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STORAGE AREA - BASEMENT
OF 325 BUILDING

R. H. Scott

February 1966

DATE February 25, 1966 -
 TO Distribution
 FROM R. H. Scott, Manager, Industrial Safety and
 A. J. Stevens, Manager, Radiation Monitoring
 SUBJECT STORAGE AREA - BASEMENT OF 325 BUILDING

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W. L. FISHE

Your help is requested.

Insufficient attention to orderly use of storage space in the basement of 325 Building has developed over a period of time into conditions calling for concerted action by your departments. A listing of the kinds of conditions that exist is attached.

Failure on our part to rectify these matters poses a variety of possible consequences worth enumerating.

1. A chance fire originating in the combustible materials would be unnecessarily difficult to combat. A likelihood of spreading radioactive contamination, of losing high value equipment, and of program interruptions would accompany such a fire.
2. Possibility of injury to personnel is enhanced.
3. Increased maintenance costs can arise from obstructed access to facilities.
4. Observation of these conditions by Commission officials could readily be detrimental to the licensing of the facilities.
5. Observation by the RUCO Industrial Safety Branch during one of its periodic inspections will almost certainly evoke a recommendation calling for Battelle-Northwest management to demonstrate more tangible concern and responsibility for safety.
6. Since the contrast with most other parts of the laboratories is so great, the appearance of this area will also create unfortunate impressions on any visitors.

Since continuation of these conditions is palpably unfavorable to operational and safety considerations, the four departments concerned are urged to make a concerted effort toward the following objectives:

1. Dispose of combustible oily and solid wastes and other trash.
2. Make maximum use of the laboratory equipment pool. Discard unneeded equipment.
3. Activate a proper disposal program for radioactive wastes. Dispose of contaminated filters presently marked "Save".
4. Set aside specific areas for maintenance activities.
5. Provide storage space for maintenance - type material. Particularly provide for safer storage of pipe.
6. Make better use of storage space by providing specific, identified, storage spaces for each user and identifying the individual responsible for orderly

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-2-

February 25, 1966

6. (continuation)

upkeep of the space. Partitioning the area is suggested as a means of obtaining better use of the space available.

7. Make proper identification of areas not to be used for storage. Examples are areas behind instrument panels, around filter boxes, doors, exits, and work benches.

8. Consider the possibility of increasing illumination levels to encourage improved housekeeping.

Radiation Monitoring and Industrial Safety Sections will be glad to participate with any representatives you designate in making plans to correct the conditions cited.

A. J. Stevens, Manager
Radiation Monitoring

R. H. Scott, Manager
Industrial Safety

AJS:RHS:blk

SAFETY AND OPERATING CONDITIONS
IN B25 BASEMENT STORAGE AREA

1. Storage areas poorly defined or poorly arranged or unsafely used.
2. Operating facilities, e.g. filter boxes and ventilation control panels made inaccessible by encroachment of storage.
3. Materials evidently stored for years without use. Discarded experimental apparatus haphazardly stored, some of it cannibalized for parts. Evidence that laboratory equipment pool is not utilized adequately.
4. Gas cylinders improperly supported, improperly stored, and not removed when job was completed. Lengths of pipe (21') standing on end and not secured. Disassembled scaffolding improperly stored in northwest corner. Rolls of vinyl plastic stored on end adjacent to aisles.
5. Electrical parts strewn about the floor. Boxes of test tubes haphazardly stored near north stairwell. Gasket materials lying about in northwest part of basement. Assault masks lying in various places, obviously unused for sometime.
6. Uranium, thorium, and other chemicals not properly labeled.
7. Contaminated materials stored with noncontaminated materials. Drums of contaminated waste on west wall unmarked.
8. Some areas represent severe fire hazards. Flammable packing materials not disposed of.