
In the United States at the same time it was forty-one per
square mile.¹⁷ If the population of the entire world were
quadrupled and placed in Russia, it would not be as crowded
as is that of the British Isles.¹⁸

¹⁵Clifford MacFadden, Henry Madison and George F. Deasy,

¹⁶Henry J. Taylor, "Is Russia Prepared to Make War?"
Reader's Digest, LII (June, 1948), 26.

¹⁷Nelles, op. cit., p. 238.

¹⁸Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow, p. 379.
The peoples of Russia are the world's youngest. More than half of them are under twenty-five. In this they resemble the America of fifty years ago or earlier, boiling with young energies that attacked the wilderness. The hardships of life and a rising birth rate, combined with a falling death rate are responsible for their youth.\textsuperscript{19} Youth which now is about a third of the population in the United States has been gradually replaced by age. The ages of expectancy for life is sixty-two for men and sixty-seven for women. A longer life span has been the main reason for the replacement.\textsuperscript{20} Since the beginning of World War II, the population of the United States has risen steadily.\textsuperscript{21}

Food and raw materials give great potential strength to Soviet Russia's position. No other single nation except the United States can become so nearly self-sufficient in the material elements of the national power.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1937 the total area under cultivation in the Soviet Union was 367,170,949 acres. This is in contrast to 377,661,000 (1935) acres in the United States. Of the entire Soviet population, about sixty-five per cent were engaged in agriculture.

\textsuperscript{19} Strong, op. cit., p. 3.


\textsuperscript{21} MacFadden, op. cit., p. 24.

\textsuperscript{22} Malevitch, op. cit., p. 99.
In the year 1935 the Soviet Union produced approximately one third of the total wheat crop of the world, two and a half times more than the United States produced; she also produced almost one half of the world’s output of oats and 80 per cent of its rye crop. The same year Russia was fourth in the production of cotton, second in flax seed output, and first in beet sugar production.\(^{23}\)

Though the Russian farm economy exceeds the American in yield per acre by about 45 per cent, it is well below the American economy in crops per man-hours worked.\(^{24}\)

Few countries surpass the United States in size of yields. Corn, the leading crop, is 58 per cent of the world’s supply, wheat 20 per cent, oats 20 to 25 per cent, cotton 40 per cent, cottonseed 40 per cent, soy beans 30 per cent, beet sugar 15 per cent, tobacco 25 per cent, and linseed 22 per cent.\(^{25}\) The size of the yield plus the fact that one fifth of the population of the United States lives on farms reveals the extent of mechanization of the agricultural industry. Over half of the available land in the United States is under cultivation.\(^{26}\)

\(^{23}\)Davies, op. cit., p. 381.

\(^{24}\)Welles, op. cit., p. 241.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., p. 241.

The Soviet meat supply in 1938 was only forty per cent of that of the United States. When the two countries are compared in population, the difference was much more.\textsuperscript{27} The stock raising industry in the United States was valued at more than three billion dollars in 1940. The evident reason for so much difference between the two countries is revealed in what a person may maintain as private property in Russia, his home, some poultry, pigs, fruit trees, and berry patches.\textsuperscript{28}

The similarity between the United States and Russia in the development of agriculture is difficult to present, for Old Russia developed more slowly than America; its farming was primitive; and its industries were foreign-owned. The Five-Year Plans have hastened mechanization, and the output of its industry in 1939 was nine times what it was in 1928.\textsuperscript{29} The United States started a long plan for agriculture that included soil conservation, irrigation projects, crop subsidies and acreage control.\textsuperscript{30}

In minerals Russia is second only to the United States, and those resources are widely diffused through the land. There are large deposits of oil and iron, and in many minerals, such as platinum, and fuels, such as peat, she

\textsuperscript{27}Welles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 115.

\textsuperscript{29}Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{30}Charles A. Beard, \textit{American Government and Politics}, p. 418.
is first in the world.\textsuperscript{31} Oil production before World War II
in the United States was sixty per cent of the world's output;\textsuperscript{32} and in Russia, eighteen per cent of the world's
total.\textsuperscript{33}

The United States rose from sixth in the production of
iron in 1932 to thirty per cent of the world's output in
1939. Since 1940 the production has steadily mounted, for
the five years following 1940, 400,000,000 ingot tons were
distributed into plane factories, 40,000,000 tons, ship
building 46,000,000 tons, aircraft and automotive industry,
30,000,000, railroads 26,000,000 tons, container industry
20,000,000 tons, and farm machinery 8,500,000. The remain-
der which was less than a third of the United States' was
used for miscellaneous articles such as machine tools, pipe
lines, bombs, razor blades, etc.\textsuperscript{34}

In the basis of percentages of sufficiency of minerals
in the Soviet Union, she enjoys one hundred per cent coal,
iron, petroleum, manganese, mica, chromite, and potash;
ninety per cent in sulphur and pyrites; eighty-five per cent

\textsuperscript{31}Strong, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{32}Royal Institute of International Affairs, "United
States Natural Resources," \textit{Foundations of National Power},
edited by Harold and Margaret Sprout, p. 656.

\textsuperscript{33}Vera Michele Dean, \textit{The United States and Russia}, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{34}Editors of \textit{Fortune}, "Steel as a Yardstick of American
Strength," \textit{Foundations of National Power}, edited by Harold
and Margaret Sprout, p. 670.
in phosphates; eighty per cent in mercury; and sixty per cent in zinc. In the supply of manganese, chromite, potash, and mercury in which the United States is low, Russia has an abundance.\footnote{Davies, op. cit., p. 387.} Before World War II, the only gaps in metals which the United States had were nickel, tin, mercury, and some of the steel alloys—manganese, chromium, antimony, and tungsten.\footnote{Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 666.}

The fundamental objectives of Russia and the United States have been peace and national security. Both have sought national security rather than foreign conquest or colonial possessions. In the development of the vast natural resources, each nation has attempted to utilize its energies and at the same time insure security.\footnote{Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran, p. 158.} The tempo of developing all phases of economics in Russia was reversed during the last two wars, for she suffered 30,000,000 casualties. Lives and what they actually produced was not all, thousands of farms and villages were laid bare by the "scorched earth" policy the Russians themselves used as the German army approached.\footnote{Edgar Snow, The Pattern of Soviet Power, p. 210.}

The development of the frontier has been a common aim in the wide search for security. Since the frontier was
closed first in the United States, her energies have been
turned toward industrial development. The same trend has
followed in Russia since 1935.39 The Russians are pioneer-
ing people, and for the last twenty years they have used the
high industrial technique of the American people as their
pattern.40

Attempts in social planning for security were made in
Russia and in the United States in the early thirties.
Russia launched a campaign to encourage economic and cultural
progress. In this campaign, schools, libraries, better liv-
ing conditions, and general intellectual advancement were
encouraged and financed as a part of the Five-Year Plan.41
During the same period the American people embraced the "New
Deal" as a mighty arm against insecurity and as an employer
to serve.42 The government began to touch the lives of more
people and to direct their private endeavors as never before.
An orgy of taxing, spending, building, setting quotas in
agriculture, changing conditions of employment, and erecting
new controls over the highways of interstate commerce, began
which lasted until World War II. Government agencies were
expanded to fit the new concepts of government. Federal

39Dulles, op. cit., p. 3.
40Strong, op. cit., p. 7.
41Max Eastman, Stalin's Russia, p. 213.
42Dixon Wecter, The Age of the Great Depression, 1929-
1941, p. 7.
employees rose from 588,000 civilians in 1931 to 1,370,000 in 1941.\textsuperscript{43}

In the quest for peace, both Russia and the United States have used parallel policies. Prior to the Bolshevik regime their trade, commerce, and foreign policies have been very much the same, for each has taken up arms against every other major power, but not against each other. When a threat to the interest of one of these great nations arose, it usually came from a common source.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Dulles, op. cit.}, p. 1.
CHAPTER II

COMMON CAUSES - HOPE - FEAR

The political systems of Russia and the United States have always been at opposite poles. Autocracy has been arrayed against Republicanism; Communism, against Democracy. The interplay of these factors, plus all the side issues that accompany them in these two great nations, provide a framework for a story of compelling interest. These two great nations with their conflicting ideas have had less trouble with each other than they have had with the other powers. When the United States first sought Russian recognition, the contrast between the parallelism in our foreign policies and the conflict in political ideas was apparent. Catherine the Great would not lend her Cossacks for the suppression of American rebels since she welcomed any development that might reduce the power of Great Britain; but at the same time, she could hardly look with favor upon republican revolt against monarchical authority.

In the nineteenth century, rivalry over trade and political interests in the Far East flared up. The people of the United States, suspicious as always, openly resented the program that was being pursued by Nicholas II. The rise or birth of a new power in the East acted as a lever to pull the
two countries together on foreign policies. The unity against Germany in World War I strengthened the accord.

The United States felt that the overthrow of the Czar was liberating a great host of peoples who wanted freedom and representative government. Only five days passed after the Czar abdicated, before the United States gave the Kerensky government full recognition, and in a very short time granted loans amounting to 425 million dollars.¹ The Kerensky government was doomed to failure from the beginning, for total deterioration, which began during the war with Japan, had reached a dangerous height when the new government was established.

Half armed citizens, an army without guns and ammunition, the majority of the population food and land hungry were some of the barriers the Kerensky government could not surmount. The result of the chaos was the Bolshevik success. With the Bolsheviks in power, the old ideological conflict was renewed. The challenge of Militant Communism could not be dismissed; fears came to light; Russia feared capitalistic encirclement; and the United States feared the Communist propaganda of world revolution.

Soon after diplomatic relation with the Russians was severed, Russia lost all of her Central and Eastern European gains since Peter the Great. The door to the Baltic was closed by the Treaty of Versailles. These and other European

¹Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran, p. 112.
losses were a blow to the Russians who were also being hounded on the other side by Japan and other Allied powers bent on fostering the counter-revolution.²

The United States had hailed the overthrow of the Czar as a great move in the interest of freedom. The actual cause of the break in diplomatic relations was the declaration by the Soviets that all debts of the Kerensky government were null and void. Faults and grievances quickly developed when the two nations no longer had ambassadors who could straighten out the tangled webs of suspicion; the Communist International, under direction from Moscow, was spreading propaganda; foreign citizens in Russia had been thrown in jail on slight pretext; religious freedom was denied; and gruesome reports of the treatment of certain minority groups, the Kulaks, stirred the world.³

The Soviet delegates were treated so badly when they went to Rapallo in 1922 that they were thrown back to brood on destructive dogmas rather than constructive possibilities of world cooperation. That conference threw Russia and Germany together, and the Stresemann period made wise, if such were, use of the understanding with Russia in dealing with the Western European powers.

When the Soviets realized they were isolated, they at once began to build a self-sufficient Russia, in an industrial

²Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 312.
and a military sense. The necessity of the rapid industrialization of Russia became evident if she were to become self-sufficient. This was met by the exportation of raw materials, desperately needed at home, in payment for what was needed from abroad.\textsuperscript{4} The establishment of the Five Year Plan; a gradual easing off the extreme of doctrinaires; fostering state education; granting a new constitution; and the gradual expansion of all liberties caused the European nations to forget their prejudices and to recognize Russia. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy led the nations in negotiating with her.

Another move made by Russia, signing the Briand-Kellogg pact for the outlawry of war, in 1928, caused many observers to predict American recognition. The Secretary of State, Kellogg, bitterly attacked Russia at that time, and delayed recognition a few more years.\textsuperscript{5}

Franklin D. Roosevelt had determined, before his election to the presidency, to seek an end to the deadlock between the two great nations. It was necessary for him to surmount the great American prejudices that had been built up through the last two decades. He at once initiated negotiations between Russia and the United States. It was necessary for him to be guided during the negotiations by the

\textsuperscript{4}Dulles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 314.

\textsuperscript{5}Samuel Flagg Bemis, \textit{A Diplomatic History of The United States}, p. 731.
clear requirements of legitimate interests of the United States. When the foundations were investigated and found to be sound, the Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov came to the United States. President Roosevelt and the Foreign Commissar reached agreements on the question of subversive activities of which the American public was wary. The two failed to come to a satisfactory understanding on the question of the debts incurred either by the imperial Russian governments or by the short-lived Kerensky one. They agreed to postpone the debt question for settlement at a future time.

In a letter to Mikhail Kalinin on October 10, 1933, President Roosevelt invited a representative into his presence with the assurance that neither Russia nor the United States would be committed in any way.

On November 16, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt informed M. M. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that the United States had decided to establish normal diplomatic relations.6

When the message from the President reached Litvinov, he replied in a letter which enumerated the fixed policy of his country as:

1. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions.

6Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Year of Crisis, 1933, p. 416.
2. To refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the government or under its direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda having as an aim the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, its territories or possessions or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

3. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group -- and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group -- which makes claim to be the government of, or makes attempt upon the territorial integrity of, the United States, its territories or possessions; not to form, subsidize, support or permit on its territory military organizations or groups having the aim of armed struggle against the United States, its territories or possessions, and to prevent any recruiting on behalf of such organization or groups.

4. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group -- and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group -- which has as an aim the overthrow or preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.7

President Roosevelt next enumerated the liberties that Nationals should have in Russia, liberty of conscience and freedom to worship as they pleased, and the free use of the English language.

In a quick reply Maxim Litvinov assured President Roosevelt that there was no need for additional legislation.

7Ibid., p. 473.
for laws existed in Russia that provided for the requested liberties.

The establishment of diplomatic relations aided the United States in several ways. Probably the most outstanding contribution was a gradual opening of world markets, Russia among them. A surplus of consumer goods had flooded the warehouses in the United States until there was no need for production. Another aid to the United States was the prestige that was gained by her acceptance of Russia on an equal basis with the other great powers. The other nations had accepted her with a Communist government and expected America to do the same. The International Economic Conference at London had been agreed to by the big nations; and while President Hoover was in the White House in the spring of 1933, delegations streamed into Washington. Conference after conference took place until there was chaos in the Capitol.

The French and British governments presented plans for economic stabilization of the major powers and also of the world. President Roosevelt failed to agree to the plans; these and other differences of opinions aroused a widespread hostility to the United States government. The achievements of the conference in London can be classed as nothing except a secondary issue of silver.

With the great nations critical of every move the United States made, and the economic situation in the nation at the lowest imaginable, it was evident that the foreign policies
which had been in the background for a long time were to be no longer ignored. Among the first of the issues the new president tried to settle was the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia. With the situation as it was, the two powers could reach an agreement. Concessions were made as the resumption of relations progressed. The debt settlement position was abandoned; the Soviet Union surrendered its counter-claims in Siberia and assumed its debt obligations. The United States extended its full facilities for Russian trade, and the Soviet government pledged itself to refrain from the use of Communist propaganda.\(^8\)

Ambassadors were exchanged with the utmost cordiality. Alexander Troyanovsky came to the United States as the first Soviet representative; William C. Bullitt was designated as the United States representative at Moscow.

As soon as the representatives observed certain social customs, the actual business of the debt settlement was started. The deadlock which lasted for eighteen months, was finally side-tracked when the commercial negotiations were completed.\(^9\) In conformance with the treaty signed in Moscow in July, 1935, the Soviet Union attempted to make purchases in the United States in the next twelve months to amount to thirty million dollars. This was a great disappointment to

\(^8\) Dulles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 198.

\(^9\) Walter Duranty, \textit{I Write as I Please}, p. 320.
the business leaders in the United States, for previous exports to Russia had reached one hundred million dollars before the economic collapse in the world.

Trade agreements and debt misunderstandings were laid aside when the Third Communist International held its seventh session. At that time reports were officially made upon the progress of Communist propaganda in the United States. Ambassador Bullitt called the Soviet government to account for the violation of the anti-propaganda pledges. A warning which was a thinly veiled ultimatum was issued; the Soviet government denied any obligation with regard to the Communist International in any country outside Russia.\footnote{Dulles, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 202.}

The first three years of Soviet-United States relationship should have been profitable, but neither country gained by the new relationship. The debt settlement had been side-stepped; trade agreements were far below expectations; and propaganda was still being distributed in the United States and elsewhere. With this seeming failure in existence, President Roosevelt sent Joseph E. Davies as his ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Davies conferred with Sumner Welles on the situation and attempted to enter Russia with an open mind. He learned all he could about the country plus his diplomatic duties.
Two of Davies' diplomatic duties were first, a renewal of the Soviet trade agreement; and second, the matter of settling a misunderstanding which had occurred in regard to the so-called debt agreement.\textsuperscript{11} There were some additional debts that worried the Americans. Private citizens demanded compensations for the losses they had received in Russia. Davies presented his case to the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Rosengolts. At the time the debt was minimized, but Davies stressed the reliability of the Soviets; he especially stressed the good graces of President Roosevelt as necessary aids to Russian prosperity. After Davies presented his side of the case, he felt the next move should be made by the Soviets. The next move was made on August 10, 1937, when the Soviet purchases were raised 33 1/3 per cent for 1938.\textsuperscript{12}

The year 1938 found the United States in the closest era of friendship that existed as far as Russia was concerned. The trials had bared the subversive part foreigners were actually playing in Russia. These facts caused fourteen consulates to be closed and foreigners to be expelled all summer. The friendliness of Russia to the United States did not hinder her in matters affecting her vital interests as was indicated by the action of the Comintern and the debt situation. The

\textsuperscript{11}Joseph E. Davies, \textit{Mission to Moscow}, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 178.
debt question was finally brought up in June after a statement of the pending matters was given to the Russian Premier, Molotov. Joseph E. Davies and Premier Molotov turned the debt settlement over to the Amtorg Russian Shipping Company. No reason was given for turning the business over to the Russian shipping company except that carrying debts through diplomatic channels would obligate Russia to pay the European powers to whom she had defaulted. No debt settlement has yet been made.

The geographical position of the United States has caused many of her leaders to direct a policy of isolation. At times the idea has receded to be followed more vehemently by a greater effort for a few years. The greatest activities of the isolationists usually appear when economic difficulties are prevalent within the boundaries of their homelands. Soon after World War I, the Congress failed to back the efforts of Woodrow Wilson in his attempts at international cooperation. The idea dominated the public mind until the first term of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the President's speeches war was denounced. In the Chautauqua speech in 1934 the idea of America's entry into World War I was laid to a blunder.

Investigation committees were active during the isolationist period and were successful in forming the policy of a cash-and-carry basis for the purchase of war materials by foreign governments. The purchases were to be made direct

\[13\text{Ibid., p. 307.}\]
to the American manufacturers and carried off in vessels that did not belong to the United States.

The Italian attack on Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War aroused the isolationists to urge that a "moral embargo" be used against belligerents. In the case of Italy and Ethiopia, the annual average amount of oil and other raw materials to be used in war would be sold to them.

When Congress reopened in 1936, there was an avalanche of mail and great numbers in Washington demanded peace-at-any-price. With so much agitation, the Department of State was asked to give its advice as to the desirability of amending the "neutrality" legislation. The official spokesman approved the revision which was enacted January 8, 1937. President Roosevelt signed the measure, but he at once began a vigorous campaign to persuade public opinion that in its own interest the United States should propose some constructive plan for international cooperation to check the forces of aggression before they succeeded in engulfing the world. One of his most quoted addresses was made in the very heart of the isolationists groups, Chicago, in October, 1937. The speech enumerated the efforts that had been made for peace in the world in fifteen years; the dangers of allowing terror to rule in the world without being called terror was reviewed; and a plea for a return to a belief in the pledged word was

\[14\] Welles, op. cit., p. 61.
made. He also stressed the necessity of positive endeavors to preserve peace.

After the Soviet Union was recognized in 1933, her efforts were utilized to make Russia a self-sufficient nation. General economics were given attention, and strenuous efforts were made to industrialize in the quickest time possible. With these policies being pushed, an undercurrent was discovered which took several years to rectify. The culmination is usually spoken of as the "purge."

It is no wonder that Russia, too, was in the isolationist camp with the United States. Public opinion against future wars was at its peak in both countries in the early part of 1938. By autumn the American people began to turn about face when the news of Hitler's treatment of the Jews came to light, all except the extreme isolationists and the blindly pacifist elements.

Public sentiment was at last aroused by the annexation of Austria by Germany; then the Munich Agreement which caused Germany to dismember Czechoslovakia. The Munich meeting of Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, and Daladier resulted in the agreements that were previously made between Chamberlain and Hitler. The excuse for aid to Hitler came from a demand of the Sudeten Germans who demanded equality with the Czechs. President Benes expected France, England, and Russia to prevent a war, but Czechoslovakia was deserted by her allies.
She was gradually subjugated by German military might until she capitulated in March, 1939.\textsuperscript{15}

The Munich Conference aroused Russia as she had not been aroused in years. The old fear, that of encirclement, was renewed. She assumed that a coalition was being organized to crush her.\textsuperscript{16} Public opinion in Russia was tempered as far as the leaders dared go, but the Russian people were later in realizing the chaotic conditions of the world than the people in the United States were. It was not until Hitler's army attacked her that the public realized that they again must fight for their lives.

The period of isolation in the United States was cli-maxed in 1939 by a declaration by President Roosevelt: "We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our armies, navies, or air forces to fight on foreign lands outside the Americas." This declaration was modified by James F. Byrnes to include "except in case of attack." This policy became a plank in the Democratic platform that year.\textsuperscript{17}

The idea of isolation was backed by theAmerica First organization which had many prominent Americans in its ranks, among them Martin Dies, Charles A. Lindbergh, General Robert E. Wood, Henry Ford, Gerald P. Nye, and others. The group led a

\textsuperscript{15}"Czechoslovakia," The World Book Encyclopedia, III, 1803.

\textsuperscript{16}Charles S. Seeley, Russia and the Battle for Liberation, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{17}James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 10.
crusade against war with any nation and attempted to lower American opinion of Soviet Russia. Charles A. Lindbergh spent one week in Russia and saw very little of the actual conditions there; yet, he came away describing the deplorable conditions in the Russian factories and the inefficiency of the Red Army. During the time Lindbergh stayed in Europe, he took an active part in attempting to unite France, Britain, and Germany. The many publicity stunts and the activities of Dies and Nye aided in keeping the American public in the isolation camp. War was almost upon the Americans before the isolationists became aware of the true situation. Lend-lease was against the policies of the group who did all they could to prevent it up until the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.18

At the same time the United States was at its peak in isolationist practices, Russia was making plans to stay out of wars. The Congress Communist Party convened in March, 1939, to adopt a program of reforms in the party structure. The "purge" had been in progress for several years, and the opposition dared not raise their voices. New men replaced those who had been condemned, and a nightmare of disunity was gone. A brighter future was in view within the party. The structure of the party and international policies were planned

18 Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy against Russia, p. 128.
by Stalin. He said that Russia would hold rigidly to peace and opposition to "war and incendiaries."

Three cardinal principles of foreign relations were laid down:

1. Unflinching resistance to any aggression against the U.S.S.R.
2. Sympathy for victims of aggression everywhere and such assistance as might be feasible.
3. Preservation of peace and friendship wherever possible.19

After Munich Russia agreed to join with Britain and France if Germany should attack Poland or Rumania; a plea for a conference (interested European nations) of non-aggression was made. At the conference in Moscow March 17, 1939, urgent needs demanded that each European nation should state its position and as a combined unit serve notice on Hitler. Britain declined the suggestion and at once entered into unilateral agreements on the continent. Other moves were made by the Soviets throughout the summer. No agreements could be reached.

All negotiations were aggravated, first, by Russia's proposal to include Poland, Rumania and perhaps Turkey in the talks at Moscow; second, by the appointment of William Strang, in England, as the spokesman at the conference; third, Russian demands for "territorial guarantees" in the Balkans; and

fourth, the ever-present suspicion that France and Britain meant to sacrifice Poland to start a martial conflict. 20

The negotiations between the three powers lasted for four months. Suspicion was in evidence at every meeting. Russia had not forgotten her abstention from the League until five years before, the hostility with which the Soviet government had been treated in the West, and that the western powers wanted to get Hitler turned towards Russia.

Agreements were achieved on August 23, 1939, between Germany and Russia, that included pledges from each not to attack the other and not to join in any grouping of powers directed against the other contracting power. 21

The Nazi-Soviet pact was drawn up after many letters and discussions. The first step toward the final agreement was the removal of trade and financial barriers. The treaty was to last ten years at the first trial. Extension was to be made by agreements before the expiration. All aggression and coalitions were to be suppressed. 22

Other agreements that contained strong economic obligations followed. The U.S.S.R. promised to deliver to Germany great quantities of raw materials. Oil, grain, cotton, and manganese were to constitute the bulk of deliveries. The

20 Ibid., p. 141.
22 Ibid., p. 248.
Germans agreed to send German machines and parts, machine tools, instruments of precision, and chemicals and drugs.23

As soon as the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed, Russia began to play her own hand with a total disregard for public opinion. She secured several advantages: occupation of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and on November 30 she invaded Finland. Russia was able to prevent Hitler from occupying Leningrad by the use of the strategic territory she acquired by the armistice she concluded in March, 1940.

Hitler's methods were used again in April, 1941, when the Soviets concluded a neutrality pact with Japan.

On November 13, 1940, the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop presented his plan of a possible Rome-Tokyo-Berlin-Moscow Axis to Herr Molotov. This agreement was partially in operation before this time, for Italy was under the complete domination of Hitler, and Japan had decided that she could get any strip of land if her armies were strong enough. Japanese and German interests were so far apart at that time that an agreement could hurt neither of them. Russia was isolated, as far as France and Britain were concerned, when she traded with Hitler. The pact provided that each nation be allowed freedom to extend its boundaries so long as the extension did not contradict another's intentions; that each nation would collaborate for early restoration of world order.

peace; that no combination of powers directly against any of them would be supported by any one of them; that the pact would operate ten years and be renewed by mutual agreement before its expiration. The pact was written in the German and Russian languages.\textsuperscript{24}

Discord became evident between Germany and Russia when German interests were threatened in Finland; bases were granted to Russia on the Dardanelles which were against the interests of Japan and Italy; and Russian influence predominated in the Balkans.

A friendship pact between Yugoslavia and Stalin was signed on April 5, 1939, the very day Germany invaded Yugoslavia. The pact was dated on the day that Germany and Yugoslavia still maintained diplomatic relations, April 5, and lasted until May 8. Andrei Vyshinsky, first Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, announced to Gavilovich the fact that Russian diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia were being severed.\textsuperscript{25}

The next countries to be notified by Vyshinsky of the severance of diplomatic relations were Norway, Belgium, and Greece. These actions plus a non-aggression pact with Japan caused Hitler to believe that Russia was about to attack him.


\textsuperscript{25}Henry C. Cassidy, \textit{Moscow Dateline}, p. 10.
The German ambassador, Schulenberg, received a letter from Ribbentrop on June 21, 1941, asking him to notify Molotov of the Reich's decision to attack Russia. He gave the following reasons:

To sum up, the Government of the Reich declares therefore, that the Soviet Government, contrary to the obligations it assumed,
1) has not only continued, but even intensified its attempts to undermine Germany and Europe;
2) has adopted a more and more anti-German foreign policy;
3) has concentrated all its forces in readiness at the German border. Thereby, the Soviet Government has broken its treaties with Germany and is about to attack Germany from the rear, in its struggle for life. The Fuehrer has therefore ordered the German Armed Forces to oppose this threat with all means at their disposal. End of declaration.26

In the winter before the German attack, the United States had repeatedly warned the Soviet government that Hitler was preparing to attack her; so had Great Britain, who was fighting for life itself at the time. The answer from the Soviets was that their greatest desire was peace. Sir Stafford Cripps asked for interviews with Stalin and Molotov; but both declined. He finally succeeded in seeing Vyshinsky. The interview was not published, but the Soviets failed to be prepared when the fateful day arrived. The invasion had been started one hour and a half before Molotov was informed of Germany's intentions. The Russian people heard it over radios at midnight.

The actual attack began Sunday morning at four o'clock. One hundred and seventy divisions numbering more than two million men, with ten thousand tanks and ten thousand planes were turned loose on the Soviet army on the Russian border. The planes showered bombs on Kiev, Sebastopol, Kaunas, Zhitonvir and other cities in the rear. 27

The Americans in Russia were tipped off concerning the attack by the evacuation of von Walther, Secretary of the German Embassy. As many as wished to do so left by plane before the invasion started.

The Americans at home just before the attack felt that since the clash between the two great powers was inevitable, a stated policy toward the Soviet Union would enable the United States to stay out of the European war. Our policies included:

Make no approaches to Russia. Treat any approaches toward us with reserve until the Russians satisfied us they were not maneuvering merely to obtain unilateral concessions for themselves.

Reject any Soviet suggestions that we make concessions for the sake of improving American-Soviet relations, and require a strict <i>quid pro quo</i>. Let Russia understand that we considered American improvement in relation to be just as important, if not more so, to Russia than to the United States.

Make the principle of reciprocity the basis of our day-to-day relations.

In general our policy toward Russia was one of firmness but friendliness. 28

27 Cassidy, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 39.

28 Hull, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 974.
The year 1940 ended with official relations between Russia and the United States only nominal. Sumner Welles began a series of conferences to build up relations between the two countries. Restrictions that had been placed on imports and exports were lifted. The cleared-up relations caused quick action to be possible when the Nazi attacked Russia the following summer. Lend-lease was quickly turned to Russia that aided her to withstand the Nazi onslaught.

The negotiations which were in progress for so long assured the Russians that the Americans were willing to give reasonable consideration to their point of view which would result in better Soviet-American relations.

As soon as the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union, the American public was informed of the importance of the event. The public responded by demanding that all assistance which the American economy could spare be given the Soviets.

President Roosevelt had cleared all barriers to Soviet aid when the dollar sign had been erased from American aid to those who were fighting against Hitler; work was under way for legal permission for loaning money to the Allies. On February 17, 1941, the bill was voted on in the United States Congress with an initial appropriation of seven billion dollars to implement the Lend-lease program which was coming up soon.29 Russia seemed to be bearing the brunt of Nazi fury

29Byrnes, op. cit., p. 12.
at that time—she needed aid, and the United States offered it at once. Unbounded admiration of the heroism in the defense of Moscow and Stalingrad swept aside the fear of Communism that had been aroused in 1935 at the meeting of the seventh congress of the Third International.\textsuperscript{30}

Public sentiment which is necessary in a democracy opened the way for pressure from individuals or groups who were interested in the overthrow of Nazi tyranny. Joseph E. Davies and others began an active campaign to get aid started to Russia at the earliest date to aid in the defeat of Germany. President Roosevelt responded to the demands by sending a special mission to the U.S.S.R. to ascertain what materials and equipment would be required by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{31} The Minister, "Bill" Bott, in charge of the mission, assured the Soviets that the United States would go just as far as the production, transportation facilities, and commitments to Britain and China would allow.

Aid to the nation that was fighting Hitler was no trouble to secure, for Roosevelt shortly afterward began shipments under Lend-lease to Russia. For several months the losses in the Atlantic were severe in men, ships, and materials. War materials, trucks, and food were the chief items sent at

\textsuperscript{30} Davies, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 507.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 508.
first. A total of eleven billion dollars enhanced Russia's capacity to withstand Germany's assault.\textsuperscript{32}

There were no barriers to much greater aid, for at the time of the division of Poland, the United States decided not to include Russia in the Neutrality Act; and Molotov had assured the United States that Russia would pursue a policy of neutrality in its relations with her.

With public sentiment against Germany, the Lend-Lease actually in operation, Prime Minister Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt met no difficulties in collaborating with Joseph Stalin in the full execution of World War II.

\textsuperscript{32} Vera Michele Dean, \textit{The United States and Russia}, p. 22.
CHAPTER III

THE CONFERENCES

After Germany invaded a large part of Russia and the fate of England was no longer certain, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt decided to meet and decide, if possible, a general agreement between the two governments covering the major bases upon which a new world structure should be set up when peace should come. The meeting was held in Newfoundland, a recently acquired American base. The English delegation consisted of Prime Minister Churchill, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Lord Beaverbrook. The group from America was much larger because the President wished to spend much of the time on the question of defense, naval and military strategy. The Americans who attended the meeting were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Admirals Stark and King, and a large group of representatives of the three branches of our armed services.¹

The final version of the Joint Declaration was not agreed upon by Churchill and Roosevelt until after noon of the last

¹Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 176.
day of the meeting. In the Joint Declaration, later known as the Atlantic Charter, Britain and the United States declared that their countries were seeking no aggrandizements, territorial or otherwise; that they desired to see no territorial changes that did not represent the wishes of the people concerned; that all people should be given the right to choose the form of government under which they lived; that all nations, great or small, should, without preference, have access to the trade of the world; that all nations, by fullest collaborations, secure improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security; that all men enjoy freedom from want and fear when Nazi tyranny is no more; that such peace should enable all men to traverse the seas and oceans without hindrance; and that all nations abandon force, and disarm after the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security—and the last clause, "They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."²

The Atlantic Charter linked the Allies together during the war. In January, 1942, the United Nations' Declaration, was signed by all the powers who were fighting Hitler, and by others as they entered the war for liberty.

²U. S. Department of State, "Declaration of Principles Known as the Atlantic Charter," The United States and the Peace, Part I, p. 3.
The Russians, after a careful study of the Atlantic Charter, signed it with three reservations. By reserving three points, as Ivan Maisky did, Russia was freed from being bound by a joint Allied program. Points on which Russia reserved the wishes of her government were: (a) American and British policy of no territorial aggrandizement which cannot exist with the idea of expansion through inclusion of new territories; (b) no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely-expressed wishes of the people concerned, which is opposite to Soviet thinking (The fate of Danzig is a good illustration); (c) full economic collaboration between all nations in the economic field. This was not included in the Soviet program.3

The signature of Stalin on the Atlantic Charter did much to cement the Allies in their fight against Hitler. Suspicion was partially overcome in the United States and Great Britain. Fears of world revolution sank into the background with a document so clearly worded as to the peace aims of the great powers. Other nations were encouraged to sign the charter, especially the weaker nations. With the pendulum of Russian-American relations swinging back and bringing with it Maxim Litvinov in the role of ambassador in Washington, accord which seemed impossible the year before was in evidence.

3David J. Dallin, Russia and Post-War Europe, p. 142.
The German attack on Russia, June, 1941, was a signal for the British and Americans to lay plans for a conference in Moscow in which perfect accord could be expected, for the Allies were going there to offer resources that were immediately available. Harry Hopkins arrived in Moscow July 30. Before he had been there twenty-four hours, he had offered American arms, ammunitions and other materials to the Russians.

The visit of Harry Hopkins was the first episode in the long story of Allied collaboration and aid to Russia.

The guests for the Ministers Conference arrived in Moscow September 28, 1941. Averell Harriman headed the American delegation and Lord Beaverbrook, the British. The Red Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Foreign Commissariat, in the person of First Vice-Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky, and the staffs of the American and British Embassies welcomed them at the airport.

Ambassadors Steinhardt and Cripps took the chief delegates, Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook, to the Kremlin to meet Premier Stalin. Molotov led the Soviet delegation to the conference, and Litvinov was a delegate and interpreter.

The conference opened September 29 at the Spirilovetskaya Palace. It was a closed meeting, at which committees were named to carry out the details. Molotov acted as president of the conference. He suggested that six committees be created, army, navy, aviation, transport, raw materials, and
medical supplies. The request was granted, and appointments were made by Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman.

The committees met daily, and the head of each conferred with Stalin each night. With men who worked together so long and well the conference ended two days ahead of schedule.  

Commitments were made by both the British and Americans. Raw materials, aircraft, tanks, and vehicles led the list. These were promised to be available at American ports and were to be delivered to Russia by the three Allied navies. The commitments reached one billion dollars to be repaid without interest in ten years.

The other subject, one of much importance, was brought up by Stalin. He asked Lord Beaverbrook for an outline of British plans for peace. Beaverbrook did not go prepared to answer that question, but later on, Antony Eden was sent to discuss the subject. They did not reach an agreement, as none had been intended to be reached, but in the discussions Stalin admitted that he had no ambitions for the Turkish Straits or Iran. He also made it clear that Russia expected to keep what it held in June, 1941. These holdings were Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Soviet-incorporated territories formerly belonging to Finland, Poland, and Rumania.  

The conclusion of the conference ended with the resolution that after the annihilation of Nazi tyranny a peace

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5Ibid., p. 141.
would be established which would enable the world to live free from fear or need. This essential step was the first one made toward a common determination to create a permanent international organization. 6

From the time the Soviets were attacked until May, 1942, there had been many consultations about aid to Russia from both the British and Americans. The battles in Russia were more fierce, if possible, than they were in 1941. The force of the German Army was so great that Russia decided she needed relief from so much pressure, and that a second front would give more relief than any material aid at the time.

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov went to London in May, 1942, to secure a promise of a second front as quickly as possible. He and Prime Minister Churchill failed to come to an agreement on that issue but did agree, or add to previous agreements, on an alliance during the war in Europe and for collaboration and mutual assistance after the war. The agreement of July 12, 1941, was replaced by the new one which provided for mutual aid if either were attacked, for cooperation to organize security in the two nations, and for uniting to preserve peace and to resist aggression. The two powers also agreed not to increase their boundaries and pledged that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. 7


7Welles, op. cit., p. 226.
After Molotov and Churchill had reached their agreement, Molotov, with Litvinov, the Russian Ambassador, called on President Roosevelt in Washington for a second-front decision.

At the first meeting President Roosevelt spoke of his desire to start the process of disarming after the war. Only enough arms to police the world would be kept. He especially emphasized the fact that Germany and Japan would have to be watched.

The conference, composed of Molotov, President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, General Marshall, and Admiral King, opened the next morning. President Roosevelt stated the cause of the meeting and related the fact that Molotov had received no promise of aid on a second front while he was in London. He also stated that he regarded it as our obligation to help the Soviets to the best of our ability.

The question of immediate need was discussed candidly. The Soviets felt that the sooner the two great powers, Britain and the United States, got into the struggle, the sooner it would be over and that aid could come too late. The demand for British and American forces that would draw off forty German divisions was made, and the possible Allied victory in 1942 was predicted. The discussions lasted for some time, and Molotov asked President Roosevelt what answer should be given in London and Moscow when he arrived there.

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President Roosevelt replied by saying that the United States could proceed toward the creation of a second front with more speed if the Soviet government would make it possible for more American ships to be put into English service. The three Allied powers issued statements in regard to a second front in 1942. The statement said that preparations were being made for a second front in 1942 in August or September. The statement also hinted at a well-prepared landing or none.

Churchill opposed the invasion of France as had been planned by Stalin and Roosevelt, for he felt that the plan would result in failure. He felt that the reprisals against the French would be much worse and that the failure would delay a full-scale European invasion. Churchill opposed a frontal attack such as was planned against France, but his insistence that the Americans and the British attack in North Africa was aided by reverses that Britain was suffering there.

During the North African campaign, which was then under way, President Roosevelt realized that aid to keep Britain from defeat in North Africa could best be given by disrupting Rommel's Nazi supply lines. He asked Stalin for forty bombers that were approaching Basra on their way to Russia. Stalin consented at once. The decision to land in North Africa according to British plans was reached in London in the latter part of July.

The successful Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in the autumn and early winter of 1942-43 gave the Allies new
courage. Pressure was lessened against Russia, and the plans of the Anglo-American armies were being successfully executed. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the combined chiefs of staff of the two countries met at Casablanca on January 14, 1943, to survey the entire field of war theater by theater. The combined staffs met two or three times a day and recorded their progress at intervals with the Prime Minister and the President.

Total agreements were reached on the plans for united action against Italy, Germany, and Japan during the 1943 campaign. 9

North Africa was the chief political issue at the conference, which was to be called the "Unconditional Surrender Conference," but the chief military consideration was the same that the two leaders had disagreed on the year before—a second front in Europe. Their decision had greatly disappointed Stalin, but at that time the situation of the Red Army was not so perilous as it had been when they discussed the subject before. The Red Army had been successful just as the Anglo-American armies had. The problem of coordinating the strategy of the Allies so that their blows against Germany would be stronger as the Red Army increased its velocity was a major consideration.

Premier Stalin was invited to Casablanca, but he felt that he was needed in Russia to direct the great offensive

9Ibid., p. 61.
that was under way on the far-flung battle lines. Military proposals were sent to him daily. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was also notified of the decisions that were being made to aid China.

General Giraud was invited to confer with the combined chiefs of staff; he was to meet General de Gaulle later. Thus we see there were many persons, interests, and causes to be dealt with at this meeting which was held in French Morocco.¹⁰

The success of the Red Army in the defense of Stalingrad, and the Anglo-American successes in North Africa opened a period of good feeling between the Soviet Union and the United States. Each complimented the other on the successes in the recent campaigns. Yet a note of discord was just under the surface as grumblings were heard about the aid the United States was sending Russia on one side, and the failure of the Allies to recognize the importance of Russia's tremendous war effort on the other. These clashes were aggravated by Admiral Standley, the American ambassador to Russia, who stated in the Moscow Press that Russia was concealing the extent of American aid. Washington quickly retracted the statement, but Russia hastily published the extent of American aid. The publication did much to settle contentions in Russia and in the United States.

Another misunderstanding or fear was in evidence in regard to Russia's role in the Far East. Russia was still bound to Japan by a non-aggression treaty. There had been no indication that the Red Army would be occupied in the global war as many hoped it would be. Many Americans felt that recent operations in the Pacific had caused Russia to escape an attack on her eastern shores. The two notes of discord, American aid and Russia's role in the Far East, were almost swept aside by an announcement on May 22, 1943, of the dissolution of the Comintern. This agency had been the greatest barrier to real understanding between Russia and America. The dissolution did more to convince doubtful Americans that Russia had abandoned the original plan of world revolution.\(^{11}\)

One of the stipulated agreements when the United States recognized Soviet Russia in 1933 was that propaganda in favor of Communism would not be distributed in the United States. Time after time, the President and American ambassadors had complained of its continued distribution. With this bone of contention removed, Americans demanded that every effort be made to collaborate with Russia in her efforts against Hitler and in her attempts for world peace.

The following months produced more need for cooperation and clarification of our relations, for the Red Army had the Germans checked and later driven back across the Dnieper.

\(^{11}\)Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Road to Teheran*, p. 257.
During the same period of time the Anglo-American armies had taken Sicily and had a firm foothold on the mainland on the road to Rome. The advances in Italy were accompanied by intensified bombing of Germany. The double attack on Germany caused Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Stalin, and President Roosevelt to realize that a still closer cooperation was necessary for the complete overthrow of Germany and for the development of workable peace plans.

The aftermath of the African campaign caused a near rift between Britain and the United States. There existed in North Africa a leader of the French, General Giraud, who was in complete agreement with General Eisenhower. The French opposition, de Gaulle and his group, were spreading propaganda by press and radio from British soil, and the United States government was in the midst of the barrage. Churchill and Roosevelt tried to get the two opposite groups together for reconciliation at Casablanca. They failed.

At the moment the last Axis resistance had ceased in North Africa, Prime Minister Churchill came to Washington, in May, 1943. His mission was urgent, for Britain was still backing de Gaulle, and the United States was still relying on General Giraud to aid in overcoming the Axis. No agreement as to the future policy of France was reached. All former pleas of the two powers for conciliation between the two French groups failed, but on June 3 de Gaulle and Giraud announced the formation of the French National Committee of
National Liberation. The two former political enemies were the co-presidents. They proclaimed the committee as the French central power and declared that the committee would relinquish its power to the provisional French government when it was established.

The question of recognition of the French committee came up. Neither Britain nor the United States thought the committee merited recognition. The two powers decided to leave Giraud in command in North Africa and to forbid the publication of two Free French newspapers in England.

The question of the French West Indies was discussed, but a satisfactory decision was not made until after the French National Committee was formed.

The question of France was still barring the way of complete understanding between Britain and the United States when the Quebec Conference was planned. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met on August 11 to begin discussions on military strategy. Our Secretary of State and others arrived August 20. At the Quebec Conference the time was set for the Anglo-American invasion of France for the spring of 1944 (Churchill demanded that the invasion be made through the Balkans, but Roosevelt overrode his plan by pointing out the dangers and costs).

The French question was still unsolved, but the seed of the trustee system was planted by Cordell Hull. It read:

First, they were to give their colonial peoples protection, encouragement, moral support, and material aid
and to make continuous efforts toward their political, economic, social, and educational advancement.

Second, they were to make available to qualified persons among the colonial peoples, to the fullest possible extent, positions in the various branches of the local governmental organization.

Third, they were to grant progressively to the colonial peoples such measures of self-government as they were capable of maintaining in the light of various stages of their development toward independence.

Fourth, they were to fix, at the earliest practicable moment, dates upon which the colonial peoples would be accorded the status of full independence within a system of general security.

Fifth, they were to pursue policies under which the natural resources of colonial territories would be developed, organized, and marketed in the interest of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole.12

A copy of the draft was given the British, and a copy was sent to Premier Stalin who had been invited to the conference.

With a declaration for peace before Stalin and many immediate problems before the Allies, plans were completed for a conference in Moscow in October, 1943. The conference was attended by Antony Eden, Cordell Hull, and Vyacheslav Molotov. Eden and Hull wanted to discuss political problems at the conference. These included the commission in Algiers to handle Mediterranean problems and the post-war treatment of Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Turkey, Iran, Yugoslavia, and the liberated areas.

The economic topics included reparations, cooperation in rehabilitation and the International Labor Office.

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, had an idea and a program for a four-nation declaration on post-war agreements which he hoped to get included as possibly the principal point on the agenda, but Molotov rejected his idea because China was included in the group. He said that China had no part or interest in European problems.

Molotov also had plans for the Moscow Conference—the same problem he had been trying to drive across since May, 1942—the second front. Molotov wanted a second front in France at the earliest date. President Roosevelt, in pre-conference exchanges, promised to reconcile the Soviets when Stalin, Churchill, and he met.\textsuperscript{13}

The delegation from the United States included Cordell Hull, W. Averell Harriman, Major General John R. Deane, Green E. Hackworth, James C. Dunn, and experts.

The delegation from Britain included Antony Eden, Sir Archibald Clerk Kerr, His Majesty's Ambassador, William Strang, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts.

Those attending the conference from the Soviet Union included V. M. Molotov, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, A. Y. Vyshinski, M. M. Litvinov, V. A. Sergejev, Major-General A. A. Gyrslov, G. F. Saksin, and experts.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 1280.
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 1282.
On the agenda were all the problems that had been submitted for discussion by the three governments.

The first problem to be discussed was that of measures for shortening the war. The experts aided in discussing plans that were complete and strategy that was in the making. Each nation pledged to cooperate more completely in military operations. Britain and the United States agreed to give the Soviets full information of their plans but made it clear that no military negotiations were to be carried on at the conference. No one of the three nations was to have secrets of a military nature that were not shared with the other two powers. John R. Deane then answered the question of the time for the establishment of the second front. The time was to be the spring of 1944. The promise was made with two reservations: that the German air fighter force in northwestern Europe be reduced and that the German land forces should not exceed certain totals. Reasons were given for the reservations, and the experts went into detail as to the needs for the cross-channel operations, including requirements for landing craft, floating piers, transportation, and all classes of supply.

As for the German land forces on the day of assault, they were to be less than twelve full strength, first quality mobile divisions exclusive of coastal, training, and airborne divisions; the Germans must not be able to transfer more than fifteen first quality divisions during the first
two months of operations. The British and Americans told Russia that they expected to create the required conditions by the softening effects of the bomber offensive, by the maintenance of pressure in Italy, by secondary landings in Southern France, by guerrilla activities in the Balkans, and by continuing to rely on Soviet pressure.  

John R. Deane proposed certain cooperation by Russia for a hasty conclusion of the war. He asked for bases in Russia to be used by the United States Air Force. They would be used principally as refueling, emergency, repairing, and rearming stations; he also asked for a more effective mutual interchange of weather information, and proposed that the United States and Russian signal communications be improved. These requirements were agreed to after much pressure by President Roosevelt on Stalin, Harriman on Molotov, and Deane on the Russian military staff. 

The second point on the agenda was the unanimous recognition by the three governments that it was necessary to continue close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war and immediately after the cessation of hostilities. 

The third point to be agreed upon and signed with China was the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security. In the Declaration each nation pledged to prosecute the war

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16 Ibid., p. 21.
until the enemies were defeated and to work in harmony in efforts of organization and maintenance of peace and security. This clause had been one of Cordell Hull's greatest desires—cooperation in peace time too. The Declaration has room for all peace-loving nations, great or small, in the system.\footnote{17}

A European Advisory Commission was established in London to study the European questions as they arose, so that fullest collaboration and cooperation could be secured between the three governments. Tripartite consultations were also provided for. The existing diplomatic channels could be used for the consultations. Provisions for an advisory council for matters relating to Italy were made. The representatives of the three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation would meet jointly to care for the problems of Italy. Representatives of Yugoslavia and Greece would confer with the others on problems that concerned them. Military operations were out of the reach of this council. The three powers wanted democracy restored in Italy as soon as possible. Russia agreed to this, but not until she had been promised a certain part of the Italian seaworthy vessels.

The three powers pledged their efforts to the restoration of independence in Austria. The annexation of Austria to Germany on March 15, 1938, was declared null and void.

\footnote{17U. S. Department of State, "Declaration of Four Nations on General Security," Toward the Peace Documents, Pub. 2298, (Revision of War Documents, Pub. 2162), p. 6.}
Austria was given to understand that account would be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.\textsuperscript{17}

The German leaders were next taken into consideration. The three powers decided that German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who had taken part in atrocities committed on the peoples in overrun countries should be taken back to the country in which the crime was committed and tried according to the laws there. If the crimes had no particular geographical location, the criminal would be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies.\textsuperscript{18}

Secretary of State Cordell Hull was given instructions by President Roosevelt to stop in North Africa on his way home from the Moscow Conference and to wait for the President, so that they could go together to Cairo, North Africa. Hull had no immunizations against some diseases prevalent in North Africa, so he cabled the President that he dared not come immediately to the United States. The two met and completed their conversation that had been started on the air regarding a future meeting of the Big Three. The President left soon for Cairo. Accompanying him were his military and

\textsuperscript{17}U. S. Department of State, "The Moscow Conference," Toward the Peace Documents, Pub. 2298 (Revision of War Documents, Pub. 2162), pp. 4-5.

\textsuperscript{18}U. S. Department of State, "Declaration of German Atrocities," Towards the Peace Documents, Pub. 2298 (Revision of War Documents, Pub. 2162), pp. 7-8.
diplomatic advisors. Among them were General Eisenhower, Roosevelt's son and son-in-law, Elliot Roosevelt and Major John Boettiger, Admiral McIntire, Harry Hopkins, General Marshall, General Arnold and Averell Harriman.

The British delegation also was large. Prime Minister Churchill headed the group. Sarah, Churchill's daughter, Antony Eden, Lord Moran and others who were either military or diplomatic advisors were present.

From China came the Generalissimo and his wife who interpreted for her husband.

Much had been done to secure the cooperation of China before the Cairo Conference in November, 1943. The United States had two objectives in mind for China, the only nation of any size left in the Far East--the other, Japan, was our enemy. The first objective for China was an effective joint prosecution of the war. The second objective was restoring China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the great nations, Britain, Russia, and the United States. China could aid the great powers in the preparation of a post-war organization and in the establishment of stability in China and elsewhere in the Orient.

The United States had relinquished her extra-territorial rights in China on January 11, 1943. Efforts were exerted before and during the Moscow Conference to get Russia to agree to China's being a signer of the Four-Nation Declaration which called for the creation of an international organization
to maintain the peace. The Congress of the United States passed an act repealing the Chinese Exclusion Laws and permitting Chinese citizens to enter the United States on a quota basis as other aliens enter. A quota of one hundred and five Chinese could enter the United States annually. These moves caused the relations between China and the United States to be more in harmony when their leaders met.

Japan had been making overtures for a separate peace with China, but Chiang Kai-Shek had repulsed every offer. These refusals gave Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt confidence in the Chinese leader, for China was war weary. China had lost some valuable territories during the years she had fought Japan. These were to be restored to China together with Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands.

Korea was to be restored as an independent nation "in due course." This decision was made without consulting Stalin. Russia was not at war with Japan, but she was one of the Allies who was to be open in her diplomatic dealings, and Korea was of special interest to Russia as a springboard and outlet to the Pacific.

The United States committed herself to supply China with Lend-lease, which was for direct military uses, to establish an air force of American volunteers in China and an air

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19 Hull, op. cit., p. 1583.
transport into China (the Burma Road was closed) and to operate a staff school for higher Chinese officers.

In addition to Lend-lease, the assistance ranged from a credit of five hundred million dollars and the facilitation of China's import and export trade to technical advice for the operation of a Chinese war production board, with the American President's representative, Donald M. Nelson, in charge.\textsuperscript{20}

Aid of an entirely different kind was offered, that of encouraging China to play a role worthy of her name. Unity was threatened by Chinese Communists in the north and the Kuomintang Party. The President of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill encouraged China to take a lead in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Bretton Woods Monetary Conference, and later in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference for the establishment of the United Nations organization.

The Cairo Conference ended with agreements that pledged to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan, to strip her of all lands acquired since the beginning of World War I, and to demand the unconditional surrender of Japan.\textsuperscript{21}

The conference ended with the agreement signed by the three great powers, but much was agreed to that was not included in the signed document. President Roosevelt and the

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 1585.

Generalissimo had argued, questioned, and finally agreed that the government of China would be made democratic after the war if Roosevelt would promise security to China on her northern boundary and would pledge that the British and other nations would no longer have empire rights to the cities of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Canton. The Americans were pledged again not to allow the British access to the air maps of China. The pledge was first given before the maps were made.22

Other subjects pertinent to China were discussed between the two leaders: the efficiency of the Chinese troops, supplies, and the future of China's neighbors, the Malay States, Burma, Indo-China, and India.

The British went to the Cairo Conference with several complaints. They wanted a different agreement as to when and where the European invasion would be and who would be in command of it. They wanted a change in tonnage quotas so that more goods could be shipped in a different direction. Prime Minister Churchill had delayed the invasion and caused the pressure of the combined armies to be used in North Africa. He presented his pet idea—"a Balkan invasion." If this plan could not be agreed upon, he had another plan to suggest—that of an attack on Norway, with pressure still kept in the Mediterranean.

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22 Elliot Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, p. 160.
Turkey's entrance into the war on the Allied side was another demand made by Prime Minister Churchill. President Roosevelt argued that Lend-lease to Turkey would lengthen the war and give very little assistance in the actual victory. Roosevelt won the argument.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 162.
CHAPTER IV

THE BIG THREE AND POST-WAR CONFERENCES

Cordell Hull went to Moscow in October, 1943, to arrange for a meeting of President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill. The place of meeting could not be agreed upon in Moscow, and Roosevelt finally agreed upon the place chosen by Stalin, Tehran, Iran. The British contingent was housed at the British Legation; part of the Americans, President Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Harry Hopkins, and Admiral McIntire, were house guests of Stalin; the remainder of the civil delegation stayed in the houses of the American minister; and the military delegation stayed in the little guest houses at Camp Amirabad.

The opening speeches were started by President Roosevelt who claimed the privilege because he was the youngest of the three. He stressed the need for the meeting and the winning of the war and suggested that the general staffs meet each day at the same time that the "Big Three" did.

Churchill stressed the power the three heads of great nations held in their hands—their power at the conference table would influence the future of mankind.
Stalin, as host, next spoke. He welcomed the visitors, said the meeting was important, and suggested that they proceed with the business.

President Roosevelt reviewed the war from the American standpoint from the time of Pearl Harbor, and he stressed the principal objective of the conference—ways and means of assisting the Soviet Union by diverting German divisions from the Russian front. It was during the conversations that the possibility of Russian participation in the Pacific war first seemed probable. Stalin said that European demands had been too great on the Red Army for anything except the necessary defenses to be in Siberia. Russian forces would need to be increased threefold before Stalin could see a possibility of Russia's entry into the Pacific war. Stalin closed the conversation on the war with Japan by saying, "Then by our common front we shall win."¹

The immediate desire of each leader was presented. Churchill wanted increased action in the Mediterranean; Stalin, a second front at the earliest date; and Roosevelt and the chiefs of staff agreed with Stalin. The two conflicting desires covered three sessions at which the chiefs of staff met with the Big Three and two others. In these meetings the commitment was made to undertake the French invasion in May, 1944.

¹John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 41.
Churchill tried every argument to increase the operations in the Mediterranean. He wanted to plan for an amphibious landing in Italy, for the capture of Rhodes in conjunction with Turkey's entrance into the war, and for the attack of southern France.

Stalin argued against any operation that would delay the invasion of France. He thought Anglo-American forces would be wasted in further operations in the Mediterranean. The chiefs of staff and President Roosevelt agreed with Stalin's demands. When the agreement was reached, Stalin tried to clinch matters by asking who the Allied commander would be. Eisenhower was chosen.

Throughout the conference Stalin was accompanied by Molotov, Voroshilov, and Pavlov, his interpreter. He wanted the Anglo-Americans to relieve pressure on the Russian front, but he wanted the Anglo-Americans in Western, not Southern Europe, for post-war gains. Churchill, who was accompanied by a delegation of between twenty and thirty, was also thinking of British interests in the post-war period. He thought Anglo-American occupation of the Balkans was necessary.²

Each of the Big Three received a surprise at the conference: Stalin expected opposition to the invasion of France; Prime Minister Churchill expected agreement and met

²Ibid., p. 44.
opposition, and President Roosevelt expected opposition and encountered support. 3

At the Moscow Conference, October, 1943, agreements had been made for closer collaboration and cooperation in regard to improved weather exchange and communications and shuttle bombing. No progress had been made in either. President Roosevelt insisted that there be an exchange of intelligence concerning plans for Russian entry into the Pacific war and that all former promises be acted upon.

Other problems that were discussed by the Big Three were: the Polish boundary, more Lend-lease to the two European powers, production in the United States, and the condition in Iran. The southern line of Poland was to run so that the city of Lwow and some of the oil fields should be in Polish territory. Stalin was insistent in his demands for more Lend-lease, and he was successful in his demands. Iran, a neutral who aided the Soviet Union in her transportation problems, was discussed at length. The Big Three issued a declaration for Iran. The document pledged the economic aid of the three powers and the protection of Iran's territory. 4

The first hint for the final disposition of Germany was made at this meeting. It was suggested that Germany be cut

3Ibid., p. 45.
4Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 189.
up into a number of individual states for the security of Europe.\textsuperscript{5}

The climax of the Teheran Conference was reached when the Big Three met for ten hours the last day. They had been in session three days before, but had never gotten together long enough at one time to agree on a subject as important as the Declaration. In the last session the Teheran Declaration was drawn up and signed. The three powers pledged to work together in war and in the peace that would follow.

Germany was to be destroyed, and complete agreements were made on the scope and timing of operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

War was to be banished for many generations. A family of democratic nations would be set up that would welcome all nations into its membership.

The final statement was that they hoped all people of the world might live free lives.\textsuperscript{6}

Pledges were easily given under these circumstances, but the political problems that presented themselves after this meeting of the three greatest powers soon disclosed the fact that pledges are much easier made than kept.

A military meeting between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt was in progress in Quebec, Canada, at the


\textsuperscript{6}U. S. Department of State, "Teheran Conference," \textit{The United States and the Peace}, Part 1, p. 9.
same time the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was convened. Military matters were the main objective of the meeting, but another problem was to be considered too—a home for the United Nations. President Roosevelt had called Edward R. Stettinius and Cordell Hull to a conference with him to discuss the outstanding points at issue at Dumbarton Oaks. In the meeting Roosevelt suggested that the best workable plan would be a rotation of the Assembly, a permanent home of the Secretariat at Geneva, and two regular places for the Council to meet. By these arrangements, no group or nation could exert too much pressure on the activities while the sessions were in progress.

Before the Second Quebec Conference met in September, 1944, a group of Americans headed by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, had insisted that he be allowed to present his plan for the post-war treatment of Germany at Quebec. Neither Hull nor Welles attended the conference, but Morgenthau did. The State Department and the War Department had given a plan at the Moscow Conference, but Morgenthau believed their plan was too mild. His plan, given by Harry White, proposed that parts of Germany should be given to neighboring countries and the remainder split into three units.7

Poland's share should be southern Silesia and a part of East Prussia that did not go to Russia. France's part would

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7Cordell Hull, The Memoirs, II, 1604.
be the Saar and the territories bounded by the Rhine and Moselle rivers. Denmark's share would be territories north of the Kiel Canal.

An international zone would be one of the three units. It would contain the Ruhr and the nearby industrial areas and the Kiel Canal. The rest of Germany would be divided into two autonomous states—South German and North German. The South German would include Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, and some smaller areas. The North German State would include a large part of former Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia, and several smaller states. No trade would be allowed between the international zone and the German states.

The destruction of the Ruhr and the surrounding areas was to be complete. All industrial plants would be destroyed or dismantled and moved, and all equipment would be removed from the mines before they were destroyed.

The Morgenthau, or Treasury Plan stated that United States military and civilian representation would be on whatever international commission was set up to carry out the German program. The continental neighbors of Germany, Russia, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium would be responsible for policing the conquered Germans. The United States troops could leave in a short time.

The State Department opposed such a drastic plan for industrial Germany who was always short of food for her population,
and the War Department maintained that the plan would require too much control to prevent collaboration between the German states. The Treasury Plan seemed to be unnecessary to the State and War Departments because they had presented their plan to President Roosevelt the year before and had given Russia and Britain a copy of it to study. 8

Following the presentation of the Treasury Plan by Harry White, two men, H. Freeman Matthews and James W. Riddleberger presented the State Department views and explained how they fitted into British and Russian ideas so far as was known. The State Department views included the unconditional surrender of Germany, the rights to occupy Germany, the freeing of all war and detained nationals of the United Nations, the demobilization of Germany, the abandonment of concentration camps and delivery of war prisoners, the maintenance of all agencies of economic control with their staffs, records, and equipment for disposition by the United Nations, and the yielding of all arms, armaments, naval stores, and stocks of raw materials.

During the armistice period, an Inter-Allied Control Commission was to be set up to carry out the terms of surrender. Germany would be occupied by Soviet, British, and American military personnel. There would be little military control except the dissolution of the Nazi Party. The reparations that would be required of Germany would be determined

8Ibid., p. 1609.
through a Commission on German Reparations. Germany would be
disarmed and the political machine would be decentralized. A
broadly based democracy would be laid during the occupational
period.

When the plan was given to Antony Eden in 1943, he said
that he favored a Germany divided into states, but as to the
major views, they were the same as his.

Molotov favored the plan but wanted the boundaries of
Germany restored to her 1938 borders. The State Department
Plan included that too.

Four days after the Quebec Conference met, President
Roosevelt sent Secretary of State Cordell Hull a memorandum
which indicated that the Treasury Plan had been embraced.
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had worked
out the locations of the occupying forces in Germany. Britain
would occupy the northwestern portion of Germany; the United
States should have most of southern Germany, including Bavaria. In settling this controversy of seven months' duration, Prime
Minister Churchill came out with a loan of six and a half
billion dollars. He manipulated another gain too: no articles
that were received on Lend-lease or identical thereto would be
exported or sold for profit. The Prime Minister's attitude at
Quebec seemed to be that of a man whose country was about to

\[9\text{Ibid., p. 611.}\]
collapse. President Roosevelt responded to his wishes by signing the Treasury Plan.

Opposition to the Treasury Plan was so great at home that Roosevelt said that he must not have given the matter much thought before he initialled it. Before three weeks had passed, the President was suggesting that since the United States did not occupy Germany, there was no need for haste in making detailed plans for her post-war existence.\(^{10}\)

The discussions continued on the treatment of post-war Germany among the members of the three departments: War, Treasury, and State until March 25, 1945, when an agreement was reached and signed by Under Secretary of State Clayton at Potsdam. The agreement failed to mention Germany's being made an agricultural and pastoral state. The State Department had objected to any plan that would cause the German population to starve or be fed by the United States.\(^{11}\)

The unity that would culminate in the United Nations was started by the Atlantic Charter. The second general step was the Four Powers Declaration. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference in the United States was convened to draw a workable framework for the United Nations organization.

The technical planning for the conference in the United States was headed by Cordell Hull. He began planning for a definite policy on the part of the United States by meeting

\(^{10}\)Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

\(^{11}\)Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1621.
with the leading Congressmen from time to time. While Hull was working with the Congressmen, Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long was conducting a campaign to induce the Democratic and Republican National Conventions to adopt planks that favored the proposed international organization. Both parties came out in favor of the organization.

Outside planning started in May, 1944. Cordell Hull invited the British Ambassador Halifax and Russian Ambassador Gromyko to his office. While they were there, Hull stressed his desire that China be included in the conference. In later discussions the Russians and Chinese were contacted and agreements were made that each would attend at different times. This seemed to be the easiest way for an agreeable conference. 12

The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, was the British representative; Ambassador Gromyko represented the Soviets; and the American delegation was headed by Under Secretary Stettinius. Others who had taken a part in the post-war planning also attended. These were: Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, James C. Dunn, Henry P. Fletcher, Joseph C. Crew, Green H. Hackworth, Stanley K. Hornbeck, and many others. The delegates were aided by the outstanding staff of experts, Leo Pasvolsky, Alger Hiss, Harley Notter, Benjamin Gerig, and Durward Sandifer. They served as the international secretariat for all four delegations.

12 Ibid., p. 1673.
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was opened by Cordell Hull with an address in which he stressed the need for an organization through which the peace-loving peoples of the world could build peace.13

As the conference progressed, similarity between the ideas of the three nations, Britain, Russia, and the United States, was evident.

The most debated subject in the early part of the discussions was the scope of the projected organization. Should the economic and social fields be included in international council under the authority of the General Assembly? The Russians favored a separate organization for all economic and social problems.

The Assembly was assigned a rather insignificant place in the British and Russian proposals, but the United States insisted that it should comprise all member states and be given real functions. The other two yielded their views on this point.

Another debated question was the power of the Executive Council. Its functions should be to promote peaceful settlement, to make recommendations to the parties to a dispute, and to settle a dispute at the request of members involved.14

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14Byrnes, op. cit., p. 34.
Nearly every question that was brought up became a disputed issue. Whether or not a member could vote if he were involved resulted in a deadlock for several sessions, and agreement was finally reached that gave the involved member a vote. Whether a majority or a two-thirds vote would carry a decision was long disputed and remained unsettled. The withdrawal and suspension of members caused many hours of negotiation, but the request that the sixteen Soviet Republics be allowed to enter the Assembly of United Nations individually caused quite an uproar. The request was refused. The status and duty of the small nations in regard to furnishing arms and air bases to the Security Organization were discussed. There was a dispute as to whether or not the membership should be limited to the original signers of the United Nations Declaration, but the group who favored the admission of additional nations won the argument. Unanimous votes by permanent members of the Security Council was the last big issue discussed. It was not settled. 15

A proposed final draft of the United Nations Charter was agreed upon after three weeks of discussion.

The Soviet Ambassador Gromyko did not want China to be considered in communicating the recommendations agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks, nor would he agree that the vote of a permanent member of the Council, even if that country were

15 Hull, op. cit., p. 1685.
involved, would not be counted. Along with this unsettled question were four others: statute of the International Court of Justice; initial membership; trusteeships; and liquidation of the League of Nations.

During the Chinese phase of the conference, the British, Chinese and Americans agreed to two changes. The first change provided for settlement of disputes "with due regard for justice and international law." In the second, provisions were made for promotion of education and other cultural cooperation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 1708.}

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that were presented to the people of the world contain ten chapters. The first chapter gives the aims as: (1) the maintenance of peace and security; (2) the development of friendly relations; (3) international cooperation in the solution of international problems; and (4) the center for harmonizing the actions of the nations.

Chapter two sets up the rules for the organization and members. The sovereignty of peace-loving states is the basis for the organization; all nations take upon themselves the obligations as designated by the Charter; all members are to settle disputes by peaceful means; all members are to refrain from using force; all members are to assist the organization in any action taken by it; all members are to refrain from
giving aid to any state that the organization is using preventive or enforcement action against.

Chapter three opens membership to all peace-loving states.

Chapter four enumerates the principal organs of the organization, a General Assembly; a Security Council; an International Court of Justice; and a Secretariat.

Chapter five lists the composition, functions, powers, and voting. All members of the organization shall be members of the General Assembly, and a member's representatives will be specified in the Charter.

The General Assembly shall have power to disarm and regulate armaments and to discuss any subject that threatens international peace and security. The General Assembly shall not make recommendations on any subject of peace or security which is being dealt with by the Security Council. Each member shall have one vote in the General Assembly.

The two-thirds majority is required on the following decisions: (1) Security Council members' election; (2) election of members of the Economic and Social Council; (3) admission of members; (4) suspension of privileges; (5) expulsion of members; and (6) budgetary questions. On questions of additional categories, and others, the two-thirds majority vote will be used.17

The Security Council is set up in Chapter six. It shall be composed of eleven members of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and later, France. The six states, three retiring each year, shall be elected for a term of two years.

The Security Council's primary responsibility shall be to act in behalf of the members of the organization, and all members shall abide by the decisions of the Security Council.

The principal judicial organ of the organization is the International Court of Justice.

The prevention and suppression of aggression is the main job of the Security Council as is designated in Chapter seven. The use of measures not involving armed force may be applied to an aggressor nation.

Armed forces from members of the organization shall be available if the case merits them. This would necessitate the establishment of a Military Staff Committee.

Chapter nine makes arrangements for international economic and social cooperation. This is made possible by creating conditions of stability and well-being, solving economic and social problems, and promoting respect for human rights and freedoms.

Chapter ten provides for a Secretariat and his staff.

Stalin had promised to enter the fight against Japan soon after Germany was destroyed. Nothing had been done among
the three nations, but Churchill and Roosevelt had made
tailed plans for their operations at the Second Quebec Con-
ference. They sent Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark
Kerr to Moscow to present their plans to Stalin. The plans
contained a broad outline of the conclusions that they had
reached. Stalin asked if Russia was expected to participate
as the three had planned. He also stressed the need for total
collaboration and the necessity of the knowledge of the role
Russia was to play. John R. Deane supplied him with a list
of missions for Russia:

1. Securing the Trans-Siberian railroad and the
Vladivostok peninsula . . .
2. Setting up Soviet and American strategic air
forces for operations against Japan from the Maritime
Provinces . . .
3. Securing the Pacific supply route in which
Russian participation would include:
   a. Making Petropavlovsk available to the United
      States as a naval base
   b. Neutralization by air of southern Sakhalin
      and Hokkaido
   c. Improvement of port facilities of the Amur
      River
   d. Military occupation of southern Sakhalin
   e. Soviet-American naval cooperation as the
      situation dictated
4. Defeat of the Japanese Army in Manchuria. (This
   was to be the Soviet Union's principal role, but the
   others were necessary preliminaries.)

The Russian chiefs of staff approved the missions and
added one which they assigned third priority, interdiction of
Japanese shipping, and air traffic between Japan and the

19Deane, op. cit., p. 242.
Asiatic mainland. They moved securing the Pacific supply route to last priority.

In the two meetings that followed in Moscow, Stalin answered several questions that had been asked him. The Red Army would require sixty divisions in the Far East before it could take the offensive--thirty more than were there at that time; the movement of thirty divisions would require three months. The sixty divisions would require two or three months' supplies stockpiled in Siberia. In completing his answer, Stalin said that the Red Army would enter the war three months after the defeat of Germany if the United States would assist in building up the stockpile in Siberia. He also promised air bases, but stressed the point that the Trans-Siberian rail capacity would be otherwise employed.\textsuperscript{20} Petropavlovsk was also assured as a naval base. The third meeting was held between the Soviet and American representatives. The needs of the Red Army were presented: three thousand tanks, seventy-five thousand motor vehicles, and five thousand airplanes. The total tonnage involved was over a million tons of dry and liquid cargo combined.

Between the Moscow meeting to plan Russia's role in the Pacific war and the Yalta Conference, little had been done toward fulfilling any promises except the delivery of eighty per cent of the Lend-lease supplies to Siberia. The Americans

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 244.
felt that some agreement that would result in action was necessary. John R. Deane presented Antonov seven questions which he answered. The plans would remain as they were made in Moscow; the United States was needed to help defend Kamchatka; preliminary construction for an American air force would be made in the Komsomolsk--Nikolaevsk area; American survey parties could visit the Amur River district at once, the Kamchatka later; the Red Army would take the southern half of Sakhalin Island as one of its first operations; American planning would be pursued in Moscow; and weather stations would be made available.  

A few days after President Roosevelt had been inaugurated in January, 1945, a large delegation accompanied him to Yalta, U.S.S.R., for a second meeting of the Big Three. Secretary of State, Stettinius, had gone ahead by air when the delegation set sail on an American cruiser. Harry Hopkins joined the delegation at Malta. On the cruiser were James F. Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Lieutenant William M. Rigdon, several military advisers, the President's physician, and some members of his family.

In the British delegation were Prime Minister Churchill, his daughter, and the chiefs of staff. With Generalissimo Stalin were Molotov and Malisky.  

21 Ibid., p. 252.
22 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 23.
The Yalta Conference met February 4, 1945. At that time the Russian and American armies were in the best positions for a swift victory that they had been at any time since the outbreak of the war.

The chief objective of the Americans was securing an agreement on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the creation of an international peace organization, but the quick successes of the armies caused the first proposal of the conference to be the treatment of post-war Germany. Stalin wanted to discuss the future of Germany along these lines: the terms of the surrender, the future form of the German states or state, the reparations, and the occupation of Germany by France. Stalin felt that the French people had been traitors to a trust, and that Yugoslavia and Poland deserved more consideration than France did. His view was not changed until he was informed that France's territory would be taken out of the British and American zones. Next he opposed giving France a representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. After many arguments on the subject, Stalin agreed.23

The greatest problem of post-war Germany arose from a suggestion that was made at Teheran in regard to dividing Germany into a number of individual states. This discussion was so tense that it was postponed for a thorough study by the ministers.

23Ibid., p. 25.
Reparations seemed to be uppermost in the minds of Maisky and Molotov. They demanded reparations in two ways. First, withdrawals from the natural wealth of Germany were insisted upon. Natural wealth was defined as factories, land, machinery, machine tools, rolling stock of railways, investments in foreign enterprises, and in fact, everything that could be moved. They demanded the withdrawal of eighty per cent of all German industry. Second, they wanted yearly payments in kind after the cessation of hostilities for ten years. The sum of twenty billion dollars was named as the total reparations, with ten billion, or one half of the total, being paid to Russia.

The Russian plan also called for the establishment of a system of priorities among the countries to receive the reparations. This system would pay according to the war effort expended and the losses suffered.

Prime Minister Churchill objected to a starving Germany. He felt that the population would perish if the Russian proposals were carried out.

President Roosevelt objected to a starving Germany, for the United States was not financially able to loan her money or to feed the people. He made it clear that no reparations were wanted by his country, but he finally yielded to Stalin's proposal for a reparations committee. The Reparations Committee started with the initial sum of twenty billions, with fifty per cent to be paid to the Soviet Union.
Provisions were made for Allied control of Germany in Berlin, and a home was given the Reparations Committee in Moscow. 24

The eight-day conference between the Big Three ended, and the report was printed in the daily newspapers in the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States February 12, 1945. The agreements reached were: (1) the completion of plans for the defeat of Germany and a promise to meet again when the need arose; (2) the plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender of Germany and the occupation by the four powers: Russia, Britain, France, and the United States; (3) the disarmament of Germany and the destruction of Nazism; (4) the punishment of war criminals and the exact reparation to be demanded; (5) a plan for the United Nations to meet at San Francisco on April 25, 1945; (6) a plan for liberated Europeans to solve their political and economic problems democratically; (7) a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter; (8) the establishment of a government in Poland; (9) the formation of a new government in Yugoslavia; (10) the regular consultation between the three foreign secretaries every three or four months, with a time-about meeting in the three capitals; and (11) a unity for peace as for war. 25

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24Ibid., p. 29.

At the Crimea Conference, Stalin asked for certain concessions and never wavered in his demands until Churchill and Roosevelt granted his wishes. Stalin knew that Britain and America would not quit the war, nor would they come to terms with Japan and Hitler. This knowledge gave him confidence in his ability to get what he wanted. The Red Army had advanced faster than the war prosecutors could imagine—there was nothing for Stalin to lose by making daring demands; there was much to be gained.

Churchill and Roosevelt were handicapped by their lack of faith in Stalin’s motives, for he had in 1939 signed a pact with the man they were then trying to conquer. The famous "unconditional surrender" at Casablanca did not draw a promise of a separate peace from Stalin. The British and Americans had learned that Stalin had attempted to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany in the spring of 1942 and again in the autumn of the same year.26

Another move that disturbed the British and Americans was the distribution of a million copies of a manifesto that was published in Moscow in 1943. An organization, National Committee for a Free Germany, was formed. Its aims were to cause a wholesale desertion in the Nazi Army. The troops were to join the ranks of the Red Army and thus cause a peace pact to be drawn up.

The formula for voting in the Security Council was not settled at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The Soviet delegation wanted all decisions to be made by a unanimous vote by the major powers. The United States' position was that the votes of the five permanent members must be unanimous, except in decisions in which a permanent member was a party to the dispute. This was changed to allow a nation in a dispute to vote. The proposal made by the United States was accepted, and the next subject to be discussed also dealt with the United Nations. The question dealt with what governments should become members.

As soon as the American proposal was accepted, Marshal Stalin introduced the idea of three members from Russia. The additional Russian members finally admitted were Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Churchill aided Stalin in getting the request granted because he wanted as many of the British Dominion members to have votes as was possible. Stalin agreed for the United States to have three also, but the agreement failed to be in the communique. Nothing was done to secure the votes then or later.²⁹

Trading usually resulted in a one-sided bargain at the conferences. The United States had traded some before Yalta, and the desire to see Russia actually in war against Japan caused the President to trade the Kurile Islands and to

²⁹Byrnes, op. cit., p. 42.
restore the rights of Russia before 1904. His promises included the ceding to Russia of the southern half of Sakhalin Island, the internationalization of the port of Dairen, the lease of Port Arthur to Russia as a naval base, and the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads. 30

The preliminary arrangements for the Potsdam Conference in Germany met several setbacks because Marshal Zhukov who was to arrange for the meeting was busy in Moscow. The meeting got underway on June 28. Only the British, Soviet, and American chiefs of staff attended.

Admiral Leahy was selected as chairman; as he assumed the leadership, he asked Antonov to outline Russia's plans and intentions concerning the Japanese. Antonov replied that the Red Army would enter the battle against Japan in August. The exact date would depend on the progress of negotiations that were being held with the Chinese.

The total outlay and progress of the American war against Japan was reviewed by General Marshall. This was taken from the files recording the atrocities, since Pearl Harbor. Marshall felt that the need for Russian participation was greater than at any other time. Many American dollars, needed raw materials, and food had been placed in reserve for the Red Army in Siberia since the last conference.

John R. Deane presented five requests to the Soviets. He asked that the United States Navy be permitted to establish two weather stations on Soviet territory, one at Khabarovsk and the other at Petropavlovsk. The second and third requests were for specified boundaries for Soviet naval and air operations. The fourth request was for an answer to previous requests for liaison arrangements. The fifth asked for an agreement to use each other's naval and air bases for safe haven and the repair of battle-damaged ships or aircraft. 31

Japan had asked for the Soviets to act as the intermediary in arranging for the cessation of hostilities. An announcement of this fact resulted in the Potsdam Declaration which called for unconditional surrender but did not offer Japan the prospect of retaining its sovereignty as a nation. In the declaration the Allied powers determined to destroy Japan; they reviewed the united effort that overpowered Germany with a promise of a greater force against the Japanese armed forces and their homeland; they issued a plea for Japan to follow the path of reason; they laid down terms to be accepted by Japan; they promised to drive militarism from the world; and they agreed to occupy Japan until her war-making power was destroyed; to limit Japan's sovereignty to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and some

31 Deane, op. cit., p. 71.
minor islands; to send the Japanese military force home; to punish Japanese war criminals, though the Japanese were not to be enslaved; to establish freedom of speech, religion, and thought; to keep the economy of Japan, except industries for re-arming, in operation; to allow Japan to re-enter world trade; to withdraw the occupying forces as soon as a responsible government existed; and to demand the unconditional surrender of Japan or threaten her with complete destruction.  

The second meeting of the Potsdam Conference did not include the British chiefs of staff. Antonov opened the meeting by stating that Marshal Stalin had that day handed President Truman the answers to the five questions. Antonov read the answers aloud. They stated that the Soviet Union was agreeable to the installation of the two weather stations, but felt that they should be manned by Soviet personnel. Admiral King told him how necessary it was that Americans man them, and Antonov yielded to the American demand.

Antonov suggested some minor changes in the boundaries that had been set between the United States and Soviet naval and air operations. The changes were agreeable.

Marshal Vasilievsky, said Antonov, would have complete control of all Soviet operations in the Far East. He agreed that there should be an exchange of liaison detachments, and

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that each nation would use each other's bases as havens. He
gave the United States chiefs of staff maps showing where
these bases were located.

The first conference in which President Truman partici-
pated was held in Babelsberg, Germany, July 17, 1945. The
objectives of the meeting were: first, to set up the machin-
ery for the earliest drafting and completion of peace treaties;
second, to agree on the principles for the occupation of
Germany; third, to plan for carrying out the Yalta Declara-
tion on liberated Europe; fourth, to try a new approach to
the reparation issue which the Reparation Commission had
failed to agree on; and fifth, to discuss the Soviets' entry into the war with Japan. Most of the details were
handled by Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Stalin,
and President Truman.33 Two other European problems were
pressing the delegation: whether or not Italy should become
a member of the United Nations and whether or not the European waterways were to be opened to all nations.

The conference opened at 5:10 in the morning. The
British were represented by Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign
Minister Antony Eden, Clement R. Attlee, Sir Alexander
Cadogan, and an interpreter. Russia was represented by
Generalissimo Stalin, Foreign Minister Molotov, Andrei
Vyshinski, Andrei A. Gromyko, F. T. Gousev, and Pavlov. The

33Deane, op. cit., p. 276.
United States was represented by President Harry S. Truman, James F. Byrnes, Joseph E. Davies, Ambassador Averell Harriman, Under Secretary William L. Clayton, Edwin W. Pauley, Counselor Ben Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State James E. Dunn and Doc Matthews.  

At Stalin's suggestion President Truman was made chairman of the group. He had acquainted himself with the previous conferences and had prepared in detail proposals to present at the earliest possible moment. His being made chairman provided him with the opportunity to present the proposal to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. The proposal was approved. The inclusion of China on the Council of Foreign Ministers and the admission of France to the ranks of the great powers were disposed of by limiting the scope of China's activities to Far Eastern problems, and by limiting the scope of France's activities to her peace treaties with Italy and Germany.

The Council of Foreign Ministers was charged with the responsibility of drafting peace treaties that would serve the interests of all nations great or small. The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was set for London in September.

The Americans presented a paper which stated flatly that the Yalta Conference agreements had not been carried

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34 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 69.
out. They proposed united action for aiding Bulgaria and Rumania in reorganizing their governments on democratic principles. Stalin, instead of answering the charge, constantly criticized the Greek government. The Soviets were hostile to Italy and Greece and demanded favors for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland in exchange for favors to Italy and Greece. The new Council of Foreign Ministers gave Italy the right to resume normal relations in the Assembly of United Nations. The other four nations were to be examined separately and concurrent peace treaties drawn up with them. They were to be recognized as soon as the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed.

When the Americans asked Vyshinski if Russia had confiscated American and British-owned equipment in Rumania, Vyshinski, maintaining that the property was German and as such should be classed as war booty, acknowledged the confiscation. The question of ownership became so controversial that an agreement was made to refer the legitimacy of American claims to experts chosen from the three nations.

One of the first requests Stalin made, and one that alarmed Churchill and Truman, was that Russia be given the trusteeship of one of the Italian colonies. Churchill urged that the request be referred to the United Nations, and President Truman suggested it be referred to the Council of

Foreign Ministers for further discussion. There the subject was dropped. 36

Prime Minister Churchill, raising the issue of the control of the Dardanelles, suggested that the Straits be free to English naval and merchant ships. The problem was acute, for the Soviets had asked for the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, and for a naval base in the Straits. The Soviets claimed that these provinces had belonged to Russia during the time of the Czars. Their claim was made stronger by a request from Turkey for Russian ownership. The English objected because Turkey was too weak to defend her interests there.

In the Yalta Conference plans had been made for four occupation zones in Germany, but the Soviets had established a fifth by referring all the German territory east of the Neisse River to Poland for administration. The Soviets defended their action by stating that no government remained in that locality when the Germans fled before the Red Army. This presented a Soviet defense problem which had been remedied by the extra zone. After much discussion the issue was postponed until a peace treaty was drawn up, and the Soviets were appeased by the transfer of the city of Königsberg to the Soviet Union.

36Bynes, op. cit., p. 77.
The reparations question, which was not settled at Yalta, became a heated debate at the Potsdam Conference. A figure, twenty billion dollars, "had been introduced as the total for the Soviets, and stipulation as in kind," not in currency, was made. Since the agreements were made, the Soviets had stripped the industries and even the dwelling houses of their total contents in the Russian zone. Molotov, confronted with these charges, admitted that they were true. This brought up the question as to whether any settlement of the reparations could be made with the Russians because the removals had not been listed or valued.

After much discussion, President Truman proposed that each nation satisfy itself out of the zone it occupied. The British and Americans were willing for the Soviets to take ten per cent of the industrial equipment in the western zone and extra equipment from the British or American zones in exchange for food or coal for the West German people. Molotov accepted the British and American offer "in principle" but he wanted the specified amount of two billion dollars' worth of equipment turned over to the Soviet Union from the Ruhr region.

The German fleet and merchant marine were divided among the three powers. Molotov contended for the division from the time the conference met until it was accomplished. He refused to agree to the reparations plan until the British and Americans agreed on the disposition of the German fleet.
On the last day of the conference President Truman asked how much reparations Russia should receive from Germany. This was settled by the Americans and British agreeing to the removal of fifteen per cent of the capital equipment from the western zone in exchange for coal, fuel, and other products. The agreement closed the conference. 37

The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in London, England, September, 1945. Much had happened since the Potsdam or Berlin Conference adjourned; the second atomic bomb had been used; Russia had entered the war against Japan; Japan had surrendered; arrangements had been made for the occupation of Japan; Lend-Lease settlements had met many unsolved problems; efforts had been made to bring the two opposing forces together in China; five changes had been made in the personnel of the United States Department of State; and preparations had been made for the London Conference.

John Foster Dulles accompanied Secretary of State Byrnes to the conference, along with the State Department advisory staff. The Council of Foreign Ministers encountered serious difficulties over its organization and agenda. Two days passed before the actual business of the conference got under way--its chief aim being the drafting of peace treaties for the defeated nations of Europe. 38

37Ibid., p. 85.
38John Foster Dulles, "Soviet Foreign Policy," Life, XX (June, 1946), 122.
A British draft was used as a basis for the work. These issues appeared: Where should the line be on the Italo-Yugoslav border? Who should control the Dodecanese Islands? What should be done with the Italian colonies? Molotov refused to have the border discussed unless the Yugoslavs were present; he would not discuss the Dodecanese before the matter of the Italian colonies was decided. The American plan for the Italian colonies was for an administration which would have an advisory council composed of one representative each from Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, Italy, and a representative of the people in the territory. Any one of the nations could bring a complaint to the Trusteeship Council; the trusteeship was to be terminated at the end of ten years. Stalin opposed the plan on the ground that the group could not agree on the administrator. His plan for the Italian colonies was for the three big powers to have the trusteeship of a colony each. Russia wanted Tripolitania.

Every effort to write the peace treaty for Italy met with opposition. The question of whether or not the representatives from China and France should be allowed to attend the conference was not agreed upon. Molotov objected to their attendance, but the Americans favored their presence. The disputes that lasted throughout the conference were whether or not the provisional governments in Rumania,
Hungary, and Austria should be recognized and whether or not a bloc was being formed against the Soviets. The Italo-Yugoslav border dispute was disposed of by sending experts to decide on ethnic lines.

After the conference was over, Ambassador Harriman met Generalissimo Stalin in the Crimea to plan for a peace conference and to discuss the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria. While Harriman was with him, Stalin let out the secret of the failure of the London Conference. The United States had not consulted the Soviets about the occupation of Japan in a manner that pleased him.

Other questions that were not answered at the conference were how the Potsdam Declaration should be interpreted and who should write the peace treaties.

The veto was used as Molotov often found himself a minority of one. When he demanded that the French and Chinese participation be expunged from the record, the group knew that nothing further could be accomplished. The representatives became so tense when the matter was brought up that a clear understanding of what each one thought of the other was made known. Molotov publicly wished that Cordell Hull and Antony Eden were still in office, and Bevin accused Molotov of "Hitlerian methods."

\[39\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 123. \ \ 40\text{Byrnes, op. cit.}, \ p. \ 108. \ \ 41\text{Ibid.}, \ p. \ 105.\]
The Moscow Peace Conference opened December 16, 1945, in the Russian city, Moscow. The representatives worked and slept in Spasso House, the home of the American ambassador; the Council held its sessions in Spridinovka House; and the meetings with Stalin were in the Kremlin.

V. M. Molotov was made chairman and James F. Byrnes introduced the proposals that he felt needed immediate consideration if the peace were to be saved. The proposals were: to create a Far Eastern Commission that would function in Washington; to locate an Allied council in Tokyo; to unify the administration for Korea until an independent government could be established; to review American policy in China; to discuss the Soviet occupation of Manchuria; to discuss the withdrawal of British troops from Indonesia and Greece; and to discuss the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. The remainder of the agenda included proposals for a United Nations Commission to consider the control of atomic energy, the reconvening of the Council of Foreign Ministers and a consideration of the question that had held sway during the London Conference—the recognition of the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria.

The American approach to peace conference procedure agreed with Russia's stand at the London Conference. The last paragraph provided that the peace conference make

recommendations to changes of the draft treaties, and the final drafts would be prepared by the states that had signed armistice terms. Molotov proposed that only the countries which had waged war against that particular enemy could consider the treaty. This proposal would require a separate conference for each treaty.

After much discussion, James F. Byrnes offered a list of states that would be eligible under the terms of the American proposal. The list contained twenty-one—all members of the United Nations. Generalissimo Stalin accepted the list later during the conference.

A peace conference to be held in Paris not later than May 1 was next agreed on, but a compromise had to be worked out which included informing and writing concurrence.

The Rumanian question was more specifically settled than it had been at any conference by agreeing to send the American and British ambassadors with Vyshinski to Bucharest to work out with the government the addition of representatives from other parties and to give assurance of civil liberties to the entire population regardless of party affiliation.

No agreements were reached on the Iran and Bulgaria questions. The Soviets claimed the right to keep an army in Iran as long as it was needed to protect the Baku oil fields.

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\(^{43}\text{Byrnes, op. cit., p. 112.}\)
and the Bulgarian government was brought into existence by elections and was working under Communist domination.

The American proposal on Japanese policy was accepted; the approval of American troops in China was secured; and the Soviet Union agreed to the creation of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.44

The representatives returned to their homes with hope in their hearts because some agreements had finally been made.

The first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations met in London, England, January, 1946. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, went to the meeting to secure the adoption of a resolution to establish a United Nations Commission on the control of atomic energy. He was successful on January 24.

The old Moscow problems followed the deputies of Foreign Ministers to London, for so many unsettled issues had been postponed in the Soviet city. The Bucharest Commission had made no progress toward reorganizing the Groza government; the efforts in Bulgaria had been as fruitless; and the Iran problem was demanding attention. The Iran problem was placed before the Security Council before the council was organized. This quick action caused the Soviets to believe a bloc was

44U. S. Department of State, Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, December 16-26, 1945, Pub. 2448, pp. 9-10.
being formed against them; and because of their suspicion, they filed a complaint against Britain for keeping her troops in Greece; and the Ukrainian delegation filed a similar charge against the British troops that were stationed in Indonesia.

March found agreement lacking on the agenda. Bidault wanted to discuss the German questions; the American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, wanted to discuss disarmament and demilitarization of Germany for a period of twenty-five years, and to start deputies drafting a peace treaty for Austria. Molotov agreed to discuss the German question, but he refused to discuss Austria.

The council agreed on the limitation on the Italian navy, the disposition of surplus naval units, rectification of the French Italian border, and on a commission to study a change in the Tenda-Briga area. 45

Plans were made for a peace conference, but Molotov maintained that there could be none until all the powers agreed on the basic issues. This gave the Soviets a veto as long as any issue was contested that they considered basic. There were many issues that were not agreed upon: the German treaty, the Austrian treaty, the Italian-Yugoslav border, the Dodecanese, Tripolitania, and many others. Efforts were made again and again to call a peace conference, but the Soviets

45 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 127.
refused to agree. There was nothing to do except to take a recess. The next meeting date was set for June 15, 1946.

The American delegation which boarded the "Sacred Cow" on June 14 for Paris included Ben Cohen, Chip Bohlen, Cassie Conner, James F. Byrnes, and two senators, Connally and Vandenberg.

For eleven days progress in the conference was slow. The Austrian question was finally placed on the agenda for examination, and the political situation in Italy was to be examined. The tempo of the conference changed on June 27. The Dodecanese Islands were disposed of by allotting them to Greece. Many hours had previously been spent debating about the issue. The Italian colony question was as quickly disposed of by allowing the American proposal to rule the decisions. This was that a decision would be postponed for a year. If no agreement were reached, the General Assembly of the United Nations would be asked for a decision on the three main issues: reparations, the colonies, and the Italian-Yugoslav border. The border question was acted upon by appointing a commission of experts to visit the area and make recommendations.  

The Soviet delegation presented draft treaties for the three Balkan states. The drafts were brief and were little more than an extension of the armistice terms.

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The deputies of Foreign Ministers got so little done that members of the Council of Foreign Ministers felt the promises for early peace treaties could not be fulfilled unless they took drastic action soon. Paris was decided on for the meeting which convened in France April 25, 1946. This meeting place gave Bidault an opportunity to press his point. He succeeded in getting rules of procedure that provided for the participation of all four delegations in the discussions of all five treaties. Russia had previously insisted that France be left out.

Two other important decisions were finally made as the work of the conference lagged again. One was a long contended one, a date for the Paris Peace Conference. Along with the invitations went draft rules of procedure which included a two thirds majority vote. The other decision in the final hours of the conference was that the Soviet Union would receive one hundred million dollars in reparations to be made up from industrial equipment not necessary for Italy's peace, Italian assets in the Balkan states, and current production from Russian raw materials.47

The Paris Peace Conference was to allow all participants in the European War to discuss the treaties. The conference was powerless to do more than make recommendations to the

Council of Foreign Ministers. Agreements had already been reached on the basic issues so any change would require an amendment which the Council could accept or reject.48

The Paris Peace Conference convened and two methods of approach were evident. The Americans believed in full and free discussions; the Soviets seemed to favor the confirmation of agreements made in the Council of Foreign Ministers without views from the small nations.

James F. Byrnes announced in his opening speech that he would support the agreements made in the Council of Foreign Ministers, and any motion carried by a two-thirds majority in the conference would be pushed and voted for by the Americans. To counteract the proposal Molotov declared that the Soviets would disregard any recommendation in the Council of Foreign Ministers that had passed by a simple majority.

When Soviet or Soviet followers offered proposals that were defeated, Molotov accused the negative nations of forming a bloc against the Soviet Union. As the controversial subjects were introduced and discussed, the meeting dragged wearily on. Each speech had to be translated into two languages. The meeting gained speed when the practice of many speeches was dispensed with.

During an insulting speech, Vyshinski accused the United States of trying to dominate the world with handouts. The delegation from Czechoslovakia applauded, and the United States promptly withdrew from them a loan of fifty million dollars.49

Trouble with Yugoslavia over an army transport plane resulted in Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson sending an ultimatum to Yugoslavia demanding an explanation. If no explanation, or an unsuitable explanation came, the United States would call upon the United Nations Security Council to take action. The explanation came before the time expired.

Many discussions of minor issues in the treaties came up, but the main issues were focused on Trieste, reparations, and control of the Danube. The Trieste question had been quite acute previous to this time. As a possible means of settling the question, four representatives were sent to investigate the possible division that would be the most suitable to the inhabitants in the territory and the powers who were attempting a settlement. When the representatives returned, each gave a different view, but the conference finally voted fifteen to six in favor of the French compromise.50

49Byrnes, op. cit., p. 143.
The Soviet armistice terms were affirmed in the reparations question in regard to the Finnish, Rumanian, and Hungarian assessment of three hundred million dollars. Greece and Yugoslavia were to receive one hundred and twenty-five million dollars. The Slav bloc fought the figure because it was too high.

The smaller Allied states presented claims against Italy totaling billions. The council agreement for Russia for one hundred million dollars had to be considered, and England presented a claim for eleven billion dollars. The final recommendations were one hundred million dollars each to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Greece, and twenty-five million to Ethiopia.

Senator Vandenberg of the United States led the American delegation in the control of the Danube recommendations. The British delegation backed the American plan which was finally adopted with a few modifications. The Anglo-American resolution affirmed freedom of navigation on the Danube; a conference to establish a new international traffic regime on the Danube; and the participation of the Big Four and the riparian states in the conference.⁵¹

Fifty-three recommendations that had at least a two thirds majority and forty-one adopted by a simple majority

⁵¹Byrnes, op. cit., p. 149.
were passed on to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The conference adjourned on October 15.

The New York Conference was held in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in October, 1946, and for once there was no debate on procedure. The minutes of each meeting and the record of each motion made were checked and re-checked in each language and with each delegation. In five weeks 855,000 pages of documents were mimeographed. Four language versions for each of the five treaties were required; 143,000 maps were cut, folded and inserted into the treaty texts.

The conference got under way, not with new, but with the old arguments presented by Molotov and Vyshinski. The Yugoslavian delegation again presented their case for control of the city of Trieste. The American delegation tried again and again to switch the discussion from Trieste to the Austrian peace treaty.

The first recommendation to be adopted at the conference dealt with immediate deliveries of reparations. On most all of the other recommendations Molotov refused to adopt them even if they had passed by a two-thirds vote in the Council sessions. After James F. Byrnes decided no progress could be made in the conference and told Molotov that all hope was dead, Molotov began to agree on the most controversial issues. The peace treaties contained forty-seven of the original fifty-three recommendations adopted by at least a two-thirds
majority and twenty-four of the forty-one that had failed to receive a two-thirds vote but were adopted by a simple majority.\footnote{52}

The treaties paved the way for the withdrawal of Allied forces from Italy, Bulgaria, and Finland, and the reduction of garrisons in Rumania and Hungary. The method for reparation payments was made for Italy, and ex-enemy states were given an opportunity to enter the United Nations. The ex-enemy states were also allowed to participate in such agencies as the International Bank, the Monetary Fund, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the International Trade Organization.\footnote{53}

\footnote{52}Ibid., p. 155.

\footnote{53}U. S. Department of State, "Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, November 4-December 12, 1946," Making the Peace Treaties, 1941-1947, Pub. 2774, European Series 24, pp. 52-64.
CHAPTER V

DIPLOMATIC CLEAVAGE AS A DETRIMENT TO PEACE

The closest unity among the three great powers, Britain, Russia, and the United States, was demonstrated at the Yalta Conference. The Big Three, Generalissimo Stalin of Russia, Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, met with Stalin to complete plans for the destruction of Germany and to plan for the peace in the post-war world. At this meeting President Roosevelt acted as peacemaker between Churchill and Stalin and tried to avoid questions which would endanger harmony. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt tried again and again to secure a promise from Stalin that he would not sign a separate peace with Germany. Stalin would not promise.¹

In their efforts to keep the Yalta Conference harmonious President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill missed their greatest chance to keep harmony in the post-war world. Technical plans should have been drawn up and signed which would have included every phase of occupation in Germany and

¹James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 25.
the exact position that each nation would take if either nation failed to live up to the agreements.

The American and Russian diplomatic exchanges were friendly until the Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in the United States except for a difference of opinion regarding China's participation in the first phases of the conference. The difference was settled by allowing the Soviet delegation to attend the conference at one time and the Chinese delegation at another. As the conference progressed, a deadlock developed between the Soviet and American delegations over the voting procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations. The Soviets wanted sixteen votes in the organization, and the Americans felt that so large a number from one political unit would endanger the usefulness of the organization. The main contention was not the votes, but the participation of a party in dispute taking part in the decisions of the Security Council. ² The differences in opinion were reconciled, but only two weeks after the Yalta Conference of the Big Three a rift appeared when the British and American members of the Allied Control Council for Rumania requested a meeting of the Council. The Soviets refused to agree to the meeting. The American ambassador, Harriman, requested an orderly development of the Rumanian situation or else consultation among the three countries on a higher level. Andrei

²Ibid., p. 334.
Vyshinski replied by going to Bucharest and demanding the dismissal of the Radescu government in Rumania. By much pressure Vyshinski secured the promise of General Radescu that the king would appoint a man to fill Radescu's place. The second man, one chosen by Vyshinski, Petru Groza, was given the responsibility of forming a new government. 3

The representatives from Poland, who were Communist chosen, next caused American uneasiness. The Russians claimed that the Lisbon government should be the "kernel" of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, but the British and American leaders insisted that a representative government be set up in Poland. President Roosevelt sent Stalin a message on April 1, 1945, that expressed his concern over the developments since the Yalta Conference in regard to the Polish question. He did not understand how Stalin had interpreted the Yalta agreement to allow a continuation of the Lisbon government. Several exchange messages were sent, and Stalin accused the British and the United States of departing from the Yalta agreement. 4

The surrender of Germany caused several curt telegrams between President Roosevelt and Stalin. Stalin accused the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Italy of negotiating with the German General Kesselring and several German staff members without allowing the Soviets to participate. President

3Ibid., p. 51. 4Ibid., p. 57.
Roosevelt denied the charge, and Stalin answered by saying that the German front was going to be opened for the American Army to advance. This lack of faith by the Russians greatly disturbed President Roosevelt during his last days.⁵

One of the first acts performed by the new President, Harry Truman, was to call the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the chiefs of staff, and Admiral Leahy together to discuss American relations with the Soviets. Soon after the meeting V. M. Molotov came to Washington to confer with the United States President.⁶

Previous misunderstandings did not help the harmony of the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. Disagreement in regard to the chairmanship of the conference started on the opening day. The custom that the host nation's representative act as the chairman without question was objected to by Molotov. He insisted that Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and China jointly fill the chairmanship instead of one man, Stettinius, United States Secretary of State. Molotov next demanded three votes for Russia in the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. Molotov won both points. He agreed that Stettinius should become chairman of the Steering Committee.

⁵Vera Michelees Dean, The United States and Russia, p. 23.
⁶Byrnes, op. cit., p. 61.
The Soviet trusteeship of Tripolitania was brought up by Stettinius. Molotov claimed that the Secretary of State had promised to support the Soviet request that Russia receive Tripolitania. However Stettinius’ statement had only been that the Soviet Union was "eligible." Arguments on the issue lasted sixteen months. When the disposition of another question seemed to be almost complete, Russia would bring up the question of trusteeship and many times thus manage to terminate discussion on the other question.7

Diplomatic relations deteriorated rapidly when Germany was no longer a common enemy. Before the surrender, the relations had been primarily military; but the capitulation of Hitler immediately uncovered political issues. Harry Hopkins was sent to Russia to bridge the gap, if possible, between military and political relations. His visit to Moscow brought to light the grievances that Marshal Stalin had against the United States. They were: the cooling of American friendship toward Russia after Germany was defeated; the admission of Argentina to the United Nations (the part played by the United States); the part played by the United States in regard to allowing France to become a member of the Reparations Commission; the American opposition to the Lubin government violated, according to Stalin, the Yalta agreements; the suspension of Lend-Lease at the end of the war; and the disposition

7"Dependent Peoples and World Order," Documents and State Papers, 1 (July, 1948), 293.
of the German Navy and Merchant Fleet—a request that one third be turned over to Russia was unanswered. 8

The Potsdam Conference held great hopes for the new President of the United States, for he wanted a firm commitment from Marshal Stalin as to when and how Russia would enter the Pacific war. 9 This promise was not so necessary, but the American military planners needed to know what to expect from Russia as the final pressure, plus the atom bomb, was put on Japan. The Chief of Staff of the Army wanted Russia to refrain from entry into the war with Japan because of Russian interests in the East and possible complications in occupying the conquered nation. 10 Secretary of State Byrnes had the same idea. 11 The need was not urgent for the first time since the entry of the United States into the war.

American commitments had been fulfilled; the atom bomb had been discussed with Russia; there was little to lose after the Americans were able to launch successfully their drives against Japan without Russia's collaboration; and the Japanese had expressed their willingness to cease hostilities. 12

8Byrnes, op. cit., p. 62.

9Frank McNaughton and Walter Hehmeyer, Harry Truman, President, p. 24.

10Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 442.

11Byrnes, op. cit., p. 208.

12Ibid., pp. 75-86.
President Truman, at Stalin's suggestion, was made chairman of the Potsdam Conference. He at once presented an American plan for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the United Nations Organization which had just held its first meeting at San Francisco. The plan was accepted. President Truman's second paper started accusations and negotiations that are in existence today, for he suggested that the obligations assumed in the Yalta Declaration had not been carried out. The statement was backed by three examples: the formation of an additional zone in Germany for Poland, the illegal seizure of American and British owned property in Rumania, and the reparations that the Soviets were taking at every opportunity.\textsuperscript{13}

Russia's steadfast determination to play a lone hand probably caused more irritation during the entire war than any other Russian trait. Even when the battle for Stalingrad was waging, the Americans were not allowed to land bombers in the Caucasus to aid the besieged city. Voluntary aid given by the Allied Air Force from bases in Italy was protested against rather than appreciated.\textsuperscript{14}

The disposal of Lend-lease and the discriminations the Soviets used, especially in the last days of the war, were a constant source of irritation. As the end of the war drew

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 75-86.

\textsuperscript{14}John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance, p. 296.
near, Russia asked for more items that pointed to post-war requirements. Examples of the items were: industrial machinery, pipe lines, port installations, oil refineries, and other items the United States felt were not necessary in the prosecution of the war.15

Planning for the Pacific war was very difficult because the centralized authority in Moscow delayed minor problems that were urgent. The Russians believed the tasks should be assigned to each of the Allies rather than to a joint operation. The Americans were promised naval bases to be used in their planning. Stalin had promised them six times; Antonov refused to agree; and Stalin backed Antonov.

As the end of the war neared, Russia denied three agreements that were made: permission to study the submarine experimental station at Gdynia, air bases for the Allies at Budapest, and a British American survey of the Amur River valley.16

A ban on Americans entering Russia aggravated the political situation between the two nations during the time prisoners were being released. Americans were released without food, clothing or medical attention and had no means of transportation to an English or American base.17 When the American ambassador, Harriman, protested against the Russian

15Ibid., p. 113.  
17Ibid., p. 28.
failure to allow the necessary aid to be given American liberated prisoners, Stalin threatened to refuse Molotov the privilege of attending the San Francisco Conference of the Assembly of the United Nations. Harriman insisted on his appearance after President Roosevelt's death.\textsuperscript{18}

In other attempts to agree later at Moscow, minor and major irritations were in evidence. The Americans could not enter Russia unless Russian pilots and navigators took them to Moscow, and the Soviet stand on keeping a part of the Red Army in Iran, a major problem, plus heated arguments over Bulgaria jeopardized progress on other issues.\textsuperscript{19}

In many issues concerning the treaties, the agenda in the San Francisco Conference, the voting procedure in the Security Council, and others, Molotov often yielded to opinions of Americans and acted as though he were the one who made the proposal.\textsuperscript{20}

Any policy that meant delay in Germany has been favorable to the Soviets. Delay meant occupying a productive zone from which resources could be drawn off, and time in which complete indoctrination could be accomplished. The delay in Germany also gave a reason for keeping the Red Army in Poland, for the Soviet soldier is an asset, as far as livelihood is concerned, instead of a liability. He lives off the land he

\textsuperscript{18}Byrnes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 96.  \textsuperscript{19}Dean, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 161.  
\textsuperscript{20}Byrnes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 110.
occupies and is often anxious to remain there in the rubble rather than return to a life where less awaits him.

The Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September, 1945, met the same issues that had dominated the San Francisco and Potsdam Conferences: reparations, Italian colonies, the control of Germany, and the Balkan States and their newly-formed governments. In their many efforts to agree, the two great nations, Russia and the United States, seemed to be drifting further apart, with Great Britain usually siding with the Americans. At that time Soviet policy began to be openly changed.

Soviet violations of treaty obligations have been an obstacle in negotiations between the United States and Russia. The violations in Germany have been more publicized, but the violations have been about the same in Austria: The impeding of traffic which deals with free movement of goods and aids industrial production has slowed up all effort at recovery. The interference with Austrian law and the seizure of United States publications plus the insistence that seventeen Communist majors remain in office have caused the diplomats of the United States to doubt many Soviet proposals.

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22Byrnes, op. cit., p. 104.

Poland was a constant source of irritation, but treaty violations were less numerous. Hampering free elections and suppressing democratic elements were the charges filed by the United States and Great Britain against Russia.

Unilateral action in the name of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania and totalitarian subversions in economic problems were the main grievances in the Balkans. More differences were evident in Bulgaria than in the other two, for the free press was abolished, free speech was denied, and the Communist Party refused entrance to and arrested American correspondents who were residing there. 24

The Soviet command in North Korea has refused to discuss or implement the agreements reached that regarded economic unity in that country.

Agreements in regard to Manchuria were disregarded, for the Japanese armed Communists moved in to take charge when the Soviet troops withdrew. 25

Soviet obstructionism prevented the establishment of a Chinese government at the port of Darien. 26

The only peace organ not affected by the veto power, the Assembly of the United Nations, dispatched groups to observe conditions in Korea, but they could not move about

24 Ibid., p. 742.  
25 Ibid., p. 743.  
26 Ibid., p. 144.
freely because of Soviet restrictions. These restrictions caused fear among the peoples of the world. The fact that the Soviet Union was able to hamper the activities of the United Nations was the cause of the awakening.  

In the long struggle to draw up peace treaties for the former German satellites along the Danube, the United States and Great Britain insisted on clauses that dealt with navigation on the Danube. In all suggestions presented by the British representatives, it was evident that Britain was unwilling to accept a place of lower prestige than she enjoyed before the war. Free navigation on the Danube would allow British shipping on the river and some of the Balkan ports would remain accessible to British ships. The United States had no designs on a free Danube except for a speedier European recovery by the use of the great waterway.  

Negotiations for settlement of the Danube question were started in 1946. The first agreement allowed nationals and goods of all states free passage, but the Council of Foreign Ministers supplemented the agreement by a decision that there should be a conference within six months after the treaties were in force to draw up a new set of rules. The four members of the Council of Foreign Ministers together


with representatives of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Ukrainian S.S.R. were to aid in drawing up the rules. Austria was also to take part after her treaty was settled. The decision gave the Soviet bloc complete control of the Danube. When France and Britain saw that the Soviet Union and her satellites had gained the offensive, they would not ask for action on the question, but the United States did. The United States could gain an advantage in several ways. First, the decisions of the conference could be treated as recommendations subject to confirmation by the Council of Foreign Ministers where each of the four powers had a veto; second, the procedure of the eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission could be followed where decisions required a majority including the votes of the four great powers; and third, Austria could be included as a member of the conference and the two-thirds rule could be applied so that a minority of the votes could block the decision.29

The conference met at Belgrade, and the Soviets presented their draft. The French and British carried no draft articles for the western case, so the United States presented it. The main aim of American strategy was to focus the debate on the major points between the Soviet and American drafts. The first point dealt with the principles of freedom of navigation and nondiscrimination. The second issue was the structure

29Ibid., p. 321.
and powers of the new Danube Commission to administer the
convention. The Soviet limited membership to riparian
states. The third point dealt with Austria, a riparian state,
but her vote was not allowed. After Austria was not allowed
to vote, the Americans proposed that the Danube regime be
established with the United Nations. The Americans took the
stand to keep the western front solid and to give aid and
comfort to the French and British.

Twenty-eight western amendments were rejected by the
Soviet bloc. The entire Soviet convention was accepted and
signed on August 18, 1948. 30

The basic issues before the Council of Foreign Ministers
in London in the autumn of 1947 were the unification of
Germany and the Austrian peace treaty. Before the conference,
three of the delegations had agreed to consider the treaty
first and the economic principles to govern the treatment of
Germany second. The Russians wanted to consider the prepara-
tion of a German peace treaty rather than the economic side.
The other delegations yielded to the Russian demand.

The first two deadlocks in the meeting were over the
Saar disposal. The delegations, with the exception of
Molotov, had agreed to separate the Saar from Germany. 31

30 Ibid., p. 326.

The German reparations issue was kept before the Council of Foreign Ministers for days, but the Soviets refused to furnish information about how much current production or holdings had been taken from their zone or how much more they expected to take.

The three powers, France, Great Britain, and the United States, after discussing every phase of the disagreements, decided that the Soviets were trying to keep the German issue open and questionable. 32

The Comintern was abolished May 22, 1943, according to statements of Russian authorities, but Communist activities were in evidence in most of the world immediately after that date as much as before. 33 In 1948 publications appeared more often and told of the plans of the old Comintern, now the Cominform or Communist Information Bureau. Andrei Zhdanov made public the offensive that was waged against Russia's allies in the recent "democratic war." European recovery was to be delayed if possible, and should the Communists in Russia need the aid of Communists everywhere, immediate aid would be given from the members throughout the world. 34

32 Ibid., p. 172.
33 George Vernadsky, A Short History of Russia, p. 473.
34 Edgar Snow, "Will Tito's Heretics Halt Russia?" Saturday Evening Post, CCI (December 18, 1948), 108.
The United States on May 4, 1948, made a reference to the Soviet system of alliances in Europe. The Soviets on May 9 replied to the reference with a statement that the alliances contained no secret protocols, and that political relations have been improved by the alliances. The Soviets then called attention to the development of the Inter-American system, the Western European Alliance of March, 1948, and the development of bases on the part of the United States. These developments were declared to be examples of aggressive tendencies in contrast to the policy of peace which the Soviets were practicing.\(^{35}\)

The Soviets were not the only group that irritated rather than settled international relations after the war. The Americans were guilty of a major offense that was totally without legality according to the Soviets. They adhered to the Pan-American Union. The Act of Chapultepec in Mexico, March, 1945, provided for collective security on a regional scale.\(^{36}\) An act against any American state is considered an act against all. The act provides that in the event of aggression the rest of the Americas will decide what course to take. The act which followed with the creation of the Anglo-American Carribean Commission in 1942 caused the Russians to


\(^{36}\)Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, editors, Documents on American Foreign Policy, VII, 435.
realize even more, if possible, the need for regional security in a Communist society. 37

The fear of Communism was revived in 1946 when it became known that Stalin had warned his people that their safety was in jeopardy as long as any capitalist nation was stronger than Russia. 38

The pattern of Soviet strategy differs in each country. This fact has caused the United States to look with suspicion on many decisions without properly weighing them. 39 The fear of Communism reached a new height in the winter of 1948-49, for men who should have known most about Russia's aims wrote articles and books that aroused the American public. George Morgan, First Secretary of the United States Embassy in Moscow, made a study of Stalin's writings from January 1, 1929, to March 29, 1948. He learned that Stalin believes capitalism and Communism will inevitably clash, and in the end one or the other will conquer. 40

The beginning of American participation in the war against Nazi Germany and Japan marked the beginning of a

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38 John Fischer, "No Rest for the Weary Russians," Reader's Digest, XLIX (December, 1946), 102.

39 John Fischer, Why They Behave Like Russians, p. 228.

changed foreign policy. Isolation and peace were discarded for an all-out war effort for the defeat of Germany first and Japan second. German war machinery was to be eliminated forever. \textsuperscript{41} The American goal was to be the same as Russia's as materials and men were thrown against Hitler's Nazi Army.

International cooperation, which led to the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Declarations, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and the Charter of the United Nations, was a policy shared by all the twenty-eight nations who desired the destruction of Nazism and a lasting peace. \textsuperscript{42}

Relief and rehabilitation as quickly as was possible were included in the American idea for a fair treatment of the devastated areas in Europe. \textsuperscript{43}

The policies of American diplomacy could not remain after the war as they had been before and during the war, for situations changed so rapidly after Germany surrendered that new policies were used without detailed planning. Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt agreed on the American policy towards Russia which included: patience and forbearing, consultation with the Russians on every point, objection to Communist interference in affairs of the United States, allowing liberated territories to set up their own

\textsuperscript{42}Ruhl Bartlett, \textit{The Record of American Diplomacy}, p. 637.

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 638.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 648.
governments as soon as possible, setting an example for Russia's actions in regard to liberated peoples and conquered territories, and, if possible, keeping her friendship.\textsuperscript{44}

The passing of President Roosevelt and the retirement of Cordell Hull marked the end of a more lenient period of diplomatic dealings with Russia. The changes were natural, not caused by personalities, for the American army of occupation had gotten down to the gruelling job of keeping a disgruntled population as pliable as possible. The military leaders, after much experience with the Communists, began to stress the need for a firmer, more purposeful dealing with them. They favored upholding principles which American democracy enjoys rather than a retaliation against principles that Americans abhor. The policies advocated by the military personnel gradually evolved into a much-used phrase in 1946—"Getting tough with Russia."\textsuperscript{45}

Senator Vandenberg, a conference and occupation observer, led the speakers within the boundaries of the United States as the "Getting tough with Russia" move gained momentum. Secretary of State Byrnes took up the cry and said, "We will not and we cannot stand aloof." Byrnes favored a bipartisan policy in origin and development, national rather than political in its conduct and character, a continuing policy

\textsuperscript{44}Cordell Hull, \textit{The Memoirs}, II, 1634.
\textsuperscript{45}Byrnes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 304.
worthy of the confidence of other nations which expressed the will of the people, and free publication of agreements made by the diplomats.

Country committees for every nation were put into operation so that men on the spot and the Secretary of State with his staff could formulate a workable foreign policy on each country in the world.\textsuperscript{46}

By the fall of 1946, so much had happened in the conferences, so many compromises, so many disputes within the United Nations Security Council, and so many Russian vetoes that Congress was extremely irritated. The question of atomic controls had also been bogged in the Atomic Energy Commission for over a year.\textsuperscript{47} With Congress disgusted, Secretary Byrnes said, "We will not and we cannot stand aloof." Winston Churchill followed the United States Secretary of State in his declarations when he spoke at Fulton, Missouri, but he went farther by advocating the need for a military alliance between Great Britain and the United States as a method of halting Soviet expansion.\textsuperscript{48}

President Truman favored a more strict attitude toward Russia too. He liked Stalin personally but was aware of the disillusionments of Cordell Hull and Franklin D. Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46}ibid., p. 246.

\textsuperscript{47}McNaughton and Nehmeyer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Newsweek}, XXVII (September 30, 1946), 23.

\textsuperscript{49}Hull, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 1467.
The happenings at home and abroad influenced the American Congress to believe that Russia meant to build up a Russian empire for a showdown with western democracy. The Congress had to approve the policies of the administration, so the President's attitude was far more temperate. He gave loyal support to the international cause of peace, but his first specific program dealt with Greece. Great Britain was withdrawing support, and the President asked Congress for four hundred million dollars to support the Greek and Turkish armies and economies.\textsuperscript{50}

While Congress was debating one and a half billion dollars for relief programs, Secretary Marshall and President Truman were meeting daily with the overall diplomatic strategy committee to draw up a plan for the European nations to help themselves; thus, the Marshall Plan supplanted the "Truman Doctrine."

The next issue on which the Truman administration acted was the Palestine question. A debate arose over the entry of one hundred thousand Jews to Palestine, and the problem of the partition of the country was presented to the Assembly of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{51}

From the first holding commitments in Greece and Palestine, the United States' foreign policy quickly encompassed the cries

\textsuperscript{50} McNaughton and Nehmeyer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 94.
for help that were made by France, Italy, and Austria. Congress granted the request of the President for 597 millions to alleviate the suffering in those countries.\footnote{Ibid., p. 94.}

The administration had not changed its policies toward European aid, for on December 18, 1947, President Truman asked Congress for seventeen billion dollars for the European Recovery Program. The grant was amended so that the total would be spent in four years if it were needed.\footnote{Ibid., p. 100.}

The policies of the government of the United States were enumerated by President Truman in his State of the Union message in January, 1948. He pledged to give full support to the United Nations, to maintain a strong armed force, to allow displaced people to enter the United States, and to move toward world peace by supporting world reconstruction.

In the summer of 1948 President Harry S. Truman restated his foreign policy. He affirmed a previous statement that he and George C. Marshall saw alike on every question. He still favored the sentiment of the year before: "Get tough with Russia." No negotiations were to be held as long as the Berlin blockade was in force.\footnote{Harry S. Truman, "The State of the Union," \textit{Vital Speeches}, XIV (January 15, 1948), 7.} The President favored no
special emissary to Moscow for negotiations, but the Soviet leader would be welcomed if he came to the United States.\textsuperscript{55}

The Congress of the United States passed the National Security Act in July, 1947, which included a council to advise the President. The council, with the advice of specialists in their fields, outlines American foreign policy. The President is consulted as the policy is being developed.\textsuperscript{56} The creation of the council has caused the United States to have one announced foreign policy.\textsuperscript{57}

Russia, like the United States, had been in the isolationist camp until war actually was started against her. The all-out war effort which was put into operation gave the defeat of Hitler priority. A few of the former rules and regulations were loosened as the Red Army was pushed back. More foreigners were allowed to travel in Russia, and in 1943 the Communist International was dissolved, according to Russian authorities.\textsuperscript{58}

The demand for the restoration of her western boundaries as they had existed on June 22, 1941, was the only territorial gain the Soviets desired in eastern and southeastern Europe before the demand for the inclusion of all of Bessarabia and

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Newsweek}, XXXIII (November 29, 1948), 20.


\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{58}Bartlett, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 561.
Bucovina. The new policy of expansion seemed to gain momentum, for the next move was an agreement with Britain for British control in Greece in exchange for a Russian free hand in Rumania.  

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In October, 1944, the British and the Soviets carried on negotiations against the wishes of the United States in regard to the treaties between Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. These moves caused the Americans to be suspicious of the intentions of Russia. The long-standing suspicions have been bared by recent Soviet activities: magnifying the fundamental differences between the leading capitalist nations of the world and the Communists, openly approving moves that bring the satellite countries closer to the Soviet Union, delaying the German peace settlement, extending Soviet power to many countries of the world, unleashing periodically violent propaganda attacks, and persistently obstructing workable solutions to the world’s major problems.  

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Russia has given no hint of retiring from the United Nations, but maintains a more strict censorship of the press and outside influences than she enforced during the "Furge." The "Furge" was a series of trials of officers in the Red Army and other Russians who were not in perfect harmony with

59 Hull, op. cit., p. 1451.

the Communist Party from 1936 to 1938. From the highest officials to the lowest laborers met death by the firing squad or by forced labor. As far as the Secret Police could tell, all opposition was destroyed. The renewal of the Communist International under the name of Communist Information Bureau which functions with Moscow as the center keeps the tension of the world at a high pitch. 61

Changes in power relations always tend to create uneasiness in the world, but no power ever rose so fast or strong in Europe as did the Soviet Union during and since the second World War. The governments of the adjoining and weaker states in Europe were first torn up by Nazi aggression and a destructive war. Then Russia's unilateral action by political infiltration gave the democracies a scare. 62

The next cause for uneasiness was the Soviet Alliance System. From May 26, 1942, to April 6, 1948, the Soviet government built up an alliance system that included agreements with England, Czechoslovakia, France, Yugoslavia, Poland, China, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. The earlier alliances dealt with the defense against Germany. The treaties had textual differences, but they contained the following common features: all parties pledged to carry the

61Edgar Snow, "Will Tito's Fertico Halt Russia?" Saturday Evening Post, CCI (December 18, 1948), 108.

war to victory, to refuse to enter negotiations for an armis-
tice or peace with a government which had not renounced ag-
gressive intentions, to give aid in the future if any of the
parties were involved in war with Germany or Japan, to form
no coalition against each other. All the treaties except
the Soviet-Yugoslavia pact provided that there would be no
interference in the internal affairs of the signatories. All
parties agreed on close political and economic collaboration
in the interest of their own reconstruction.63

The Soviet treaties showed a change in objectives from
1946 to 1948. The new objectives were: collaboration
against German aggression or aggression on the part of any
other third power, mutual assistance when the need arose,
pledges on the part of all contracting parties to observe
their obligations to the United Nations, and military and
other assistance in order that peace might be maintained.64

While the Soviet Alliance System was being perfected,
the American Secretary Marshall fell upon a plan that would
aid the European nations in their recovery and furnish a
market for American products. The European nations could
participate in the program if they cooperated with the givers
of the money. On June 5, 1946, Secretary Marshall called
upon the European nations to agree on what they needed

63"Soviet Alliance System, 1942-1948," Documents and
State Papers, I (July, 1948), 226.
64Ibid., p. 227.
financially and what part they would take themselves in a program for recovery.65

The first active resistance to the proposed aid program came late in June when Molotov refused to attend the Paris Economic Conference unless he could know the details of the financial aid program. His refusal helped the program to be acted upon by the Congress of the United States. The inspection of the economic status of a participating country, which would not be allowed in the Soviet Union, was desirable if the program were to be successful. The refusal exempted Soviet participation.

In June, 1947, Secretary Marshall suggested that the American people might be willing to aid all European countries, western or eastern, in restoring their war-damaged factories and farms. At the time there was no hint that the proposal might divide Europe into two hostile camps. There was no hint that American dollars would equip foreign armies or sponsor a virtual revolution of American design. Extraneous schemes became entangled with the original purposes of the Marshall Plan.66

The Soviets have been accused of aiding in the expansion of the plan first by a loud "No!" at the Paris Conference in 1947. Later V. M. Molotov denounced the plan in Moscow and

65Byrnes, op. cit., p. 307.
66Ibid., p. 308.
exhorted all countries associated with Russia to boycott it. The Communist Information Bureau was set up in Warsaw under Russian direction with the declared purpose of wrecking the American aid plan.\(^{67}\) Menacing gestures were made against the plan that resulted in a split in European loyalty.

As the European Recovery Program began to take form in Washington, Congress created a new agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration, to direct and control E.R.P.'s operations. Paul G. Hoffman was the director of the E.C.A., and Averell Harriman was President Truman's ambassador to Marshall Plan countries.

Each European participant had expected to deal separately with the United States government, but Averell Harriman insisted on joint planning. Their agency set up in Paris became the O.E.E.C. The agency appraised all of the applications for European aid. After the major clashes of interests were reconciled to some degree, the European Recovery Program assumed that seventeen billion dollars would be needed in four years to aid nineteen countries.\(^{68}\)

By September, 1948, more than 802 million dollars had been sent in relief goods and over 615 million dollars in recovery goods.

\(^{67}\)Demaree Bess, "Does E.R.P. Mean War or Peace?" Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (January 29, 1949), 16.

\(^{68}\)Ibid., p. 177.
France was buying over 25 per cent of aid goods authorized for Europe; Britain ran a close second with 24 per cent; Italy was third with 11.5 per cent; the zones occupied by the United States and Britain received 10.5 per cent, the Netherlands 9.8 per cent, Austria 6.7 per cent, Greece 5.4 per cent, Denmark 2.3 per cent, the French zone of Germany 2.2 per cent, Norway 2.1 per cent, Trieste .4 per cent, and Belgium .14 per cent.

Food led the list in amount of dollars spent. Fuel was second, and processed food orders grew each month. The food bulk was returned to regular trade channels at the end of 1948.\(^6^9\)

Communist retaliation against the Marshall Plan was at work before the program was planned or introduced into the public mind and made legal by Congress. Strikes were provoked in France and Italy, and propaganda contrary to American aims was spread. The Europeans had so many different interests and ideas that it was difficult for them to realize actual interest in European recovery existed any place in the world. With the conflicting groups at work among the downtrodden people, they were quickly rushed into one or the other of the camps. The idea of a United States of Western Europe by 1952 like the United States of Eastern Europe imposed so forcibly

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on the unfortunate European states by Stalin was not inviting.\textsuperscript{70}

The Marshall Plan plus pressure from military groups gradually prepared public opinion for the acceptance of a peace pact. On March 17, 1949, invitations were issued on behalf of the governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States to the governments of Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal to join in signing the North Atlantic Treaty during the first week in April.\textsuperscript{71}

The highest hopes of American diplomats were embodied in the United Nations Charter, but one member, Russia, attempted to prevent the system from working by obstructive tactics and the misuse of the veto. The United Nations Charter recognizes the importance of regional arrangements consistent with the purposes and principles of the charter. Such arrangements can greatly strengthen it.\textsuperscript{72} On the basis of this the framers of the North Atlantic Treaty felt that the treaty would strengthen the United Nations Charter.

The preamble of the treaty enumerates the following aims:

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 104.


Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

The North Atlantic Treaty provides for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and for a strict adherence to the purpose of the United Nations in international relations.

The parties by mutual aid and self-help will maintain and develop their capacity to resist armed attack.

The parties will consider an armed attack against one of them as an attack against all, and such an attack and measures taken as a result of it shall be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The treaty does not conflict with any international engagements now in force.

A council shall be established which can meet immediately. Each of the parties will be represented on the council.

Other European states may be invited, by unanimous agreement, to issue a signatory.

The treaty shall be in force as soon as it is duly ratified by a majority of the signatories.

The treaty is to be reviewed after ten years, if any of the parties desires and shall be in force twenty years,
After twenty years, any party may withdraw after one year's notice. 73

The pact is another way of strengthening the United Nations Organization from an American viewpoint, but the favors that have been previously given to the signatories of the pact have caused the Soviets to suspect an attempt to encircle the Communists. If the Charter of the United Nations were correctly drawn up so that one nation could have little affect on its operation, the North Atlantic Peace Pact would be of no use. Allying the East against the West with ultimatums is the proposed method of keeping peace.

Since June 18, 1948, five new alliances have been added to the Soviet Alliance System, yet the Soviets condemned the creation of the projected North Atlantic Pact. 74

The future of Germany had overshadowed every conference from 1942 until the Potsdam meeting. General rules were laid down and general policies were sent up, but the Allied Control Council could not agree to the treatment of Germany as an economic unit. This lack of unity caused the Potsdam decision to treat Germany as an economic whole to be unenforced. The Soviets gave their idea of the future of Germany in 1946. Molotov said that they wanted ten billions of


74"New Links in the Soviet Alliance System," Documents and State Papers, I (March and April, 1949), 681.
dollars in reparations and participation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in a four-power control of the industries of the Ruhr district. The United States opposed the control of the industries of the area because they were essential to the economic recovery in Europe. James F. Byrnes began trying to get the zones in Germany merged and a government by the local citizens in operation as quickly as possible. The Soviets blocked every peace move toward Germany with their veto power until March 20, 1948. They contended that merging the three zones and establishing the seat of the German government at Frankfurt broke the Potsdam agreements and that French, British, and American rights to remain in Berlin were no longer legal. The currency issue went hand in hand with the merging of the zones, for new currency was issued in them. Stalin agreed to lift the blockade August 2 if Soviet currency would replace all western currency in Berlin. He also said that trains could re-enter the city if the formation of the Western German government were postponed. However, travel was not all that had been restricted. The only automobile highway between Berlin and Helmstedt was blockaded on April 2, 1948; the United States and British Signal Corps personnel were ordered out of the Soviet zone; a new documentation of barge traffic

75 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 170.

was ordered on May 20; and electric power was cut off in the Western sectors on that date. Supplies from the Soviet zone to other sectors of Berlin were suspended on June 19 which caused conditions to be worse in the city.

On July 6, 1948, the American government sent a note of protest to the Soviet government. The note stressed the seriousness of the Berlin crisis and previous agreements in regard to the occupation of Berlin. The agreements implied the right of free access to Berlin. In the reply of the Soviets the claim that Berlin was a part of the Soviet zone and that all the rest of Germany was inseparably linked with Berlin was made and Russia stated that communications between the Western zones would remain restricted. The United States government had insisted that no negotiations would occur unless the restrictions were lifted.

At the Yalta and Potsdam conferences the four powers had agreed to draw up a statute for all of Germany as a unit and to conclude a peace treaty with Germany when democracy was developed enough for recognition as a nation. After the British and American zones had been merged, Russia objected, saying that the merging was a violation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. Other violations were enumerated: the demilitarization of Germany had not been carried out; the Ruhr district had not been placed under the control of

77Ibid., p. 8.
all four powers; the governments had interrupted decisions concerning reparations from the Western zones in Germany; the Control Council had ceased to exist; and the three occupation groups had caused the destitute condition of a part of Berlin. The three powers agreed with Russia that the Berlin issue concerned all of Germany as a unit and that negotiations should include all of Germany rather than Berlin alone.\textsuperscript{78}

Plans for a meeting with Stalin began in July. At first Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin met with the United States Ambassador Smith, but Zorin only restated the Soviet stand. The same day Smith was granted an interview with Molotov. Molotov objected to the Berlin discussion until all of Germany could be considered.\textsuperscript{79}

The first meeting with Generalissimo Stalin on August 2 seemed to improve the chances for settling the Berlin crisis, but Stalin insisted that the decisions made in London with respect to the establishment of a Western German government be suspended. Negotiations with Stalin were agreeable and details were left for another meeting with Molotov. His decisions seemed to contradict those made by Stalin in regard to lifting the blockade. The Americans and British wanted the complete blockade lifted, but Molotov spoke of the restrictions put in force after June 18. The earlier restrictions included the inspection of every piece of baggage, the

licensing of every bargeload of freight, and the closing of the highway too long for repairs.

The currency problem was discussed again and again. The Russians were for a four-power control of the money that was used in Berlin. The same kind of money would be used in the Russian zone. The other occupying groups did not object to the proposal if some control were set up to limit the amount of money printed. An agreement was almost reached, but Stalin insisted on the postponement of the plan made in London for setting up a West German State. Bedell Smith sent the proposal to Washington where it was turned down. The countries finally agreed to a solution and sent orders to the four military governors to do two things: first, lift the blockade and second, introduce Soviet zone currency into Berlin.\(^{80}\)

The Soviet commander Sokolovsky failed to meet the orders by killing time, and later he told the others that only parts of the blockades would be lifted—those imposed since June 18. He then argued that the four-power commission would have no control over the Soviet-zone bank which printed and issued the money. His move that surprised the other governors most was his insistence on Soviet control of the airlift into Berlin. The Americans were in favor of ceasing all negotiations on the Berlin crisis when Molotov

\(^{80}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 25.}\)
notified them that he was backing every move Sokolovsky had made.

In mid-September inter-Allied disagreements arose over whether the Berlin crisis should be turned over to the Security Council or the Assembly of the United Nations. The United States favored turning it over to the Security Council.\footnote{Ibid., p. 61.} Andrei Y. Vyshinsky wanted the issue settled by the Big Four Council of Foreign Ministers. He maintained that the whole German problem should be settled by them, for the Berlin dispute did not fall within the scope of the Security Council. Vyshinsky lost his point by a nine-to-two decision, and charges were filed jointly by the United States, Great Britain, and France against Russia for violating the United Nations Charter by blockading Berlin. The debate lasted several days, and was ended by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky casting his country's twenty-seventh veto in the Security Council. He maintained that the Western powers wanted Russia to lift the blockade and later to talk about the currency problem.

During the entire negotiations over the Berlin crisis, the American and British planes operated the airlift at a daily expenditure estimated at five hundred thousand dollars. Each of the six hundred-odd flights into Berlin cost about one thousand dollars. The airlift has been credited with the following achievements: It has given Germans in the
Western powers' zones an increased food ration of two hundred seventy-four calories per day; it has increased critical food items from ten to one hundred per cent above supplies on hand when the blockade was set up; and it has increased utilities—power, water, supply, sewage disposal, and transportation from ten to twelve per cent.\footnote{82}

Attempts to settle the Berlin crisis ended in failure at Lake Success, New York, on March 16, 1949, according to a report made by the president of the Security Council. The Soviet Union charged that the three nations, France, Great Britain, and the United States were to blame for the failure and the other three nations blamed the Soviets. Each side claimed the other had violated written agreements, and the United States delegation claimed the "currency issue" was not the real issue, but a blind to force the Western powers out of Berlin.

The neutral nations who had been asked by Herbert Vere Evatt, President of the United Nations Organization, to work out a solution for the Germany issue failed and refused to attempt further solution unless one of the big powers asked for it. No response was given to this announcement.\footnote{83}

The failure to end the Berlin crisis caused representatives from France, Britain, and the United States to arrange


for ministers from the three countries to consider critical issues that are hindering unification in Western Germany.\textsuperscript{84}

When Berlin was agreed upon as the city for four-power occupation, technical experts drew up agreements, but an American delegate on the Big Three's Advisory Commission waived the technicalities aside because the Soviets might feel that their co-workers did not trust them. As a result, the Americans had only two small documents in writing to show what the agreements had been regarding occupation policies. One outlined the borders for the four occupation zones; the other divided the city of Berlin into four parts.\textsuperscript{85}

The Red Army captured Berlin and occupied it almost two months before the Western occupants got there, but each group was given its correct zone. The Russians politely moved out for the occupying forces, but many officials had been put in office who were friends of the Soviets. It has been impossible to oust them because of the veto power in the Allied Control Council.

Traffic of every kind was under strict Soviet control except the air traffic. This was made safe by a written agreement signed by all four powers in November, 1945.

There are two airfields in Berlin, Tempelhof in the American sector and Gatow in the British sector. The air

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., p. 378.

control tower under four-power direction is located in the American sector. 86

Very little in the original plan for joint occupation of Berlin was workable. The restrictions placed on German output so badly needed in Germany and in the rest of the world, and four-power control that did not operate unless all agreed to the proposals caused a near physical and moral collapse. When the plan was new, the Americans and British acquiesced to the Russians, but changes in diplomatic policies and the monotony of yielding became tiring. In 1946 the British and Americans agreed on a plan to force a showdown in Berlin. The zonal frontiers were to be abolished, and each occupation power would retain troop stations in their areas. The troops or authorities would not hinder the movements of persons, goods, newspapers, or political ideas. A central economic administration under the control of the four occupying powers would operate in Berlin for all of Germany. Russia refused the plan and the result was a division of Germany into East and West. The Potsdam agreement in August, 1945, pledged a united economic Germany. When Russia turned the Anglo-American plan down, she broke by her action a pledge to collaborate. 87

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86 Demaree Bess, "Will We Be Pushed Out of Berlin?" Saturday Evening Post, CCI (July 31, 1948), 7.

After a committee of disinterested members of the Assembly of United Nations had failed to make recommendation in regard to the city of Berlin, the Big Four Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris, France, May, 1949, to discuss the crisis again. The failure to reach agreements on the big issues in the three previous meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers caused the four members to abandon the search for a solution to the major questions: how to unify Germany and what kind of a peace treaty should be drawn up with the ex-enemy.

After three weeks of discussion, the Westerners and the Russians fell back on two lesser problems: (1) How could the occupying forces live peaceably side by side in the divided city, and (2) how could the long-overdue peace treaty with Austria be drawn up. 88

Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State, returned home with the American delegation of nearly one hundred to report that little was done in Paris. He said that a limited agreement to finish the Austrian peace treaty was reached and that the East and West were to proceed with separate plans for Germany. He restated "our firm policy in Europe" and asked that the United States Senate quickly ratify the North Atlantic Pact and approve the United States' plans for rearming Western Europe. The crisis, then, was not ended.

88 "Behind the Soviet Enigma," Newsweek, XXXIII (June 27, 1949), 31.
Before one can recommend any policy for living wholesomely in a world with such difference in two major ideologies, it is necessary to review a few of the blunders that have been made by the United States in her relations with Russia. The first mistake was that of allowing Russia to maintain diplomatic relations with the United States during the thirties when she fostered the Communist International. The "getting tough with Russia" idea at that time would have saved years of confusion.

The second mistake was made at Munich. The United States there backed England in her decision to allow Germany to take Czechoslovakia. This threw Russia into the camp with Germany.

The third mistake, giving aid to Russia without any commitments attached, caused Russia to keep asking for more. The United States President was interested in an early end to the war, but he should have required commitments with each promise of supplies. These commitments should have included a promise of freedom to all the liberated Europeans, specific amounts of reparations to Russia, and completed plans for occupation with ultimatums for failure to keep any part of the agreements.

The fourth major blunder was at Yalta where the United States guaranteed to Russia operation bases in China, railroad concessions, possession of the Kurile Islands, and part of Sakhalin Island. The possession of these islands assured Russia of havens as China was being conquered by Russia.
President Truman's actions in his first dealing with Stalin and in his press reports shadowed our diplomatic relations. His actions were irritants, for he should have seen that a safe method of voting in the Security Council was agreed upon, but he let the opportunity slip through his fingers. His stated policy of "getting tough with Russia" and his actions have not been parallel.

With the major mistakes of the United States with Russia in mind, one can predict that if the two great nations do live in the same world side by side in safety, the policy of the United States toward Russia must include fair dealing and an honest presentation of the American point of view. This policy will keep the American public informed and will eventually affect Soviet reaction.

The United States should closely adhere to the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Peace Pact. The pact provides for action if the Soviets attack any of the signatories. A sufficient army and equipment should be available to back up the provisions of the pact at any time. This will prevent any moves on the part of any nation that does not want war.

The United States should actively oppose Communism, not by berating it, but by presenting an active democratic pattern of living in the world.

The welfare of the United States must be considered in all foreign relations, for the people of the world are looking
toward the United States for leadership of the highest type. The policies of the United States must not, because of some vested interest of her own or of one of her neighbors, fail to give the type of leadership that is expected of her. Leadership that is worth while assumes responsibility and cooperation—both of these must be encompassed.

If the United States will adopt a policy of fair dealing, of avoiding secret agreements, of glorifying democracy, and of fostering American well being, the danger of Communist strategy will cease to be in evidence. The two nations who have so long and patiently lived side by side will learn that the world is large enough for both Russia and the United States and for others who have ideas that are foreign to each of them.
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