

JAPAN'S AGGRESSION PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR

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JAPAN'S AGGRESSION PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR

THESIS

**Presented to the Graduate council of the North
Texas State Teachers College in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements**

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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158591

McKinney, Texas

August, 1948

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CHAPTER I

JAPAN: ITS LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

Geography

Nature gave the Islands of Japan a very favored spot where civilization could prosper and a people could develop into a strong and great nation. A happy combination of temperate climate, plentiful rainfall, fairly fertile soil has certainly given it a place among the leading peoples of the world.

Japan proper, with a population of over seventy million, is composed of an archipelago of four main islands and hundreds of smaller ones. The four main islands of Japan are strung out in a great arc along the coast of East Asia and cover the same spread of latitude and the same general range of climate as the east coast of the United States.

Americans have often tended to overemphasize the smallness of Japan, contrasting it with the vast stretches of our own country, or to other giants like Russia and China. Japan is smaller than France or pre-war Germany but slightly larger than the British Isles or Italy, the homes of the two greatest empires our western world has ever seen.

The mountains of Japan have cut the islands into small valleys and plains and have pushed the Japanese out upon

the sea, making them the greatest seafaring peoples of Asia. There are few navigable streams, and in the old days before the advent of railways, telegraphs, and steamboats, intercommunication was difficult. The nation was separated naturally into small groups, each of which tended to become independent of the central power, and the feudal form of government and the emphasis on family which we are later to notice easily developed.

The large islands are Kyushu, the original home territory of Japan's semihistorical founder Jimmu Tenno; Honshu, the main island on which is located Tokyo; Shikoku, a land of double rice crops; and, in the north, the recently settled Hokkaido. The total area of Japan proper (including the Ryukyus) is 147,707 square miles, somewhat less than that of California. By including the empire as of 1941 (Formosa, Korea, Karafuts), the area is raised to 260,769 square miles, about the size of Texas.¹

Japan is covered with volcanic peaks and picturesque inlets -- scenes of striking natural beauty. The cost of this inspiring scenery is that only 20 per cent of the country side is arable and the farmers of the island concentrate their efforts on the small plain areas scattered here and there along the seacoasts or between the mountains. This means that the limit of population supported by home-grown food are soon reached. Any excess beyond these limits must either emigrate or busy itself, as in Great Britain, with manufacturing and

¹John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation, p. 5.

commerce. Fortunately there is near at hand a vast continent. In Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia are lands for immigrants. In China there is the greatest potential market in the world and unmeasured supplies of raw material.

Nature has been rather stingy with Japan in mineral resources. The mountains of Japan, together with the heavy rainfall have, however, given Japan one great asset in the modern world -- water power, all the more important in a land comparatively poor in other respects.

By way of natural resources Japan has fair soft coal deposits and is rich in gold, copper, and sulphur. Hydroelectric power is also plentiful. However, for a modern industrial nation Japan is poor in essential resources of iron and petroleum.

An island people, the Japanese are fishermen as well as farmers so that while mountains hinder the growing of rice in much of the area, the sea provides fish to make up for this loss. Today the mountains with their rapid streams are of inestimable value to Japan as a source of water power for industrial development. The mountains and the seas have also influenced artistic and religious developments and provided the Japanese with a sacred world of mountain and forest spirits and deities of land and of sea.

Today Japan is becoming an industrial nation with great manufacturing cities which depend for their existence on natural resources, such as oil from Southeast Asia and coal from

Manchuria, as well as on free access to markets. This has led to the situation of a newly industrialized independent nation in the midst of an area dominated by Occidental colonial and economic interests-- a situation which was bound, sooner or later to lead to a war of survival.

Customs

The customs of a country are the expressions of the heart throbs of its people. If we are to really know Japan, we must study its customs.

In the study of Japanese customs it is our purpose to consider them according to the crises in the personal lives of individuals and then the more national ones according to the calendar. We must watch the similarity of customs between east and west become more apparent. Every crisis of life, from cradle to grave, has its appropriate service for seeking divine blessing.

Motherhood is universally honored as the crown of womanhood. The Bible contains the beautiful songs of Elizabeth, Mary, Hannah, and many others, exalting this God-given privilege. In Japanese family life there is the custom known as the CHAKUTAI (girdle-fastening) ceremony particularly in the case of the coming of the first born. This is a time of great rejoicing. It means, first, the wife is about to fulfil the great hope of the family; second, she thereby insures for herself a permanent place in the family; and third, she gains a place in the happy band of mothers.

When her days are fulfilled and the ordeal is safely over, the joy and thanksgiving of the mother and her friends must find expression. The mother's heart craves an opportunity to receive the blessing of religion and the approbation of her friends upon her new born child. In Christian lands we see this human longing in the christening or infant dedicatory service. According to the custom of the Jews, Jesus was taken to the temple on the eighth day. In Japan the mother dresses her child up in all the elegance the family can possibly afford. The child is carried, not on the back as is ordinary in carrying babies, but in the arms of a near relative, a kind of god-mother. In the presence of the officiating priest, the KAGURA dance and holy water sprinkling ceremony are performed to invoke divine blessing on the young child. This ceremony in Japan, as in the old English Church, means also the purification of the mother and thanksgiving for the life of mother and child.

In Japan the little boy at the age of five leaves babyhood behind and puts on his first KAKAMA (bloomer skirt), a skirt like father's, at the HAKAMAGI (skirt-wearing). The little girl at the age seven wears her first sash like grown up girls and women, at the OBITAKI (sash-tying) ceremony.

The children's holidays are known as the GOSEKKU (five holidays) and come according to the old months. The first is on the seventh of January and is called JINJITSU. The JINJITSU is a New Year festival and is sometimes called NANAKUSA (seven grasses) from the use of seven vegetables in the soup on this

children's day of New Year Holidays. The second is on the third of the third month called JOKI, commonly known as Girls' or Dolls' Festival. This festival is a great occasion in the home of girls and consists of display of heirloom dolls in the sacred alcove of the best room of the home and of feasts for children prepared as if for the dolls, all the food and dishes being much smaller than those ordinarily used. The third is on the fifth of the fifth month and is called TANGO (Boys' festival). This festival is observed where all the others may be neglected, for the pride and joy of a male heir in the family line is literally proclaimed from the housetops in the flying fish on a pole higher than the house, one for the heir and one for each of his brothers. The thought that dead fish go down stream while live fish go up, and the story of the carp which climbs the waterfall, inspire boys to overcome obstacles and encourage them to climb the waterfall of fame. The boys who became great and the great crisis in the boyhood days of Japan's great men are set forth and told by parents and story tellers. Hero worship is ingrained into the children and they are easily inspired to emulate their ideal. The next holiday comes on the seventh of the seventh month and is called TANABATA. The TANABATA is the festival of the weaver and is connected with worship of the star Vega which is brightest on the night of the seventh day of the seventh month. The fifth holiday is on the ninth of the ninth month and is called CHOYO. This holiday is the festival of the chrysanthemum.

The beginning days of adolescence are recognized in the life of the boys of Japan. JUSAN-MAIRI (going to the shrine at thirteen) is the time of the first independent visit to the family shrine. This is just one year later than Jesus went to the temple after the manner of the Jews, to worship on his own volition.

The next great occasion in the life of the young "samurai" is at fifteen, at the "gempuku" (war clothes), when the boy has his hair shaved like the warrior and is initiated to the life of a "samurai." His boyhood days are over and he begins to feel and act like a man.

The next important event in the life of the Japanese youth is the "Konyaku shiki," when the marriage engagement is announced and the completion of the arrangements for marriage of the children is completed by parents and friends. This is a time of great happiness and satisfaction on the part of the parents when a good match has been made by the hired go-between.

After the announcement comes the wedding ceremony. A wedding is merely a family affair until it is properly registered. Then it becomes legal. Even then it can be dissolved upon mutual consent.

We now come to days and ceremonies connected with death. Most of these are Buddhistic, chiefly because the Shintoist would have nothing to do with the dead, calling them unclean, and leaving the family to bury their dead any way they chose, only so as not to contaminate the community.

The Christian funeral has been adopted in a few cases by non-Christians because of its economy, it being cheaper to have a preacher and Christian ceremony than to pay the priests of the temple to conduct the long expensive Indo (Buddhist Mass) ceremony. There is a great contrast in beauty and comfort between the non-Christian and the Christian ceremony, the one being formal to serve the dead, and the other inspirational to comfort the bereaved.

In connection with the burial of the dead there are harmless customs, as for example the "tsuya" (watch meeting or wade) where feasting is carried on instead of prayer. The Japanese seek at such times as this to please their dead by doing what gave joy to the departed.

The bereaved in western countries visit the grave of the departed on Sundays for a few weeks', and then observe the day on its anniversaries by placing flowers on the grave. This same heart beat is found in the Japanese seventh day, the forty-ninth day, the one-hundredth day, and the yearly anniversaries, some of which are more important than others.

The Japanese are fond of doing some special work or act to mark special days and special occasions. One case comes to mind of two young men who asked the church people to allow them to plant trees in the church yard on the day of their baptism. One member of the church gave a feast in honor of the first birthday of his son and heir. Another gave a substantial gift to the church on his wedding day.

Another faithful son gave a goodly sum to the ladies' Aid in honor of his mother on her first funeral anniversary day. These are just a few of the ways the Japanese have of expressing their desire to commemorate life's crises. Such occasions have been used by the Christian church to get the membership to consecrate their wealth and their enthusiasm to the church and the activities of the church in human service.

As we think back over the things we have just studied, we are impressed with the following words of an eminent Christian leader,

"The three things, birth, marriage and death, are deeper than the church, are of infinitely greater influence than the church; keep men close to the divine, keep men human and sober, more than any ecclesiastical system can hope to do. The kind of church the world wants and in a sense is waiting and searching for is the church that grows out of life. We are weary of the interpretations of life which are compressed and sometimes distorted to fit the dogmas and institutions of the church."²

We will now take into consideration a few of the days which are observed by the nation as a whole. The first national custom of the Japanese New Year is the Emperor's HATSUMIZU (first water) bath, when he performs a religious rite of cleansing and purification to bring peace and prosperity to his land and people. This rite is frowned on as ancestor worship.

The next festival is KIGENSETSU (Founder's Day) on February eleventh, celebrating the founding of the Empire.

²William Hugh Erskine, Japanese Customs, p. 13.

Each nation celebrates its foundation; think of Empire Day and Independence Day. On the third of April the Japanese celebrate the death of Jimmu Tenno. Jimmu Tenno, the descendant of Amaterasu Omikami, was the first Emperor and the celebration of his death is one of the great days in the Japanese calendar. He means as much to the Japanese as Abraham to the Jews, or as Washington to the Americans.

TENCHOSETSU, the birthday of the ruling Emperor, is another great day in the Japanese calendar. Some people consider the Emperor as the representative of his ancestors or as the living son of the Sun Goddess.

The greatest of all the celebrations in Japan is the Higan (the Spring and Autumn Equinoxes). It has a religious significance although it antedates all the religions in Japan. At the Higan the farmers pray to and thank the gods for good crops. Then they have the Harvest Festival to express gratitude for an abundant harvest.

The last national festival we will discuss is SHOKONSAI (calling Spirit Ceremony), coming generally the first week in May. In every land there is some commemoration of the sacrifices of those who have died for tribe or country. This day always means everything to the Japanese because there is scarcely a family which has not lost some loved one during some of the wars. It means much to the nation, for only as she honors her dead can she get others to be willing to die on the field of battle. They are taught that those who die on the field for their country will become gods.

Historical

Who are the Japanese? The origin of the Japanese is in part determined by the fact that Japan is an island archipelago lying off the large mainland continent of Eurasia. In this geographical position she resembles Great Britain and, like Britain, she has received immigrants and culture influences from various parts of the near-by continent from prehistoric times up to the present.

Culturally Japan is a daughter of Chinese civilization much as the countries of northern Europe are daughters of Mediterranean culture. The fact that Japan isolated itself from the home of its civilization and from all other people meant that in Japan the borrowed culture had more chance to develop along new and often unique lines, and to grow into distinctive patterns of civilization. One popular concept is that the Japanese have never been anything more than a race of borrowers and imitators. The truth is quite contrary. Isolation has made the Japanese a highly selfconscious people, unaccustomed to dealing with foreigners individually or as a nation. Isolation has made them painfully aware of their differences from other peoples and has filled them with a sense of superiority, which they are anxious to prove to themselves and to others.

Modern Japanese historians believe that the Japanese race is a mixture of Asiatic and Polynesian stocks, descended from invader immigrants of prehistoric times. The two strains are visible in the faces of the people today. The Asiatic type is the handsomer. Its physical marks are thin features, slanting eyes, a faintly aquiline nose, a slightly receding chin, a small mouth, delicate hands and small feet. The South Sea breed is coarser, with a pudding face, flat nose, the large mouth and teeth which caricaturists exaggerate, high cheeks, and thick bones.

Japanese teach that the first human Emperor was Jimmu Tenno, great grandson of the grandson of Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess. The date given to the rule of Jimmu Tenno is about 660 B.C. It is clearly fabulous. Written records were not kept until a thousand years later because the Japanese had no written language. The theory that the Emperor is a descendant of the gods was substantiated by the claim that seventeen of the first twenty Emperors lived for an average of 96 years and that one reigned for 99 years.

Jimmu Tenno was in all probability the leader of the invading band who conquered the earlier inhabitants of Japan. His story undoubtedly belongs to the same class as the story of Romulus and Remus.

The religion of Jimmu Tenno and his followers was a simple creed which saw spiritual life in all nature. Every grove and mountain and waterfall had its resident deity;

many aristocratic families claimed to be descended from a god, like their chief. This religion feared ghosts and dreaded the corruption of death, and its rites required the observance of strict cleanliness.

The early Japanese were divided into many different clans and each one was ruled over by a high priest. The religion was primarily that of nature worship. It was after a while called Shinto, "the way of the Gods," to distinguish it from the continental religion of Buddhism. Shinto absorbed Chinese ancestor-worship and it is as ancestor-worship that the ordinary Japanese is familiar with Shinto. Japanese children in well-regulated households begin their day by standing before the family shrine and bowing with clasped hands and closed eyes to the memory of those of the family who have gone before -- it may be a sister, a soldier brother, a grandfather, a grandmother, the nation or the Emperor. This simple Shinto concept of deity should be born in mind in trying to understand the deification in modern Japan of living emperors and of all Japanese soldiers who have died for their country.

For seven hundred years (1156-1868) shogun succeeded shogun. Japan had become a feudal state composed of hundreds of clans and each governed by a shogun. Japan remained an empire in name though the power had passed to military rulers. Wars were frequent and four military dynasties successively reigned. They did not aspire to the title of emperor. The family of Jimmu Tenno lived in mouldy palaces and discharged its priestly

functions. It was too weak to challenge the feudal lords. In most European countries this stage was marked by growth. In Japan it was different because in Europe religion was affairs of the church. In Japan church and state were one. From this concept one can realize what a world of make-believe the Japanese have built themselves into.

The feudal age brought forth one of the most extraordinary episodes recorded in human history. Japan closed her doors on the world and went into seclusion. From 1636 to 1855 Japan was a sealed country: no ships of over 150 tons might be built; all larger vessels were destroyed; no Japanese might leave Japan; no foreigner might enter. Christianity was delayed or hindered by wholesale slaughter. Perhaps hundreds of thousands of converts were slain, in fact, it is reported not one was left alive.³

By the middle of the nineteenth century, political and social changes were long over-due in Japan. The growth of nationalism and the development of a full-fledged commercial economy had made Japan ready for an entirely new political and social order. In the last years of the eighteenth century the Russians, Portuguese, French, and the Spanish began to try to enter Japan. But the Americans were the most interested of all in opening Japanese ports. Their whaling vessels frequented the North Pacific and the waters around Japan and they wanted permission for their whalers and clipper ships to enter Japanese ports to take on water and replenish their stores. Another

³ Hugh Byas, Government By Assassination, p. 7.

American motive for establishing relations with Japan was from a commercial point of view. The New England traders did not wish to be beaten to a new commercial field by foreign merchants.

The first official attempt by the United States to open diplomatic and trade relations with Japan was in 1846 by Commodore Biddle. This attempt failed.

In 1847, Commodore Glyn anchored his ship, Preble, right off Nagasaki and threatened to bombard the city if fifteen foreign seamen being held for shipment to Batavia were not handed over. The Japanese authorities bowed to this show of force.

The Dutch government tried to warn Japan that America intended to force the opening of the country and recommended a peaceful opening rather than resistance as that might mean a war. The shogunate did not act on this advice. It realized that Japan's position was indeed precarious in an industrial nineteenth-century world of aggressive colonial powers.

The shogunate also had a home front to deal with and it was no easy matter. The court nobles were beginning to take an active interest in politics. Soon after his coronation, The Emperor Komei (1846-67) formally instructed the shogun that, in accordance with ancient tradition, all questions of foreign policy must be submitted to the court before the final decision.

During this time the laws of Japan decreed death for any foreigner entering the country, and although this was not always

enforced, those unlucky mariners stranded in Japan who eventually got out usually had strange and hair-raising stories to tell of the cruel treatment.

It was soon obvious that Japan would not voluntarily open its doors. The American government decided to delay matters no longer, but to force the doors of Japan open. It dispatched a naval force of four warships under Commodore Mathew C. Perry. Perry steamed into Tokyo Bay in July 1853 bearing letters from President Fillmore to the "Emperor" of Japan. Commodore Perry thought that he delivered these letters to the Emperor, who in fact never saw them. The shogunate went to the unusual length of calling a council of the DAIMYO. At this junction the shogun died and the government asked Perry for more time. He withdrew to the Ryukyu Islands for the winter, with promise that he would return early the next year to receive a reply.

Japan was thrown into a state of confusion over this sudden crisis. The Japanese were appalled by the size and guns of the American "black ships", as they called them. When Perry returned to Tokyo Bay in February 1854, the government under the threatening guns of American ships had no other choice but to sign a treaty with the United States providing, among other things, that American ships could anchor at the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. The shogun's government lived up to its promise at the ultimate expense of its life. Most of

the DAIMYO and the Emperor were opposed to such a treaty. Yet despite the refusal of the Emperor to sanction the action and in the face of criticism by conservative DAIMYO, the government concluded the treaty. Thus they brought a dangerous nation to being.

This touched off the civil war ending with the "Restoration" of 1868. But, while the shogunate had been indeed overthrown, the real government of Japan merely passed into the hands of the two powerful clans, Satsuma and Choshu. Two clan leaders, Ito and Yamagata, now struggled for supremacy behind the throne. Ito believed in peace, Yamagata in war. The descendant of Jimmu Tenno, a youth of sixteen called Matsuhito, was enthroned as Emperor with the name Meiji (Enlightened Rule).

Ito long opposed the 1894 war with China, but Yamagata favored it and won. It must be acknowledged to our discredit, that our curiosity about Japan did not become admiration until Japan had whipped China.

Japanese sometimes said to foreigners,

"We had excited your curiosity as to our art, our intellectual attainments, and all the pursuits of peace; but it was necessary to demonstrate our ability to kill in order to prove that we were civilized."⁴

The new government revived the divinity of the Emperor. Shinto was made the state religion. The divinity of rulers was taught in schools. They were taught that other countries had man-made ruler, but the Sun Goddess had chosen Japan for her domain and had sent her descendants to rule it. The people existed for the state.

⁴ James A. B. Scherer, Japan Defies the World

A desire to dominate neighboring countries soon revealed itself. In 1877 a clansman known as the Great Saigo opposed the abolition of the military class. He demanded an invasion of Korea to divert the public from political agitation and to re-establish the warrior caste. The government had a hard fight to defeat Saigo and his war party, but it succeeded. Saigo committed hara-kiri. The people believed that Saigo was a great patriot because he wanted to conquer Korea thirty years before the government annexed it.⁵

On his accession in 1926 Emperor Hirohito chose for the name of his reign the characters Sho-wa, meaning Enlightened Peace. The Showa Restoration movement is the name given to the agitation of the young officers which in years to come would prove themselves to be the strongest force in Japan. Now for the story of expansion.

⁵ Byas, Hugh, Government By Assassination, p. 12.

CHAPTER II

THE ABSORPTION OF KOREA

Across from the Empire of Japan, a large peninsula stretches down from the mainland of Asia between the Sea of Japan and the Gulf of Chihli. So isolated did this peninsula become, and so slow were its inhabitants in opening their land to international intercourse, that the outside world named this land "The Hermit Nation." The natives, however, call their country "Chosen," or "Land of the Morning Calm."

The Korean Peninsula is neither large nor rich, except in natural beauty. Wrote one who knew it well, in 1905,

"They have denuded the hills of forests and permitted their lands to decline in productive power year by year. Five sixths of the country is filled up with lovely mountains and scantily clad hills and, in the valleys and plains that go to make up the remaining one sixth, ten or twelve million sad-eyed people are gathered together, laboring for the most part as beasts of the fields, sleeping with them too. There is but one city -- Seoul -- a bit of what Korea might have been if it had not been ruined in the past."¹

With the open door policy came Western civilization and Western ideas of military conquest and superior modern weapons of war. Japan was a pupil of the west, and soon equipped herself with the modern instruments and Western military mentality. When she was fully ready, she came, bowed, and asked for our good will by saying, "Please make friends with

¹A.W. Harris, Europe and the East, p. 504.

us, as we are your next-door neighbor. All nations of the world should throw their doors wide open to one another. They have international treaties to protect all nations, weak as well as strong."

The first of these treaties was signed between the United States and Korea in 1882. The first article of the treaty reads like this:

"If any powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings."²

The leading European nations soon followed the example of the United States and made commercial treaties with Korea.

The Korean people are not to be blamed entirely for the horrible plight in which they found themselves at the opening of the twentieth century. For on its soil was decided the problem of supremacy between China, Japan, and Russia. It is well to remember that the wrecking of Korea began in the sixteenth century at the hands of Japan, when the imperial Regent Hideyoshi at the head of an army of the best warriors of the East reduced the country to ruin in six years. An unimpeachable Japanese authority described it but a short time ago:

"The Seven Year's War was one of the most cruel and unprovoked wars the world has ever witnessed. Korean civilization was completely destroyed. The Korean people suffered to such a degree that even the graves of their kings were molested and rifled. At the close of the war Korea was a land of ruins, so

²Syngman Rhee, Japan Inside Out, p. 24.

great had been the devastation. The Koreans have ever since fostered great enmity toward the Japanese. Even today, Korea is filled with monuments, traditions, and literature describing the horrors of the Seven Years war. The difficulties that Japan has experienced in her administration of Korea since 1910 are generally accounted for by this lasting memory of an old war."³

The Chinese, who came to Korea's aid, also remember it.

After the final battle which lasted nearly a week, the Japanese cut off 38,700 Chinese heads, pickled the ears and noses in tubs, and conveyed them to Kyoto, where they were buried in the well known Ear Mound before which curious travelers still stand agape.⁴

Two hundred years passed before the Koreans had recovered materially from those early conquests; and it was not until the early eighties of the nineteenth century that the people were induced to open their country to world trade.

The Japanese, through pressure from China, secured the Japanese-Korean Treaty of 1876, whereby the independence of Korea was guaranteed and the port of Fusan opened to trade. Then other nations followed suit. This beginning of international intercourse, however, heralded only more trouble and sorrow for the helpless Koreans. In the years that followed, the intrigues of foreign government and of Korean political leaders kept the affairs of the country in the utmost confusion and retarded all development.

Two parties were contending for control in Korea at this time. One, the progressive or conservative group, led by the

³Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, p. 175.

⁴James A. B. Scherer, Japan Defies the World, p. 46.

clever and courageous Queen Min, and the other known as the "Liberal Party." The Queen managed to frustrate all the Japanese schemes and intrigues for ten years, in spite of the assassination of six of the ablest progressive supporters of the reign.

By 1894 Japan found it necessary to take a more active part in international affairs. The new Japan was certain to enter a period of expansion. This expansion, together with her intense patriotism and the existing conditions in the Orient, was certain to bring on serious clashes with other countries. The first trouble was in Korea which has been momentous for the entire world.⁵

It was natural that there should be friction in Korea. China and Japan had temporarily adjusted their differences by the agreement of 1885, but both had continued their intrigues. Then, there was Russia more to be feared than China. Unless something was done, the feeble Korea would fall an easy prey to the ever-expanding empire of the north. Were the Land of the Morning Calm to become Russian, Japan believed that she would have a relentlessly aggressive power at her very doors, that her commerce with the neighboring continent would be stifled by unfavorable restrictions, and that the natural outlet of growing population would be threatened. It must be remembered that Russia's frontiers in Asia had for centuries been steadily advancing. We have seen that she desired a foothold in southern Korea to make sure of a safe passage from Vladivostok

⁵A. W. Harris, Europe and the East, pp. 505-506.

to the open Pacific. She was already intriguing in Korea and was so strong in Peking that she might succeed in using China as a catspaw.⁶ Therefore, Japan feared the Russian menace and began to seek means of blocking this aggressive nation.

Japan proposed that China unite with her in permanently reorganizing the peninsula's government and in putting down disorder. China declined, refusing to admit that Korea was independent, and claimed the right to fix limits both to the number of Japanese troops that could be sent, and to their use.

China evidently thought Japan too torn by internal strife to become a formidable foe. China began sending more troops to Korea, although she had been warned by Tokyo that such action would lead to war. To China's surprise the Japanese ended their internal strife and united solidly. The Chinese were beaten on land and on sea. China was compelled to sue for peace. The dwarf had beaten the giant, and had demonstrated to the world that it was a factor to be reckoned with in the future.

Europe had watched the war with interest and surprise. The German emperor saw in Japan's victory a yellow wave of conquest that would eventually shake to its foundation the entire world.

By the treaty that ended the war, the complete independence of Korea was proclaimed and the suzerainty of

⁶ Kenneth S. Latourette, The Development of Japan, pp. 164-165.

China ceased forever. Japan received the Liaotung Peninsula in Southern Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores. Through pressure from Europe, Japan gave back to China the Liaotung Peninsula.

The Korean government was induced to accept a number of advisers; many important reforms were instituted; and the finances were reorganized and placed on a flourishing basis through the genius of the British financial adviser, Sir McLeavy Brown. Many Koreans refused to support the new regime. Then the Japanese representatives committed the inexcusable and cowardly political blunder of instigating the assassination of brave little Queen Min and the arrest of the King on October 8, 1895. The latter however, escaped four months later and took refuge in the Russian legation. Japanese influence began to wane.⁷

In 1897 began a scramble of European powers for leased territories and spheres of influence in China. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Western nations were entering on a new period of colonial expansion. China's importance had been made unmistakably apparent in her war with Japan, and European powers were not slow to take advantage of it. Russia obtained a lease on Port Arthur and Dalny on that Liaotung Peninsula of which she had deprived Japan scarcely three years before. Consequently, a spirited rivalry and competition ensued between Russians and Japanese for the control of ill-fated Korea.

⁷ A. W. Harris. Europe and the East.

Flushed with victory, Japan rushed secret preparations for another war, and in 1904 she was ready to take on Russia. Once more the soil of Korea resounded to the sound of turmoil and tramping feet; and this much oppressed land became the base of operation in a new conflict which increased the impoverishment of the Korean people still further.

Japan and Korea agreed to sign a defensive and offensive alliance, by which Korea was to open the peninsula for the Japanese troops to march through. The Japanese government pledged to withdraw her troops from Korea when peace should be restored. With that understanding, a Korean national army marched side by side with the Japanese army to fight the Russians in Manchuria. When the war was over Japan violated her pledge. Japan filled the country with her victorious army and betrayed her ally by robbing it of its independence and by robbing its people of their land. Twenty-three years later, the United States used its "good offices" not for Korea, according to its treaty, but for Japan, which was dealing "unjustly" with Korea in open violation of her promise.

By 1905, there was left in Korea absolutely nothing worth having; and its inhabitants had drained the last dregs of humiliation and despair. No wonder tablets appeared by the wayside reading, "If you meet a foreigner, Kill him; he who lets him go by is a traitor to his country."⁶

In spite of her reverses Russia was by no means crushed;

⁶A. W. Harris, Europe and the East, p. 508.

but for internal disturbances she might still have persisted and won. The Japanese were willing to negotiate. Their finances, already overloaded by years of preparation, were threatening to give way under the strain of prolonged war. When President Roosevelt offered his mediation both powers welcomed it.

The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed September 5, 1905, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, provided for:

1. Cession of the southern half of Saghalien to Japan.
2. Transfer of Russia's lease of Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.
3. With exception of Liaotung Peninsula, both powers to evacuate Manchuria.
4. Recognition of Japan's special interest in Korea.
5. Recognition of the sovereignty of China in Manchuria and affirmation of the Open-Door Policy.
6. Chinese-Eastern Railroad south of Changchun to be awarded to Japan, north of that point to be retained by Russia.⁹

This was the taste of blood that started the Japanese in quest of more land to conquer. The Japs began to believe they were invincible and that world conquest was becoming more and more real. Out of this national dream came what was later to be known as Tanaka's Memorial. This dream was to be kept away from the knowledge of Westerners, especially Americans.

During World War I, the nations of the world were condemning Germany for calling international treaties "scraps of paper" but the German government replied, "I am only doing what the American government did nine years ago with Korea." ¹⁰

⁹Mary A. Nourse, The Way of the Emperor, p. 251.

¹⁰Sunomei Rhee, Japan Inside Out, p. 25.

As a result of her expansionist policy, Japan's gains were unbelievable. She had fought two short wars, each time being able to make a desirable peace before her adversary pushed her to exhaustion. As a reward for her military achievements Formosa and half of Saighalien were added to the empire and Korea was declared independent, paving the way for its annexation within the next five years. She had bound herself as ally to the strongest nation in the world in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and she had gained parity with other nations in dealing with Far-Eastern questions. Not a bad record for a country which scarcely forty years before had stepped from a medieval feudal status with no foreign connection.

The Treaty of Portsmouth had hardly been signed before the organization of the new regime was begun. The Nipponese statesmen conveniently forgot their promises to Korea in the treaties of February 23 and August 22, 1904, guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of that country, but binding the Koreans to accept Japanese assistance and advisers in the reorganization of their state. Capitalizing on the Russian Agreement in the Treaty of 1905 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of August 22, 1905, the Japanese Government promptly took the control of affairs within the Hermit Kingdom into its own hands. The "independence" of Korea simply meant independence from everyone but Japan. Korea was saddled with a Japanese financial adviser and a diplomatic adviser; land was confiscated; Korea was forced to give fishing rights to the

Japanese and the postal telegraph and telephone were taken over by the Japanese. Japanese gendarmes appeared and martial law throughout Korea was declared. The railroad from Seoul to Manchuria was completed. Towns and cities were given Japanese names.

The Marquis Ito, himself, was made Resident-General of Korea in 1906. In 1908 he announced that Japan did not propose to annex Korea, but a year later he declared that Korea must be amalgamated with Japan. The Korean army was disbanded. Considerable resistance was made by the Koreans, which culminated in the assassination of Prince Ito in 1909. Count Terauchi gave Korea a short reign of terror. He was forced to abdicate in favor of his feeble-minded son. In August, 1910 Korea ceased to be a nation even in name when she was annexed to Japan.¹¹

The Nipponese leaders of those days were not satisfied with the establishment of a well ordered commonwealth, but looked forward to the time when their country should be the leader of the Orient and a great world power. It was deemed essential that the Nipponese should have a foothold upon the continent; and, for this purpose no section of the coast was more suitable than Korea. It was close to Japan and had behind it the vast areas of Manchuria and Mongolia, and gave an easy approach to the heart of China. Therefore, Korea was just a stepping stone in Japan's march of aggression.

¹¹Mary A. Nourse, The Way of the Emperors, p. 253.

Unfortunately, the Japanese who came to Korea were soldiers and camp-followers. The army occupied the country during war and military rule is strict everywhere. The Japanese soldiers in Korea were those who had fought in the campaigns against Russia. They regard Korea as the prize of the war. The civilian immigrants who poured into Korea after the war were not the best type of Japanese. Americans know the breed -- the carpet-baggers of the Southern States after the Civil War. The same class of Japanese hurried to Korea, and they rode roughshod over the helpless natives, appropriating food, seizing farm animals, taking possession of land, maltreating women, and, in some instances when opposed, burning houses and even villages. Police and teachers carried swords. The police had unlimited power. The punishment applying to Koreans only in these cases were flogging death.

F. A. McKenzie in his book The Tragedy of Korea gives us some startling instances in Japan's rule of Korea. Mr. McKenzie tells of visiting two state prisons;

"In the first, at Ping-yang, I found eighteen men and one woman confined in one cell. Several of the men were fastened to the ground by wooden stocks. The prisoners were emaciated, and their bodies showed plain signs of horrible disease. Their clothing was of the poorest, the cell was filthy, and the prisoners were confined in it, without exercise. One man had been in the cell for six years.

"The second prison, Sun-chon, was much worse. In the inner room there -- so dark that for some moments I could see nothing -- I found three men fastened flat on the ground, their heads and feet in stocks and their hands tied together. The room had no light or ventilation, save from a small hole in the wall. The men's backs were fearfully scarred with cuts from beatings. Their arms were cut to the bone in many places by the ropes

that had been tightly bound around them, and the wounds thus made were suppurating freely. One man's eyes were closed, and sight gone, heavy suppuration oozing from the closed lids. Presumably the eyes had been knocked in by blows. The men had lain thus confined without moving for days. The place was the nearest approach to hell I have ever seen."¹²

Finally, 1919, the incoherent desire for independence found public expression in an "independence movement" or independence demonstration. And the world has never seen a more striking or more universal expression of the popular will than was shown in a peaceful yet courageous and dignified manner by the Koreans on that occasion.

On the first day of March, 1919, the whole country was in mourning for the Korean Emperor recently deceased. In the morning of that day, thirty-three courageous young men sat down in a popular restaurant and drafted the "Declaration of Independence of Korea."

Instead of calling in a number of prominent Koreans and making a serious effort to discover the grievances, the Nipponese officials set in operation all their police and military forces. Innocent men and women were arrested and thrown in prison, and outrageous attacks were made upon helpless villeges. Hundreds of persons were persecuted and suffered great indignities at the hand of the police and troops. Koreans were beaten and tortured to make them reveal the names of the so-called conspirators. Indeed, this persecution became so widespread and terrible that it aroused at length

¹²F. A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea, p. 120.

the indignation of the whole world; the force of public opinion compelled the Japanese Government to promise reforms in the administration of Korea.

The Koreans do not place much trust in the promises of the Nipponese reforming statesmen. This is a handicap for Japan. It can not be over-come, except by a straightforward, honorable, and just treatment of Korean rights. Everything must be done by and for the Korean nation.

CHAPTER III

THE MANCHURIAN STEAL

Manchuria, which is known in China as the Three Eastern Provinces, was a large fertile region almost undeveloped and thinly populated. Japan wanted Manchuria at any price. It would assume an important role in the solution of the problem of Japan's surplus population.

Manchuria is a vast country with an area as large as that of France and Germany taken together, estimated at about 380,000 square miles.

Manchuria is bounded on the west by the Chinese province of Hopeh and by Outer and Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was formerly divided into three special administrative areas Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan -- which were given the full status of provinces by the National Government in 1928. On the north-west, north-east, and east, Manchuria is bounded by Siberian provinces of the U.S.S.R., on the south-east by Korea, and on the south by the Yellow Sea.

The soil of Manchuria is generally fertile, but its development is dependent on transportation facilities. Many important towns flourish along its rivers and railways. Many important crops, such as soya-beans, kaoliang, wheat, millet, barley, rice and oats, are raised abundantly. It is referred to as the "granary" of Asia.

The mountain regions are rich in timber and minerals, especially coal. Important deposits of iron and gold are also known to exist, while large quantities of oil shale, dolomite, magnesite, limestone, fireclay, steatite, and silica of excellent quality have been found. So with these many physical assets, Japan looks forward to the time when Manchuria would become a part of her fast growing empire.

The history of Japan's aggression had its beginning in the swift and decisive victory of her armies and navy over China in the war of 1894-1895. Japanese interest in Manchuria began with the war. The war with China, principally over Korea, was largely fought at Port Arthur and on the plains of Manchuria. The treaty of Peace signed at Shimonoseki ceded to Japan in full sovereignty the Liaotung Peninsula. To the Japanese, the fact that Russia, France and Germany forced them to renounce this cession does not affect their conviction that Japan obtained this part of Manchuria as the result of a successful war and thereby acquired a moral right to it.¹

Russia's interest in Manchuria greatly disturbed Japan. In 1891 the Trans-Siberian Railway had reached Eastern Siberia; slowly but surely it was creeping across Asia, opening up a land of immense distances. It had for many years been thought fit only for exiled criminals. In 1896, five years after the first sod had been turned, it had reached China on the borders of Manchuria. Its destination was to be at Vladivostok

¹League of Nations, Appeal By the Chinese Government, p. 39.

on the Pacific Ocean. Thus it must cross Manchuria. In 1896 Russia was granted that right. At the same time that this request was made a secret pact in treaty form was concluded between China and Russia. The treaty, which was kept secret for many years, provided for a Russo-Chinese alliance against Japan.²

In 1898, Russia secured a lease for twenty-five years of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula, which Japan had been forced to give up in 1895.

In 1900, Russia occupied Manchuria on the grounds that the Boxer rising had endangered her nationals. Other powers protested. In 1901, the draft of a secret Sino-Russian treaty was discussed, by the terms of which China, in return for the restoration of her civil authority in Manchuria, was to sanction the maintenance of the railway guard, and to engage not to transfer to other nations or their subjects, without consent of Russia, mines or other interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang. This aroused public opinion in China and other countries and, on April 3, 1901, the Russian Government issued a circular note to the effect that the project had been withdrawn.

It is little wonder that Japan viewed these situations with alarm. On January 30, 1902, she signed the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance and accordingly felt herself more secure. She therefore pressed with other powers for the evacuation

²P. T. Etherton, Manchuria, pp. 9-10.

of the Russian forces in Manchuria. Russia declared her willingness to withdraw on conditions which would have virtually closed Manchuria and Mongolia to other than Russian enterprise. In July 1902, Russian troops appeared at the mouth of the Yalu River. Several other acts convinced Japan that Russia had decided upon a policy which was a menace to her interests, if not her very existence.³

After much negotiation ending in negative results, Japan saw looming ahead of her a life and death struggle with Russia, on the outcome of which her own fate in Asia must inevitably be decided. She fully realized this at the close of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and had been preparing for it with redoubled energy.

In 1904 came the collision, Russia was defeated and the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed September 5, 1905, whereby Japan regained the Liaotung Peninsula with possession of the South Manchurian Railway as far north as Changchun. Both parties agreed to restore to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria occupied or under control of their respective troops, with the exception of the leased territory. Both reserved the right to maintain guard to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria.

In 1919, Japan annexed Korea. This annexation indirectly increased Japanese rights in Manchuria, since Korean settlers became Japanese subjects over whom Japanese officials exercised

³League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government, pp. 33-34.

jurisdiction. It was thought in Washington that Japan on the northern mainland would be an effective block or check to Russia.

Encouraged, the Japanese shifted their attention further west, toward Manchuria and Mongolia, with an eye also on Russian Siberia. In 1915, as a result of Japan's entry into the first World War, the government of Japan became a government by the Army General Staff. But when making war against Germany, Count Okuma, then premier, declared that Japan "neither plans to acquire any territories, nor to deprive China or any other nations of any of their possessions."

A few months later the Japanese attacked the Germans in China, captured Tsingtao, and seized the German-built railway in Shantung. Shortly afterwards, while all Europe was involved in colossal warfare, this Count Okuma, the same who spoke above presented China with the famous or infamous "21 Demands." Unprovoked by any hostile Chinese action, this note ranks as the most ruthlessly cynical international document in modern times.⁴

The Twenty-One Demands were divided into five groups. The first group demanded that China recognize Japan's rights in Shantung, including railroad-building and the opening of important towns and cities as commercial centers. The second group demanded similar privileges in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Here she demanded an extension of the leases to

⁴Edgar Snow, Far Eastern Front, p. 42.

ninty-nine years and several new rights for Japanese subjects. The third group demanded a monopoly of mines and of iron and steel works in the Yangtze valley. The fourth group consisted of the single demand that China agree not to cede any harbor, bay or island to any Power but Japan. Group five seemed to endeavor to include anything and everything which might have been left out of the other groups. It was the most devastating of all. It demanded that Japanese political, financial, and military advisers be employed by the Chinese government: that the police in certain cities be under joint Sino-Japanese administration: that China should purchase from Japan at least 50 percent of her munitions: that Japan should have the right to construct strategic railway lines in the Yangtze valley: and that the Japanese should be permitted to spread their ethics (presumably Shinto) throughout China.

The course of the war made not only China's entry but also more active participation by Japan desirable. Great Britain and France both requested that Japan give naval assistance in the Mediterranean but Japan agreed to give such aid only on conditions that Great Britain her partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, would support her claims to Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific. By this agreement Japan achieved, in 1917, a recognition by her ally of an enlargement of her interests and power beyond Chinese Waters.

During the spring of the same year Japan was successful in making agreements with France, Russia, and Italy that they

also would support Japan's claim to Shantung and to the Pacific islands north of the equator which had formerly belonged to Germany.

Toward the end of the European war, the Japanese General Staff, satisfied with apparent success over the "21 Demands," turned again to the program of expansion. Japan proposed the allies' intervention in Siberia to assist the repatriation of Czech-Slovakian troops. At first United States was unfriendly to the idea but by 1918, when it became evident that the only choice lay between allied intervention or sole Japanese intervention, they decided in Japan's favor.

She gave her solemn assurance to China and Western nations that no more than 12,000 armed forces would be used. She sent 172,000. Upon withdrawal by other powers of their troops early in 1920 and Japan's refusal to remove hers there arose a general feeling that probably the Russians were right when they declared that Japan had territorial ambitions in Siberia.

The United States, now aware that she had been duped, led in the demand, with a thinly veiled threat of reprisal. In 1922, two and a half years after the other powers had withdrawn their troops, Japan withdrew hers from Siberia. Bowing before the inevitable, she withdrew, to begin another decade of preparation.

Much took place during the next decade. Japan had become looked upon with distrust by the nations of the world. She must change that view. Her motives during this decade were to

lift herself above international suspicion. To reestablish lost confidence, Japan became signatory to the Nine-Power Pact, provisions of which forbade her to interfere in domestic Chinese politics. She joined the League of Nations, by which she pledged herself not to resort to war. At the Washington Conference in 1922, she restored Shantung to China and China was given the opportunity to buy from Japan the Shantung Railway. Japan agreed to cancel certain of the more objectionable articles in the Treaty of 1915. In interest of world peace, she renounced her alliance with England. She acknowledged that any nation warring against another should be considered an international outlaw.

In the Washington Armament Conference Japan had achieved one great diplomatic victory. By her seemingly, good tactics she managed to induce the Powers to rest in her the chief responsibility for peace in the Orient. In the "5-5-3 naval ratio," and in other naval limitations Japan for the first time became mistress of the Pacific. No single power could challenge her. This was better than anything she had given up.

Japan's non-aggression policy was only a bluff. In 1927, "Blood and Iron" Baron Tanaka, and spokesman for the military, came into control of the Japanese Government. He reversed the previously milder policy of Baron Shidehara, who was anxious to cooperate with China. Tanaka favored a strong aggressive policy toward China. His first move was to send troops into

Shantung, to "protect Japanese lives and property." The time was not ripe and after a few months the troops were withdrawn.

The Japanese hatred for America was being brought out in the open more and more. Wrote Lieutenant-General Sato, formerly of the General Staff:

"We hate the Japanese Government which, because of its fickleness and weakness has endured these insults (from the U.S.A.), has endured these abuses. However, we must hate the Government of the United States to a much greater degree. We cannot help but hate and despise these people, who have perpetrated all kinds of crimes and violence against the Japanese race."⁵

Baron Tanaka submitted to the Emperor a document known as the "Tanaka Memorial." This secret memorial was to Japan what Hitler's "Mein Kampf" was to Germany. They were both a military blue print for remapping the world. The Japanese denied that there was such a document and most of the Americans believed the denial but very soon a copy of the original was smuggled out of Japan and given to the United States. We still did not want to believe what was true but looking around us, we could see the world situation had altered rapidly during recent years. The continents of Europe and Asia were being re-mapped. Let us see if they were following or will follow - Tanaka's prediction. Here is a statement from the 5,000 word memorial:

"The Three Eastern Provinces are politically the imperfect spot in the Far East; to safeguard ourselves as well as others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of blood and iron. In carrying out this we have to face the United States, which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison."⁵

⁵ Edgar Snow, Far Eastern Front, p. 46

"In the future if we wish to control China the primary move is to crush the United States, just as in the past we had to fight the Russo-Japanese War. But to conquer China we must first take Manchuria and Mongolia. If we conquer China and the rest of the Asiatic countries, then those of the South Seas will fear us and surrender. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours, and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by the Emperor Miyi, the success of which is essential to our national existence."⁶

This document is, without doubt the unerring guide to the march of Japanese aggression from 1928 to that fateful day, December 7, 1941.

The ratification of the London Treaty proved to be the last important act in a period in which the liberal minded and those adhering to constitutional government were able to hold the militarists in check.

In 1930 Japan stood at the crossroads. At one hand lay the road of peace. On the other hand lay the road toward further expansion and war. They took the latter.

In 1931 less than a year after the ratification of the London Treaty, the Manchurian Incident occurred which gave Japan the excuse she had been looking forward to getting.

On the night of September 18, 1931, a Japanese officer and six men were on patrol duty. They were proceeding southwards in the direction of Mukden. They heard the noise of a loud explosion a little way behind them. They turned and ran back to a point where a portion of one of the rails had been blown out. On arrival at the site of the explosion, the

⁶Edgar Snow, Far Eastern Front, p. 48.

patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the line. Fighting commenced and Manchuria was soon occupied by Japan. On the morning of the Saturday, September 10, the population of Mukden woke to find their city in the hands of the Japanese troops. The suddenness of the attack on Mukden, which was the nerve center of Manchuria, created a panic among the Chinese population. There is all indication that the occupation was planned well in advance. The extreme rapidity with which the Japanese army acted suggests a prepared plan. Seven hours after the attack upon the railway Mukden and four other cities were in Japanese hands.⁷

The question uppermost in the minds of the nations of the world, is whether the Japanese had decided upon a temporary or a permanent occupation of Manchuria. She set up a "puppet" government filled from her own ranks. Her pledge to the League was to withdraw her troops "as soon as security of Japanese subjects and property was assured."

China immediately appealed to the council of the League of Nations. The Council appointed a neutral commission to investigate and study the dispute on the spot and report back to the Council. Lord Lytton an Englishman, was made chairman.⁸

While the Lytton Commission was proceeding to the scene of the trouble in the Far East, Japan, undismayed, proceeded with her aggressive policy and set up the independent state of Manchuko. During this time some Chinese attacked five

⁷P. T. Etherton, Manchuria, p. 292.

⁸Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States,

Japanese subjects outside the international settlement of Shanghai. An ultimatum was served on the Mayor of Shanghai and he complied but Japan would not accept and fighting broke out. This caused China to appeal to the assembly of the League. The appeal to the Assembly mobilized the judgment of the small states of the League, who for their own future safety were anxious to secure small or weak states from the aggression of great powers.

The Lytton commission finished its labors in September, 1932. The League published its report on October 2. It was in favor of China. It did not mince matters. Her actions in Manchuria had not been in self-defense. Japanese civil and military officials had conceived it and carried it out. By unanimous vote of the League Assembly Japan stood on every count condemned.

The report, skillfully handled by the military party threw the Japanese populace into a frenzy of anger and in the storm Japan withdrew from the League.

As Matsuka, Japan's official delegate departed he spoke these last words for Japan.

"In a few years we shall be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth was---Japan's mission is to lead the world, spiritually and intellectually---Japan will be the cradle of the New Messiah."⁹

Washington was in favor of invoking the nine Power Treaty but Great Britain side stepped the proposal. Many leaders believe this to be the first step in the long chain of evils

⁹Post Wheeler, Dragon in the Dust, p. 209.

that followed. It encouraged Mussolini to over run Ethiopia, Hitler to seize Austria--the beginning of Europe's deluge of blood.¹⁰

With this incident in the background, the Manchurian Steal was complete. And now for the next move of Japan, the aggressor.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 209.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADVANCE INTO CHINA

It is very evident that the conquest of China was the first important step in Japan's scheme. Like all militarists and dictators do, they overestimated their power, but they were no exception. They made two great blunders in their China campaign.

First, they failed to estimate correctly the spirit of Chinese patriotism. Japanese bomb and machine-gun raids achieved the miracle. They made the Chinese more determined to unite and resist. The great Nipponese army bogged down. An easy victory in China would have enabled them to launch a major campaign against the United States.

Second, the Japanese started too soon to close the "Open Door." They undertook at once to oust all white men and their businesses and to make Japanese control over China complete. They did not believe that any nation or nations would go to war with them in order to maintain the "Open Door," but their calculations were wrong. If they had used the slow-moving, underhanded process which they used in seizing Korea, they would doubtless have met with greater success.

Chinese and Japanese have much in common that distinguishes both peoples from Europeans and Americans. Japan's cultural debt to China is enormous. From its neighbor Japan, absorbed

the Buddhist conceptions or religion which are the foundation stones of Japanese civilization. From China came the thousands of complicated hieroglyphs which make the Japanese written language so hard to master.

With so much that unites Japan and China, culturally and psychologically, there is perhaps still more that divides them.

The Chinese scholar and publicist Dr. Lin Yu-tang, whose book, My Country and My People, is a remarkably brilliant piece of national cultural and psychological self-analysis, draws the following contrast between Japanese and Chinese national temperaments:

Compare the Japanese, busy and bustling, reading a newspaper in the tram or in the train, with dogged face and determined chin and a cloud of imminent national disaster hanging over his brow, determined that Japan must either smash the world or be smashed in the next conflict, and preparing for its coming and the Chinese in his long gown, as placid, as contented, as happy-go-lucky as if nothing could ever shake him out of his dreams -- The "yellow peril" can come from Japan but not from China. Deep down in our instincts we want to die for our family, but we do not want to die for our state. The propaganda of the Japanese militarist Clique that says a nation would aggrandize itself in order to bring "peace and harmony" to Asia, or even to the world, can have no appeal to the Chinese.¹

From 1870 to 1880 marks a period of expansion by European powers, who were feverishly extending their possessions in Africa, the Pacific islands, and even on the mainland of Asia. It is not strange that Japan felt she should follow the Western example.

In 1875 Japan obtained complete possession of the Kurile

¹Quoted by W. H. Chamberlin, Japan Over Asia, p. 78.

Islands from Russia. To the south Japan saw equally tempting islands for Japan's imperialism. They were the Bonin group. About them there seems to have been no discussion and Japan occupied them in 1878.

In 1868 Japan laid claim to the islands of Liu Chius, a long string of islands extending from the southwestern islands of Kyshu to Formosa. By 1876 the Liu Chiuans accepted Japanese rule, which fact was recognized by the Chinese Empire in 1881.

During this period troubles grew between China and Japan when several sailors from Liu Chius were killed by the savage tribes of Formosa, which was a dependency of China.

Naturally, when Japan wished to protest the killing of the Liu Chiuans by the savages of Formosa, she proceeded to get in touch with the Chinese government. She received no satisfaction, for China had the attitude of upholding her overlordship of Formosa, but at the same time denying her jurisdiction over the savages. Matters dragged on, for neither Japan nor China wanted war, especially Japan as she then thought of China as a great empire and did not feel strong enough for such an encounter. It was, finally, agreed that Japan was justified in her expedition to Formosa and therefore should be paid an indemnity, 100,000 taels, for families of the murdered Liu Chiuans and 400,000 taels to pay cost of roads and buildings put up by Japan and now returned to the Chinese. For the moment Formosa was left to China

but the affair revealed her weakness. By paying an indemnity and showing an unwillingness to fight, China had made herself vulnerable for further demands on her territory.²

China's weakness was a stimulus to Japan's expansionist urge, which began to be felt as the population increased rapidly after the abandonment of the policy of self-isolation. All of Japan's important accessions of territory have been entirely or partially at the expense of China. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 led to the acquisition of the rich semi-tropical island of Formosa, which is now Japan's sugar bowl. Another result of the war was the disappearance of the vague protectorate which China had hitherto exercised over Korea. This was replaced by a Japanese protectorate which ended in outright annexation.³

Todasu Hayashi, author of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance wrote in 1895:

"What Japan has now to do is to keep quiet, to lull the suspicions that have risen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching, waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient."⁴

For ten years Japan remained quiet and agreeable to all suggestions of the Western Powers. She was winning their good favors. At this time many of her statesmen felt that she should strengthen herself with an alliance with some

²Mary A. Nourse, The Way of the Emperors, p. 234.

³W. H. Chamberlin, Japan Over Asia, p. 84.

⁴Mary A. Nourse, The Way of the Emperors, p. 247.

European country. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in January, 1902. By this alliance both countries recognized the independence of China and Korea and the special interest of each. Thus if Japan should go to war with Russia over Korea or Manchuria, England was to use her efforts to keep other powers from going to Russia's aid.

In 1904 Japan was at war with Russia and 1905 Russia and Japan were willing to sign a peace treaty. In this treaty Japan gained much she had been dreaming of in the past several years.

Even before Japan defeated Russia on the Manchurian battle-fields in 1904-'05, she had harbored an interest for that region. In the twenty-five years following that war Japan poured millions of yens into the development of Manchuria.

The reasons for the seizure of Manchuria were many. The Japanese super-trusts which invested money in the gigantic South Manchuria Railway Company wished to halt the construction of competing Chinese lines. The Army wanted to establish a base for an attack on Russia. It was further desired to halt the expected liberal victory in the autumn election. Japanese troops, in Manchuria, were given "Stand By" orders. Incidents began to occur with alarming regularity.

Japan started on her conquest of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, which must be reckoned the most important date in

Japan's modern history, not because of the Manchurian invasion itself, but because it marked the beginning of a decade during which Japan has retraced her way to a military barbarism rooted in feudal days while at the same time divorcing herself from her associations with the Western democracies which had contributed so much to her progress and advancement in the preceding sixty years.⁵

Japan was now under the domination of militarism. Militarism is not a matter of the number of soldiers maintained by any country, nor even of the frequency and ruthlessness of its wars. It is a word which is used to describe efforts on the part of the professional soldier to control the functions of the civil administration and to curtail the rights of the citizen. When the armed forces are allowed to be the ruling factor in a state, that state may be said to be under the domination of militarism.

A small bomb exploded on, or near, a railway track near Mukden, on the night of September 18. The blast was bungled, and a train passing over the spot soon afterwards arrived in Mukden on time and with its passengers recalling no jolts.

The Chinese resistance was half-hearted and unorganized. Within four days most of the Manchurian cities were sacked, and within four months Chinese troops had fled south of the Great Wall. While the League of Nations blustered and threatened Japan moved on. The Japanese army crossed the Great Wall and

⁵Wilfrid Fleisher, Our Enemy Japan, p. 22.

drove toward Tientsin. In the little town of Tangku, on May 31, 1933, the Chinese and the Japanese signed a truce agreement. This agreement demilitarized a large strip between Peiping and the Great Wall and gave Japan the right to send planes over the area to check upon the Chinese.

This was used as a wedge to pry the North China doors open to Japanese infiltration and to shut the "Open Door" to foreigners. Thus the aggression continued on its merry way, paying heavy returns, and encountering no resistance from Japan's western rivals.

In 1935, Mr. Hirota, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought forth his Three Principles regarding China. They read:

1. China shall not again utilize the influence of Europe and America to embarrass Japan.
2. Relations between China, Japan, and Manchukuo shall recognize Manchukuo and promote economic cooperation with Manchukuo and Japan.
3. China and Japan shall co-operate in defense against Communism, especially along the northern border of China.

At this time Communism was nothing to be alarmed about in China. It was just a means to an end for Japan.

In the winter of 1935-1936, Japan attempted to bring Inner Mongolia under her rule. The three Provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningxia make up Inner Mongolia. A swift raid from Manchukuo, carried out by Manchukuo Mongols with Japanese "advisers", brought a large part of Chahar within the orbit of Japanese Army influence. But attempts in the other two provinces failed.

Japan received a check in Inner Mongolia which gave a little faith to China. Japan was finding that the morale of local leaders was stiffening and they were referring questions to Nanking instead of following the former practice of making local arrangement on their own responsibility.

With the situation of the two countries like this another incident arose. At Lukuoehiao, Marco Polo Bridge, near Peiping on July 7, 1937, Japanese soldiers were engaged in night maneuvers which resulted in a skirmish with a band of Chinese soldiers. In the skirmish a couple of Japanese were killed and at least ten times as many Chinese. It is the same old story repeated again. Remember Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria?

Had the Japanese had any wish for peace, an amicable settlement could have been reached the next day; but instead of that they attacked General Sung Che-yuan, who was commander of the 29th Army. He was urged to declare his independence of Nanking, but this he steadfastly refused to do. On August 8, Japan occupied Peiping.⁶ Thus the story ---

In the middle of August, armored cars, spitting gun fire, raced through the Japanese section of the International Settlement in Shanghai and flung themselves at the Chinese defenses.

Japan had struck, and to the world the end of China seemed at hand. Japan had total control of the air, sea and land. Japan had modern machines of death and also controlled a huge slice of land in the very city she was attempting to invade.

⁶Morgana Young, Imperial Japan, p. 296.

The opposing Chinese force -- a wall of flesh almost entirely without machine support -- was massed just beyond the boundary of her own concession. Japan had only to train the guns on that spot and to keep them firing.

In front of this staggering array of armament the Chinese actually held out for two months. Flesh, machine guns, hand explosives, and rifles held up the armored advance of a country hailed as undefeated and undefeatable.

China, ancient sprawling China, a country of philosophers not of warriors, had resolved not to argue but to fight.⁷

On December 13, exactly one month after it had smashed the Chinese defense of Shanghai, the Japanese army entered the gates of Nanking, the Chinese capital, some two hundred miles distant. This notable feat might well have gone down into history as one of the most spectacular military achievements of modern times. Actually whatever credit might have been due on this score was gravely discounted by the outrageous conduct of the Japanese troops in the cities which they occupied.

At Nanking the Japanese Army lost much of its reputation, and threw away a rare opportunity to gain the respect of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign opinion. The collapse of Chinese authority and the break up of the Chinese armies in the region left vast numbers of people ready to respond to the order and organization of which Japan boasts. But boasts and promises alike were obliterated by what actually happened.

⁷Herryman Maurer, The End is Not Yet, p. 31.

The occupation of Nanking by the Japanese Army resulted in the greatest authenticated massacre in modern history. Twenty thousand men, women and children were done to death. For four weeks the streets of Nanking were splashed with blood --- mothers were raped while their children screamed in terror at their sides. There were instances where three-and-four-year-olds were bayoneted.⁸

On Friday, December 17, 1937, robbery, murder, and rape continued unabated. A rough estimate would be at least a thousand women raped during the night and day. One poor woman was raped thirty-seven times. Another had her five months infant deliberately smothered by the brute to stop its crying while he raped her. Resistance meant the bayonet. The hospitals were rapidly filling up with the victims of Japanese cruelty and barbarity. Rickshas, cattle, pigs, donkeys, often the sole means of livelihood of the people, were taken from them.⁹ This is not a very pleasant picture but it is authentic.

In November, 1938, came Prince Konoye's "New Order" declaration. It defined Japan's objective as complete domination of East Asia, to the exclusion of all her rivals. Said Konoye:

"It is undisputed history that China heretofore has been a victim of (imperialist) rivalry -- Japan realizes the need of fundamentally rectifying such a

⁸Ching-Chun Wang, Japan's Continental Adventure, p. 179.

⁹H. J. Timperley, Japanese Terror in China, p. 33.

state of affairs and she is eager to see a new order established in East Asia.---

"Japan is in no way opposed to collaboration with foreign Powers nor does she desire to impair their legitimate rights and interests. If the Powers, understanding her true motives, will formulate policies adapted to the new conditions, Japan will be glad to co-operate with them.

"Germany and Italy, our allies against Communism, have manifested their sympathies with Japan's aims in East Asia.-- It is necessary for Japan not only to strengthen still further her ties with these countries but also to collaborate with them on the basis of a common world outlook in the reconstruction of world order."¹⁰

In October 1938, after twelve months of horrible fighting, China was still undefeated. The anxious world wondered at China's endurance. They asked this question: Can Japan succeed and what will be the consequences? Here are some of the factors that are against and those that are in favor of Japan's success.

First of all the Chinese, although hopelessly inferior in equipment, were resisting the Japanese attacks with astonishing courage and endurance. Then there was indication that the invader would be gradually worn down or both belligerents would become exhausted.

Japan's hope for quick victory was disappointed in the last few months of 1938. Their plans were delayed. It is true Japan occupied most of the railways, but they exercised little control beyond narrow strips of territory along these railways. They had won battles but had secured little that was of decisive value.

Next the nations of the world would suffer should Japan

¹⁰M. J. Gayn, The Fight for the Pacific, p. 119.

succeed. Russia would suffer most because she knows Japan's design on Eastern Siberia. Great Britain was also alarmed because her steel, cotton and woolen goods occupy an important position in China's growing market; to say nothing of Hong Kong, Singapore, India and her South Sea possessions.

United States had serious reasons to be alarmed by the Japanese invasion of China. Besides the violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, both of which were sponsored by her statesmen, America's interest in the Pacific was substantial. Her longest sea-coast was on the Pacific. Hawaii, which was American territory, and the Philippines, which were under American protection, were in the Pacific.

When China was forced into the war with Japan in 1937, most of her friends were of the opinion that she would collapse in one year. Three years passed and in spite of all the unspeakable sufferings and losses the Chinese Government at this time was stronger than ever before since the Republic, the Chinese Army was bigger, better disciplined and better equipped, the Chinese people were more united and more resolute to follow the able and enlightened leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, to the end until victory was achieved.¹¹

In 1940 Konoye returned to the political scene in Japan. He found the war in China still raging. Elsewhere, however, the picture had been changed. Hitler ruled over Europe, England was being devastated by air raiders and Washington was launching

¹¹Ching-Chun Wang, Japan's Continental Adventure, p. 207.

a desperate program of rearmament which was not to be completed before 1944. The golden opportunity for which Japan had hopefully waited for so long had finally arrived.

New aggression was in the making. New conquests called for a new policy. Thus in June, 1940 --- soon after the fall of Paris --- the Foreign Office erected its last aggressive mile post. It took the form of Foreign Minister Hashiro Arita's "Greater Asia" statement. Said Mr. Arita:

"All mankind longs for peace, but peace cannot endure unless nations have their proper places. Since this is difficult in the present stage of human progress, the next best thing is for peoples who are related geographically, racially, culturally and economically to form spheres of their own.

"The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are --- very closely related. They are destined to co-operate and minister to each other's needs for their common wellbeing and prosperity.

"This system presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region with which as the center the peoples within that region will secure their co-existence and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere."¹²

Control of China was still what Japan wanted more than anything else, but Japan was not content with China alone. She sought new fields of conquest---at the expense of the democracies. She turned her aggression to the south.

¹²M. J. Gayn, The Fight for the Pacific, p. 120.

CHAPTER V

THE MARCH INTO THE PACIFIC

Over four hundred years ago, and since that time voyagers have sailed over the whole of the Pacific's vast area and made it known to the world. Lying in this vast ocean are the numerous island groups of the South Seas and the mid-Pacific, partly coral in formation and partly survivals of a sunken continent. These island groups are under the flags of Great Britian, Holland, the United States, France, and Japan.

The Pacific Ocean, covering about one third of the earth's surface, was certainly the finest highway in the world and the richest in possibilites of production and commercial power.

Japan's advance to the west has pushed its frontier far into Continental Asia, up to the Amur River, where it is faced by a formidable "Great Wall" in the shape of Soviet steel and concrete fortifications, tanks, and airplanes. The advance west strengthened Japan's grip on North China and stimulated her to resist.

Japan's advance took her into South East Asia and into the Pacific. The south advance brought Japan into contact with British India, Ceylon, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Siam, and Malaya. In these countries Japan found a storehouse

of the minerals, raw material, and tropical foodstuff which she needed. Cotton and wool, iron and gold, rubber and tin, oil, hemp, and copra, are only the leading items in the long list of products which Japan imports from India and from the lands of the South Pacific.

Just as the army advocated the continental expansion, so the navy sponsored Japan's southward advance.

Admiral Sankichi Takahashi, when he was Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet in 1936, told a gathering of Osaka industrialists,

"Japan's economic advance must be directed southward, with either Formosa or the South Sea Island Mandates as a foothold. In this case the cruising radius of the Japanese Navy must be expanded suddenly as far as New Guinea, Borneo, and Celebes."¹

While Japan was struggling to conquer the rest of China and seeking to grasp everything within her reach, the effects of her military movements were felt all over the world. Through her Axis alliance she was rendering helpless the British, French, and Dutch possessions in the East. Her attempts to monopolize China's vast material resources, manpower, and foreign market, and her claim to the Pacific menaced the peace and security, not only of the United States, but of the entire Western hemisphere.

In 1936, Ishihara, who operated a shipping line between Japan, the Strait Settlements, and the Dutch East Indies, recommended that Japan conclude a treaty of alliance with Germany

¹W. H. Chamberlin, Japan Over Asia, pp. 166-167.

and the Soviet Union in order to make European Powers keep their hands off the Orient. He characterized as "unnatural" policies which prevented Japanese from settling in Australia and the Dutch East Indies. He believed that Japan's southward policy would solve the political, economic, and social problems confronting the country.

The Japanese Empire had two southern outposts: the island of Formosa, taken over after the war with China in 1894-1895, and the widely scattered South Sea Mandated Islands, former German colonies which represented, for Japan, the chief spoils of World War I. Of the two, Formosa was much the more important.²

The Mandated Islands, which Japan acquired as a mandate from the League of Nations after the War, consist of fourteen hundred widely scattered islands of the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianas.

Fortification of the islands was forbidden under terms of the mandate. Yet in 1936, while Hideo Mikami, a member of the Japanese Diet, was visiting the South Sea Mandated Islands, he made this statement calling for their exploitation as a base for "southward advance":

"We must regard the Mandated Islands to the south and Manchoukuo to the north as two wheels of one vehicle in their importance to the well-being of our nation, instead of considering them as independent of each other. It is imperative for Japan to equip the islands, along with Formosa, properly, with a view to making them a strategic base for the realization of this nation's policy in

²W. H. Chamberlin, Japan Over Asia, pp. 169-170

the South Seas regions. The development of the South Seas region is Japan's national policy. This great task cannot be accomplished without the united effort of the Japanese nation.

"It must rouse itself to energetic efforts, realizing that its mission is to open up this boundless storehouse of the South Seas for the benefit of humanity."³

As Japan looked southward, she found two large groups of rich islands squarely across her path. The first of these were the Philippines, and south and southwest of the Philippines lay the vast Dutch East Indian Empire, one of the naturally richest and most thickly populated colonial regions in the world.

Aggression in China was pushed into the background. Aggression in the South Pacific was about to start. The navy was taking over the direction of Japan's Imperial destinies.

In every nation, the fighting services pick their prospective foreign foes. The Japanese Navy picked United States, Britain, and Russia. The first of these is the most important, the second the least important enemy.

In the 1930's, ambitious naval officers wrote books on Japan's coming war with Great Britain. The best known of such works was a book by Lieutenant Commander Toyo Ishimaru, titled Japan Must Fight Britain. He said:

"As Japan's wisest policy is to do everything she can to avoid war with America, war with England is not so utterly absurd as most people suppose; in fact, one can see good reasons why it should occur...

"For Japan---force provides the only final solution. This is the reason why, sometime in the future, she will fight England."⁴

³W. H. Chamberlin, Japan Over Asia, p. 178

⁴M. J. Gayne, The Fight for the Pacific, p. 182.

In 1937 Japan launched an undeclared war on Britain. Japanese guns claimed British lives. British warships, merchantmen, and property were shelled. British interests were violated. Japan took what she wanted. And, as appeasement began to undermine the British policy in the Pacific, Japan turned to the United States.

On April 3, 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote a letter criticizing proposals to establish a naval frontier beyond which the United States Fleet would not be permitted to operate. The United States Government, the letter added, intended to maintain the 5-5-3 naval ratio "unless the political situation in the Pacific shall be so altered as to permit an agreement on some other basis."⁵

The Japanese Navy was very angered. Mr Hull's statement was interpreted as a direct challenge to Japan's supremacy in the western Pacific and to her southward drive.

The Japanese navy was serious. It believed in Japan's mission to convert the Pacific into her own private lake. So in 1938, Rear Admiral Kiyoski Noda, the Navy's spokesman, issued an open warning to the democracies that Japan considered the Western Pacific her home waters. He said:

"We cannot but watch the situation with grave concern if the American Government follows Mr. Hull's suggestions...

"When we say western Pacific, we mean that area in the Pacific which is necessary for safeguarding Japan's national defense, with the Japanese Navy in firm command of the sea..."

⁵Ibid., p. 182.

"The American defense line is, apparently, now being extended into western Pacific...

"With Japan meaning to hold herself responsible for the maintenance of peace in the western Pacific, there will be no danger of a collision with other Powers unless the latter assume a menacing attitude towards Japan."⁶

By 1940, the United States began to lay plans for a gigantic naval expansion. The navy office in Tokyo was alarmed. It began to tell its people and the world that America plans to cross the Pacific and fight the Japanese fleet near Japanese water. But it added, "If the United States by these methods is trying to restrain Japan, she is wasting time, because at this stage Japan cannot retreat under any pressure whatsoever."⁷

Washington's decision to double the size of the United States navy and Mr. Hull's demands for maintenance of the status out in the southern Pacific, the strengthening of the naval and air base in Alaska, and the presence of the United States battle fleet in Hawaiian waters, was interpreted by the Japanese navy as signs of hostility.

Japan's master stroke was in gaining the little kingdom of Thailand, as its ally in the struggle for the Pacific. The Thai ruler thought he foresaw the outcome of World War II and decided to hitch his star to the Rising Sun. The Thai leaders found their new ally exacting and aggressive. In 1941, Thailand unhappily found herself forming the spear-head of the Japanese advance southward.

⁶Ibid., p. 183.

⁷Ibid., p. 183.

Thailand decided to strike at Indo-China in the fall of 1940. The move - if not directly inspired by Japan - had her full support.

Thailand wanted a pledge that "if and when" France gave up Indo-China, Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia would revert to Thailand. Vichy, the French Government ruled by Germany, rejected. Thailand and Japan waited the reaction of Washington and London. When it was clear that the democracies were not prepared to give Indo-China support, Thailand and Japan struck.

By January 1941, a well equipped Thai army was hammering on the thin French lines. When the French defenses caved in, Matsuoka - for the second time - summoned the French envoy to offer mediation. Another rejection was absurd. French and Thai delegates met aboard a Japanese cruiser to sign a Japanese-drafted armistice agreement. Once again hesitation and uncertainty had proved to be the democracies' greatest foe.

Washington saw the urgent need of action if Japan were to be halted before she reached the border of Malaya. In secrecy the United States approached the Governments of Indo-China and Thailand with offers of good offices in settling the border dispute. Having vainly tried to enlist American aid for months, Indo-China welcomed the offer. Thailand remained uncommunicative. Germany knew that any delays in Japan's march in the Pacific meant added British strength in Europe and Africa. Germany simply notified Vichy that it opposed the United States mediation in Indo-China.

Matsuoka delivered the post-mortem on the defeat of the democracies. Speaking in the Diet on the day Indo-China and Thailand agreed to Japanese mediation, he said:

"The acceptance of our offer by the two governments is only natural. It is recognition of the fact that the area involved in the hostilities lies within Greater East Asia, which is under Japan's leadership."⁸

The success obtained by Japan in French Indo-China and in adjoining Thailand, by combining military pressure with political intrigue, had increased the vulnerability of the American position in the Philippine Islands, had placed the British position in Malay and Burma in new jeopardy, and had caused alarm and feverish war preparations in the Dutch East Indies.

The early summer of 1940 found the Japanese army and navy on the march southward. Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands were securely occupied, and Japanese force were near the northern borders of French Indo-China. She was patiently waiting a German victory in Europe. That would mean the transfer of at least half the American fleet to the Atlantic Ocean and give Japan the chance to take Hongkong, wrest Indo-China from the French, probably capture Singapore, and take her pick from the "Treasure Box of Asia" - the Netherland East Indies.

Then came the collapse of Holland and Belgium, the surrender of France and British Dunkirk.

Japan put pressure on Britain to close the Burma Road. She agreed to do so. The crafty British realizing the rainy

⁸Ibid., p. 252.

season was coming agreed to close the road for ninety days. Britain was stalling for more time. China and Japan could not find a way to peace, therefore, Britain did not gain anything.

At the beginning of the conflicts in Asia and Europe, Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement policy made the British position more precarious than ever before. When Churchill took up the leadership of England, it was hoped that he would adopt a firm policy toward the Nipponese. But, lack of preparation, of trained forces and material forced him to act with caution.

The Rome-Berlin-Tokyo line-up brought new life and new determination to the British. In spite of all the air-raids, London met the attackers with stubborn counter attacks.

Mr. Churchill offered, on July 12, 1940, to close the Burma Road to China for a period of three months.

The Burma Road was reopened, on October 17, at the scheduled time, to remain China's only Open Door. The fight for the Burma Road was on.

NETHERLANDS INDIES

High upon the list of prizes, in the Pacific march by Japan stood the rich, populous, and inadequately defended Netherlands Indies. With their motherland overrun by German armies, their Queen and her government living in dangerous exile in London, their homeland cities being bombed by the

Royal Air Force, the Dutch in the Netherland East Indies were living in fear of two things. First, they feared Japanese armed invasion, and second, they feared that such an invasion might succeed for the same reason the invasion of Holland succeeded - lack of co-operation by the highest authorities of adjacent areas threatened by an aggressor nation.

Within its gates foreign agents wove wide-strung intrigue, while in sight of its shores the war ships of Japan, Britain, and the United States streamed in anxious anticipation of each other's moves. Washington seemingly remained aloof, but it was to American war supplies, financial aid, and the great United States fleet that the East Indies looked with hope.

Japan's interest in the Netherlands Indies was not new. Since World War I, ambitious naval officers had nursed a secret desire to add the islands to the ocean wide Japanese empire. Between 1929-1934 Japan launched a great trade drive. Behind this act of trade came the Japanese retailer, the barber, and curious photographer, the rubber-grower, the great shipping and trading concerns and the diplomats and the navy. It was the prelude to conquest.

The Japanese navy's interest became deeper and deeper, for the navy realized that there existed a fabulously rich reservoir of crude oil for its men-of-war. Figures on naval oil consumption were a jealously guarded secret.

The Netherlands Indies were alarmed. The "Manchurian Steal" was still too fresh in their minds for them to take the moves of Japan at their face value. Japan tried intimidation but without success. In 1934, Japan began to negotiate. The wrangling over quotas, import tariffs and freight rates went on for months. An accord was finally reached and they were meeting for the last time to exchange friendly vows, when the head of the Japanese delegation, Nagaoka, faced the chairman of the Netherlands mission and congratulated both nations. Then he made it known that Japan hoped that the outer possessions of the Netherland Indies are to be developed jointly by the Japanese and the Dutch. The "outer possession" are all islands except Java. The Dutch official reddened, rose solemnly, and banged his gavel on the table. The meeting was adjourned.

Japan at this time held Canton, Hainan Island, and the Sprately group of islands. Japan was in effective military occupation of northern Indo-China, and the southern half was at her mercy. In Thailand she dominated her policy completely.

The Netherland East Indies were stunned with the suddenness of Holland's capitulation in May, 1940. On May 11, 1940, Japan notified the government of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy that she would insist on the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies, in spite of Holland's involvement in the European war. At

this time talk was that the United States would take over until a final settlement was reached.

Soon after the fall of Holland and the notification of a status quo in the Netherlands Indies, Japan sent a special mission to Batavia to get desired oil concessions. The mission quietly expressed Japan's desire to take over the oil refineries that were operating under Dutch control. The Dutch agreed to negotiate. Under the contract which was dictated by Japan, forty percent of Japan's oil requirement for the following six months would be supplied by the Netherland East Indies.

The whole life, effort, and thought of the leaders of the Netherlands East Indies were devoted to about three aims; first, to make the islands defensible as quickly as possible; second, to mine and prepare to destroy everything of any value to any conqueror on any island upon which the Japanese may land; and, third, to develop production and expand trade as greatly and as rapidly as possible to aid their exiled government in London. Her defenses expenditures rose rapidly. Light cruisers, small submarines, fleet torpedo boats, bombers and flying boats were bought in the United States. Links were also established with the neighboring Philippines.

The Malays of Netherlands Indies knew what had happened in Manchuria, China and French Indo-China. They did not want it to happen in their own land. They vowed loyalty to their

government and joined the armed services to fight the battle of the Pacific.

Japan had without doubt missed her opportunity of seizing the East Indies in the early summer of 1940. By 1941 the Dutch had enlarged their army, navy, and air force. They had received airplanes, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, and other war necessities for the islands. They had mined all the oil wells, refineries, docks and all equipment that could be used by Japan. Everything was carefully mapped out by competent engineers, and the universal slogan was: "Assure such a degree of ruin that an invader will neither produce nor profit for at least two years ahead."¹⁰ It was this aim rather than American and British pressure that led Japan to a course of negotiation rather than invasion in 1940-1941.

In October, 1940, Japan commented, "There is little sense in trying to reason with the East Indian Government as long as the Anglo-American policy remains what it is. Perhaps the language of bombs would be better understood."¹¹

Early in 1941 it began to seem as if bombs would solve the problem. Japan could not wait any longer. Come what might, she must control those islands. Britain could not allow Japan to carry out her plans, for the Netherland East Indies lay astride the great imperial routes between the Pacific Ocean and Europe. United States opposed because that

¹⁰Hallett Abend, Japan Unmasked, p. 131.

¹¹M. J. Gayn, The Fight for the Pacific, p. 297.

would disrupt the entire scheme of American defense. Thus, the East Indies became in 1941, one of the major battle grounds in the struggle for the Pacific.

PHILIPPINES

A glance at the map will show that Japan, regardless of the extent of her possible conquests in the south, would never feel secure as long as the United States had a foothold in the Philippines. Japan may say she had no intentions toward these islands, but whatever position she may attain in French Indo-China, in Thailand, and in the East Indies would always be menaced by the possibility of a flanking movement if the United States fleet had a base at Manila.

Early in March, 1938, the war and navy department were considering withdrawal of the United States first defense line from the Philippines to Hawaii. It was thought by some strategists that the American defense front should be drawn closer to continental United States so as to strengthen the security of the Pacific coast.

Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, informed the Naval Affairs Committee in 1937 that it would be almost impossible to defend the Philippine Islands against a first-class sea power.

The Philippines' helplessness roots in the same evils that sent France to her downfall - inertia, overconfidence, refusal to look ahead and prepare.

For Burma and Malaya and the Dutch East Indies - and especially the Philippines - Indo-China was a tragic lesson in unpreparedness.

Japan demanded a share in the development of economic resources in the Philippine Islands. On October 20, 1937, Japan handed the Commonwealth Government a "surprise brief". The brief said, "The commerce between the United States, the Philippines, and Japan furnish an excellent example of 'triangular' arrangement."¹² The Filipinos and the Americans let it pass with very little notice.

When Japan gained supremacy in the western Pacific as a result of the Washington Conference of 1921, the Manila politicians for the first time became aware of the potential menace to the north. On March 24, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, granting independence to the islands after a ten year period of transitional government. On November 14, 1935, Quezon was inaugurated as President of the Philippine Commonwealth.¹³

The menace of Japan was very alarming to Quezon, and he asked President Roosevelt for assistance. As a result, General Douglas MacArthur was detailed to the Philippines. He went to work immediately on a plan of defense.

In 1941, Japan found herself in a dilemma. She had gone so far that it was almost impossible to go back. Nations

¹²Syngman Rhee, Japan Inside Out, pp. 137-138.

¹³M. J. Gayn, Fight for the Pacific, pp. 312-313.

and islands were arming themselves against attack from her. The American navy was furnishing cruisers to convoy the precious ships and army transports westward across the Pacific from Honolulu to their ports of destination. So her predicament was this:

First, she knew that any understanding she might have been able to effect with the democracies would entail giving up all her military conquests and to disarm to a point where she could no longer be a constant threat to the peace of the Pacific.

Second, she dared not remain quiet for very long, hoping to see Hitler win and then join actively against the democracies. If he won without Japan's active help, Japan would be in dire peril.

Third, only if Germany should win the war would Japan be able to keep and assimilate the vast area she had already conquered.

Fourth, Japan could not wait too long. Already as a result of the freezing of her assets and the cessation of her trade with the United States, with all parts of the British Empire, and with the Netherlands East Indies, she was suffering almost the equivalent to a strict naval blockade.

Fifth, every month that she waited and watched and hesitated, the circle around her tightened. The enemy got stronger.¹⁴

In October, 1941, Japan had just completed moving men

¹⁴Hallett Abend, Ramparts of the Pacific, pp. 183-184.

and material into the northern areas of Manchukuo, Korea, Chahar, and Suiyan provinces in northern China. She was getting ready for Russia to collapse. This did not happen, so they had to turn their attention south. It was certain that Japan would attack the Philippines and particularly Manila first. But Filipinos felt confident that they could withstand the assault.

In early 1941, General McArthur was asked point blank about the state of preparedness in the Philippines, and he replied:

"Conditions are good now, but give me a breathing spell of a couple of months more and it will be hopeless for Japan to attack the islands with intent of conquest. Before the first of the year we will have 200,000 men here, and that will be ample."¹⁵

He did get the "breathing spell of a couple of months" which he had asked for in early October.

Nevertheless, in less than a month after the outbreak of the war, he had lost Manila and most of the island of Luzon. We lost in Manila because the Japanese were underestimated, both in strength and ability, and because General McArthur thought his forces were strong enough to repel any attempt at invasion which Japan was strong enough to make.

Tokyo struck in December 1941, it was all or nothing. The dice were thrown - the answer was yet to come.

HAWAII

From Manila to Honolulu the sea distance by the shortest,

¹⁵Ibid., p. 182.

almost straight, line across the Pacific is 4,767 miles, and with a ship averaging fifteen or sixteen knots an hour the trip requires thirteen days and thirteen nights.

In 1940 Honolulu and Hawaii were faced with these problems or questions: Is our preparedness far enough along? How about the tens of thousands of Japanese in Hawaii? How will we feed ourselves if the sea lanes between here and the coast are interrupted?

The Hawaiian Islands were America's most powerful base and were the pivot of the defense line in the Pacific. Nothing was being left undone around Honolulu, and all over the island of Oahu, to make Pearl Harbor and impregnable land fortress to shelter the great naval base.

There was no continental soil nor coast-line within a radius of 2,000 miles. This made Pearl Harbor unique among the naval bases of the world and gave it a place of power unapproached even by Malta or Singapore.

Hawaii had two vulnerable points. They were the presence of 150,000 Japanese and the shortage of food. Some of the Japanese were thoroughly American in ideology and loyalty, many thousand were not. These retained all their native characteristics and owed their allegiance to Japan. These were watched as potential "Fifth Columnists". Hawaii had to import most of its food stuff and a widespread submarine blockade would soon put it on a starvation diet.

Pearl Harbor, the great base a few miles from Honolulu,

was protected by tall mountain ranges on two sides and by batteries of twelve inch stationary and eight inch mobile guns on the third. There was only one entrance to the great bay that afforded a protected water area of about six square miles for naval use. The civilians would ask the naval officers what would be done if some Japanese fanatic sank a Japanese ship right across the harbor entrance. The usual reply was a wise smile and some such remark as, "If the harbor were bottled, the fleet wouldn't be inside." How wrong this statement turned out to be in December, 1941.

In 1940 work started on bases throughout the Pacific to fortify them. Japan looked on in alarm.

Right in the heart of the Japanese mandated area in the South Seas lies Guam. The navy had tried for years to get Congress to fortify the island, but without success. In 1941 they realized that time was too short to convert it into a strong base. The Japanese watched these efforts without much concern because she knew it would be foolish for the United States to fortify Guam."

The older Japanese born and reared to maturity in Japan were in many cases more pro-Japanese than pro-American. Most of the Japanese who had paid return visits to their motherland was so sharply struck by the contrast between liberty and restraint, between prosperity and poverty, in their old homes and their new, that they returned to Hawaii staunchly pro-American.

In Hawaii the Japanese were permitted to maintain Japanese language schools, openly paid for by the Government of Japan. The number of Japanese teachers were increased beyond reason. It was found that Shintoism was decreasing while the number of Shinto priests were increasing very rapidly. This class of priests were instrumental in formulating clashes and stirring up hatred in China. Was their mission the same here?

In 1940 the islands voted a little more than two-to-one in favor of a statehood. It was thought in some quarters that voters of Japanese blood were instructed to vote against the statehood project, or otherwise the majority in favor of it would have been much larger. Tokyo may have thought that a victorious Japan could more easily detach a territory from a defeated United States than to force the cession of the forty-ninth state.

In 1941 it was found that Japan was trying to conscript Hawaiian-born Japanese into the army. The Japanese Consul-General denied the accusation, but admitted that Japanese with dual citizenships who visited Japan might be drafted.

For several years this question was purely a matter for the islands themselves, but with Japan openly aligned with Germany and Italy, the problem became international.

Hawaii was more than a main defense post of our western coast, as so long as Pearl Harbor and Hawaii were in our possession, no other nation could attain naval superiority in the

Pacific. It would first be necessary to take Hawaii from us before any nation could attack our western coast or successfully assail the Panama Canal from the Pacific side.

When the probability of losing Hawaii was suggested to the navy or army leaders they would grin and say, "Let them come and take it - if they can."

On December 7, 1941, Japan did come, but they didn't take it, although they caused untold damage to both ships and planes. They blundered in the worst way by not following up that masterful stroke.

CHAPTER VI

FACE TO FACE WITH AMERICA

The Pacific Ocean, which with the advance in navigation has grown narrower each year, separates Japan and the United States, two countries which in history, ideals, civilization, culture, had nothing in common. The governments of the two countries represented the extremes of political ideas, the one a democracy, the other an autocracy. The two races of people were so different that neither could adopt the ideals and culture of the other. Therefore, when the Japanese began to pour into America, the Americans were compelled to take certain defensive actions.

During the 19th century, Japan and the United States were the greatest of friends. But even friends will quarrel.

In 1853 Commodore Perry steamed into Tokyo Bay. This marked the first real contact between Japan and the United States. Perry carried with him a letter from the President of the United States. After much negotiation the letter was delivered with the understanding that Perry would return the following year to receive an answer.

The letter was signed in 1854 and provided for the protection of shipwrecked sailors, the opening of two ports in addition to Nagasaki where ship supplies might be secured,

goods be purchased and supplies of coal stored. This agreement did not provide for the residence of Americans in the treaty ports.

Three years later Townsend Harris, America's first consul-general to Japan, managed to negotiate a new treaty which gave Americans the right to reside in treaty ports, and be subject to trial only by their own consuls. Tariff and trade regulations were agreed upon and almost every detail of the regulations which were to exist between Japan and the foreign powers for nearly half a century were fixed in this treaty. Harris and his secretary were the only foreign residents of the country for quite awhile.

In the troubled years which followed, the tolerant attitude of the United States toward Japan stood out in contrast to that of other powers. It was interpreted by the military men of Japan as a sign of weakness.

One of the earliest examples of this occurred a short time after foreigners were allowed to take up residence in Yokohama. An Englishman was riding on a highway near there when he was attacked and killed by a retainer of the Prince of Satsuma. The British Government immediately demanded an indemnity of \$500,000 from the central government and \$125,000 from the Prince of Satsuma. After long negotiations the first sum was paid, but the Prince of Satsuma refused to comply. He finally paid the indemnity only after a British squadron had bombarded and burned his capital.

Another outbreak occurred while negotiations in regard to the above incident was still in progress. The American legation at Yedo was burned and at about the same time the Secretary of the legation was killed. The United States demanded only \$20,000, half of that sum to be paid to the mother of the murdered secretary. There was quite a difference between the English and American demand.

A short time after the burning of the American Legation the Prince of Choshun and the Prince of Satsuma made an attempt to close the straits of Shimonoseki, through which vessels from the Inland Sea entered the Yellow Sea enroute to China. The first boat to be fired upon was an American vessel. After an unsuccessful attempt by an American war ship to open up the Straits, combined action was taken by British, French, Dutch and American war vessels. After three days' attack the Straits were opened and negotiations for an indemnity begun. The sum was fixed at \$3,000,000, an amount which was paid and equally divided between the four nations.

In 1881 a movement was begun for the return of America's share of the \$3,000,000 indemnity. It was finally returned to the Japanese in 1883. This act is represented to have been a voluntary act of Congress. Here are the real facts of the case. Learning that the money was unexpended, the Japanese government employed a shrewd American lawyer to lobby through Congress a bill for the return of the indemnity, paying him a fee reported to have been \$40,000.¹

¹Carl Crow, Japan and America, p. 170.

To gain a more dignified place among the nations, Japan knew she must have new treaties. As in all previous efforts of this kind, the greatest encouragement came from the United States, which in 1887 negotiated a treaty abolishing extra-territoriality and placing American residents under the jurisdiction of Japanese courts and Japanese laws. This treaty was not enforced because of the refusal of other powers to negotiate similar agreements.

It was not until Japan had proved her powers in arms in the war with China that the rest of the nations recognized the claims Japan had been pressing for a quarter of a century. They negotiated new treaties with Japan in 1894. In these treaties it was agreed that extra-territoriality should be abolished, the entire country opened to the residence of foreigners, and Japan be allowed to regulate her own tariff.

The relations between Japan and the United States were undergoing certain modifications during the closing years of the nineteenth Century. Japan had reached maturity and was no longer the minor nation on which the United States could look with paternal regard. Victory over China had established her as the leading Oriental power and had given untold prestige to her Emperor. Her ministers began to look forward to the time when Japan would dominate the Pacific and rule China.

The day when we could work with Japan was passing. America, through the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, appeared on the Pacific as a potential rival of Japan and this at once changed her attitude toward her old friend.

When discussion of the terms of annexation was begun in 1897 Japan protested vigorously, declaring the independence of the country was necessary to maintain the good relations of the powers on the Pacific and that annexation might injure the rights of Japanese subjects living in Hawaii. On being given assurance by the United States that Japan's rights would be fully protected the protest, although never withdrawn, was not pressed. Most historians believe that if the United States had abandoned the idea of annexation the ultimate domination of the islands by Japan would have been inevitable.

The American occupation of the Philippines coming soon after the annexation of Hawaii was another blow to Japanese expansion. Japan looked with a jealous eye on the advancement of any power in that sphere which she had marked as her own. She concealed her resentment at the encroachments of the United States only because Russia seemed more dangerous.

Japan had for centuries wanted complete control of China and Korea. Korea had once been a tribute paying nation to Japan and the latter country had barely emerged from her seclusion before there was begun a Japanese intrigue for the domination of Korea which eventually led to war between China and Japan.

The war with China was Japan's first modern war. It lasted only a few months with China being loser. If Japan had been allowed to keep all that the treaty with China had given her, she would have been satisfied. But European

countries with the aid of the United States compelled her to relinquish the Liaotung Peninsula. At this time Secretary Hay made his proposal for the Open Door in China. Japan was ready to assent to the proposal because she saw China threatened with dismemberment by the European powers. It was important for Japan that China be saved for a time until she was in a position to secure a larger share, or preserve the integrity of China by taking over the entire country.

In the early part of the twentieth century Japan succeeded in defeating Russia. It was United States that offered its good offices in securing peace between the two countries. It was in this treaty that Japan made possible two of her ambitions -- the annexation of Korea and the domination of South Manchuria.

The United States was interested in the conclusion of peace not only because of sentimental interest, but also because the war was being fought on one of America's richest trade fields -- Manchuria.

It was not long before the Americans who had rejoiced in the victories of Japan over Russia realized their sympathies had been misplaced. Under the Russian domination of Manchuria our goods had found a ready sale. But under the iron-fist of Nippon our goods were barred for several years to give the Japanese trader time to stock the native dealer with Japanese commodities. After a lingering decline, the death of American trade in Manchuria was made final in 1915,

by instructions from the State Department at Washington to the American consul of Manchuria to close up his office.

With Russia out of the way, it was necessary for Japan to pick out another probable enemy. This selection fell on the United States for several reasons. The signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance made improbable any conflict with another European power. China was helpless. On the other hand, no matter in what direction Japanese statesmen looked for avenues of further expansion, the giant form of the United States stood in the way. America possessed Hawaii, the Philippines and Alaska; all logical avenues for Japanese growth. From the Japanese point of view it appeared that they had been deprived of their natural destiny in the Pacific merely because the United States had preceded by a few years their entrance into the affairs of that ocean. It was a trick of fate which in a few short years had changed the position of the United States from Japan's greatest aid in her domestic development to Japan's greatest obstacle in the accomplishment of her imperialistic plans. After the annexation of Korea there remained, outside New Zealand and Australia, not one desirable foot of territory in the waters washed by the Pacific which Japan could appropriate without running a foul of the United States.²

In 1900 Japan began to attack the Monroe Doctrine. This was an attempt to turn the attention of the United States from

²Ibid., pp. 187-189.

the Far East. She thought United States might be forced into a bargain in which Japan would agree to keep hands off on the continent of America while United States would give Japan a free hand in China. She began negotiations to secure a foothold in Mexico. These negotiations were unsuccessful.

While the Chinese exclusion act was under discussion in San Francisco, in 1900, Japanese immigration suddenly began to increase. It was because some Americans demanded that the act be renewed as an Asiatic exclusion act so that it would exclude Japanese as well as Chinese.

In 1907 San Francisco established separate schools for the Asiatics. The Japanese protested and there arose a threat of war. Then came the "gentleman's agreement." This agreement provided that the Japanese government shall issue passports to the continental United States only to such of its subjects as are non-laborers or laborers who, in coming to the continent, seek to resume a formerly acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife, or children residing here or to assume active control of an already possessed farming enterprise in this country.³

The immigration of the Japanese had scarcely been stopped when agitation arose over the question of Japanese landownership. California legislatures had proposed bills which would prevent or restrict the acquisition of land by Japanese and other Asiatics, but their passage was always prevented by pressure from Washington. The California legislature in 1913

³H. S. Millis, Japanese Problem in the United States, p. 15.

disregarded the protests from Washington and passed the Webb bill. This bill prohibited the purchase or lease for a period no longer than three years, of agricultural land by any alien not eligible to citizenship. The bill also provided that such aliens ineligible to citizenship may hold land which they now own or on which they hold liens, but it cannot be sold to or descended to aliens of similar status.

The California land law was the subject of prolonged diplomatic correspondence. The issue was so greatly exaggerated that it grew into a grave international issue.

The Japanese did not try very hard to settle the controversy of the California land law, or the other question over the right of Japanese naturalization, in the courts of the United States. The truth of the matter was that the Japanese statesmen were by no means anxious to have the California land question settled. This gave them a whip to carry on programs of military and naval expansion at home.

Dr. T. Iyenaga, at the Japanese-American banquet held in New York on May 19, 1915, expressed the views of official Japan when he said,

"Unless America stops trying to interfere with the policy of Japan in China and comes to a clearer understanding of what Japan is trying to do in China, I indulge in the prediction that there will be more serious disturbances in the relations between Japan and America than was caused by the California affair. We are going to remain the firm and best friend of China, but United States must leave to us the procedure."⁴

The United States became involved in World War I for

⁴Carl Crow, Japan and America, pp. 197-198.

reasons which could be identified with its actual or supposed interests in the Far East. World War I destroyed the Far Eastern balance of power that had existed until 1914, and substituted in its place a Japanese-American antagonism. While Britain and her allies fought to stop Germany's expansion in Europe, the United States, through moral persuasion, diplomatic pressure, and political and military intervention resisted Japanese expansion in the Far East. The United States had been challenging Japanese ambitions in China for the better part of two decades. During this period Japan had been making steady progress toward an imperialist goal. The war gave her the golden opportunity that she had been looking forward to for so long. With all her great European rivals busy, only United States stood in her path to the hegemony of China.

On August 3, 1914, China turned to the United States with the proposal that it endeavor to obtain the consent of the belligerent European nations to an undertaking not to engage in hostilities either in Chinese territory and marginal waters or in adjacent leased territories.

Within four days America sounded out the powers interested in China, including Germany, on their willingness to observe the neutrality of the Pacific Ocean as well as the "status quo" of the Far East. Germany alone accepted it, though too late. On August 14 Japan sent an ultimatum to Berlin, following it August 23 with a declaration of war.

Britain invited Japan to enter the war against Germany. The request was only that the Japanese fleet should, if possible, hunt out and destroy the armed German merchant cruisers that were attacking British commerce.

Japan was a Frankenstein monster turned loose in China. She immediately sent an ultimatum to Germany in regard to German territory in Asia. Germany rejected the ultimatum. By December, 1914, Japan, still assuring the world that she was not in the war for selfish purposes, had the entire province of Shantung and most of the German islands north of the equator safely within her grasp.

Japan now used the Shantung province as a springboard to enter China. She presented her infamous Twenty-One Demands to China, whereupon China turned to Britain and America for help. From February to May, China fought the demands but a Japanese ultimatum in May forced her to yield. The Twenty-One Demands showed to America the treachery and aggressiveness of Japanese diplomacy. Thus American-Japanese relation became strained.

In the winter of 1915 President Wilson had his hands full with the Mexican situation, the British blockade, submarine warfare and the sinking of the Lusitania. His thoughts were removed from actions in the Far East. America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany February 3, 1917, and President Wilson notified all the neutral countries to take

similar action. On March 14, China broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and entered the war on the side of the allies.

The declaration of war on Germany, April 6, 1917, shifted American policy in the Far East. Japan was given a free hand in China. Although in 1917 American diplomacy was preparing for the greatest offensive against Japanese expansion in its history, Wilson could not give much attention to this offensive until after the German armistice.

The offensive was to take four principal forms: first, to bind Japanese capital investment in China to the co-operative ordinances of the new four-power consortium; second, participation in the allied military intervention in Siberia in order to prevent Japan from detaching the maritime provinces from Russian rule; third, the restoration of Shantung to China, and fourth, codification in treaty form of the principles of the Far Eastern policy of the United States together with the Wilsonian principles of non-aggression and collective security as applied to the Pacific Ocean and the region of Eastern Asia. The major parts of this program were accomplished at the peace conference and its sequel, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.

From November 12, 1921, to February 6, 1922, the delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan applied themselves to the limitation of armament and to the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. Headed by Secretary

Hughes the American delegation was composed of Elihu Root, former Secretary of State, Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, and Oscar W. Underwood, ranking Democratic member of that committee. The real control of this conference was exercised in private. Hughes of the United States, Balfour of England, Kato of Japan were the "Big Three" at the Washington Conference.⁵

Hughes' introductory address was quite a surprise because he cut short his welcoming speech and presented a concrete plan for reducing the number of ships and tonnage of the American, British and Japanese navies.

The Washington Conference adjourned February 6, 1922 with many noteworthy accomplishments. The outstanding ones were; the agreement of Japan to a 5-5-3 ratio with United States and England and the consent to maintain a "Status Quo" with respect to fortifications in their Pacific possessions; the return of the Shantung province in full sovereignty to China; the agreement of Japan to withdraw her troops from Siberia; and last, the granting to American citizens equal cable, radio, and residential rights with the Japanese on the island of Yap. In return Japan was given control of the Pacific islands north of the equator.

The goal of United States and England was to save China from Japan. It was felt in Washington that if Japan were assured of supremacy in the Western Pacific, she would abandon most of her war gains in China.

⁵A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the

All was well and peace descended upon the Pacific -- a peace that lasted until 1931. For in September 1931, a Japanese army on the continent struck in Manchuria. The moment was well chosen. America and Europe were occupied with economic chaos. As Stimson put it, "If anyone planned the Manchurian outbreak with a view to freedom from interference from the rest of the world, his time was well chosen."⁶

Seventy-two hours after the fateful railway explosion in Manchuria Stimson informed Japan of America's profound concern over Japan's violation of the Nine Power Treaty. A week later the League asked Japan to withdraw her troops from the occupied area. As expected Japan ignored the request.

Nations throughout the world wanted to see the "Status Quo" of the Pacific maintained. The clamor for action came from countries which did not have to bear its cost. Britain and France which alone would have had to fight the aggressor, displayed little interest. And by February 1932, Britain the appeaser and Japan the aggressor seemed nearly equally villainous to the American eye. America had to keep reminding both that they had signed the Nine Power Treaty and were pledged to uphold it. Stimson became angered and wrote a lucid letter to Senator William E. Borah. In this letter he pointed out the United States had given up her naval supremacy in 1922 in exchange for guaranties with regard to China.

⁶A. Whitney Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the United States, p. 410.

There was a broad hint that Washington might reconsider its undertakings if the other signatories broke their pledges.

The letter did the trick. Britain, in four days after the letter was written, guided through the League a resolution based on Stimson's doctrine of non-recognition.

In 1934, Japan went a step further on the road of aggression by denouncing the 5-5-3 naval ratio, her dockyards were promptly closed to visitors, and work was launched on new men-of-war. The "Status Quo" of the Pacific was about to be upset.

Having entrenched herself in Manchuria, Japan began to squeeze foreign interests out of her puppet state. The oil and tobacco interests were the first victims. Japan officially sponsored smuggling and opium traffic into China. American industrialists and shipping concerns felt the heavy boot of the invader. The Open Door was being closed and American rights were being violated. Washington contented itself with notes but Japan resorted to action. With her Western rivals unwilling to halt or stop her, Japan decided in 1937 to add North China to her growing domain.

It was announced on September 6, 1937, that the entire coast from the Great Wall to Indo-China was under an airtight blockade. On September 14, President Roosevelt issued a statement prohibiting merchant vessels owned by the United States to transport arms, ammunition, or implements of war to China, or Japan. Then on September 21, Japanese military

and naval authorities in Shanghai warned Americans to leave Nanking because of the imminent necessity of Japanese bombing of that city.

President Roosevelt, on October 5, delivered his famous "Quarantine" speech. He condemned the bombing of noncombants, and said,

"The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance on international morality be restored."⁷

On December 8, the United States government urged the Americans to leave Nanking. The U.S.S. Luzon, a gunboat of the Yangtze River Patrol, was aiding in the evacuation. It was also stated that the U.S.S. Panay would assist in removing the remaining Americans upriver.

On December 12, 1937, Japanese forces moved their big guns near the Yangtze River and poured terrific artillery fire on the Nanking defenders. Some of the shells fell near the U.S.S. Panay. Lieutenant Commander J. J. Hughes, in charge of the Panay, ordered the gunboat to move further up the river. The Panay had convoyed several Standard Oil tankers some twenty-eight miles above Nanking and there they anchored. While at anchor and with American flags prominently displayed, the ships were attacked by Japanese bombers and the Panay was sunk. The Japanese planes also machine-gunned the survivors

⁷William G. Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order, pp. 237-238.

trying to go ashore.

On December 14, the United States sent a note to the Japanese Government through Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. This note called attention to the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government that rights and interests of the United States and other powers would be fully respected, but that Japan had violated these rights. The note also stated that the United States expected the Japanese Government to make a formally recorded expression of regret, make complete indemnification, and give assurance that American interests and property in China would not in the future be subject to attack.

At first, the Japanese assumed a stern attitude. They denied everything that would count against them. They pleaded self-defense. They tried to place the blame on the Chinese and Americans. By these statements they were trying to deceive the American people.

A note of apology and a statement that orders had been given to Japanese authorities on the spot in China with a view to preventing further occurrences of this sort was handed to Ambassador Grew on December 14. In this apology the Japanese would not frankly admit that the American version was correct.

The United States stopped sending notes and representations, and on March 23, 1938, sent to Japan its bill of indemnity, amounting to \$2,214,007, for deaths, injuries and property damage done to the United States Gunboat Panay and three

American oil tankers. On April 22, 1938, the Japanese Government paid the above sum.

The Japanese did not live up to their pledge. The many indignities heaped on America and the damages and injuries inflicted upon American citizens by the Japanese in China since the above agreement are too numerous to mention. Things went from bad to worse after the Panay incident. The State Department, finally, had to abolish the American-Japanese commercial treaty. They had without doubt reached the conclusion that in dealing with Japan nothing is more important than a show of force.

By 1937 Japan had denounced the Nine-Power Treaty, the Washington Treaty, and the London Treaty. She was technically free to build her navy to equal or surpass that of Britain's or the United States.

On February 5, 1938, Ambassador Grew presented the American request for information concerning Japan's ship building program. Japan rejected the request. Whereupon the United States, Great Britain, and France pledged themselves to keep pace with Japan and raise their own capital tonnage from 35,000 to 45,000 tons. The battle of the oceans were really on in earnest.

The movement of the American fleet into the Pacific in the spring of 1939 was a hint to Japan that the United States was not unprepared to back up its protests. By the later part of

1939 almost every diplomatic method to keep peace with Japan had been tried with no success.

During the summer and fall of 1939, announcements came from Japanese sources of the establishment of a central Chinese Government. The former Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Ching-wei was to act as head of this Government. On March 30, 1940 Wang Ching-wei was set up in Nanking as head of a new Chinese regime, with authority over the occupied areas.

The United States was quick to announce to the world her refusal to recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime. On the same day, Secretary Hull issued the following statement.

"In the light of what has happened in various parts of China since 1931, the setting up of a new regime at Nanking has the appearance of a further step in the program of one country by armed force to impose its will upon a neighboring country and to block off large areas of the world from normal political and economic relationship from the rest of the world."⁸

To offset the bluff made by Japan the United States declared that she would grant a loan of \$20,000,000 to China.

The situation in Europe was very dark. Holland, France, and almost all of Europe had fallen before the German war machine. These events turned the attention of Japan to the possibilities of southward expansion. Their eyes were focused on the Netherland East Indies. Mr. Hull tried to stop them by referring to notes signed by Great Britain, France, United States and Japan to respect each other's right. On May 22 the German Government notified Japan that it was not interested

⁸Ibid., p. 298.

in the status of the Netherland Indies. This was taken by Japan as a blank check which she should cash immediatly.

On August 1, 1940, Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, revealed Japan's new foreign policy. The policy was to establish a "new order for Greater East Asia" in place of the old objective of a "new order for East Asia." The policy was to embrace not only Japan, Manchouko and China but also Indo-China and the Netherland Indies. He asserted that Japan's policy in the Far East was nothing more than an "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine." With this policy Japan had mapped her course and had shown it to the world.

On September 28, 1940, Tokyo joined hands with Berlin and Rome. This was looked on with disfavor by the United States.

The question uppermost in the minds of statesmen throughout the world was; where will Japan strike next?

CHAPTER VII

THEN PEARL HARBOR

In spite of all her camouflaging, there were many people in the United States who knew what Japan was about to attempt. There was one who had the courage to voice his conviction, United States Senator Key Pittman. In an address given in Las Vegas, Nevada, December 19, 1935, Senator Pittman said:

"Sooner or later, the United States will be faced with the necessity of fighting for its very existence, and if we wait too long, the outcome will be much in doubt. What are we going to do, if they (the Japanese) grab the Philippines, which is almost sure to come? Will we retreat or will we stand and fight?"¹

In November, 1938, came Prince Konoye's "New Order" declaration. The statement boldly defined Tokyo's objective as complete domination of East Asia, to the exclusion of all her rivals.

New conquests called for a new policy. Thus in June, 1940, soon after the fall of Paris, Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita's "Greater Asia" statement was made. It is as follows:

"All mankind longs for peace, but peace cannot endure unless nations have their proper places. Since this is difficult in the present stage of human progress, the next best thing is for peoples who are related geographically, racially, culturally and economically to form spheres of their own.

¹Syngman Rhee, Japan Inside Out, p. 40.

"The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are...very closely related. They are destined to cooperate and minister to each other's needs for their common well-being and prosperity."²

In 1940 Japan made her decision. It was all or nothing. She joined hands with Berlin and Rome and they extended recognition to her puppet government at Nanking. The gamble was on. Japan's destiny was not in her own hands but in the hands of the warring nations of Europe.

Japan was eager and ready to go to war on the side of the totalitarian states as far back as the Munich Pact in September 1938. There is no doubt but that Japan would have struck against British Hongkong and French Indo-China in September 1939 except for the shock of the Berlin-Moscow agreement in August. So for a year she waited to see what would happen. She saw the band-wagon moving along and she decided to climb on. First France collapsed and Holland was overwhelmed. This was her chance for expansion into Indo-China and the East Indies.

Tokyo thought at first Washington would be easily consoled but soon she was convinced otherwise. America would not agree to anything short of her relinquishing all gains made since the summer of 1937. This she could not think of doing. So, on September 27, 1940, Japan signed the new Tripartite Pact at Berlin and bound herself to triumph or to fall with Germany and Italy. The terms of the treaty did not give Japan

²Mark J. Gayn, The Fight for the Pacific, p. 120

very many advantages, but, there is good authority for believing that the treaty contained three "confidential provisions" that have never been acknowledged. They are as follows:

1. In case of victory, Germany and Italy agree to use their influence to assist Japan in acquiring complete control of French Indo-China and of the Netherlands East Indies.
2. Germany and Italy pledged themselves to mediate between China and Japan after the close of the war in Europe.
3. Germany alone agrees to use her "fullest political and diplomatic good offices" to help effect the conclusion of a binding nonaggression pact between Soviet Russia and Japan.³

In return, Japan was bound to go to war against any neutral nation that goes to war against either Germany or Italy. Each term of the treaty and each move that Japan made brought her nearer to war with America.

Foreign Minister Yosuka Matsouka in a broadcast on October 10, 1940 declared:

"I wish earnestly that such a powerful nation as the United States and all other nations at present neutral do not become involved in the European war or come by any chance into conflict with Japan because of the China incident or otherwise. Such an eventuality, with all the possibility of bringing awful catastrophe upon humanity, is enough to make one shudder, if one stops to imagine the consequences."⁴

Prince Konoye said to newspaper men on October 6, 1940:

"The question of peace or war in the Pacific will be decided by whether the United States and Japan understand and respect each other's positions. If the United States recognizes Japan's leadership in East Asia, Japan would recognize United States' leadership of the Americas.

³Hallet Edward Abend, Japan Unmasked, p. 19.

⁴Syngman Rhee, Japan Inside Out, p. 31.

If the United States refuses to understand the real intention of Japan, Germany, and Italy in concluding an alliance for positive co-operation in creating a new world order, and persist in challenging those powers in the belief that the accord is hostile action there will be no other course open to it than to go to war."⁵

Therefore, both the Premier and the Foreign Minister, for the first time in the history of American-Japanese diplomacy, openly and officially asserted, in the form of newspaper interviews that Japan "should declare war on the United States." This fist shaking of both Tokyo and Berlin caused a few Americans to open their eyes and say "the sooner we have a two-ocean navy the better."

To prevent the Pacific area from experiencing the same horrors that was devastating Europe, United States entered into discussions with Japan. For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

In July 1941, the Japanese government connived with Hitler to force the Vichy government of France to give them permission to place Japanese armed forces in Southern Indo-China, and then they began sending troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between the United States and Japan were thereupon suspended. But during the following month, at the urgent request of the Japanese government, the conversations were resumed. These conversations will be discussed more fully in the latter part of this chapter.

⁵Ibid., p. 31.

As the year 1941 opened, a vast movement of political forces throughout the world was intensely active. The Axis were very well organized but the anti-Axis countries were not. In all countries not at the moment engaged in the hostilities in Europe, there was great rivalry. Russia at this time was not actively engaged in the European war. Russian railways continued carrying German machines and supplies to Manchuria much of this cargo being enroute to Japan.

Italy was suffering severe military losses in Albania and Libya. Bulgaria and Rumania were brought into the Nazi fold. Germany's vast military machine was riding roughshod over the greater part of the continent of Europe.

In Japan the nation was aware of what its leaders called a "Golden opportunity" to fulfill the nation's desire for expansion. Japan was faced with a great internal struggle in regard to methods to be used. The people were tired after three and one-half years of war in China. Japan was also faced by growing American aid to China while her exports from the United States had practically ceased.

We, in the United States, saw Japan as a conquering power, spreading herself over much of the Far East and crowding out other powers. But Japan saw the whole process from the inside of what, to her, seemed to be a vicious and choking circle of enemies. To Tokyo the view was like this: To the northeast and east was Alaska, which we were fortifying, and Canada, which was hostile toward Japanese aspirations. On our west coast the anti-Japanese attitude was strong and the

Exclusion Act was upheld. Then there was Hawaii, with our naval base at Pearl Harbor; Midway Island, which we were fortifying; Wake Island, a stop-over station. At Manila we based a fleet and had airfields. The ring continued toward the south with the Netherlands East Indies and then China and, northward lay Soviet Russia nearly joined to Alaska.

In all this gigantic circle Japan saw no friend except weak Thailand and her own puppet allies. So she must find a way out.

The Japanese Government headed by Prince Konoye resigned October 16, 1941, and a New Government was formed under General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister, with Shigenori Togo as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The army had taken over and by the end of October, Japan's attitude became menacing. The American government was given to understand that there was a time limit to the negotiations and that an agreement, if any, would have to be reached before November 15, when Premier Tojo would convene a special session of the Diet. A few days before the scheduled Diet meeting the Japanese government suddenly announced its intention to send Mr. Kurusu as special envoy to this country, in an eleventh-hour effort to avert a break. Mr. Kurusu's departure from Japan about coincided with the dispatch of the three aircraft carriers which took Japanese planes to within striking distance to Hawaii, and Kurusu's mission appears to have been only to stall for time until Japan's military plans were completed.⁶

⁶Wilfrid Fleisher, Our Enemy Japan, p. 150.

Kurusu's arrival in Washington coincided with a loud beating of war drums in the Japanese Diet. When the special envoy made his first call with Ambassador Nomura at the State Department on the morning of November 17, Secretary of State Hull had before him on his desk the text of belligerent speeches delivered to the Japanese Parliament by both Premier Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo, against the United States. Tojo called upon the United States to end the so-called "economic blockade" of Japan, halt the "military encirclement" which he alleged the A.B.C.D. nations had thrown about Japan, and observe a hands-off policy with regard to China. Mr. Hull told the two envoys what his fundamental principles were and then he listened to the well-worn Japanese arguments about establishing a "New Order in East Asia" and a "co prosperity sphere" among all the nations of the Pacific.

Mr. Hull's terms, endorsed by President Roosevelt, met with rejection, and Japan sent new instructions that were considered absurd and revealed clearly that there was no chance of an agreement with Japan.

What Japan's proposal amounted to was that the United States was to supply Japan with all the oil she needed, suspend the embargoes and cease aid to China, in return for which Japan would agree to launch no new conquests. All that Japan was willing to do was remove its troops from southern Indo-China, where they had been recently sent, into the northern part. Mr. Hull realized clearly that there was nothing left

to be done in the diplomatic field and that it was only a matter of time until a complete breakdown developed, and possibly war.⁷

On November 26, President Roosevelt called Mr. Hull into his office for a talk. When he returned to his office at the State Department, Mr. Hull then summoned the Japanese envoys and handed them a 2,000-word plan for a Pacific settlement which he had been working on for some time.

It was not expected at that late hour that the Japanese would accept the American proposals. They could have done so if their professions for peace had been genuine, but at that time, as is now known, their aircraft were well on their way to Hawaii.

Mr. Hull in his last plan had insisted that Japan withdraw her troops entirely from both China and Indo-China. America and Japan were to abolish extraterritoriality in China and to persuade the other powers to follow suit, and they were to conclude a new commercial treaty to replace the one the United States denounced in January, 1940, to normalize their trade relations.

During the last days of November, reports reached the State Department that Japanese troops were pouring into Indo-China by the thousands. The reports also indicated that an attack on Thailand was imminent.

On December 2, President Roosevelt directed Under-

⁷Ibid., p. 154.

Secretary of State Sumner Wells to inquire of the Japanese envoys what were the reasons for this increase of forces in Indo-China in excess of the Japanese agreement with Vichy, threatening the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. On December 5, the Japanese sent an answer to the effect that the reports were exaggerated and that they were precautionary measures following Chinese troop concentrations on the northern border of Indo-China.

As war clouds were gathering over the Pacific, President Roosevelt played a last card. He sent a direct message to the Emperor of Japan, on the night of December 6, in which he declared that continuance of the existing strained situation was unthinkable and the peoples of the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, and Thailand cannot sit "either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite." The President urged the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China as a condition for the maintenance of peace in the South Pacific area.⁸

Emperor Hirohito's answer was delivered to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo three hours and forty minutes after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull came to his office in the State Department, as he had been doing for several Sundays past during the emergency situation, at ten-fifteen o'clock. He looked tired and worn

⁸Ibid., p. 160.

from the twenty days of incessant meetings, not only with the Japanese envoys, but with the diplomatic representatives of the other nations concerned in the Pacific affairs and with high American naval and military officials.

At one o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese embassy telephoned for an appointment for the Japanese envoys to meet Secretary Hull at once. This appointment was fixed for one forty-five o'clock. The Japanese arrived late at the State Department, at five minutes past two, and were conducted to the diplomatic waiting room.

While the Japanese negotiators were waiting, Mr. Hull, who was seated at his desk in his office across the hall, received a telephone call from what he has described as an "official" source to the effect that "there is a report that Pearl Harbor was attacked this morning," and he was told that his informant was trying to "run it down."

At two-twenty o'clock, five or ten minutes after Mr. Hull had hung up the telephone receiver on his desk and while he was still awaiting confirmation of the reported attack on Hawaii, the two Japanese envoys were ushered into his office.

Mr. Hull looked grave, as did also the Japanese envoys, who presumably were unaware at that moment of the Japanese attack on Hawaii but who had brought Japan's defiant note rejecting the American proposal for a Pacific settlement and breaking off negotiations.

Secretary Hull read the long 2,500-word note presented to him by Ambassador Nomura "carefully and deliberately" in the most tense silence, and as he read it his anger mounted, but he contained himself until he had finished the last insulting paragraph, which read:

"Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust American-Japanese relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American Government has been finally lost..."⁹

Turning in his swivel chair toward Ambassador Nomura at his left, with the note still in his hand, Mr. Hull declared with the greatest indignation and in a voice quavering with emotion;

"I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered a word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."¹⁰

Ambassador Nomura, who had sat by in silence until then, fumbled to try and find some words to reply to the Secretary of State's remarks, but Mr. Hull gave the envoys no chance to formulate an answer and curtly bowed them out of his office

⁹Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 166.

without a handshake. No mention whatever was made during the meeting of the report of the Japanese attack on Hawaii.

Thus, on December 7, 1941, eighty-eight years since Perry steamed into Tokyo Bay, the United States and Japan were at war.

Japan had undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. I will give you part of President Roosevelt's message to Congress, on December 8, 1941, to prove the above statement. It is as follows:

"Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan... The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. Very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

"Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

"Last night Japanese forces attacked Wake Island.

"Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday speak for themselves...

"I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December seventh, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire."¹¹

The sudden criminal attacks by the Japanese in the Pacific provided the climax of a century of aggressions. These aggressions began, literally speaking, with the visit of Commodore Perry to Japan ninety-six years ago. They ended with the visit

¹¹United States News, Prelude to Infamy, pp. 47-48.

of two Japanese emissaries to the Secretary of State, December, 7, 1941.

In 1853 Japan was forced out of her seclusion, and she became an apt pupil to the Western ideas. All nations trusted her, and she roared with joy until through her ego she proclaimed herself superior to all nations and set out on her divine mission to conquer the world. First, she absorbed Korea; second, she stole Manchuria; third, she invaded China; fourth, she marched into the Pacific; and fifth, she struck Pearl Harbor and the United States. Her pattern of aggression was one without an end except in defeat.

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