COMMUNISM IN CHINA

APPROVED:

Jack Johnson
Major Professor

J.B. McAlister
Minor Professor

[Signature]
Member of the Department of Economics

Jack Johnson
Dean of the Graduate School
COMMUNISM IN CHINA

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State Teachers College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

By

Alex Dickie, Jr., B. S.
166374
Denton, Texas

June, 1949
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Tables</th>
<th>iv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Illustrations</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN CHINA</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>THE KUOMINTANG AND THE COMMUNISTS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>COMMUNISM'S SPREAD OVER CHINA</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE UNITED STATES-CHINESE-RUSSIAN TRIANGLE</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bibliography | 157 |

iii
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Estimates of Major Categories of Post-War American Aid to China</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Draining the Peasant's Income</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Path of the Chinese Republic</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The Far East -- Major Problem for Makers of U. S. Policy</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is fourfold: to show why and how Communism is emerging in China; to explain the special characteristics of the Chinese Communists and their tactics; to indicate the effect of Communism on the people of China; and to attempt an analysis of the attitude the Chinese Communists manifest toward the United States and Russia. Special emphasis will be laid upon the conflict between the Kuomintang (Nationalists) led by Chiang K'ai-shek and the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung.

Method of Procedure

The material of this study will be presented by:

1. Giving a short history of China before the overthrow of the old Chinese government under the Manchus;

2. Explaining economic and social conditions causing people to force change of government under Sun Yat-sen and later turn to Communism;

3. Narrating the events connected with the rise of the Kuomintang and the Communists;

4. Describing the Communists, their beliefs and their military tactics;
5. Showing the effects of the spread of Communism over China;
6. Presenting the United States-Chinese-Russian triangle in China; and
7. Summarizing the findings.

Source of Material

The material for this study has been gathered and compiled from:

1. Personal observation of the writer while serving as a Lieutenant in the 5th Regiment of the First Marine Division during its occupation of China for a period of nine months. The writer also gathered first-hand information from interviews with high-ranking army officers.

2. Books and periodicals published by people who have lived in China or who have been on duty there with the United States Government.


Old China

China had land contacts with the West from ancient times onward, but its contacts with the seafarers began only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Seafarers from Portugal, Spain, England, and other Western countries traveled to China in search of oriental commodities. Trade grew with Russia across the long northern land border, and much later, after the American Revolution, Yankee ships began plying to Canton. ¹

The newcomers were little better than pirates and did not inspire the Chinese with very much confidence in them. They were not only sharp traders, but some of them would seize territory if they could. Thus began the era of commercial expansion.

China had a period of glory from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. The Chinese

. . . called their land "the Middle Kingdom," that is, the center of the world. They considered it superior to all other countries. For many centuries China's neighbors in Asia, from Burma to Korea, had copied and learned from Chinese culture. Not unnaturally, China looked down on the unfamiliar Westerners as it did on the familiar Asiatic peoples.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese were not alone in holding a high opinion of their society. Especially from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century many Europeans fully agreed with them. Voltaire praised the spirit of religious tolerance in China, contrasting it with the intolerance of Europe. Chinese tea, incense, art objects, silks, playing cards, lacquer-ware, sedan chairs, and calling cards were introduced into the West.

At the end of the eighteenth century no other empire could rival China in population or size. The Chinese Empire included the eighteen provinces of China proper (from Yunnan and Szechwan in the south and west to the 1,500-mile-long Great Wall in the north) and spilled across the frontier area of Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. On the remote fringes lay Nepal, Burma, Siam, Annam, Laos, the Liu Cuir (Ryukyu) Islands, and Korea, all paying tribute to the imperial court at Peking as diplomatic vassals of China.

¹Lawrence K. Rosinger, Forging a New China, p. 4.
Actually, the emperor was not a Chinese at this time, for in 1644 the Manchus, a from Manchuria, had overthrown the Chinese house of Ming and established their own Ching Dynasty. Many Chinese resented the alien rulers. But the Manchus became more and more Chinese in culture, and except at the very highest level most officials were Chinese.\(^2\)

The Chinese went through about two thousand years of slow change. The old society of China "laid great stress on keeping life unchanged; a strong spirit of compromise helped to reduce pressure for social reform."\(^3\) Thus China developed within the same old framework, making no changes in the way of life. Through all this period there was an enormous peasant population living very near poverty while they supported a small ruling class of landlords and scholar-officials. "Taxes in money, grain, and other commodities flowed north to Peking, nourishing the officials, supporting the administration, and paying for the capital's glorious buildings, whose green, blue, and golden-tiled rooftops still gleam in imperial splendor."\(^4\) The writer spent his first night in Peiping in one of these palaces. It was being used as transit quarters. Although the city of Peiping was walled, the palace also had a wall. The palace itself had walls of rock, and roof and floors of tile. On the roof there were carved statues of Buddha and some gods; they were placed where we normally have gables. The writer also saw rain gods placed out in the open in the country. But the

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 4-6.  \(^3\)Ibid.  \(^4\)Ibid.
people must not have trusted too much in their rain gods because

... from the days of the early Han emperors in the second and first centuries B.C. it was the unceasing concern of government to keep the dikes and irrigation works in repair, so that neither flood nor drought would prevent the intensively cultivated fields from producing abundant crops. But when government became too corrupt and oppressive, peasant rebellions would erupt, bringing the establishment of a new dynasty.  

White and Jacoby in Thunder Out of China explain the same situation:

Time and again the weight of the old system has grown too heavy for the peasant to bear. At such moments he has punctuated the history of his land with blood, swept it with desperate fury, thrown out the reigning dynasty, and established a new order. Each of the many dynasties of China was born of upheaval; each started with a vigorous administration on top, a reorganization and redistribution of land and feudal obligations on the bottom. And with each new dynasty in turn the process of widening differentiation went on afresh until it was again intolerable, and revolution brewed out of the suffering and discontent burst forth anew.  

The philosophy of old China, developed around the sayings and ideas of religion, is really a system of ethics, and the Chinese thought they were to follow this line of behavior. The ruler was to be kind and virtuous in his dealings with the people and the people were to obey him submissively. People even won cases in court by quoting sayings from Confucius. The family was stressed as the

5Ibid.

foundation of the state since it was in the family where the child learned the obedience he was to have for his state also. Children were taught to revere the aged and to worship their ancestors. Family ties were very strong, but the status of women was inferior to that of men.

Officials were chosen through a remarkable civil service examination system requiring a detailed knowledge of books on Confucianism -- but no particular knowledge of administration. The scholar-official was highly honored. He was, however, often guilty of corruption. Under the law the civil service examinations were open to anyone, rich or poor. Still it was generally the sons of the wealthy, not of poor peasants, who had the time and money to prepare for the extremely difficult tests.

Because of China's size the central government was unable to exercise control over the localities, and local political power usually lay in the hands of the landed gentry. 7

Although China was one of the most advanced of the pre-modern societies, it did not measure up to western civilization when it began coming in contact with it.

Handicraft artisans were no match for factories in turning out guns and ships, or goods for ordinary consumption. This first became clear as a result of the so-called "Opium War" of 1839-42, when the British defeated China and forced on the Peking government a treaty ceding Hongkong to Britain and opening various ports to foreign trade. Previously the Manchus had allowed trade to be carried on only at the port of Canton under sharp restrictions.8

Other foreign governments began using force and threats of force to extract concessions from the Manchus. By the end of the nineteenth century China had been stripped of its tributary influence in many of its outlying territories, and

7Rosinger, op. cit., p. 7. 8Ibid., p. 8.
it was well on its way toward becoming a colonial area.

Resinger sums up this edging in of the powers as follows:

Burma had been incorporated in India by the British, Annam and Tongking had been seized by the French, and made part of Indo-China; Korea was under constant Japanese and Russian pressure as a result of Japan's victory in the war of 1894-95 with China; and Formosa, the Liu Chius, and the Pescadores were Japanese possessions. The Russians were strong in Manchuria and had their eyes on Mongolia, while in Tibet the British had developed a special position. Within China, the various powers had marked out whole provinces as "spheres of influence"; the French, Germans, British, and Russians held long-term leases on important coastal areas; Hongkong was a British colony; and Macao belonged to Portugal.

Foreign troops were stationed on Chinese soil, a series of Chinese cities (the treaty ports) had been forced open to foreign trade, and foreign tariff, which was collected by a foreign-supervised customs administration, was fixed by treaty at such a low level as to allow foreign goods to enter practically unimpeded. Citizens of the various foreign countries enjoyed extraterritorial rights; that is, they were not subject to Chinese law for offences they might commit.

Many Chinese cities contained special foreign-controlled areas known as concessions or settlements, the most famous being the International Settlement at Shanghai. Not least important was a treaty arrangement under which any privilege given to one power was automatically extended to the others. It is easy to understand why the Chinese called their agreements with the powers the "unequal treaties."

The Peking government was quite incapable of meeting the threat from the outside. It is true that a small group of officials helped to introduce some Western machinery and scientific knowledge. But they did so to strengthen the old Confucian society, not realizing that modern guns, ships, railways, and textile plants would cause the death of Confucianism as a system.

All the normal features of China's past were rapidly becoming disadvantages. Decentralization made it difficult to meet foreign pressure; family loyalty, once such a powerful bond, was not as strong a unifying force as the nationalistic spirit of other countries; and a Confucian education was no longer adequate
preparation for official service. At the same time the ugly aspects of the old order, such as its corruption, became less and less bearable.9

Thus the great wall the Chinese had spent many laborious years building all around their large empire no longer served to keep the foreigners out. The writer was more impressed by the sight of these walls than by anything else in China's surroundings picturing the past. There were also large rock walls, which one could not ascend, around every city, all mines, legations, palaces and many of the villages. The large wooden gates were still being guarded when the writer was there in 1945-46.

China might have become a complete colony, but the foreign powers could not agree on how to divide the country.

The Japanese and Russians both wanted Manchuria, the Germans and British sought North China and the Yangtze Valley, and the British and French competed in South China. Rivalry for trading advantages, railway contracts, and other opportunities for investment was acute.

It was plain that China could be served up only through the sharpest international conflict. War actually broke out between Japan and Russia in 1904-05; but to the British, French, and German governments, China seemed less important than Europe, the Near East, and Africa. Although joining in the contest for special privileges in China, Britain also felt that its trading interests would be better served if China remained a unit than if it were divided among several powers.

The United States, while neither using force nor seizing territory in China, had generally claimed for itself treaty rights won by other economic development, and political outlook, was unprepared and unwilling to join in a partition of China.10

---

9Ibid., pp. 8-9.

10Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Crisis, p. 246.
Lawrence K. Rosinger explains this idea further in his book, *China's Crisis*, when he says:

Traditionally the United States and China have been on relatively close terms, because in the maelstrom of Far Eastern international relations this country has seemed to ask least from the Chinese. The reason, it need hardly be said, does not lie in the inherent goodness of Americans, but in the nature of this country's interests and national development. For the United States found at an early date that its international economic position was best served by helping to establish a united, sovereign China rather than by competing in a division of the Chinese spoils.\(^{11}\)

Therefore the United States in 1899, at the suggestion of Britain, called on the Powers not to discriminate against the trade of other countries in their spheres of interest or influence in China. In 1900 America expressed her wish to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative integrity. This is known as the Open Door policy in China.

Another factor that saved China from colonial status was the development of a nationalistic feeling in their own country. This new Nationalism which developed toward the end of the nineteenth century had two main purposes: to destroy the Manchu imperial system and to end the special rights of the Powers, so that China could develop along modern lines according to its own desires.

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN CHINA

At the beginning of the twentieth century China, occupying a territory in Eastern Asia about one third larger than continental United States, with a population of 465 million, of whom two million are Christian, reached a crisis brought about by its social and economic conditions. In fact, China is a modern example of what France was before Bastille Day. It is true that China had thrown off rulers before, but this time its turbulent condition seems to be demanding something different. White and Jacoby say:

The crisis today is different from the crises of years gone by. For one reason, an ordinary historical upheaval would yield only a system of weak peasant equality, and what history demands now is something that will lift Chinese society to the level of the modern world. For another, the normal cycle of reorganization has been too long frustrated.¹

We might take a look at the social and economic conditions. Although China has rich land upon which are produced wheat, barley, corn, kaoliang, millet and other cereals and peas and beans, in the north; and in the south rice, sugar, and indigo, its seething mass of uneducated people do not

¹White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 33.
know how to develop its resources and cannot get together in one government for all; hence, it is one of the world's largest concentrations of poverty. Great quantities of fruit can be grown there; fiber crops of hemp, jute, ramie and flax are abundant; cotton and tea are also grown. In fact, China ranks as one of the great cotton producers of the world. Silk culture has been one of the most important industries for four thousand years. Livestock is supposed to be raised in large numbers also, but the writer did not see one-half dozen cows all nine months he was there.

To go along with their rich land, the Chinese farmers have almost no tools with which to work. The writer saw no modern implements for the cultivation of their fields. In all the fields there were many coolies shoveling around and many women working. White and Jacoby must have seen the same sort of field work for they say:

All the work is done by hand, from the sowing of the rice grains in early spring, through the laborious transplanting of the tufts in water-filled paddies in late spring, to the final harvesting by sickle in the fall. The Chinese farmer does not farm; he gardens. He, his wife, and his children pluck out the weeds one by one. He hoards his family's night soil through all the months of the year; in the spring he ladles out of mortar pits huge stinking buckets of dark green liquid offal, and carefully, without wasting a drop, he spreads the life-giving nitrogen among his vegetables and

---

2 "Can the Chinese Puzzle Be Solved?" Platform, p. 5.
plants. When harvest time comes, the whole family goes out to the fields to bring in the grain. The family helps him thresh his grain, either by monotonously beating it with a flail or by guiding animals that draw huge stone rollers round and round in a circle over the threshing floor.\footnote{White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 22.}

Resinger states that "China desperately needs reforestation, more irrigation, better farm methods, and other improvements. But technical change is not enough. The entire structure of rural life is out-of-date."\footnote{Rosinger, op. cit., p. 22.}

"China is one of the foremost coal countries of the world, with reserves estimated at 243,669,000,000 tons."\footnote{The World Almanac, 1947, p. 459.} It has iron ore; in fact, the oldest iron industry in the world is in Shansi. Tin, antimony, wolfram, molybdenum, bismuth, and salt are also mined. It has some oil wells in South Manchuria and Densu.\footnote{Ibid.} The writer does not know who owns most of these mines and oil wells, but he does know that the only coal mines he saw in the great Lensi producing area were owned by British and Belgians. This may throw some light on China's poverty.

"Eighty per cent of China's four hundred and more millions live in villages. Almost all of these people live by working the soil."\footnote{White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 21.} That may be one reason the farms are so small.
The average Chinese farm is 4.18 acres, the average American farm, 157 acres. On the Chinese farm 6.2 people live, while only 4.2 live on the American farm. There are 15.7 acres of land in crop for every person living on the American farm, but in China there is only .6 of an acre. On his tiny farm, the Chinese must produce three-quarters of the food he consumes, his fuel and fodder, and enough cash crop to pay his taxes and purchase the things he must buy.

But if the average farm is only four acres (and 65 per cent of all farms are smaller than average) surely there are a few large farms. Of the farms surveyed in the largest and most reliable study made thus far, about 7 per cent were called "very large farms" -- yet the average size of these very large farms was only 13 acres. By American standards there are no large farms in China.

Not only are the vast majority of Chinese farms too small to provide an economic use of the work available from the farm families, but even these small farms are fragmented into many fields frequently separated by considerable distances. This has come about as a result of inheritance which divides the land among all the sons. With large families it does not take many generations for even a large farm to be split and fragmented into the tiny holdings that are typical in China.

The result of this situation is grinding poverty for the vast majority of all rural folk. Food alone accounts for about 60 per cent of the value of all goods consumed by the rural population of China. Rent, clothing, fuel, and light represent an additional 24 per cent. These five items compose 84 per cent of rural Chinese living standards, a fact which means that the rural population lives just at the subsistence level.9

In one expert's view "the Chinese economy has had from early times a maximum of people competing for a minimum of natural resources."10 Rosinger says that China needs to hold its

---


10"Can the Chinese Puzzle Be Solved?" Platform, p. 4.
population in check, but this can come in the long run only through a new attitude toward the family. The population question is therefore inextricably linked with the need for social, economic, and political change. Along the lines of overpopulation, the marines found it was a case of the survival of the fittest in China. One morning when they went out to their parade ground, they found two newly born Chinese babies lying on the parade ground dead. They had been thrown away by their parents. Another time they passed an old man lying in the ditch on a very cold afternoon. He was groaning and suffering. The writer realized that the old fellow had no one to look after him and would probably die that night.

One could not keep from noticing the overcrowding of people in China. It would be hard to guess how much floor space the average Chinese has in his home, but in some dwellings it looked as if there would have to be some overlapping if everyone were to lie down at the same time. In the villages these small houses are for the most part very flimsily constructed with no rest-room facilities except the back door, opening into the street or alley.

The basic cruel fact about the Chinese standard of living for the great majority is that it is extremely low. Why is this so? The fundamental cause is overpopulation in relation to a limited productive land area and largely prescientific methods of

11 Rosinger, op. cit., p. 22.
production. These conditions are further exagger-
ated by a conservative cultural climate that proved
useful in ages past, but is now inadequate to deal
with modern needs.

The territory of China is vast, with 3.3 million
square miles, more than 300,000 square miles larger
than the continental United States. Yet the interior
two-thirds is so high, so dry, so rugged, that most
of the population lives in a coastal strip not more
than 1,000 miles deep and equaling only 43 per cent
of the area of the United States. Even this agricul-
tural portion of China is so rugged that only 27 per
cent of it can be cultivated.

No one really knows how many Chinese there are,
but there seems little doubt that there are between
450 and 500 million. This huge horde, except for a
few millions, lives in the coastal strip that is
called agricultural China, and 80 per cent of them
depend on the land as their principal means of pro-
duction. There are only about 236 million acres of
land under cultivation, as compared with 365 million
acres under the plow in the United States.

This paucity of arable soil has caused an over-
whelming pressure of population on the land. An av-
erage of approximately 1,500 persons actually live
on every square mile of cultivated land -- in many
localities the population density far exceeds this
average to balance the places where it falls below.
The farm population has been squeezed into every
little valley, up the slopes of every mountain or
hill where any soil can be found, and onto marginal
lands where scanty and erratic rainfall is a constant
hazard. This process has caused a modification of the
terrain greater than that of any other area of equal
size in the world. Nearly half the land under cul-
tivation is irrigated, about a quarter is terraced.12

China's economic ills are well expressed by Harold

Issacs when he says:

In 1942 China -- occupying one of the largest
land areas of our globe -- had fewer miles of rail-
road tracks than the state of Illinois. . . . China
with its 451 million souls has 1.1 million students
enrolled in its secondary schools. This is only

12 Winfield, op. cit., p. 2.
slightly more than the 1 million students in the high schools of Illinois and New York. The industrial production of this populous land is smaller than that of Belgium; there aren't as many gadgets in all China as in one of our midwestern states. A relatively modern segment of China is confined unwillingly to cramped quarters along the coast, while the remnants of traditional China lie prostrate in the social life of the millions in the paddy fields.\(^{13}\)

It was in one of the relatively modern segments of China -- Peiping -- where the writer first stayed. He also went to Teintsen and later to Lensi where he saw the country. In Peiping the 5th Marine Regiment, to which he was attached, was billeted in the American, French, and Italian Legations and maintained a company outpost at two airfields about eight miles from the city. The Marines' living conditions in Peiping were very good, as were other foreigners' dwelling houses. Also some of the upper-class Chinese lived very well. The Chinese resentment for foreigners, evident in many cases, can no doubt be attributed to this fact. One never saw a foreigner who was not living like a king in comparison with most of the Chinese. Even the German family of a Nazi Major General, whom the writer had occasion to visit, occupied a very neat villa and seemed to be quite prosperous. Even though the dwellings in Peiping are fairly well constructed, the overcrowding is worse than one could ever imagine.

Before World War II there was extensive milling of flour

\(^{13}\) Platform, p. 5.
and rice and also some tanning, cement and glass manufacture. On the Marines' eight-mile hike beyond the high walls enclosing Peiping, they would march past two desolate old hollow buildings that once produced textiles and flour for the Chinese economy. These two factories had no doubt employed several thousand Chinese workers at one time and produced goods that were gravely needed then as now. To the writer they seemed to represent the whole stalemate, bankrupt Chinese situation of this twentieth century. Nowhere on earth were such things as clothing and flour needed so badly as in this very region, and there stood the remnants of the Chinese industry gutted and the purpose of its construction forgotten. One building was now being used to house units of the Chinese Nationalist Army; the other was stripped clean of everything except for the brick walls. These walls would perhaps go too if they had some way to remove the bricks.

Chinese needs total revision of its land-tenure system. With all of its agricultural and mining work and with little industrial development, it is still in a semi-feudal state. It has the landlord and warlord over the poor tenant. On the one extreme it has the rich upper class and on the other, the lowly peasant. Rosinger says:

China's main source of power is neither by dynamo nor even the water wheel, but human muscle.

14 Ibid., p. 22.
Everywhere life means incredibly bitter toil -- the toil of Shanghai's coolies pulling rickshaws and carrying drums of oil, or of rural China's peasants harnessed to the plow when they have no animal to do the job.\textsuperscript{15}

The publication \textit{Platform} adds an important detail that the landlords who are often merchants, money lenders, or officials as well as rent collectors, usually hold political power in the villages.\textsuperscript{16} They own large tracts of land upon which peasants have lived and worked for generations. Each peasant rents his small block of land which his father and grandfather worked. White and Jacoby explain this situation as follows:

By ancient custom in certain places the tenant formerly had an inalienable right to his tillage; the landlord's legal title gave him what was called "bottom" rights, but the tenant possessed "surface" right, the right to farm the soil, and no landlord could sell the surface rights out from under the peasant or dispossess him of his means of livelihood.\textsuperscript{17}

The landlord succeeds in getting most of the money made from the crops either for rent or for taxes. A government bulletin of the province of Ninghsie lists the taxes one of the big land owners, General Ma, collected as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item sales, domestic animals, camels, salt-carrying, salt consumption, opium lamps, sheep merchants, porters, pigeons, land, middle men, food, special food, additional land, wool, coal, skins, slaughter,
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{15}Rosinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Platform}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{17}White and Jacoby, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 30.
boats, irrigation, millstones, houses, wood, milling, scales, ceremonies, tobacco, wine, stamp, marriage, and vegetables.\textsuperscript{18}

Rosinger says of the landlord:

There is every evidence that China's upper classes have had their full measure of class-consciousness and have felt a strong sense of superiority to the mass of the people. The idea that in village life a wealthy landowner is just "one of the boys" is a myth pure and simple. Near the leading cities -- especially Shanghai -- the big landlords frequently do not live in their villages, but use the rents collected by their agents to enjoy the night life and other pleasures of the metropolis. The customary attitude toward the lower classes is often one of brutality, at least by American standards. In the last analysis, China has had little class fluidity even though individuals have sometimes risen from lowly to high positions.\textsuperscript{19}

Then Rosinger gives a picture of a particular landlord whom Chiang K'ai-shek's son found when he went out to institute some local reforms.

Teng Lao-mou is worth half a million dollars. The entire region has been in his tight grip. His family has never contributed men or money to the public. All the common people were afraid of him and nicknamed him "The Tiger." It was said that local government could never function without the elimination of the Tiger.

Today I resolved to settle this case. As soon as I got over the mountain I started to make inquiries and tried to get a guide. But the people in this region are very tough and stubborn and declined to guide any stranger. Finally a farmer who was perhaps somewhat drunk was found. But he conducted us only half way and then bolted, despite our pleadings. Later we found the Chief of the Pao (a subdivision of a county), and I was introduced to him as a District Administrator. The Pao Chief hastily greeted me and repeatedly apologized: "My eyes failed to see the

\textsuperscript{18}Edgar Snow, \textit{Red Star Over China}, p. 315.

\textsuperscript{19}Lawrence K. Rosinger, \textit{China's Crisis}, p. 5.
greatest mountain!" It was found out later that the Chief had mistaken us for bandits.

The Pao Chief was also somewhat afraid of the Tiger. So I beseeched him to leave us when we were approaching the Tiger's house.

Four battle towers surrounded the Tiger's mansion. Inside the mansion there were vegetable gardens and pig sties. It was almost a world by itself. When we entered the gates we were told to see the Pao Chief if there was any official transaction, and that the Tiger would not see us. But we managed to force our way in. We rounded up all the members of the household and locked them up in one room. Meanwhile the Tiger was questioned about the number of rifles in his possession. He said he had only one, but refused to surrender it. A search was conducted, and in one tower alone thirty-three rifles and a quantity of cartridges were found.

Finally we brought the Tiger along with us. The common people were overjoyed when they saw the Tiger under arrest. But when they were asked to help in carrying the things, only one farmer volunteered, while the rest were still dominated by fear of the Tiger.20

Rosinger also gives a description of the military power of the landlords in Kiengsu province:

In the northernmost districts of the province, those landlords owning 10,000 to 20,000 mow each (one mow is one-sixth of an acre) usually live in mud castles with armed guards, and their tenants are scattered in small villages within a two-mile radius, the castle acting as a trading centre for the whole community. Some of these big landlords maintain a rather large armed force, with 30 to 50 riflemen in addition to those armed with old-fashioned weapons. Often these forces are not the local tenant peasants but have been recruited from bands of scattered troops resulting from civil wars. Against these armed forces of the big landlords, the District Magistrates are politically impotent.21

White and Jacoby report approximately the same thing regarding the landlords and add a few more details, showing

20Ibid., pp. 6-7. 21Ibid.
the commotion the warlords sometimes cause.

The ancient trinity of landlord, loan shark, and merchant is a symbol hated throughout Chinese history. It represents a system that has shackled China's development for five centuries. During the last century, however, the system has tightened about the Chinese peasant as never before because of the impact of the West, by commerce and violence, on its time-worn apparatus. Concentration of landholding had usually been stimulated in olden times by famine, flood, or disaster, when the peasant was forced to sell or mortgage his lands to meet his emergency needs. But the impact of Western commerce created new forms of liquid wealth in China and concentrated it in the hands of the relatively minute number of go-betweens of Western industry and the Chinese market. This new commercial wealth lacked the know-how, the courage, or the proper conditions to invest in industrial enterprises, as commercial wealth historically did everywhere else; it found in land its safest and most profitable form of investment. Particularly in the vicinity of such cities as Shanghai and Canton, where the new wealth was created, it poured into the countryside; land values shot upward, and the peasant was crushed by a process he could not understand. In the neighborhood of such cities 80 per cent of the peasants are bare-handed tenants. The increasing importance of land as an item of commercial speculation divorced the landlord from the personal obligations he had formerly borne. Absentee landlords living in urban comfort far from the villages sold and bought land at increasingly high prices; they extracted the maximum possible revenue.

Another grim factor for a generation past has been civil commotion. The war lords who tore the interior to pieces were most of them shrewd, brutal men who wished to crystallize permanently both their gains and their social position; this could be done best by acquiring land. Peasants were beaten off their fields, or their ownership was taxed away. In one county near Chengtu, in western China, 70 per cent of the land is held by a single person, a former warlord. These war lords, even though their military fangs are now drawn, are still potent economic forces.  

---

22 White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
In China the most pitiful part is "the peasantry -- those impoverished, undernourished, exploited, illiterate, but kind, generous, courageous and just now rather rebellious human beings who are the vast majority of the Chinese people -- "23 The Marines found this statement true. The writer will never be able to understand how the lowly, undernourished peasant manages to survive his miserable existence.

Crushed by speculation, war lords, and Western commerce, strait-jacketed by their ancient feudal relationships, the peasants of China have been gradually forced to the wall. . . . Some scholars think that China is perhaps the only country in the world where the people eat less, live more bitterly, and are clothed worse than they were five hundred years ago.24

This condition prevailed in China at the beginning of the twentieth century and is still the true picture according to the observation of the writer. One of the house boys in the officers' quarters, Shu Men, seemed to be typical of the Chinese family man. He had two sons. One, the Nationalist Army had taken against his wishes to fight for the cause. The Army had come for the boy; and the family, not having the money to buy his way out, had no choice but to bid the lad farewell. He had to fight to protect his government that kept him a miserable slave who was doomed from birth. The boy had survived his basic training period; and seizing

23Snow, op. cit., p. 67.
24White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 32.
his first opportunity, he came home. The Army followed
and carried him away again, but this time there would be no
coming home. The lad would lose his head for deserting,
Old Shu came crying to the Marines for help, but they, too,
were protecting the cause. The other son was seven years
old and always hung around the officers' quarters. The
officers made him bathe daily, fed him usually two meals
a day, and enjoyed him very much. He too was doomed and
even younger than the older brother. He had a cataract on
both eyes, and according to the Navy doctor he would be
blind by the time he was ten years old. In all China there
were not more than two doctors who could perform the neces-
sary operation. To have them operate on a lowly coolie's
young son was an impossibility. White and Jacoby explain
the condition of the Chinese system as follows:

The weight of ignorance and labor is only part
of the burden the Chinese peasant bears; there is
also the weight of a social system as antique as his
ideas and superstitions. The peasant's relation to
the land is conditioned by those who control the land.
It is characteristic of China's present social state
that this, the most overwhelming of all her problems,
should completely lack adequate statistics. Some of
those who have studied the problem estimate -- but
very roughly -- that 30 per cent of China's peasants
are part tenants and part freeholders, another 30 per
cent are tenants or landless farm hands, and 40 per
cent own the land they till. This analysis is very
shaky. The pressure on the tenant and the small
owner is far different from the pressure in American
rural life. Chinese landlords reekrent their fields
to the last possible grain. On good lands they demand
from 50 to 60 per cent of the crops; in some areas,
including Chungking, they take up to 80 per cent of
the cash crops. In districts where land ownerships is highly concentrated, the great landlord may conduct himself as a baron with his own armed retainers, his ruthless rent-collecting agents, and his serfs -- the tenant farmers.

The small owner is frequently little better off than the tenant. Anyone may tax him and usually does. He must bear the heavy load of government exactions, the petty pilferings of all the local officials and the demands of army officers who may be stationed in his district. Even the soldiers feel free to demand pigs, meat, and food of him when passing through his district. Every farmer needs credit at some time or other, and credit in China may reduce the farmer who nominally owns his land to the status of farm laborer for his creditor. A loan -- for seeds, tools, family emergencies -- enmeshes the farmer in the web of usury. Despite all government efforts to break the system in the villages, credit still remains in the hands of the village pawnbrokers and loan sharks -- often the same men who are the large landlords. Interest rates run from 30 to 60 per cent a year and higher. Once caught in the grip of the usurers, a man has little chance of getting out. Marketing is another process in which the small peasant usually loses. He sells his grain at low prices in the glut season of harvest; what he buys back from the market he buys at high prices during the lean season. Transportation is so crude, roads are so few, that each district operates almost as an isolated entity. There is no national market that fixes prices, nor are there railways to equalize surplus and deficit areas.

Appeal by the peasant against the oligarchy that rules him is useless. The local government to which he must appeal against iniquitous taxes, usurious interest, common police brutality, is by its very constitution the guardian of the groups that crush him.25

The writer noticed that everything was run on the "cumeshaw" or money basis. The Chinese told the writer that the police force in Peiping was supposedly a family of high standing with the Nationalists, and the only way to get on the force was to be born in or marry into the family. This police

25Ibid., pp. 28-29.
force was in a very dominant position, for its members could stop anyone from leaving or entering the city proper and demand a toll. Just where this toll went, one could not say, but no doubt the policemen would take out his share before turning it over to the government. White and Jacoby give a vivid description of such collectors:

Even before the war the few interested students of the problem of local government were shocking the conscience of China by detailed local studies of how the system worked; they were producing dry little brochures that damned the system from paddy field to courtyard. In some places peasants who failed to keep up their interest rates were seized by local police and thrown into jail; they were left to die of hunger unless their families brought them rice and water. Peasants were forced to work unpaid on the estates of some landlords as part of their feudal obligations. And every agent of government or landlord took his own particular percentage when levying his demands on the peasants' harvest.26

The peasant is held back by many obstacles. "Millions of peasants are caught in a web of high rents, usurious interest rates, and extortionate taxes,"27 says Rosinger, who then gives the illustration reproduced on the following page.

It seemed to the writer that everyone in China was working for someone else. Even the lowly rickshaw coolie had to rent his rickshaw by the day and in many cases, his

26 Ibid.

27 Lawrence K. Rosinger, Forging a New China, p. 23.
income for the day did not exceed the rent charges. Leu
Shaw has written a novel which is a best seller. It pic-
tures the life of the boys the writer saw with their rick-
shaws on the streets of Peiping and Teintsen:

Happy Boy was a countryman and his lips and tongue
were not as quick and fast as those of fellows born and
raised in the city. . . .
When he had decided to pull a rickshaw, he went directly to get a rickshaw to pull. He rented an old broken-down one to try out his legs. The first day he earned no money; on the second his business was quite good, but for the next two days he was flat on his back, his ankles swollen up like two calabashes and hurting so that he couldn't lift up his feet. He bore it without complaint, no matter how great the pain was, because he knew that this was unavoidable, that it was an experience through which every rickshaw man must pass. Until he had suffered it he would not dare to really stretch his legs and run. 28

In two or three weeks' time he had succeeded in getting his legs worked into the new pattern of activity, and they no longer pained him after the first painful swelling had subsided. He realized that the style of running which he had developed was very good to look at.

Happy Boy lived in the Human Harmony Rickshaw Shed on West Gate Road as he did not have a wife.

The manager of the Human Harmony, the Fourth Master Liu, was nearly seventy years of age. The man himself was old, but in his heart he was still full of tricks. In his youth he had been a treasury guard, had run a gambling house, had bought and sold women, and had lent out money at the devil's own rates. Fourth Master Liu had all of the endowments and qualifications necessary to these occupations -- the strength, the shrewdness, the trickiness, the social knack, and the name. Before the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty he had taken part in mob fighting, had stolen the daughters of good families, had knelt on chains before the magistrate. On chains he had not even knitted his brows, nor once called for mercy. The officer was taken in by his fortitude, and accepted his innocence; from this he had gained his name.

As it happened, the republic had been established by the time he got out of jail; the power of the police

---

was getting stronger all the while, and Fourth Master Liu could see that the time of the local heroes had So he had opened a rickshaw shed. A local bully by profession, he knew how to deal with poor people -- when to be hard, when to let up a little. And he had a flair for using people. The rickshaw pullers were afraid to talk back to him; all he had to do was to glare at them and laugh, and they could only stand stupid before him. It was as if he had one foot in heaven and the other in hell -- it was best to do what he told you to.

He now had sixty-odd rickshaws, the oldest of them at least seven parts new. He wouldn't keep broken-down carts around. The rent he charged was higher than other sheds but at each of the three yearly festivals he allowed two more days' rent-free than did the others. There was a place to live in the Human Harmony Yard, and unmarried rickshaw boys could stay there rent-free. But you had to pay your rickshaw rent; if you couldn't settle your accounts and tried to hang on anyway, he would keep your bedding and throw you out of the door like a broken teapot. But if any of the men had some pressing trouble, or some sudden illness, they had only to tell him; he would not hesitate but would go through fire or water to help them. Such was his name and fame.29

Happy Boy wanted a rickshaw of his own, but he really had to go through torture to get the money to buy it.

He would have to keep on without smoking or drinking wine; he might as well not even drink good tea. Rickshaw pullers of his respectability were accustomed after a fast run to go into a teahouse and drink a cup of tea made from leaves that cost ten coppers a packet, with two lumps of white sugar to it, in order to catch their breath and lessen the heat within them. When Happy Boy had run until the sweat was dripping even from the lobes of his ears, and there was an acrid feeling in his breast, he would want very much to do the same thing. This certainly was not from habit, or from a desire to put up a front, but rather because one or two such cups of tea were truly necessary to press down the bitterness inside him. But he would only think about it, and would still drink tea made from the sweepings of tea leaves that cost only a copper a packet.

29Ibid., pp. 56-57.
So deadly tight about spending money, Happy Boy was even more grasping about earning it. When he was not hired by a private family by the month, he worked the whole day, taking his rickshaw out early and bringing it in late. If he had not made a certain sum of money he would not stop for the day, no matter what time it was or how tired his legs were. Sometimes he went right on working a whole day and night together.

The money he saved he had given to Fourth Master Liu to keep for him. When he had collected enough, he had asked for it back and had bought his new rickshaw.

"Fourth Master Liu, look at my new new rickshaw!" Happy Boy said. The old man looked at it and nodded his head. "It's good enough."

"But I've still got to live here. When I get a job by the month, I'll go to live in the house where I'm hired," Happy Boy proudly added.

"All right." Fourth Master Liu nodded his head again.

Thereafter, when Happy Boy was hired by the month he lived at the house of his master, and when he lost the job and had to pick up fares on the streets he lived at Human Harmony.30

Rosinger says, "It is a tribute to the peasant that, despite these conditions, he is often a person of dignity, native intelligence and humor."31 Henry Seidel Canby expresses the same idea when he reviews the book Rickshaw Boy. He says:

Happy Boy came, an orphan, from the country when he was eighteen. He was big, handsome, strong, a little slowwitted. He was entirely illiterate, but the first thing one notices is that essentially, which means morally, he is a civilized man. The ethics of the great Chinese philosophers were his ethics. Somehow he had been made to believe in right actions, in the good results of good. That was why they called him Happy Boy. His life in this novel is a struggle with every kind of horrible poverty, injustice, sexual perversion, social wrong. He stays civilized, somehow, through it all. And when you have finished this novel

30 Ibid., p. 49.  
31 Rosinger, op. cit., p. 23.
you realize that the real problem of China is not politics as such, or military power, but an age-
long social injustice and economic disorganization, where good and lovable men like Happy Boy, morally
sound, survive only because of the remarkable charac-
ter of their race.

But, of course, this is not even talked about
in the novel, which is entirely objective. When a
girl student in his rickshaw talks to Happy Boy about
freedom of speech and the rights of man, it does not
occur to him that such matters could be of any con-
cern to the poor, who must first keep from starving.32

Rosinger explains how China from the beginning of her
history has never put democracy into practice:

Confucius and Mencius, far from being democrats,
were supporters of a feudal social order. Both de-
sired an aristocratic type of government with clear
distinctions between the rulers and the ruled, but
realized that the feudal princes could hope to sur-
vive only if they reformed themselves.33

Some little spark of democracy creeps in according to Somer-
set Maugham in one of his stories about China:

It was a cold night. I had finished my dinner,
and my boy was making up my bed while I sat over a
brazier of burning charcoal. Most of the coolies had
already settled themselves for the night in a room
next to mine and through the thin matchboarding of the
wall that separated us I heard a couple of them talk.
Another party of travellers had arrived about an hour
before and the small inn was full. Suddenly there
was a commotion and going to the door of my room to
look out I saw three sedan chairs enter the court-
yard. They were set down in front of my room and
from the first stepped out a stout Chinese of imposing
aspect. He wore a long black robe of figured silk,
lined with squirrel, and on his head a square fur cap.
He seemed taken aback when he saw me at the door of
the principal guest chamber and turning to the land-
lord addressed him in authoritative tones. It ap-
ppeared that he was an official and he was much annoyed

32 Henry Seidel Canby in review in The Book-of-the-Month-
33 Rosinger, China's Crisis, p. 4.
to find that the best apartment in the inn was already taken. He was told that but one room was available. It was small, with pallets covered with tumbled straw lining the walls, and was used as a rule only by coolies. He flung into a violent passion and on a sudden arose a scene of the greatest animation. The official, his two companions, and his bearers exclaimed against the indignity which it was sought to thrust upon him, while the landlord and the servants of the inn argued, expostulated, and entreated. The official stormed and threatened. For a few minutes the courtyard, so silent before, rang with the angry shouts; then subsiding as quickly as it began, the hubbub ceased and the official went into the vacant room. Hot water was brought by a bedraggled servant, and presently the landlord followed with great bowls of steaming rice. All was once more quiet.

An hour later I went into the yard to stretch my legs for five minutes before going to bed and, somewhat to my surprise, I came upon the stout official, a little while ago so pompous and self-important, seated at a table in front of the inn with the most ragged of my coolies. They were chatting amicably and the official quietly smoked a water-pipe. He had made all that to-do to give himself face, but having achieved his object, was satisfied, and feeling the need of conversation had accepted the company of any coolie without a thought of social distinction. His manner was perfectly cordial and there was in it no trace of condescension. The coolie talked with him on an equal footing. It seemed to me that this was true democracy. In the East man is man's equal in a sense you find neither in Europe nor in America. Position and wealth put a man in a relation of superiority to another that is purely adventitious, and they are no bar to sociability.

When I lay in my bed I asked myself why in the despotic East there should be between men an equality so much greater than in the free and democratic West, and was forced to the conclusion that the explanation must be sought in the cess-pool. For in the West we are divided from our fellows by our sense of smell.

. . .

The matutinal tub divides the classes more effectively than birth, wealth, or education. . . . Now, the Chinese live all their lives in the proximity of very nasty smells. They do not notice them. Their nostrils are blunted to the odours that assail the Europeans and so they can move on an equal footing
with the tiller of the soil, the coolie, and the artisan. I venture to think that the cess-pool is more necessary to democracy than parliamentary institutions. 34

Rosinger says, "In reality the peasant had no voice in government." 35 He brings out the point that as long as the peasant lives on the very

... margin of subsistence, the future of any Chinese government will be uncertain, Chinese industries will have only a limited home market, and the country will remain weak. Any Chinese political group which demonstrates to the peasant that it can improve his life is bound to make a powerful appeal to him, despite his usual conservatism. 36

That is the reason that first Democracy under Sun Yat-sen and later Communism with its promise of land division have made such progress in China. Of this condition Fairbank states:

China's low economic standard of living has gone hand in hand with a low political standard of freedom, yet China's masses have become increasingly susceptible to organization through economic, political, social, and ideological appeals and devices. This has made it possible for the Chinese Communists to establish themselves as the leaders and organizers of the Chinese revolution, even though the Communists' "democracy" is phony according to our American standards. 37

35 Rosinger, op. cit., p. 5.
36 Rosinger, Forging a New China, p. 23.
Therefore we see that in China something has to be done for the lowly peasants, for "a million Chinese regularly starve to death every year." 38

Harold Issacs makes a good summary statement for the economic and social conditions in China when he says:

China has suffered from a chronically bankrupt peasantry, unbridled landlordism and usury, inadequate and frustrated industrialization, civil war, invasion, and, today, inflation and more civil war. Coming all together in concentrated doses within the last decade, they have thrown China into heaving convulsion. 39

CHAPTER III

THE KUOMINTANG AND THE COMMUNISTS

Communism came into China during Sun Yat-sen's dominance of the Republic. Sun had established the republic in South and Central China in 1911 by overthrowing the Manchus. After another revolution in 1917, he founded the Kuomintang (Nationalist) party and drafted its program according to his principles -- "nationalism, democracy, and livelihood." Ch'en Tu-hsiu was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party, which was organized in Shanghai in 1921. Sun Yat-sen, while not subscribing to Communism, in the two years before his death (in March, 1925), fully recognized the usefulness of Communist methods and accepted Communist collaboration in his Nationalist cause. Sun was not a Communist, but he was deeply stirred by Lenin's declaration against imperialism and the Soviet stress on racial equality; therefore, when Soviet Russia established contact with him and offered assistance in strengthening the Kuomintang, he invited the Communists to join in his movement. Abram

---

1 John King Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 186.
2 Rosinger, op. cit., p. 16.
3 Ibid.
Adolf Joffe, a top Bolshevik, had issued the following statement:

Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

In order to clarify the situation, Dr. Sun Yat-sen has requested Mr. Joffe for a reafirmation of the principles defined in the Russian Note to the Chinese Government dated Sep. 27, 1920. Mr. Joffe has accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen that the Russian Government is ready and willing to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all the treaties and exactions which the Czardom imposed on China, including the treaty or treaties and agreements relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway. . . . Mr. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-sen (who has fully satisfied himself as to this) that it is not and has never been the intention or purpose of the present Russian Government to pursue an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China.4

Fairbank says of this agreement:

This was purely a marriage of convenience. The entente announced in a joint statement by Dr. Sun and Adolph Joffe in January 1923 was a strictly limited arrangement. It stated that Sun did not favor communism for China since conditions were not appropriate to it, that Joffe agreed that China needed unity and independence, and that Russia was ready to aid the Chinese Nationalist revolution. As Sun Yat-sen wrote to Chiang Kai-shek at the time, he had to seek help where he could get it. In other words, Sun

4George Creel, Russia's Race for Asia, p. 21.
now sought and accepted Comintern aid, but communism in his mind did not supplant his own Three Principles of the People as the program for the Chinese revolution.

In addition to aiding the Nationalist revolution, a second objective of the Comintern was to develop the Chinese Communist Party and get it into a strategic position within the Kuomintang. In 1924 members of the Chinese Communist Party were, by agreement with the Kuomintang, admitted to membership in it as individuals, at the same time that the Chinese Communist Party continued its separate existence. This admission of Communists was consistent with Kuomintang theory because both parties were united on the basis of anti-imperialism and the Kuomintang aimed to lead a broad national multi-class movement avoiding class war. On their side the Chinese Communists sought definite class support among urban workers, poor peasants, and students. But they recognized that this class basis was still weak and backward. They therefore sought to go along with the Nationalist movement without antagonizing the various anti-Communist elements which were included within it. It should not be forgotten that the Communist movement in China at this time was still in its infancy and numbered hardly more than a thousand members. As in other countries the Chinese Communists of this period were significant for their ideas and methods of organization rather than their numbers.5

Several authors have described the infiltration of the Communists into the Kuomintang. Rosinger states that with Soviet aid the Kuomintang was reorganized at the beginning of 1924.6 This time it included a great mass following, along with the élite who had first organized it. Snow says that two Russian agents -- Michael Borodin and General Golen -- were his (Sun's) most conspicuous advisers.7 Creel

5Fairbank, op. cit., p. 188.
6Rosinger, op. cit., p. 16.
7White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 38.
explains that the Communist Party of China was born with the help of the Communist International, it grew up under the guidance of the Communist International, and the Chinese Revolution developed under the guidance of the Communist International. 8

Fairbank gives the back history of the Comintern (Communist International) and shows how it works:

The Comintern (Communist International) or Third International was a successor to the First and Second Internationals which had been organized in 1864 and 1889, respectively, to bring together the various elements of the Socialist movement in Europe. In 1914 the Second International succumbed to militant nationalism. After the war the Russian Bolsheviki had organized the Third International out of scattered groups in various countries. Their first Comintern congress in 1919 was followed by six other international congresses before the outbreak of World War II. In general it was the function of the Comintern to represent the Russian Communist movement in its world-wide aspect. This was particularly true in the first years after World War I when the Bolsheviki were encouraging active revolution in many countries of Europe. After 1921, when Lenin turned the Soviet Union to his new economic policy, the Comintern competed with the revived Socialist parties of Europe but was less actively revolutionary, except in China.

In this period the Communist movements in foreign countries were guided from, and were represented in, Moscow by an exchange of delegates. These delegates usually worked anonymously or at least inconspicuously but provided a channel through which the revolutionary leadership in charge of the Russian revolution could influence similar movements elsewhere. As early as March 1921, delegates were sent to China to aid the formation of the Chinese Communist Party and seek cooperation with Sun Yat-sen.

The Marxist-Leninist theory held that Western capitalism was using the backward countries of Asia

8Creel, op. cit., p. 176.
as a source of profit to bolster the capitalist system. Without imperialist exploitation of Asia, which allowed continued high wages for the workers of the West, it was believed that capitalism would more rapidly collapse. Revolutions in Asia, which would deprive the imperialist powers of their markets and source of raw materials, would therefore constitute a "flank attack" on Western capitalism at its weakest point -- that is, in Asiatic economies where imperialist domination exploited the working class most ruthlessly. From the very beginning the Bolsheviki had called upon the colonial peoples to rise against their Western masters. In China the Soviet government had capitalized upon its own impotence by renouncing the privileges of the Czar's unequal treaties. Comintern propaganda had concentrated upon British imperialism as its chief target. The Comintern picked China as the chief area of foreign struggle in the years from 1922 to 1927.

Thus from the beginning the Kuomintang-Communist entente was a precarious thing, held together by the common enemy, imperialism, and also, while he lived, by Sun Yat-sen's predominance over the anti-Communist elements of his party.\(^9\)

In order to add strength to the revolutionary movement in 1924, an academy for the training of revolutionary officers was set up with Russian assistance on the banks of the Whampoa River. Sun chose "a slim and cold-eyed Chekiang youth"\(^10\) named Chiang K'ai-shek to head this academy. Chou Enlai received appointment as director of the "political department." "Trained in France and Germany by the Old Bolsheviks, Chou was counted on as one well qualified to aid General Bleucher [Galen] in the seduction of the Whampoa cadets."\(^11\) The Russian advisers had been so impressed with

\(^10\)White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 38.
\(^11\)Creel, op. cit., p. 23.
Chiang that they sent him to Moscow in 1923, "for a six months' course in indoctrination." After his return, Chiang rose from comparative obscurity to dominance in his party. After Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925, Chiang's authority was almost unchallenged. By 1927 Chiang and his forces had overcome many war lords and his authority had spread to Shanghai and Nanking. The greater part of the Communists were at Henkow, and the principal military power was at Nanking grouped about Chiang K'ai-shek. Mao Tse-tung became editor of the Political Weekly, a publication of the political department of the Kuomintang. He was "put in charge of training organizers for the peasant movement, and established a course for this purpose which was attended by representatives from twenty-one different provinces, and included students from Inner Mongolia." After the establishment of Wempos Military Academy, "other Soviet advisers arrived from Russia, and the Kuomintang-Communist Party en-tente began to assume the proportions of a nation-wide revolutionary movement."

All was going well for the Kuomintang-Communist combination until in 1927 it appears that "the Comintern was not giving 'advice,' but flat orders, to the Chinese Communist party, which was apparently not even empowered to reject

\[^{12}\text{Ibid.}\] \[^{13}\text{Snow, op. cit., p. 143.}\] \[^{14}\text{Ibid.}\]
them."¹⁵ "It became apparent that these 'friends from the
Kremlin' were more devoted to Russia than to China. A plot
was uncovered to destroy the national government and set
up a Soviet-dictated regime in China. This provoked the
civil strife that is still raging."¹⁶

Chiang saw in the Communists a leadership as
cold-blooded and ruthless as his own. To his pas-
sionate nationalism their connection with Russia was
wicked. His brief visit to Russia had given him an
insight into the working of a dictatorial state along
with a lasting dislike for the Russians. He saw the
Communists as Russian agents, possessed of some magic
formula that would tear the countryside apart in social
upheaval -- and he hated them.¹⁷

Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China explains further the
nature of the disagreement as it was told to him by the
Communist leader, Mao Tze-tung. He says:

The Comintern sent a message to Borodin, ordering
the Party to begin confiscation of the landlords'
land. Roy, the Indian delegate to the Comintern, got
hold of a copy of it, and promptly showed it to Wang
Chiang-wei, then chairman of the Leftist Wuhan Gov-
ernment. The result of this caprice is well known.
The Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang by
the Wuhan regime, its strength collapsed, and soon
afterwards Chiang K'ai-shek destroyed Wuhan itself.¹⁸

The message was later found in a raid on the Russian embassy
by Chiang Tso-lin and confirms Russian control. Creel says
that other documents were also found showing that the Com-
munist movement in China was receiving from Russia a monthly

¹⁵Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁶"Zero Hour for China," Scholastic, December 1, 1948, p. 12.

¹⁷White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁸Snow, op. cit., p. 148.
subsidy; but Greel does not state how much. The message sent by Stalin was as follows:

1. Land in Hunan and Hupeh is to be confiscated by the peasants without any reference to the government, the peasants acting through the Communist Party.
2. A new leadership is to be created within the Kuomintang, consisting entirely of Communist Party members. The left wing of the Kuomintang is to be eliminated.
3. The Kuomintang is to be reconstructed along more radical lines, so that in due course the Kuomintang as a party disappears, and the Communist Party of China takes its place.
4. A court is to be created, consisting of persons with known reputations, which is to judge counterrevolutionary military men and is to punish them for their opposition to the revolutionary activities of the Communist Party.
5. Finally an army is to be organized, drilled and armed. This army is to consist of 20,000 armed Communists and 50,000 laborers and peasants of Hunan and Hupeh.

Chiang sent Borodin and General Bluecher (Galen) out of China by way of motor transport route through Inner Mongolia. Madame Sun Yat-sen, resenting Chiang's expulsion of the Communists because she remembered her husband's friendship for them, followed them to Russia. In order to explain to her his change of mind about the Communists, Chiang issued the following statement:

When I returned from a tour of inspection through Russia, I had very clear-cut views as to the essential differences between the two policies, Lenin's and Sun Yat-sen's. I was unable to convert the learned doctor to my views, but I learned his. He said, "China has no room for the co-existence of Communism and the Kuomintang. We must admit the Communists and

---

19 Greel, op. cit., p. 33.  
20 Ibid.
convert them, and the Three Principles will serve as a melting pot." This is more than enough to indicate that in admitting the Communists into the Kuomintang fold, Dr. Sun had no intention of doing so at the expense of injuring the party. But by professing Kuomintang principles in a halfhearted fashion, and by adopting deception, they have tried their best to disorganize our military and party affairs, besides calling a halt on the whole Northern expedition, . . . The fact that I am a Kuomintang man makes it impossible for me to look placidly on. I must be firmly resolved to wage war on the Communists. 21

Chiang began a purge of the Communists by disarming them and executing their leaders. He and his men killed "an estimated 140,000 in that bloody purge and drove the rest underground." 22 Chiang did all this before the Communists ever knew that he had turned against them. "He cut them off from the workers of the city, but he could not break their contact with the agitated peasantry." 23 Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian general," appeared on the scene with 11,000,000 Russian rubles (about $5,000,000) that had been given him by Moscow. This sum was for the recruiting and equipment of troops for the war against Chiang K'ai-shek. 24

Snow explains about financial aid being given by Russia as follows:

---

21 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
23 White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 44.
24 Greel, op. cit., p. 32.
The active military, political, financial and intellectual collaboration given the Chinese National Revolution was until 1936 under the direction chiefly of Zinoviev, who was chairman of the Communist International. . . . Stalin led the Comintern which gave the Chinese Communists their tactical line and 'directives' throughout 1926, and on through the catastrophe of the spring of 1927.25

Fairbank explained the cause of the Communist catastrophe as follows:

This ignominious failure of the Comintern's laboratory experiment in revolution in China has been a cause of scrimonious internecine dispute ever since. Trotsky and his followers had opposed the Comintern effort to use the Kuomintang. They foresaw Chiang K'ai-shek's betrayal and urged an independent program to develop workers' and peasants' soviets in China under purely Communist leadership. Stalin and his supporters, however, had argued that an independent Communist movement in so backward a country would invite suppression all the sooner. They had looked forward to the time at a later stage of the revolution when, in Stalin's phrase, the Communists could drop their Kuomintang allies as so many "squeezed out lemons." Whatever the merits of these competing strategies, it is plain that the right-wing Kuomintang squeezed first. Much of the Comintern's ineptitude undoubtedly came from its remoteness from the scene of action. Lacking instantaneous radio communication, Stalin and his colleagues could hardly succeed in masterminding by the aid of Marxist dialectics the confused and unprecedented stirrings of revolution in a place like Shanghai. In the end the Comintern made Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who had been a founder and leader of the Chinese Communist Party, the scapegoat. He was expelled.26

The internal struggle continued through many campaigns until in 1931 the Communists established a government of their own in Kiangsi province in the southern part of China.

25Snow, op. cit., p. 376.
26Fairbank, op. cit., p. 191.
The Nationalists established their capital at Nanking and conquered Peking and renamed it Peiping. In 1943 Chiang K'ai-shek finally forced the Communists out of their southern stronghold. Then they took their "Long March" of about six hundred miles to the northwest, where they set up a new government at Yenan.

The Communists' arrival in Yenan coincided with a turning point both in their own history and in the party line. By now they had become an independent organisation, their ties with Moscow were nominal. The Soviet Union had re-established friendly relations with Chiang K'ai-shek and left the Communist Party to fend for itself.27

Fairbank explains the same situation as follows:

After the "long march" when Chinese communism was reorganized on its new base in the Northwest, it appears to have achieved a maturity which was more practical than doctrinaire and more concerned with meeting local problems than with a Marxist millennium. By this time (1935) the Communist leadership had been weathered and tested by experience. Doctrinaires like Li Li-san, who advocated reliance upon the city proletarian, had been expelled or submerged. (Li re-emerged in Manchuria in 1946 after a long sojourn in Russia.) The military command had become centered in an experienced leader, Chu Teh. Beginning with ten thousand men and two thousand rifles in 1926, the Red Army of 1932 had totaled about one hundred thousand men, but the men still outnumbered the rifles. The civil government under the politburo was now clearly dominated by Mao Tse-tung, a Hunanese intellectual of peasant origin who had been one of the founders of the Party in 1921. During the Nationalist revolution Mao had become head of the revolutionary peasant unions. He was well fitted by experience to guide intellectuals who sought to lead the peasant class.

Like all Communist movements, the Chinese Party stood to rise or fall by its relationship to the spirit

27White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 45.
of nationalism. If it represented a foreign influence infiltrating Chinese society and subverting the national culture and independence, its progress would be slow and its social revolution might be thwarted by Nationalist aspirations. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Communist movement could establish a claim to true patriotism and become a vehicle for Chinese nationalistic sentiment, its revolutionary task would be much easier.28

It was about this time (1932) that the Japanese threat proved to be the very danger the Communists could use to show their spirit of nationalism by championing the Nationalist resistance to Japan. They suggested co-operating with all patriotic groups to save China from Japan. Fairbank states: "In 1932 while Nanking was still obliged to temporize with the Japanese, the Chinese Soviet Republic, although blockaded on all sides, made the gesture of declaring war on Japan."29 Chiang hated the Japanese, but he thought he ought to crush the Communists first and then establish unity to fight Japan. Chiang said, in substance:

China's one hope of ending Japanese aggressions lay in an united country and not merely in the "united front" as proposed by the Reds. Communism was neither nationalistic nor democratic in any sense of the words, but a totalitarian ideology conceived by Russia as the instrument for Russian domination. Honor and loyalty alike were remote from Red conception, and to take them in as allies was to open the door to treachery, and betrayal. When had the Communists ever kept faith? And what more plain than that their sudden outburst of patriotism was born of bitter necessities? One more blow would end the Red menace forever, and then China could and would go forward

28 Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
29 Ibid.
against Japan, no longer fearful of knives in the back.  

However, the Communists captured Chiang and tried to persuade him to adopt an eight-point coalition pledge and let the Communists into his government on an equal footing with his party. Chiang would not agree unless they would dissolve their Soviet Republic, "consent to the incorporation of their forces into the National army and abandon the Class Struggle."  

After the Japanese really attacked China, Chiang and the Communists did form a coalition. Mao Tse-tung made the following pledges:

In order to safeguard the independence and freedom of the Chinese Nation, a national war of liberation shall be proclaimed. . . . The Communist Party is prepared to fight for the realization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary principles . . . the policy of insurrections which aimed at the overthrow of the Kuomintang's political power, the policy of land confiscation and the policy of Communist propaganda, shall all be disowned and discontinued . . . the former Red Army, which has been reorganized into the Eight Route Army, shall be under the control of the National Military Council, and ever ready to be sent to the front. . . . With the disappearance of the Chinese Soviet Government a system of political democracy shall be put into practice so that the country may be politically united.  

Mao accepted only if each Red Army unit could retain its political commissar for the maintenance of Party discipline,
and Communist troops be under the command of Communist generals. These conditions were met and besides Mao Tze-tung, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh were put on the advisory council of the Supreme National Defense Council. When the People's Political Council was organized in 1938, the Reds received full recognition. But the Communists did not lay aside their old hatred for the Kuomintang. One month after making the loyalty pledge, Mao Tze-tung issued a secret directive to his followers:

The Sino-Japanese war affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy should be 70 per cent expansion, 20 per cent dealing with the Kuomintang, and 10 per cent resisting Japan. There are three stages in carrying out this fixed policy; the first is a compromising stage, in which self-sacrifice should be made to show outward obedience to the Central Government . . . but in reality this will serve as camouflage for the existence and development of the party. The second is a contending stage, in which two or three years should be spent in laying the foundation of our party's political and military powers. . . . the third is an offensive stage in which our forces should penetrate deeply into Central China, sever the communications of the Central Government troops in various sectors, isolate and wrest the leadership from the hands of the Kuomintang. 33

At first, the Communists did their part in fighting the Japanese.

. . . They did fight valiantly and well against the Japanese, as several United States military officers have testified. They gave full cooperation in the war when it was sought. At their capital of Yenan they built by hand an airfield for the B-29's. 34

33Quoted by Congressman Walter H. Judd, June 19, 1948, and included in Greel, ibid., p. 80.

34Wailey, op. cit., p. 60.
Although they never did engage in any pitched battles, they used guerrilla warfare to cut Japanese communications and harass the occupation forces, but "they had as much interest in wiping out the Central Chinese troops as the Japanese." This caused the Nationalists much trouble, as can be seen from the following quotation:

Up to 1943 the Communists engaged in guerrilla operations that were fairly effective, and also discontinued the mutinies that had bedeviled the Nationalists in the past. With the repulse of the Germans at Stalingrad, however, making Allied victory a certainty, sabotage of the national effort was resumed on a large scale. Boldly setting up their armies as independent commands, without regard for the overall strategy of the National Military Council, the Reds attacked weak positions, and even joined with the enemy in defeating Chiang's troops. A notable instance was the slaughter of 20,000 Nationalists in Shantung in August 1943. This army, in process of transfer, was attacked by the Japanese from the north, and by the Communists from the south. Hopelessly outnumbered and surrounded, Chin Chi-yung, their commander, committed suicide rather than surrender.

The Nationalists fought the Japanese very hard also; but they took many of the arms the United States had sent them to fight the Japanese and used the arms to fight the Communists. The United States Government found this out, and this caused the United States Government to mistrust the Nationalists to some extent.

Chiang was accused of having lined up with the warlords and the upper class and not doing anything for the

---

35Cree, op. cit., p. 83.
36Ibid., p. 86.
common people. This caused many of the peasants to turn to the Communists. Fairbank says:

By retaining personal power, the Kuo-mintang leaders devitalized their organization. Politically they marked time while waiting for the war to end. The best men among them knew how to modernize China technologically. But they were unable to mobilize the back country in a continuing social revolution. The revolution consequently passed them by.

Coming later upon the scene, the Chinese Communists have implemented the three aspects of Sun's revolutionary program for China in inverse order. Where the Kuo-mintang had begun by emphasizing nationalism, the Chinese Communists began by developing the principle of livelihood, particularly as expressed in Sun's slogan of "land to those who till it." They followed this up with an emphasis upon material betterment of the peasantry through local organizations for increased production.37

Chiang K'ai-shek's government ran into insurmountable difficulties every time he tried any reforms. These snags were lack of capital and the necessity for the change of the old order of the propertied class. Fairbank elaborates on the difficulty of internal reforms in China.38

Many fine blueprints have been offered for China's economic regeneration. Land reclamation, reforestation, water conservancy, hydro-power, crop and animal breeding, better tools, improved land use, pest control, crop storage facilities, land redistribution, rent reduction, light and heavy industrialization, rural industry and cooperatives, cheaper farm credit, mass education, public health, transportation, law and order -- all have their advocates and their obvious rationale. The first and foremost object of all such efforts is to increase the efficiency of farm production, which will increase the food supply. How is this to be done?

Any solution will involve all the factors of production, but especially the human and social factors.

37Fairbank, op. cit., p. 211. 38Ibid., p. 217.
First, any widespread and organized effort to effect an increase in food production will require a heavy capital investment in technological improvements -- diversified crops, farm equipment, training programs, research and education -- and major public works for water control, power and fertilizer production, transportation and the like. In China, however, this capital investment is likely to be available only through government channels or under government stimulation, so that government policy is immediately involved. Secondly, since any government seeking capital faces alternatives of borrowing abroad, seeking the rich, or squeezing the masses, or a mixture of these methods, the whole question of paying for this program must eventually become a political issue. Meanwhile, in the third place, any increase of food supply must depend on the cooperative organization of farm labor and resources to effect their more efficient use in the farming community. But cooperation of this sort involves the association of farmers in great numbers. Sooner or later it is likely to affect the interests of the propertied class.39

Although Chiang's hands were tied by lack of capital with which to work, he did try to advance the cause of Nationalism. George Creel says he called a constitutional convention in 1931 which adopted a provisional constitution; then again in 1936 he called a convention to draft the permanent constitution to be voted on in 1937.

Even General Marshall praised the document approved on Christmas Day 1946 as "democratic," and regretted "that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly, since the Constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted."40

But White and Jacoby say:

Chiang's difficulty was that he tried to function in two stages of trusteeship at once. To fight the war he needed to levy men, money, and rice from the people;

39 Ibid., p. 221.  
40 Creel, op. cit., p. 13.
to do this he had to use the old, oppressive network of village chiefs, which kept the peasants under rigid control. And to fight the Communists he had to intensify his censorship and secret police. At the same time he was fond of democratic phrases and catchwords. He talked about the imminence of the ballot and constitutional rights; he promised the peasants more freedom, but operated always to restrict what little they had. He was enmeshed in his own promises. His government had two facades; one faced toward the peasant and retained all the old familiar undemocratic features of Chinese feudalism, but the imposing outer front, which faced China's allies, was built of materials pleasing to Western eyes -- political tutelage, habeas corpus, democracy.\textsuperscript{41}

While Chiang was doing this the Communist armies were indoctrinating the people and fraternizing with them as they went along. "Politically indoctrinated armies were a new thing in Modern China.\textsuperscript{42} As Japanese were thrown out of office, the Communists slipped into their places and they used their propaganda to persuade the people "to put up with their regime rather than rebel against it.\textsuperscript{43}

Creel defends Chiang for not carrying out the internal reforms by quoting General Douglas MacArthur as follows:

\begin{quote}
The international aspect of the Chinese problem, unfortunately, has become somewhat beclouded by demands for internal reform. Desirable as such reform may be, its importance is but secondary to the issue of civil strife now engulfing the land, and these two issues are as impossible of synchronization as it would be to alter the structural design of a house while the same was being consumed by flame. . . . the maintenance of China's integrity against destructive forces which threaten her engulfment is of infinitely
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41}White and Jacoby, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{42}Fairbank, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 207-208.
more concern. For with the firm maintenance of such integrity, reform will gradually take place in the evolutionary process of China's future.44

Immediately after the conquest of Japan, the writer was sent with the Marine Occupation Unit to China. General Marshall was in China at that time trying to straighten out the tangle between the Nationalists and the Communists. The writer was never told what the Marine mission in China was, and he was never able to learn through asking his superiors. In Lensi the Communists were fighting the Nationalists all around the town and the mines. When a man from the Marine platoon would come to the writer in a depressed mood and confide in him that he was afraid of what might happen on his next train guard mission and would ask just why he should risk his hide to guard Chinese coal mines from a British-Belgian-Chinese owned mine, what could the writer tell him if he did not know himself? One time the writer had made a coal train guard run to Peitoe Beach; and on boarding the train for his return to Lensi, he sat with Colonel "Bull" Frisby. Colonel Frisby commanded the 5th Marine Regiment through most of its major campaigns in the Pacific and was highly respected by Major General Rockey, the Commanding General in China. The writer asked Colonel Frisby just what the Marine mission was in China. He said, "My boy, I do not know unless it is to meddle." From what

the writer could see and gather from time to time, that pretty well summed up the whole thing. The Chinese mine officials and the British and Belgian mine officials said if the Marines ever pulled out, the Communists would take over the mines within twenty-four hours. Controlling interest or fifty-one per cent was owned by the British and Belgians, and the coal was going to the Nationalist Government; so what was America's role? The Marines' sole purpose seemed to be to protect the corrupt Chinese Government as it then existed under the Chiang regime.

After the 5th Marines were transferred to Lensi, ever so often someone would bring in a collection of dead men the Communists had killed. The Nationalists did not publicize this fact, however; they slipped the wounded into the hospital, where the writer knew the doctor. That is where the writer got his information on the Nationalist losses. The Marine intelligence section received daily combat reports from the Nationalists; and if they had been tabulated, the Communists reported killed would likely have run into several hundred thousand monthly. Many of their engagements were on paper only or through negotiations. The Communists would surround a village held by the Nationalists and then through negotiations the battle would take place. The Communists would say, "We have 35,000 more men here than you and could defeat your army." The Nationalists
would agree and surrender so much of their territory without ever firing a shot. The key points such as the major cities along the coast, the coal mines, the air fields, and the railroads were the Marines’ “babies.” Though the Marines were in very small tactical units, the Communists respected their fire power and except for a few scattered incidents they were not bothered.

After the writer’s transfer to the Lensi mining region to replace the 7th Marines, his platoon was scattered over a rather wide area. The Regimental Headquarters were set up in Tengshan with two battalions in that region. The writer’s battalion was sent thirty miles north to Lensi actually to guard the mines and bridge fifty-four along the North Chine Railroad to Chen Wun Tso from where much of the coal was shipped down the coast.

When the Marines arrived, they found the Nationalist Chinese in Lensi in a near state of panic. They reported a large concentration of Communist troops around the Koachushan Mining Association mine five miles west of the Lensi walled compound. The Marine Colonel looked the situation over and dispatched a skeleton unit to bridge fifty-four, another to the mine east of Lensi, and left one in Lensi proper. Then all the remaining units including the writer’s machine-gun platoon were sent immediately to the threatened area. The Marines dug machine-gun and motor implacements and
set up all their defense for the attack that never came.Apparently the Communists had thought when the 7th Regiment pulled out that morning, there would be no replacements or at least that the replacements would be slow in arriving. After a couple of days and nights without attack, the skeleton crew left behind by the 7th Regiment until the writer's regiment arrived were sent on to Peiping to join their unit and all was left to the writer's regiment. This regiment made Lensi their battalion headquarters with Headquarters Company, George Company, a platoon of tanks, and a platoon of half tracks concentrated there. Fox Company was sent to one mine and Easy Company to the other mine; and one platoon was detailed to bridge fifty-four, an outpost on a railroad between Teintsen and Chen Wu Tao. Though the Marines had many alerts and though the Nationalist troops nearby were attacked by the Communists, the Marines were never faced with an all-out attack. The Communists tried their "jitter" campaign on the Marines. As long as the Marines were in a state of readiness for attack, there was no trouble from the Communists; but when the Marines returned to their quarters, the Communists would open with harassing fire. Often they would fire into the trees around the billet of the Marines but never into the billet itself.

It was very fortunate for the writer's regiment that the Communists never chose to attack, for the Marines would
not have had a ghost of a chance. Though their troops were the best in the world, they were only a skeleton of what it would have taken to fight an engagement. It seemed to the writer that the Marines' presence there was more or less a dare which, "Thank God," the Communists never chose to take. They no doubt realized that to wipe the handful of Marines would have meant war with the United States and this was far from what they had in mind.

The writer Rosinger includes in his book, Forging a New China, a very pertinent cartoon which the writer has copied. It shows the path of the Chinese Republic as set up by Sun Yat-sen and how it was opposed by Yuan Shih-Kai at first. Then it shows how the movement reorganized in 1924 under Soviet Advisers, the emergence of Chiang K'ai-shek and then the split between the Communists in Kiangsi and the Nationalists in Nanking. It also pictures the co-operation of the Communists and the Nationalists during the Japanese war and Marshall's mediation in trying to get the Nationalists and the Communists and the few democrats to establish a coalition regime. It ends by showing the Nationalists and the Communists far apart and both shooting at the Democratic League in the center (see Fig. 2 on the following page).

General Marshall stated that there was little hope of reconciling the Communists and the Nationalists after he tried to mediate between them. He explained the situation in China as follows:
Fig. 2.—Pata of The Chinese Republic

-- From Rosinger, Forging a New China, p. 55.
In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.

On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed a communistic form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type.

The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a government of the type endorsed by the Political Consultative Conference last January had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the Government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolutions for the formation of the new government and intended by coercion of military force and the action of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of ignoring the effect of the fears and suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various matters under negotiation. They each sought only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility.

I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. This has usually been under the cover of political or party action, but since the Party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastat-

ing in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe...
that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments -- men who would put the interest of ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end, as for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February and March, some within a few blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave the Communists good excuse for such suspicions.

However, a very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda.\footnote{George C. Marshall, quoted by Harold R. Isaacs, \textit{New Cycle in Asia}, pp. 63-66.}

Marshall then explains how this propaganda is definitely planned to mislead the Chinese people, especially so as to arouse hatred of Americans. Then he continues:

Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them.

I have never been in a position to be certain of the development of attitudes in the innermost Chinese Communist circles. Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent
months indicates an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiation by their last offer which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13 which the Government could not be expected to accept.

Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications -- regardless of the cost in suffering to the Chinese people.

The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.

But one can see what slender chance the liberals in the government and in the Communist Party have in looking at the cartoon (p. 57) in which both the Nationalists and the Communists are far apart and both are shooting at the Democratic League. White and Jacoby also explain the situation as follows:

The Kuomintang seemed determined that in their final choice the Chinese people should have no alternative to rule-by-terror except rule-by-Communism. All through the summer months, wherever the government's machinery of dictatorship could trap them, the liberals and democrats who offered the only non-totalitarian
leadership in the land were either killed, imprisoned, or silenced by fear. Secret assassins singled out for cold-blooded murder not Communists but defenseless members of the Democratic League who had spoken their minds too freely. In Kunming, refugee professors sought safety beneath the roof of the American consulate. In the wake of Chiang's trip to Manchuria, seventy-seven newspapers and periodicals were suppressed by the censors of Peking. Two newspapers were suppressed in Canton. In Peking machine-gun nests were set up by the government armies to sweep the streets in the event of trouble. In Shanghai, the police registered the intellectuals and "Thinkers," listing their names and giving them identification cards of varied colors. All through central China, the promises the Kuomintang had made in the flush of victory were dishonored. In North China the inevitable and expected incident happened. Communist guerrillas, who had watched American marines league with Kuomintang troops to bar them from the railway lines for so many months, grew trigger-happy. A field detachment of guerrillas ambushed an American convoy on the highway between Tientsin and Peking, and Americans and Communists killed each other.

This is an incident the writer covers in detail in a later phase.

The Kuomintang greeted the incident with sedate good cheer as finally sealing Communist-American enmity; the Communists immediately unleashed a barrage of propaganda denouncing America, and declaring -- despite all contrary evidence -- that they had attacked only because the Americans had been accompanying Kuomintang troops.

By late summer, the elaborate structure of truce and American neutrality that Marshall had sought to create was crumbling rapidly. Marshall co-opted a wise and dignified American missionary, Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, to be ambassador as his fellow-envoy. And within a few weeks the two men issued a joint statement admitting the failure of their diplomacy and declaring that it was a seeming impossibility to arrive at any peaceful solution agreeable to both parties. 46

The present situation between the Nationalists and the

Communists is very pointedly described by Hailey in the following quotation:

Last December, armies led by those few survivors of the long march of 1927 swept down from the Shensi hills, where Chiang thought he had them bottled up after their flight there from South China in 1934-35, and in a campaign of two months captured or displaced all Nationalist armies north of the Yangtze River in North China and in Manchuria, and drove Chiang into retirement. Today they seem to be in a position soon to make themselves rulers of a large part of the world's most populous nation -- 465,000,000 people.47

47Hailey, op. cit., p. 10.
CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES

Many people are now wondering what kind and manner of men these Communists really are. A detailed history of the lives of the three Communists who are at the head of the party in China is really a history of the Chinese Communists and of their workings. Edgar Snow succeeded in getting the life of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese People's Soviet Republic, direct from Mao himself. Mao's childhood as told to Edgar Snow is interesting and informative about the customs of China when told in Mao's own words:

I was born in the village of Shao Shan, in Hsiang T'an Hsien, Hunan province, in 1893. My father's name was Mao Jen-sheng, and my mother's maiden name was Wen Ch'i-mei.

My father was a poor peasant and while still young was obliged to join the army because of heavy debts. He was a soldier for many years. Later on he returned to the village where I was born, and by saving carefully and gathering together a little money, through small trading and other enterprise, he managed to buy back his land.

As a middle peasant then my family owned fifteen mou of land. On this they could raise sixty tan of rice a year. The five members of the family consumed a total of thirty-five tan -- that is, about seven each -- which left an annual surplus of twenty-five tan. Using this surplus, my father accumulated a little capital and in time purchased seven more mou, which gave the family the status of "rich" peasants. We could then raise eighty-four tan of rice a year.

At the time my father was a middle peasant he began to deal in grain transport and selling, by which
he made a little money. After he became a "rich" peasant, he devoted most of his time to that business. He hired a full-time farm labourer, and put his children to work on the farm, as well as his wife. I began to work at farming tasks when I was six years old. . . .

I began studying in a local primary school when I was eight and remained there until I was thirteen years old. In the early morning and at night I worked on the farm. During the day I read the Confucian Analects and the Four Classics. My Chinese teacher belonged to the stern-treatment school. He was harsh and severe, frequently beating the students. Because of this I ran away from the school when I was ten. I was afraid to return home, for fear of receiving a beating there, and set out in the general direction of the city, which I believed to be in a valley somewhere. I wandered for three days before I was finally found by my family. . . . After my return to my family, however, to my surprise, conditions somewhat improved. My father was slightly more considerate and the teacher was more inclined to moderation.

The old man continued to "amass wealth," or what was considered to be a great fortune in that little village. He did not buy more land himself, but he bought many mortgages on other people's land. His capital grew to $2,000 or $3,000.

My father had had two years of schooling and he could read enough to keep books. My mother was wholly illiterate. Both were from peasant families. I was the family "scholar." I knew the Classics, but disliked them. What I enjoyed were the romances of old China and especially stories of rebellions. I read [these romances] while still very young, and despite the vigilance of my old teacher, who hated these outlawed books and called them wicked. I used to read them in school, covering them up with a Classic when the teacher walked past. I believe that I was much influenced by such books, read at an impressionable age.

I finally left the primary school when I was thirteen and began to work long hours on the farm, helping the hired labourer, doing the full labour of a man during the day and at night keeping books for my father. Nevertheless, I succeeded in continuing my reading, devouring everything I could find except the Classics. This annoyed my father, who wanted me to master the Classics, especially after he was defeated in a lawsuit due to an apt Classical quotation used by his adversary in the Chinese court. I read a
book called *Words of Warning*, which I liked very much. The authors, a number of old reformist scholars, thought that the weakness of China lay in her lack of Western appliances -- railways, telephones, telegraphs and steamships -- and wanted to have them introduced into the country.

*Words of Warning* stimulated in me a desire to resume my studies. I had also become disgusted with my labour on the farm. My father naturally opposed this. We quarreled about it, and finally I ran away from home. I went to the home of an unemployed law student and there studied for half a year.¹

A few rebellions against landlords occurred around where Mao was during the next year and made a lasting impression on his young mind, already rebellious. He says:

In this period also I began to have a certain amount of political consciousness, especially after I read a pamphlet telling of the dismemberment of China [by Japan]. . . . After I read this I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realize that it was a duty of all the people to help save it.

When Mao was sixteen, he went to a school in Hsiang, where his mother's family lived. He continues:

I had never before seen so many children together. Most of them were sons of landlords, wearing expensive clothes, very few peasants could afford to send their children to such a school. I was more poorly dressed than the others. I owned only one decent coat-and-trousers suit. . . . Many of the richer students despised me because usually I was wearing my ragged coat and trousers. However, among them I had friends, and two especially were my good comrades. One of those is now a writer, living in Soviet Russia.

I made good progress at this school. The teachers liked me, especially those who taught the Classics, because I wrote good essays in the Classical manner. But my mind was not on the Classics. I was reading two books sent to me by my cousin, telling of the Reform movement of K'An Yu-wei. One was called the

¹Snow, op. cit., p. 117.
Journal of the New People. I also learned something of foreign history at this time and of geography.

At this time Mao felt pride in Japan's victory over Russia at the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

Later Mao went to Changsha to a middle school. While there the students demonstrated their anti-Manchu sentiments by a rebellion against the pigtail. Mao says:

... One friend and I clipped off our pigtails, but others, who had promised to do so, afterwards failed to keep their word. My friend and I therefore assaulted them in secret and forcibly removed their queues, a total of more than ten falling victim to our shears.²

At Changsha he joined the regular army where he spent much of his time reading the newspapers. He read the Hsiang Kiang Daily News, where he first saw Socialism discussed. After he had been a soldier for half a year, he resigned and continued his studies. He began to read advertisements of schools in the papers and paid his dollar to register for several of the schools -- a police school, a soap-making school, a law school, and a commercial school -- all of which he soon left and decided to continue his studies by reading in a library. He spent half a year this way.

Later Mao went to Hunan Normal School for five years and graduated in 1918. Here his political ideas began to take shape. Here also he acquired his first experiences in social action. His favorite teacher was an English teacher

²Ibid., p. 123.
of ethics. "He believed in his ethics very strongly and
tried to imbue his students with the desire to become just,
moral, virtuous men, useful in society." Mao married his
ethics teacher's daughter, Yang K'ai-hui, who was later
killed by the Kuomintang. He had been married at fourteen
by his family to a twenty-year-old girl but never lived with
her and never considered her his wife. Now he is married
to Ho Tau-chien. Mao built up a group of students around
him at the normal school and formed various societies while
in the normal school. He also became an ardent physical
culturist. He describes his activities:

The next summer I set out across the province by
foot, and journeyed through five counties. I was ac-
 companied by a student named Haio Yu. We walked
through these five counties without using a single
copper. The peasants fed us and gave us a place to
sleep; wherever we went we were kindly treated and
welcomed.

In the winter holidays we tramped through the
fields, up and down mountains, along city walls, and
across the streams and rivers. If it rained we took
off our shirts and called it a rain bath. In the
spring winds we shouted that this was a new sport
called "wind bathing." We slept in the open when
frost was already falling and even in November swam
in the cold rivers. All this went on under the title
of "body-training." Perhaps it helped much to build
the physique which I was to need so badly later on in
my many marches back and forth across South China,
and on the Long March from Kiangsi to the North-west.

Mao says that at the time of his graduation,

... My mind was a curious mixture of ideas of lib-
eralism, democratic reformism, and Utopian Socialism.
I had somewhat vague passions about "nineteenth-century
democracy," Utopianism and old-fashioned liberalism,
and I was definitely anti-militarist and anti-im-
perialist.
It was not until later that he took up Marxism.

In the winter of 1920, I organized workers politically, for the first time, and began to be guided in this by the influence of Marxist theory and the history of the Russian Revolution. During my second visit to Peking I had read much about the events in Russia, and had eagerly sought what little Communist literature was then available in Chinese. Three books especially deeply carved my mind, and built up in me a faith in Marxism, from which, once I had accepted it as the correct interpretation of history, I did not afterwards waver. These books were The Communist Manifesto, translated by Chen Weng-tao, and the first Marxist book ever published in Chinese, Class Struggle, by Kautsky, and a History of Socialism, by Kirkupp. By the summer of 1920 I had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist, and from this time on I considered myself a Marxist.³

In Snow's writing there was a pause to give an explanation as follows: "Mao was now a Marxist, but not a Communist--simply because as yet there did not exist in China such an organization as the Communist Party." But in 1921 the first provincial branch of the Communist Party was organized in Hunan, and Mao became a member of it.

... Except for a brief period in early 1927 when Mao disagreed so violently with party policy, which was being dictated by the Russian adviser, Michael Borodin, that he was ousted from the Political Bureau and the Party Front Committee, he has been since the head man of the Chinese Communist movement.⁴

At present the eyes of the whole world are on this man Mao; people are wondering if he will give up his authority and become a tail-light to Russia's kite or if he has enough Nationalism and love for China to become a Chinese

³Ibid., p. 139. ⁴Hailey, op. cit., p. 16.
Tito and turn against Russia in favor of his own country.

Henry R. Lieberman, in an article, "Fear of Chinese Tito," in The New York Times of February 6, 1949, speaks of possible Soviet fears that Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, with his domestic program of co-operation with "middle economic groups," might become a Tito. Foster Hailey in The New York Times of February 13, 1949, refutes that statement by saying that the Chinese Communists last summer denounced Marshal Tito and the Yugo-slavs. Snow says, "Remember that the Chinese Communists' adherence to the Comintern, and unity with the U. S. S. R., have always been entirely voluntary, and could have been liquidated at any time by the Chinese from within." Snow also continues:

... "The Soviet Government in China," reads the Constitution adopted at the first All-China Soviet Congress, "declares its readiness to form a revolutionary united front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations, and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally.

The second high Communist in China is Chu Teh, sixty-two, Commander-in-Chief of the Communist armies. He has always been a professional soldier. He is the son of a wealthy family of South China. He graduated from Yunnan Military Academy in 1911 about the time Sun Yat-sen was starting his first but unsuccessful revolution. He was put in command of a company and by 1916 he was a brigade commander.

5Ibid., p. 16.
Then he became aide-de-camp to the Governor of Yunnan, which post he held until 1921 when he joined the Communists.

In 1922 Chu was sent to Germany by the Communists "to study the files of the German General Staff and to help the growth there of Communism."6 Twice he was arrested in the Weimar Republic and was asked to leave.

Chu returned to China in 1926 while the Kuomintang and the Communists were staging their revolt. First he became an army political commissar and then head of the Nanchang branch of the Whampoa Military Academy and Chief of Police of Nanchang. George Creel says, "Opium smoking and loose living brought about his discharge [from the army] and it was in this time of unhappiness that he fell under the influence of a Russian group and became a rabid convert to Communism."7 When Chiang K'ai-shek started his purge of the Communists, Chu Teh, in command of the Ninth Army, led the Nanchang rebellion but was defeated and then he fled to join Mao. Since the Nanchang defeat, Chu Teh "has never lost either a battle or a campaign against Chiang's soldiers."8

In his early days before he became a Communist, Chu Teh lived as a typical warlord, with fine houses and concubines. He was also an opium addict. After he became a Communist he lost his houses and freed his concubines. He

---

6Snow, op. cit., p. 370.  
7Hailey, op. cit., pp. 56-57.  
8Creel, op. cit., p. 50.
cured himself of the opium habit by going aboard a British vessel where he could not get the drug. He has never used the drug any more. He lived in Yanan, the Red Capital, with his first wife for twelve years. They have no children.

Chou En-lai, fifty, is top Communist diplomat, in charge of foreign affairs. He is evidently "the rarest of all creatures in China, a pure intellectual in whom action was perfectly coordinated with knowledge and conviction. He was a scholar turned insurrectionist," ⁹ says Edgar Snow of Chou. Chou comes from South China. He is the "son of a great Mandarin family, his grandfather a high official in the Manchu dynasty, his father a brilliant teacher, his mother extraordinary (well-read woman who actually liked modern literature!)." ¹⁰

When Chou was fifteen, his parents moved to Manchuria. He attended middle school at Tientsin, then he spent a year at Waseda University, in Japan. Later he came back to Tientsin and attended Nankei University. Chou himself "seemed destined for a career as a scholar, for from early childhood he showed marked literary genius," but he became interested in the revolutionary movement.

... Like many others of his generation, educated in a period of national awakening, his interest in literature was deflected. When, after the First

---

⁹Snow, op. cit., p. 45. ¹⁰Ibid.
Revolution (1911), China's innocent "Literary Renaissance" began to germinate more serious growths, Chou was swept into the movement for social revolution.\textsuperscript{11}

He became a student leader of the movement. "In 1919 he was arrested and sentenced to a year in jail."\textsuperscript{12} There he met Ting Ying-chao, whom he married. She is an educated woman but is now an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Chou studied and helped organize a Chinese Communist Party in France and Germany, where he stayed four years. When he returned home, he became chief of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy at the time Chiang K'ai-shek was its head.

During the Communist purge, Chou was imprisoned, but he escaped and went underground with the Communists in Hong-kong, Shanghai, and Canton. In 1928 he was sent to Moscow by the Communist Party to attend the Sixth Congress of the Communist International.\textsuperscript{13} He returned to Moscow in 1935 for the Seventh Congress also.

Hence we see that the three top men in the Communist Party are all educated men and were all from well-to-do families. Mao Tse-tung and General Chu Teh have never been to Moscow. "The Chinese Communist command are hard-boiled, tough-minded men who seem to have a very good idea of exactly where they want to go."\textsuperscript{14} Foster Hailey continues:

\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{12}Hailey, op. cit., p. 57.  
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
The top men of the Chinese Communist Party are, on the record, all Marxists who believe in the dictatorship of the worker, in class war and in world revolution. In public statements on international affairs they have faithfully followed the Cominform line. They picture the United States, and most Western democracies, as ruled by monopoly capitalists, with imperialistic designs.¹⁵

General Marshall says of the Chinese Communists in general:

The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. . . . On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments -- men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future.¹⁶

The writer's impression of the Communists was that they were not a Russian-led organization but rather some of the lowly peasants who had been kicked around and half starved ever since they came into the world. The Communists had come along and at least dealt with them as though they were men rather than beasts, and by going with them, they could get something to eat and have some hope for the future.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 10. ¹⁶Issacs, op. cit., p. 65.
But the leaders and the dyed-in-the-wool Communists have worked out a Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist ideology which they teach to the poor coolies. Edward King-Tung Chen, Instructor in Spanish and Government at the University of Houston, says that the basis of the Communist ideology is

. . . Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism. In fact, the Chinese Communists have always acknowledged that. They have even given their basic ideology a simplified name in Chinese. Using the first syllable of the three names, they call their basic ideology, the principle of Me-Li-Sxe. However, the Chinese Communists take pains to explain that Communism is but their ultimate goal, as China, which is still in a semi-colonial semi-feudalistic status, is not ready for Communism. For the time being, that which should be put into practice, that which will direct all the activities of the Chinese Communist Party, is the thought of Mao Tze-tung. As the New Democracy Handbook (published by a Communist publishing house in Hongkong) states it: "The thought of Mao Tze-tung is the Communism of China. It is the Marxism of China."

According to The New Democracy, written by Mao in 1940 as a Communist directive, Chen says that Mao explains that

. . . according to the Marxist doctrine, the revolution must go through several steps, from feudalism to capitalism, and then from capitalism to Socialism. China is still under feudalistic control now. To permit it to go through the routine, going into the capitalistic society or bourgeois dictatorship, and then emerge into Socialism, will never do. To go directly into Socialism is out of the question, as the task of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism is still uncompleted. Therefore, Mao proposes that the Chinese revolution go through two stages, of which the first should form the groundwork of the second. The first stage is to set up a new democracy in which

---

the progressives of all classes, excluding only the feudal and bureaucratic elements such as those which comprise the Kuomintang, will participate. The new state will be a combined dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. With the establishment of this coalition government, there will be a gradual shift into the second stage. Power will then be centered in the proletariat until the final attainment of the second stage with the abolition of classes and the realization of Socialism. Evidently, this stand has been endorsed by Moscow, for it has been preached by the Chinese Communists for nine years already, and Mao has not been disavowed by Moscow as a heretic yet. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party, in a plenary session of their Central Executive Committee held at Peiping recently, fully endorsed all the stands and declarations made by Mao Tse-tung.18

Therefore, Chen says that at the present time, the Chinese Communists are gradually approaching the completion of the first stage of their revolution. Now the world wants to know what principles or ideology the Chinese Communists will follow after they come into power. For that reason Chen has studied the writings and public utterances of Mao Tse-tung and summarized the principles of the Communists as follows:

GOVERNMENT. The new government is to be set up through a series of meetings of the people. From the village to the district, then to the area, the province and to the nation. At each level, the people's representatives will elect the government and select the representatives to the next level. This is what they call democratic centralization. Actually, it is used to assure that only the chosen one will rule.

ECONOMY. All big banks, big industries, and big commercial establishments must be state-owned. In order to ensure the freedom of the people's livelihood

18 Ibid.
from the influence of private profit, all native-owned or foreign-owned enterprises, either monopolist or of a dimension too large for private efforts, will be managed and controlled by the state alone. For the time being, the state will not confiscate any other form of private property and will not forbid the development of capitalistic production, so long as it does not affect the people's livelihood. The reason for this is that the Chinese economy is still in a very backward state. The new government should take necessary steps to change China from an agricultural to an industrial economy, starting first by developing light industries and then gradually progressing to heavy industries. Relations between labor and capital are to be harmonized so that the rights of the working class will be adequately protected, yet, at the same time, reasonable profits assured for the investors. As for the capital to develop these industries, the greater part of it will come from the accumulated wealth of the Chinese people. Foreign investments will be welcomed, but only those which will comply with Chinese laws and will be beneficial to the Chinese economy. In other words, the new economy will be strictly a state-controlled economy.

LAND REFORM. Each tiller to have his land, an idea developed by Dr. Sun Yet-sen, father of the Chinese Republic, is to be carried out. The feudalistic relations in the villages are to be destroyed. Land owned by the big landlords will be taken over and distributed to the peasants. Ownership of land will thus be readjusted, not with a view of building up a Socialist agriculture, but only in order to turn the land into the peasants' own property. At present, over 80 per cent of the population of China consists of peasants. The peasant problem thus becomes the fundamental problem of the Chinese revolution and the peasantry becomes the main force of the revolution. The politics of the new democracy is in essence the politics of the transfer of power to the peasantry. After land reform is on its way, the peasants will be encouraged to reorganize cooperatives to stimulate production. The increased productive power will in turn stimulate industrial progress, and thus strengthen the people's economy.

EDUCATION. The cultural leaders, the educators, and the educated class will be respected by the people only if they will serve the people and mix themselves with the people. As 80 per cent of the population of China is still illiterate, the essential task confronting the new government is to erase illiteracy.
Illiteracy must be wiped out. Along with mass education, a new Chinese culture must be developed. The ancient, feudal, and fascist culture must be eliminated. The rubbish must be sifted out and discarded. The new culture which will take its place will neither be entirely Chinese nor entirely Western. Nor will it be proletarian nor socialistic. Its contents will be anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. It will be scientific. Not only will China's ancient democratic heritage be kept, but the progressive democratic culture of all countries will also be absorbed on a great scale. It will take what is really revolutionary and democratic in all of them. The new culture, which will be a native culture of the Chinese people, will also form a part of the world's progressive cultural movement. The new culture should be used in the services of the workers and the peasants. The task which the new government is to perform has a twofold motive. On one side, it must provide for the education of the revolutionary cadres, and on the other, the education of the masses. At the same time, the two forms of activity are to be linked up so as to raise the standard, both of national culture and of the means whereby it is conveyed to the people. For the people, the cultural weapon is to be wielded as a powerful weapon of the revolution.

RELIGION. Communists may work in a united front for political action with people who profess religious or idealistic beliefs but should have nothing to do with philosophical idealism or religion in themselves. To show their impartiality, they say that even the application of Marxism is useless. The point is to grasp the general truths of Marxism and apply them to the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, i.e., to sinicize Marxism.

ARMED FORCES. The armed forces shall be the fighting might of the entire people under the new democracy. It shall be backed by the entire population, not just a particular party or particular group of people. To assure that the members of the armed forces have the proper attitude, they are to be educated, so that they will discard their ancient feudalistic concept and really serve the people.

MINORITY PEOPLES. The minority peoples in China such as the Manchurians, Mongolians, Thibetans, Turks, Miasos, etc., are to have absolute equality with the other peoples within China. The language, customs, and religious beliefs of each of them will be respected. All will have the right to determine their own destiny. They can, of their own free will, join the united and free Republic of China, which will be a union of all
peoples joined together of their own free will.

FOREIGN RELATIONS. Establish friendly relations with all nations on the basis of mutual respect of each other's independence and equality. The hand of friendship offered by the Soviet Union and the international proletariat should be firmly grasped, as the refusal to take help from the U. S. S. R. has inevitably led to disastrous consequences in the past. The friendship of the U. S. A. as well as Great Britain are to be welcomed, but their foreign policy should not be contrary to the genuine desire of the Chinese people. Regardless of the nation, there can be no greater error than to back up reactionary forces in China to oppose the will of the Chinese people. Internationally, all people should have the right to determine the form of government they desire in the democratic manner. The Chinese people support all endeavor to bring about world peace. They will join hands with the people of the U. S. A., Great Britain, France, U. S. S. R., and all other people who will go along together toward the path leading to a firm and everlasting peace.

Edward King-tung Chen then sums up the principles which the Chinese Communists will put into practice. He says:

The kind of government which will appear in China is this: It will be a soviet type of government modeled after the U. S. S. R. The people will participate only at the lowest level. At the upper levels, they will be indirectly represented. The national economy will be strictly controlled by the government. Private industries can only exist with the permission of the government. Agriculture will be guided by the state. Land confiscation will be carried out more rigidly. Education will be turned toward the Communist line so that the people will be properly indoctrinated. The armed forces will be made an absolute tool of the Communists. No opposition will be tolerated. The ancient Chinese culture will be remolded to fit the Communist pattern. The teachings of Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tze, Chuang Tze, and other philosophers which have guided the Chinese people through many centuries are to be discarded. Social institutions will be changed. Traditional beliefs will not be tolerated. Under the guise of religious freedom, atheism will be used to destroy all religions. Other rights of the people will be similarly restricted.
Minority peoples will have equal status within the Chinese union. Finally, in foreign relations, it will tie itself with the Communist world. Only the U. S. S. R. and her satellites are worthy friends. The U. S. A., Great Britain, and other Western nations will be enemies, because they are capitalistic, feudalistic, and imperialistic. 19

The Chinese Communist Party is organized similarly to Communist parties elsewhere; however, it does vary somewhat from the Russian pattern. Mao stated that "it was the Chinese peasant instead of the city worker, on whom the Chinese revolution must be based." 20 Mao has also said that farm collectivization is not feasible among the Chinese. The Communists do not take all the land belonging to a landlord. In Manchuria now they permit landlords to keep seventy-five acres, and in North China they keep twenty-five acres if they can farm that large an area themselves.

The Reds are political propagandists and organizers. Wherever they go they explain to the peasants that "only through revolution can their needs be realized"; 21 and that the Communist Party is the only party which can lead them. Mao said, "Our main tasks, as we saw them, were two: to divide the land, and to establish Soviets. We wanted to arm the masses to hasten this process." 22 They organize all the people so that the "people's militia" holds the land the Communists conquer while they go on somewhere else. Harry R.

---

19Ibid. 20Bailey, op. cit., p. 57.
21Snow, op. cit., p. 274. 22Ibid.
Leiberman says in *The New York Times* (January 4, 1948) that when the Communists enter a town, they look up the village roughneck. They give small parcels of confiscated land to the poorest peasants to enlist their support. Their propaganda is very malicious according to General Marshall:

"I wish to state to the American people that in the deliberate mis-representation and abuse of the action, policies, and purposes of our Government this propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse bitter hatred of Americans."  

However, Marshall recognized "that China's civil war was no mere coup-d'etat. It is in fact, a social revolution, which the Communists have been smart enough to lead" with their slick-tongued propaganda. Some writers (Snow and White and Jacoby, for example) leave the general impression that they think if the Americans had been smart enough to study the conditions of the starving Chinese and to lead the social revolution in China themselves, the whole situation might have been different. From all writings Mao seems to be a person who is interested in the welfare of the Chinese only. Snow says he receives very little compensation for his part in the revolution. In fact, he, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai would all have been well off financially if they had stayed with the Nationalists. They all gave up their

---

23 Isaacs, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

wealth to follow the Communists. Evidently these men are all hunting something better for the Chinese people, and they think the Russian pattern of Communism offers what they want. White and Jacoby say that the United States might have made friends with the Communists in 1944:

The fall of 1944 opened a high opportunity to America. For a brief period it was possible to prove to the Chinese revolutionary movement that America too stood for progress. In all the last twenty years the magnificent energies and the social conscience of the Communists had been linked by a rigid formula to exclusive support of the Soviet Union. Now was the moment to prove to both the Russian and the Chinese Communists that America acted not out of any Marxist predestination but out of a conscience that sought freedom and democracy everywhere in the world.

We cast this opportunity away. During the next six months we chose to prove to the Chinese Communists that no matter how friendly they might be to us, we would support the government of Chiang K'ai-shek against them under any circumstances. We chose to prove to the Chinese Communists that indeed the only friend they had was the Soviet Union; we forced them back to an alliance and dependence on Russia more unquestioning than at any time since the days of the Long March. By so doing we created the very thing we feared most, a huge organized mass of Asiatic peasants believing that America was their enemy and Russia their only friend. It was not the relief of Stilwell that did this; the Communists accepted that as a minor tragedy arising from American ignorance. It was the course of American diplomacy during the year of 1945 that finally convinced the Chinese Communists that America was a hostile power. 25

The United States tried political and military aid and made some errors at that, according to Creel. "General Joseph Stilwell had sacrificed China's best divisions by ill-fated

Burma campaigns, and his feud with General Claire Chennault had materially lowered the effectiveness of China's air force. But the United States tried to patch up the trouble, as Creel says:

The good offices of Patrick J. Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative, were solicited to arrange a truce with the Reds, and when the effort failed, the Central Executive Committee resorted to actual pleading. At the Eleventh Plenary Session held on September 13, 1943, resolutions were adopted beseeching the Communists to abide by these four points:

(1) To fight for the realization of Sun Yet-sen's principles; (2) to stop the policy of violence for the overthrow of the government; (3) to abolish the Soviet Republic, as solemnly pledged in 1937, and join in the establishment of true national unity; (4) to disband the Red armies as independent forces, and submit to their reincorporation in the National armies.

Chiang K'ai-shek, at this session, also made the specific pledge that within one year after the close of war, a National Assembly would be called, and full sovereignty restored to the nation as a whole. After handing the government over to the people, and the establishment of constitutional rule, the Kuomintang would retire to a position of equality with other parties, enjoying only the right of equal treatment "under the principles of freedom of assembly, organization, speech and publication."

Rejecting all overtures, the Communists went ahead with the capture of strategic positions and the upbuilding of their armies.27

However, Chiang K'ai-shek always insisted that no peace could be made with the Communists and proved it, as the writer explained in Chapter II. In return for all the United States' pains and efforts to get the Nationalists and the Communists to come to a peaceful agreement, the United States

---

26Creel, op. cit., p. 87.  
27Ibid., pp. 87-88.
received the following thankless comment from Chou En-lai:

General Marshall was most bitter against the propaganda work of the Chinese Communist Party. It is true that since last March the Chinese Communist Party has incessantly exposed mistakes and changes in the United States Government policy towards China. It especially ceaselessly exposed and protested against stationing of American troops in China, American intervention into Chinese internal affairs, and penetration into Liberated Areas. . . . The essence of the policy of American imperialism is to colonize China, and facts of the Kuomintang diplomacy of national betrayal were also frequently thoroughly exposed by us.\textsuperscript{28}

Such malicious reference to the alleged imperialism of the United States is what has driven America to support Chiang K'ai-shek, who is married to one of the Soong sisters who was educated in the United States and knows that this country has no imperialistic desires in China.

There is another Communist leader in Manchuria named Lin Piao who is being discussed more prominently in the last few weeks since the writer started his study. Lin Piao is a forty-one-year-old field leader for the Communists operating in Manchuria and Jehol. He is one of the Communists' ablest military leaders since he is the conqueror of Manchuria. He believes that there should be no compromise with the Nationalists. At times he has occasion to differ in policy with Mao, the present leader of the Communist Party.

Mao's leadership is political and not military. He is

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 168.
the master propagandist and organizer of the party. He leads the people according to his own ideas. It is too bad that these ideas are not along democratic lines instead of communistic. He tells of his organizing Communist movements himself:

In May, 1922, the Hunan Party, of which I was then secretary, had already organized more than twenty trade-unions, among miners, railway workers, municipal employees, printers, and workers in the Government Mint. A vigorous labour movement began that winter. The work of the Communist Party was then concentrated mainly on students and workers, and very little was done among the peasants. Most of the big mines were organized and virtually all the students. There were numerous struggles on both the students' and workers' fronts.\(^{29}\)

Also, he says, "While in Hunan I organized the nucleus of the great peasant movement of that province. . . . I left my home, where I had been resting, and began a rural organization campaign. In a few months we had formed more than twenty peasant unions." Then he continues, "I was sent to Changsha to organize the movement which later became known as the Autumn Crop Uprising."\(^{30}\)

Snow then tells us that the Communists have a Red theatre where they put on propaganda playlets. Dancing, singing, and pantomime all go along with it. "The whole thing is "propaganda in art" carried to the ultimate degree."\(^{31}\) No admission is charged, and all the poorer people

\(^{29}\text{Snow, op. cit., pp. 141 and 149.}\)

\(^{30}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{31}\text{Ibid., p. 105.}\)
crowd to the performances.

"Chinese Communists may be agrarian reformers; they may be genuinely Chinese but they are also genuinely Communists and like Communists everywhere they 'steer their course by Moscow's star.'"32 Mao speaks of two Russian Communists, Yorck and Volen, who attended a meeting of the Central Committee in 1926.33 He also speaks of receiving "the report of the proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party, held in Moscow,"34 and adds, "With the new line adopted at that Congress, Chu Teh and I were in complete agreement... Party harmony was re-established."35

Edgar Snow says the Chinese Communists planned "a brief epoch of 'controlled capitalism,'" and then a period of state capitalism, followed at last by a speedy transition into Socialist construction, with the help of the U.S.S.R. All this is indicated quite clearly in Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic.36 Snow also adds that they expected to be 'aided by their 'proletarian allies' of the world, and the toilers of the U.S.S.R.'37 Snow explains the Russian influence in China as follows:

34Ibid., p. 153.
35Ibid.
36Ibid., p. 438.
37Ibid., p. 439.
Certainly and obviously Russia has for the past
dozens years been a dominating influence -- and par-
ticularly among educated youth it has been the domi-
nating external influence -- on Chinese thought about
the social, political, economic, and cultural problems
of the country. This has been almost as true, though
unacknowledged, in the Kuomintang areas as it has
been an openly glorified fact in the Soviet districts.
Everywhere that youth has any solid political beliefs
in China the impact of Marxist ideology is apparent,
both as a philosophy and as a kind of substitute for
religion. Among young Chinese, Lenin is almost wor-
shipped, Stalin is by far the most popular foreign
leader, Socialism is taken for granted as the future
form of Chinese society, and Russian literature has
the largest following -- Maxim Gorky's works, for
example, outselling all native writers except Lu
Hsun, who was himself a great social revolutionery.
... Marxism, the Russian Revolution, and the
triumphs of the Soviet Union are influences which have
made deeper and more profound spiritual impressions
on the Chinese people than all bourgeois Christian
influences combined.

"... The Soviet Government in China," reads the
Constitution adopted at the first All-China Soviet
Congress, "declares its readiness to form a revolu-
tionary united front with the world proletariat and
all oppressed nations, and proclaims the Soviet Union,
the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal
ally."

Snow also says he saw and heard and felt the idea of the
Chinese Communists "having behind them such a great ally --
even though it has been less and less validated by any demon-
strations of positive support from the Soviet Union -- is of
primary importance to the morale of the Chinese cause, and
they deeply cherish it."38

Snow was even more emphatic in an article in The Satur-
day Evening Post when he said:

38 Ibid., pp. 369-371.
It is misleading to contend that Chinese Communists are not Marxists, however, or that they do not hope, ultimately, to build up a classless socialist state in China, or that they are not very close to the Soviet Union in their sympathies. People who try to persuade Americans to accept them on the ground that they are not real Communists, in the foregoing sense, are either misinformed or deliberately dishonest. 39

But Roger Lapham, chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration in China, gave a statement to the press on November 2, in which he made the following statement: "I am not saying that every Chinese Communist soldier is a disciple of Marx, but there is no doubt the leadership of the Chinese Communists have the same wave length as Moscow." 40 George Creel says that Lin Yutang makes this finding:

There are not different national Communist parties in dozens of countries, there is only one international Communist party in the world. There are not different party lines changing from time to time; there is only one Communist party line in whatever country and time, and that is, Russia is always right. 41

Along the same line Chen goes into the question as to whether the Chinese Communists are real Communists are only radical agrarians. He says:

On April 24th, 1945, Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communists, delivered a report to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on the political situation in China. This report has been published since then in pamphlet form under the title, On Coalition Government, and is regarded as one of the bibles of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao

---

39 Quoted by Creel, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
declared: "We Communists have never hidden our political aims. Our future aim, or rather our ultimate aim, is to push China into the realm of Socialism and Communism. This is definite and unrevocable. The name of our party and the universality of Marxism clearly indicate the direction of this highest, highest, and most beautiful ideal that is to be realized. Each one of us on becoming a member of the party has before him two motives: to fight for the new democratic revolution in the immediate present, and to fight for the proletarian socialist revolution of the future." If the Chinese Communists themselves do not deny that they are true followers of Communism, why should we deny it for them?

Recently, a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives released a study on Communism in China. In the report, the subcommittee pointed out that "for many years, the most important single test of unqualified Communist discipline has been the following of zig-zags in the world party line. This has been the test that has distinguished heretics against world communism from its loyal followers. It is the test that has combed out the present tried and proven leaders." In 1935, the Comintern adopted the popular-front line; the Chinese Communists followed it. From 1937 to 1939, Moscow favored the war against Japan; the Chinese Communists meekly joined themselves with the Chinese Nationalists in fighting the Japs. From 1939 to 1941, Moscow called the European war an imperialistic war; the Chinese Communists slackened their war effort and concentrated on their own drive for power. Then, after June 22, 1941, the imperialist war became the war for freedom and democracy; the Chinese Communists again pushed their war efforts.

More recently, similar adherences to the Moscow line have been made by the Chinese Communists. Tito was declared a traitor of Communism. The Chinese Communists castigated him. Moscow declared that the Atlantic Pact was a threat against world peace. The Chinese Communists also said so. American and European Communists, under Cominform direction, declared that if their nation went to war against the U. S. S. R., they would refuse to bear arms. The Chinese Communists openly proclaimed that they would align themselves alongside the U. S. S. R. and fight any aggressor if the U. S. S. R. were attacked. Indeed, the Chinese Communists do not deviate at all from the dictates of Moscow. There can be no more faithful followers.
In the words of the U. S. Congressional subcommittee, "No Communists in the world have better standing."  

Numerous statements have been made about where the Chinese Communists obtain their arms. Creel says:

General Fu Tso-yi is the grizzled Nationalist commander-in-chief who was holding Hopei province against the Communists. When we sat together in Peiping, I asked about the source of Red supplies, and he shrugged as he made answer: "Since they do not believe in God, certainly the regular replenishment of their stock piles cannot come from heaven. And in view of their denial of Russian support, it is indeed strange that in almost every engagement we capture weapons and munitions with Russian markings... First equipped from the huge stores of Japan's crack Kwantung army, handed over by the Russians, they have since received a steady flow of supplies from Russia."  

H. E. Paul Yu-Pin, D. D., archbishop of Hankow, is also on record with similar charges. "Russia supplies much of the war materials used by the Chinese Communists; most of the guns, ammunition and artillery used were surrendered to Russia by Japan; some of the supplies are part of American and British Lend-Lease to Russia."  

"The Chinese Communists now are fighting with American arms they have captured from the Nationalists, and the more arms we send Chiang K'ai-shek the more the Communists will have." They are also fighting with arms purchased from the American Marines in some cases. We Americans are not always perfect

42 Tung Chen, op. cit.  
and for a few dollars of American currency the writer has seen men sell weapons to their enemy. Soon after the war ended all our weapons did not show on the books, and in several instances equipment was reported missing that could have gone to no other place than to the Communists. It was a commonly known fact that an American weapon would bring from $150 up. The writer knew one officer who sold a 45-calibre pistol for $150 in American dollars, to our barber, who was in "cahoots" with the Communists. Communists are also using Russian arms, according to Creel. He says:

. . . The major portion of Russian supplies goes to Lin Piao's so-called Northeast Democratic Allied Army, operating in Manchuria and Jehol, made up of Chinese, Koreans, Japanese prisoners of war and Mongolians. First equipped from the huge stores of Japan's crack Kwantung army, handed over by the Russians, they have since received a steady flow of supplies from Russia.46

The Communists do not fight open warfare but are masters of guerrilla tactics. They tried some of their guerrilla warfare on us. One day our Marine supply convoy between Teinsin and Peiping was faced with an ambush. The Communists, being extremely familiar with the road and surrounding territory, picked a spot between two hills on either side of the road to deploy and await our convoy. When all the vehicles had moved within range and before the lead jeep had cleared the pass, they opened fire. The

heaviest concentration of fire was directed to the lead jeep which was occupied by the senior officer who was in command of the convoy and the communication or radio jeep. Both were knocked out. With the officer out of the way, the guerrillas calculated that the remainder would be a disorganized mob; but our troops were far from new at the game and such was not the case. The senior non-commissioned officer took immediate command and deployed the men in the ditches to return the fire. He dispatched the rear jeep to make a break back to Teinsin for help.

The remaining men in the Marine detail did not have enough fire power to drive off the attackers, but they did prevent complete annihilation. When a combat unit of Marines arrived from Teinsin, the Communists used a small branch as their avenue of retreat and scurrieded into a nearby village. Once inside the village there was no way to tell one coolie from another, for the Communists wore no uniforms and were in the same dress as everyone else. This was not hard for them to do, for they were just Chinese coolies who had joined with the Communists. The Communists had given them organization, training, and weapons. The only means of retaliation we had was to wipe out the entire village, and such was not in line with American policy. We came out with one officer and three enlisted men killed and nine others wounded. Thereafter we sent a tank along with a
well-armed and alert convoy and were not bothered again on that particular run.

During the writer’s own brief stay in China it was quite apparent that Chinese attitude toward us had changed. When we first arrived, everyone was very friendly toward us and would greet us when we passed with their thumbs up, shouting, "MayGWAW Ting ha00," which means "America very good," or "Ting ha00 Joe." At first, there was never any sign of hatred or contempt to greet us. By the time the writer left, nine months later, we could drive through the village of Lensi and hear more "BOO ha00's," which means "no good" or "very bad," than we did "Ting ha00's." It was usually the Chinese children who expressed the sentiment. This change of attitude must have been because of the "Hate America" campaign that George Creel explains. He quotes Chou En-lei as saying:

One year ago the people of the entire country welcomed President Truman’s statement on China, and the arrival of General Marshall to mediate. But before long the policy of American imperialism toward China was revealed in all its nakedness, while the policy of national betrayal by Chiang K’ai-shek’s government also revealed itself in flat detail.47

The growing inflation in China was quite apparent also, as we were able to get more Chinese money daily for one of our dollars. The merchants got to where they would deal almost entirely in American currency rather than in their

47 Creel, op. cit., p. 66.
own money. Lieberman has said:

How well the Communists are succeeding is indicated by the increasing paralysis of communications, the constantly soaring cost of living, the ever-mounting frustration of the middle class, the heavily disproportionate balance of trade and the spread of Communist influence even below the Yangtze into South China.48

CHAPTER V

COMMUNISM'S SPREAD OVER CHINA

Events in China are now viewed as ominous. Communism is spreading over the whole coastal area where the large cities are and where most of the civilization of China is concentrated. This apparent triumph of Communism has its effect upon various phases of the life of China as follows: (1) the military and political situation in China is changing, (2) the peasant's plight is worse than before the war began, and (3) religious workers have to be very careful not to offend the Communists.

Military and Political

Chiang K'ai-shek is now in retirement at Fenghua in Chekiang Province, his native district. He holds his old belief, however: "'I firmly believe,' he insisted, 'that the government will win out in the end... The people of the nation should realize that only by carrying on this war of self-defense can a real peace be secured."

There seems little hope of carrying on the struggle without aid from the United States, however, and this aid is not to be had. According to John King Fairbank, who spent seven years in China concluding a variety of United States Government

---

services as Director of the United States Information Service in China and who is at present in charge of the Regional Program on China at Harvard University, it would not be wise for us to continue the aid. He says:

In Asia we would be ill-advised to support non-Communist regimes unless they can gain the acquiescence of the organized peasant masses, on whom political power will in the future increasingly be based. Non-Communist regimes cannot get such support unless they stand for principles and programs which are superior to those of Communism from the point of view of the peasant -- not merely from the American point of view. . . . The fact is that Chiang Kai-shek has had twenty years in which to compete with Communism for the support of the Chinese peasantry, and he has lost.

As for the future, we must be prepared to see the present National government lose ground steadily while we stand by helpless to prevent it, until factions separate, less extensive regimes are organized and reorganized, and the Chinese Communist tide has reached its watermark. Only after a period of change and regrouping in Chinese politics can we hope, in the midst of the prevailing chaos, to find ideological allies -- and such allies may not emerge for some time. . . . What has become increasingly clear is that we cannot offset the Russian ideological influence by purely material means.  

Chiang K'ai-shek admits:

If a negotiated peace is not detrimental to the national independence and sovereignty, if the constitution is not violated . . . the entity of the armed forces is safeguarded and the people's free mode of living . . . is protected, then I shall be satisfied. . . . As long as peace can be realized, I am not concerned whether I step out or stay on . . .

Li Tsung-jen, the vice-president, has taken over the reins of government as acting president. Last April in

---

the Chinese elections Li won the vice-presidency over Chiang's candidate Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen, on a "reform platform." Then Chiang appointed Sun Fo premier. Li and Chiang do not have the same approach to problems confronting Nationalist China. Since Li took over as acting president, the Legislative Yuan has forced Sun Fo's resignation. Ho Ying-chin, a prominent leader of the Whampoa generals' clique has taken his place.

The new Premier comes from neighboring Kweichow Province. Besides cementing the ties between Kwangsi and Kweichow in South China, the new appointment is interpreted here as presenting General Li with a better chance of enlisting the support of the Yangtze Valley troops commanded by generals who in the past, have looked for leadership to General Ho.  

This change of premiers represents another political victory for Acting President Li Tsung-jen, whose government is pursuing a policy of "peace or war," depending on the Communists' willingness to negotiate and the concessions they are prepared to make. Li lists three basic tasks confronting the Nanking Government as reorganization of the Army, political "reform," and the achievement of peace with the Communists.

Nevertheless, it remains clear that Li Tsung-jen is not getting all the co-operation he would like to be getting from the armed forces, the central bank, and the military men named by Chiang to strategic governorships just before

---

he left Nanking on January 21. Holding on to Chiang is as it has always been; it seems that no other group is able to unite the Kuomintang leaders except Chiang and his men. A number of key military men will take orders only from Chiang. Thus Nationalist China now seems to be in a frustrated state of not being able to do with him and being unable to get along altogether without him. Many of his long-time associates and former followers by force of habit still look to him for guidance when they have to make decisions. This has caused Chiang to be accused of interference in the new setup.

It seems that Chiang is afraid that Li Tsung-jen might make a peace with the Communists that would amount to abject surrender; hence he unintentionallymeddles by giving advice to the people who come to him. But

... the course of Chiang's actions since he retired and in the days immediately before he left Nanking indicate a bowing to widespread popular feeling for peace and an inner personal conviction that any attempt at peace with the Communists is bound to fail. The Generalissimo regards his fight with the Communists as part of the larger international struggle and those close to him have indicated clearly that they are pinning their hopes on an intensification of Russo-American differences in the Far East.5

Chiang has always thought that giving the Communists a share in a coalition government would only give them a chance to infiltrate into the whole of China with their behind-one's-back methods. He tried to trust them in the beginning and

5Ibid.
found that they could not be trusted, as explained in
Chapter III.

The Communists have now crossed the Yangtze River and
have captured Nanking, a metropolis of about two million
people. Nanking has been a symbol of the Chinese Republic.
It was there in 1912 that Sun Yat-sen took the oath as
president of the Republic. It was there in 1929 that Gen-
eralissimo Chiang K'ai-shek set up his capitol and head-
quarters for the war against the Communists. The capture
of Nanking assuredly has raised the morale of the Communists
and now they are approaching Shanghai.

President Chiang K'ai-shek emerged from retirement on
Friday, April 22, and met with Acting President Li at Hang-
chow. They both signed a communique pledging the National-
ists to fight to the end for the people's freedom and the
national independence. They named a single commander for
all Nationalist forces in China. James Reston says that
Chiang had previously ordered what is left of the National-
ist Air Force to withdraw to Formosa. He also ordered the
Nationalist warships to retreat to that island; and when he
went south into retirement, he took with him a large part
of the gold and silver reserves of the government.6

Scholastic Magazine says there are those in the United
States who believe that China's present plight is due to

---

6 James Reston, "U. S. Will Follow Hands-off Policy in
military incompetence, economic backwardness, and governmental corruption.\(^7\)

Nathaniel Pfeffer, a professor of international relations at Columbia University, says it matters not whether the Chinese order their economic affairs on a collectivist principle or an Adam Smith principle, so long as the Chinese alone are affected. Marc T. Greene says:

There must be an end to landlordism, repressive taxation, and ruthless military conscription. These above all else have gained the Communists the sympathy and support of the peasantry and have enabled the Communist armies to triumph. Such medieval abuses as farming out tax-collecting to ruthless militarists, who often collect as much as 20 years' taxes in advance, would seem enough to turn even the long-suffering and peace-loving Chinese peasant to ideological extremes.\(^8\)

The Peasantry

Marc T. Greene explains the Communists' hold on the people of China as follows:

The present Chinese Government never can put down the "Communist" movement because the former is out of favor with the Chinese people and the latter is believed by peasants, coolies, and the masses generally, to be fighting their battle against corruption, crushing taxation and wide-scale food profiteering.

Whether the Chinese masses are being misled or not is beside the immediate point. They are on the side of the Communists, supporting them, feeding them, encouraging desertion from the Government ranks,

\(^7\) "Zero Hour for China Again," Scholastic Magazine, December 1, 1948, p. 48.

spying, conducting an undercover anti-Government warfare both physical and psychological, and developing fifth-column activities all over the country. 9

Nathaniel Peffer says, "The story of China in these years is tragic indeed, but it is not a story of unmixed good and evil on either side." 10 Mrs. V. Y. Rejebian, who talks over W. F. A. A., a Dallas radio station, says that both Nationalists and Communists are capable of ruthless action. The ideal setup supposed to come about under the Communists has some strings to it, according to Nathaniel Peffer:

In the areas held by the Communists, landless peasants have been given land taken away from owners of bigger farms. Rents and taxes have been lowered. But for these economic reforms, which have long been overdue in all China, the population in Communist-controlled regions is paying a heavy price. The Reds have imposed a one-party dictatorship, with all the totalitarian trappings -- abolition of civil rights, suppression of opposition by terror, persecution, and purges. In general the Communists in China follow the same pattern of behavior as their brothers in Eastern Europe. 11

This idea is further delineated in a story by Richard Tregaskis in the April issue of True Magazine. Tregaskis takes a Chinese resident of Chungli, in Chehar Province (Inner Mongolia), and shows how he has been harassed by the see-saw battle of the Chinese Civil War. Tregaskis is True's round-

---

9Ibid., p. 18.


11"Zero Hour for China Again," Scholastic, December 1, 1948, p. 12.
the-world correspondent. He says:

... like many another peasant, he has seen his town conquered by both the Communists and the Nationalists, and impoverished by both. For Chungli was occupied by the Communists for fourteen months at the end of the Japanese war, then taken over by the Nationalists, taken again by Communists in a three-day reign of terror, held insecurely by the Nationalists once more, and has now again passed into Communist hands, perhaps decisively this time.

In this dizzying round of invasion and counter-invasion, Jong has lost most of his lands and all of his livestock.

Tregaskis says the Communists left him only two acres of land because anyone with more acreage is considered a capitalist.

... Both sides taxed him and other peasants — so heavily, some of them told me, that it was hardly worth cultivating the fields at all. He was beaten and jailed by the Communists for hiding grain and silver, and once again by the Communists for objecting to a plan to demolish the Catholic church. The Communists took all of his oxen, horses and mules, pigs and sheep on the legal pretext that he owed retroactive back pay to the hired hands who had worked for him and his father. When the Communists were driven out, he joined a volunteer militia at the urging of the church, and when the Communists came back and had a fight with the militia, and he fled to the city of Kelgan, the Communists caught and executed his son.

Losing his son was a great blow to Jong because now he had only daughters left. This son had helped him with the farm work and he could not very well get along without him. The son

... Jong Jun had fled to the mountains when the Reds came, but a Communist patrol had caught him. Not recognising him as one of the Jong family, however, they had simply asked him to lead them to Teiping Shan, a village about seven miles from
Chungli. This he had done, and might have escaped untouched. But someone, some sharp-eyed partisan, full of the spirit of reckoning and revenge, had recognized him as the son of one of Chungli militia, a Catholic reactionary, Jong Yo-sen. So they had given him a quick hearing, Communist fashion, and put two bullets through his head, and left his body on the road to Taiping Chen (Peace Village).

Once set up in Chungli,

... the Communists rushed into an energetic program for spreading the Marxist gospel in Chungli. The leaders called a meeting next day in the Da Tao, or big square, at 3 o'clock, and the whole town turned out for it. The officers stood to attention and saluted the people of Chungli; the people clapped. There were three speakers; they told how the Communists had won the war against Japan and they used the phrase which was to be dinned into Jong's head, and the other heads of Chungli, in the succeeding months: "No Communism, no China."

About three times a week, he would hear the banging of the gong for a mass meeting in the village square. Plans for raising the wages of the workers and the income of the farmers were discussed loud and long. It was decided that the farm laborers should have a raise immediately, and also retroactively -- a large increase to be collected for times as far back as people of Chungli could remember, and all to be paid on the spot by the cruel exploiters of the people, and with all the necessary interest, it was shouted.

There was also some physical work to be done at Communist orders, which was a blessing for Jong's tortured frame. One of a group of about 300 men of Chungli aged 20 to 40, he walked to Kalgan and carried Japanese military supplies stored there to a Communist headquarters outside the city. Then they all walked back to Chungli.

Later the Nationalists conquered Chungli and Jong had to help out with money matters for them. He says:

The new government ... needed taxes and military levies. The first tax was 9 per cent; nine sen out of each 100 sen. Also, there would be the military tax; the peasants had to pay for the upkeep
of soldiers. A new sien jung arrived to take over the county affairs. Another regime was starting, and that meant more taxes, and the "squeeze, or easy money and privilege, to which the Chinese people were accustomed.

Therefore Jong Yo-sen is a typical man in the middle in China -- the man who must pay the bill for the high-riding armies of both sides, the man who really suffers, with his family, in China's modern history of war.12

This Jong does not understand much about what is going on around him and is a bit like our man we had in the Marines:

... He knows dimly that there are countries called Russia, America and England, but he isn't sure which direction they lie in or how they may differ from China. Sometimes, he and his friends at the tobacco shop try to piece together their limited vocabularies and understand a few of the headlines in stray old copies of Chinese newspapers, and they agree that it looks as if these people called Uh-gwaw-run (Russians) and the other country called Am-ay-ika argue a good deal. And they also see by the papers that the Russians are supposed to be backing up the Communists in China.13

Pearl Buck says that the only key the Chinese have as to whether they have a good ruler or not is the price of rice:

The Chinese people in their age-old common sense have never rushed to rid themselves of tyrants. They are hurrying now. They believe that Heaven has decreed against a tyrant by the simple fact that the price of rice has gone higher than the average man can afford to pay. A good ruler keeps the price of rice down. When he is no longer able to keep it down,

12 Richard Tregaskis, "Mr. Jong and the Fortunes of War," True, April, 1949, pp. 43, 104-111.

13 Ibid.
it is time for him to go. . . .

At present, the price of rice in China is fabulous, far above the ability of the people to pay. Rice is the basic commodity and all other commodities are related to it. . . . Since the Nationalist Government can do nothing, apparently, about reducing the price, it is, in the opinion of the people, doomed to fail.

The Chinese, having seen that the price of rice has risen above all precedent under the present leaders, know that it is time to look for others. They are scanning their horizons with full confidence. Leaders have always risen from the people and will always rise. It is a question of time. . . .

"What about the Communists?"14

The Chinese are asking this question and wondering if they might do anything about the price of rice. That is about all they know about what is happening over there.

Treatment of Churches

George Creel says: "American correspondents in China, such as are neither ignorant nor prejudiced, have all reported that Christianity is banned in Communist areas. 'The sole exception to this,' he quotes William H. Newton as saying, 'is those few cities where there are foreign missionaries who might possibly report on the situation. Even in those instances, religious worship is discouraged and Chinese pastors persecuted and humiliated.'"15

Richard Tregaskis explains:

Probably the tactics of the Communists in Chung-li were a good deal sharper than usual, for Chungli

---


15 Creel, op. cit., p. 198.
is the principal seat of the Catholic church in Chahar and the site of the largest church building in the province. The population, before the war, at least, was nearly 100 per cent Catholic, and the Communists have been hostile to towns which have contained Catholic elements.

At one of the Communist meetings, the leaders said the church would have to make restitution to the people who had worked for it and had been "exploited." The back pay which the Communists alleged was owed to the workers came to 2,200,000 Chinese dollars—or about $45,000 U.S. at the going rate of exchange. The church fathers recoiled at this considerable figure, but the Communists had an answer for that; they gathered together about a hundred of the poorest people in town and took them to the church compound and told them to stay there, to be fed and housed until further notice; i.e., until the church paid for the damage.

The fathers gave in. They got together all the cash in the church, its wheat, flour, six mules, four oxen, four carts and the equipment of the church mill, to satisfy the debt.\textsuperscript{16}

But Henry A. Wallace, in a Seattle speech on May 21, 1948, seems to believe that it depends on how the church acts as to whether it is harmed or not by the Communists. He says:

\begin{quote}
Missionaries in China have a long and honorable record, but at the present time their status is being weighed in the balance. Some are said to serve as spies for the Kuomintang or for the American Embassy, and are looked on with increasing suspicion. Those who are preaching fundamental Christian doctrine, and trying to help the people improve their health, industry and agriculture, are made welcome. When Christians get into politics against the people, they must always expect trouble, because they then cease to be Christians.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16}Tregaskis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{17}Henry A. Wallace, quoted by Creel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 198.
This seems to be the opinion of Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe, a missionary to China with The United Christian Missionary Society and professor of sociology at the University of Nan-king. He explains that at a recent meeting in Kuling a group of missionaries from many communions discussed whether or not it was possible to carry on work in the Communist territory. He says:

Briefly, the experience of these missionaries indicates that Christian work can be carried on in Communist territory in China, provided the Communist authorities are convinced (1) that Americans are not there as political or military agents either of their own government or of the Central Government; and (2) that Chinese church leaders are not too closely tied up with the landlord and exploiting classes in Chinese society.

The Roman Catholics while opposed to the Communists on ideological grounds, have made working arrangements with the highest Chinese Communist authorities. In most areas they are retaining their non-American priest and, where they cause trouble for local work, they remove their American priests.

Many Chinese Protestant pastors and co-workers have been able to carry on even where they felt it would be easier for them if their American colleagues withdrew. The Friends’ Service Unit has worked on both sides of the line but found it difficult to convince both the Central Government and the Communists that they were non-political and purely Christian and humanitarian in their efforts. All phases of the Christian program: church work with regular preaching of the gospel, schools including religious courses, and medical work were described as permitted in many Communist areas in addition to relief work. It was reported that working conditions were more favorable in more stabilized areas behind Communist lines than in actual fighting areas.

The experience of those who had worked in Communist territory was that in some cases American missionaries in the area can stay if they are not too closely associated with the Chinese Central Government or with American Government personnel. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists are suspicious of missionaries who once leave and try to come back.
They are more receptive to new missionaries. This means that the way is open to both missionaries who have made a reputation for themselves in an area for working for the benefit of the common people, and for new young missionaries, like the Friends' Service Unit groups, who come with an understanding that they come simply as Christian workers with no political connections. The study group thought each missionary who went should insist that he be known as a Christian missionary and not be hidden as a technical worker. But Christian technical workers could go as laymen with a Christian witness. All who go should go as volunteers and not merely upon assignment by their mission board, but with mission board backing.18

Business Men's Outlook

According to an editorial in The Fort Worth Star-Telegram, the iron curtain is being rung down by the Communists in China:

The back door Iron Curtain apparently is being rung down by the Communists in China. For "military reasons" they have ordered foreign correspondents in Peiping to cease the gathering and transmitting of news to the outside world, leaving all such activity to the Communist radio. Peiping is far from the fighting front and the censorship, therefore, is regarded as an ominous sign for the future of foreigners in China.

The gentle approach of the Communist regime to foreign interests in China earlier in the military campaign raised hopes that foreigners would be allowed to operate under more or less satisfactory terms. Schools operated by foreigners apparently were not greatly molested and business interests received indications a modus operandi might be worked out.

The cutting off of news, however, may mean the twilight of conquest is over and that the serious business of realigning the national life along communist principles may be about to begin.

The question of whether the white man (non-Russian) can remain in China as a factor in the country's commerce and trade is being considered much now.

The big question U. S. business men and policy makers in China are asking is: "Where do we go from here?"

Most of the business men have decided to sit tight, keep U. S. firms alive wherever the Communists take over. They are taking the gamble because they feel that the worst the Communists can do is to tell them to go.

There is some evidence that the Communists are eager to have the Western business men stay. More than a few trade feelers have come out recently. For example, the Communists are offering to sell soy beans, furs, and wool. They want to buy cloth, oil, capital goods, and a long list of other items. Russia can't supply these now, probably won't be able to for a long time. So, many Western business men figure they might as well hang around. It won't cost much and is better than losing everything.

One banker put it this way: "We may be kicked out straight off. Or maybe the Communists will kid us along for a year or so and then dump us. Or maybe they will welcome us for continuous trade. After all, China must trade -- and the Communists are realists."

But the fate of the U. S. business men in China hinges on the policy Washington adopts toward a Communist government there.19

As we know from reading the papers, the Communists have crossed the Yangtze River, captured Nanking, and are at Shanghai. Marc T. Greene says of Shanghai:

... the focal point of trade in all the Far East, the principal port of entry, one of the half-dozen largest cities in the world... Once the gay Paris of the Orient, ruled largely by and for the stern businessmen, it is today a down-at-heel Chinese city -- drab, heavy, reminding one always of the poverty and

disease and actual starvation which afflict its millions.

Normally -- and still if a stable and honest non-Communist government could in some way be brought into being in China -- this market [Shanghai] would be mainly America's and England's. Here, because of the enormous reconstruction requirements, is the greatest of all export markets, potentially at least. Because it is that, it is also the chief commercial bone of contention between Russia and the West.

If a Communist regime succeeds that of Chiang K'ai-shek, Shanghai will become, to all intents and purposes, a Russian city, much like Harbin and Derien before the war. That will very definitely mean the end of American and British as commercial factors of any importance in Shanghai.20 Shanghai is the primary marketing city of China and headquarters for most foreign enterprises. Greene continues that "neither [the United States nor England] could carry on in the rest of China, even if permitted, while barred from Shanghai."21

Therefore it is very evident that the most important part of China is already in the hands of the Communists with the fall of the important cities along the coast. Since the Nationalists are making no strong stands, it appears that Communism can now spread in any direction its leaders choose to take it.

20Greene, op. cit., p. 18. 21Ibid.
CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED STATES-CHINESE-RUSSIAN TRIANGLE

The most controversial part of the study of Chinese Communism is found when trying to unravel the triangle of the United States, Chinese, and Russian affairs and the resulting attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States and Russia. The writer will give opinions on both sides of the controversy without trying to establish which is the correct opinion. The correct opinion is what top diplomats are now trying to figure out with little success. Since the Communists' attitude toward the United States came about because of the actions of the United States in China, according to White and Jacoby, it might be well to review the policy of the United States and its actions in China following the Japanese surrender. The writer will also later review Russia's actions following the war. White and Jacoby state that in China "our policy had produced another monstrous result. It had succeeded in ranging Russia squarely against the United States in Asia."\(^1\)

Immediately following World War II the United States

\(^1\)White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 290.
had forces in China disarming the Japanese and evacuating them from China. The writer saw this evacuation going on at Tanku, a little south of Peiping. President Truman explains:

Our government had agreed to assist the Chinese Government in the reoccupation of areas liberated from the Japanese, including Manchuria, because of China’s lack of shipping and transport planes. Three armies were moved in by air and eleven by sea to central China, Formosa, north China, and Manchuria. Most of these moves had been made before General Marshall arrived.

The disarming and evacuation of Japanese progressed slowly -- too slowly. We regarded our commitment to assist the Chinese in this program as of overwhelming importance to the future peace of China and the whole Far East. Surrendered but undestroyed Japanese armies and hordes of administrators, technicians, and Japanese merchants, totalling about 3,000,000 persons, had to be removed under the most difficult conditions. At the request of the Chinese Government we had retained a considerable number of American troops in China, and immediately after V-J Day we landed a corps of Marines in north China. The principal tasks of these forces were to assist in evacuation of Japanese. Only some 200,000 had been returned to Japan by the time General Marshall arrived.

General Marshall also faced a most unpromising internal situation on his arrival in China. Communications throughout the country were badly disrupted due to destruction during the war and the civil conflicts which had broken out since. This disruption was preventing the restoration of Chinese economy, the distribution of relief supplies, and was rendering the evacuation of Japanese a slow and difficult process. The wartime destruction of factories and plants, the war-induced inflation in China, the Japanese action in shutting down the economy of occupied China immediately after V-J Day, and finally the destruction of communications combined to paralyze the economic life of the country, spreading untold hardship to millions, robbing the victory over the Japanese of significance to most Chinese, and seriously aggravating all the tensions and discontents that existed in China.
Progress toward solution of China's internal difficulties by Chinese themselves was essential to the rapid and effective completion of most of the program in which we had already pledged our assistance to the Chinese Government. General Marshall's experience and wisdom were available to the Chinese in their efforts to reach such solutions.

Events moved rapidly upon General Marshall's arrival. With all parties availing themselves of his impartial advice, agreement for a country-wide truce was reached and announced on January 10th. A feature of this agreement was the establishment of a unique organization -- the Executive Headquarters in Peiping. It was realized that due to poor communications and the bitter feelings on local fronts, generalized orders to cease fire and withdraw might have little chance of being carried out unless some authoritative executive agency, trusted by both sides, could function in any local situation.

The headquarters operated under the leadership of three commissioners -- one American who served as chairman, one Chinese Government representative, and one representative of the Chinese Communist Party. Walter S. Robertson, Charge d'Affairs of the American Embassy in China, served as chairman until his return to this country in the fall. In order to carry out its function in the field, Executive Headquarters formed a large number of truce teams, each headed by one American officer, one Chinese Government officer, and one Chinese Communist officer. They proceeded to all danger spots where fighting was going on or seemed impending and saw to the implementation of the truce terms, often under conditions imposing exceptional hardships and requiring courageous action. The degree of cooperation attained between Government and Communist officers in the headquarters and on the truce teams was a welcome proof that, despite two decades of fighting, these two Chinese groups could work together.²

The United States also tried to mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists, but they had little success in so doing, as can be seen from President Truman's explanation, which will be given later. First the writer wishes to

²Harry S. Truman, quoted by Issacs, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
state that during his stay in Peiping there were numerous army Colonels who represented peace feelers. They had their headquarters at Rockefeller Foundation, the prettiest building in the city. In fact, the Marines under the writer's supervision set up the offices for these Colonels. They did not have an enlisted man and had to beg the Marines for men. The writer does not know exactly what they did -- they seemed to stand around in each other's way most of the time. President Truman explains the situation as follows:

"Last December I made a statement of this Government's views regarding China. We believed then and do now, that a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace, that a broadening of the base of the National Government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China's progress toward this goal, and that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace. It was made clear at Moscow last year that these views are shared by our Allies, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On December 27, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, and Mr. Bevin issued a statement which said in part:

"The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They affirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China."

I asked General Marshall to go to China as my representative. We had agreed upon my statement of the United States Government's views and policies regarding China as his directive. He knew full well in undertaking the mission that halting civil strife, broadening the base of the Chinese Government,
bringing about a united, democratic China were tasks for the Chinese themselves. He went as a great American to make his outstanding abilities available to the Chinese.

Events moved forward with equal promise on the political front. On January 10, the Political Consultative Conference began its sessions with representatives of the Kuomintang or Government Party, the Communist Party and several minor political parties participating. Within three weeks of direct discussion these groups had come to a series of statesmanlike agreements on outstanding political and military problems. The agreements provided for an interim government of a coalition type with representation of all parties, for revision of the draft constitution along democratic lines prior to its discussion and adoption by a national assembly, and for reduction of the Government.

In March General Marshall returned to this country. He reported on the important step the Chinese had made toward peace and unity in arriving at these agreements. He also pointed out that these agreements could not be satisfactorily implemented and given substance unless China's economic disintegration were checked and particularly unless the transportation system could be put in working order. Political unity could not be built on chaos. 3

Then the United States Government authorized certain credits to the Chinese Government to help meet the emergency need.

This will be discussed later. President Truman's explanation about the mediations continues:

Before General Marshall arrived in China for the second time, in April, there was evidence that the truce agreement was being disregarded. The sincere and unflagging efforts of Executive Headquarters and its truce teams have succeeded in many instances in preventing or ending local engagements, and thus saved thousands of lives. But fresh outbreaks of civil strife continued to occur, reaching a crisis of violence in Manchuria, with the capture of Chengchun by the Communists, and where the presence of truce teams had not been fully agreed to by the National Government.

3Ibid., pp. 55-58.
A change in the course of events in the political field was equally disappointing. Negotiations between the Government and the Communists have been resumed again and again, but they have as often broken down. Although hope for final success had never disappeared completely, the agreements made in January and February have not been implemented, and the various Chinese groups have not since that time been able to achieve the degree of agreement that was reached at the Political Consultative Conference.

It is a matter of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. Because he knows how serious the problem is, and how important it is to reach a solution, General Marshall has remained at his post even though active negotiations have been broken off by the Communist Party. We are ready to help China as she moves toward peace and genuine democratic government. 4

It is this help to China that has caused the United States to be criticized. Truman says that we recognize the National Government as the legal government of China. This has caused trouble also. In other words, our helping the National Government of China has caused much comment and much controversy. Mao Tse-tung has used this fact to cast us in the role of imperialists intervening in Chinese affairs to prop up a reactionary Kuomintang. Every help we gave to our ally, the National Government of China, has appeared to Chinese Communists to prove that we are on the side of the Kuomintang. Fairbank thinks that Mao's Marxism assumes that imperialism is the final phase of capitalism, but this is dogma. Since imperialism is the domination of one people over another, it is very plain that imperialism occurred in

---

4Ibid., p. 55.
many places before capitalism ever came into power. Nationalism, for instance, may cause imperialism in this sense without the aid of capitalism. Thus evil connotation arises in the minds of the people trained by Marxism when such words as feudalism and imperialism are mentioned. But they do not understand how imperialism is used because they attach the word to our relations with China. Therefore, "Chinese Communism expects the worst from the United States and thereby increases the chance of getting it."\(^5\)

Aid to China was for a long time a private matter carried on by missionaries, relief organizations, agencies like the Rockefeller Foundations interested in educational and medical development, and other groups and individuals. In 1908 and 1924 the United States remitted part of the Boxer indemnity as a gesture to help China remake herself. But it was not until the recent war that official aid to China became the dominant form of American assistance. Beginning with loans in the months before Pearl Harbor and the clandestine development of the American Volunteer Group as an air force in Burma and Yunnan, we embarked in 1942 upon a continuing government program of financial, material, and technical aid. The aid the United States gave to China is estimated in Table 1 on the following pages. The table gives (1) military aid; (2) relief, rehabilitation, and

---

\(^5\)Fairbank, op. cit., p. 264.
trade development; (3) fiscal aid; and (4) educational and philanthropic aid and then gives the total.

TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF MAJOR CATEGORIES OF POST-WAR AMERICAN AID TO CHINA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Aid</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. MILITARY AID</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military lend-lease goods and services (to June 30, 1947)</td>
<td>$ 702,564,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of maintaining residual U. S. armed forces in China, for mediation, training, and guard duties (through 1947)</td>
<td>110,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small naval vessels and craft transferred under Act of 1946</td>
<td>31,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of small-arms ammunition, June, 1947</td>
<td>657,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$ 844,721,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. RELIEF, REHABILITATION, AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. share of UNRRA program and administration costs, including continuation of agricultural aid by United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
<td>$ 492,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus war property sales (at agreed values), including shipping and technical services fund</td>
<td>270,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Import Bank credits</td>
<td>98,693,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend-lease &quot;pipe-line&quot; sales of non-military supplies</td>
<td>54,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-UNRRA relief assistance</td>
<td>27,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 1 -- Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Aid</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Commission credit for purchase of cargo vessels</td>
<td>$ 22,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. share of miscellaneous United Nations activities, including International Children's Emergency Fund, International Refugee Organization, World Health Organization, social welfare, and research</td>
<td>4,764,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ 970,107,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### III. FISCAL AID

Balance of half-billion war loan of 1943                                                                                                                                          $ 155,000,000

#### IV. EDUCATIONAL AND PHILANTHROPIC AID

Rockefeller Foundation grant for medical education endowment                                                                                                                $ 10,000,000

United Service to China (education, medicine, child care, nutrition, agriculture, etc.)                                                                                   10,000,000

Miscellaneous other educational aid (notably through United Board for Christian Colleges, China Institute, China Medical Board, American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., American Book Center, Scout, Red Cross, China Aid Council, etc.) 5,000,000

Miscellaneous other philanthropic aid (notably through churches, colleges, Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, etc.)                                                                5,000,000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Aid</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational and survey grants from emergency funds of the President,</td>
<td>$450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including share of Sino-American Agricultural Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6,570,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$825,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTIMATED GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>$2,000,278,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional aid proposed by Secretary Marshall in November, 1947</td>
<td>$300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement cost of $100,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement cost of $6,570,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement cost of $825,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*From Rosinger, FORGING A NEW CHINA, pp. 62-63.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Truman elaborates on some of this aid as follows:

An example of such aid is the recent agricultural mission to China under Dean Hutchison of the University of California, sent at the request of the Chinese Government. A joint Chinese-American agricultural collaboration commission was formed which included the Hutchison mission. It spent over four months studying rural problems. Its recommendations are now available to the Chinese Government, and so also is any feasible aid we can give in implementing those recommendations.7

Engineer Todd, while working for UNRRA to change the course of the Yellow River in China back to its pre-1938 bed (it had been cut to flood areas that the Japanese were trying to take), had the co-operation of both Nationalists and Communists at first, but later had trouble with the

---

7Issacs, op. cit., p. 58.
Communists. During January, 1947, the Communists demanded a five-months' postponement of the work on the river. They were afraid it would sever their armies in Honan and Shantung Provinces.

Since the aid the United States gave to China has been interpreted as aid to the Nationalists alone, this has caused criticism of our methods. White and Jacoby say:

If we sought security in China by espousing the Kuomintang, the Soviet Union meant to counter by espousing the Chinese Communists. Russia had behaved with rigid correctness toward the Communists of China in the few weeks following Japan's defeat, a Red Army general had flown to Yenan to tell the Chinese Communists that armed Chinese Communists would not be permitted to enter Manchuria. Now suddenly Communist armies began to appear all up and down the Manchurian railways; they were fighting, with obvious Russian approval, against the Kuomintang divisions that were supported by the Americans. There seemed to be a direct working understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Russians for the first time since 1935; American action had brought this about.8

The United States will again aid China, says President Truman:

When conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform in China and which, in so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial relations between American and Chinese businessmen.9

But the United States, by aiding the Nationalists, has alienated even the liberals in China from co-operating with us in

8White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 63.
9Issacs, op. cit., p. 63.
their working for the betterment of China, according to Fairbank. The incredible corruption and brutal terrorism practiced by the Kuomintang government as its problems multiplied and its leadership moved to the right, caused the Chinese intelligentsia to move steadily to the left in their political thinking. Thus the Chinese Communist Party has been able steadily to recruit personnel from the student class, and to gain the sympathy of intellectuals in education, the professions, and the lower levels of the bureaucracy. The Communist appeal in terms of civil liberties and social justice has influenced the intellectuals, Fairbank states:

The attraction of the Chinese Communist movement for the genuine liberal in China cannot be understood in purely American terms. The liberal intellectual in China generally abhors totalitarianism. He would be paternally opposed to Russian domination of China. The Kuomintang regime, however, is so different from the United States Government, and the Chinese Communist Party so divergent from the American Communist Party, that Chinese liberals by their own liberal principles are often pushed into the opposition, where the Chinese Communists are anxious to receive them.

Moreover, the Communist regime, operating entirely in the countryside, has been for over a decade a responsible and functioning government with a public record by which to be judged. Given the hard conditions of Chinese life and the record of the Kuomintang as a point of comparison, the Communist record is one of considerable achievement. In the Communist area, communism is an open movement, not a conspiracy. It has attracted a great number of the student youth of the country. In this situation the Chinese liberal who as an individual subscribes to much the same ideals of freedom as his American counterpart, is more nearly on the fence than the average American would think possible.
From the above it seems that we cannot expect to find in the near future a Chinese liberal movement on which we can base a policy. Yet liberalism, in its peculiar Chinese form, will be an important and continuing factor in Chinese politics. We have nurtured it in the past. But recently we have been losing its allegiance. American aid of the National Government is widely regarded in China as a chief factor permitting the Kuomintang right wing to terrorize and stultify those Chinese liberals who have heretofore looked upon us as their natural allies.10

Since land is the chief form of wealth in China today, as Rosinger says, its use and ownership are decisive in setting the tone of Chinese life. Such problems as civil liberties, the expansion of the China market and the significance of the China policies of the United States and the Soviet Union are all linked with the future of the land and the peasant.11 Therefore China can hardly achieve internal stability or contribute to world peace until its people as well as its means of production have been modernized.

People spend much time wondering if the Communist movement is Russian-dominated, and Winston Churchill says that it is Kremlin-dominated. But Rosinger points out a very important fact, which is an

... important fact for Americans to understand the prevailing temper of the Chinese people. Much of our newspaper comment evaluates China as a military pawn in a Russian-American struggle for world power.

10Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 294-295.
This, however, is by no means the attitude of the Chinese people, most of whom are thinking of problems of livelihood to the exclusion of anything else. Those Chinese who are concerned with international issues have no desire, in the main, to choose between the United States and the Soviet Union, for they know that this would help to turn their country into a future battlefield. Moreover, in judging American and Russian policy, the overwhelming majority of Chinese will not allow ideology to determine their preference, but will weigh the effects of the two policies on China's own problems.12

It is also true that

... the United States gave Nationalist China "periodic sops" in the form of financial "aid" enough to keep it from collapsing at the moment and not enough to give it something on which to stand. The amount at any one time was small but the total exceeds two billion dollars, and China is worse off than at the beginning.13

Henry Lieberman cabled The New York Times from Nanking, "After receiving $2.5 billion in post-war assistance, the Nationalist Government is in far worse position than it was before the first dollar was spent."14

But giving money, such as the United States has done, has not accomplished what the giving of a crust of bread or a piece of land by the Communists has done. Captain Sidney Murdock of the United States Army, just returned from the occupation forces in the East, says that China is definitely gone to the Communists and to Russia. He says the millions of dollars the United States has given and done no

12 Ibid.
14 platform, p. 3.
bragging about have made little or no impression upon the Chinese. At any rate, our help has not made the impression that the Russian and Communist ideology has made. Murdock finds the effect of the Communist propaganda lying is appalling. He says all over China, particularly around mines and factories, there are cartoons with obscene pictures on them and at the bottom is written "Down with U. S. imperialism!" or something like that. Fairbank says of the Communist propaganda and its effect upon the Chinese people's opinion of the United States:

... their propaganda has taken on the evil character of regarding the truth as a relative matter. The New China News Agency supplies a daily budget of news material by radio to local papers in all the Communist areas. The news thus circulated is highly colored with interpretation -- even more than the news in some of our American news magazines. Untruth is justified by the Party's objectives.

This lack of principle concerning truth and falsehood is made more serious by two practical factors. The first is that the Communist leadership, while highly intelligent, has been living for years inside an intellectual blockade. The flow of Western publications of all sort into Communist China during the last decade has been hardly greater than the flow of Western drugs and medical equipment so grossly impeded by the National Government. This has allowed greater opportunity for the climate of opinion inside Red China to suffer from auto-intoxication and self-deception. Observers have reported a sort of euphoria and a good deal of wishful thinking along Marxist lines -- for example, that American Capitalism is about to collapse, overwhelmed by unemployment and inflation.15

Captain Murdock brought a Korean girl to study music at North Texas State Teachers College. She had also heard

15Fairbank, op. cit., p. 270.
this Communist propaganda about the decay of the United States and was surprised to see San Francisco standing, for she had heard that it had been totally destroyed. Captain Murdock thinks we are going to have to think up a better approach to China than giving financial aid to Chiang K'ai-shek to fight Communism. Louis Dolivet, a writer, thinks the same thing. He says:

The leaders of the West who take an objective view will see that communism is advancing only where there is misery and suffering. They will realize that even the most reactionary regimes do not constitute an effective barrier against communism. They will observe that imprisonment, torture or killing of Communist opponents, aside from being abhorrent to the democratic-minded, not only does not arrest communism but accelerates it. Few could have been more relentless in opposing Communism than Chiang K'ai-shek.

The observant will also note, on the other hand, that in all countries -- and Western Europe is the best example -- where the conditions of the people are improving, the advance of communism is arrested. . . . the Eastern allies are employing primarily political weapons -- even in China. Aside from promising bread, land, lower taxes, they cannot compete with the West in economic largesse. But so large are the areas where even one meal a day is not available, Russian weapons are winning victories.16

Now that everyone admits the failure of our method of giving aid to China, William Winter has elaborated on a new plan for action in Asia against Communism. He says:

It is eminently true that Communist movements in Asia win friends and influence people because there is no alternative dynamic and positive program offered them. A policy of opposing communism, of resisting Communist efforts by force, or of supporting

political groups solely because they are anti-Communist, is disastrously futile.\footnote{17}

The challenge is that of Karl Marx, rather than the challenge of the Red Army. It is the challenge of an idea. An idea cannot be stopped with bullets. It must be met and challenged in turn with a better idea, thinks Winter. The United States needs to study what the Communists have offered the Chinese and then offer them something better. Such guarantees as freedom of speech and freedom of the press do not answer Communist promises of freedom from want. Their problems are different from ours, and the solutions must similarly differ from our own domestic patterns. There are progressive, democratic forces struggling in Southeast Asia. Their programs call for nationalization of key industries, collectivization of agriculture programs which may contain elements of socialism. Although we do not welcome such obviously socialistic programs in America, it would be short-sighted and prejudicial for us to deny those programs to Asia.

Winter explains that in his tours of duty as a foreign correspondent in the Far East he has met many people who supported what they called "Communist" movements. Except for the relative handful of intellectual leaders, none had ever heard of or read Karl Marx. In fact, few had any

\footnote{17William Winter, "For Action in Asia," \textit{New York Times}, March 20, 1949.}
knowledge that out of the brain of the man Marx had come all the seeds that had flowered into Communism. To most self-styled Communist supporters in Asia, Communism seemed to be simply a plan to reduce high rentals on absentee-owned farms and reduce the usurious interest rates charged by money-lenders.

It appears that if there existed an American-born program to achieve similar ends, the discontented people of the Far East might be as ready to support such ideological export as they are to support the programs endorsed by the Cominform. It seems that Communism's appeal is not a natural love of the Soviet Union, nor is it a deep respect for Karl Marx; it is the basic struggle for survival, the demand for a better life, a decent standard of living.

... What is needed is an economic rather than a purely political solution. Most people in the region care little about who runs their country; their primary interest is food and freedom from want.  

Premier Ho Ying-chin of China thinks Communism should be fought with ideas instead of with bullets:

Ferociously anti-Communist during his long years of loyalty to the Gemo, Ho attended Buchmamite moral rearmament meetings while in the U. S., decided he must "fight idea with idea" rather than "force with force." After the Japanese surrender, Ho opposed Chiang's policy of attempting to hold Manchuria against the Communists. In 1948 he spurned Chiang's offer of the premiership.  

18 Ibid.

The main question Americans ask about the Chinese Communists is: What are their relations with Russia? Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen, figured out Russia’s relation to the Communist movement in China after a long period of arguing in the Kuomintang about them. Ever since the death of his father in 1925, this able son of Sun Yat-sen has been China’s most ardent Russophile, and has preached the good faith of Moscow and often broken with Chiang K’ai-shek for failing to make terms with the Chinese Communists. He was always enthusiastic in his support of a coalition government, and helped General Marshall deal with the Reds. But in 1947 he changed his attitude and came out with this public confession of error:

It is no longer possible to doubt Moscow’s complete control of the Chinese Communists. They are the absolute instruments of Soviet policy, the chosen expression of Russia’s soaring ambition in the Far East. There is no difference between Soviet actions now and those of Japan when she instigated the Mukden Incident in 1931. Not only was Manchuria turned over to the Communists, while Nationalists were barred, but the retention of Dairen, in defiance of an explicit treaty provision, is for no other purpose than to use it as a supply base for the Reds. If the Communists win, China will first become a pseudo People’s Republic, similar to Outer Mongolia, after which it will be incorporated into the Soviet Union, and systematically enslaved.20

Some of Russia’s actions in Manchuria and in other areas in the latter part of 1945 and the early months of 1946 constituted intervention on the Communist side, explains Rosinger.

For example, in certain cases the Communists entered cities evacuated by the Russians and seized Japanese equipment which had been left behind. The Russians withdrew sometimes without much advance warning to the government, when they knew that the Central forces were further away than the Communists. And on several occasions the Russians refused or held up facilities for entrance of Central troops into Manchuria.  

There are several writers who think that if we lose our chance to help China hold the Communists, all Asia will go to Communism.

"If we abandon China," wrote Freda Utley in *Last Chance in China*, "we lose all Asia. The Chinese Communists are better than the Russians, but they are on the other side -- the side which inevitably finds itself pulled into the orbit of Stalin's totalitarian tyranny." This, it was predicted, would result in a gigantic addition to the power of the Communists the world over, and open the way for consolidation of all the pro-Communist forces from Indonesia to India.  

The publication *Platform* continues:

In the words of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee report on communism in China, "It may be true that we cannot guarantee success, but without aid the impending loss of China is certain. . . . To surrender the whole problem to the Communists is not the way to peace but to war. We cannot win the race by not running. We cannot even prevent the race from occurring. The other side is running, and the prize of peace lies at the end of the track, peace with freedom or peace in the cinders of one Soviet-dominated world."

---


22 *Platform*, p. 12.
In support of this contention, the Central Yuan of China appealed directly to Congress in a message to Speaker Joseph W. Martin, December 14. Warning that "China's struggle to suppress the Communist rebellion is, in reality, an anti-aggression war in defense of the way of life of the democratic nations and the peace of the world," the message declared that the present conflict is not to be regarded "merely as a civil war to achieve China's national peace and unity. . . . If China should unfortunately be conquered, the Far East will be Sovietized and so would Asia and Europe. Even the Americas might not be secure."23

Many other writers think that the Chinese Communist triumph is a Soviet triumph.

The Communist leaders gathered at the Congress in the National Theater in Sofia excitedly welcomed developments in China. They repeated again and again that, despite American help to Chiang, the Nationalists' regime is crumbling. . . . A disquieting factor -- which Soviet leaders and their friends abroad realized very acutely but did not care to discuss openly -- is the major Communist triumph outside of Soviet-occupied territories since the Bolshevik Revolution.

The once-basic Marxist assumption -- that communism would first, and almost automatically, appear in highly industrialized countries -- having proved faulty, leaders of the world Soviet bloc faced enormous difficulties. These difficulties increased with the appearance of the democratic United States as a leading factor in the world. They grew even greater as developing Socialist forces showed unbreakable hostility to Soviet bloc expansion.

In China, international communism sees the achievement of a basic goal of Soviet global strategy. The assumption that Asia is more nearly ripe for revolutionary changes and for communism than Europe is now receiving a triumphant confirmation. Despite the failures of Communist policy in China in the middle '20's, with the rise of Chiang, now, only 20 years later, victory is within reach.

Top-ranking leaders of communism gathered in Bulgaria for the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, have reached the conclusion that their victories

23Ibid., p. 13.
in China represent the purest types of triumph which Communists crave.

To world communism the approaching victory in China represents an event surpassed in historic significance only by the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia. Its importance exceeds by far the establishment of Communist-controlled regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 24

Some writers make the situation look even worse. Hanson W. Baldwin, military analyst of The New York Times, says that a Communist victory in China would give Soviet Russia control over an additional 400,000,000 people, one fifth of the world's manpower. An immediate consequence would be the destruction of trade between western Europe and southeast Asia, so vital to the success of the European Recovery Program. Baldwin says the idea that all that the Chinese Communists want is social and economic reforms, and that once they have gained power they would dissociate themselves from Russia, was very definitely proved false by a speech of the top Communist chieftain in China, Mao Tse-tung. In a message broadcast by him November 7, 1948, celebrating the thirty-first anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Mao called for a world-wide united Communist front supporting Russia in the combat against "American imperialism." He scoffed at the idea of any "middle road" between Communism and capitalism as "utter hypocrisy and thorough bankruptcy." 25

Creeel goes so far as to say:

In nothing has the Administration been more blind and bumbling than its misreading of Russian purpose. Without any larger expenditure of effort than obstruction of the Marshall Plan, Stalin has succeeded in centering America's attention on Europe while from the first his main offensive has been in Asia -- the Asia, as pointed out by Lenin, that provided the capitalist countries of the world with the raw materials that gave them their profits.26

An editorial in The New York Times expresses an idea similar to that of Creeel. The editorial says that as a people, and as a government representing that people, we are essentially Europe-minded, and Far-East minded. Thus we are at present in a period of confusion and dismay in respect to China, and we are silent although the freedom of China is at stake. We can wait and see only up to a certain point. "The Communist ultimatum forced the Government of China to make its hard decision. Each further Communist gain will bring closer the forcing of a similar decision upon us."27

Rosinger takes a more lenient view from the above writers when answering the question of the Communists' relations with Russia. He says that the answer is complex. On the one hand, the Communists are Marxists and have always asserted that they hope some day to create a Communist China. On the other hand, they regard Communism as realizable in China only in the distant future, despite their own

26Creeel, op. cit., p. 248.

desire for its attainment. They have never, even in their most radical actions, sought to carry out collectivization of the land (which would certainly be repugnant to the Chinese peasantry today). Their present program is clearly built on Chinese, not Russian, conditions, and they give every indication of being popular in their areas. The realism and practicality of the Chinese Communists, says Rosinger, seem to make their attitude toward the United States and the Soviet Union. Ideologically they are in agreement with the Russians, but they give every indication of realizing that ideology is not the only thing that matters in the world. Their conversation reveals a keen awareness of the tremendous economic power of the United States and the role this country could play in building up a united China. Although they attack violently American assistance to the Central Government's civil war effort, they do not wish -- any more than the bulk of the Chinese people -- to choose between the United States and Russia. Perhaps the situation can be put most accurately by saying that, while they feel certain of Russian friendship, they also want American good will -- that they are not hostile toward the idea of co-operating with the United States but approach our policies in the light of their own interests. It is significant that at those moments when the United States has been most friendly, or at least most objective, in its
dealings with them -- for example, during the latter part of the war, when an American military mission visited Yenan, or during the first phase of General Marshall's mission -- they have returned the friendliness and objectivity. On the other hand, they react sharply to American actions against them and reply in kind, as far as lies within their power. 28 According to The New York Times, the Communists know that China, today, is an unindustrialized country lacking in technological experience and surplus capital and must go through several transitional phases before it can arrive at genuine Communication. These phases include a fairly high degree of private ownership and management and a degree of political democracy. There would be a mixed economy, with both state ownership and private ownership in smaller enterprises, and there would be for a time representative political institutions. More important, the success of Communism in China is conditional on industrialization and modernization, which in turn are conditional on capital goods obtained on credit, which in turn can come only from America. There would thus be some reason for not antagonizing America by too close an affilition with Russia. The newspaper comment continues:

Taking both military and political considerations into account, it seems wiser then not to draw the issue with Russia over China. This does not

entail complete renunciation. There are positive as well as negative arguments for abstaining. For one thing, it must be repeated that it cannot yet be considered fore-ordained that the Chinese Communists will resign themselves and their country to Russian jurisdiction. Their revolution has been nationalistic as well as social from the beginning. They may prefer to detach themselves from all coalitions, to retain control over their own destiny and devote themselves first of all to making the country strong, to working out their political and social system their own way and under their own motive power. They may therefore refuse to attach China as a tail to the Russians' kite, to be raised and dropped with the winds of Moscow's foreign policy.

If the worst comes to the worst and the Communists should elect to adhere to the Russian bloc, it will nevertheless take them years to organize the country. It will take them years just to recruit and train enough men for the administrative machinery. It will take them years to solve the agrarian problem and to make a start toward industrialization, without which China's manpower will be the raw material of a military machine and not the finished product.

In the interval there will be time for Russian-American differences to work themselves out one way or the other.29

The same article states that on the external aspect there is more cause for doubt and concern. The Communist leaders maintain that while they have a philosophical affinity with Russia, their role in world affairs would be Chinese and autonomous. This thesis is hardly acceptable now that Russian-American cleavage cuts across the whole world. But of course, the Chinese Communist Party has been established long enough to have become nationalized in a way that no other Communist party is outside of Russia. The Chinese Communist leaders have worked out their own methods, their

own theories, their own program for nearly thirty years; it is far from certain that when finally successful after a long struggle they will immediately surrender control of their own movement. Some United States observers think there is a chance that a Communist government in China might not be cut from the same cloth as those in Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania. It would be foolish to think that the Communists can whip four hundred million Chinese into line with Marxist slogans and Marxist terror, according to an article in Business Week. Some observers also say that it will be an economic advantage if the United States can do business with a Communist government in China. They point out that a self-supporting, non-Communist Japan must trade with China, particularly with Manchuria. Otherwise, United States' taxpayers will have to support Japan for many years to come. "Washington will have a tough time swallowing these arguments. But another would be to write off China completely." 

There is another line of thought that Russia might not care to have China too closely attached to it. "Russia could hardly consider China much of an asset to its side. Industrially China is a fourth-rate power, it couldn't possibly arm itself for modern warfare. Russia could

---

30 Ibid.

hardly fill the gap."

As far as Russia's action toward China in the past is concerned, White and Jacoby seem to justify Russia's actions. Since United States service men seldom comment on international affairs, the writer quotes the authors:

During the period of Russia's peril, when Germany was ravaging her frontiers, Russian interest in China had been reduced to a minimum. Her attitude toward the Chinese Communists had been one of impeccable aloofness, though in her controlled press she repeatedly showed her discontent with Chiang's political system. Russian press criticism of China made almost precisely the same points that were being made at the time by the joint directors of American policy, Stilwell and Geuss. Down to the autumn of 1944 the policy of Russia and America in the Orient had moved along parallel lines toward the same objective, the establishment of a democratic, unified China. When Hurley became American ambassador, Russian and American policies began to diverge. America was now wholeheartedly behind the Kuomintang. Our unconditional support of Chiang and our increasing penetration of China struck the Soviets more and more as outright control. Criticism of America rarely appeared in the Chungking press, but the Russian Embassy was extremely sensitive to the occasional vituperative criticism of the Soviet Union permitted by the Chinese censorship; the Russians knew that the senior leaders of the Kuomintang detested them. The alliance of the Americans and the Kuomintang seemed like a direct menace to Russia.

The signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty in August, 1945, marked a halfway point in the three-way relationship of Russia, China, and America. This treaty was forced on China as much by American diplomacy as by Moscow. All the basic points had been agreed on at Yalta in the preceding January; the concessions that the Russians won from China were offered to them by the Americans as the price of Russian participation in the war against Japan. When T. V. Soong went to Moscow six months after the Yalta agreement in the hope of negotiating a complete treaty, he found that he was required to assent to an agreement already roughed out in advance by two other powers.

32 Ibid.
Much of the treaty could be justified as a normal working understanding between two neighboring countries. Outer Mongolia became independent; this was legal recognition of a situation that had existed in fact for twenty years. Russia secured by the treaty joint control of the Manchurian railways; such control had functioned before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Joint operation was probably a necessity in view of the curious geographical conformation of the Soviet maritime province. The bitter heart of the treaty lay in the clauses requiring China to give up her sovereign control of Port Arthur and Darien. Darien was made an international free port, with special rights for Russia, and the Russians received the right to establish a naval base at Port Arthur on Chinese soil. Such a treaty would have been called imperialist in the old days; it remains so today. In August, with the signing of the treaty, the Russians were prepared either to protect themselves against a hostile coalition in the Far East or to establish friendly relations if a new united China emerged from the war. The treaty promised full respect and support for the recognized government of China, in other words Chiang K'ai-shek. But it meant that Russia now had two excellent ports on its flanks for use either in trade or in war.

The leaguing of American military forces in direct coalition with the Kuomintang against the Communists proved the next Soviet move.

Having rooted themselves in Manchuria, the Russians next proceeded to a monumental blunder, an act that enormously complicated the delicate task of unity. They sacked Manchurian industry. This conduct could be explained, but it could not be condoned. The Soviet Union had been devastated by the German war, and Japan's industrial empire in Manchuria evoked a vendal enthusiasm in the Russians; they needed machinery and they took it. A second explanation could be given: with the prospect of a hostile China growing to the south, the devastation of Manchurian industry seemed a primary defensive measure. Neither accounting was a justification. Manchurian's machinery, its industrial plants, had been built by Chinese labor; the Japanese had engineered it, but they had sweated the mines and factoriess out of Chinese sinew. The installations belonged to China by right of sovereignty and as reparations for the vast damage Japan had done her. Whether the Communists, the Kuomintang, or a coalition was to control China, Manchurian industry was the cornerstone of China's future. However much or little the Russians took from Manchuria, their
action left enduring suspicion and hostility in the Chinese mind, and for the first time in many years the right wing in Chinese politics had a popular issue on which to appeal to the country. 33

All authorities agree that Russia is maintaining a technically "correct" diplomatic position in regard to China at present. The New York Times for March 6, 1949, says:

Despite the ascendency of Communists, the Russians are continuing to maintain a technically "correct" diplomatic position here. Soviet Ambassador N. V. Roschin is the only top Big Four envoy who has established himself in Canton, now the legal seat of the Nationalist Government. Meanwhile, a Soviet air mission has arrived in Tihwa, capital of Sinkiang, to negotiate with Nationalist representatives. The Russians are dealing for mining, trade and aviation rights in that northwest province.

A coalition government in China would not necessarily preclude a federation in which Manchuria, Sinkiang and possibly Inner Mongolia would remain under the Chinese flag as more or less autonomous areas. Whether or not the Nationalists and Communists come to terms, the greater part of the commentators and people having lived in China think Soviet Union seems to stand a good chance of extending its influence in this borderland "security belt." 34

One fact makes onlookers wonder if Russia's correctness is not feigned since the propaganda of the Chinese Communists in the last two years has been in exact harmony with that of Russia. It has become more virulently anti-American as Russian-American relations have worsened. While it is true that American help for Chiang K'ai-shek has given the Communists a grievance of their own, it is also true that in

33White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 290.
content, direction, and intensity their propaganda has more closely reflected America's relations with China. And if the division of the world into two camps becomes sharper, there is at the very least a fair presumption that the Chinese Communists will conclude that no country can stay neutral and that therefore China must array itself with Russia. In that case the consequence for all eastern Asia would be fateful. Russia would hold sway from the Adriatic to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{35} A recent United States Government bulletin states about the same thing about China's Communism following the Kremlin's propaganda:

Chinese communism is regular communism. Its doctrines follow those of Lenin and Stalin. Its leaders are Moscow-trained. Its policies and actions, its strategy and tactics, are Communist. The Chinese Communists have followed faithfully every zigzag of the Kremlin's line for a generation.\textsuperscript{36}

It looks as if Russia may be playing both sides -- Communists and Nationalists -- in China for what she can get out of each one. Russia has only lately made a treaty with the Nationalists through a top-ranking Nationalist general, Chiang Chih-chung, who is a representative of the Central Government's Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Industry and National Resources Commission, in regard to Sinkiang, which borders China on the northwest. The general was acting

\textsuperscript{35}Tbid., March 14, 1949.

\textsuperscript{36}Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee 5, \textit{Communism in China}, 1949.
with the consent of Acting President Li Tsung-jen and Premier Sun Fo (lately resigned). This agreement gives the Soviet Union mining, trade, and aviation monopolies for the next forty years in Sinkiang. The minerals in Sinkiang are tungsten, gold, oil, vanadium, and molybdenum; and there are unconfirmed reports that there are also large deposits of uranium. In return for the rights given the Russians they promise to help the people of Sinkiang in building better roads, hospitals, schools, and in improving their sanitation and their standards of living. The New York Times says of this agreement:

Although the pattern is by no means clear yet, the concentration of China's industrial resources in North China, Manchuria, and Sinkiang -- combined with Russian concern about their security and the Communists' ideological leanings toward Moscow -- favors a large role for the Soviet Union in future industrial development in this country. 37

Sinkiang came into Kuomintang hands during Russia's darkest hours in the fight with Germany, explains Edgar Snow. Kuomintang troops had never before controlled that vast area of half a million square miles. For some years it had been ruled by an ex-Manchurian general, Sheng Shin-tsaai, who carried out a pro-Soviet policy. After the Japanese invaded this area Russia sent a small force of combat and service troops to help police the area. They also helped develop some oil wells and other industry with the

Generalissimo's consent. When the Generalissimo sent envoys to ask the Russians to leave Sinkiang, they withdrew not only their gendarmes, but also all their machinery and oil-drilling equipment.

A glance at a map of the Far East as given in Fig. 3 on the following page will help clarify the position of the Communist armies in China. The map also shows Sinkiang and the part that is concerned in the deal with Russia and the Nationalists.

Even though the Russians and the Chinese working together seems ominous for the United States and England in China, something might happen to change this situation, said Winston Churchill in a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in April, 1949. Fairbank speaks of the development of two wings of Chinese Communism, the "native" wing under Mao Tse-tung and the "foreign" wing under more direct Russian influence in Manchuria. A recent issue of The New York Times carried an article by Lieberman that elaborates upon "Rift among Communists" as follows:

Now that the Communists have undertaken big-city rule, a number of Government leaders here hold the view that the old party-line conflict between "rural gradualism" and "big-city radicalism" is more likely to reassert itself within the context of world communism's "Tito problem."

A member of the Shanghai peace mission said he was impressed by the different attitudes of Mao Tsetung, who seemed disposed toward peaceful settlement,

38Fairbank, op. cit., p. 306.
Fig. 3. -- The Far East -- major problem for makers of U. S. policy.
and General Lin Piao, the Communist conqueror of Manchuria. The 41-year-old Lin Piao, one of the Communists' few able field leaders, is classified here as a member of the school holding that there should be no compromise with the revolution and that it should be permitted to run its full course.

Pursuing logic that cannot be checked at this distance, some Nanjing observers point out that Mao Tse-tung's personal party strength is basically political and not military. A large-scale Yangtze crossing requiring the use of Lin Piao's well-equipped Manchurian army, they argue, might well make him instead of Mao Tse-tung the dominant Communist personality in a disorganized China.

In reporting the action taken at the recent plenary session of the party's central committee, the Communist policy-making group had upheld "the correctness" of Mao Tse-tung's line since 1945 but had called for a switch in the party's center of gravity from rural areas to cities. General Chou En-lai, veteran party negotiator and a member of Mao Tse-tung's secretariat, was named Chairman of a delegation appointed to discuss peace with the Nanjing Government. Among the delegates was Lin Piao.39

Fairbank had already anticipated problems for the Communists when he stated:

In proportion as the Chinese Communists, who have hitherto gained influence chiefly in agrarian areas, get control over cities and national affairs, we can expect them to face increasing problems. If Chinese Communists stay closely within Moscow's orbit, there will eventually come conflict with genuine Chinese patriotism. If Communist reconstruction of China has to build by taxing the peasant's surplus, it may offer him far less than could be offered with our help in technological know-how and materials. The inheritors of the Kuomintang will not have an easy time.

During this critical period Marxist dogmatism may drive a Chinese Communist regime into increasing despotism. Yet we cannot counter this trend by aid from abroad unless and until Chinese sentiment leads the way. If the great body of Chinese who are now disillusioned with the Kuomintang are eventually to

become disillusioned with communism, they must accomplish this themselves. We cannot do it for them, and our efforts to save them against their will would only be resented and used against us.

It is therefore most important that the United States retain a certain measure of diplomatic flexibility with respect to Chinese politics. Any commitment to deal only with a recognized Chinese government-in-exile, or with Chiang K'ai-shek bolstered by American aid in a South China or a Formosan base, can only handicap our cause. Without indulging in much hope that we can work with Chinese communism, we must avoid accepting claims to legitimacy by Chinese political figures who have lost credit with their own people. The Chinese Communist success helps Russia, but cannot be equaled with Russian conquest of China. We have to face up to the fact that the Communist movement is not only genuinely Communist but also genuinely Chinese.40

James Reston sees a chance that Communists may bog down in a "strategic morass." He says China is not a strategic springboard but a "strategic morass," according to the United States Government. China cannot be conquered as the Communists have conquered some nations of eastern Europe. It is a vast continent of a country, populated by undernourished, highly individualistic people; and the Communists do not have the administrative organization or skill to deal effectively with the economic problems of the country. He explains:

... Winning the war, the State Department feels, will be easy for the Communists; running the country will be extremely difficult, and probably cannot be done without enlisting legions of non-Communist officials, who may very well, in the long run, prevent the effective communization of the area.

Some of our officials believe that the Communists will thus not only get bogged down in the "strategic

moress," but that Mao Tze-tung and the other Communist leaders will rapidly show signs of "Titoism" once they are in control.

The top officials of the Department think that the Communists will get caught in the morass, all right, but they are discouraging the idea that the Chinese Communists are good-hearted agrarians who will defy Moscow and introduce their own native brand of Titoism.\(^1\)

But at present we must stick to the seriousness of the facts and not be misled, by what might conceivably happen, into a state of false optimism. The New York Times says that the objectives of the Chinese Communists are:

1. Complete defeat of the Kuomintang and unification of all China under their control.
2. Establishment of a Communist-dominated coalition government oriented toward the Soviet Union and lined up behind Russia in the "cold war."
3. Reconstruction and industrialization of China.

At the present juncture, the first two objectives seem easier of attainment than the third.

The primary Communist military objective right now seems to be the Lower Yangtze Valley area and its key cities of Hankow, Nanking and Shanghai, with Hangchow on the coast.\(^2\)

As for the future, George Creel says:

To babble about a "bona fide coalition government" and an "autonomous Red China" is merely adding fatuity to blunders and betrayals. A Communist China is Russia's China. Acceptance of that fact is the one sound base for a new Chinese policy.\(^3\)

---


\(^3\) Creel, op. cit., p. 250.
Winston Churchill said in his speech over the radio in the United States, in April, 1949: "The worst disaster since the war has been the fall of China to the Communists."
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

Studies of the writings and comments in regard to Communist China, presented by the writer to emphasize his own impressions received during a nine-months' stay in that country, reveal the following findings: China, a nation of 465 million people with many undeveloped natural resources, is one of the world's largest concentrations of poverty because of its backward economic and social conditions. The nation is overpopulated, making a maximum number of people compete for a minimum of natural resources and making the farms too small to grow food enough to sustain life at a very high level. Industrial equipment, farm machinery, and all modern devices are very scarce, thus making China's main source of power the human muscles of the poor coolies. The social organization is antiquated since it still has unbridled landlordism and warlordism over the lowly peasants. Taxation is very heavy upon the peasants.

The result of this poverty is (1) illiteracy for the peasant and (2) low health standards because of lack of doctors and of money to pay for medical services.

The Chinese peasant has no voice in the government.
This fact makes him a prey for such ideas as Communism that promise a better life for the lowly even though, so far, it has done little to raise his standard of living.

Communism was brought into China by the Russians during Sun Yat-sen's dominance of the Republic because Sun needed the help of all parties in China to establish his principles of "nationalism, democracy, and livelihood" and because he was deeply stirred by Lenin's declarations against imperialism and the Soviet stress on racial equality. A military academy was set up to train revolutionary officers with Chiang K'ai-shek as head of the academy. Chiang was sent to Moscow to receive indoctrination in Communism, but he did not like the Russian viewpoint.

All went well for the Kuomintang-Communist combination until in 1927 a plot was uncovered to destroy the national government of China and set up a Soviet-dictated regime in that country. This provoked the civil strife between Chiang K'ai-shek, leading the Nationalists, and Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, leading the Communists. This warfare went on in South China for a while until the Communists saw that they did not have a chance and migrated to North China in 1931, where they set up a capitol at Yanan.

During the Japanese war both Nationalists and Communists co-operated to overthrow the Japanese but the Communists took every opportunity to strengthen their own cause against the Nationalists. They adopted a coalition pledge
with the Nationalists; then secretly issued directives to their followers to let their policy be seventy per cent expansion of Communism, twenty per cent dealing with the Kuomintang, and ten per cent resisting Japan. The Nationalists had to carry the major burden of the Japanese war as the Communists fought only guerrilla warfare and engaged in no pitched battles. The Nationalists had to finance the army and to conscript the soldiers. Chiang had little chance to carry out the proposed reforms for the common people as he was too busy with the war, but he did line up with the "upper crust" of China, and this action alienated the lower class from him and his party. Thus the peasants and the liberals joined with the Communists.

The United States kept forces in China trying to mediate the dispute between the Communists and the Nationalists, but without success. The United States stood behind the Nationalists for a long time, but eventually it was realized that there was no right and wrong side to the Chinese struggle because each side was capable of ruthless action.

The three top Communist leaders are Mao Tze-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai -- able-bodied, tough-minded men who are all Marxists and follow the Cominform line. They do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end even if it does wreck the economy of China. They seem to have more nationalism, however, than Lin Piao, an able military leader and the conqueror of Manchuria, who is coming
into prominence in the last few weeks as a possible rival of Mao for the leadership of the party. Lin Piao is more strait-laced than the other three leaders and co-operates well with Russia.

There are some liberals in the Communist party. Apparently there are in the party many lowly peasants who only use it as a hope to better their condition without knowing what it is all about.

The Communist ideology consists of:

1. Government set up by the people and called democratic centralization.

2. State ownership of big banks, big industries, and big commercial establishments, and of large native-owned or foreign-owned enterprises.

3. Each tiller having his own land by division of land. Encouragement of co-operatives to stimulate production.

4. Wiping out of illiteracy by drafting the aid of cultural leaders and educators. Developing a new culture that is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, yet is scientific.

5. Working with religious people for political purposes only but having nothing to do with idealism or religion in themselves.

6. Creating armed forces backed by the entire population.
7. Giving minority peoples equality with others.

8. Tying China solidly with the Communist world, of which Russia is the leader. Being friends with the United States of America, Great Britain, and other Western nations only if their policies coincide with those of the Communists. Considering the capitalists and imperialists as their enemies.

The Chinese Communist Party is organized similarly to the Russian party, but the Chinese do not take all the land from the owners -- they leave them twenty-five acres in some places and in Manchuria seventy-five acres.

The Communists' tactics are, malicious propaganda against the Nationalists and the United States, indoctrination of the conquered people by speeches, plays, etc., guerrilla warfare using captured United States arms and Russian-made arms.

The Chinese civil war has caused growing inflation, which is another drawback to the Chinese.

Communism is spreading over China. Chiang K'ai-shek is in retirement and Li Tsung-jen has taken over as acting president. The peasant's plight is worse than before the war began. Religious workers have to proceed with caution to keep from offending the Communists. Foreign businessmen in China hope to "sit tight" and do business with the Communists.
The United States, Chinese, and Russian triangle is baffling. The United States’ relations to China have been taking the form of helping to evacuate Japanese forces from China, and trying to mediate between Communists and Nationalists. The United States recognizes the Nationalist Government as the legal government of China. This has given the Communists grounds for considering the United States as an imperialistic nation intervening in Chinese affairs. By aiding the Nationalists, the United States has alienated the liberals who are now joining with the Communists.

The United States has given more than two billion dollars in aid to China. President Truman says that the United States will give more aid to China for economic reconstruction when conditions there improve.

But, as a whole, American aid to the Nationalist government in China has left it in a worse condition than it was in before a dollar was spent. Therefore, our giving money has not accomplished what Russian idealism and promises have accomplished. Communism seems (to the people of China) merely a plan of reducing high rentals on absentee-owned farm lands and usurious interest rates charged by money lenders. They care little about who governs them, just so they have food.

Since the giving of money to China has failed to do anything for China and has caused the United States to be
little thought of in China, other forms of aid to China have been suggested. One suggestion is to stop killing and use a little propaganda to appeal to ideology. Another is to use a program with some socialism by nationalizing key industries and collectivization of the Chinese agricultural program. In other words, there should be an American-born program to achieve the same ends that Russia has achieved with the Communist ideas. That is, fight Communism with ideas instead of bullets.

The significance of the American and Russian policies in China is linked with the future of the land and the peasant since China can hardly achieve internal stability until its people and its production have been modernized and its living standards have been raised.

Russian actions in China are puzzling. After V-J Day Russia behaved with rigid correctness at first; then when she saw the United States giving aid to the Nationalists, she started seizing Manchurian railways and allowing Communists to enter Manchuria. Now Russia is rooted in Manchuria. The Russians have behaved in a technically correct manner by continuing to recognize the Nationalist regime as the government of China. But onlookers are positive that there is a strong hidden tie between the Communists and Russia since the propaganda of the Chinese Communists in the past two years has been in exact harmony with that of Russia.
It more closely reflects Russian-American relations than Chinese-American relations. 

Russia is evidently playing both sides -- Communists and Nationalists in China -- for what she can get out of them. The newspapers state she is now making a treaty with the Nationalists for rights in Sinkiang. Many people think it is no longer possible to doubt Russia's control of the Chinese Communists. Most people argue that a Communist triumph in China means a grand Soviet triumph in which all Asia will embrace Communism. If this is the case, Soviet Russia will gain control over an additional 400,000,000 people and one fifth of the world's manpower. One writer has gone so far as to state that Stalin has succeeded in centering American attention on Europe while he steals Asia with all of its raw materials.

However, some people say that a Communist victory in China may not mean very much to Russia in the long run. They say that although Communists are ideologically in agreement with Russia, they realize they will need industrial equipment from the United States; hence they hesitate to choose between the United States and Russia. The Chinese revolution has been nationalistic as well as socialistic from the beginning and we cannot be sure that the Chinese will resign themselves and their country to Russian jurisdiction. Even if they should do so, it will take years and
years just to recruit enough men for the administrative ma-
achinery. It will also take years to solve the agrarian
problem. Since China is industrially a fourth-rate power,
Russia may not consider it much of an asset. There are
some troubles developing for the Communists such as the
problem of city government and the differences developing
between the foreign wing of Communism under Lin Piao and
the native wing under Mao Tse-tung.

The Communists' present objectives seem to be the de-
feat of the Kuomintang and unification of all China under
Communist control; establishment of a coalition government
oriented toward the Soviet Union, and lined up behind Rus-
sia in the "cold war"; and reconstruction and industrializa-
tion of China. Therefore, most people concede that Com-
munist China is Russia's China and that the worst disaster
since the war has been the fall of China to the Communists.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Pamphlets


Articles


Tregaskis, Richard, "Mr. Mong and the Fortunes of War," True, April, 1949.

Weidman, Jerome, "Good Reading," Holiday, January, 1949.

"Zero Hour for China Again," Scholastic, December 1, 1948.

Newspapers


Unpublished Material

Tung Chen, Edward King, "Ideology of the Chinese Communists," paper read before the meeting of the Southwest Social Science Association, held at Fort Worth, Texas, April 16, 1949.