FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
1776-1898

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FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
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PREFACE

To write a diplomatic history of the United States and France for the period 1776-1898, one must begin with some review of the part which North America and the European countries played in the international politics of Europe in the centuries preceding American independence. In a brief summary, I have tried to bring the reader's mind to the point to which he will be able to understand some of the problems that the American Colonies faced at the time that they wanted to become a new and independent nation. This study, due to the enormous amount of foreign diplomacy, is by no means exhaustive. I have tried to limit the diplomacy of the United States with the other nations to a minimum and omitted all relations except in instances which are closely related to the diplomacy of France and the United States.
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CHAPTER I

FRANCO-AMERICAN WAR DIPLOMACY BEFORE

THE TREATY OF 1778

He who rules the waters also rules the world. This seemed to be true to a certain extent on the part of several European nations, because for more than two and three-quarters centuries prior to the American Revolution, the maritime nations of Europe struggled among themselves for trade and empire in America. It was not until after the great Spanish war of 1585-1604 that France and England were able to plant any enduring colonies in North America. However, by the end of this war they had solved the internal political and religious problems which had absorbed their energies and delayed their maritime activities. Beginning with the seventeenth century, the colonies and overseas commerce came to be more and more valuable to the mother nations, and by the end of this century, France, England, and the Netherlands had forced express recognition from Spain of their own colonies in America. With Spain forced to retire from the North American scene, the stage was set for a great duel for the control of that continent by France and England.¹

¹Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 5.
War in Europe generally spread to the colonies, and in trying to get control of the North American continent, France and England fought each other in six great wars between 1688 and 1815. It was the general policy of France and her allies in this historic struggle to "expand on the continent of Europe, and by overpowering her neighbors with her armies, to break into their colonies and commerce."\(^2\) Thus we can readily see that in the wars waged before the Declaration of Independence, the English colonies were involved in the conflicts of the European nations. The colonies were settled for the sole purpose of supplying the mother country and had no voice in the matters of which they became so vital a part.

In each of the six wars between France and England, France lost not only her territory but much of her prestige. The most significant war, as far as territory was concerned, was the French and Indian war. When the Treaty of Paris of 1763 was signed at the close of this war, the map of North America had to be remade. France had to give up territory that she had been fighting hard to maintain and control. Since England was the victor, she automatically became the controller of what France was to lose. France transferred to Great Britain all French territory to the east of the Mississippi River, excepting New Orleans and the two small islands

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 6.
of St. Pierre and Miqueleon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. England also acquired Canada and a large amount of France's other possessions, but they did not have any bearing on American diplomacy at this time.

The settlement of 1763, which closed the last of the pre-Revolutionary wars, clarified the situation in America and placed the colonial boundaries on a more substantial basis than they had been before. Up until this time the boundaries had been merely words printed on paper and some actually overlapped in places. Among the provisions of the treaty that was of later significance to the diplomatic history of the United States, was the regulation of the navigation of the Mississippi River. France insisted on retaining New Orleans as a part of Louisiana, thus the river flowed between French banks on its last two hundred and twenty miles to the sea. England was quick to realize that if any of her colonists wanted to use the Mississippi as an outlet to ocean traffic then trouble would come from the French. She also knew that since France "controlled both banks of the Mississippi" then the colonists could not pass that way. England decided that the time was present that this point should be settled, so she insisted on a provision declaring the navigation of the river to be equally free to the English colonies as well as to the

3 Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, p. 3.
French.⁴ Not only did France lose the territory east of the Mississippi, but she was separated from her western territory as well. In a secret treaty a few hours after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, 1763, France transferred all of the territory of Louisiana west of the Mississippi River, including New Orleans, to Spain to compensate her for the loss of the Floridas to Great Britain.

The Treaty of Paris of 1763 almost caused the collapse of the political machinery in France. The government had been built upon a policy of territorial gain and now all this was taken away. Since the masses of the people had no voice in governmental matters, there was nothing that they could do except to realize that their homeland had been defeated. But the leaders of the country could not sit idly by. They became determined to redress this situation and try to retrieve the fallen position of their country and make it once again the leader in European politics. They began to look about them to try to find an excuse for rising up and in some way avenge themselves. It did not take them long to see the situation of rebellion swelling among the English colonists in America, "so they sought in the tendency of the colonists to revolt against their mother country so that France could avenge herself on England and tear up the Treaty of Paris."⁵

⁴Bemis, op. cit., p. 10. ⁵Ibid., p. 17.
France's determination to rise again by stirring up the English colonies provided the beginning of Franco-American diplomatic relations. M. de Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, appeared to be working for the interests of those countries which would be useful to him later when France rose again to a world power, among them the United States of America. A clear evidence of this is found in his instructions to his first minister to the United States as he was departing. Vergennes told his minister, Gerard, to tell the Americans that France was engaging in the struggle only because of them, that the engagements undertaken were absolute and permanent, and that their causes were common causes never to be separated.\textsuperscript{6} He did not know just how soon he was going to be called upon to make these words good and get his revenge on England. In fact, the events came much sooner than he had expected them to. In 1774, the first coercive acts again roused the English colonies in America and started a struggle that eventually ended in the Independence of the Colonies with the help of France.\textsuperscript{7}

It can readily be seen that the roots of American Revolutionary diplomacy were deeply imbedded in the foreign relations of France. In order to keep a watchful eye upon the

\textsuperscript{6}Francis Wharton, \textit{Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution}, II, p. 524.

\textsuperscript{7}Bemis, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 18-19.
British colonial controversy, she had maintained a secret agent in America. Little reference is made to this, but it is known that the Continental Congress, on November 29, 1775, appointed a committee to correspond with certain nations friendly to the colonial cause and later sent an agent, Silas Deane, to France. Deane was instructed by the committee of correspondence to engage in the business of providing goods for the Indian trade. This was to throw off any suspicion that he might arouse with England, and also the court of France might not like it if it should be known publicly that an agent from the Colonies was in that country. Franklin wrote a letter for Deane to deliver to some friends who would see that he met the right people and eventually get aid from the King. It was really a good thing that he had the letter, because when he tried to obtain arms and equipment for 25,000 men he was officially refused. He was to get an audience with M. de Vergennes and try to find out the disposition of France on certain points such as,

... whether, if the Colonies should be forced to form themselves into an independent State, France would probably acknowledge them as such, receive their ambassadors, enter into any treaty or alliance with them, for commerce or defense, or both? If so, on what principal conditions?

Immediately after Deane's arrival in Paris, he was introduced to Caron de Beaumarchais, a French courtier known to

\[8\] Wharton, op. cit., II, pp. 78-80.
history as "the literary genius who played at politics."
Beaumarchais acted as the go-between in Deane's transactions with Vergennes and the King, thus greatly accelerating the relief by way of war materials to the American colonists. In fact, it was through him that Vergennes was enlisted in the scheme, and French historians of the period give him credit for finally winning the approval of the King to the rebel cause and to the plan which his fertile brain had devised. He was told by the King that the French could not openly deal with the American colonies, so he thought up the idea of how the King could aid the colonies in a disguised way. This idea was not new to Beaumarchais, because he had already talked with Arthur Lee, a member of the secret committee in London, about France furnishing munitions to the revolted colonists under the guise of trade. Ever since the revolution of the British colonies had assumed an organized resistance, he had been active with his facile pen, and had labored by his personal interviews to bring the French government to the support of the colonies.

A fictitious commercial house was set up with the stage name of Rodrigue Hortalez and Company, and through this house all the transactions between the French and American colonies were made. The house got off with a flying start. On June 10, soon after its establishment, Beaumarchais received a million

livres from the French Government, and on August 11, a little more than a month after the Declaration of Independence, he was instrumental in getting Charles III of Spain, royal uncle of the youthful French King, to match this with another million to be distributed in the same way through the commercial house. With the capital acquired through the loans of these governments, Beaumarchais was able to deliver the much needed arms and equipment from the French government arsenals to Deane, who was to repay them by Congressional shipment of cargoes of tobacco and other American products.

Perhaps the best example of how important this company became to the American colonies can be explained by the amount of gunpowder sent to them by France. All of the eighty thousand pounds of powder in the colonies at the outbreak of the war had been used up by the winter of 1776, and with very little saltpetre on hand, it looked hopeless for the colonists. After the organization of the commercial company, 1,454,210 pounds of powder was imported, plus 698,245 pounds of saltpetre. It can be concluded from this that well over ninety per cent of the powder used came from France. Dr. O. W. Stephenson in his writings on this period said, "If it had not been for the great quantities of powder obtained by importations from France before the Saratoga campaign, the

10 Samuel Flagg Bemis, American Secretaries of State, I, p. 12.
revolution would have broken down long before that time.\textsuperscript{11} In September, 1776, Deane wrote to Robert Morris, "I shall send you in October clothing for 20,000 men, 30,000 muskets, 100 tons of gunpowder, 200 brass cannon, 24 mortars, with shot, shell, etc., in proportion."\textsuperscript{12} Thus France had decided to pour oil on the flames of rebellion in America before the Declaration of Independence. In fact, even before any agent of the United States had set foot on French soil. Her main motive was not to aid the colonies, but to embarrass Great Britain, and seek the moment of revenge on her.\textsuperscript{13}

As soon as the Declaration of Independence was signed, the Second Continental Congress decided to send an official diplomatic mission to Europe, directed primarily to the French court because at this time France was our only true ally. Because of the conditions of travel and of getting letters and instructions to the diplomats, the entire diplomatic corps depended upon Paris to furnish them with the latest developments of their home affairs, and in return kept the American Congress informed of their relations to the different foreign powers. Thus when our first commission of Lee, Franklin, and Deane arrived in Paris, our other diplomats


\textsuperscript{12}Foster, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 14-15.

\textsuperscript{13}Bemis, \textit{Diplomatic History of the United States}, p. 21.
automatically looked to Franklin for guidance and instructions. Since he was older and more experienced in service, it was only natural that he should be looked upon for guidance and advice in carrying on the diplomatic services of this newly formed nation.

The commission to Paris rejected any idea of seeking an alliance with France. Even Vergennes' own plans did not then include an American alliance. The fact was that the United States hoped to make a one-sided treaty with France by which the independence of the United States would be recognized and military aid and protection given, without any guarantees by the new nation that she would not accept any offers of reconciliation from Great Britain and leave France in the lurch. ¹⁴

Franklin overshadowed his colleagues of the commission, and became very popular with the French people. "He not only took Paris, he took France; and taking France meant the independence of his country."¹⁵ The people of France could not tell the United States how glad they were that she had revolted against England, so they gave their praise to Franklin, who endeared himself to their warm-hearted public opinions as they praised the struggle of the American patriots against such heavy odds. People in all walks of life came to love him—from the King down to the common man. Through his

¹⁴Bemis, *Diplomatic History of the United States*, p. 25.
recommendations many Frenchmen entered the services of the American revolution, pledging themselves to help liberate the Americans, as well as to seek fortune, glory and experience for themselves. Perhaps the one who stands at the head of the roll of honored foreigners who have contributed to the greatness of our country was the Marquis de Lafayette, who distinguished himself by gallantry on the field, and by a lifelong devotion to the cause of liberty.\textsuperscript{16}

Franklin and his colleagues soon realized that the work before them was not an easy task. They were confronted with many embarrassing situations. Among these was the problem of maintaining communications between the United States and her diplomats. Many ways were tried, but the best method of getting secret materials through the mails was to use invisible ink and to make several copies of the material, and send each by a separate route. However, this did not always prove to be successful because at one time Congress did not hear from its diplomatic corps for over eleven months. Another "thorn" they had to put up with was the British system of bribery, corruption, and a large corps of spies which edged its way into the services of our diplomats in Paris and elsewhere in Europe. This had been going on before our representatives arrived in Paris, because Deane, upon being introduced

\textsuperscript{16}Foster, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 17.
to Vergennes, was warned by him to be on his guard against such practices.\textsuperscript{17}

Even though the United States and France were on the friendliest of terms now that France had received our commissioners, she was not willing to jump into the war against England until she saw whether the colonies were going to put up a good fight or not. Diplomacy can do little in the face of military reverses, and that was what had been going on during the winter of 1776-77. France knew that the authority of the Continental Congress was not respected and the American soldiers were beginning to turn away from the battles. The spring of 1777 had opened with the British forces everywhere triumphant. Therefore the tone of the French government had changed from "friend" to "just a watchful nation." Even Beaumarchais became afraid for his safety. "My government," he said, "will cut my throat as if I was a sheep."\textsuperscript{18} He felt that the King blamed him for France's support of the revolution.

This watchful waiting by the French diplomats did not have to be carried on for very long. When the news of the surrender of General Burgoyne's army at Saratoga reached Paris in December, 1777, a great change came over the political circles of France. Vergennes decided that the time had come to act, so he proposed that his government recognize

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 26-27. \textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 29.
the independence of the American states by negotiating the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, thus at last getting down to the negotiations that the commission had had in mind when they first came to Paris. On December 6, the King of France authorized Vergennes to start negotiations, but six days later Vergennes informed Franklin that France could not go ahead with the treaty until she heard from Spain, since France and Spain had made an agreement not to make separate treaties. 19

On December 6, the same day that the King informed Vergennes to make a treaty with the Americans, Great Britain sent a message to her secret service ace, Paul Wentworth, directing him to ascertain the American commissioners' idea of a peace. He was to secure full information of America's relations with France, Spain, and the other powers of Europe in regard to the rapidly developing European crisis. Britain hoped to prevent the crisis by interesting the Americans in a peace negotiation before they could conclude an alliance with France. On December 17, 1777, Wentworth approached Deane with his proposal of a reversion to the colonial status of 1763 with a repeal of the obnoxious tariff and navigation acts passed since that date. 20 However, since Deane was not

19 E. S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778, pp. 114-120.

willing to accept anything but absolute independence from England, the diplomats adjourned without reaching a settlement.

As soon as Vergennes heard about the proposals of the British, he became very much alarmed. He knew that if he stood by and did nothing, then France would not be any better off than she had been before the war. He immediately dispatched a message to Spain urging the King to join France in recognizing the United States before they came to a reconciliation with Great Britain, and in making a treaty with the republic. On December 17, while waiting for an answer from Spain, Vergennes sent Gerard, one of the Secretaries of the Ministry, to inform the American diplomats that he would recognize the independence of the United States and make a treaty. It is worth noting that practically all that Gerard told the Americans was pleasing to them. Gerard informed them, by order of the King, that it was decided, and his majesty was determined

to acknowledge our independence, and make a treaty with us of amity and commerce; that in this treaty no advantage would be taken of our present situation to obtain terms from us which otherwise would not be convenient for us to agree to; his majesty desiring that the treaty, once made, should be durable, and our amity subsist forever, which could not be expected if each nation did not find its interest in the continuance, as well as in the commencement of it; that his majesty was fixed in his determination not only to acknowledge, but to support our independence by every means in his power; that in doing this he might probably soon be engaged in war,
with all the expenses, risk, and damage usually attending it. 21

The main point that the King wanted brought before the Americans and for them to realize, was that it was manifestly to the interest of France that the power of England should be diminished by our separation from it. Also there was to be no binding restrictions about the treaty, and we were free to make a peace for ourselves from any other nation whenever good and advantageous terms were offered to us. Gerard told the Americans that the King had placed one condition that would be required of America. It was simply that we in no peace to be made with England, should give up our independence and return to the obedience of that government. 22

The American commissioners were asked to inform their government of this proposed action, but as yet, there had been no reply from Spain and France desired to wait until she heard from Charles III before signing the treaty.

On January 6, 1778, one month to the day after France had proposed a treaty, Wentworth met Franklin to talk about an English treaty. Franklin told him that he would not consent to a peace without complete independence, and that he had no time to talk with anyone unless they represented the English government and were endowed with powers to make a treaty. He also intimated that he had no power to make a treaty with England.

The following day a meeting of the French Royal Council met and agreed to conclude two treaties with the United States—one of amity and commerce, and the other one of alliance. In this treaty of alliance it was to be specifically stated that its purpose was to secure "the absolute and unrestricted independence of the United States." The secret meetings of Franklin and Wentworth began to worry the King of France, so on January 8 he sent a letter to Spain urging her to come in with France on the treaties. He pointed out to Spain that although England had been in a war, she was actually none the worse from it. She still ruled the seas and if the colonies joined in with England it would be impossible to subdue the two powers. Had not the colonies already shown their power to wage war!

Vergennes waited patiently to hear from Spain. Each day brought England and the colonies closer together and he knew it. On the afternoon of January 8, he sent Gerard to the American commissioners at Passy and informed them what had taken place in the Royal Council the day before. He also wanted to know what it would take to stop the talks with the British agents. The commissioners immediately told him that for some time they had been trying to get a treaty of Amity and Commerce, and the immediate conclusion of that treaty.

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23 Bemis, American Secretaries of State, I, p. 18.
would cause them to reject the proposals of the British. Another question that Gerard put to the commissioners sought to obtain from them the terms which would prevent the American Congress and people from entering into an arrangement with Great Britain short of independence. Deane replied, "An immediate engagement of the part of France to guarantee the present possessions of the Congress in America, and either to enter into a war with England or furnish Congress with the money."  

Vergennes realized that the conflict between England and the Colonies of North America was fast becoming as important to France as to Great Britain. He decided that it was time for France to decide upon the policy she was going to follow. In his unsigned letter of January 13, 1778, he stated the controversy which was playing upon his mind, and said, "There exists two courses only—that of abandoning the Colonies, and that of supporting them."  

He knew that if France did not support the colonies then England would make a reconciliation with them and preserve her supremacy and gain an ally. France needed all the friends she could get and there was now present an easy way of gaining one. This was to give immediate support to the Colonies.

Having made up his mind to aid the Colonies, Vergennes

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sent Gerard to visit the American commissioners and arrange for the signing of the treaties. The ministers met in Paris and signed the treaties on February 6, 1778. In a letter dated February 8, 1778, Franklin informed the United States that the treaties were finished and signed, and he hoped that they would be ratified immediately after they arrived. 27

As soon as France had signed the treaties, she sent the Treaty of Amity and Commerce to George III in England to see what his reaction would be. France did not send the Treaty of Alliance, fearing war would be declared on her before she was ready for one. George III had already received a copy of both treaties due to his intricate spy system, and had had Parliament repeal the intolerable acts and other legislation that was obnoxious to the colonies. By this he hoped to forestall ratification of the French treaties by the United States. England sent a peace commission to the colonies, hoping to arrive before the French treaties, but the treaties arrived in the United States on May 2, 1778, ahead of the English mission, and on May 4, 1778, they were ratified by the Congress. The treaties caused France and England to drift rapidly into a state of war, and the Treaty of Alliance thus came into force and effect.


This treaty has importance and interest in that it was the first celebrated by the new nation. It adopted almost all the provisions of the "Plan 1776" which the Americans had drawn up. It also was the first and only treaty of alliance ever negotiated by the United States. It is interesting to speculate whether without it, the independence of the United States could have been achieved after it had been declared. It is easy to see that it shortened the war, saved much bloodshed and money, and brought the European nations to look upon the United States as a nation to be reckoned with. It was insurance to the young nation of America, and paid off its benefits at one of the "most needed" times in American history.
CHAPTER II

RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE

UNITED STATES, 1776-1790

All the nations of Europe understood that France's recognition of the independence of the United States would be an act of intervention, which the British government would resent and oppose. While the United States had declared their independence, they were still in the midst of the struggle actually to secure it, and France knew that by helping the United States, she would also be drawn into the conflict. This fact was acknowledged in the treaty itself. Its essential and direct end was avowed to be "to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States, in matters of government and of commerce."¹ If France were going to guarantee the United States her independence, then there was no other alternative for France but war. According to the Treaty of Alliance, France was no longer just a base for supplies; American privateers with their captures were no longer to be classified as pirates when they

sailed into French harbors. There was now no violation of neutrality. Officers desiring to serve in America could now go openly instead of secretly to the United States.\textsuperscript{2} France had been overhauling her fleet for several months, and it was now ready to put to sea. On its westward cruise toward America, it ran into the first overt act of hostility. On June 17, 1778, the French fleet was challenged by a British naval force, but, due to its recent overhaul, the French fleet was able to reach America and render effective that independence which the Treaty of Amity and Commerce had already recognized.

Precious moments were taken up by Vergennes in order to get an alliance with Spain even after the treaties had been signed and ratified. He promised Spain, that a successful war might result in the reacquisition of the Floridas, which had been ceded to Great Britain in 1763. But Spain seemed to realize that she was playing, at best, only a secondary role in the transaction. She, therefore, decided to enter the war upon a cause of her own, separate and distinct from that of the United States and France. Spain proposed to end hostilities by a truce between Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain was to withdraw her troops and treat the colonies as if they were independent. The proposals were not accepted by Great Britain, whereupon Spain believed that her honor required her to participate in the war.\textsuperscript{3} She decided on war as

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 468-472.
\textsuperscript{3}Bemis, American Secretaries of State, I, p. 26.
the best way out of this situation, but decided that it was not the time just then to declare it. By waiting she hoped to get specific and positive advantages from both her enemy and her allies.

France was criticized severely for waiting on Spain to join her, but Vergennes wanted to play on the safe side of the fence, and he thought that Spain would be of more help to the United States and France than she later turned out to be. Vergennes felt that the conjunction of the Spanish and French fleets was necessary if the enemies of England were to have that control of the seas essential to their undertaking. This view was shared by General Washington in a speech that he made on October 4, 1778 in which he stated that, "If the Spaniards would but join their fleets to France and commence hostilities, my doubts would all subside. Without it I fear the British navy has Spain too much in its power to counteract the schemes of France." 4

At this time Spain had forty ships of the first line, but they were not armed to meet the British in a real battle. Vergennes probably thought that Spain was much stronger than this when he was using all his efforts to try to get her to join the Franco-American Alliance. This waiting on the part of Spain caused Vergennes acute distress. He exclaimed in despair in November, 1778, "Only by the most vigorous exer-

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4Wharton, op. cit., p. 360.
tions in the war could Spain ever atone for the damage it had done by withholding its military aid in 1778.  

Vergennes soon saw that Spain's entry into the war against Great Britain would have to be bought, and the Spaniards drove a hard bargain. At Aranjuea, in April, 1779, France agreed, among other things, in exchange for Spain's promise to enter the war, to aid in the recovery of Minorca, Pensacola, Mobile, the bay of Honduras, and the coast of Campeche; and that no peace would be concluded without Gibraltar. In consequence, the United States, already bound not to make peace without the approval of France, now found itself obliged, without having given its consent or having been consulted in anyway, to remain at war until Gibraltar had been won. Fortunately, Spain was subdued by Great Britain, and the Gibraltar question did not have to be settled by the Americans.

In 1779, the Second Continental Congress drew up its first resolutions of peace at the suggestion of France. According to the resolutions, John Adams was appointed plenipotentiary for the sole purpose of negotiating peace. When Adams reached Europe, he could not come to terms with Vergennes, who at this time was really trying to dictate what the American nation was to do. Adams sternly resented the French intervention into American diplomacy, and did not waste any time in telling

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6 Arthur Burr Darling, *Our Rising Empire 1763-1803*, p. 29.
Vergennes what he could do "in mild language". He laid before the courts of Europe the first manifestation of "shirt-sleeve diplomacy, undisguisedly telling the world where one stands in frank and open language, and letting the world take it or leave it." Later, when Adams saw that he could not peacefully negotiate with Vergennes, he openly proposed to invite the British to Paris to discuss peace terms. At this time Vergennes tried to get Adams to go to the peace conference at Vienna, but he refused to go unless the participating powers would first guarantee the colonies their independence. Vergennes could not promise Adams that the other powers would do this; so Adams refused to go. It was at this time that he stood up for what he thought was right, and struck the note for absolute neutrality which was to characterize American diplomacy from then on. In 1782 Adams wrote to Livingston, American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that

America has been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee that France and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce.8

7Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 49.

8Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomacy, p. 92.
Realizing that he could not dictate terms to Adams, Vergennes decided that he must try to get rid of him. He sought to have Adams removed by sending instructions to the French minister in the United States to present the argument to Congress. Vergennes wanted Congress to correct their wayward decision of only one sole negotiator, and by June 15, 1781, Minister Luzerne had persuaded Congress to submerge Adams in a commission of five consisting of John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson. Congress also revised the instructions of the commission at the request of the French Minister. At this time in American history, the Congress was looking for someone to lean on, and seemed to welcome any proposals by France. This was to be shown in Vergennes' instructions to his minister. Except for the one indispensable point of independence, the new instructions placed the American Commission fully under the advice and control of the French Court. If the American Commissioners had followed their instructions, Vergennes would have been able to modulate the progress of the negotiations among the several belligerents and mediators until the French interests were fully satisfied, whether the American interests were obtained or not. The commissioners sensed the dominating role that France was trying to play, and because of this, Franklin began his secret negotiations with England.

9Wharton, op. cit., pp. 504-505.
After the British were defeated at Yorktown, the parliamentary opposition in England overthrew the war government of Lord North and insisted on peace negotiations. The government of England became unstable as the different factions tried to get control of the ministry. At first, the Marquis of Rockingham succeeded to the post, but the ministry was divided as to the manner in which the colonies should be treated. Lord Shelburne, the Secretary of State for the colonies, believed that America should be granted her independence. He sent his minister, Richard Oswald, to France to talk to the American Commission. Thomas Greenville, representative of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Charles Fox, was sent to France to represent the foreign office in regard to peace. Franklin and Vergennes made it clear to the British that they could expect no separate peace from either France or the United States, and the allies would not give anything for American independence which was to them an accomplished fact. Vergennes soon turned the peace negotiations over to the Americans and British, as he felt that England might convince the Americans that the presence of France in their discussions was holding up peace for the attainment of non-American objectives like Gibraltar, and thus lead them to desert France for England. Vergennes hoped to control negotiations without actual participation.

11Fish, op. cit., pp. 42-44.
The American Commission decided that America had won her independence and that they now wanted a treaty to end the war. England was asked to furnish a representative with the required commission to make a treaty, and that it was to the interest of France and not of England to postpone the recognition of independence until the final treaty would be made, which would take some time.\(^1_2\) Shelburne thought that since Oswald was a good friend of Franklin, he would be capable of getting better terms from him than from any other Englishmen. Shelburne recognized that he also must have the friendship of Franklin, so he informed Franklin that Oswald was his choice for the British negotiator if it pleased Franklin. He added, "If any other channel occurs to you, I am ready to embrace it."\(^1_3\) In other words, Franklin could choose the British representative to work with him if he wished to do so.

Franklin learned from Oswald that Great Britain wanted peace, and that the war should not be continued to enable France to impose humiliating terms upon her. Franklin informed Oswald that France and the United States were acting together and neither was willing, at this time, to separate from the other. In turn, Oswald was instructed by Shelburne to insist in the strongest manner, "That if America is independent she must be so of the whole world. No secret, tacit, or

\(^1_2\)Fiske, op. cit., p. 9.

\(^1_3\)J. Smyth, Writings of Franklin, VIII, p. 460.
ostensible agreements were to exist with France. If negotia-
tions break off, all our rights in America will stand as be-
fore." In other words, England demanded the separation of
France and America, and not even a secret connection was to
exist. Independence was to be the price of peace; negotia-
tions would bring about independence--so if the negotiations
failed, England was to exert every effort to push the war to
its utmost. Franklin assured Oswald that upon the establish-
ment of peace between Great Britain and the United States the
alliance with France would be at an end.

At the same time that Oswald was authorized to work with
the Americans, Grenville was commissioned with him, but he was
to treat with the King of France or his ministers, together
with the ministers or any other prince or state who might be
dconcerned. Franklin took issue with Grenville in that he
said that he did not represent a "prince", and that he repre-
sented not one but thirteen states as one nation. Fortunately, as far as peaceful negotiations are concerned,
Grenville did not have any influence in the negotiations after
the appointment of Shelburne as the Prime Minister in England.
Oswald was Shelburne's selection as British negotiator, so
Grenville had to retire automatically from the scene.

During the time that these preliminary negotiations were

15Bemis, American Secretaries of State, I, p. 57.
being carried on, and even up until the time that Oswald was furnished with a commission to make peace, Franklin acted as sole commissioner in Paris. It was not until June 23, 1782, that Jay arrived in Paris to aid him, but he became ill soon after his arrival. To Franklin, therefore, should be given the credit of forming the nucleus of the Treaty of Paris of 1783. In his memorandum, to which he referred when talking with Oswald, Franklin set forth two groups of provisions which were later referred to as his "eight points". He intended to use these as a guide in negotiations that would come up when the actual treaty was to be made. He termed the first four provisions as "necessary" and these were to be insisted upon. The others were "advisable" and he hoped to get them in the treaty, if possible to do so.

Franklin's health grew steadily worse after Jay arrived; so he had to turn over the peace negotiations with Oswald to him. Jay could not come to immediate terms with Oswald, because he felt that Oswald's commission was not befitting his nation. Jay pointed out in a letter to Livingston in November, 1782, that it had been the obvious interest of Great Britain to separate the ties that bound France and the United States, and if England were still interested in this, then she had to work with the American commissioners on an equal

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16Jared Sparks, Franklin's Works, IX, p. 354.
basis as other nations. Oswald's commission stated that he was to "treat, consult, or agree in any way with the Commissioners of the Colonies or 'Plantations'" and to this Jay had taken offense. He felt that the American commission should wait until the arrival of the English commission under seal before they took any action as the terms of the commission might vary from the copy which Oswald had presented. This had been suggested by Vergennes to Jay, and both had agreed on it. But Jay was not to be satisfied long. He began to analyze the actions of Vergennes at this time and became suspicious of him. Jay thought that Vergennes wished to continue the dependence of the United States upon France during the course of the negotiations, and even to postpone them to suit French interests. This was borne out in Jay's letter of November 17, 1782.

Jay received word that Vergennes' secretary, M. Reyneval, had been sent to London to confer with Shelburne. Jay thought Vergennes had sent the secretary to seek a treaty and leave the American nation out in the cold. He outlined four reasons why the secretary was sent. Briefly they were: (1) to let Shelburne know that the French did not want him to treat the United States as independent, prior to a treaty; (2) to see if England would favor France in regard to fishing rights;

17Wharton, op. cit., VI, pp. 29-30.

18Hale, op. cit., II, p. 93.
(3) to impress Shelburne of the need to keep the United States from the Mississippi River; and (4) to get a general peace on terms agreeable to France, or if not, then a stop should be put to the negotiation.\textsuperscript{19} Jay was sure that France wanted to deal against the territorial and maritime interests of the United States and finally persuaded Franklin to see his way. Without consulting Franklin, Jay sent his own representative, Benjamin Vaughn, to London to see Shelburne and to counteract the supposed proposals of the French. It was a bold step, and only his success in the negotiations saved him from disgrace. Franklin still had faith in Vergennes because he knew that French policy was founded upon separation of the United States from Britain. He felt, with Jay, that the United States must become independent of both Great Britain and France.

John Adams returned to Paris from Holland on October 26, 1782. He had left France hostile to Vergennes, and upon his arrival in Paris, he was inclined to ignore the courtesy of diplomacy. He refused to visit Vergennes until he was advised by Lafayette and Franklin that Vergennes was expecting him. Adams quickly picked up the threads of the past negotiations and decided, with Jay, that the United States should think and act for themselves. He had been informed of Reyneval's mission to London, and, although, he did not know the exact

\textsuperscript{19}Wharton, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, p. 29.
purpose of it, he knew Vergennes well enough to surmise that France would cooperate as readily with Great Britain as with Spain in restricting the power and the territory of the United States.

In the peace negotiations at Paris, it was proposed by Vergennes, on behalf of France, that the Confederation be restricted to the coast lands east of the Appalachians, extending as far south as East Florida. By this project the Western lands south of Ohio were to be made neutral and left as territory for Indian tribes, and the lands north of the Ohio were to remain under English control. Vergennes hoped that this would be an expanding field for the former French colonists of Quebec. He probably did not desire to handicap the colonies as much as he hoped that, at some future time, there might be a vigorous French population extending southward to the Ohio from Canada, which might come under the power of France.

Adams and Franklin did not see eye to eye on all the peace proposals, although their purposes were the same. If Adams had only left off some of his self-esteem and his envy of Franklin, he could have seen this. He went about his work in a hurrying, undiplomatic way, while Franklin was slow and always maintained diplomatic courtesy to the French Court. Franklin reasoned out the advantages of playing along with

20 Fiske, op. cit., pp. 16-20.
France and came to the conclusion that it was best for them to do so for their country's sake. The independence of the United States lay at the heart of French foreign policy, and French money was still necessary to the American cause. Even if the French Alliance should lose its power with the conclusion of peace and for all practical purposes come to an end, it still served as a threat to hold Great Britain in check, and Franklin realized this. He could also see far enough in the future that long after the peace had been made, Britain would still be a North American power, and it would not be wise to lose France's friendship at this time.²¹

For six weeks the officials wrangled over proposals, boundaries, and claims of both governments. Whether these discussions were explained to Vergennes, Franklin did not record. But Oswald stated later that Franklin had asked Shelburne to keep them secret from France.²² Franklin was placing high value upon the French Alliance, and he probably felt that as long as he kept France from knowing what was being placed in the treaty proposals, then France would have no excuse to repudiate and renounce the Alliance. These negotiations might be considered by some to be in direct violation of the Alliance of 1778.

On November 30, 1782, the preliminary Anglo-American articles were ready to be signed, and the American Commis-

²¹ Darling, op. cit., p. 91. ²² Ibid., p. 47.
sioners asked themselves whether they should first inform Vergennes of their content and to see if he favored them. After consultation, they agreed not to do so. This was in direct violation to their instructions given by the Congress when they were sent over to Paris to negotiate a peace. So it was not until after the signing of the provisional treaty that they decided to inform Vergennes of their actions. Franklin was appointed to do the task. His expectations about Vergennes did not mature, because Vergennes did not manifest any astonishment, except at the favorable terms which his ally had extracted from Great Britain. In fact, Vergennes did not think it wise to deny the Americans a loan of an additional six million livres which they asked for at this time. Franklin halfway expected Vergennes to turn down the loan on the grounds that the Americans, as far as France was concerned, had violated article eight of the alliance treaty, which states, "Neither of the two parties shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained."\(^\text{23}\) Actually the American Commission was aware that they should not have acted without French consent, because in the first request for peace suggested by France it had been agreed upon and stipulated that the treaties with France were to be left in their full force and validity.

\(^{23}\text{Malloy, op. cit., I, p. 481.}\)
Although Vergennes did not reprove Franklin and the American Commission for their conduct in regard to the treaties, he did write to Luzerne in Philadelphia to inform the Congress of the Commission’s conduct. He said that he did not blame anyone, not even Franklin. He thought that Franklin had yielded too easily to the bias of the English who did not pretend to recognize the rules of courtesy in regard to France. Vergennes probably realized that Franklin had deceived him, but he at the same time realized that the United States was now a nation of its own. He might have thought that America would turn against France later anyway; so he would not bring charges against her at this time. His feelings are expressed on this matter in his letter to Luzerne in which he states, "If we may judge of the future from what has passed here under our eyes, we shall be poorly paid for all that we have done for the United States, and for securing for them a national existence."24

Evidently the King did not hold any grudge against America, because in a letter of November 2, 1783, to the President of Congress, Luzerne stated that it was his Majesty's intention that the United States should enjoy in the ports of his kingdom not only all the advantages which they enjoyed before their independence, but even some favors which had not

24 Wharton, op. cit., VI, p. 152.
heretofore been granted to them. Franklin's defense, if it may be said that he needed one in regard to the treaties, was that nothing was agreed upon contrary to the interests of France, and that no peace was to take place until France had come to an agreement with England. This is exactly the way the nations carried out the treaty. No peace came until September 3, 1783. The preliminary treaty was accepted without change as the permanent treaty of peace, and was signed by Great Britain, Spain, France, and the United States.

Now that peace was accepted by the nations once more, Jefferson thought it would be a good idea to carry out the terms of the peace. The Alliance of 1778 had stipulated that France would guarantee the independence of the United States and its territory as fixed at the end of the war with England, but when Jefferson asked Vergennes to help the United States remove the British garrisons from the frontier posts occupied within American territory, he gave only a noncommittal answer. The United States was practically helpless in this matter because of the creeping paralysis which had assailed the Confederation. It appears that Vergennes felt that this was the best condition for the States because he seemed

26 Wharton, op. cit., VI, p. 723.
27 F. P. Blair, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America, I, p. 752.
to dislike a confederation of republics, particularly thirteen states under one government. In this weakened condition, it would be impossible to pay back the money that France had loaned, but Vergennes and his successor, Montmorin, preferred to see the American Confederation politically too impotent to collect its taxes rather than strong enough to pay its just debts\textsuperscript{28} and defend its rights and interests against all comers. In other words, he did not want to see the new republic gravitate outside of the orbit of French diplomatic control. It is true, Vergennes was willing to make loans and subsidies to the United States for the purpose of gaining their independence, but he had only one aim in mind when he did this. He had taken skillful advantage at a decisive moment, of a great opportunity to cripple the British Empire, and this done, he was willing to see the new nation "sweat" under its own problems as long as they remained out of Europe.

These feelings against the United States were retained by France a little later when the new nation was trying to form a new government. Montmorin instructed de Moustier, the French Minister in the United States in 1784, in regard to the new Constitution, to tell the Americans that the King was only

\textsuperscript{28} The financial debt to France amounted to about 35,000,000 livres which France had loaned to the United States during the Revolution; ten million of this being a loan from Dutch bankers, underwritten and guaranteed by France. Bemis, \textit{American Secretaries of State}, I, p. 259.
feebly interested in this new policy. His Majesty thought that the deliberations would have little chance for success because of the diversity of affections, interests, and principles in the different provinces. Then too, the King wished to see the United States remain in its present state, because if the United States should assume the position of which they were capable, "They would soon acquire a force and power which they would probably be very eager to abuse." Yes, France had begun to fear the growth of the United States.

Another good example of Vergennes' attitude of self-interested tutelage of the United States is found in the consular convention of 1782. This treaty, drafted by Franklin and Vergennes, was very one-sided in that it allowed French consuls jurisdiction over disputes arising between French nationals residing in America. Although the convention gave the United States the same privilege, this provision, giving full immunity to the persons, houses, papers, and agents of consuls, would have given foreign consuls power over the whole land and its business. Fortunately the Senate did not ratify the treaty, but it is easily seen how eager Vergennes was to have a hand in controlling the United States and taking advantage of her in this time of political ineptitude of the Confederation.

29American Historical Review, VIII, p. 713.
30Bemis, American Secretaries of State, I, pp. 252-253.
When Jay began his duties as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he took up this consular convention treaty to see if he could not change it to be of some benefit to the United States. He was not in favor of it as it stood and did not fail to tell others about it. He did not possess the enthusiasm for France which Jefferson or Franklin had had. His suspicions during the negotiations for peace at Paris in 1782, that Vergennes was full of duplicity and equally as willing to injure as to favor the United States, provided personal coolness toward that Court. However, his conduct in official dealings with the French ministers was always unexceptionable. Fortunately, no serious issues came up between the two countries during his tenure of office. He did not care for the French, nor they for him. This is shown in a letter to Jay from Paris, October 16, 1784, in which his friend, William Bingham, said

No one is better acquainted than you are with this court, and no one is more jealous of their country's honour, in essential points. You may well imagine, then, that your appointment was not regarded with satisfaction, nor will the congratulations you will receive on it from certain quarters be sincere.31

Placing the original draft in one column and a revised form in another, he made it clear to the French the articles that would have to be modified in order for the American Congress to ratify it. Consuls were to present their commissions on arrival to the United States in Congress assembled

31Ibid., p. 251.
instead of to the respective States. No provisions were made for the erection of special chapels for the consuls to worship in, and consuls were forbidden to appoint "agents" with consular privileges and immunities to serve in distant parts of the country. The revised treaty still provided that in civil cases between nationals residing in the territory of the other party, the consul should exercise jurisdiction. Vergennes grumbled a little at the revised form, but he gracefully resumed negotiations. Thanks to Jefferson's popularity in France at this time, another convention was signed by him and Vergennes' successor, Montmorin, in 1788.  

Another object of Jay's diplomacy with France was to gain the commercial favors that he wanted to get for American goods and ships in the French West Indies. He decided that it was now time for the United States to break into the hitherto prevailing system of colonial monopoly that had been practiced by all European powers. He was surprised that he received these favors with so little diplomacy. They were granted to the United States in a very considerable degree, and without much solicitation. France had her own object in this. Vergennes reasoned that if he did not grant the United States the right to go into the West Indies, then she would go in and engage in illicit commerce there. He still reserved a proviso to his agreement, which stated that under no consid-

\[\text{Ibid., pp. 256-257.}\]
eration should the interests of French national commerce and navigation be sacrificed for the purpose of pleasing the United States.33

On April 30, 1784, seven free ports were opened in the French West Indies, to which foreign ships under sixty tons burden might bring lumber, provisions, peltries, raw furs, resin, and tar upon payment of a small tariff. In return these ships might carry out such items as molasses, rum, and French merchandise.34 Thus the United States had a ready market now for her goods. The articles to be carried into the Indies were exactly the articles that the Americans produced and needed to export. Due to the efforts of Jay and Jefferson certain lowering of tariffs were secured on American whale oil during the same year, and by 1788, American whale oil was admitted to the exclusion of that of all other foreigners.35

On May 7, 1784, Thomas Jefferson was appointed a coadjutor with Franklin and Adams to negotiate treaties of commerce with European Powers. It was commonly believed that he would succeed Franklin as Minister in Paris, because Franklin had already asked to be recalled because of sickness. When Franklin left Paris in 1785, true to the belief, Jefferson

34Journals of the Continental Congress, XXII, p. 312.
succeeded him as Minister. Jefferson's ability to adapt himself to his surroundings made him personally acceptable to the French people the same as his predecessor. Jefferson went to Paris, friendly to France and distrustful of England, so his appointment was a matter of gratulation to the French government. Luzerne, who was still the Minister of Louis XVI at Philadelphia, wrote to Vergennes and gave this pen picture of the new minister: "He is full of honor and sincerity and loves his country greatly, but is too philosophic and tranquil to hate or love any other nation unless it is for the interest of the United States to do so." In this, Jefferson was pictured as a man who would be easy to deal with only so long as his country could be satisfied. His diplomacy in Paris had to deal with no very critical matters outside the government, unless the Barbary Pirate controversy can be considered as such. While in Paris, Jefferson had to deal with the Barbary States for the release of captured American sailors. In this incident, he was obliged to suffer humiliation and endure unsuccessful efforts; unsuccessful because his government could not pay enough to ransom his fellow countrymen. In another important transaction that he tried to promote, American commerce, he failed because his beliefs and policies ran counter to the Farmers-General, the largest and most powerful class in France at the time. The Farmers-General's livelihood

36Bemis, American Secretaries of State, II, p. 7.
depended on the maintenance of barriers to trade, and Jefferson wanted to lower or remove them.\textsuperscript{37} To this class, or rather company, the French King farmed out the tobacco revenue of the kingdom, giving a complete monopoly on the sale of tobacco in France in return for an annual fixed sum. In 1785, the Farmers-General proceeded to make a contract with Robert Morris of Philadelphia to furnish all its tobacco, at a figure about one-half the prevailing price. Quickly and without warning, this contract ruined the French market for American tobacco, lowered the purchasing power of the United States for French goods, and had its part in preventing France from winning its share of American commerce after 1783. Jefferson tried his best to get Vergennes and his successor to understand how the tobacco had ruined France's bargaining power, and even suggested that the Farmers-General be abolished. Vergennes told him that the hold which that institution had on the insecure finances of France was too tight to be broken. Vergennes did try to abolish it later, but to no avail. It lasted until the collapse of the ancient regime itself.\textsuperscript{38}

Jefferson had another problem to deal with, one that no other foreign minister had had. This was the question of how

\textsuperscript{37}Louis Martin Sears, \textit{History of American Foreign Relations}, pp. 50-51.

he was to use his diplomacy in a country in revolution. After his arrival in Paris, the Bastile had fallen and the great days of the first stage of the French Revolution had brought their hope to the revolutionists. Realizing that Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of Independence, the revolutionary leaders naturally came to him for counsel and advice. He did not at first know how to cope with this situation, so he went to see the Secretary of the Foreign Office and told him the situation in which he had been placed. As a result of the intricate spy system of the French Government, the secretary had already been informed of the proceedings. He absolved Jefferson of all responsibility, praised him for his honesty and trustworthiness, and even encouraged him to offer any counsel which might lead to a constructive program of reform.\footnote{Sears, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 53.}
CHAPTER III

FRENCH IMBROGLIO 1790-1800

On August 4, 1789, the National Assembly in France abolished all class privileges; thus with one blow, all the privileges that had been built up since feudalism were torn down. Jefferson was now anxious to return to the United States. He turned over the affairs of the Legation to William Short, as Charge d'Affaires, and on September 26, set out for America. He thought that he had been in France during her worst period, and believed that she would travel more comfortably along the road to national happiness and prosperity. If he could have looked into the future, he would have changed his mind, for France was soon to undergo the most shocking and scandalous period of her history.

Gouverneur Morris was sent to Paris before Jefferson left, and although he was not authorized to act as minister, he assumed the post in his dealings with the French. He was friendly to France, and became personally acquainted with many distinguished Frenchmen while there. One of his acquaintances was Lafayette, who showed him the draft of the French Declaration of Rights. Morris gave him his opinion on it, and suggested several amendments. He remarked that the American
example the French were trying to follow had done the French
good, but "that a popular government was of no value to
France."¹ Morris further stated that, "The French wanted an
American Constitution with the exception of a king instead of
a president, without reflecting that they have not American
citizens to support that Constitution."² Morris was a sup-
porter of the King and because of this, he never did gain the
popularity that his predecessors had had. The people of France
wanted a republic and had no sympathy for the King or his fol-
lowers.

In March 1790, Morris went to London and spent most of
the year there, returning to France early in 1791. He resumed
relations with Lafayette, whom he found fuller of his imprac-
tical theories and less disposed to listen to American advice
than when he left. Lafayette told Morris that it was no
longer a question of liberty, but simply, who shall be master
in France. Lafayette believed that the National Assembly was
falling fast and that the Constitution was worthless. Morris
suggested that France's only hope of salvation lay in a for-
egn war which would turn the people's ardor, now inflamed
against the government, into a new channel. Morris was an-
ticipating Napoleon III's policy which was to come later.

¹Daniel Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 145.
Morris informed Washington of the French situation and of the part that he was playing. Accordingly, early in 1792, Morris received his appointment as Minister to France. He accepted the mission, although he realized the difficulties and dangers of the task before him. His acceptance began one of the most thrilling and chequered missions, not only in American, but in all diplomatic history. During the Reign of Terror he was the only foreign minister who dared to remain at his post.

Morris was presented to the French Court in June, 1792. On June 20, the mob forced through the palace gates, killed the Swiss Guards, and compelled the King to put on the red cap of liberty.3 Morris told Lafayette that at that moment "the Constitution gave its last groan,"4 and in six weeks all would be over. His predictions were accurately fulfilled. Morris was personally favorable to the King and hoped that he could keep his throne, but he foresaw the King's doom. Morris proved that he was a man of courage and heroism in his desperate and chivalrous scheme of planning the escape of the royal family from Paris. The scheme would probably have worked had not the King's nerve collapsed at the critical moment. When the incident was over, the King sent for Morris and confessed his regret that he had not followed his advice and begged Morris to take charge of the royal papers and money. Morris

4 Walther, op. cit., p. 208.
declined the custody of the papers, but accepted the money which amounted to seven hundred fifty thousand livres. This was used to hire and bribe those individuals who were obstructing the King's flight.\textsuperscript{5} The King moved too slow, thinking that the crisis would pass over, but the terrible day of August 10 caught up with him. The King was relieved of power, and in January, 1793, he was sent to the guillotine, thus ending Morris' scheme to aid the Monarchy.

During the day of August 10, 1792, many of the French people sought shelter in the house of the American Legation. From early morning until past midnight the house served as a hiding place from the maddened men of the streets. Morris was willing to risk his own life in the cause of humanity to save not only his personal friends, but all who came to him. He said that the people had come of their own accord, and "They are persons to whom our country is more or less indebted."\textsuperscript{6} He believed that in helping these poor frightened Frenchmen, he was in a way helping to repay them for their support of the American Revolution.

The news of the French declaration of war on Great Britain in February, 1793, came as a surprise to America. George III, the recent enemy of the United States, was now engaged in wars with the old ally of American independence. The United States

\textsuperscript{5}Beckles Willson, America's Ambassadors to France, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 53.
still considered herself as an ally of France, pledged to defend the French West Indies in case of war. What part would she have to play now? This was strictly a European war, but feelings began to rise in America justifying both sides of the question.

Washington and his cabinet had to decide what part they were to play in the war, since by the Treaty of 1778 with France the United States had agreed to aid France if needed. The President and his cabinet officers, including Hamilton and Jefferson, had instinctively decided on the maintenance of strict neutrality, but neutrality should be declared by Congress, and Congress, like all America, was divided in its sympathy. Washington knew that there was a lot of pro-French feelings in America because of the part that France had played in the Revolution in America. There was also the question of what France would think of Jefferson's letter of February 17, 1793, to the French minister soon after the minister had informed the United States that France had set up a Republican form of government. Jefferson had stated that the government and citizens of the United States viewed with the most sincere pleasure every advance of the French nation "towards its happiness, an object essentially connected with its liberty," and that there had been widespread joy throughout the United States when word had been received informing them that France

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7J. B. Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, I, p. 121.
had risen superior to the foreign invasion and domestic trouble. "This," stated Jefferson, "had proved that the sympathies of the American people were great and sincere." 8

Washington called his cabinet together and put several questions before them. The first concerned the French Alliance. Did it continue in effect after the Revolution? The treaty had been made with a monarch now fallen and deceased! Hamilton and his group argued that the treaties should be suspended pending clarification of the revolution in France. Jefferson maintained that the treaties continued in full force because they had been made with the French nation and not with Louis XVI alone. 9 Jefferson also believed that the question of interpretation and application of the treaties should be postponed for future decision.

Another question under debate was whether a minister of the new French Republic should be received absolute or without qualifications. Again the advocates were torn between Hamilton and Jefferson. Hamilton said that the minister should be received after informing him of an intention to suspend a decision of the validity of the treaties. 10 Jefferson maintained that the minister should be received without qualification, i.e. recognition without conditions. If Washington

8Ibid., p. 122.
9Bernis, American Secretaries of State, I, p. 68.
would do this, then maybe France would not invoke the alliance. Washington decided in favor of Jefferson, and the new French Minister, the Citizen Edmond Genet, was received without qualification. It appeared that Washington had taken the right step. Genet informed him that France would not question the treaties, nor did she choose to demand military aid in defending the West Indies according to the terms of the alliance. France reasoned that since the United States did not have a strong naval force it would be better to have her remain neutral. France was basing this neutrality on the provision in the Treaty of Amity which had stipulated that free ships make free goods and foodstuffs and naval stores are never contraband. The treaty further provided that the enemies of one party could not outfit privateers within the ports of the other or bring prizes to those ports.\footnote{Malloy, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 468-478.} France intended to use this provision against Great Britain. If America remained neutral, then American vessels could bring into France, through the British naval blockade, goods which would provide France with the provisions and naval supplies to carry on the war. It is not difficult to see why France thought American neutrality was more valuable to her than American belligerency.

The followers of Genet say that because of a storm at sea, his ship landed at Charleston, South Carolina instead of at the intended port at Philadelphia. Two other reasons had
something to do with the change of the route; he learned that two British frigates were cruising off New York and Philadelphia on the lookout for him; and he wanted to make an appeal to the people of the South on his way northward. In this way he could arouse the feelings of the American people and sway them to his way of thinking. In all his speeches along the route to the capital, he was greeted with great ovations. That a foreign minister should be so accessible to all who came to see him pleased the general public at each stop that he made.

Genet's instructions were that he was not to invoke the alliance, but to use neutral American soil as a base for organizing attacks against British and Spanish colonies and commerce. Actually records bear out the facts that he commissioned four privateers, manned chiefly by Americans, and sent them out to attack the British commerce along the coast of the United States in the ten days stay in Charleston. He then set himself to the task of appointing consuls and giving them admiralty jurisdiction for the condemnation of prizes which the privateers would soon be bringing in. It is interesting to note that this was being done before he presented himself or his credentials to the President. Evidently he must have anticipated that all of the American ships would join in on his scheme to turn privateer, because he brought about three hundred blank letters of marque in his briefcase, authorized by the executive council of France, to give to
anyone who would aid his cause.\textsuperscript{12}

To finance this plan, Genet was relying on the advance payment of the remaining debt to France, which at this time amounted to about two and a half million dollars, and on the proceeds which he would get from the sale of French naval prizes to be sold in American ports. Genet contended that since the Treaty of 1778 forbade France's enemies to set up these prize courts and send out privateers, it allowed France the privilege.\textsuperscript{13} Genet's plan even went so far as to arrange for an expedition of American adventurers to be organized on the Georgian frontier in order to attack the Spaniards and wrest New Orleans from them. His instructions also called for him to issue propaganda to stimulate the revolt of British and Spanish colonists in Canada and Louisiana.\textsuperscript{14}

Washington was unmoved by the clamor of the American people over Genet. He realized how much depends on neutrality, and he did not flinch in his determination. On May 18, 1793, Genet was formally presented to the President by Jefferson, and the President greeted him in all his formal dignity, not as Genet had been accustomed to during the past few days in America. He had come a long way to carry on a delicate piece

\textsuperscript{12}Moore, \textit{op. cit.}, V, p. 591.

\textsuperscript{13}Malloy, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 296.

of negotiation, but he was now facing a man who would soon disrupt his plans. Genet found that Washington's Government intended to enforce the letter of the treaty. The Government immediately forbade the outfitting of French privateers in American waters or the recruiting of crews therein. Genet tried to divert the mind of the Americans from the question of privateers by suggesting negotiations of a new commercial treaty, which was the most prominent feature of his instructions. The Americans were for settling the privateer question first. There were differences of opinion on this and the problem turned out to be not an easy one to settle. Hamilton would yield nothing to Genet. Jefferson would yield all that would not involve us in war with England, and Washington stood in between. After much debate, it was decided that we could not forbid France to license her privateers in our ports, as this was in keeping with the international practice of the day, but that vessels thus commissioned must leave our waters and not send their prizes back. If the prizes were sent back, then they would put the United States in the position of furnishing a base of operations against England. After telling Genet of this decision, he was informed that he must send the new privateers out of the United States' waters.¹⁵

Genet met these demands with commands of his own. He told the Americans that they could be just as neutral as they

¹⁵American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 150.
pleased, but American ports must be available to French privateers and prizes, for, until Congress, and Congress only, said otherwise, that was the law. He told Washington that he nor anybody else could erase a treaty without the consent of both parties.16

Early in July 1793, it was learned that the Little Sarah, a prize which had been sent in by a French National ship, was being fitted according to Genet's own private instructions. Right away trouble began brewing. The President had ordained that no further arming of privateers would be permitted. To start the controversy, the governor of Pennsylvania sent his secretary to Genet to tell him not to let the ship leave the harbor, but Genet refused to countermand the brig's departure. In the Cabinet, sitting without the President, Hamilton urged that batteries be mounted on Mud Island to sink the ship if she attempted to sail. Jefferson decided that he would consult Genet personally on this matter, and Genet promised that he would only take the ship to a nearby port, Chester, to take on supplies, and that she would probably not be ready to sail before the President's return to the White House.17 Genet did not actually promise Jefferson that the ship would not sail, and this insecurity caused the Cabinet deep apprehension. Should they allow the orders of the government to be violated

17 Ibid., p. 240.
before their eyes? What could they do? Nothing but hope. At all events, ten days later, the Petite-Democrat-Cornelia\(^18\) sailed on a cruise.

Washington returned July 11, in an angry mood because of the events that had just taken place. It was not the privateer alone that had incensed the President. There was something else which concerned him more, and that was whether or not the French minister was "to set the acts of the Government at defiance with impunity, and then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the people?\(^19\) There was a report from Jefferson stating that Genet had done that. Genet had told Dallas, the secretary of the governor of Pennsylvania, that he would appeal to the people over the President's head. There it was: Genet had threatened to by-pass the President in order to get what he wanted done. What then should the President do in regard to the foreign minister? There was only one thing to do--demand his recall.

On August 15, 1793, Morris was instructed to ask for Genet's recall. Morris informed M. Deforgues, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Genet's dealings in America. He seemed to be hurt over learning of this, and declared that measures would be taken to show the American government that the proceedings and criminal maneuvers of Genet were not authorized

\(^{18}\)Genet changed the name of the Little-Sarah after meeting the daughter of the governor, George Clinton, New York.

\(^{19}\)Bemis, *Diplomatic History of the United States*, p. 98.
by his instructions, Morris had not been closely connected with the new government which had recently come into power in France, so the authorities of the Republic took advantage of the request for Genet's recall to ask for Morris' withdrawal.

There had been a great change in the government of France, and the new regime was cutting heads off by the hundreds. Genet suddenly realized that there was a guillotine waiting for him. The new French government had already sent him his recall, and also sent a new minister to replace him in the person of Citizen Fauchet. Fauchet had been given the orders to have Genet arrested and sent home to his death. Genet appealed to the President to have mercy and not deport him. Washington,-disliking to press him to this extremity, refused to allow him to be extradited, and thus saved his life. He remained in America and married a daughter of Governor Clinton of New York, where he lived to a ripe old age.

The blundering way in which Genet had tried to override the President caused widespread indignation toward France in the eyes of the American people. The French cause was thereby ruined and the diplomatic situation eased up considerably. For a little while it looked as though the war in Europe could be fought without any entangling alliances with the United States, but this was not to be the case. Even though

20Moore, op. cit., IV, p. 487. 21Ibid., p. 490.
the United States did not declare war, she did have to participate in some naval engagements and suffer the blockades and decrees of France and England.

In February, 1793, France had thrown open the ports of her colonies entirely to vessels flying the Stars and Stripes on terms similar to those enjoyed by French shipping. England stated that this gave privileges not enjoyed before the war, therefore it was in direct opposition to the British Rule of 1756. With this start, France and England began to issue other decrees against each other which had a direct bearing on the diplomacy of the United States as well as other nations.

By a decree of the National Convention of France, May 9, 1793, the commanders of French ships of war and privateers were authorized to seize merchant vessels laden with provisions bound to an enemy's port, or with merchandise belonging to an enemy. This decree ran counter to the views of the United States concerning freedom of trade as well as to treaty stipulations. Morris informed the French of the American views, and Genet replied that the United States was expressly excluded from the operation of the decree. The action of the French government in enforcing this exemption seems to be full of inconsistencies, and Morris told the French that retaliations would be followed by France's enemies. His prognosis proved correct. By an Order in Council of June 8,

\[22\textit{American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 244.}\]

\[23\textit{Ibid., p. 244.}\]
1793, the commanders of British cruisers were authorized to seize all vessels laden with grain, flour, or meal, bound either for a port in France or for a port occupied by the French arms. No exception was made for American ships, as was the case with the French decree.24 Jefferson, still the friend of France, took issue with the English minister in the United States, and even went so far as to pen a letter to the United States minister in England to be delivered to that government. It denied that corn meal and flour were contraband, and if the United States allowed its exports of food to be restrained from entering French harbors, it would be unneutral to allow them to be exported to British ports. Jefferson said this was the same principle involved when French privateers were forbidden to fit out in American ports and Great Britain was excluded from the same privilege.25 This order was followed by another in November, 1793, but was not made public until late in December, thus giving the British vessels time to reach their victims before they knew of the order. The order gave British naval commanders the right to "stop and detain all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony."26 These captured ships were to be brought in for prize court adjudication.

The British ships headed for the Caribbean and, without

24 Ibid., p. 240.  
25 Ibid., p. 239.  
26 Ibid., p. 239.
warning, captured about three hundred American ships trading with the French islands. These ships were soon lying idle in the harbors of the British West Indies awaiting the local decisions of the British Admiralty courts. About one hundred fifty of these American ships were condemned, leaving the crews stranded and without clothes to cover their backs. Communications were so slow at this time, that before the United States heard of this episode, England had modified the November order with a third order of January 8, 1794, which provided for the capture of "all ships laden in whole or in part with military or naval stores bound for French colonies, and all ships bound for a blockaded colonial port."27 During this period of naval seizures, there was also trouble on the American frontier. General Anthony Wayne had tried to reach a settlement with the Indians who had been incited by the Governor-General of Canada and were hostile to the government of the United States. The Indian attacks grew worse, and it was soon learned that General Wayne could not make an agreement with them. On December 4, 1793, the American Senate met and heard in detail about the recent Indian negotiations and how Wayne had failed in this task. Americans began to blame Canada for the Indian actions, and soon they began to place all the blame on Great Britain because she owned Canada. While this trouble was brewing, news reached the United States of the maritime spoliations of Great Britain. A war crisis

27Ibid., p. 231.
flared up and the United States placed an embargo on all American shipping for one month in the hope that it would have some bearing on the decrees of the other powers, but it was of no avail. Hamilton saw, in any rupture with England, the ruin of American credit and the collapse of the new nationality of 1787. He therefore persuaded Washington to send the experienced diplomat, John Jay, on a special mission to London to see if he could come to a settlement with the British and eliminate a war.\textsuperscript{28}

Jay landed in England on June 12, 1794, and part of his instructions was that no stipulations whatever were to interfere with the United States' obligations to France.\textsuperscript{29} Historians believe that it was an ideal time to make a treaty, because England realized that the United States was her greatest foreign customer at a time when commerce furnished the revenue to carry on the French war. Therefore, she would rather make a treaty than declare war on the United States. With friendly relations of a partial nature existing between the two nations Jay succeeded in making the treaty and had signed it by November 19, 1794. This was known to the world as the Jay Treaty.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28}Bemis, \textit{Diplomatic History of the United States}, pp. 100-101.

\textsuperscript{29}American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 473.

\textsuperscript{30}The entire Jay Treaty is found in Malloy's \textit{Treaties, Conventions, Internal Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States and other Powers}. 
James Monroe was sent to France to succeed Gouverneur Morris at the same time Jay was sent to England. He was selected because of his known friendship to the French Republic, and having affiliated himself with the Republican Party in America, he would naturally appeal to the revolutionary leaders in France. It has been stated that he was sent to keep France in a good humor while Jay made the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Great Britain, but this has no actual facts to bear it out. One thing that supports this assumption was that Monroe was kept in ignorance of Jay's instructions. He was deceived as to the real character of that mission and instructed to allay French suspicions. As far as he knew, Jay was merely seeking redress for spoliations and evacuations of the occupied northern posts. He was also instructed to "let it be seen that, in case of war with any nation on earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural ally."31

Monroe was received with great ceremony by the French National Convention. He was accepted by the people as well as the government, and without wasting any time, he succeeded in persuading the French government to repeal the obnoxious maritime decrees, in so far as the United States was affected by them. France also agreed to go back to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778, and promised to compensate the Americans for the violation of the treaty. Monroe was hard at work

31American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, p. 668.
with the French when the text of Jay's Treaty was finally made known. He was therefore in no position to defend it. He had led the French to believe that in case the treaty was not satisfactory to them then it would never be ratified by the United States.

Although the treaty was not satisfactory to Washington, it was finally ratified. To France the treaty was a slap in the face. The treaty gave great umbrage to France, not only because it granted privileges of asylum to British ships of war and recognized the right to capture enemy goods in neutral vessels, but also because it definitely fixed the position of the United States as a neutral.

When the Jay Treaty was returned to the United States to be ratified by the Government, France instructed her ministers, Fauchet and his successor, Adet, to try to frustrate the ratification by any means possible. They tried to bring pressure on the President, the Senate, and even on the House of Representatives, only to fail in their task. The French Ministers were soon to learn that the time of French control of American diplomacy had come to an end. They could no longer dominate and control the American government as they had done in Vergennes' time. As soon as the treaty was ratified, the Secretary of State advised Monroe to defend the treaty in France. Officially he did, but unofficially he did not. However, he did soothe the French feelings for a little while by
telling them that everything would be taken care of by the defeat of Washington's Party.

Fauchet advised his government that it should put pressure on the American government by taking Louisiana back from Spain, thus giving France adjoining territory to the American States which she could use to her advantage. As soon as Adet arrived in America he recommended to the French government to show its displeasure with the United States. This was just before the presidential election of 1796, and he thought that this would serve as a warning to the people of the disaster which might follow if Washington were elected again. Even the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delacroix, joined in the clamoring by stating that Washington was not to be reelected if America wanted to remain the friend of France. Washington began to get suspicious of Monroe's actions and thought that he might be talking against the Federalists in America and telling the French what to say. Conditions continued to rise to such a point that on the eve of the election, the Directory made up its mind to suspend diplomatic relations with the United States. The Directory intimated that the relations were so intense that if on the morrow Washington were to be elected, war would probably follow. At the same time the Directory also intimated that if Jefferson were elected, then regular relations would be restored. The Directory wanted Jefferson elected in the hope that under the new administration
of the Republicans the Jay Treaty would be torn up and a new one made which would give more consideration to France and not as much to Great Britain. Aside from the demonstrations of the French Directory and the ministers, the full resentment of the French Government had already been brought out in decrees which were forerunners of the Milan and Berlin decrees of Napoleon. The decrees were issued on July 2, 1796, and had already been put into effect. According to these decrees, the French ships would hereafter treat neutral vessels, as to searches, captures, and confiscations, in the same manner as their governments should suffer the English to treat them.\footnote{Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, pp. 107-109.} In other words, Napoleon thought that if England were going to stop all ships and pull them into her ports and harbors, then he could do the same. This was setting aside the principles of the Franco-American treaty.

All this was carried on in the hope of influencing the American people to repudiate Washington, but although the French did not know it, he had beaten them to the draw. He had already chosen not to run for reelection in 1796. He took advantage of the situation in his farewell address, and urged the American nation to steer clear of foreign entanglements. In his farewell message in 1796, Washington issued statements which indicated that he foresaw a dangerous affinity in the French alliance which might become so engrossed in domestic
politics, that it would become a hazard to complete independence.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humcr or caprice.\(^{33}\)

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was appointed to succeed Monroe, but when he arrived in Paris, the Directory refused to recognize him and ordered him to leave France. He then retired to Amsterdam to await the crisis. Many of the Republicans insisted that this was not enough grounds for war, while the Federalists openly demanded war. The powder keg was filled and was waiting for the match to set it off.

If the United States had been run by a war minded person at this time, there would have been a war, but Adams was determined, if possible, to reestablish diplomatic relations. In the autumn of 1797, he appointed a commission consisting of C. C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry to attempt new negotiations. Tallyrand was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He had recently returned from exile in the United States where he had made his living by selling French secrets of state and speculating in western lands. Adams was sure that the commission could come to an understanding with Tallyrand,

\(^{33}\)American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, pp. 34-37.
but this was not to be the case. The commissioners arrived in Paris at the crest of the French Revolution and found themselves confronting a situation unparalleled since the last century of the Roman Republic. France was sitting in the middle of Europe selling peace to her neighbors.\textsuperscript{34} Tallyrand was making for himself a huge fortune through bribes and gifts. Naturally it was expected that the commissioners would pay for their recognition, and when they refused, Tallyrand refused to recognize them or receive them officially. Tallyrand sent intermediaries who later appeared in the envoy's published documents as Messrs. X, Y, and Z, and demanded $250,000 for himself and his associates, and a loan or gift of several millions of dollars to France. The United States could evade any violation of neutrality, he said, by purchasing certain Dutch bonds worth about fifty cents on the dollar. Marshall and Pinckney stated to the intermediaries that they would not pay one cent for American recognition by France. They immediately left Paris, but Gerry, who was a Republican and who still hoped to make a deal with Tallyrand, remained in Paris for about three months. But, failing to come to a decision, he too broke off negotiations and sailed for home.\textsuperscript{35}

The real break in the diplomatic relations did not come

\textsuperscript{34}Fish, op. cit., p. 127.

\textsuperscript{35}American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, pp. 157-59.
because of the bribe that Tallyrand wanted. It is true, the Commissioners refused to adhere to any form of bribe, but diplomatic relations were not broken until after they had asked the Directory to suspend its measures against American commerce. When the Directory refused to do this, negotiations were ended and an undeclared war ensued from 1798 to 1800 between the two nations. Acts were passed in May and June of 1798 which allowed public armed ships to capture French armed vessels and bring them in for prize court procedure. Even American merchant ships were allowed to arm themselves for defense and make prizes of French armed vessels which attacked them. Acts were passed to raise the regular army to 13,000 men and at the same time the Navy Department was created with appropriations for new war vessels. The United States did not at any time authorize offensive hostilities nor the capture of private property, because this would have given France the right to say that Congress had declared war, thus placing the blame of the war on the United States.

Adams had been greatly stirred by the French refusal to receive the American Commission in 1798. Upon receiving word of their rejection, he immediately declared that he would "Never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation."  

Adams meant what he said, because it was not until the French had intimated that they would receive an American minister that Adams sent one. Victor DuPont, formerly a French consul at Charleston, was sent to the United States in 1798 as consul-general. Adams did not give him an exequatur, but DuPont had some conversations with Jefferson who convinced him that the attitude of France was drawing Great Britain and the United States closer together. Also Jefferson suggested that if France would reverse her policy the Republicans would triumph in the election of 1800 and this would be to the benefit of France.

DuPont returned to France and put these points before Tallyrand. At this moment Tallyrand was contemplating rebuilding a great French colonial empire in America along the Mississippi Valley. He quickly surmised that if the United States should be driven to war then New Orleans and Louisiana might be captured from Spain before France could get hold of this territory for herself. Tallyrand's colonial dream would then vanish. He informed the Directory of his plans, and they decided to change their attitude toward America. William Vans Murray, the American minister at the Hague, was advised by the French charge d'affaires that if an envoy were sent to France from the United States he would undoubtedly be received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent and powerful nation. To further the cause of good feelings
toward America, Napoleon, who had acceded to power as the First Consul, caused the drastic and obnoxious maritime decree of 1798 to be repealed.

Adams sent to the Senate the nomination of Vans Murray as minister to France. The assurances of Tallyrand had come indirectly to Adams; so he suggested that Vans Murray should not go directly to Paris until direct assurances were received from the French Government.\textsuperscript{37} As a result of controversies in American politics, Adams decided to send William R. Davis and Oliver Ellsworth with Vans Murray. Tallyrand sent over assurances in the summer of 1799 that the commission would be received, but their instructions were not completed until late in October. According to the instructions, the commissioners were to require indemnity for spoliations and to secure a release from the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Alliance with France.\textsuperscript{38} With the instructions finally completed, Davis and Ellsworth embarked and joined Vans Murray in March, 1800, in Paris. After many delays, because of the battles that Napoleon was engaged in, a convention was agreed to and signed September 30, 1800. The main articles were that the two parties should treat each other's citizens and commerce fairly, and all national vessels that had been captured and all private vessels that had not been judicially condemned were to be

\textsuperscript{37}American State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, p. 239.  
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., II, pp. 301-306.
restored. All the old treaties were suspended and provisions were made to reestablish diplomatic relations on a firmer footing.\textsuperscript{39} Napoleon was happy with the terms and declared that the undeclared war that had just preceded would soon seem nothing more than a family quarrel.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39} Malloy, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 496-505.

\textsuperscript{40} Sears, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 89.
CHAPTER IV

LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE WAR OF 1812

If September 30, 1800, was a day of good will and rejoicing in the mind of the American Government, the following day would have been the opposite if they could have only had modern methods of communications. On October 1, 1800, Spain signed a secret treaty with France retroceding Louisiana to France with the same stipulations and boundaries as she had received it in 1763. This treaty would nullify the Franco-American amity so recently concluded, so in order not to have an open break with the United States, the treaty was signed in secret. Rufus King, American Minister in London, learned of the treaty and informed the United States in March, 1801. President Jefferson was much concerned over the news of the treaty and the entire government became aroused over the danger of losing the free navigation of the Mississippi River. Jefferson knew that the western states would not stand by and see their products denied the right of passing down the Mississippi,¹ and as soon as the Spanish Intendant suspended the right of deposit at the docks of New Orleans in 1802, the President realized that the government had to take action. His first idea to try to pacify the western population was to

¹Bartlett, op. cit., p. 103.
send a diplomat to France to purchase West Florida as a substitute outlet for American products. This was to be purchased from Spain if France did not own it, with the hope that France would help in the transaction.

Pierre S. DuPont de Nemours, a French powder maker in the United States, was embarking for France on a visit about the time that the news of the treaty was causing so much unrest in America. Jefferson decided to send a letter to Livingston by DuPont in which he pointed out these views:

There is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three-eights of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half of our inhabitants. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. From that moment, we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.2

Jefferson had authorized DuPont de Nemours to read the letter before it was sealed in the hope that he would convey the contents of it to Bonaparte. DuPont was to try to make Bonaparte understand that if Louisiana had been retroceded to France, then this would probably cause war with the United States in the near future, a war which would annihilate her on the ocean and place the high seas under the despotism of two nations, of which the United States would be one. The other would be none other than France's old enemy, England.

2Beckles Willson, op. cit., p. 85.
Jefferson further indicated to Livingston that he must find out if New Orleans could be purchased, and if so at what price. Trouble was already springing up because of the New Orleans suspension; and it would not be long before the entire country would be in an uproar. The opposition had raised the cry of war already, and had begun to try to get the western inhabitants to arm and take possession of New Orleans themselves. The West felt that Jefferson could handle the situation better than the Federalist opposition, because through his policies the West had increased in settlement and commerce and capital had flourished.³

Livingston made little progress in his negotiations in 1802 as to whether France was willing to part with her colonial territory. He reported to Secretary Madison that Napoleon was preparing to send an army of 10,000 men to occupy Louisiana, but due to a heavy frost setting in at the harbor of Helvoet-Sluis the army was never sent. However, the news added to the anxiety of Jefferson and caused him to create a special mission "for the purpose of enlarging and more effectually securing our rights and interests in the river Mississippi, and to the territories eastward thereof."⁴

James Monroe was appointed to join Livingston in Paris to try to negotiate a treaty or purchase of some type whereby

³Bemis, Diplomatic History of United States, p. 132.
⁴Foster, op. cit., p. 191.
this territory would come under the jurisdiction of the United States. The Senate promptly confirmed the appointment of Monroe, and in March, 1803, he set sail for France. His instructions contemplated the purchase of New Orleans and both East and West Florida and to guarantee the free navigation of the Mississippi to citizens of both countries.\(^5\) This was already guaranteed to the United States by the Treaty of Ildefonso with Spain in 1795, but Jefferson felt that this was a controversial matter that must be put into writing with France. Monroe was further instructed that if France was not willing to part with the whole of New Orleans, then he was to try to get as large a portion of the island as he could.

Preferably, he was to get a part large enough to build a large commercial town on as little remote from the mouth of the river as possible. If it should be impossible to purchase any land at all, then Monroe was to insist upon France to give the citizens of the United States the right of deposit in New Orleans as well as the privilege of holding real estate for commercial purposes, build a hospital, and let our consuls reside there.\(^6\)

Even though Jefferson's letter was in a way a demand on the government of France, it did serve its purpose. Jefferson's views on the Louisiana question caused Napoleon to pause

and think. However, this was not the only reason that the Americans were going to find the purchase of Louisiana so easy. The war that Napoleon was to wage against England; his costly failure to conquer San Domingo so as to make that island a point of strategic advantage whereby he could dominate the West Indies and Louisiana; and the fact that the Americans might take possession of Louisiana by force, all caused a change of policy by Napoleon. He began to realize that his best policy would be to make friends out of the Americans and put them in a position to develop such strength and power that would enable them in time to humble England to the dust. He could get money from the deal to swell his war chest and at the same time get the satisfaction that England would not have Louisiana if France could not have it. With this in mind, he decided to sell Louisiana to the United States.

Napoleon first announced his decision to his brothers who tried to get him to change his mind. They said that the constitution did not confer this power on him, but he said that he would act independently of the constitution. He called in his ministers, Marbois and Decres, and told them about his decision. He pointed out to them that there was no time to lose. Already England had twenty vessels in the Gulf of Mexico and the conquest by the English would be easy if they only took the trouble to descend upon it. Napoleon further stated:
I wish to take away from them (the British) the idea that they will ever be able to own this colony. I contemplate turning it over to the United States. I should hardly be able to say that I had ceded it to them, for we are not in possession of it. But even a short delay may leave nothing but a vain title to transmit to these republicans, whose friendship I seek. They are asking me but a single city of Louisiana, but I already regard the whole colony lost, and it seems to me that in the hands of this rising power it will be more useful to the politics and even to the commerce of France than if I attempt to keep it.7

This conference with his ministers took place two days before Monroe landed in France. The day before Monroe came to Paris, Livingston had an interview with Tallyrand who dropped a hint of the decision to see how Livingston would take it. Livingston did not jump to the opportunity of buying the territory without informing his government by letter. He reported:

M. Tallyrand asked me this day, whether we wished to have the whole of Louisiana. I told him no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas. He said that if they gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value, and he wished to know what we would give for the whole. I told him that it was a subject I had not thought of, but I suppose we would not object to twenty millions francs.

When Livingston decided that the United States might be interested in the whole territory, he sought to continue the negotiations on this basis. Tallyrand, hoping to get a larger amount of money if the United States really wanted the

7Barbe Marbois, History of Louisiana, Lawrence's translation, p. 274.
territory, stated that he was not authorized to make the offer to sell. He claimed the Louisiana territory was not yet in the hands of France, Napoleon merely had its acquisition in contemplation. Livingston informed Tallyrand that if France did not own the land, then he would advise his government to take possession of it. Tallyrand became alarmed over this sudden change in Livingston and proceeded to talk business.

Monroe's reception of the idea of obtaining the vast territory of Louisiana was very different from Livingston's. Instead of reporting to his government, he wanted to act. He thought that there was no time to refer the matter to the United States government because of the long delay caused by slow transmission of requests and permissions across the ocean by the slow sailing ships of that day. Neither was there time to obtain from Spain the annulment of the clause in the San Ildefonso Treaty which stood in the way of France's alienation of the retroceded province; even if Napoleon was determined to do so. Napoleon wanted quick action, and Monroe was the man to give it to him. Disregarding what his government might say of his actions, he accepted Napoleon's proposition to sell. He could not be certain whether his government would sustain his decisions or not, but he believed that Jefferson would stand behind him in the diplomacy of the transaction. To this

9Bemis, American Secretaries of State, II, p. 104.
he had only his belief, because Jefferson had many bitter opponents both in and out of Congress who could bring pressure on him if the purchase was unsatisfactory.

As soon as Napoleon saw that he could come to terms with Monroe, he placed the negotiations in the hands of his minister, Marbois. Evidently, he did not trust Tallyrand, probably because Napoleon learned of his love for money, and also felt that the Americans would not come to a settlement with him. Negotiations for a settlement on the price and extent of the territory began, and by September, 1803, the treaty was ready to be ratified.

Marbois was instructed to ask fifty million francs, but he named one hundred million as the price to be paid. Monroe declared that this was too much, so Marbois came down to sixty million provided the United States would settle the twenty million franc debt of the American claimants against France. Monroe agreed to this and the treaty was drawn up and signed by the ministers of both nations. Napoleon received more money than the minimum he had set, won the friendship of the United States, and above all, he kept Louisiana out of the hands of England.

The news of the purchase met opposition in the United States, but it soon died down. Jefferson quieted the opposition by suggesting that the land west of the Mississippi could be used as a refuge for Indians. He did not realize, at this time, that the treaty was to be the greatest achievement of
his life. He had been ready to defend any thing that the minister had done, but his main difficulty came from the Spanish minister. The minister protested against the cession from France on the ground that France had given a pledge to Spain that she would never alienate the territory, and France also, had agreed to procure the recognition of the King of Tuscany, of Russia, and of England. Spain claimed that since France had failed to keep either of these promises, the territory could not be ceded by France because she did not own it. In answering the objections of the Spanish minister, Secretary Madison replied that the protests were not well-founded since Spain had failed to serve notice of her claim to the Louisiana territory to the United States and this country had taken the title in good faith.\(^{10}\) The Senate did not recognize the protests of Spain, and on October 21, 1803, promptly ratified the treaty. With the delivery of the territory in December, France was eliminated as a territorial factor in American history.\(^{11}\)

Once again the distress in Europe had turned out to America's advantage. This territory doubled the territory of the republic and became one of the earth's richest storehouses of power, food, and fuel. All this addition can be accounted for, not by the diplomacy of any one person, or group of

\(^{10}\) *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, II, pp. 569-572.

\(^{11}\) Fish, op. cit., p. 146.
people, but by the stars of luck themselves. If the yellow fever had not struck Napoleon's forces in Santo Domingo, if the deep frost had not set in by the harbor of Helvoet-Sluis, and if England had not begun to cause France trouble, then the purchase probably would have never been made. France could have set up her intended colonial empire adjacent to the United States and from that day forth America would have been entangled more and more in the conflicts of European rivalries.

The Peace of Amiens in 1801-1803 proved nothing more than an armed truce. Even though formal hostilities ceased, a continuous warfare continued between France and England over problems of commerce. Napoleon began to look around in Europe to see what countries he could conquer and bring under the control of France. He decided that after his fleet was defeated by the British under Lord Nelson at Trafalgar in October, 1805, he would no longer try to defeat the British on the sea. He adopted the plan that if England was to be the mistress of the seas, then he would be the master of the land, not only of France but of all Europe. His first step was to close all the ports of western Europe to the British ships and gradually starve them into submission. With this in mind he started issuing his decrees. It is not known what occurrence brought on the first, but for every decree issued, England would retaliate by an order in council. By August, 1804, all French ports along the Channel and North Sea were
in a state of blockade. Neutral vessels were forbidden by England to trade in these ports to which France readily declared the blockade to be illegal, because Great Britain did not have the ships in this region to enforce the blockade. Britain maintained that she did not have to have the ships there in order to make the order legal. It is not difficult to see the serious effect that the decrees and orders were to have on American commerce. How can a ship enter a port if it is blockaded by two warring nations? If the ship got past one nation's navy, it would be captured when it pulled into the port. It did not matter now whether British acts and French decrees were conceived with hostile intent toward the United States, or whether they were merely retaliatory acts against each other, no matter how one looked at it, the United States was going to be affected.

Prior to the end of the year 1806, the American causes of complaint in relation to the capture of American vessels were numerous, but after that date they were vastly multiplied. On May 16, 1806, England issued an order to attack Napoleon by proclaiming the coast of the Continent from the Elbe River to Brest in a state of blockade. Six months later, November 21, 1806, Napoleon issued a decree from Berlin declaring the British Islands under blockade, and prohibiting all trade in English goods. No vessel proceeding to or coming from England or the English colonies, was to be admitted to any French
port. Without waiting to learn the effects of this decree, Great Britain retaliated with an Order in Council, dated January 7, 1807, which forbade all vessels to engage in the coastwise trade of France and of her allies or of any ports to which British vessels were denied access. Britain became disturbed by the alliance of Russia and France, and issued another and stronger measure for retaliation upon Napoleon as well as for crippling American trade. This order, November 11, 1807, ordered a blockade of all ports and places of France, of her allies, and of all countries from which British ships were excluded. Also any ship that carried any certificate of origin issued by France was to be considered good prize.

More than a month later, Napoleon replied with his Milan decree, December 17, 1807, declaring that every vessel that should submit to search by an English vessel should thereby become denationalized and hence be lawful prize. The British Islands were to be under conditions of blockade, both by land and sea, and any ship sailing from the ports of England or of the English colonies or of the countries occupied by English troops was to be regarded as lawful prize.

The United States refused to acquiesce in any of these decrees and orders, and through both diplomatic and legislative

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13 Ibid., III, p. 5.
14 Ibid., III, pp. 29-31.
15 Ibid., III, pp. 290-291.
channels sought to make her resistance felt. As soon as the American minister at Paris had learned of the Berlin Decree, he went to the Court and asked what effect it would have on neutral nations, and whether American vessels would be seized in the event of their going to or from the ports of Great Britain. 16 American Minister Armstrong was informed that the imperial decree made no modification of the regulations at present observed in France with regard to neutrals or of the convention made between France and the United States, September 30, 1800. He was also told that seizures contrary to the existing regulations would not be allowed.

This information had been given to Armstrong by the French Minister of Marine, but it did not satisfy the American government who desired to have this confirmed by the Emperor. Armstrong was to ascertain if the decree was to operate to all neutrals alike, and if so, then he was to issue a formal protest. Napoleon was away from Paris at this time, but upon his return Armstrong had two audiences with him. Napoleon had hoped to form a union of all the commercial states against Great Britain and in these audiences his design was made known to Armstrong. In referring to the attack upon Chesapeake by the Leopard, Napoleon said: "This is abominable; they have pretended hitherto to visit merchantmen, and that they had a right to do so; but they have set up no such pretentions with

16 Ibid., II, p. 805.
respect to armed ships. Here was evidence of Napoleon's desire to array the United States in war against Great Britain; while at the same time Great Britain hoped for a break between France and the United States.

Armstrong soon learned that a number of American ships were seized on the high seas, brought into the ports of Spain, and were awaiting before the Court of Admiralty for examination. Armstrong urged the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to explain why this had happened. The French minister replied that the Emperor regarded "every neutral vessel going from English ports, as lawfully seizable by French armed vessels." This disavowal by the French government of any exception to the decrees greatly embarrassed the American government in its negotiations with Great Britain when it attempted to prove that the United States had not suffered by the French decree. Great Britain wanted the United States to either rise against France or to acknowledge that she was submitting to the French decree. The American Minister insisted that the United States had not submitted to the decree, but had done all within its power in the way of protest. Armstrong maintained that, while the French decree affected neutral commerce slightly, being limited to neutral ships passing from British ports to those of France and her allies, the British Orders in Council

17 Ibid., III, p. 243.  
18 Ibid., III, 243.  
19 Ibid., III, 245.
annihilated the whole of the public law of Europe in relation to maritime prizes and substituted a sweeping system of condemnation and penalty in its place.\textsuperscript{20}

With one retaliation following another, American commerce was gradually being driven from the seas. Very few ships could make a round trip to Europe without being seized or condemned by either France or Great Britain. President Jefferson realized that something should be done or the entire sailing fleet of the United States would soon be gone. He urged Congress to pass the Embargo Act on December 22, 1807, forbidding any ships from leaving American ports except foreign vessels in ballast, or vessels engaged in the coasting trade.\textsuperscript{21}

This act resulted in more injury to the United States than to France or Great Britain. Jefferson soon had to realize that he could not close up his ports without causing hardships on his own people. America needed the trade, and without it she could not survive. He instructed Armstrong to give a copy of the Embargo Act to the French government and to tell them that America was willing to repeal the act if France would repeal her decrees against the neutrals, actually against the United States. Armstrong was informed that all American vessels brought into French ports would be sequestered until an understanding could be reached between France and the United States in regard to Great Britain. France

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, III, pp. 203-206. \textsuperscript{21}\textit{Fish, op. cit.}, p. 160.
offered the United States the alternative of acceding in her designs against Great Britain, or incurring the confiscation of all American property carried into French Prize Courts. Armstrong relayed this to Jefferson who again instructed him to use his best endeavors to induce France to repeal her decrees. He could get no satisfaction from France; in fact, the situation steadily grew worse. On April 22, 1806, Napoleon issued his Bayonne Decree authorizing the seizure and confiscation of all American vessels then in France or which might arrive there. 22 Napoleon was basing this action on the assumption that after the United States had issued the Embargo Act no American vessel could navigate the seas without infracting the law of the United States. If no ship could leave the United States, then all ships on the open seas flying the American flag would be connected in some way with the British fleet.

Armstrong saw that Napoleon, as long as he was winning victory after victory on the continent of Europe, was not going to repeal his decrees. He therefore asked his government to repeal the Embargo Act and put in its place a system of armed commerce. Armstrong felt that the embargo was not doing any good, and by arming the merchant ships they could at least protect themselves from capture on the seas. England had refused to repeal her Orders in Council and was at this time

22Bemis, American Secretaries of State, III, p.98
apparently more desirous of seeing America at war with France than she was to see her at peace with either France or Great Britain.

In March, 1809, Congress raised the embargo as to all other nations except Great Britain and France. This act prohibited all voyages to the British or French possessions and all trade in articles of British or French produce or manufacture. In May of the following year, the United States passed the Macon Bill No. 2 which provided for trade with the world, and declared that if Great Britain or France should revoke or modify its edicts before March, 1811, and cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, and if the other nation should not in like manner revoke or modify its edicts, the provisions of the non-intercourse and non-importation law should be revived against the nation refusing so to act.

The law was now laid down. The question was which of the two nations would revoke their edicts first and make an excuse for America to enter the war on their side. Time was now beginning to play an important role in the dramatic situation facing the three nations.

Communications were sent out to the American ministers in both France and Great Britain; each was to urge a repeal

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of the edicts. The French minister placed the responsibility for securing this on the United States when he stated that if England would revoke her Orders in Council, then France would revoke her decrees. Each decree would follow the revoked order in chronological sequence. This would have cleared matters a great deal if England would have only adhered to this provision. She refused, and for several months negotiations were at a standstill.

The French government took advantage of these fruitless negotiations and formulated a cunning plan to deceive the United States and force her into war with Great Britain. Armstrong received a note on August 6, 1810, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duke of Cadore, announcing that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been revoked and that they would cease to have effect after November 1 of that year. This news was sent to the British government, but England refused to believe the French decrees had been repealed. This did make the British change their attitude a little toward the United States, and the American minister in London was informed that whenever France repealed her decrees and the commerce of neutral nations shall have been restored as it was before the issuing of the decrees, then England would feel that she was compelled to revoke her orders.

President Madison was willing to jump to any conclusion and accept any words that might seem to him as the truth from France. Relying on the note from the Duke of Cadore, Madison issued a proclamation on November 2, 1810, declaring that all restrictions upon the commerce of France and her dependencies should cease from the date of the proclamation. He realized that something of this nature had to be done to save American commerce, even though it might bring on war with Great Britain. Three months later, Great Britain still refusing to repeal her orders, the United States revived the non-intercourse and non-importation law against her. However, a provision was made that in case England should revoke her Orders in Council, then the United States would suspend this law. England knew that France did not intend to carry out the revocation of her decrees, and continued to tell the United States so. Even though American ships were seized almost daily by France, Secretary Monroe tried to persuade England that the ships were merely detained and not condemned. His position was rather difficult to maintain, for he knew that France had not ceased to seize neutral vessels. In interviews later found in the French archives, "Perfect evidence is found that the administration felt keenly the hypocritical position which it was obliged to assume." Monroe had to assure the British

28 James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, I, pp. 481-482.

29 Kendric C. Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, p. 44.
minister that the French decrees were repealed and a little while later go to the French minister and berate him because France, as far as her actions showed, gave no evidence of the repeal.

The repeal of the Embargo in 1809 had been considered a rebuff by Napoleon. On August 4, 1809, he had issued his Vienna Decree which ordered the seizure and confiscation of all American ships that should happen to enter the ports of France, Spain, or Italy. This decree had been in secret in order to get a larger number of American ships in the French harbors. Napoleon's idea was to let the ships enter and seize them afterward. This was a saving on the part of his meager navy, because in this way the French did not even have to leave the shores of France. However, by 1811, Napoleon had evidently changed his attitude toward the American commerce. When he heard of the action of President Madison in reviving the non-intercourse and non-importation acts against Great Britain, he agreed to admit American cargoes. Such cargoes were required to be exchanged for French goods of which two-thirds must be silks.30 All the American vessels that had been sequestered in the ports of France after November 2, 1810, were ordered to be released, and at the same time American vessels carrying only American products and manufactures were admitted. This was good news to Madison, but it did not

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entirely satisfy the American government. Joel Barlow was sent as minister plenipotentiary to Paris to secure more liberal commercial terms and at the same time present American claims for losses resulting from the enforcement of the French decrees. Napoleon decided to place himself on friendlier terms with the United States, and on May 10, 1812, he officially informed the American government that he had definitely repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees. The stipulation was that the repeal was retroactive to November 1, 1811. War clouds drifted quickly over the United States and England, and on June 17, 1812, a bill was passed declaring the United States to be in a state of war with Great Britain.\(^\text{31}\) Congress considered the idea of a declaration of war on France at the same time, but the bill failed to pass by two votes.\(^\text{32}\)

Four days after the United States went to war with Great Britain, Napoleon declared war on Russia. Marching at the head of his grand army of over five hundred thousand men, he invaded Russia's vast domains and in less than three months had captured the capital city of Moscow. Napoleon was not destined to conquer this land, and by the middle of October he was forced to abandon his attempt and retreat with his badly demoralized army. The United States could not expect

\(^{31}\text{Annals of the Congress of the United States, Twelfth Congress--Second Session, p. 1637.}\)

\(^{32}\text{Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 156.}\)
any assistance from Napoleon until he could get his armies mustered again, so she had to face the task of defeating England alone. Russia was not feared at this time, because peace meant more to her than war. American products were wanted in the Russian ports and Russia knew that if England's war with the United States could be brought to a hasty end, then England could turn all her attention toward France. Russia offered to act as mediator between England and the United States, but England insisted that any settlement would have to come from the diplomats of the governments directly and not by an outside nation.

In the spring of 1813, Napoleon began to organize another army with which he hoped to march against the combined armies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The new grand army consisted of about 270,000 troops, but since it was organized in only three months, it was not to be compared to the grand army which had marched into Russia. With this army Napoleon entered into the contest against the combined powers and was defeated. He was exiled to the island of Elbe which was to be his residence until his death. However, fortune was to come his way again for a brief moment. On March 1, 1815, he landed in the Gulf of Juan near Cannes and marched on the capital. Paris was secured without bloodshed and once again Napoleon was the master in France.

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Quickly organizing another army of 125,000 men, he engaged the Prussians and English in one great battle at Waterloo, on June 15, 1815. For three days the battle was in doubt as to which armies would win, but during the late hours of the afternoon of June 18, Napoleon's forces were compelled to retreat and became scattered. Napoleon managed to escape to Paris to see if the government would receive him, but on July 8, 1815, Louis XVIII resumed his throne; and on July 15, Napoleon surrendered himself to the British government on board the British man-o-war, *Bellerophon.* America's ally in Europe had been beaten. England had again become the victor, but America had gained from the war.

The War of 1812 had brought American diplomacy once more to the front. Europe, moreover, had seen that this young nation could give as well as take in the difficulties of the world. After France was defeated at Waterloo, the nations of Europe settled down to peace for over a generation. France, with her enormous expenditures of both blood and money, was left in no mood for waging an aggressive policy against her enemies.  

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35 *Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States*, p. 179.
CHAPTER V

FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM THE TREATY OF GHENT THROUGH THE MEXICAN WAR

The period following the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, to the inauguration of Jackson in 1829, is noted for its smooth-rolling diplomacy between the United States and France. There were very few disputes and controversies to come up that needed any real working out between the two. The American Ministers in Paris had little to do except attend the balls and parades and receive the distinguished visitors who were continually darkening their door. At no time did the two have to make preparations for a war or even actually bring the question to the general public. But, as in all diplomatic relations, a few minor affairs had to be settled by the governments in a peaceful manner.

In 1822, the governments of Great Britain and the United States renewed their efforts to suppress the African slave trade, but their efforts were blocked by France. President Monroe's message to Congress in April, 1822, indicated that the people of France were not to blame, but the trouble came from the laxity of the French laws. Appeals were continually

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1 Fish, op. cit., p. 188.
2 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, p. 140.
sent to the French King to get him to join the other nations in the suppression of the illicit traffic, but these appeals made little impression on Louis XVIII.

James Brown was appointed as Minister to France by President Monroe, and as soon as he arrived in Paris in 1824, he took up the slave question with Count de Villèle, the new Foreign Minister. Villèle agreed that the slave trade had ceased to be profitable to France, and the Government considered it an infamous trade. He asserted that the engagement to put an end to the slave trade had been contracted at an inopportune time and under humiliating circumstances, and the French resented dictation by any foreign power on the slave question. Brown and his successors carried this matter on for years, until in Louis Philippe’s reign, the French Ministry took upon itself to subscribe to an international slave treaty. Legal slave trade was then forever abolished between the nations of the world.

Following the overthrow of Napoleon, the Czar of Russia, Alexander I, brought the continental allies together with the Bourbon King of France and formed the Holy Alliance. The purpose of the alliance was two-fold. The first was to protect the peace of Europe against another outbreak by France, and second, to prevent any subversive or revolutionary movements in their own or other states which could destroy the monarchy. 3

3Moore, op. cit., VI, pp. 374-379.
When the United States recognized the independence of the Latin American states in 1822, the nations of the Holy Alliance looked on with disapproval. England felt that intervention by the alliance should not take place, but the rest of the nations felt that they should step in and put down the revolts against Spain. This would be preserving the power of the monarchy in the separate states. It was soon seen by the other nations that France's idea of intervention was different from their own. She was planning to make of the Spanish provinces American monarchies ruled by French Bourbon princes, and closely connect them with France. Great Britain saw this scheme and decided that she could not let France do this, because the balance of power in Europe would not be maintained. George Canning, the British Minister to the United States, met with Richard Rush, Secretary of State, to decide what they could do to keep the European nations out of the Americas. Some suggestions were drawn up but the United States would not accept them. America felt that she was strong enough to make and enforce laws pertaining to American provinces without the aid of England.

In President Monroe's message to Congress on December 2, 1823, he put forward America's independent policy which became known as the Monroe Doctrine. The essence of the policy was that the United States would not take part in the politics of

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wars of European powers in matters relating to themselves, nor would she stand by and let European powers interfere with the political system of the American continents or allow them to acquire any new territory on these continents.\textsuperscript{5} France would have to abandon her ideas of American empires, or come into conflict with the United States. She decided that American friendship was more valuable than war, so she abandoned any attempt to intervene. The nations of Europe began to recognize the independence of the new Latin American states, thus settling any possible danger of intervention in South America.

After John Quincy Adams was elected President in 1824, he decided to let Brown remain as the minister to France. Although he had failed to get a settlement on the slave trade, he was to press for another American settlement against France. He was to settle once and for all the bill against France for spoliations which were at this time, many years overdue.\textsuperscript{6} He presented his proposals to the French minister who told him that if France were to pay for all the damage wrought in the conflict of the Napoleonic decrees, not all her present possessions would suffice to discharge the debt. The minister told Brown that America should have urged her claim at the time the other countries did, not ten years afterward. Brown replied that the French Minister, ten years ago, had asked the United

\textsuperscript{5}American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, pp. 245-250.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., V, p. 479.
States not to press her claims until France could pay them, and that France was more able to pay now than when she had all her creditors of Europe at her throat. For three years Brown tried to get a settlement, only to fail as he had done before.

When Andrew Jackson became President in March, 1829, Brown was more than glad to relinquish his post as minister to William C. Rives. He had had enough of France and was ready to enjoy his home in the United States once again. Rives' instructions were carefully laid out for him to follow in fulfilling his mission. His first duty was to try for a settlement of the claims. A new Ministry under Prince Polignac had been set up before Rives arrived, and it was with the Prince that he was to carry on the negotiations. Rives carefully drew up the claims treaty and presented it to Polignac, who promised to examine it carefully and cordially. After many weeks he addressed Rives on the subject and brought up once again articles seven and eight of the old Louisiana Treaty. Article eight stated that ships of France were to be treated upon the footing of the most favored nation in American ports, and since French ships had been ordered out of American ports, France had a counterclaim against the United States. The claim went further to state that America had

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7Bemis, American Secretaries of State, IV, p. 164.
8Malloy, *op. cit.*, I, p. 510.
actually seized a number of French vessels. The other article in question concerned the paying of the claims to the Beau-
marchais heirs. France claimed that this should also be taken up if claims were to be paid by the two nations. The bring-
ing up of these articles placed a different angle on the negoti-
tiations.

President Jackson had made up his mind that a settlement was going to be made if he had anything to do with it. In his annual message to Congress of 1830, his words gave little pleasure to Charles X and Polignac who immediately voiced their protest to Rives. Rives told them that the longer a delay was made, the less friendly America was becoming to France. At this time everything seemed to be going prosper-
ously with the King and his Ministry so they felt they could take as long as they wished to make a settlement on the claims. They were to find very soon, however, that they could use some of the friendship of America. On July 26, 1830, Paris was flung into blazing excitement and confusion, and in three days the most powerful monarch in Europe was overthrown, and his army routed into oblivion. A Provisional Government was quickly set up, and the Duc d'Orleans came forward as Lieu-
tenant-General of the Kingdom. Lafayette had been one of the members of the Provisional Government and had come to Rives to ask advice on the type of government that should be set up.

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9Richardson, op. cit., II, p. 506.
Rives suggested that "under the circumstances the best and most stable form of government for the French would be a popular throne, surrounded by republican institutions." 10 Lafayette had conferences with the Duke and both agreed that France needed a ruler surrounded by republican institutions—exactly what Rives had suggested. Rives' approval was freely quoted and the Duke was proclaimed Louis Philippe, the King of France.

Three days after the Chamber of Deputies met, the King sent Rives an invitation to dine with him. The King informed him that he would preserve the sentiments of the Duke of Orleans, and that he would make every effort to settle the differences between the two countries. Rives relayed this to Van Buren, the Secretary of State, and Van Buren replied that the change of government seemed a most happy stroke for America. America was in favor of the revolution and would be disappointed if good did not come of it.

As the weeks passed, Rives became aware of the hard fight that the King was going to have to get a settlement of the claims. A French Minister would incur great responsibility in the settlement of the claims, so little was done by the ministry.

When the ministry was replaced in November, 1830, the

10Bemis, American Secretaries of State, IV, p. 174.
King exerted all his influence and the draft of a Franco-American Convention was drawn up and approved by the King. All that remained was for the royal commissioners to fix the exact sum to be handed over by France. Count Sebastiani, the new minister, sent a note to Rives and asked him to dine with him. After the dinner, the French Minister said that the matter had gone too far, and that there was no use to waste time in haggling over the sum to be reached. It was time for France to be generous. He told Rives that the government had authorized him to propose a lump sum of fifteen million francs as a definite adjustment between France and the United States. Rives replied that he was shocked by such a small sum, because the United States had demanded fifty million francs as a minimum. Finally Edward Livingston, who succeeded Van Buren as Secretary of State, took a hand in the matter and a convention was signed July 4, 1831. A settlement of twenty-five million francs ($5,000,000) was decided upon to be paid to the United States in six annual installments. France was to deduct one million five hundred thousand francs in satisfaction of all claims against the United States,\(^{11}\) including the claims of the heirs of Beaumarchais. This claim alone amounted to four and a half million francs.\(^{12}\) Another provision of the Convention was that France agreed to abandon her interpretation of

\(^{11}\) Malloy, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 523-524.

\(^{12}\) John H. Latane, \textit{American Foreign Policy}, p. 199.
the disputed articles of the Louisiana Treaty in return for a reduction of duties on French wines imported into the United States for a period of ten years.\textsuperscript{13}

The Convention of 1831 was signed by the king and the Chamber of Peers, but the Chamber of Deputies refused to ratify it, or to make any provision for carrying it out. Therefore, when the first payment fell due on February 2, 1833, there was no money set aside to pay the note. Jackson became angry that France would make a treaty and then default on it so soon, that he told the Secretary of the Treasury to draw a draft on the French Minister of Finance through the Bank of the United States.\textsuperscript{14} France did not do anything about the draft except to say that the financial clauses of a treaty of France, as well as the United States, could not be carried into effect without the cooperation of the legislature. The Chamber of Deputies met again and the appropriation bill was again voted on, but it failed to pass by a narrow margin.\textsuperscript{15}

Edward Livingston was sent to Paris to replace Rives in 1833. When Livingston arrived in September, the King was on a yachting trip. Upon the King's return to Paris, Livingston was given a reception befitting his rank. Livingston ventured

\textsuperscript{13}Malloy, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 525 and Moore, \textit{op. cit.}, V, p. 615.

\textsuperscript{14}House \textit{Ex. Documents}, February 8, 1833, Twenty-third Congress, Second Session.

\textsuperscript{15}Latane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 199.
to urge the King to call a special session of the Chamber to see if they could not come to an agreement on the Treaty of 1831. The King informed him that he was not in favor of this, but that the measure would be submitted at the next regular session and expressed an earnest hope that it would be carried. Livingston soon realized how antagonistic the two parties in the French government were toward each other. The Republicans in the Chamber of Deputies would have voted to carry out the terms of the treaty provided the Americans would get the twenty-five million francs. They claimed that the Americans would get only fourteen million, and the rest would go into the purse of the King. This proved to be the keynote in the debates to follow, and on April 1, the long deferred bill was defeated by eight votes. The Ministry resigned, and the king, filled with deep concern as to how America would receive the news, dispatched a letter to his minister in Washington to assure the President that a new Chamber of Deputies would be summoned immediately.16 A new bill would be submitted to them, and he was sure that the bill would pass. This promise pertaining to the new bill was not fulfilled.17

While this was taking place, another unfortunate incident occurred in the French harbor at Toulon. The French flagship, the St. Philippe, had returned from Algeria, and

16 Bemis, American Secretaries of State, IV, p. 286.
17 Richardson, op. cit., III, pp. 103-104.
the ships in the harbor had saluted her return. For some reason, one of the guns on the frigate, United States, had been left loaded, and on May 4 it was accidentally discharged. Two Frenchmen were killed and several others wounded. Apologies were immediately made by the United States, but the incident caused much excitement and ill-feeling toward the United States. Comments were made by many that the incident was not an accident. The United States volunteered compensation to the survivors and injured, and hoped that the ill-feelings would soon change.

In the summer of 1834 the new Chamber met but again nothing was done about the American Treaty. Livingston had a private audience with the King who again told him that it was his hope that the Chamber would act favorable to the Treaty. Livingston wrote to Jackson, telling him how the King felt on the matter, but at the same time told him that many of the members of the Chamber had stated that the Convention had given more than the United States was entitled to ask for. President Jackson received the letter rather scornfully, and in his annual message to Congress in December he stated:

My conviction is that the United States should insist on a prompt execution of the Treaty and that, in case of refusal or further delay, we should take upon ourselves measures of redress.18

Jackson then proposed the adoption of a law authorizing the

18Richardson, op. cit., III, p. 97.
seizure of French property in case France did not make any provision in the next session of the Chamber to pay the claims. Livingston met the next packet ship from the United States, but he did not receive any mail from the President. Instead, several American newspapers were sent over which had printed the words of the President in regard to France. The press immediately translated the papers into French and printed the statements so that all of France would have a chance to read them. The public felt that France had been grossly insulted by Jackson, and the King, himself, felt that the President had been too outspoken. A letter was sent to Livingston declaring that the French Government had been shocked and pained by Jackson's words, and although they were deeply wounded, the French would not be dissuaded from the course they had previously resolved upon. France was going to pay the bill, but first some statement must be given by the President in regard to what he had said. In other words, France wanted Jackson to apologize to them. The French Minister was recalled, and Livingston was told that his passport was at his disposition if he wanted it. Even though he refused to take his passport, the United States was informed that diplomatic intercourse between the two countries was suspended.\footnote{Latane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 200.}

\footnote{Latane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 200.}
a French naval fleet sailed for the United States. 20

Relations between the two nations fumed for more than two years. France based her policy on the fact that the President had insulted her, and until he apologized, relations would remain suspended. On March 25, 1835, the Chamber of Deputies decided to pass an act which would provide for the payment of the claims, but no money was to be paid to the United States until a satisfactory explanation was received concerning the President's message of the previous year. 21 Livingston received word from Jackson that if he wanted to he could come home, in fact, he was surprised that Livingston had not already departed from France. Livingston saw that neither country would give an inch of ground because their honor would be hurt, so he prepared to leave Paris in April, 1835. He had done all that he could do, and time would have to do the rest.

Before Livingston left, he sent the following note to the French Minister:

The President, as the chief executive power, must have a free and entirely unfettered communication with the co-ordinate powers of the Government. The principle, therefore, had been adopted that no foreign Power has a right to ask for explanations of anything that the President thinks proper to communicate to Congress. To submit even to a discreet exercise of such a privilege would be troublesome and degrading, and the inevitable abuse of it could not be borne. 22

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20 Fish, op. cit., p. 227.
21 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 290.
22 Willson, op. cit., p. 193.
France may have had the right to ask for an explanation, but Jackson was not a man to apologize. In this frame of mind and attitude he had the bulk of the nation behind him. He did, however, make a stab at reconciliation in his message of December 7, 1835, in which he said that he did not have any intention of menacing or insulting France. He would not go any further toward making an apology or explanation.  

England recognized that the United States and France would not yield enough to straighten out their difficulty, so she asked if she might not intervene and act as mediator. Jackson accepted England's offer and France decided to to likewise. In consequence of this friendly intervention, France considered the President's message of the past December to be enough of an apology to please her national pride. France agreed to pay the debt in six installments, four of which were to be paid immediately, and the other two would follow shortly. Thus, after years of negotiations and diplomacy, the ruthless spoliation inflicted by Napoleon on American commerce was paid for by the French people.

Now that the diplomatic relations were placed once more on a sound basis by the intervention of England, Jackson began to make preparations to select a minister to France. His

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24 Bemis, op. cit., p. 291.
choice was Lewis Cass who was at the time Secretary of War. Cass readily accepted the position and sailed for Paris by way of London. As soon as the necessary arrangements were made with the French Foreign Office, he crossed the channel and was presented to the French Court, thus ending the rupture in Franco-American diplomacy.

For five years Cass' stay in Paris was characterized by little diplomacy. He had little to do except entertain and be entertained with his family. He was a personal friend of Louis Philippe and was found often in conference with him. Perhaps the only real time that he had to exert any diplomacy occurred in 1842. After the Emancipation Act of 1833, abolishing slavery in the British colonies, England tried to secure international cooperation of all nations in the suppression of the slave trade. In December, 1841, representatives from England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria met in London and signed the quintuple treaty suppressing the slave trade. This part of the treaty would not have drawn a protest from Cass, but the treaty further provided that

... the high contracting parties agree by common consent that those ships of war which shall be provided with special warrants and orders... may search every merchant vessel belonging to any of the high contracting parties which shall on reasonable ground be suspected of being engaged in the traffic in slaves.**

Cass wrote and published a pamphlet which he distributed

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**A. W. Ward, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 244.**
over the two hemispheres. He denounced the treaty as an attempt on England's part to authorize her claim of search and seizure. Acting without instructions from the United States Government, Cass sent a copy of his pamphlet to Guizot, the French Foreign Minister, protesting against France's being a party to the treaty. He said that if France accepted the interpretation that the treaty imposed on her, then she would be violating the American flag if she stopped an American ship. If this were to happen, then the United States "would prepare themselves for one of those desperate struggles which have sometimes occurred in the history of the world." 26 The Chamber of Deputies became alarmed at this, and refused to ratify the treaty for several years. Cass was thereby given credit for defeating the English plan. 27

Cass left Paris in the latter part of 1842, and for eighteen months the post of minister to France was vacant. There were no important relations that had to be settled, so the legation was looked after by its secretary. Finally in 1844, President Tyler appointed William R. King as minister, and in June of that year he arrived in Paris. In his first interview with the King he was informed that America was considered the natural ally of France, and he (the King) hoped that cordial relations would continue to exist between the two. The King

26 Latane, op. cit., p. 216.

had already been informed of the attitude of the United States on the Texas question, and he had probably made up his mind on the matter. In King's instructions there was no specific statement in regard to Texas. His work was merely to strengthen the friendly relations already existing between the two countries, and he was to use his own discretion in accomplishing this. He was a true southerner from Alabama and considered the Texas question of a personal nature to himself. It is known that the day before King sailed for Paris, Calhoun, the Secretary of State, received a document from the Texas envoys telling of the English-French efforts up to that date. Pageot, the French minister, had been empowered to present to the American Government a formal protest against the projected annexation, but he had agreed with the British minister that a mere protest unsupported by more decisive measures of resistance would be futile and might weaken the opposition party's power in the Senate. Perhaps King was orally told to find out all that he could about the plans of France. At least, that is what he proceeded to do.

King dined with Louis Philippe on Independence Day, 1844, and broaching the subject of Texas, the King asked to know why the Texas Treaty had been rejected by the United States' Senate. King informed him that the rejection was due to

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28 Willson, op. cit., p. 208.

political considerations of a domestic nature, but he was sure that since the majority of the American people were in favor of annexation, the Senate would ratify the treaty at the next session. The King was very frank in his conversation. He desired that Texas remain an independent State, because of the commercial advantages France had with her. The King finally assured the American Minister that in any event, no step would be taken by his Government in the slightest degree hostile or which would give to the United States just cause for complaint.30 The King would go even further in his assurances. He would advise the Mexican Government that her best policy would be to recognize at once the independence of Texas.31

King realized that Louise Philippe had influence in matters of diplomacy, but it was from Guizot, the Minister, that he wanted to get assurances. Guizot was the ruling spirit of the French Cabinet as well as its most able exponent and defender of its principles and policy in the Tribune. In an interview with Guizot, King was assured that there had been no joint protest by England and France. King knew better. Guizot then stated that after the Senate had failed to ratify the Texas Treaty, the annexation of Texas was at an end. King bluntly told him that the project was by no means at an end. Texas was necessary to American security, and the foreign

30 Latane, op. cit., p. 254.
31 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
powers had just as well forget about getting a foothold in Texas. King informed Calhoun of this talk with Guizot, and Calhoun replied expressing his gratification at the result of the conversation.32

When news reached Paris in February, 1845, that Congress had passed a bill for the annexation of Texas, King reported that England and France were united in a desire to induce Texas to continue as a Republic. He also said that it was a pity that France was so blind as not to see her true policy. He thought that England had France seeing the annexation question as England wanted her to see it. Finally, in the following July, the Texans voted to be annexed to the United States.33 By this time, King had begun to see that France was gradually turning away from the United States in favor of England. She had already stated that she could not look upon the annexation with indifference.34 King declared that Louis Philippe dreaded democracy, and England dreaded the future power of the United States. Even though the Texas controversy had risen between the powers, American prestige had risen in Europe. The French were soon to learn that although they had once again risen to a great power, the United States had grown also. The only way that France could hope to survive would

34Justin H. Smith, Annexation of Texas, p. 383.
be to remain friendly toward the United States, and the two together could have a controlling influence on England's actions.

President Polk's message to Congress concerning Texas in December, 1845, was considered by the French as a rebuke to them. The King and his minister, as well as the people, were mortified that the President should say such phrases as to injure their pride. Actually all that he said was that France had tried to keep Texas from being annexed.\textsuperscript{35} A wave of "Americaphobia" swept over the land throughout the media of the press, and a marked revision of the judgment of Louis Philippe was seen by King. He expressed himself in a letter to Secretary Buchanan in January 1846, stating,

Under no circumstances can the United States count upon the goodwill of the King of the French. They are obnoxious to him, first as republicans, and secondly as the rival of England, and as he grows older naturally his pre-possessions and prejudices grow stronger. Louis Philippe is now every inch a King. The most we can hope, even from public sentiment in France, is that it may repress this antipathy from ripening into active hostility.\textsuperscript{36}

To make matters worse, the London Times brought forth an article stating that France had joined with England in a protest against the Texas annexation. France had repeatedly denied this to the American minister. The Debate, a French

\textsuperscript{35}Congressional Globe, XV, Part I, Twenty-ninth Congress, First Session, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{36}Willson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 213.
paper, copied the article and published it to the French people. A portion of the article states:

Mr. Calhoun and Mr. King stated in their official correspondence, with an assurance that has seldom been equalled, that they received from the King of the French a pledge that France would offer no opposition to the work they had in hand. That statement was utterly false; for, although France did not conceive that her interest in the State of Texas was sufficiently strong to justify a declaration of war, she did protest, as energetically as England.  

When King read this he was infuriated. He wrote to Guizot asking for an immediate explanation. This was not the first time that the dispatches between him and the Secretary of State had been assailed in such, as he considered, an outrage. Guizot answered that the newspaper was not a government organ and he could not be held responsible for its contents. This did not please King. He replied to Guizot that unless the Foreign Minister was prepared to confirm the accuracy of the statement which had been made in the dispatch he felt that he would have to break off diplomatic relations with the French Government. Guizot replied that he hoped the American minister would not adopt such an uncalled-for course of action. He agreed to repeat his assurance that in the Texas question France would take no action hostile to the United States, or which would give them just cause for complaint.  

Scarcely had this controversy been settled when news

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reached King of more Anglo-French antagonism toward America. French and British ships had been ordered to blockade Buenos Aires. If America was going to extend her territory to the Gulf and keep foreign ships out of the Americas, then she would have to keep an eye on these ships. But during the summer, the French opposition party attacked the Government on its Texas policy and on the French Entente with Great Britain. The press took up the issue, and denounced the whole scheme of France joining in with Great Britain. 39

This caused Guizot to think over the policy that he had been following, because the leader of the opposition, M. Ballaut, denounced the Government's policy as unwise and gratuitously servile to England and offensive to the United States. Guizot denied that the French Government had sought to control the will of the people of Texas with regard to annexation, but admitted that its influence had been exerted in favor of the independence of Texas. 40 He later had to admit that his instructions to his representative in Texas had been communicated to the British. Later, Guizot elaborated in the Chamber of Deputies that America was growing too strong and there was a danger of her absorbing her feeble neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, that was why he had been working in conjunction with the British to


40Smith, op. cit. pp. 399-400.
thwart the annexation of Texas.

When the United States and Mexico went to war in June, 1845, King had an interview with Louis Philippe. The King again assured him that he wanted nothing to do with the war, because at heart he was a republican and against all monarchy, whether in Mexico or anywhere else. Minister King had become accustomed to these chantings of the French by now, and he instinctively distrusted all royal and ministerial declarations about French policy. He wrote to the Secretary of State what the King had told him, but at the same time he informed the Secretary that when Mexico was blockaded, France sent a French squadron of ships into the Gulf which would need watching. America then prepared to engage the French if they should offer trouble. Fortunately, there was no interference in the relations of Mexico and the United States. The Oregon Boundary Treaty was signed June 15, 1846, between the British and the United States, and all danger from Franco-British policy in regard to Mexico was dispelled.\textsuperscript{41} Relations between the French and Americans cooled off to a peaceful diplomacy, and in September, 1846, the American Minister wrote home that the settling of the Oregon question had removed the only cause threatening peace in Europe. He now wished to resign and leave France while she was friendly to the United States.

\textsuperscript{41}Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Twenty-ninth Congress, First Session, IV, p. 1168.
Once again the threat of war had come from France, but the match never got close enough to the powder keg to set it off. During this period, from the Treaty of Ghent through the Mexican War, the French and American diplomats had to work hard at times to prevent war. But even without war, the United States could claim one good victory—that was, getting a final settlement of the difficulties which came out of the Napoleonic Decrees. With the Mexican War over, the two nations settled down to friendly relations until the great civil war in the United States.
CHAPTER VI

FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM 1846 TO THE
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR

The year 1849 was a boom year for the United States, both in gold and in diplomatic controversies with France. A fresh rupture in the diplomacy occurred which caused considerable unrest between the two nations. In October, 1848, a French ship, the Eugenie, grounded on the rocks at Rojo, Mexico. The United States navy had some ships in the Gulf at this time, and Commander Carpender of the warship, Iris, saved the French ship from ruin by pulling it to safety.

The commander thought that his services deserved some reward, which on being refused, he detained the ship for a short time. The French consul at Vera Cruz informed the French Minister at Washington, M. Poussin, of what had taken place, and eventually the French Government instructed him to ask for an explanation and apology of the American actions.

The Secretary of the Navy made an official report, but this did not satisfy the French minister. He at once wrote a letter of his own initiative to the Secretary of State in which he was highly critical. The President and Cabinet did not like this, so Poussin was invited to Washington to give
an explanation of the letter.\textsuperscript{1} Secretary Clayton wrote the findings of the interview directly to the French Foreign Minister, De Tocqueville, because he thought that the American Minister in Paris, Richard Rush, had already left France to return to America.

William Cabell Rives was appointed by President Taylor to replace Minister Rush, and on his arrival in Paris, he was plagued with trouble. It had so happened that Rush had not left France, and De Tocqueville could not understand why the Secretary of State had written directly to him instead of through the American Minister. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had been placed at the head of the French Government, but he felt that he could not accept the new minister under these disturbing circumstances. Rives had an interview with the French minister, and explained why Secretary Clayton had written directly to the French Government. Then De Tocqueville wanted to know why the United States had summoned the French minister in Washington to appear before the Secretary to which Rives reported that the minister had not been summoned, but invited to Washington.\textsuperscript{2} The French minister, De Tocqueville, accepted this explanation and the diplomatic relations were restored to normalcy.

In January, 1851, the French Ministry resigned. Louis Napoleon had to form a new cabinet, which was what he wanted.

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Willson, op. cit.}, p. 234-5. \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 235.
The men in the cabinet were picked and they were to do as he said. He began to turn imperialistic as the first Napoleon had done, and began getting his forces together for action. His first order was to repeal the suffrage law.\(^3\) A placard was sent through the Paris streets declaring universal suffrage to be re-established and proclaiming martial law. He then surrounded the palace of the National Assembly with troops so that members could not enter. Several of the leading members of the Assembly were arrested and sent off to prison. Both the High Court and the Court of Cassation were dissolved and the Paris press was put under strict censorship.

Rives was just as surprised at the French leader's actions as France was. He refrained from weekly receptions of the President, because he felt that it did not become a representative of a free Constitutional Republic to dine with a "would-be-monarch". For months Rives waited for the fall of the French President, but the Government was firm, and although all the other ministers in Paris gave in, Rives remained aloof. The issue was not long left in doubt. In December, 1851, a general election was held, and the Prince President Napoleon received seven and one-half million votes. There were only six hundred forty thousand votes against him. Rives decided that if the people of France were willing to keep Louis Napoleon in power, then he would have to recognize

\(^3\)Moore, op. cit., I, p. 125.
him. Rives was duly instructed to recognize the imperial authority and presented himself at the Court, where he was as cordially received as any of the other diplomatic envoys. 4 President Fillmore wrote to Rives and told him to extend congratulations to the new French President. This brought great satisfaction to Napoleon and goodwill towards the United States.

Although Rives never did actually recognize Napoleon's way of running the French Government, he did not cause any complaint to be raised to the point of severing relations. Throughout all his dispatches to the Secretary of State concerning the coup d'état, Rives was very candid and outspoken in his reports. One letter was found to be so offensive to France that the French Minister at Washington was instructed to call on the Secretary of State and make a complaint. Secretary Webster instructed Rives to make an apology, but to this he declined. 5 He thought that he should be allowed to think as he pleased so long as it was only his own beliefs. The incident soon cleared up, and he remained at the Paris Legation for another year. This was long enough to see Napoleon become Louis Napoleon, Emperor of the French. He was replaced by Minister John Mason whose first main task was concerned with the Ostend Manifesto concerning the sale of Cuba by Spain to the United States.

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4 Moore, Ibid., p. 126. 5 Willson, op. cit., p. 243.
The Cuban question had been in the limelight ever since the United States had issued the Monroe Doctrine. Neither of the nations, France, England, and the United States could stand by and let any one of the other two get possession of Cuba or any of the territory around the island. The first intimation that France was trying to get control of Cuba was in 1825 when she sent a large French squadron into the West Indies and hovered along the coasts of Cuba for several weeks. The United States and England both protested to France that they could not consent to the occupation of Cuba by France under any contingency whatsoever. The next main issue of this problem came in 1850 and 1851 when a Cuban patriot, Narciso Lopez, sailed from the United States and tried an unsuccessful assault on the islands. He was captured and executed by Spain. Soon after this, both the British and French representatives at Washington told the United States that their squadrons in the West Indies had been instructed to repel any attempt of invasion of the island of Cuba. The United States Government readily replied that she could not regard this in any way except with grave disapproval. She considered this as a combined protectorate of American waters by European nations, and this was in strict violation to her Monroe Doctrine, because Cuba lay at her door. The island commanded the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, and at the

same time barred the entrance to the Mississippi River.\footnote{Bartlett, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 238.}

Spain was determined to keep possession of Cuba at all costs, but she soon realized that her best policy would be to get the United States and the other powers to recognize her as the ruler. In January, 1852, she persuaded France and England to urge America to enter into a tripartite convention for the guaranteeing of Cuba to Spain. When the proposals were presented to the Government at Washington, Secretary Webster replied that although the United States would refrain from joining into a convention of any kind with the other powers, Spain could count on the friendship of the United States in the defense and preservation of the island.\footnote{Latane, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 297.}

The United States had tried once before to buy Cuba from Spain, but the offer had been refused. Then Pierre Soule of Louisiana was sent as American Minister to Spain, and in his instructions, he was told to secure a commercial treaty favorable to the United States' trade with Cuba. On his way to Spain, he had to go by Paris. He was not received very cordially by France, and when he arrived in Spain he learned that Louis Napoleon had advised the Court at Madrid not to receive him. Napoleon knew that Soule would try to purchase Cuba from Spain, and he did not want this to happen. Spain was practically under the control of France at this time, and
the French Foreign Minister "held the rod over her." Soule soon saw that the French influence over Spain would forbid her selling Cuba. He also realized that Spain was not going to come to any agreement with him, so he abandoned the idea of working alone with Spain.

Seeing that Soule could not cope with the power of French control in Spain, the President of the United States instructed him to meet in a conference with Mason and Buchanan, the American ministers in Paris and London, respectively. Their purpose was to overcome any obstacle which France and England might bring up in order to keep the United States from getting control of Cuba. The three ministers were to meet in Ostend, Belgium, in October, 1854. Their decision was to offer $120,000,000 to Spain as a maximum price for the island, and if it were refused, then the United States would be justified in wresting Cuba from Spain by war. If the United States had gone far enough to engage Spain in war over the island, then it is presumed that France would have joined on the side of Spain. England would have remained neutral, and the United States would have had to fight the two powers alone. Fortunately, there was no action taken by either nation, and friendly relations between France, Spain, and the United States were restored.

The first indication of France's feelings toward the conflict arising in America came in 1860 shortly after Lincoln was elected to the presidency. Charles Faulkner, the American Minister in Paris, reported that it was the sincere wish of the French people to see the Federal Union maintained in its integrity. He also felt that even though the Emperor would not openly declare which side of the issue he would take, Napoleon would not receive any Confederate commissioners favorably. This was not, however, to be the way the diplomacy turned out.

Faulkner saw that he could not have southern sympathies and still represent the United States as minister. He asked for his recall and received it in April, 1861. When he arrived in America, he was promptly arrested on a charge of treason and confined in the prison at Fort Warren. A week before Faulkner sailed, William L. Dayton, the new minister, arrived in Paris and in his first interview with the Emperor, nothing was said concerning the war.

The United States passed the Southern Ports Bill in July, 1861, authorizing the President to close the ports of the United States by proclamation. This was to be a paper blockade, and as soon as England and France learned of it, they both raised a protest. Dayton wrote that the Paris press

11United States at Large, XII, p. 255, (Section 4).
was stirring up a hostile feeling among the people toward the United States, and he suggested that some money should be spent to put public sentiment right in certain parts of Paris. This letter was probably the cause of Faulkner's arrest, but he was found later to be innocent of any disloyalty to the American Government. France said that if the United States would make the Port's bill into a commercial blockade, then she would accept it, but until this was done, she would not consider the southern ports blockaded.

In 1856, following the Crimean War, the powers of Europe had adopted the Declaration of Paris in which privateering was abolished. As soon as Jefferson Davis let it be known that he was issuing commissions to privateers, Secretary Seward made arrangements to sign the Declaration of Paris in order that the European powers would look upon the Confederacy with contempt if privateers were commissioned. This was a very smart move on Seward's part, because the way he saw it, all citizens of the United States were bound by the law of nations and the treaties entered into by the United States. This was brought to the attention of Davis, and his Confederate Congress passed a resolution that the South would accede to the Declaration of Paris in all parts except privateering. Seward brought the Confederate policy before the French minister at Washington, and the minister agreed to sign a convention covering the Declaration of Paris, provided that
it did not implicate his government. To him, the Declaration was not a part of international law at that time, but just an agreement.

Before hostilities broke out in the United States, the Confederate Government sent a commission to France to see if she would recognize the government, but the commission was informed that France and England would pursue the same course. At the same time it was intimated that recognition was a mere matter of time. 12 From March, 1861, to the end of the war, Confederate agents were busy in France obtaining moral, financial, and material help. Dayton asked Seward for a Consulate to aid him in his affairs, and John Bigelow was sent to Paris. 13 The two worked together to keep Napoleon from entering the war on the side of the Confederacy. There was no guarantee by France that she would not enter hostilities, even though she had declared neutrality. Napoleon might get an idea of colonial empires again, and take advantage of the situation as it presented itself.

In an interview with Napoleon in the interests of the Confederacy, the Emperor expressed his opinion to an English ship-owner that the blockade in America was not effective, and if England and France had cooperated they could have put and end to it long ago. At this time Napoleon was prepared

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12 James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II, pp. 3-11.

13 Willson, op. cit., p. 262.
to send a large fleet to the mouth of the Mississippi River if England would back her up. France would then demand free sailing throughout American waters for her merchant vessels with their cargoes of goods and supplies of cotton.\textsuperscript{14} The Confederacy sent John Slidell of Louisiana to France to try to get recognition by the Emperor, as well as to see about France building ships for the Confederate navy. He had been captured by a United States ship on his first attempt to get to France, but had been released and allowed to proceed to Paris. In July, 1862, he had his second interview with Napoleon III, but the Emperor did not have much to say. It was widely rumored at this time that the Emperor had made up his mind to intervene if Southern victories continued. This encouraged Slidell so much that he sent a formal note to the Foreign Secretary asking for recognition. Whether France would aid the Confederacy or not ranked second to recognition to Slidell.\textsuperscript{15}

On April 22, 1861, Secretary Seward sent instructions to Dayton informing him that the President had always repudiated all designs whatever in disturbing the system of slavery as it existed under the Constitution and laws.\textsuperscript{16} This was done so that Dayton could show the French that abolition of slavery

\textsuperscript{14}Richardson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 236-239.

\textsuperscript{15}Willson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{16}A. Seward, \textit{Diplomatic History of the War for the Union}, p. 227.
was not the object of the war. This would not only have given France a reason for declaring war but it would have driven the loyal slave-holding border states into the Confederacy. France could have said she had to intervene in order to save slavery, because it was from the slaves in the South that France had been getting her raw cotton and other crops.\textsuperscript{17} France probably did not like slavery, but she needed American cotton, and without slavery there would be no cotton.

Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of September 22, 1862, was received in France with favor. The press claimed that Lincoln did not condemn slavery. It went further to publish the statement that far from condemning slavery, he promised to maintain it and if all of the Confederate States laid down their arms in the next three months, slavery would be maintained in all the territories. No one could then say that the North was fighting for the suppression of slavery.

On January 1, 1863, the final proclamation on slavery was issued, and all the world knew then that the North was fighting for abolition of slavery. Clergymen in France began to issue addresses asking the people to show their sympathy for the Negroes.\textsuperscript{18} If they were freed, how could they survive in a land where they had been the cause of a great struggle.

\textsuperscript{17}Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, (1862), p. 104.

\textsuperscript{18}Frederick Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, p. 341.
Demonstrations were held in the North, and people began to wonder if the whites and blacks could now live together as equals.

Before this last proclamation had been issued, Slidell had had another interview with Napoleon on October 28, 1862, in which the Emperor informed him that he was in sympathy with the South. However, he was afraid to act without England because he was afraid she would go against him and he would lose the trade with the United States. Napoleon asked Slidell what he thought of France, Russia, and England mediating between the warring factions. Slidell replied that he did not like the idea of Russia joining in, but he would not object to France and England. Napoleon then issued his proposal to Slidell in which he stated:

My own preference is for a proposition of an armistice of six months, with the Southern ports open to the commerce of the world. This would put a stop to the effusion of blood, and hostilities would probably never be resumed. If the North refused, it will afford good reason for recognition and perhaps for more active intervention.19

On January 8, 1863, Slidell again urged the Emperor to recognize the independence of the Confederate States in the hope that if he recognized them, then all the other nations in Europe would do likewise.20 Napoleon believed that the

19Richardson, op. cit., p. 345.
20Ibid., p. 391.
North was going to be defeated, so he informed his minister in Washington to make a formal offer of mediation to the United States. Seward wrote to Dayton July 21, 1863, that he could not understand the policy of the Emperor or why he would not give the Union his sympathy. Soon after the offer of mediation was received, Seward instructed the French minister to tell his government that the United States had declined the mediation proposal. Since Napoleon could not get the cooperation of England, he did not go any further on the question of intervening.

Another part that France played in the Civil War politics was brought to light on September 10, 1863. Bigelow informed Dayton that he had been shown proof that France was building Confederate ships in the ports of France. There was at the time "four ships at 7,200,000 francs, two at 2,000,000 francs, a gunboat and much artillery and turrets for gunboats in the process of being built."\(^{21}\) The Emperor did not say that these ships were for the South, but in later trials it was proven that the project was being carried on under his authority. Only one of the ships, the Stonewall, was delivered to the South.

Napoleon undoubtedly anticipated the overthrow of the American union during the war. This might have been one reason why he was in sympathy with the South and took advantage

\(^{21}\)Willson, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
of the situation to launch his Mexican adventure. To get an actual picture of the part that France played in this episode, it will be necessary to take up the Maximilian story in Mexico.

In the early part of 1861, France, England, and Spain sent a group of naval vessels to Vera Cruz with the intention of taking possession of the customhouses in several Mexican ports for the purpose of satisfying claims that they had against the Mexican Government. Soon after their arrival, the English and Spanish commanders decided to leave because of the course that France had taken.\(^{22}\) When England and Spain left, the Triple Alliance was dissolved. Instead of taking over the ports, France intended to go into the interior if Mexico did not pay promptly. France demanded the payment of $27,000,000 and when Mexico declared that she could not pay at the time, French troops were ordered to Mexico City. In June, 1863, the French troops marched into the city and set up a provisional government.\(^{23}\) An assembly was appointed, and it decided to set up an empire under the Archduke Maximilian of Austria. If he should decline to take the throne, the Emperor of France would be asked to take over.

President Lincoln had viewed the situation in Mexico as unfavorable from the beginning, but the assurances by the


allies that they were seeking no political objects, only a redress of grievances, kept him from intervening. He told France that no foreign government could be permanent in Mexico, and if France continued to exercise such, then this would be the beginning rather than the ending of revolution in Mexico. Secretary of State Seward instructed Dayton to call attention to the fact that the United States had more than once informed the European powers that she could not look with indifference upon any armed intervention in Mexico since it was so close to the United States.

France told the United States several times that she was in Mexico only to settle grievances, but as time went by, she continued to exert her power in different parts of Mexico. Seward could not see why France had to establish a monarchy in Mexico in order to collect her debts and vindicate her honor. He wrote to Dayton instructing him to tell France that the United States had always acted upon the same principles of forbearance and neutrality in regard to wars between powers friendly to the United States, and if France did not change her policy, then this Government would have to change hers. This could mean a war with France.  

Mr. Dayton had an interview with the French Foreign Minister who informed him that an election was to be held in

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24Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1863, II, p. 929.
Mexico. It was expected that the Archduke Maximilian would be elected and then all the troublesome complications would be over. France could then retire from Mexico, and the empire could run itself. Seward told Dayton to inform the French minister that America's attitude toward foreign intervention had not changed, and if Mexico elected Maximilian the United States would still question his recognition.

As soon as the Civil War was over, General Sheridan was sent with an army of about 50,000 men to the Rio Grande, but since this army was made up of Union volunteers who had enlisted for the Civil War, the war department recognized the necessity of organizing a new army for the purpose of acting against the French army in Mexico if they did not get out. The army was to be organized under the republican government of Mexico, and General Schofield was selected to command it.

General Schofield was given a leave of absence from the United States Army for twelve months, and departed toward Mexico. He met Secretary Seward at Cape May, and Seward proposed that Schofield go to France and see whether Louis Napoleon could be made to understand the necessity of taking his troops out of Mexico. He agreed to make the trip and on November 19, 1865, he sailed for Europe with two members of his staff. When he arrived in Paris, he found that the intervention in Mexican affairs was very unpopular there,

25Moore, op. cit., VI, p. 495.
but the national pride was touched at the thought of withdrawing at the suggestion of the United States. He had two personal interviews with the Emperor, and by January, 1866, he was ready to sail for home.26

In the latter months of 1865, the French minister in the United States had been instructed to ask the President to recognize the Emperor Maximilian. He said that the United States held official intercourse with the other monarchs of the world, so why not recognize the one in Mexico. Seward replied on December 6, 1865, that the United States recognized the right of sovereign nations to carry on war with each other

... if they do not invade our right or menace our safety or just influence. The real cause of our national discontent is, that the French army which is now in Mexico is invading a domestic republican government there, which was established by her people and with whom the United States sympathizes most profoundly.27

The United States could not sit idly by and see the empire carried on under her own eyes and expect the friendship of Mexico in future years.

Napoleon was now in a tight situation. Other factors besides American objections were pressing him to withdraw his troops from Mexico. French opinion, stirred by the press,

26Ibid., VI, pp. 496-499.

27House Executive Documents, No. 73, Thirty-ninth Congress, First Session, Part 2, p. 347.
was becoming more hostile to the expedition. Prussia was threatening to disturb European peace, and Maximilian's bankrupt government was failing to impose itself on Mexico as well as to fulfill its obligations to France. Maximilian had promised to assume all the debts of Mexico to France and eventually the whole cost of the French expedition. In return, Napoleon had promised him protection through the aid of the French troops.\textsuperscript{28}

In the face of the increasing difficulties bearing on France, Napoleon called his advisors together to decide on what policy he should follow. It was decided that France could not possibly profit in the Mexican adventure, so the French troops would be evacuated. The United States and Mexico agreed on a plan of withdrawing the troops in three separate detachments. The first one was to leave in November, 1866, the second in March, 1867, and the third in November, 1867.

As soon as Maximilian learned of Napoleon's intention of removing the troops, he sent his minister, Almonte, to France to persuade the Emperor to change his mind. He realized that he could not remain in Mexico without the French troops, because the Mexican people would rally around the Mexican leader, Juarez, and cause the empire to fall. Napoleon paid no heed to Almonte, so Maximilian sent his wife, Charlotte,  

\textsuperscript{28}Case, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 348.
on a special mission to France to secure promises of continued French aid. Almonte was given a harsh lecture on Mexico's failure to fulfill her debt promises, and Charlotte was given assurances that France would stick to her promise of removing the troops. Charlotte tried several times to get Napoleon to change his mind, absorbing so much of her energy that she finally broke under the strain of frustration and gradually became demented.\(^{29}\)

When November came in 1866, the French troops were not removed. Napoleon had decided to postpone the withdrawal of all his troops until the spring of 1867. Secretary Seward promptly dispatched a cable to Napoleon that the United States had entered into an agreement with France and he wanted the agreement adhered to. The United States could not acquiesce in the plan for delay because there was no more assurance that France would move her troops next spring than there had been for the withdrawal of a part in November. He also said that a delay would cause a serious conflict in the plans of the United States.\(^{30}\) Napoleon's answer for the delay was that he wanted to propose a provisional government to be formed to the exclusion of both Maximilian and Juarez. When Seward declined the proposition, Napoleon gave up hope, and in February, 1867, the French troops were evacuated and

\(^{29}\) Case, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

intervention quickly came to an end.\textsuperscript{31}

Elihu B. Washburne was appointed by President Grant to be the minister in France from 1869 to 1877. During this period he experienced both war and peace, and had to keep friendly relations between two factions that took over the government of France. When he arrived in France, there was to be heard the deep rumbling of popular discontent. The people were dissatisfied, restless and uneasy. They began having large gatherings to discuss their plight, only to be dispersed by the police and squadrons of cavalry. Perhaps this would have continued until a general overthrow of Napoleon would have taken place had it not been for the European war-clouds forming so suddenly. On July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia. Hardly had the war begun before France was defeated. She was outnumbered in men, material, and artillery. When the news of Napoleon's capitulation at Sedan reached Paris, a revolution broke out. On September 4 a Republic was proclaimed, but a few days later Paris was placed in siege by the Prussians and the republic had to fight for its existence.\textsuperscript{32}

As soon as the United States received word that Napoleon was deposed and a Republic was proclaimed under the provisional government of the National Defense Committee, Washburne

\textsuperscript{31}Moore, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, pp. 503-504.

\textsuperscript{32}Willson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 296-301.
was instructed,

If provisional government has actual control and possession of power, and is acknowledged by French people, so as to be, in point of fact, de facto government, of which you will be able to decide. . . you will not hesitate to recognize it. 33

Washburne recognized the government on September 7, 1870, being the first diplomatic representative to acknowledge the Republic.

The recognition by Washburne created great popular enthusiasm in France. The masses paraded in the streets waving both French and American flags. Bands played in front of the American Legation, and Frenchmen were continually filling the hall and giving praise to Washburne for the recognition he had so promptly given.

In November, 1870, the Secretary of State cabled Washburne and told him that he and the American Consul were at liberty to leave Paris if they desired to do so. Washburne replied that even though he would like to see his family, he considered it his duty to remain in Paris for a while longer. He claimed that Paris was the seat of the Government of the country to which he was accredited as Minister, and at that time was the seat of the Provisional Government of the National Defense.

Paris held out until January 28, 1871, when the city capitulated. A government was formed at Bordeaux, and M. Thiers

33Moore, op. cit., I, p. 127.
was named to head it, and soon after, the treaty of peace was signed, and ratified. The Germans were allowed to march into Paris on March 1, but they were not to stay long. By March 16, they had to evacuate the city and an insurrection of the French set off the "reign of terror". The Commune was proclaimed and the regular government of France was driven out and established itself at Versailles. Washburne followed the Government, and set up his office in Versailles. This was the first time that the American Ministry had been set up in any place in France except Paris.

During the latter part of 1871, the French Republican Government began to take over in France, and by January 1, 1872, by an act of the Assembly, M. Thiers was proclaimed President. Washburne was instructed to call upon him and congratulate him in the name of the Government of the United States. Through the work of the minister, France felt that the United States had been in sympathy with her during these trying days. She acknowledged this friendship, and as soon as the government was placed upon a sound footing, diplomacy again ran smoothly.

In the summer of 1879, M. de Lesseps planned the building of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama under the authority of the Colombian Government. The de Lesseps' project thoroughly aroused the American people and press. Questions arose

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34 Willson, op. cit., p. 310.
as to its control if built under European auspices, as to the protection of its neutrality, and as to possible conflicts with the Monroe Doctrine. The press became so hostile that the United States Congress passed a resolution warning the nations of Europe that a canal under their protection would be considered an unfriendly act, violating the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary of State Evarts, told the American minister in Colombia to try to discourage the project.  

Hostile feelings continued to rise in America against France, because it was a French company building the canal. In 1880, in compliance with a senate resolution, the President issued his statement to the effect that the policy of the United States was a canal under American control. No contract or negotiations could ever be entered into between private projectors and the Government of Colombia except in contemplation of the position of the United States.  

The United States was taking the attitude that the French company and Colombia knew that they would come into conflict with the Monroe Doctrine, but they had been willing to take their chances with it.

Copies of the President's message were sent to the Ministers in the European capitals. The positive declaration of

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35 Bemis, American Secretaries of State, VII, p. 236.

36 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VII, p. 585.
the policy was a notice to the world to take the Monroe Doctrine seriously. The American people and press were delighted, and the French were impressed. The French Government assured the United States that it had no interest in the project, even though it was being built with French loans. The French Minister in Colombia was instructed that on no account was he to commit the French Government to the support of the project.37 France had realized once again that the United States intended to enforce the Monroe Doctrine.

The most notable event that took place following the third Republic in France came about over the "Great American Pork Question." In February, 1881, the French Government passed an ordinance prohibiting the importation of American pork. There had been widely advertised reports concerning trichinosis and mortality among the swine of France, and France laid the blame on the imported swine from America. This prohibition was a great blow to the growing American industry, so the American minister was to urge France to rescind the law. The United States said that it was absurd for France to take such a stand and regretted that France had seen fit to promulgate such a decree. However, France listened to the French farmers who did not want the imported swine, and refused to revoke the decree38 which lasted until 1891.

37Bemis, op. cit., p. 238.
38Willson, op. cit., p. 316.
Another incident happened in this same year. Kalakum, the King of the Cannibal Islands, better known as Hawaii, made a tour of Europe. He was suspected by the United States Government of wishing to dispose of territorial concessions in a country over which the United States was already contemplating a protectorate. The French Foreign Minister, M. de St. Hilaire, was informed by the American Minister that:

If the King was induced, by interests and influence at variance with those of the United States, to listen to propositions looking to the alienation of a part of the islands, or even to his vacating his throne upon certain conditions and permitting the whole or any part of his kingdom to pass under the domination of some European power, then the United States could not but regard unfavorably any movement, negotiation or discussion aiming at that end.\(^{39}\)

Soon after the Hawaiian affair, the American Minister, Levi Morton, issued a warning to France concerning Venezuela. France had become angry about the conduct of the South American Republic, because she had refused to pay her debts to France. France had decided to take forcible measures for their collection by preparing to seize the customs at the ports of La Guayra and Punto Cabello. Morton told the French minister that if this were done then the United States would have something to say on the issue. Again the Monroe Doctrine was tossed in the face of a European power to defend the Americas. France took the minister's hint and solved the question in a more peaceful attitude.\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\)Ibid., 318.  
\(^{40}\)Ibid., 318.
After 1885, until the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the relations between France and the United States concerned only minor notice in the world of affairs. Very little diplomacy had to be carried on to keep the two nations on friendly terms with each other. By this time, France had begun to realize that if she were going to get along with the United States, she must first think before she acted. On the other hand, the United States realized the need of French friendship in order to maintain her trade interests in Europe.

It has been shown that from the beginning of the diplomatic relations between France and the United States, France continually insisted that her national honor be placed first, at all times. The relations were strained many times because of this belief, but on the whole, the two nations were friendly toward each other and worked together for the best advantage of each.

This study has given a brief concept of the most important diplomatic relations between the two nations from the birth of the United States down to 1898. It is important that one make a study of the past relations if he expects to understand the diplomacy between the two. In so doing, he will build up a background or foundation which will prepare him to understand better the conflicts, disputes, and diplomatic relations now and in the future.
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