Smart Grid Integrity Attacks: Characterizations and Countermeasures

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Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored, transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator, and used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyber attacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks ... continued below

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Giani, Annarita; Bitar, Eilyan; McQueen, Miles; Khargonekar, Pramod & Poolla, Kameshwar October 1, 2011.

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Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored, transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator, and used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyber attacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines is presented. This requires O(n2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected in power systems using standard graph algorithms. Known secure phase measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyber attacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p + 1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyber attacks.

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  • Second International Conference On Smart Grid Communications,Brussels, Belgium,10/17/2011,10/20/2011

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  • Report No.: INL/CON-11-22059
  • Grant Number: DE-AC07-05ID14517
  • Office of Scientific & Technical Information Report Number: 1035890
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc829721

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Office of Scientific & Technical Information Technical Reports

Reports, articles and other documents harvested from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information.

Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) is the Department of Energy (DOE) office that collects, preserves, and disseminates DOE-sponsored research and development (R&D) results that are the outcomes of R&D projects or other funded activities at DOE labs and facilities nationwide and grantees at universities and other institutions.

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  • October 1, 2011

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  • May 19, 2016, 3:16 p.m.

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  • Dec. 1, 2016, 10:26 p.m.

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Giani, Annarita; Bitar, Eilyan; McQueen, Miles; Khargonekar, Pramod & Poolla, Kameshwar. Smart Grid Integrity Attacks: Characterizations and Countermeasures, article, October 1, 2011; Idaho Falls, Idaho. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc829721/: accessed May 21, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.