

SENSITIVITY, INSPIRATION, AND RATIONAL AESTHETICS: EXPERIENCING
MUSIC IN THE NORTH GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

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This dissertation examines pre-Kantian rational philosophy and the development of the discipline of aesthetics in the North German Enlightenment. With emphasis on the historical conception of the physiological and psychological experience of music, this project determines the function of music both privately and socially in the eighteenth century. As a result, I identify the era of rational aesthetics (ca.1750-1800) as a music-historical period unified by the aesthetic function and metaphysical experience of music, which inform the underlying motivation for musical styles, genres, and means of expression, leading to a more meaningful and compelling historical periodization.

The philosophy of Alexander Baumgarten, Johann Georg Sulzer, and others enable definitions of the experience of beautiful objects and those concepts related to music composition, listening, and taste, and determine how rational aesthetics impacted the practice, function, and ultimately the prevailing style of music in the era. The construction, style, and performance means of the free fantasia, the most personal and expressive genre of the era, identify its function as the private act of solitude, or a musical meditation. An examination of pleasure societies establishes the role of music in performance and discussion in both social gatherings and learned musical clubs for conveying the morally good, which results in the spread of good taste. Taken together, the complimentary practices of private and social music played a significant role in eighteenth-century life for developing the self, through personal taste, and society, through a morally good culture.

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CHAPTER 1 PHILOSOPHY OF THE NORTH GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

1.1 Introduction: The Era of Rational Aesthetics

The famous question “What is Enlightenment?” was first proposed to the readers of the popular monthly magazine *Berlinische Monatsschrift* in 1783, and responses by Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant followed shortly thereafter.¹ The disparity in their positions represents what would become a schism in the metaphysical foundations of eighteenth-century thought, yet our current definition of the North German Enlightenment tends to only consider the view of Kant to epitomize the entirety of the era. This reliance on the writings of Kant has led to a great misunderstanding of Enlightenment philosophy, which has only just begun to be resolved.

Examining pre-Kantian philosophy has a profound impact on explanations of the experience and function of music during the North German Enlightenment, which I define loosely as encompassing the years 1750-1800. This era has been misunderstood until now both philosophically and musically mainly because of teleological approaches to historiography, which are aimed towards Kant and the Viennese Classical Period, respectively. The era can be defined instead on its own terms by examining according to rational aesthetic principles the philosophy alongside the music of the North German Enlightenment.

In order to understand the experience of music in this era, the concept of “experience” must be considered twofold. First it can be defined by the physiological and psychological response to music as feelings (*Empfindungen*). The commonly repeated

¹ Johann Friedrich Zöllner, “Ist es rathsam, das Ehebündniß nicht ferner durch die Religion zu sanciren?” in *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Bd. 2, hrsg. F. Gedike und J.E. Biester (Berlin: Bei Haude und Spener, 1783), 508-517.

trope of sensitivity was, during the Enlightenment, regarded as more than mere sentimental feeling. Rather, the experience of feelings, including those produced by music, was considered to have had a significant impact on the body and mind. The second use of experience is in relation to the methodology of rational philosophers. Based in empirical practices, rational philosophy considered experience as a means for learning and discovery; the experience of the beautiful arts was indeed one such means for discovering sensate cognition. Therefore, defining the experience of music through this philosophy can provide a greater understanding of the function and meaning of music in the North German Enlightenment. The objective of this dissertation is to define the foundational principles of rational aesthetics and re-examine concepts concerning the beautiful arts according to those principles. This perspective enables a construction of the aesthetic experience and function of music in both private and social realms.

The foundational principles of North German rational philosophy are first established in the opening chapters, which examine theoretical concepts of aesthetics. These foundations can be found in the works of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Leibniz's monadic theory provides a definition of the beautiful, and Wolff's systematic cognitive theory establishes the role of physical sensation in the acquisition of knowledge. Both of these concepts inform Alexander Baumgarten's (1714-1762) metaphysics, which leads to his establishment of a theory of aesthetics for the first time in modern philosophy. A foundational principle of Baumgarten's theory is that sensory cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntnis*) is obtained through the experience of feelings (*Empfindungen*) in study of the beautiful arts (*schönen Künste*), which enables the development of a beautiful soul. Through this theory can be

defined the aesthetic experience of beautiful objects, as well as those concepts pertaining both to the artist, such as inspiration, invention, and the genius, and to the amateur, such as the forming of individual taste.

The paired practices of private and social music performance provide a look into the practical application of rational aesthetics. From the perspective of the eighteenth-century practice known as solitude, the free fantasia serves as a means to identify the function and experience of private music performance at the clavichord as a musical meditation. The aesthetic function of pleasure societies (*Gesellschaften zum Vergnügen*), on the other hand, is considered through the roles of music in performance and discussion in both social gatherings and learned musical clubs. Taken together, these complimentary practices played a significant part of eighteenth-century life as a means to develop the self, through personal taste, and society, through a morally good culture.

The publication and acceptance of Immanuel Kant's writings signals the demise of rational aesthetics. Kant rejects a metaphysical structure that recognizes sensations as a part of the cognitive process; therefore, in his system the beautiful arts cannot lead to the acquisition of knowledge, sensate or otherwise. The breakdown of rational metaphysics results in the demise of Baumgartian aesthetics, and thus marks a shift away from Enlightenment thought.

Through a reconstruction of rational aesthetics, a period can be identified that is unified according to the aesthetic function and experience of music, and therefore leads to a more meaningful periodization of the era ranging from approximately 1750-1800. An understanding of rational philosophy not only explains the underlying motivation of the arts, but also enables a true response to the questions of "What is Enlightenment."

1.1.1 Rational Aesthetics as Method for Periodization

In music historiography, the period ranging from roughly 1750-1775 has long been considered a transitional period.² This is particularly evident in studies of the music of C.P.E. Bach, which often base their analysis against the styles of the high Baroque and the Viennese Classical eras. Since the early 20th century, C.P.E. Bach's music has been described as belonging to the style of *Empfindsamkeit* because of surprising turns of harmony, rhythm, and dynamics, and thought to be a more personal and individualistic expression of the *galant* style.³ Even though the term *Empfindsamkeit* was not used in the eighteenth century to describe a composer's musical style, it can in fact gain a new and richer meaning when understood in the context of the North German aesthetics, which thus can be identified as its own musico-historical period distinct from the late Baroque and high Classical eras. The era of rational aesthetics as defined according to North German Enlightenment philosophy, is unified by the ultimate aims of *Empfindsamkeit*, taste, and culture and influenced all aspects of music, including composition, performance, and listening. Therefore, rather than considering it a mere "transitional period" as is accepted in current literature, the era is defined by its own aesthetic aims and not by those of surrounding periods.⁴

Philosophical concepts on artistic creation during this period can be identified through contemporaneous philosophical and historical sources. Philosophers such as Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, and Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779), among

² See for example Leonard Ratner, *Classic Music: Expression, Form and Style* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1980); Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997); and Philip Downs, *Classical Music: The Era of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).

³ See, for example William S. Newman, *The Sonata in the Classic Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963), 122-123, 423.

⁴ See, for example Rosen *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* and Downs, *Classical Music: The Era of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven*.

others, were concerned with the cognitive process and the relationship between the mind and the body in the development of ideas. Unlike the previous generations, sensory impressions became an integral part in the process of understanding and were crucial in the development of the discipline of aesthetics. *Empfindsamkeit*, when defined from the perspective of Enlightenment aesthetics, served a larger moral purpose in the development of the human soul. Developing one's morality was considered equally as important as intellectual growth during this time period, and as sources demonstrate, the arts in general, and music in particular, were a crucial means for doing so. In order to create a beautiful soul, it was believed that one must develop all of the faculties of cognition, which included the faculty of the senses. Thus, the arts were not merely for the purpose of creating beautiful objects. Because the arts, including drama, poetry, music, and painting, possess the ability to stimulate sensations, they served a greater moral function in the development of a beautiful soul.⁵ The prevalence of the concepts of aesthetics and *Empfindsamkeit* is evident in contemporaneous publications on the beautiful arts.

The era of rational aesthetics can therefore be unified according to definitions of aesthetic function and the experience of music. By first determining the philosophical foundation of the arts, the prevalence of certain genres, styles, and performance means can be explained. The moral underpinnings of rational aesthetics led to the rise of the concept *Kenner* and *Liebhaber*, which were hierarchical designations for identifying the level of knowledge as acquired by amateurs. In addition, the era of rational aesthetics also saw an increased prevalence of certain genres such as the free fantasia, music publications for amateurs, and journals dedicated to the study and spread of the arts.

⁵ Frederick Beiser, *Diotima's Children* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 121.

Therefore, through an analysis of aesthetic principles together with the social function of music in the North German Enlightenment, I justify the era of rational aesthetics as an independent period in music historiography.

1.1.2 Situating Rational Aesthetics

The philosophy of the North German Enlightenment is hardly represented in discussions of contemporaneous music in secondary literature. In modern literature, the philosophy of the Enlightenment is either not very well known, or only understood through the lens of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a harsh critic of the early-enlightened thinkers. Furthermore, many of the primary philosophical sources, originally published in either Latin or German, have not yet been translated to English or available in modern editions. The discussion of philosophy and aesthetics, however, played an important part of print culture in its day, and thus can serve as a basis for understanding musical aesthetics. Through these sources it is apparent that the views of rational philosophers were distinct from both the Cartesian philosophy held over from the previous century and the Kantian analysis of judgment at the end of the century. For that reason, rational aesthetics can be considered its own era distinct from those surrounding it.

René Descartes (1596-1650) had proposed a dualistic view that distinguished the rational, thinking part to the mind, the *res cogitans*, from the mechanical part of the body, the *res extensa*. The perception of the mind in this system is immaterial, clearly distinct, and separable from the physical body. Descartes places emphasis on the consciousness of the mind and awareness of the self as a perceiving subject.⁶ In this view, the experience of music takes place in the *res cogitans*; therefore, music, as an application of

⁶ Marleen Rozemond, *Descartes's Dualism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 2-3; Bell, 16.

mathematical principles, was understood as a thinking art.⁷ Physical sensations were not directly connected to the mind, rather were a mechanistic response to outside stimuli that were represented in the mind separately from the sensation itself.⁸ As I will show, this separation of the mind and body is the fundamental difference between Cartesian and Enlightenment philosophies. In contrast to the Cartesian model, rational philosophy created a system of cognitive faculties that accounted for sensations as a part of the cognitive process leading to understanding and the creation of ideas.

Immanuel Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), among other things, critiques the perceived prominence that Enlightenment philosophers gave to the thinking mind in cognitive philosophy. Kant believed the concept of aesthetic judgment in earlier generations to be purely objective and lacking the element of subjectivity. In his own writing on the topic in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), it is the subjective element that plays the most prominent role in Kant's conception of aesthetics, which has a further influence on the nineteenth century.⁹ North German Enlightenment aesthetics did not, in fact, eliminate a sense of subjectivity. Rather, aesthetics contained both objective and subjective components, a concern Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) endeavored to clarify (see Chapter 2.2.3).¹⁰

Recent publications, in particular Frederick Beiser's *Diotima's Children* (2009) and Stefanie Buchenau's *The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment* (2013), have attempted to reconstruct the metaphysical and aesthetical conceptions of this

⁷ Jairo Moreno, *Musical Representations, Subjects and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in Zarlino, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 53.

⁸ Moreno, 54.

⁹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 16-20.

¹⁰ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 4-8.

time.¹¹ Beiser offers a survey of Enlightenment aesthetics through its leading figures, and determines the founding of the practice within the metaphysical framework of the works of Leibniz and Wolff rather than the traditionally-accepted claim of Baumgarten as the father of aesthetics. Furthermore, he attempts to explain aspects of rational philosophy that have been misinterpreted in previous studies and defend the rational model against the criticism of Kant at the end of the eighteenth century. Buchenau, on the other hand, looks to the concept of invention as a leading instigator for the founding of aesthetics in the German Enlightenment. She identifies the source for this new discipline in the works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), which are later taken up by Christian Wolff and the rational philosophers of the eighteenth century.

In his *The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700-1840* (2005), Matthew Bell examines theories of psychology in the Enlightenment and their impact and representations in literature of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.¹² In relation to the German Enlightenment, Bell considers the concept of *Empfindsamkeit* in relation to psychology and the most prominent North German Enlightenment playwright, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781).

These three sources mark a shift in modern reconstructions of the Enlightenment that consider the metaphysical and philosophical foundations of rational thought, rather than form a teleological historiography aimed towards Kant. Where Beiser and Buchenau are concerned with philosophy, and Bell on literary traditions, the purpose of this project is to go beyond these works to examine the metaphysical foundations for rational

¹¹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*; Stefanie Buchenau, *The Foundations of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment* (New York: Cambridge, 2013).

¹² Matthew Bell, *The German Tradition of Psychology in Literature and Thought, 1700-1840* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

aesthetics in the defining of the experience of the beautiful arts in general, and of the music in particular, through primary sources. From these foundational principles, other key concepts from Enlightenment thought can be understood, such as beauty, perfection, the genius, and taste, as well as the psychological experience of inspiration and a beautiful artwork. Furthermore, North German Enlightenment philosophy is used to explain the aesthetic function of music both privately and socially.

Even though the discipline of aesthetics is not considered to have existed before the publication of Baumgarten's *Meditationes* (1735), it has its roots in the earlier philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. Beiser called this era of "rational aesthetics" (ca.1720-1781), a title which I borrow to define the era. He suggests that contemporary analysis of Early Enlightenment philosophy has only understood rational aesthetics according to Kant's misreading of the philosophers before him.¹³ The main tenets of rational aesthetics, including the philosophy of the body and mind and the role of physical sensations, lay the foundation for defining aesthetics in the period.

1.2 Perception and Sensation in the Tradition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

The early German Enlightenment has its beginnings in the philosophies of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. Both of these philosophers were attempting to account for, among other things, the causal relation between the body and mind, the answer for which they found insufficient in the Cartesian construct. While historically the works of these two philosophers are often conflated as the Leibniz-Wolffian system, a conflation that Wolff refuted in his time, there are crucial differences

¹³ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 4, 16.

between the two, and both were influential on the Early Enlightenment movement.¹⁴ On the one hand, Wolff's system of cognition had a lasting effect on the rationalists to follow him, and on the other, Leibniz's definition of pleasure and his attempt to account for the "je ne sais quoi" experience were taken up in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, Wolff and Leibniz both placed an emphasis on the perception of the senses and the relationship between perceptions and the mind in the cognitive process. Leibniz was primarily concerned with defining the substance of the soul and its relation to the universe in his system.

1.2.1 Substances and Apperception

While his structure did not persist long after Wolff developed his own system of cognition, Leibniz is considered to be one of the first enlightened philosophers in Germany due to his influence on Wolff and on later conceptions of beauty, pleasure, and perfection. The primary concern in the present study is to introduce those features of his philosophy that figure prominently in the development of rational aesthetics, including his concepts of perception and apperception, as well as his definition of the beautiful.

A central issue for Leibniz is to determine the substance of the soul, which he calls the monad. A monad can be defined as a simple, non-extended substance, of which the actual world is constituted. There are an infinite number of monads; the central monad is God and all others are created by God. Finally, monads can neither be created nor destroyed: they were all created at the time the universe was created and will exist until the universe ends.¹⁵ Monads go through a series of states, which Leibniz calls

¹⁴ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 47.

¹⁵ Benson Mates, *The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 36.

perceptions, and these states are driven to change by appetite. The perception by the monad is a mirror of all other monads; therefore, perceptions are a reflection of the universe. Furthermore, they reflect not only its present state, but all past and future states of the monad within itself.¹⁶

Just like the universe, a human being is also made up of an aggregate of monads, with a central one that constitutes the soul and controls all other monads. What distinguishes human beings (and animals) from plants and other objects is the ability of the monads of the soul to perceive distinctly and have the capacity for memory.¹⁷ The clarity of perception of the monads varies depending on the level of mental activity. The lowest and most obscure forms of the monad are sensations, which are merely physical matter.¹⁸

Perceptions are on both the conscious and unconscious level. Conscious perceptions, or apperception, are confused representations of the perceived object: monads are perceived not individually, but as an aggregate of the monads of the object.¹⁹ Driven by appetite, the desire of the human psyche is to improve the monad's representations. The highest form of the monad contains the most clear and distinct representations, and this state can only be achieved through the development of cognitive habits such as memory and reason.²⁰

Unlike Descartes's system, Leibniz describes a mind that, while not always conscious, is always thinking, thus allowing for an unconscious state of mind. He justifies this by stating that unconscious perceptions, or *petite perceptions*, may go unnoticed, but

¹⁶ Mates, 38-39.

¹⁷ Mates, 40-41.

¹⁸ Bell, 17-18.

¹⁹ Mates, 42-43.

²⁰ Bell, 17-18.

one is always able to recall them. As an example, he describes the experience of a perception while asleep, which are in the realm of *petite perceptions*. If one does not perceive during unconscious states, then one could not be awakened by a loud noise; therefore, because one can recall the noise when the mind is unconscious, then the mind must still be thinking even though one is not aware of it.²¹

Leibniz explains that monads are mirrors of the universe at any given time. Furthermore, a perception by a monad is an expression of the perceived object through that monad. As a result, perceptions have knowledge of the universe at its foundation, but from the unique point of view according to the state and position of the monad (or perceiver).²² This means that through sense perception one is able to comprehend knowledge; however, according to Leibniz, the clarity of the knowledge is dependent on the quality of the sense perception.

1.2.2 Sense Perception and Taxonomy of Knowledge

Leibniz's philosophy of sense perception had a lasting influence on rationalist aesthetics; in particular, his taxonomical system of knowledge lays the foundation for distinguishing between aesthetic and logical truths in Baumgarten's writings. For aesthetic rationalists, the senses lead to the perception of the beautiful, and Leibniz outlines a system for identifying the quality of sense perceptions.

Knowledge, according to Leibniz, is either obscure or clear, and clear ideas are either confused or distinct.²³ Obscure ideas cannot be distinguished from other ideas that

²¹ Mates, 201.

²² Mates, 198-200.

²³ Leibniz, "Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas" (1684) in *Selections*, ed. by Philip Wiener (New York: Scribner's, 1951), 283. This translation uses the words indistinct and distinct; however, I have changed it to confused and distinct to be consistent with other translations used throughout this and the next chapter.

are similar to it. Clear ideas, on the other hand, can be distinguished in either a distinct or a confused way. The characteristics of confused ideas cannot be enumerated in a way that allows it to be distinguished from other things. Confused ideas are often recognized through the senses, such as a scent, taste, or color, rather than characteristics that can be formulated.²⁴ One can enumerate all characteristics of distinct ideas, such as number, size, and shape, which are those characteristics that contain nominal definitions. By nominal definitions Leibniz is referring to the ability to observe characteristics that can distinguish one thing from another by marks and signs, as opposed to real definitions, from which all possibilities of things can be shown.²⁵ The difference between the two is that which is observed (nominal) versus that which is possible (real).

Leibniz writes that one cannot even provide nominal definitions for sense qualities because of their mysteriousness.²⁶ In addition, because they cannot be identified by signs, sense qualities contain neither nominal nor real definitions, rather they must actually be sensed.²⁷ Sense perceptions are thus clear but confused ideas. The clear and confused nature of sense perceptions will be an essential element of Baumgarten's theory of aesthetics, yet for Christian Wolff they were considered an inferior type of knowledge.

1.2.3 A Theory of the Beautiful: The Perception of Perfection and Unity in Diversity

Another significant aspect of Leibniz's system is the relationship of sense perception to the definition of beauty, which was continued by the rational philosophers who followed him. While he does not distinguish an aesthetic theory in his philosophy,

²⁴ Leibniz, "Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas," 283-285.

²⁵ Leibniz, "Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas," 287. Also discussed in Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics" (1685) in *Philosophical Texts*, trans. by Richard Francks and R.S. Woolhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), §24, 76-77.

²⁶ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 37.

²⁷ Beiser, 37-38.

Leibniz includes discussions of related concepts, such as beauty, pleasure, and perfection. A basic tenet of Leibniz's theory is that God is the ultimate perfection and the universe he created is perfect, regulated in a perfect order and infinitely divisible.²⁸ In addition, all things he created are perfect, including simple substances (monads), though they may not in themselves be perfect in their own nature.²⁹ God created an infinite number of simple substances, all of which provide different perspectives of the same perfect universe. Thus, God created the greatest possible variety with the greatest possible order, which results in producing the greatest amount of perfection as possible.³⁰ Pleasure, or the contemplation of beauty, is the perception of perfection in an object. One perceives the power of the object through the harmony of its diverse properties.³¹ Pleasure is one's representation of perfection (its unity or harmony in diversity), meaning both subjective and objective elements enable the experience of pleasure: the objective is the perfection in the object itself, the subjective in the individual experience of that perfection.³² In sum, beauty, or pleasure, is the perception of perfection in the contemplation of the object, and the object itself is perfect due to its unity in diversity.

While Leibniz does not discuss the arts directly as a means for the experience of beauty or pleasure, in his earlier work *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686), he writes that when we have a confused knowledge of something, we can know it in a clear way. Leibniz relates this to poetry, in that we can clearly know if a poem is good or bad in how it pleases or displeases us because of a certain "*je ne sais quoi*."³³ Therefore, according to

²⁸ Leibniz, "Monadology," in *Philosophical Texts*, trans. by Richard Francks and R.S. Woolhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), §64-65, 277.

²⁹ Leibniz, "Monadology," §41-42, 273.

³⁰ Leibniz, *Monadology* §57-58

³¹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 35.

³² Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 36.

³³ Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics" in *Philosophical Texts*, §24, 76.

his philosophy of pleasure, we find pleasure in the poem because it is perfect, though our knowledge of it is confused in a clear way. This concept of clear and confused ideas will reoccur and be a crucial element in the rational aesthetics of Baumgarten.

1.3 Christian Wolff's Empirical System of Rational Thought

Christian Wolff developed a system that scientifically accounted for human epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge. As with Leibniz, he did not create a theory of aesthetics, but his cognitive theory and systematic method became the basis for rational aesthetics.

1.3.1 The Science and Method of Rational Philosophy

Christian Wolff opens his 1728 treatise *Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere*: “by means of the senses we know things which are and occur in the material world. And the mind is conscious of the changes which occur within itself.”³⁴ Wolff takes as a first principle that sensations are the origins of knowledge. Secondly, he emphasizes the awareness of the mind as a perceiving subject in the acquisition of knowledge, meaning one can gain knowledge through experience. The first chapter, dedicated to outlining history, philosophy, and mathematics as the three types of human knowledge, shows the distinction of these three types of knowledge and how, when used together, they can lead to a greater degree of knowledge. The primary concern in the *Preliminary*

³⁴ Christian Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis sive logica : methodo scientifica pertractata et ad usum scientiarum atque vitæ aptata præmittitur discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere* (Francofurti & Lipsiæ : Prostat in Officina Libraria Rengeriana, 1728); of this two-part treatise, an English translation of the second half can be found in Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse of Philosophy in General*, trans. by Richard J. Blackwell (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1963), §1, 3.

Discourse is to develop a universal method that can be used as the basis for obtaining knowledge in any discipline.³⁵

History, writes Wolff, is the knowledge of things that occur, which is known through experience.³⁶ Philosophy, on the other hand, is the knowledge of the reason for which things occur.³⁷ Where historical knowledge is mere fact, or what he calls “bare knowledge,” philosophical knowledge attempts to go further to explain why things occur, or the reason of the fact.³⁸ Therefore, history is the foundation for philosophical knowledge.³⁹ Finally, he calls mathematics the knowledge of quantities of things.⁴⁰ Wolff explains that through the combination of the historical and the philosophical, knowledge is confirmed.⁴¹ Additionally, mathematics combined with philosophy provides the highest degree of assurance in knowledge.⁴² Thus, through all three types of knowledge together, with philosophy as the primary branch, things can be known historically, quantitatively, and philosophically in the highest degrees.

Wolff divides philosophy into three parts: that which treats God he calls natural theology, that which treats the soul is called psychology, and that which treats bodies is called physics.⁴³ With regards to psychology, Wolff defines two faculties of the soul, the cognitive and the appetitive.⁴⁴ The cognitive faculty of knowing truths is used in the discipline of logic, and the appetitive faculty for choosing good over evil is applied in

³⁵ Courtney Fugate and John Hymers, introduction to *Metaphysics* by Alexander Baumgarten (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 15-16.

³⁶ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §4, 3-4.

³⁷ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §6, 4.

³⁸ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §7, 5.

³⁹ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §10, 6-7.

⁴⁰ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §14, 8-9.

⁴¹ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §26, 15.

⁴² Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §28, 15-16.

⁴³ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §57-59, 34-35.

⁴⁴ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §60, 35.

practical philosophy.⁴⁵ He further distinguishes between empirical and rational psychology. On the one hand, empirical psychology is the practice that observes reasons for the principles of psychology through experience; on the other hand, rational psychology is concerned with deriving *a priori* concepts of the human soul from *a posteriori* observations.⁴⁶ The distinctions between empirical and rational psychology are further explained in the respective treatises *Psychologia empirica* (1732) and *Psychologia rationalis* (1734).⁴⁷ Empirical psychology is concerned with conscious occurrences of the soul. It is the practice of attending to our perceptions of experiences, which are the basic principles for rational psychology.⁴⁸ Rational psychology considers concepts that are possible, as opposed to that which is observed of empirical psychology. Therefore, rational psychology seeks methodically to find the reasons for the principles of empirical psychology.⁴⁹

An innovative feature of Wolff's philosophy is the scientific method he establishes as the basis for the practice of philosophy. This method, similar to the rules of mathematics and derived from true logic, is a deductive one that requires terms that have been adequately defined, sufficiently demonstrated, and ordered in a way showing how those that come first lead to those that follow.⁵⁰ This is a system known as first philosophy. From this method, which is based on experience, Wolff systematically defines, among other things, his cognitive theory. He determines a methodical cognitive system that is based on experience and begins with the feeling sensations.

⁴⁵ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §61-62, 35-36.

⁴⁶ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §112, 57.

⁴⁷ Translations to English with commentary of the prolegomena for both treatises are available in Robert J. Richards "Christian Wolff's Prolegomena to Empirical and Rational Psychology: Translation and Commentary" in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 124 (1980): 227-239.

⁴⁸ Richards, 231-232 from Wolff, *Empirical Psychology*, §2 and §4.

⁴⁹ Richards, 238 from Wolff, *Rational Psychology*, §7.

⁵⁰ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §139, 76-78.

1.3.2 Wolff's Cognitive Theory and the Hierarchy of Knowledge


While Wolff rejected Leibniz's theory of monads, he did accept a dual perception that included both a physical and a cognitive element: impressions begin as sensations on the physical body, while at the same time the mind is conscious of these impressions. Consciousness and sensation are inherently linked in this dual perception; therefore, Wolff argued for a connection between the body and the mind.⁵¹ From this foundation, Wolff describes a hierarchical process of cognition produced by mental faculties, which have the final purpose of creating rational ideas.

Wolff names seven faculties of cognition: sensation (*Empfindung*), apperception, imagination (*Einbildungskraft*), attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*), memory (*Gedächtniß*), invention (*Erdichten*), and understanding (*Verstand*) (see Fig. 1.1). The cognitive process begins with the sense organs receiving physical impressions from an object. Apperception, a concept he borrows from Leibniz, focuses the mind on the senses. Imagination then stores the impressions, and attention isolates the impressions from one another. Through the faculty of memory, known and unknown ideas are distinguished, which then leads to the invention of new, but empty ideas out of existing ideas. Finally, the process of understanding allows for the capacity to create truly new ideas.⁵²

⁵¹ Bell, 21.

⁵² Christian Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 2007 [facsimile reprint Halle: Magdeburgischen, 1751]), "Von der Seele überhaupt, was wir nehmlich von ihr wahrnehmen," §191-283, 106-155.

Figure 1.1: Flowchart of Wolff's Faculties of Cognition



Wolff's process is to create clear ideas out of unclear, or confused ideas. As with Leibniz's definition, confused ideas are those perceptions of an object that can only be measured through the imprecise qualities of the senses, i.e. qualities that are difficult to define and differentiate from other objects. Wolff considered physical sensations to be the most unclear of all ideas, while those obtained through understanding are the clearest. According to Wolff, because the lower faculties produced inferior, indefinable ideas, only the higher faculties, those faculties that could produce clear and rational ideas, could discover truths.⁵³ From this perspective, the purpose of the lower cognitions is to lead to understanding; yet, they do not always do so. While all ideas begin as perceptions of an object by the lower faculties, not all perceptions are distinctly focused through the cognitive faculties. Sensations can still be perceived with very little mental activity

⁵³ Bell, 29.

because the body and mind are connected – in such a case the result is a state of sensory cognition.

1.3.3 Art and Knowledge

While Wolff never disclosed a theory of the arts, he certainly saw them as a source for obtaining knowledge. By arts, however, Wolff did not mean what would now be referred to as the as the fine arts. The distinction between the beautiful, or fine arts, called the *schönen Künste* in Enlightenment Germany, and the mechanical arts would not occur until later in the eighteenth century. Therefore, any reference to the arts by Wolff would be inclusive of both the mechanical and the fine arts. In his *Discursus praeliminaris* Wolff writes:

Art often reduces secret historical knowledge to common historical knowledge. The operations of art and also experiments often bring to light facts of nature which otherwise would be hidden. Hence, it makes no difference to the knower whether nature presents things to the senses or whether art provides the senses with things which otherwise would escape their notice. With the help supplied by art only attention and acumen are needed to arrive at the contents of both secret and common historical knowledge. Therefore, by means of art, secret knowledge is reduced to common knowledge.⁵⁴

By secret historical knowledge, Wolff means those facts of nature that remain hidden without the necessary attention to observe them, which includes knowledge of the facts of nature. For example, a blacksmith can learn the secret properties of fire through the art of fusing metals, making what was considered secret knowledge of the nature of fire available as common knowledge.⁵⁵

Common historical knowledge, which Wolff considers the lowest grade of human

⁵⁴ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §24, 13-14.

⁵⁵ Buchenau, 44.

knowledge, is acquired through the senses. Therefore, this paragraph suggests that through art one can observe the secret knowledge of nature by reducing it to common, sensate cognition.⁵⁶ Art can thus focus one's attention in a way that can reveal common knowledge, although Wolff considers it a lower form of knowledge.

Buchenau writes that Wolff found the study of arts (in the broad sense) to be a considerable method for invention.⁵⁷ While the artist may not know exactly how something is created, such as the fusing of metals by the blacksmith, the task of the philosopher is to empirically reconstruct the reasoning of the inventor, meaning through sense perception, and deduce a general method based on universal principles.⁵⁸ Therefore, the artisan provides a unique access to knowledge, which can be discovered by the philosopher.

Though Wolff did not develop a philosophy of the arts per se, he acknowledged the potential importance of the arts for obtaining philosophical knowledge through empirical principles. His primary interest, however, was in forming principles for obtaining intellectual knowledge and the creation of ideas. It was not until the writings Wolff's successor, Alexander Baumgarten, that the arts became a primary interest, when Baumgarten sought to elevate the arts to be equal to rational thought.

⁵⁶ Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse*, §21-22, 12-13.

⁵⁷ Buchenau, 43.

⁵⁸ Buchenau, 44.

1.4 Alexander Baumgarten's Defense of Sensate Knowledge and the Birth of Aesthetics

Alexander Baumgarten was greatly influenced by both Leibniz and Wolff. From Leibniz, Baumgarten retains the concepts of monads and pre-established harmony/universality, and from Wolff he takes his systematic, scientific method.⁵⁹ It is known that he owned many of Leibniz's works, including *Monadology*.⁶⁰ Christian Wolff's writings, however, were banned in 1723 from Prussia when he was expelled from his teaching position at the Universität Halle because of his perceived atheism. However, due to the influence of his brother, Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, Alexander, who completed his studies at the University of Halle, learned the philosophy of Wolff despite the ban.⁶¹

Baumgarten's first attempt at a systematic promotion of sensate cognition was in his dissertation for the Universität Halle, first published in 1735, titled *Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (Reflections on Poetry)*.⁶² Following the defense of his dissertation, Baumgarten began teaching philosophy at Halle. Although it was still banned, Baumgarten taught Wolff's logic without explicitly using his writings.⁶³ This led to Baumgarten writing his own *Metaphysics* (1739) based on his interpretation of the empirical and rational philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. Baumgarten's student, Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), translated this treatise from Latin to German for his own teaching, which was published in four volumes between 1755-1759.⁶⁴ The treatise then became the primary textbook for metaphysics through the

⁵⁹ Fugate and Hymers, 13-17.

⁶⁰ Fugate and Hymers, 13.

⁶¹ Fugate and Hymers, 6-7.

⁶² Alexander Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, trans. with an introduction by Karl Aschenbrenner and William Holther (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1954).

⁶³ Fugate and Hymers, 7.

⁶⁴ Georg Friedrich Meier, *Metaphysik*, 4 vols. (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1755-1759).

end of the century. Most famously, it was taught by Immanuel Kant and served as the basis for his critique of rational philosophy in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft* (*Critique of Pure Reason*) (1781).⁶⁵

In 1750/1758 Baumgarten published the two-volume *Aesthetica*.⁶⁶ This work attempts to realize the philosophy he put forth in *Meditationes* in a systematic, scientific manner, and from these two books the discipline of aesthetics is traditionally considered to be born.⁶⁷ As a result of his metaphysical basis, the conception of aesthetics by Baumgarten and his followers emphasized the importance of physical sensations as the basis for cognition.

1.4.1 Baumgarten's Metaphysical Foundations

Baumgarten's aesthetics could only have arisen from within a metaphysical framework that is influenced by both Leibniz and Wolff. From Leibniz Baumgarten took the concept of monads and pre-established harmony, though he treated it using Wolff's systematic method so as to give greater strength to Leibniz's argument for monads.⁶⁸ The most significant aspect of Baumgarten's metaphysics that informed his aesthetics comes from Wolff's argument that the experience of sensations is directly linked to the acquisition of knowledge.

In the opening of *Metaphysica* (1739) Baumgarten explains that he is concerned with the first principles of human knowledge, which include ontology, cosmology,

⁶⁵ Fugate and Hymers, 22. Immanuel Kant, *Critik der reinen Vernunft* (Riga: verlegt Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1781).

⁶⁶ Alexander Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, trans. to German by Dagmar Mirbach (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007).

⁶⁷ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 118-119.

⁶⁸ Fugate and Hymers, 22.

psychology, and natural theology.⁶⁹ His ontology and cosmology, the concepts of being and of the world respectively, are based on the system created by Leibniz. He defines metaphysical truth as the ordering of many into one and perfection as the agreement of several things together on a single ground. A being is created on the simple substance of the monad; a composite being, such as a human being, consists of monads that are in agreement.⁷⁰ The world is comprised of a multitude of things that are connected through a universal nexus of the whole, which creates a universal harmony.⁷¹ Baumgarten explains that the entire universe and every substance in it are also comprised of monads.⁷² All monads mutually influence one another and are ordered in a pre-established, universal harmony, which is perfection.⁷³ Therefore, the universe is a perfection of ordered multiplicity in harmony. All of Baumgarten's concepts of ontology and cosmology are in agreement with Leibniz's writings. The primary difference from Leibniz is in Baumgarten's systematic explanation of empirical psychology, which is more closely aligned to Wolff's method.

In his discussion of psychology, Baumgarten is interested in determining the predicates of the soul, which is an expansion on Wolff's system of cognitive faculties. Psychology in general is concerned with predicates of the soul, which Baumgarten further classifies like Wolff as either empirical or rational. Empirical psychology, in which one deduces assertions based on the experience of the soul, is considered in contrast to rational psychology, which is concerned with deductions through a series of

⁶⁹ Alexander Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* (Halae Magdeburgicae: Impensis Carol, Herman, Hemmerde, 1739). English translation consulted Alexander Baumgarten, *Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials*, trans. and ed. by Courtney Fugate and John Hymers (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), §1-2, 99.

⁷⁰ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §230-235, 143-144..

⁷¹ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §400, 175.

⁷² Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §392-396, 173-174.

⁷³ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §408, 176; §436-437, 182-183.

arguments.⁷⁴ While he examines more faculties of the soul than Wolff, the most significant difference between the theories is that Baumgarten recognizes that some faculties are used to know things either confusedly, meaning through the lower cognitive faculties, or distinctly through the intellect.

Baumgarten begins by defining the lower cognitive faculty as knowing something in the soul obscurely and confusedly.⁷⁵ Representations of the lower cognitive faculty that are not distinct are considered sensitive representations.⁷⁶ He adds that the science of knowing things through the senses is aesthetics, hence emphasizing the significance of the senses that was not recognized in the work of Wolff.⁷⁷ The faculty of sense can be either internal, representing the present state of the soul, or an external sensation, which is physically felt in the body and represent one's present state in the universe.⁷⁸ External sensations are felt through the sense organs, and the more strongly the organ is moved, the clearer the representation. Whether internal or external, sensations are always felt obscurely on some level.⁷⁹

Following sensations is the faculty of imagination, which allows one to form images in the mind of a previously felt sensation, though absent of that initial sensation.⁸⁰ Because sensations are always somewhat obscure, the faculty of imagination presents even less clear images of those sensations.⁸¹ The faculty of discerning differences and similarities among things, which Baumgarten calls perspicaciousness (*perspicaciae*), uses

⁷⁴ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §501-504, 198.

⁷⁵ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §519, 201. This source translates “*facultas cognoscitiva inferior*” to “inferior cognitive faculty.” In order to keep terminology consistent, I will use the phrase “lower cognitive faculty” throughout.

⁷⁶ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §519-521, 201-202.

⁷⁷ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §533, 205.

⁷⁸ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §534-535, 205.

⁷⁹ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §536-537, §544, 205-207.

⁸⁰ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §558, 211.

⁸¹ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §570, 214.

higher faculties involving thinking and the skills of wit and acumen.⁸² The faculty of memory follows, which allows one to recognize perceptions.⁸³ Through the faculty of invention one separates and combines things. Foresight allows one to be conscious of a future state.⁸⁴ The faculty of judgment, which Wolff did not discuss, is the ability to judge the perfection and imperfection of objects. Taste is the judgment of the sensitive, and aesthetic criticism is the art of forming taste and the faculty of judgment.⁸⁵

Anticipation, or expectation, is the representation of an object that was created through the faculty of foresight.⁸⁶ Finally, the faculty of characterization is the ability to perceive signs along with the signified, which can lead to either symbolic or intuitive knowledge. A characterization leads to symbolic knowledge when the sign is perceived as greater than the perception of the signified; alternatively, intuitive knowledge is obtained when the signified is perceived as greater than the sign.⁸⁷

In contrast to the lower cognitive faculties, the intellect allows one to know things distinctly, which uses the upper cognitive faculties.⁸⁸ Reason is the faculty to perceive things perspicaciously. While the lower faculties enable the cognition of things confusedly, reason and the intellect allow knowledge of things distinctly. For that reason, many of the faculties can be used to perceive things either sensitively (i.e. through the lower faculties) or intellectually (i.e. through reason). Using sense perception one can know confusedly by recognizing their similarities and differences (perspicaciously) with

⁸² Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §575, 216.

⁸³ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §579, 217.

⁸⁴ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §589, 219; §595, 221.

⁸⁵ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §606-609, 223-224.

⁸⁶ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §610, 225.


⁸⁷ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §619-621, 226-227.

⁸⁸ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §624, 228. Baumgarten *Metaphysics* translates Latin phrase “*facultas cognoscitiva superior*” to “superior cognitive faculty.” In order to keep terminology consistent among the various philosophies, I will use the phrase “upper cognitive faculty” throughout.

the faculties of sensitive wit and acumen, memory, invention, judgment, anticipation, and characterization. On the other hand, one can know things distinctly through reason using the higher cognitive powers, such as intellectual wit and acumen, memory, judgment, anticipation, and characterization (see Figure 1.2).⁸⁹

In comparison with Wolff’s system, only the right side of the flowchart would have been acknowledged as a part of cognitive process. He considered sensations only as a means for focusing towards understanding, with the lower cognitive powers at the bottom of the process and upper faculties at the top. Baumgarten, on the other hand,

Figure 1.2: Flowchart of Baumgarten’s Analogous Faculties⁹⁰



⁸⁹ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §640-641, 232-233.

⁹⁰ This flowchart does not include of all of the faculties of the senses or intellect, only those that Baumgarten mentions as analogous in *Metaphysics*, §641-641, 232-233.

considered the lower and upper as analogous powers that provide different but equal quality of knowledge.⁹¹ Whether through the senses or through reason, the faculties represent an object: through the senses the representation is obscure and through the intellect they are distinct. Baumgarten does not apply an evaluative judgment of one representation over another. On the contrary, by defining the lower faculty as analogous to reason he is affirming their equivalence. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure can also be perceived either through the senses or the intellect and is driven by the faculty of desire.⁹² The feeling of pleasure is the intuition of perfection, which is the true and the good.⁹³ It is the lower faculties of cognition and the acquisition of sensitive cognition through the perception of the beautiful that becomes the basis for Baumgarten's work on aesthetics.

1.4.2 Defining Aesthetics

The foundation of Baumgarten's philosophy of aesthetics can be viewed as originating in his dissertation, *Meditationes* (1735), in which he emphasizes the importance of sensate representations, which are those representations that are received through the lower cognitive faculties, or through inferior cognition.⁹⁴ His use of the term "aesthetic," originating from the Greek word for perception, indicates his intention for the discipline to be primarily concerned with how one perceives objects.⁹⁵ As discussed above, Baumgarten makes a distinction between two types of knowledge: intellectual knowledge through the powers of reason of the higher cognitive faculties, and perceptual cognition through sense impressions of the lower cognitive faculties. This was a new

⁹¹ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §640, 232-233

⁹² Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §655, 237; §663, 240.

⁹³ Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, §655, 237.

⁹⁴ Baumgarten, *Reflections*, §3, 38.

⁹⁵ Aschenbrenner and Holther, introduction to *Reflections*, 4.

concept at the time, since for Wolff, sense impressions were merely for the purpose of leading to knowledge and understanding and did not contain knowledge in themselves. Baumgarten asserted that both types of knowledge contained truths: on the one hand, intellectual cognition resulted in logical truths, and on the other hand, sensitive cognition leads to aesthetic truths.⁹⁶ Obtaining aesthetic truth is the final goal of Baumgarten's philosophy. He defines aesthetic truth as the perception of beauty, which is the experience of pleasure in the perception of perfection. Through the development of aesthetic truths, one creates what he called a "beautiful spirit" (*schöner Geist/ingenium pulcrum*), which means that Baumgarten's aesthetics was an ethical discipline designed to develop morality in the human soul.⁹⁷

Baumgarten's original plan for his *Aesthetica* (1750/1758) was to provide both a theoretical and practical application of aesthetics.⁹⁸ In two published volumes he discussed nearly the entire first chapter of the theoretical part of the treatise, which he titles "Heuristics."⁹⁹ Baumgarten left his treatise unfinished at the time of his death, having not yet written chapters two and three of Part I on methodology and semiotics, respectively, and the entirety of Part II on practical aesthetics. Nevertheless, the two-volume chapter on heuristics provides a comprehensive theoretical explanation of Baumgarten's newly-defined discipline of aesthetics.

In the preface to the first volume of *Aesthetica* (1750) Baumgarten writes, "Aesthetics (the theory of the liberal arts, lower epistemology, the art of beautiful thinking, the art of thinking that is analogous to reason) is the science of sensual

⁹⁶ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 153.

⁹⁷ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §2, 10-12.

⁹⁸ Baumgarten provides before the preface of the first edition a proposed overview of the entire treatise. Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, "Übersicht," 4-11.

⁹⁹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, 20-21.

cognition.”¹⁰⁰ This definition for the first time attempts to systematically outline a modern conception of the practice of aesthetics.¹⁰¹ While the influence of Wolffian metaphysics is apparent, Baumgarten sought to elevate sensual cognition to its own philosophical discipline equal to that of rationality, which he called aesthetics, rather than considering the lower cognitions a mere part of a hierarchical process.¹⁰² This is clear by his alternate titles for aesthetics: thinking as analogous to reason is beautiful thinking, which has the ability to acquire cognition and the final purpose of forming a beautiful soul. Natural aesthetics, he adds, is only promoted through the use of the lower faculties and not through a dogmatic teaching. Where natural logic is taught, natural aesthetics is an innate and acquired aesthetic that is practiced and not learned.¹⁰³ Aesthetics can be useful across many disciplines, he explains, including philosophy, hermeneutics, exegetics, rhetoric, poetics, and music.¹⁰⁴ Baumgarten mostly treated poetics and rhetoric in this incomplete work, though his plan was to extend to all arts.

Baumgarten writes that “the purpose of aesthetics is the perfection of sensory cognition as such. This is thus the beautiful. And to shun it [the beautiful] is imperfection. This is thus the ugly.”¹⁰⁵ Thus Baumgarten’s plan for aesthetics is in developing the ability to perceive perfection, which is the beautiful, and to avoid imperfection, or the ugly. There are universal principles for sensory cognition of the beautiful and for

¹⁰⁰ “Die Ästhetik (Theorie der freien Künste, untere Erkenntnislehre, Kunst des schönen Denkens, Kunst des Analogons der Vernunft) ist die Wissenschaft der sinnlichen Erkenntnis.” “Aesthetica (theoria liberalium atrium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §1, 10-11.

¹⁰¹ Beiser, *Diotima’s Children*, 119.

¹⁰² Kai Hammermeister, *The German Aesthetic Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.

¹⁰³ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §2, 10-13.

¹⁰⁴ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §4, 12-13.

¹⁰⁵ “Der Zweck der Ästhetik ist die Vollkommenheit der sinnlichen Erkenntnis als solcher. Dies aber ist die Schönheit. Und zu meiden ist die Unvollkommenheit derselben als solcher. Dies aber ist die Häßlichkeit.” “Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis. Haec autem est pulcritudo, et cavenda eiusdem, qua talis, imperfectio. Haec autem est deformitas.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §14, 20-21.

beautiful objects, he explains.¹⁰⁶ The first universal principle is what he calls the agreement of thoughts, or the appearance of the object.¹⁰⁷ The appearance of the object should be considered in the general sense, without consideration of the order or use of signs, which are the second and third universal principles, respectively.¹⁰⁸ The object should contain “the richness, the greatness, the truth, the clarity, the certainty, and the life of knowledge, as long as they agree in a single perception and among themselves.”¹⁰⁹ When these parts agree, the result is the perfection of cognition that is transmitted through the object. Furthermore, the phenomenal result is a sensual beauty, which “delights the richness, the noble demeanor, and the certain light of moving truths.”¹¹⁰ The beautiful, when perceived through the senses as a perfection, conveys a pleasurable cognition that is rich, noble, and true.

Aesthetics had both practical and ethical purposes – the practical to create works of art, and the ethical to develop a beautiful spirit. In order to create a beautiful spirit, one must develop all of the faculties of cognition, including the faculty of the senses. Thus, the arts are not merely for the purpose of creating beautiful objects, but serve a greater moral function in the development of a beautiful soul.¹¹¹ According to Baumgarten, the ideal logician is one who has cultivated both the disciplines of aesthetics and of rational thinking.¹¹² The ability to perceive these beautiful perfections is a result of beautiful

¹⁰⁶ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §17, 20-21.

¹⁰⁷ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §18, 22-23.

¹⁰⁸ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §18-20, 22-23.

¹⁰⁹ “Der Reichtum, die Größe, die Wahrheit, die Klarheit, die Gewißheit und das Leben der Erkenntnis, insofern sie in einer Vorstellung und unter sich übereinstimmen.” “Ubertas, magnitudo, veritas, claritas, certitudo, et vita cognitionis, quatenus, consentiunt in una perceptione, et inter se.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §22, 25.

¹¹⁰ “die Fülle, die edle Art und das gewisse Licht des bewegenden Wahren ergötzen.” “in quibus iuvat copia, nobilitas, veri lux certa moventis.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §22, 24-25.

¹¹¹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 121.

¹¹² Hammermeister, 8-10.

thinking, which requires one to possess certain qualities. Baumgarten considers this the “character of the fortunate aesthetician.”¹¹³

1.4.3 The Aesthetic Character of a Beautiful Spirit

The fortunate aesthetician possesses innate characteristics of both the spirit and the heart. Those characteristics of the spirit refer to the ability of the cognitive faculties, which he divides by the lower and the upper faculties of cognition. Proceeding up the cognitive faculties, Baumgarten names as the first two qualities of a person possessing an “innate graceful and tasteful spirit” are the power to feel sharply and the natural disposition to imagine something.¹¹⁴ Next, a fine insight can refine sensations and imaginations through astuteness and wit, then memory provides the power to recognize something.¹¹⁵ A person with a poetic predisposition, he explains, is able to connect and separate imaginations in a beautiful way.¹¹⁶ A tender, fine taste in connection with a fine insight can judge sensuous perceptions, imaginations, compositions, and so forth.¹¹⁷ The final two lower cognitive faculties required of an aesthetician are the ability to foresee or expect something and, finally, the ability describe the imagination.¹¹⁸

In addition to the lower faculties, Baumgarten also names an innate ability of the upper cognitive powers of understanding and reason as an important characteristic

¹¹³ “Charakter des glücklichen Ästhetikers.” “Characterem felicis aesthetici.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §27, 26-27.

¹¹⁴ “der angeborene anmutige und geschmackvolle Geist.” “ingenium venustum et elegans connatum.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §29-31, 28-29.

¹¹⁵ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §32, 30-31; §33, 30-31.

¹¹⁶ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §34, 30-31.

¹¹⁷ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §35, 30-33.

¹¹⁸ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §36-37, 32-33.

contributing to graceful spirit of the aesthete.¹¹⁹ Baumgarten explains the use of reason, in which the aesthete,

from time to time, while he disregards not only his own past condition—what memory might return to him—but even his own outward feelings, directs his attention towards some invented condition as if it were a future one, knows to examine the same as good or bad with a finer insight, and can place it with appropriate signs before the eyes, and indeed under the reign of understanding and reason.¹²⁰

Therefore, the true aesthete must have equal facility of both his lower and upper faculties: the lower faculties gives one access to beautiful thinking and feeling, while the upper allows one to examine, form judgments, and create beautiful objects. The ultimate goal of this process is to judge all possible future conditions in order to make the appropriate moral choices.

The final innate ability of a “fortunate aesthete” is one’s aesthetic temperament, or what Baumgarten calls the “innate greatness of the heart.”¹²¹ One who possesses the predisposed inclination towards a great aesthetic temperament is more likely to be lead through the faculty of desire towards beautiful cognition.¹²² The qualities of a person with an innate aesthetic temperament include great “external powers, work, appropriate leisure, delight of the mind, freedom, honor, friendship, vigor, and reliable

¹¹⁹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §38, 32-35

¹²⁰ “bisweilen, indem er nicht nur seinen eigenen vergangenen Zustand—was immer ihm auch das Gedächtnis davon zurückbringen mag—, sonder selbst seine äußeren Empfindungen außer acht läßt, seine Aufmerksamkeit auf irgendeinen erdichteten Zustand als auf einen zukünftigen richtet, denselben als guten oder schlechten mit feiner Einsicht anschauend erkennt und ihn mit angemessenen Zeichen vor Augen stellen kann, und zwar unter der Herrschaft des Verstandes und der Vernunft.” “Ingenium venustum naturaliter dispositum est, ut aliquando, non a statu suo praeterito solum, quicquid memoria regerat, se dab ipsis sensationibus externis abstrahendo, fictum, aliquem statum, ut futurum, attendat, eundem, ut bonum, vel malum, perpicaciter intueatur, et signis convenientibus ob oculus ponere possit, sub intellectus et rationis imperio.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §39, 34-35.

¹²¹ “angeborene Größe des Herzens.” “Magnitudinem aliquam pectoris connatam.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §45, 36-37.

¹²² Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §44, 36-37.

well-being of the body,” and so forth.¹²³ Most importantly, the greatest attribute is an excellent desire towards greatness, which is also an innate characteristic of the heart.

In addition to innate qualities of the fortunate aesthetician, Baumgarten also names four activities for forming and maintaining an aesthetic character. The first he calls aesthetic practice (*exercitatio aethetica/ästhetische Übung*).¹²⁴ Through aesthetic practice one can strengthen the agreement between the innate qualities of their spirit and their disposition. While one may be born with those innate qualities, without practice they will become weakened.¹²⁵ Baumgarten names two types of aesthetic practice. The first is through improvisations, which should begin without the guidance of a learned art.¹²⁶ Improvisations such as these form those features of beautiful cognition before the invention of the learned arts. It is what he calls the “first spark” of beautiful nature that precedes all arts.¹²⁷ In other words, these improvisations enable the discovery of a beautiful nature that comes before and is the basis of all of the arts. Baumgarten makes a parallel of this practice to music as the study of arithmetic, during which one is not conscious of their counting soul.¹²⁸ Therefore, not only does one obtain the foundational cognition of the beautiful through this type of improvisation, but also acquires this cognition without being conscious of it.

¹²³ “äußerliches Vermögen, Arbeit, verhältnismäßige Muße, Gemütsergötzlichkeiten, Freiheit, Ehre, Freundschaft, Munterkeit und ein zuverlässiges Wohlbefinden des Körpers.” “Pecunia, opes, labor, otium comparativum, deliciae externae, libertas, honor, amicitia, vigor et valetudo corporis firma.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §45, 36-37.

¹²⁴ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §47, 38-39.

¹²⁵ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §47-48, 38-39.

¹²⁶ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §52, 42-43. “ersten Funken.” “primi igniculi.”

¹²⁷ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §52, 42-43.

¹²⁸ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §54, 42-45.

The second type of aesthetic practice adds a learned art to the improvisation, which can further advance one's innate and acquired natural aesthetic.¹²⁹ Both practices taken together form the skills of the spirit, the disposition, and the aesthetic temperament, which are strengthened through habit and increases the innate greatness of the heart.¹³⁰ Therefore, through both types of aesthetic practice, whether with or without a learned art, one strengthens the innate qualities of both their beautiful spirit and temperament by forming habits of the mind and body. The more one practices, the greater aesthetician they become, which ultimately leads to a more beautiful spirit and heart.

In addition to aesthetic practice, one must also form an aesthetic theory that influences how they will create aesthetic objects, according to Baumgarten. He writes that, as with aesthetic practice, there are two types of aesthetic theories. The first is of beautiful learnedness, through which one can have both a better cognition of the object and can think beautifully about it.¹³¹ He adds that

The most important parts of beautiful learnedness are the theories that are concerned with God, the world, of men, and in particular in regards to the moral conditions, with history, without exclusion of mythological stories, ancient relics, and the particular types of symbols.¹³²

Beautiful learnedness is thus concerned with fundamental principles that both come before all artworks and are integral to all beautiful artworks. The second type of aesthetic theory is, on the other hand, concerned with the rules for each art, which must be learned

¹²⁹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §58, 46-47.

¹³⁰ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §59, 46-47.

¹³¹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §63, 48-51.

¹³² “Die wichtigeren Teile der schönen Gelehrsamkeit sind die Lehren, die sich mit Gott, der Welt, dem Menschen, insbesondere, insoweit es seinen sittlichen Zustand betrifft, mit der Geschichte, ohne Ausschluß mythologischer Erzählungen, mit den Altertümern und den besonderen Arten der Zeichen beschäftigen.” “Pulcræ eruditionis potiores partes sunt disciplinae, deum, universum, hominem, qua statum praesertim moralem, historias, nec exclusis quidem mythicis, et antiquitates, signorumque genium exhibentes.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §64, 50-51.

through careful and precise practice.¹³³ Baumgarten discusses the importance of different levels of rules that govern the arts. The lowest level contains those rules that govern the arts in general and the highest are those concerning specific arts.¹³⁴ Rules for the arts are necessary to perceive the beauty in works of art, as well as to create works according to them.

The third requirement of fortunate aestheticians is the practice of aesthetic inspiration, which he also describes as “the beautiful excitation of the mind and ignition, the inner urge, the delight, the furor, the enthusiasm, [or] a certain godly spirit.”¹³⁵ Inspiration is directed through improvisation and aided to a higher degree through theories.¹³⁶ By having developed the spirit and mind through improvisation and theories, one can be in the correct position to be able to experience inspiration through the lower cognitive powers.¹³⁷ Baumgarten writes that

To the psychologist it is clear that in such an inspiration the entire soul is strengthened in its power, however mostly in the lower faculties, so that almost the entire foundation of the soul raises itself higher and breathes something higher and willingly grants things...¹³⁸

From the inspired state, one is able write better and more quickly.¹³⁹ Furthermore, citing the ancient Roman philosopher Lucretius, Baumgarten explains that while in a state of inspiration one is connected to God’s power, making one capable of granting that power

¹³³ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §68, 52-53.

¹³⁴ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §71-72, 54-57.

¹³⁵ “die schöne Erregung des Gemüts und Entflammung, den inneren Drang, die Entzückung, den Furor, den Enthusiasmus, eine gewissen göttlichen Geist.” “pulcra mentis incitation, inflammatioque, ορμη, ecstasis, furor, ἐνδοουσιασός, πνεῦμα θεοῦ.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §78, 62-63.

¹³⁶ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §78, 62-63.

¹³⁷ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §78, 62-63.

¹³⁸ “Den Psychologen ist klar, daß in einer solcher Begeisterung die ganze Seele ihre Kräfte verstärkt, am meisten jedoch die unteren Vermögen, so daß beinahe der ganze Grund der Seele sich etwas höher erhebt und irgend etwas Höheres atmet und willig Dinge gewährt.” “Psychologis patet in tali impetus totam quidem animam vires suas intendere, maxime tamen facultates inferiores, ita, ut omnis quasi fundus animae, surgat nonnihil altius, et maius aliquid spiret, pronunusque suppeditet.” Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §80, 64-65.

¹³⁹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §79, 62-65.

to one's works.¹⁴⁰ He names a number of ways in which one could be stirred into a state of inspiration, such as through emotion and the movement of the body, being in the correct position of soul, which requires a healthy spirit and body, and, most importantly for this present study, through the practice of arts.¹⁴¹ Therefore, if one has developed a beautiful spirit and temperament, one can enter into an inspired state in which the lower cognitive powers take over to elevate the soul through a direct connection with God's power and enable an easy experience and transmission of beautiful cognition.

The final characteristic of a fortunate aesthetician is the ability and aspiration to better or correct aesthetic objects, which elevates them to the realm of the beautiful.¹⁴² While many things are brought forth through beautiful thinking, whether from improvisation or inspiration, through the process of aesthetic correction the imperfections can be removed and a work can be treated according to the rules of the arts.¹⁴³ Aesthetic correction is thus the final refinement of a work of art, in which the ideas created by the aesthetician are made perfect according to the theoretical and aesthetic rules of the art, thereby completing the creative process of the artist.

1.4.4 The Aesthetic Idea and the Beauty of Aesthetic Objects

Before Baumgarten developed his theoretical concepts of aesthetics he formulated a definition of the aesthetic idea from the perspective of poetry in *Meditationes*. He writes that aesthetics aimed to create the "perfect sensate discourse" in which the "parts are directed toward the apprehension of sensate representations."¹⁴⁴ The discourse becomes more perfect according to the degree to which it can awaken such

¹⁴⁰ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §80, 64-65.

¹⁴¹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §81-92, 64-75.

¹⁴² Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §96-97, 76-79.

¹⁴³ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §97-99, 76-79.

¹⁴⁴ Baumgarten, *Reflections*, §7, 39.

representations in the perceiver.¹⁴⁵ One is awakened to the discourse through sensitive representations, which Baumgarten defined as clear but confused representations. He explains that ideas can be made-up of either clear or obscure representations, and either confused or distinct representations.¹⁴⁶ According to his metaphysics, the aim of the upper faculties is to produce distinct representations. The lower faculties, on the other hand, are for the purpose of knowing things obscurely (see Chapter 1.4.1). Baumgarten explains that poetic representations should be clear rather than obscure, meaning that the object can be distinguished from others. In addition, representations should be confused and not distinct. Confused ideas are those that cannot be analyzed for its individual features.¹⁴⁷ The essence of poetry cannot be defined with distinct terminology; therefore, poetic communication is untranslatable. It is this untranslatable essence that becomes, for Baumgarten, perfection, wherein lies the beautiful truth, and the reason poetry should contain confused representations.

The characterization of ideas into clear or confused, distinct or obscure types was not new; it could be found in the works of Wolff and Leibniz. Baumgarten adds to the concept a new degree of idea, which he calls extensive clarity. Extensive clarity refers to the number of sensate representations. The highest degree of poetic representations is achieved by the greatest degree of extensive clarity.¹⁴⁸ The purpose of sense representations is to arouse affects.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the most perfect types of poetic ideas are extensively clear and confused, and can arouse the affects of a person, thus leading to the development of a beautiful spirit.

¹⁴⁵ Baumgarten, *Reflections*, §7-8, 39.

¹⁴⁶ Baumgarten, *Reflections*, §3-15, 38-42.

¹⁴⁷ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 126-127.

¹⁴⁸ Baumgarten, *Reflections*, §16-17, 43.

¹⁴⁹ Baumgarten, *Reflections*, §25, 47.

Baumgarten expands on the defining of the aesthetic object in *Aesthetica*. In the remainder of his theoretical chapter, he is concerned with explaining the five qualities that constitute a beautiful object, which he names in the overview of the first edition as aesthetic wealth, greatness, truth, certainty, and the life of aesthetic cognition.¹⁵⁰ The second volume, which addresses the final two characteristics, changes them to light and persuasion. Buchenau explains that Baumgarten is providing an update into contemporaneous language of Book III of Cicero's *De oratore*, in which the ancient Roman author names five attributes of speeches, namely that they are clear, explicit, full, perspicuous in matter and language, and whose delivery is artistic.¹⁵¹ Although Baumgarten uses the discipline of rhetoric as his starting point for explaining his philosophy, the examinations of these characteristics are rooted in rational metaphysics.

Where defining the characteristics of the fortunate aesthete in the opening of the treatise examines the subjective role of aesthetics, those qualities that are required to enable one to perceive and create aesthetic objects, Baumgarten was also interested in determining the necessary qualities of the object itself. For Baumgarten, the experience of beauty involved the perception of a beautiful object by a beautiful soul; therefore, defining aesthetics requires both an objective and a subjective element.

Aesthetic wealth is concerned with the material of an object that allows one to think more beautifully about an object.¹⁵² This material must fall within what Baumgarten calls the aesthetic horizon of human knowledge, which can be observed

¹⁵⁰ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, "Übersicht," 6-11. The subchapter titles are Der ästhetische Reichtum (*ubertas aethetica*), Die ästhetische Größe (*magnitudo aethetica*), Die ästhetische Wahrheit (*veritas aethetica*), Das ästhetische Licht (*lux aethetica*), Die ästhetische Gewißheit (*certitudo aethetica*), and Das Leben der ästhetischen Erkenntnis (*vita cognitionis aethetica*).

¹⁵¹ Buchenau, 139-140.

¹⁵² Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §115, 92-93; §119, 96-97.

through lively and graceful beautiful thinking. It may also fall within the realm of the logical horizon, but would be treated scientifically rather than beautifully.¹⁵³ Therefore, an object can be treated both scientifically and artfully whether it is examined from the upper or lower cognitive faculties, though this is not true of all objects. In order to discover whether certain material is rich enough for treatment, according to Baumgarten, an aesthetician must first examine it from the senses only from the basis of its nature. This will help one determine if an object or theme can be thought beautifully and serve as the basis for a work of art. One may also be drawn to the object and become aroused into an inspired state of the spirit, which reveals it to be worthy of aesthetic treatment.¹⁵⁴

Aesthetic greatness goes beyond wealth to include those objects that create an everlasting impression on the spirit and are preserved in the memory.¹⁵⁵ The greatness can be either natural or moral, the differences of which are determined by its freedom. Natural objects are those objects that follow standardized rules for the argument, in the rhetorical sense.¹⁵⁶ Moral greatness, on the other hand, is associated with the concept of freedom according to moral laws and considered an aesthetic dignity.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, something that is morally great creates an even stronger impression on the spirit and memory of the perceiver.

The third characteristic, the aesthetic truth of an object, can also be both known and sensed. This Baumgarten calls it the metaphysical truth of the object, which is recognized for its agreement with the most general principles of metaphysics.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §121-123, 98-101.

¹⁵⁴ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §128, 104-107.

¹⁵⁵ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §177, 152-155.

¹⁵⁶ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §181, 156-157.

¹⁵⁷ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §182, 156-159.

¹⁵⁸ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §423, 402-403.

Aesthetic truths are logical truths in the wider sense in that they are truths that can be discovered through reason; however, aesthetic truths are perceived through the lower cognitive powers and therefore known through the senses.¹⁵⁹ Baumgarten explains that one who is always striving towards aesthetic truths and practices perceiving them, develops this inclination as a trait of the mind, which is necessary for perceiving the beautiful.¹⁶⁰

Aesthetic light, the fourth characteristic of an aesthetic object, is concerned with the clarity and comprehensibility of the object, which allows one to differentiate the characteristics of the object. Baumgarten emphasizes that by clarity he does not mean, for example, in the logical comprehension the words of the text; rather, aesthetic light allows one to see the object beautifully.¹⁶¹ It is what he calls the shimmering and shine of lively thoughts, which increase the sensory comprehensibility of the object.¹⁶²

The final characteristic is the object's aesthetic persuasion, which is the sensory certainty, or the knowledge of the truth and possibility of the object that is gained through sensory perception.¹⁶³ Baumgarten clarifies that he does not mean persuasion in the rhetorical sense, in which one could be convinced of false truths through the use of flattery and refinement of language.¹⁶⁴ Persuasion provides a practical value of poetry and the arts. It is used to create an effective change in the audience, which impacts the faculty of desire, making the perceiver more inclined towards moral actions.¹⁶⁵ Thus, persuasion completes the aesthetic character of the moral perfection of an object.

¹⁵⁹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §423-424, 402-405.

¹⁶⁰ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §555, 532-533.

¹⁶¹ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §614-617, 602-605.

¹⁶² Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §618, 606-607.

¹⁶³ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §829, 848-851.

¹⁶⁴ Baumgarten, *Ästhetik*, §830, 850-851.

¹⁶⁵ Buchenau, 144.

Baumgarten treats all five characteristics to an extensive analysis in which he demonstrates how aesthetic objects are able to inspire beautiful thinking and contemplation. It is clear that he is not concerned in each description with understanding the object from an intellectual or logical perspective; rather, Baumgarten is always reminding his readers that these traits inspire a cognition that is analogous to reason, which is knowing confusedly through the senses. Objects can be either known through reason or through the senses; the former creates intellectual ideas while the latter inspires beautiful thinking. Taken altogether, aesthetic wealth, greatness, truth, light, and persuasion are each one degree higher towards the attainment of the beautiful, or perfection, that must be considered by the aesthetician in the creation of an aesthetic object.

1.5 Conclusion

Unfortunately, Baumgarten was never able to finish his project on aesthetics; therefore, his conception of the discipline from a practical perspective was never fully realized. The metaphysical basis for aesthetics, in addition to his theoretical analysis, influenced the arts through the end of the century. His students, including Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), based their writings on aesthetics on Baumgarten's theories and helped to fully realize his plan.

A primary concern of Sulzer and Mendelssohn were in defining a practical application of the beautiful arts and making aesthetic philosophy accessible to both artists and audiences. Where Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten published in the highly academic language of Latin, the next generation of aestheticians published in German, and some of their works were also distributed in periodicals. The philosophy, which began as an

attempt to define the cognitive experience of beauty by Baumgarten, ultimately aimed to establish a theory of taste and provide guidelines for developing the self through aesthetic experience.

CHAPTER 2 PHILOSOPHY OF THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

2.1 Introduction: Defining the Aesthetic Experience

With the birth of aesthetics in the North German Enlightenment came an increased emphasis on the lower cognitive states in conceptions of the arts. In particular, those states that produce only clear and confused ideas through the senses were optimal for transmitting beautiful artworks. While the lower cognitive states of the soul were neither capable of producing rational ideas, nor of obtaining a clear understanding, they provided special access to the beautiful through the intuition of perfection. The ultimate purpose of Baumgartian philosophy was to obtain aesthetic, or beautiful, truths through the powers of the soul. The concept of sensations within rational aesthetics was crucial in defining the parameters of artistic creation and the experience of artworks. Through a re-definition of the fundamental terminology such as *Empfindungen* (feelings) and *Empfindsamkeit* (sensitivity) according to the writings of rational philosophers, the aesthetic experience of artistic objects in general can be constructed. These definitions form the basis for understanding all artistic concepts in the discipline of aesthetics, such as the psychological and physiological source of musical pleasure and the process of creating aesthetic objects that are capable of producing an effective change on an individual.

Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779), one of the most prominent and prolific Enlightenment authors, continued the Baumgartian tradition of rational aesthetics. Many of his writings were published at the peak of the rational movement and provided theoretical and practical views on aesthetics. Through his publications, Sulzer influenced other prominent rational philosophers, such as Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), as well

as the educated middle class on topics of the arts, particularly through his highly influential, multi-volume encyclopedia, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste* (1771-1774).¹ This work is significant both for its explanation of the beautiful arts in general, and for the first time introducing music systematically into the discussion of aesthetics. The concepts he addresses therein were rooted the principles of the experience of *Empfindungen*, a concept unique to the rational cognitive process developed by Wolff.

2.2 Principles of *Empfindungen*

Within the framework of rational philosophy, *Empfindungen* and *Empfindsamkeit* were not understood merely as feelings and sensitivity, respectively; rather, they were deeply rooted in the cognitive experience of physical sensations for the purpose of acquiring sensitive cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntnis*). The adjective *empfindsam*, therefore, should not be used to describe a style of music as it is often discussed in modern literature on this era. Instead, the rational philosophy of Baumgarten, Sulzer, and others will show that *Empfindsamkeit* can be redefined as the aesthetic experience of *sinnliche Erkenntnis*. More specifically, these authors show that through *Empfindungen* one achieves a psychological, dreamlike trance state in which one explores the realm of the lower cognitions in order to develop beautiful truths. This type of sensory experience, however, has often been ignored in modern discussions of eighteenth-century music performance and listening. It is today most commonly associated with non-western and

¹ Johann Georg Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Kunste* (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967 [reprint of the second edition Leipzig: F. von Blankenburg, 1792]).

developing countries, usually as a phenomenon that takes place during religious ceremonies.²

Ethnomusicologist Judith Becker defines trance as a “deeply emotional” and “intensely private” experience that takes place in an “absent-minded, dreamy state.”³ A trance state is evoked in a listener when the senses are stimulated by sight and sound, which results in a flood of emotional sensations.⁴ Becker writes that the concept of trance disappeared from Western culture when Descartes established a dualism between the mind and the body, in which physical sensations were not connected to mental activity. Descartes placed musical thinking in the domain of the *res cogitans*, the thinking realm of the mind, thus excluding the physical body, the *res extensa*. The physical sensations brought on by sounds and sights are a crucial aspect in evoking a trance in the listener. Becker asserts that the separation of the mind and body in seventeenth-century Cartesian philosophy established an ideology of music as a thinking art that continued into the twentieth century; therefore, emphasis is placed on the intellectual response to music rather than the physical response.⁵ However, as demonstrated thus far, North German Enlightenment philosophy recognized a connection between the mind and body, which established relationships among physical sensations, emotions, and ideas. The physical sensation of *Empfindungen* is a crucial part in the aesthetic experience and the communication of sensate cognition.

² Judith Becker, *Deep Listeners: Music, Emotion, and Trancing* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 38.

³ Becker, 38.

⁴ Becker, 2.

⁵ Becker, 4-5.

2.2.1 The Experience of *Empfindungen*

The aesthetic philosophies of Wolff and Baumgarten greatly influenced writings on the arts and artistic creation, and by the middle of the eighteenth century there was for the first time a distinction between the mechanical arts and the beautiful arts (*schönen Künste*). Sulzer, the most prominent writer on the beautiful arts and student of Baumgarten, was interested in the psychological aspect of artistic creation with an emphasis on the cultivation of one's morality.⁶ Throughout Sulzer's encyclopedia are articles specifically aimed towards defining concepts of the beautiful arts in general. Because rational aesthetics and the beautiful arts were grounded in the lower cognitive state of feelings (*Empfindungen*), coming to a definition of the philosophical principles of *Empfindungen* is a necessary step in determining eighteenth-century approaches to artistic creation and the psychology of music performance and listening.

In line with Baumgarten's definition of the term, Sulzer writes that aesthetics is "the philosophy of the beautiful arts, or science, which derive both the general theory and the rules of the beautiful arts from the nature of taste."⁷ He goes on to say that aesthetics is the "science of feeling (*Empfindung*)" and that "the main purpose of the beautiful arts [is] to...arouse a lively sense (*Gefühl*) of truth and good; therefore, the theory must be based on a theory of unclear cognition (*undeutliche Erkenntniß*) and feelings (*Empfindungen*)."⁸ Sulzer explains that through his publications, he attempts to outline

⁶ Thomas Christensen, introduction to "General Theory of the Fine Arts (1771-74) Selected Articles," in *Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment*, ed. Ian Bent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 5-9.

⁷ "Die Philosophie der schönen Künste, oder die Wissenschaft, welche sowohl die allgemeine Theorie, als die Regeln der schönen Künste aus der Natur des Geschmacks herleitet." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie, "Aesthetik,"* 1:47.

⁸ "Die Hauptabsicht der schönen Künste geht auf die Erweckung eines lebhaften Gefühls des Wahren und des Guten, also muß die Theorie derselben auf die Theorie der undeutlichen Erkenntnis und der Empfindungen gegründet sein." Sulzer *Allgemeine Theorie, "Aesthetik,"* 1:47.

both a theoretical and practical plan for aesthetics, going beyond Baumgarten's mere philosophical foundations.⁹

Sulzer identifies the origin of the feelings (*Empfindungen*) of the soul as an arousal of the sensory tools (*sinnlichen Werkzeuge*), which are caused by the movement of nerves in the body.¹⁰ There are two basic principles in arousing the senses. First, the power of feeling in the soul is proportionate to the movement of the nerves. Second, the diversity and complexity in the movement of the nerves are proportionally diverse and complex feelings of the soul. The feeling of uniform, ordered, and harmonious movement in the nerves, which he defines as the experience of beauty, results in sensory pleasures (*sinnliche Vergnügen*). The soul feels this beauty, although confusedly, and from it experiences pleasant feelings. Sulzer demonstrates this experience by discussing the harmony of music. He shows that the progression of sounds set simultaneously against one another is felt in the soul as feelings through the senses, which are unclear representations. As a result, pleasant feelings are aroused in the spirit.¹¹

Sulzer explains that feelings aroused from sensory pleasures are much livelier than ideas, and as a result, sensory pleasures have certain advantages over intellectual ones. Most significantly, sensory pleasures are able to arouse more powerful feelings because they are physically felt in the body. Sulzer describes intellectual pleasures as being "only the shadow" of sensory pleasures because they are what he calls secondary feelings.¹² They are considered secondary because intellectual ideas are unable to stir the

⁹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Aesthetik," 1:47.

¹⁰ Sulzer, "Untersuchung über den Ursprung der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen," in *Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte Philosophische Schriften aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt* (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1773), 53-54.

¹¹ Sulzer, "Untersuchung," 64-70.

¹² "nur die Schatten." Sulzer, "Untersuchung," 74, 63.

spirit nearly as well as sensory feelings. Brought forth through the faculty of memory, intellectual ideas are only ideas of things and not the feelings of things themselves. For example, he writes, the feeling of colors stirs more lively impressions than the memory of them through intellectual ideas.¹³ Thus, sensory pleasures are more capable than the intellect of effecting the soul because they are physically felt in the body. Furthermore, Sulzer's description of the experience of sensations and the resulting *Empfindungen* is in line with Baumgarten's definition of aesthetics as discussed in Chapter One: confused ideas, the basis of aesthetics, are representations of sensory impressions in the soul, which lead to beautiful truths. These ideas are rooted in the lower cognitive states, and when one feels pleasure, they are experiencing beauty through the intuition of perfection.

Sulzer further describes this distinction between what is felt and what is known in his definition of *sinnlich* (sensory).¹⁴ Contrary to sensory experiences, when one knows something one is conscious of it, can recognize it, and distinguish it from others. This, Sulzer writes, is designated as *erkennlich* (cognitive). We gain knowledge of an object when we contemplate it as outside of us in order to understand it clearly and distinctly. When one experiences the feeling of the object, on the other hand, attention is directed internally, creating impressions inside the perceiver, which is a *sinnlich* experience according to Sulzer. The object arouses a feeling within and effects a change in the individual. The source for both feeling and knowing is the object itself. Therefore, an object can be experienced in two ways, as either *sinnlich* or *erkennlich*: with the distinction determined by whether the object is known through feeling or through clear

¹³ Sulzer, "Untersuchung," 62-63.

¹⁴ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Sinnlich," 4:408-410.

knowledge.¹⁵ In other words, *sinnlich* is an internal reflection of the self through the object in lower cognitive states, whereas *erkennlich* is a higher cognitive examination attempting to clarify the object itself. Sulzer further supports this definition in his article on *Empfindung*, in which he writes that feeling (*Empfindung*) is understood in contrast to clear knowledge.¹⁶ Feelings make pleasant or unpleasant impressions on us and stir the faculty of desire (*Begehrungskräfte*). Knowledge, leading to clear ideas, is concerned with the object as outside of us, whereas feeling is the impression of the object inside us.¹⁷

The sublime, as discussed by Sulzer and Moses Mendelssohn, belongs to a particular class of objects that produces a confusion of the senses.¹⁸ The sublime differs from the beautiful, Mendelssohn explains. While a beautiful object has definite boundaries, Mendelssohn explains that the full dimensions of a sublime object cannot be perceived, making it sensuously immeasurable (*Sinnlichunermesslichen*).¹⁹ The senses are unable to perceive the object, and the result “is initially a *trembling* or shudder that comes over us and then something similar to the dizziness that often forces us to divert our eyes from the object.”²⁰ Mendelssohn adds that the sublime occurs in nature, such as

the unfathomable world of the sea, a far-reaching plain, the innumerable legions of stars, every height and depth that is beyond the reach of the eye,

¹⁵ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Sinnlich,” 4:408-410.

¹⁶ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Empfindung,” 2:53-59.

¹⁷ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Empfindung,” 2:53.

¹⁸ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Erhaben,” 2:97-114; Moses Mendelssohn, “Ueber das Erhabene und Naïve I den schönen Wissenschaften,” in *Philosophische Schriften*, zweiter Theil (Berlin: bey Christian Friedrich Voß, 1771), 153-240; English translation consulted, Mendelssohn “On the sublime and naïve in the fine sciences,” in *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. by Daniel Dahlstrom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

¹⁹ Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 192-193; Mendelssohn, “Ueber das Erhaben,” 157.

²⁰ Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 193.

eternity, and other such objects of nature which appear immeasurable to the senses.²¹

Although the sublime only occurs in nature, its effect can be reproduced through imitation in the arts. Mendelssohn makes clear that when produced through imitation, the sublime, called the grand or the greatness (*das Große*), is not in itself an unlimited magnitude, but only appears as such in order to create the effect of the sublime.²²

Mendelssohn and Sulzer are both primarily concerned with producing this effect through literary genres, using examples from ancient Greek poetry. The greater prominence of this effect in literature is also apparent by Mendelssohn's title. He specifically refers to the beautiful sciences (*schönen Wissenschaften*), which encompasses all of the literary genres, rather than the beautiful arts (*schönen Künste*), which includes music. Mendelssohn does, however, provide a single example of the sublime in music. He explains that it can be produced through the repetition of a single sound at equal intervals, which gives the effect that the sound is grand and has no boundaries.²³

Through these descriptions, it is clear that the sublime was a device for producing a particular effect in the audience and should be considered differently from the experience of the beautiful. While the beautiful was rooted in the feeling of sensations and the perception of perfection, the sublime was a state of confusion of sensations that produced a shudder. The use of the sublime as a musical effect warrants further

²¹ Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 193.

²² Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 193.

²³ Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 193-194.

examination, particularly with the topic of noble simplicity, which Mendelssohn names as one means for representing the sublime.²⁴

The ultimate purpose of the beautiful arts, including music, was to serve as a source for *Empfindungen*, hence as a means for arousing a change in an individual. For this reason, experience of *Empfindungen* were not merely considered for pleasure; they served a higher purpose in the development of one's morality.

2.2.2 *Empfindungen* and Moral Worth

Sulzer identifies *Empfindungen* as having both psychological and moral meanings. The psychological meaning, he writes, is merely the pleasant or unpleasant feelings brought forth by the impression of the object. In the moral sense, on the other hand, *Empfindungen* help one develop their moral character.²⁵ According to Baumgarten's theory, the purpose of aesthetics is to acquire sensitive cognition, and the arts serve as a practical discipline for the development of a beautiful spirit.²⁶ This is supported by Sulzer's description of the moral meaning of *Empfindungen*: he writes that through the development of feelings one gains a moral worth. One achieves a proficiency of sense (*Gefühl*) through repetition. *Empfindungen* such as honor, righteousness, and gratitude, are made familiar through their repetition in the beautiful arts. This proficiency allows one to quickly bring these feelings forth from within and becomes the driving force directing one's actions. According to Sulzer, the duty of the beautiful arts is to arouse *Empfindungen*, which must be directed by reason and wisdom. For this reason, he explains, it is important to examine the treatment of *Empfindungen* in the theory of the

²⁴ Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, 197.

²⁵ Sulzer, Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Empfindung," 2:53.

²⁶ Beiser, 120-121.

arts.²⁷ Therefore, for a modern understanding of the function of artworks in the eighteenth century, the primary goal in the creation of artworks during the Enlightenment was to develop the morality of the audience through the experience of *Empfindungen*.

Sulzer identifies two methods artists can use to arouse the audience's *Empfindungen*. The first, he says, is that in order to move another to weep you must weep yourself (which is a quotation of Horace). The second method is to present either a lively account of a previous experience or a model of the object of feeling within the artwork, which will bring forth those *Empfindungen* in the audience. As an example, he writes that in order for one to arouse pity from an audience, one must portray an object of pity in a lively manner. When the poet opens his own heart, his audience can see the effect of this feeling and, in turn, feel it within themselves.²⁸ Furthermore, he explains that whether one is portraying the object of the feeling or the portraying the feeling itself, these works of art are an important influence on the forming of the mind (*Bildung von Gemüthern*). The artist must dedicate himself to teaching and leading his fellow citizens and, through his artworks, inspiring in his audience *Empfindungen* of order and right.²⁹

According to the definition Sulzer has provided, the *Empfindungen* experienced through works of art are not merely to be judged as pleasant or unpleasant. Pleasant feelings are only the immediate result of works of art. The audience perceives the *Empfindungen* portrayed in the artwork, and are thus moved to experience these feelings within themselves. Because these feelings that are aroused are intended to help the audience develop their moral character, the artist himself must be of a high moral worth in order to present such moral and righteous ideas to the audience. Thus, the status of the

²⁷ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Empfindung," v. 2, 54-55.

²⁸ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Empfindung," 2:57.

²⁹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Empfindung," 2:59.

artist is elevated from craftsman of the mechanical arts, as was true earlier in the eighteenth century, to one who has unique powers of feeling, is of noble character, and can morally guide others through his artworks. This change in the status of the artist, and the arts in general, demonstrates the purpose and significance of the beautiful arts in the North German Enlightenment.

2.2.3 The Subjective and the Objective in the Aesthetic Experience

One of the criticisms of rational aesthetics made by contemporaneous empiricist philosophers, including Edmund Burke, was what they deemed to be the lack of subjective feeling in the judging of the experience of an artwork by a spectator.³⁰

Additionally, empiricists believed that the rationalists placed too great an emphasis on the perfection of the object to bring forth feeling. The empiricists considered that artworks should be judged only on the subjective impression of an object by an individual, which is a concept continued later in the century in the writings of Immanuel Kant.³¹ The rationalists, however, emphasized the importance of both the subjective and objective perspectives in their experience of the artwork.

Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), also a student of Baumgarten, defended rational aesthetics against his critics. In his *Briefe über die Empfindungen* (1755), Mendelssohn based his definition of aesthetics on the Baumgartian one.³² He writes, through a fictional literary exchange between Theocles (a rationalist) and Euphranor (an

³⁰ For a discussion of Edmund Burke's aesthetics, see for example Tom Furniss, *Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender, and Political Economy in Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and Tom Huhn, *Imitation and Society: The Persistence of Mimesis in the Aesthetics of Burke, Hogarth, and Kant* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004).

³¹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 6.

³² Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. by Daniel Dahlstrom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

irrationalist), the importance of sensations as a cognitive experience.³³ Like Baumgarten before him, he explains that the experience of pleasure is the cognitive perception of beauty though confused representations.³⁴

As a later addition to his earlier explanation of *Empfindungen*, Mendelssohn published *Rhapsodie, oder Zusätze zu den Briefen über die Empfindungen* (1761) as a further defense of rational aesthetics.³⁵ As a response to the primary accusation of the empiricists, who believed that the rationalists did not account for the subjective response of the individual, Mendelssohn writes that the experience of pleasure of an object is not merely on the basis of the object itself. It is the relation of the object to the subject that causes pleasure in the individual.³⁶ In other words, aesthetic beauty is not merely found in the object itself, rather beauty occurs during an interaction of a perceiving subject with the object. He writes this to justify why people can find joy or pleasure in representations of sadness. While an object may represent something that is evil, the representation itself can be perceived as beautiful by a subject.³⁷ This is what Mendelssohn calls the mixed sentiments: when one experiences displeasure of the object itself, yet there is a pleasure in the perception of its representation.³⁸ Thus, rational aesthetics contain both objective and subjective elements. The objective is in the representation of the object itself, and the subjective is in the individual's perception of that object, both of which are necessary to arouse the experience of pleasure. The object can only be deemed beautiful if the subject

³³ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 201-206.

³⁴ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 201-206.

³⁵ Moses Mendelssohn, "Rhapsodie; oder, Zusätze zu den Briefen über die Empfindungen" in *Philosophische Schriften*, zweiter Theil, 1-94; English translation consulted, Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. and ed. Dahlstrom.

³⁶ Mendelssohn, trans. Dahlstrom, 132-133.

³⁷ Mendelssohn, trans. Dahlstrom, 134.

³⁸ Mendelssohn, trans. Dahlstrom, 14; Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 211-217.

is capable of perceiving it as such. Therefore, the experience of the beautiful in works of art is in the interaction between the object and the perceiving subject.

Mendelssohn describes the aesthetic experience of pleasure as follows:

Harmonious sentiments (*harmonische Empfindungen*) in the soul correspond to harmonious movements (*harmonische Bewegungen*) in the limbs and the senses. In a state of sensuous rapture (*sinnliche Wollust*), the entire neural structure is set into motion, one harmonious motion, and since this is the case, the entire basis of the soul, the entire system of sentiments and obscure feelings, must be moved and put into play as well, one harmonious play. By this means every capacity for sensory cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntniß*), every power of sensuously desiring is engaged in the way most conducive to it and sustained in the exercise. In other words, the soul itself is transported to a better condition.³⁹

This account of the experience of sensations can explain how it was believed that the perception of an object could move the soul. Upon perceiving an object, the body experiences physical sensations. The soul desires to increase and sustain the feelings in order to gain sentient, or sensory, cognition, which not only changes, but is also capable of improving the state of the soul. This aesthetic experience, a cognitive *empfindsam* state, is the goal of the beautiful arts. On the one hand, the judgment of an artwork as pleasant or unpleasant is dependent on the personal experience of *Empfindungen* by the audience, as this is the goal of the artwork. On the other hand, in order for the audience to have this experience the artwork must be capable of arousing their *Empfindungen*. Each individual, having their own temperament and experience with *Empfindungen*, will have their unique impressions from each work. By having both a subjective and objective element in the judgment of artworks, a greater emphasis is placed on the experience of the individual in relation to the perfection of the object.

³⁹ Mendelssohn, trans. Dahlstrom, 140.

Mendelssohn's description of sensuous rapture in the experience of *Empfindungen* can only be understood through Wolffian metaphysics and rational aesthetics. He not only examined the theoretical basis of the effect of artworks, but also attempted to form a practical aesthetic through the literary genre of the tragedy in his correspondences with Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781). Lessing's first influential work, *Miß Sara Sampson* (1755), provides an example of how he used the stage to show the significance of *Empfindsamkeit* and to educate his audience on the fundamental principles and aims of aesthetics.

2.2.4 *Empfindungen* and Literature

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was a critical figure in German Enlightenment literature, and through his publications he participated in the dialogue on rational aesthetics and the role of *Empfindungen* for moral development. Lessing was familiar with works by rational philosophers, especially those by Leibniz and Wolff, and indirectly referenced Wolffian philosophy in his influential theoretical treatise *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*.⁴⁰ Furthermore, he corresponded with Moses Mendelssohn on the aesthetics of tragedy. Through the genre of the *Bürgerliches Trauerspiel* (Bourgeois Tragedy), Lessing explored the concept of *Empfindungen* through his characters in order to illustrate his philosophical views.⁴¹ The heroic characters of Lessing's works were often described as *empfindsam* and placed in opposition to the rational, though usually flawed, characters. The *empfindsam* characters were typically portrayed as living by a higher moral code, and as discovering beautiful truths during lower cognitive mental states, such as through dreams, imaginations, and intuitions. By

⁴⁰ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* (Hamburg and Bremen: Cramer, 1767).

⁴¹ Bell, 34-36

representing the *empfindsam* characters as those with a higher moral standing, Lessing implies a value of beautiful truths over those obtained through reasoning.⁴² An example of this tension between *empfindsam* and rationality can be seen in *Miß Sara Sampson*, Lessing's first *Bürgerliches Trauerspiel*.⁴³

Miß Sara Sampson is a moral tragedy that portrays the values of virtue and truth over insensibility and deceit. In the opening, the title character Sara Sampson has been taken by Mellefont to a hotel where they make plans to elope after Sara's father disapproves of their relationship. Mellefont is depicted as a rational, unfeeling character that has lived a dishonorable life. In his past he associated with gamblers and vagrants and seduced many women, and it is clear that he has not conveyed this history to Sara. Sara, whom Mellefont refers to as his "sensible Sara," maintains her virtue and ardor throughout the play and tells Mellefont she will still marry him even though it means he will not receive an inheritance he is owed, proving she wants to marry him for love and not money. Marwood, Mellefont's former lover, pursues Mellefont and attempts to convince him to return to her. Marwood is also characterized as a cruel, unfeeling character, who, after first trying to seduce Mellefont, uses their illegitimate daughter, Arabelle, as a ploy to win back his love. Marwood confronts Sara and reveals the truth of Mellefont's past and daughter Arabelle. Despite what Sara has learned of Mellefont, she remains steadfast in her love and forgives him. Sara's father, who dislikes Mellefont's character, chooses to forgive Sara for running away and accepts Mellefont as his own son, despite his disapproval of Mellefont's past. As Sara lies dying from a poisoning by Marwood, she forgives Marwood of her treachery and asks her father to raise Arabelle as

⁴² Bell, 38.

⁴³ Bell, 36; Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Miß Sara Sampson* (Berlin: Voß, 1755). English translation consulted, Lessing, *Sara*, trans. by Ernest Bell (Bath, England: Absolute Press, 1990).

her own daughter. After Sara's death, Mellefont recognizes his guilt and takes his own life. The tragedy closes with Sara's father vowing to care for Arabelle as a legacy of Sara as she wished on her deathbed.

Miß Sara Sampson provides a two-fold moral purpose. The first is to teach the audience about moral worth by feeling pity for the characters of Sara and her father. The second is to show by example how greater truth can be obtained through the experience of *Empfindungen*. The issue of which emotional responses he should attempt to draw out of his audience is a primary concern for Lessing in his writings on aesthetics.⁴⁴ He determines that the feeling of pity for the heroic characters is most appropriate because, according to rational philosophy, pity is an emotion that allows one to improve their morality.⁴⁵ In a letter to Friedrich Nicolai in November 1756, Lessing writes that the purpose of the tragedy is to stir the passions.⁴⁶ He adds that in the genre of tragedy, no other passion stirs the spectator more than pity. Lessing further explains that while he does not accept terror or admiration as passions, they are useful as a means to arouse and sustain pity. Terror, by shocking the spectator, arouses pity, whereas admiration for the hero sustains it.⁴⁷ For that reason, heroes in tragedy must always be steadfast in their virtue, and furthermore, should be the least fortunate for the duration of the play.⁴⁸ Lessing's description of the purpose of pity in tragedy is in line with rational philosophy. By experiencing pity for the hero, one is able to improve one's morals through the work's cognitive content.⁴⁹ Sara, the tragic heroine of *Miß Sara Sampson*, instills pity in the

⁴⁴ Bell, 35.

⁴⁵ Bell, 35.

⁴⁶ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel* (November 1756).

⁴⁷ Lessing, *Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel* (November 1756).

⁴⁸ Lessing, *Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel* (November 1756).

⁴⁹ Bell, 35.

audience by demonstrating her strong morals. The shock of her death and the admiration for her loyalty and morality allow the audience to feel pity for her and her circumstance.

Lessing demonstrates the power of intuition obtained from *Empfindungen* in Act I, Scene vii. Sara recounts a nightmare to the rational Mellefont, who does not believe in the validity of dreams. Sara describes her dream as taking place with “half-closed eyelids” and “not quite asleep.”⁵⁰ Following the rationalist view on perceptions, dreaming is a state when the mind is still somewhat active, but not fully conscious. The nightmare represents the ability of Sara’s consciousness, in a state of low cognition, to alert her of danger.⁵¹ The dream foreshadows her murder by Marwood at the end of the tragedy, proving that certain truths can only be perceived when the faculties are too weak to drown out the upper, rational faculties. Thus, through the dream, Sara enters into a cognitive state in which her faculties of reason are suppressed and she is susceptible to the *Empfindungen* aroused by her sensations. These *Empfindungen* lead her to the intuition that she was in danger. Matthew Bell, recognizing the tension between rational thinking and moral feeling in Lessings’ *Trauerspiel*, writes:

Mellefont and Marwood earn the wages of sin because their duplicity rebounds on them. Both deceive others and then themselves with a rationality that is unmasked as self-interested denial of moral feeling. By contrast, Sara’s ‘martyrdom’ vindicates the truth-value of intuitions and sensibility.⁵²

Lessing demonstrates through this tragedy that *Empfindungen* provide access to truths that are otherwise not obtainable through reason. By having a deeply developed sensibility, Sara remains open to receiving intuitions through a dreamlike state of *Empfindungen*. Rational thought without feeling, as in the characters of Mellefont and

⁵⁰ Lessing, *Sara*, 16.

⁵¹ Bell, 36-37.

⁵² Bell, 39.

Marwood, leads to a life without morals and the undoing of all those in their paths. *Miß Sara Sampson* not only shows the effects of rational philosophy and *Empfindungen* in literature, but Sara and her father serve as ideal models of *empfindsam* characters for the audience.

The genre of the tragedy as developed by Lessing provides concrete examples of the influence of the philosophy of *Empfindungen* on literary aesthetics. Lessing demonstrates both the high moral value of arts through the prevailing moral qualities of his characters, which are felt as *Empfindungen* by the audience, and the underlying philosophy that motivates the actions of these characters. Philosophers who addressed the ability of music to make an effective change on the audience were concerned with its physiological and psychological effect. In attempts to identify the aesthetic power of music, contemporaneous authors examined the perception of music by the senses and the resulting mental conditions possible.

2.3 Sensory Pleasure and the Aesthetic Powers of Music

The writings of Sulzer and a philosopher from the next generation, Karl Ludwig Junker (1748-1797), aimed to explain the energy, or aesthetic power, of the beautiful arts generally, and sought to find the source of musical pleasure in particular. Both authors examine how the beautiful arts actually produce an effective change on the perceiver and consider the relationships between the work, the body, and the soul.

2.3.1 *Energie* in the Beautiful Arts

Sulzer's article *Von der Kraft (Energie) in den Werken der schönen Künste* is intended for artists, in the general sense, as an outline of the guiding principles for the

production of the beautiful arts.⁵³ His discussion focuses on three distinct types of energy that are possible through works of art and the effect of these types of energy on the audience. While the article rarely actually explains how this energy is achieved in artworks themselves, it explains the different psychological states of the audience according to the type of energy contained in the artwork. As Sulzer has stated elsewhere in his writings, the beautiful arts are not merely for pleasure. The beautiful arts are one of the three great subjects of the human faculties, the other two being politics and philosophy. Sulzer explains that the works of philosophy and the beautiful arts share related principles: the purpose of the beautiful arts is to make functional the guiding moral goals of philosophy.⁵⁴ To designate the term “beautiful arts” to works that were meant simply to please or amuse, writes Sulzer, is degrading.⁵⁵ Thus, the discussion of the power of the beautiful arts was an important one, meant to guide the artist in choosing appropriate moral subjects and demonstrate its effects when this is achieved.

The first principle for producing works of the beautiful arts, unlike previous conceptions of artistic creation, is not in the imitation of nature. This, Sulzer explains, is both arbitrary and unproductive. Instead, the artist is to choose a subject that is both useful and comes to him with a degree of power and energy. This will allow the artist to give to the subject of his work all possible energy, and in turn, be most effective in moving the heart of his audience.⁵⁶ Sulzer recognizes three states of the soul that are brought on by perceiving things outside of us: the state of thought or reflection

⁵³ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft (Energie) in Werken der schönen Künste,” in *Vermischte philosophische Schriften aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt* (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1773). Originally published in “Abhandlung von der Kraft (Energie) in den Werken der schönen Künste,” in *Neues Hamburgisches Magazin* 5 (1769): 152-183. Page numbers refer to the 1773 edition.

⁵⁴ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 123.

⁵⁵ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 122.

⁵⁶ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 122-123.

(*Nachdenken*), of contemplation (*Betrachtung*), and of emotion (*Bewegung*).⁵⁷ The three states move progressively from more thinking to feeling cognitive states, the third of which (*Bewegung*) having the greatest impact on the beautiful arts. Sulzer explains that “the perfection that we perceive in a thing calls us to reflect on it (*Nachdenken*), the beauty pulls us immediately to inspection or contemplation and the energy brings forth the emotion.”⁵⁸ While perfection and beauty can arouse reflective and contemplative states of mind in the perceiver, it is the energy with which they are instilled that moves the emotions and has the greatest effect on moral development. Sulzer also identifies three causes of this energy in the beautiful arts that are capable of bringing forth the state of emotion in the audience.

Each of the three causes of energy is increasingly stronger in degree of their effectiveness. The first Sulzer calls “the quick interruption of the series of our ideas.”⁵⁹ To depict this first type of energy, Sulzer describes a depressed man whose sorrows occasionally give way to happiness. In these moments the depressed man forgets his character and finds himself in an effortless, sweet dream, then quickly returns back to his depressed state. The weakest of the three types of energy in an artwork is that which causes only a brief change of emotional state. This type of energy, through its quick interruption, does not last very long because the state is easily disturbed by an outside stimulus. Sulzer considers those objects containing this type of energy to be in the class of the strange and wonderful. It is their newness or their particularities that makes one

⁵⁷ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 124. While the primary translation of *Bewegung* is motion or gesture, Sulzer specifies his meaning by placing the word emotion in English in parenthesis following the German word.

⁵⁸ “Die Vollkommenheit, die wir an einer Sache wahrnehmen, heißt uns darüber nachdenken, die Schönheit reit uns zur Beschauung oder Betrachtung derselben fort und die Energie bringt die Bewegung hervor.” Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 124.

⁵⁹ “die schnelle Unterbrechung der Folge unserer Vorstellungen.” Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 124.

aware of them and arouses the attention of the audience. The same effect occurs when one hears a loud noise while sleeping.⁶⁰ However, while the shock or surprise draws attention to it, it does not have the power to sustain such a state for an extended period of time.

According to Sulzer, this type of quick interruption is often used in music, represented through various quick and surprising changes, such as “through the piano and forte, through wide intervals, through pauses, through changes of tonality, through new or strange harmonies, through chords, and many other means that raise up the primary tone of the piece from time to time.”⁶¹ This type of energy is the most insignificant because it only temporarily effects the listener, so does not necessarily serve the greater, moral purpose of the beautiful arts. They tend, instead, to be merely amusing and pleasant, which may be excellent in their own right, but these effects are still considered the lowest expression of such energy.⁶² This remark about the musical representation of the lowest form of energy is most impactful in debunking the idea of *empfindsam* as a style of music. The type of musical characteristics described, such as sudden dynamic changes, pauses, and changes in harmony, have been described by many modern sources as the defining features of the so-called *empfindsamer Stil*.⁶³ While the words *empfindsam* and *Empfindsamkeit* are used frequently in primary source literature of the time, it is never used to describe a style of music, or any other type of art. Using these words in such a way is a construction of modern literature on the topic. Sulzer is indicating here that in

⁶⁰ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 124-126.

⁶¹ “durch die Piano und Forte, durch die weiten Intervalle, durch Pausen, durch Veränderungen der Tonart, durch eine neue oder sonderbare Harmonie, durch Akkord, und durch viele andere Mittel, welche den Hauptton des Stücks von Zeit zu Zeit erheben.” Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 126.

⁶² Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 126.

⁶³ See for example Leonard Ratner, *Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style*.

fact these surprising and shocking types of expressions may be pleasant, but they are meaningless in their inability to cause an effective change in an individual. The first type of energy in the beautiful arts hardly satisfies the philosophical definition of *empfindsam*, a dreamlike trance state in which one explores the realm of the lower cognitions to develop beautiful truths. While these musical techniques may have a momentary effect on the listener, they do not drive the entire process of moving the soul towards beautiful truths. The claim that these effects make one temporarily aware through the faculty of attention implies a higher cognitive state, which is antithetical to the true *empfindsam* state. Sulzer does write that this type of energy may be useful in certain circumstances, for example, when an artist needs all possible stimuli to create the greatest impression on the audience.⁶⁴ Still, it is the least effective means for arousing beauty.

The second type of energy creates the state of contemplation, which elevates the imagination in an individual. Sulzer describes a scene in which one is in a pleasant daydream. During this daydream, there is no clear awareness, and one discovers an object whose beauty distinguishes itself from other object around it. While perceiving this beautiful object, the soul is made livelier through the contemplation of its beauty. The significance of the state of contemplation is in its ability to stir the imagination of the perceiver. Artworks that are capable of this type of arousal of the imagination are not only pleasant, but also possess a natural perfection or beauty.⁶⁵ Thus, through the perfection of the object, one is brought into a state of imagination.

The experience of perfection is vital to the development of the individual, and Sulzer identified two types of perfections. Those of the mind correlate to reason, while

⁶⁴ Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 126-127.

⁶⁵ Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 127-129.

those of the beautiful arts are sensory objects. The former have their perfection in truth, clarity, naïveté, simplex, strength, and other clear notions about an object. The latter, perfect beauty, or those truths obtained through the imagination, is concerned with imitation of sensory objects, comparisons, descriptions, regularity, order and harmony in the arrangement of the part, and beauty and grace in the forms.⁶⁶ Both truths are relevant to the formation of the individual, although the former is through the higher faculty of understanding, and the latter is through the lower faculty of imagination. Sulzer explains the impact on the imagination when it is elevated through the perfect beauty of the *schönen Künste*:

First we become stirred by the beauty, which the artist knows for us, then we consider the thing, whose attention has brought forth this emotion mixed with contemplation; we try to comprehend the degree of perfection that we have just admired; we trouble ourselves to assume such a complete idea for ourselves, and we are successful.⁶⁷

Just as in the previous type, this type of energy requires a higher cognitive faculty, though in this case, the faculty of imagination is inspired through a dream-like state. This state is stirred by the perception of perfection and beauty, though not by surprise, as in the first type of energy. The ability of the artwork to stimulate contemplation and the faculty of imagination enables certain distinguishing benefits of this second type of energy. The first benefit lies in the artwork's ability to teach and increase knowledge in the audience. Where the philosopher attempts to make truths understandable through reason, the artist makes them sensory (*sinnliche*) through the imagination. Reason does not move the audience, but through the imagination these truths can touch the heart,

⁶⁶ Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 129.

⁶⁷ "Erst werden wir von den Schönheit, welche uns der Künstler gewußt, gerührt; dann betrachten wir die Sache, welche diese mit Bewunderung vermischte Rührung hervorgebracht hat, aufmerksamer; wir suchen den Grad der Vollkommenheit, den wir so eben bewundert haben, zu begreifen; wir bemühen uns, eine so vollkommene Vorstellung uns zu eigen zu machen, und es gelingt uns." Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 130.

influence actions, and make the truths more vivacious. Only through this second type of energy can an artist give the artwork a speculative truth, writes Sulzer.⁶⁸ The term “speculative” is not intended to imply a negative connotation as it may be understood now; rather its meaning is comparable to intuitive, or not examined through reason. Though this knowledge is speculative, it is nonetheless a truth. Therefore, with the power of reason one obtains philosophical truths through understanding, while the stirring of the imagination makes sensory those philosophical truths, allowing the audience to intuit its speculative truth.

An additional distinguishing feature of this second class of energy is the development of excellent taste. Taste is cultivated by increasing one’s ability to be moved by this type of energy. Through artworks that stir the imagination, the learned man gains sensitivity, which gives a more essential good and makes one capable, through good instruction, of becoming complete. With such developed sensitivity, according to Sulzer, the learned man can more strongly feel emotions such as honor and shame and is more powerfully guided by them.⁶⁹ Comments such as these reiterate the significant moral and social impact of the beautiful arts and *Empfindsamkeit*. To be a “complete man,” one was both learned and *empfindsam*. Thus, contrary to accounts in modern literature, a man of *Empfindsamkeit* was not considered effeminate.⁷⁰ On the contrary, to be a sensitive man meant to have a highly developed sense of morality through the beautiful arts.

The third and final type of *Energie* is the most powerful because it immediately effects the moral senses and the passions, or the powers of the soul, without requiring

⁶⁸ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 131-132.

⁶⁹ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 133.

⁷⁰ See for example Annette Richards, *The Free Fantasia and the Musical Picturesque* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 170, in which she describes the sentimental man as “the male hero the effeminate and tearful man of sentiment.”

higher cognitive powers. This is possible because the object brings forth the passions of the perceiver that have already been refined through their previously-developed taste. The energy of the object is strengthened by pre-existing ideas that come from within the experiences of the perceiver.⁷¹ For that reason, Sulzer writes, “their effects depend on the character, on the morals, the state of mind, and the present condition of the person.”⁷² This statement further confirms the point that rational aesthetics requires the active interaction of the perceiving subject with the object and is not based purely on objective judgment. The experience of the energy happens between the subject and object, and for the object to have the greatest affect, the subject must be of a highly developed *empfindsam* character.

Sulzer explains that this type of energy can act in two ways on the perceiver. The first is on the senses, i.e. music through hearing and the visual arts through painting, sculpture, etc.; the second types do not appeal to the senses, and these include eloquence and poetry. It is clear that Sulzer places greater significance on the second type, yet does demonstrate the effect of sound and music on the soul.⁷³ There is no limit to the expressive powers of music and, Sulzer writes “there is no single type of touching or movement of the soul that cannot be expressed through a series of notes and could be made sensitive.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, when a composer uses this energy through his melody and harmony, the works can have the most powerful effects on the heart.⁷⁵ Thus, when music is powered by this third type of expression, it immediately touches the heart,

⁷¹ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 136-137.

⁷² “Ihre Wirkung hängt von dem Charakter, von den Sitten, von der Gemüthsfassung und dem gegenwärtigen Zustand der Personen ab.” Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 137.

⁷³ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 137-141.

⁷⁴ “es keine einzige Art von Rührung und Bewegung der Seele giebt, die man nicht durch eine Folge von Tönen ausdrücken und sinnlich machen könnte.” Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 137.

⁷⁵ Sulzer, “Von der Kraft,” 137.

drawing the listener into a lower cognitive *empfindsam* state. If the listener has a highly developed *empfindsam* character based on a moral good, the music will have an even greater effect by pulling those *Empfindungen* into the heart and stirring the passions directly without using the higher faculties of attention or imagination. While the musical arts can have a great effect on the soul of the listener through the highest degree of energy, it is not, according to Sulzer, the highest of the art works.

The disciplines in the *schönen Wissenschaft*, which include poetry and eloquence, are merely the shadow of the sensitive things themselves because they must be perceived using the intellect, making them less powerful than the sensitive feelings themselves. They can, however, gain their power in other ways. Because the original ideas themselves are still based in nature and the senses, as were considered all ideas in rational philosophy, they still maintain their own kind of energy. Furthermore, when these works are performed, the orator represents his own imagination and sensitive perceptions of the ideas to the audience. Thus, the performance plays a critical role in the sensitive expression of the object. Finally, in this class of works, especially in rhetoric, there are more intellectual ideas, which take the work beyond the power of feeling.⁷⁶ Thus, altogether, these works include both a feeling, or sensitive expression, through its performance, and an intellectual power through its ideas. Sulzer considers these works to have the greatest power or energy above all other arts because they combine the cognitive powers of the intellect and emotion.

While Sulzer did not find the musical arts to inspire the highest form of the aesthetic experience, his descriptions show that they contain a certain power that can affect the listener. Those characteristics that are often used in contemporary literature to

⁷⁶ Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 141.

represent the music of this time period (sudden changes of dynamics, pauses etc.), while still an important source of energy, where not, in fact, considered in the era to be the highest form of music. Therefore, the power of music in bringing forth the aesthetic experience in the listener is greatest through the third type of energy as described by Sulzer; on the other hand, the simple, shocking musical effects used to in the music of this generation had the weakest effect.

Sulzer's analysis of the energy in the beautiful arts was intended to apply more generally to all of the arts. Karl Ludwig Junker treated more specifically how music acts on the body and soul of the listener. In disagreement with Sulzer, Junker found the music to be the most powerful of all of the arts in its ability to bring forth an effective change in a listener through an *empfindsam* state.

2.3.2 The Value of the *Tonkunst* and the Finer Sense of Hearing

While Karl Ludwig Junker is often associated with the *Sturm und Drang*, anti-Enlightenment empiricist movement at the end of the century, his numerous writings on musical aesthetics were heavily influenced by those of the previous generation. Junker's theological studies at the University of Göttingen exposed him to a wide array of aesthetic theories, including those of English, French, and North German philosophers. Throughout his texts he often cites authors such as Rousseau, Mendelssohn, and Sulzer.⁷⁷ His philosophical basis, however, is rooted in rational philosophy and his aesthetics is concerned primarily with the connection of the body, the soul, and the musical work. As explained in chapter one, rational philosophy was not necessarily devoid of empiricist methods, and throughout Junker's writings it is clear that his empiricist philosophy was

⁷⁷ Roye Wates, "Karl Ludwig Junker (1748-1797): Sentimental Music Critic," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1965, iv.

still rooted in the rational, Wolffian framework. Unlike the rational philosophers, however, Junker placed greater emphasis on the subjective feeling of soul and less on the object in the interaction with an artwork. He does acknowledge that sensory pleasure, which he defines as a type of perfect sensory cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntniß*), begins with the influence of an object on the sensations of the body.⁷⁸ Thus, unlike the purely empiricist formulations, the object still played an important role in this experience. His explanation of the source of musical pleasure attempts to describe the effect of music on the body and, ultimately, its value for morality and bodily health.

Of the musical arts (*Tonkunst*), Junker writes that, unlike other types of art, “the pleasures that are granted are lively, immutable, and to a certain extent, indispensable.”⁷⁹ He further explains that, because of their nature, they are capable of awakening pleasant feelings in an individual; thus, the musical arts belong to a class of useful, necessary arts.⁸⁰ He continues:

Only each sensory cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntniß*) of everything in general already perfects the feeling; and the dark desires (*dunklen Triebe*) of the soul, which so often correspond to the arts, were raised up through the sensory pleasure (*sinnliche Vergnügen*) to a higher degree of perfection (*Vollkommenheit*). Just as each pleasant feeling in art is an effect of perfection, it is, in turn, inseparable from knowledge and choice of the good.⁸¹

These remarks show that Junker is in agreement with the Baumgartian concept of the effect of sensory feelings on the body and mind. He explains that the feeling of beauty,

⁷⁸ Karl Ludwig Junker, *Über den Werth der Tonkunst* (Beyreuth und Leipzig: Joh. Andreas Lübeck, 1786) (originally 1777), 8.

⁷⁹ “...lebhaft, unveränderlich, gewissermaßen unentbehrlich, sind die Ergötzungen, die sie gewährt.” Junker, 2.

⁸⁰ Junker, 2.

⁸¹ “Allein jede sinnliche Erkenntniß vervollkommt schon überhaupt das Gefühl; und die dunklen Triebe der Seele, denen die Künste so oft entsprechen, werden durch das sinnliche Vergnügen auf einen höhern Grad von Vollkommenheit erhoben. So wie jede angenehme Empfindung in der Kunst eine Wirkung der Vollkommenheit ist, so ist sie hinwieder von der Erkenntniß, und Wahl des Guten unzertrennlich.” Junker, 3.

which leads to sensory cognition (*sinnliche Erkenntniß*), is the experience of perfection, and that this perfection is driven by the dark desires of the soul. By dark desires he is referring to the lowest motivating force of the soul that lead the lower cognitive states, enabling perceptions that are not focused through understanding. In addition, Junker is distinguishing in degree of sensory feelings, which he expands on later in the essay. Through the arts, he explains, sensory pleasures are raised to a higher degree of perfection, the effect of which leads to cognition and a greater moral sense, making the arts indispensable. As stated previously, this greater moral purpose of the arts was first expounded on by Baumgarten himself as the primary function of the lower cognitive states, which was later continued in the writings of Sulzer. Further demonstrating his reliance on the Wolffian/Baumgartian cognitive model, Junker writes that feelings become clear ideas (*Vorstellungen*), which is knowledge of an object in its absence and requires the faculty of imagination. Therefore, all external ideas originate in sense perception.⁸² This is a basic precept of rational philosophy.

Quoting Moses Mendelssohn's "Über die Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften" (1757), Junker writes:

The beauty of art in general, says Moses, is the self-appointed mistress of all of our feelings, the foundation of our natural desires, and the animated spirit, that transforms the speculative knowledge of truth into feelings, and incites to a more active resolution.⁸³

Thus, in his citation of Mendelssohn Junker admits that beauty not only controls our feelings, but is also a natural desire of the soul. Beauty is thus a speculative truth, a

⁸² Junker, 7.

⁸³ "Die Schönheit der Kunst überhaupt, sagt Moses, ist die eigenmächtige Beherrscherin aller unserer Empfindungen, der Grund von allen unsern natürlichen Trieben, und der beseelende Geist, der die spekulative Erkenntniß der Wahrheit in Empfindungen verwandelt, und zu thätiger Entschließung anfeuert." Junker, 3-4.

phrase also used by Sulzer to define the intuition of perfection, and speculative truth is felt in the body. Junker does, however, alter Mendelssohn's text slightly with the addition of the words "of art in general." In doing so he placed this statement in the context of the arts, whereas Mendelssohn was describing more generally beauty in nature. Through this change, Junker acknowledges that beauty in the arts, just as beauty in nature, is itself a speculative truth that is experienced through the body, which can inspire one's actions. Delegated to a mere footnote, he explains that beauty in music is achieved through "sensory ordering, an agreement of single notes with the whole (meaning melody), the alternating relationship of notes to one another, imitation, and all passions that may be expressed through notes."⁸⁴ Junker does not take the time to explain it further, which is an indication that he is more concerned with the bodily response to music in this explanation of its worth than with the construction of beautiful music that can arouse such a response.

As previously mentioned, Junker evaluates the different senses according to degree, and places them on a scale of coarse, fine, and spiritual based on one's awareness of the feeling of the sense.⁸⁵ The more coarse senses, defined as the "bodily sense of the animal man," relies on the conscious effect on one's sensory tools (*Werkzeug*). These include the lower senses of taste and smell, which are not useful for the arts.⁸⁶ The finer senses, namely hearing and seeing, on the other hand, do not make one conscious of its effects. Junker considers them the noble senses because they are more closely connected to the soul. Finally, the spiritual feeling occurs without contact of the soul and organs and

⁸⁴ "die sinnliche Ordnung, die Uebereinstimmung einzelner Töne zum Ganzen, die wechselseitige Beziehung der Töne auf einander, die Nachahmung und alle Leidenschaften, die durch Töne auszudrücken sind." Junker, 3.

⁸⁵ Junker, 8.

⁸⁶ Junker, 8.

is the highest feeling of moral good. The senses of seeing and hearing, being the middle step of the tripartite divisions of the senses, are in a unique position, he explains. They are, on the one hand, physically felt in the body like the coarser senses, and on the other hand, not consciously felt, like the spiritual sense. Thus, the finer senses can be developed through the visual and musical arts for a greater moral good.⁸⁷ Of the two, music is the most powerful of the arts. It can arouse a feeling in the heart that is completely analogous to the passions, and these are indicated to the listener through signs. He explains that unlike the sense of sight, hearing is finer because it has a great sensitivity to the nuances of sound, which enables one to recognize these signs more easily.⁸⁸ Finally, because it takes place in time, music is a more active experience by the listener compared to the visual arts:

A wise man says that music leaves the greatest part of its effects on the imagination of the listener; with the visual arts, however, the artist is almost exclusively active, while the audience is almost exclusively passive. On the other hand, in music the listeners influence themselves together with and as much as the artist, and indeed must be involved with it through quite different states of mind.⁸⁹

This last point examines the role of temporality, a characteristic unique to the experience of music, which enables a deeper and more effective arousal of an *empfindsam* state in the listener. Music is an interaction between the listener and the composer because, through the temporal process of hearing music, the imagination of the listener is stirred, thus allowing the listener to create new ideas in their mind while listening. Over time the changing impressions of music allow for changes in the state of mind. The static nature of

⁸⁷ Junker, 8-10.

⁸⁸ Junker, 9-17

⁸⁹ “Daher sagt ein Weiser, die Musik überläßt den größten Theil ihrer Wirkungen den Einbildungskraft der Hörenden; bei den bildenden Künsten ist aber der Künstler fast ganz allein thätig; der Zuschauer fast ganz leidend. Dahingegen in der Musik der Hörer mit dem Künstler zugleich auf sich selbst mit wirkt, und zwar aus verschiedenen Gemüthszuständen, mit wirken muß.” Junker, 17n.

the visual arts, according to Junker, limits the impressions perceived by the audience, and consequently, the number of different effective states of the mind. This increased number of states of mind offered by listening to music allows for greater exploration of one's *Empfindungen*, thus allowing for a greater moral development, giving music a greater moral worth. Junker's comment that the audience is involved in the artistic experience, not a mere spectator, demonstrates that the act of listening to music is an active one that accounts for the subjective response in the experience as the interaction between the composer (through the musical work) and the listener. Looking back to the degrees of sensations, those feelings of the body, the mind, and the spirit, all three take part in this experience, which can enable a physical change in the mental state of the individual leading to the development of a beautiful soul. The body first perceives the music, the imagination of the mind is stirred, which ultimately touches the soul, or spiritual feeling, allowing for a true aesthetic transformation.

Sulzer and Junker disagree on which sensation is the most powerful sense for the arts. They do agree, however, that the beautiful arts facilitate a transformative power on the soul that can both give enjoyment to the audience, and also mold their moral development. Literary works also attempted to demonstrate the effective power of music, proving its ability to move the senses and influence one's moral character.

2.3.3 Case Study: Literary Representation of the Aesthetic Power of Music

Jean Paul Friedrich Richter (1763-1825), an early German romantic writer, illustrates the potential effect of music in an elaborate scene of his semi-autobiographical

novel *Hesperus* (1794).⁹⁰ While this is a fictional account, this very popular novel demonstrated for his audience the importance of being sensitive of character, the truths that can be communicated through the arts, as well as the ideal experience of music. Jean Paul provides a deeper understanding of the power of music, proving that even the most rational person can be inspired to discover beautiful truths if confronted with a beautiful work of art.

The main character of in the novel, Victor, who is the son of English nobility, was trained to be a physician, and, as a rational thinker, does not believe in love at first sight. He is proven wrong, however, when during the performance of an Adagio movement of a Stamitz symphony at a garden party, he is transported into an *empfindsam* state, in which his faculties of reason are suppressed and he is open to experience the overwhelming sensations brought on by the music. When he sees Clotilda at the concert, a woman with whom his friend is deeply in love, Victor's perception of her becomes immediately clear as he realizes his love for her. Through this episode, Jean Paul suggests that listening to music, and more specifically, an Adagio, is considered equivalent to a dream-state, in which the mind is less active in its ability to focus impressions. Jean Paul cannot describe the Adagio with distinct representations; rather, he must do so with confused images in a highly poetic language. For Victor, the confused impressions caused by the Adagio are too powerful for him to control through reason. The Adagio conjures up other impressions in Victor's mind, impressions, which, like music, are not able to be defined, yet contain beautiful truths:

⁹⁰ Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, *Hesperus oder Fünfundvierzig Hundposttage* (Berlin: Matzdorff, 1753). For English translation, see Richter, *Hesperus or Forty-Five Dog-Post-Days*, translated by Charles T. Brooks (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1865).

There is in a man a mighty wish which was never fulfilled: it has no name, it seeks its object, though all that thou namest it and all joys are not its reality; but it recurs, when in a summer night thou lookest to the north or towards the distant mountains, or when moonlight is on the earth, or the heavens are studded with stars, or when thou are very happy[...]. But this wish, to which nothing can give a name, – our strings and tones name it to the human spirit.⁹¹

The “mighty wish,” which cannot be defined by reason, is experienced at night, during a time of dreams when one’s cognitions are too weak to focus impressions. The images of nature – the distant mountains, the moonlight, the stars – are, according to rational philosophy, clear, but confused objects whose individual parts cannot be distinguished. The ultimate obscure object, the indefinable wish, can only be described through other obscure objects, which, in this case, are music and nature. Thus, *Empfindsamkeit*, as an experience of the lower faculties of cognition, can only be achieved when the impressions are both clear and confused. Victor’s senses were so overwhelmed by the Adagio that he entered into an *empfindsam* state and discovered a truth that he would not have discovered through reason and understanding: his love for Clotilda. Victor for the first time heard the Adagio not only through the noble sense of hearing, but also through his moral sense, enabling him to discover a truth from within himself. Music had an effective change on his heart, which allowed him to discover a love for Clotilda.

Literary examples of the experience of music demonstrate the contemporary view of the expressive powers of music on the mind and the heart. While philosophers were interested, on the one hand, in identifying the effective cause of these effects, they were also concerned on the other with the question of how artists experience this power and consequently infuse it into their works of art. The process of artistic creation is explained through the theory of *Empfindungen* and the artists’ experience of them. Artists were

⁹¹ Jean Paul, 369.

known to have special access to their own *Empfindungen*, which was a source of their creative power.

2.4 *Empfindungen* and the Creative Power of the Artist

Within rational aesthetics there were often described two different means for the process of artistic creation. The first appears to highlight a more intuitive perspective on the arts, while the second often stems from a more intellectual perspective, through higher cognitive powers. In the latter, these definitions relate to the aesthetic experience of overwhelming *Empfindungen*, as exemplified in Sulzer's discussion of the powers of inspiration (*Begeisterung*). Invention (*Erfindung*), using higher cognitive powers, and also a crucial tool in the creation of the beautiful arts, was likewise understood from two perspectives. The first definition of invention comes from its long history as a rhetorical device, while the second is described as a conduit for discovery. Inspiration and invention are critical concepts in understanding the process of artistic production in rational aesthetics, and both show the importance of feelings in the creation the beautiful arts. Furthermore, both the ability to be inspired and to discover through invention from within the self were markers of artistic genius, a frequently explored theory among aesthetic philosophers.

2.4.1 Inspiration (*Begeisterung*)

Sulzer's definition of inspiration in the *Allgemeine Theorie* identifies a special experience by artists according to rational aesthetic theories and confirms the presence of the *empfindsam* state as defined above. The experience of inspiration, Sulzer writes, allows the artist to more freely express themselves through their art. He explains that

All Artists of some Genius affirm that they feel from time to time an extraordinary effectiveness of the Soul, in which work is tremendously easy; because the imagination is developed without great effort, and the best thoughts come flowing with such abundance, as if they were given from a higher Power.⁹²

This special experience of heightened effectiveness (*erhöhet* *Wirksamkeit*) enables the artist to easily express ideas, which gives the work "a new degree of life."⁹³ This effect can occur in two ways, either through the powers of desire (*Begehrungskräfte*) or through the imaginative powers (*Vorstellungskräfte*) of the Soul.⁹⁴ The difference between the two forms of inspiration is that the former is developed exclusively through the senses, while the latter formulates ideas through the higher faculty of imagination. Both forms of inspiration originate from a lively impression (*lebhaften Eindruck*) made on the soul "that makes an object of particular aesthetic power in the Soul."⁹⁵ Hence, while feeling the powers of inspiration in a lower cognitive state, artists can not only more freely express themselves, but can also create a work that has a special aesthetic power, which in turn could have the ability to effect another.

The first form of inspiration, using the powers of desire, Sulzer describes as an "enthusiasm of the heart" (*Enthusiasmus des Herzens*). As previously mentioned, rational theory considered the faculty of desire one of the lowest motivating forces of the soul, thus placing this experience in the lowest of cognitive states. Desire is what drives the attention of soul and the mind towards certain objects or feelings. This state is

⁹² "Alle Künstler von einigem Genie versichern, daß sie bisweilen eine ausserordentliche Wirksamkeit der Seele fühlen, bey welcher die Arbeit ungemein leicht wird; da die Vorstellung sich ohne große Bestrebung entwickeln, und die besten Gedanken mit solchem Ueberfluß zuströmen, als wenn sie von einer höhern Kraft eingegeben würden." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Begeisterung," 1:349.

⁹³ "einen neuen Grad des Lebens." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Begeisterung," 1:349.

⁹⁴ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Begeisterung," 1:349.

⁹⁵ "den ein Gegenstand von besondrer ästhetischer Kraft in der Seele macht." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Begeisterung," 1:349-350.

experienced through “reverent, political, tender, or sensual rapture” and creates impressions that are “livelier than one’s knowledge of its composition.”⁹⁶ Sulzer adds:

Then the soul becomes all feeling; it knows of nothing outside, but only of what is inside itself. All ideas of things outside itself recede into darkness; the soul sinks into a dream, whose effects for the most part restrain one’s reason as much as enlivens one’s feelings (*Empfindungen*).⁹⁷

Sulzer is describing the lower cognitive *empfindsam* state in which the upper faculties of cognition are suppressed and one experiences sensations from within the self. From impressions of objects with special aesthetic powers, the artist is able to experience sensations of the soul in a dream-like state. This description of an *empfindsam* state also coincides with Sulzer’s definition of *Empfindung*. While in an inspired state, ideas outside of oneself receded into darkness, meaning one is not contemplating the object to understand it more clearly, as this would lead to understanding. Instead the ideas can be described as confused, according to rational philosophy. The internal feelings of the impression are driven only by those dark (or unclear) desires of the soul. By enlivening one’s feelings of the object, one allows the aesthetic object to make an impression on the soul. This impression can effect a change on one’s soul, which leads to its moral development.

The second form of inspiration, employing the power of imagination, uses a higher level of cognition. Still, according to Sulzer, nothing is seen clearly in the soul except the feeling of the object. This feeling is now subject to the play of the imagination, which is able to make the impossible possible through the correspondence of different

⁹⁶ “andächtige, oder politische, oder zärtliche, oder wollüstige Schwärmereyen.” “ist das Gefühl seiner Wirkung lebhafter, als die Kenntniß seiner Beschaffenheit.” Sulzer, *Allegemeine Theorie*, “Begeisterung,” 1:349-350.

⁹⁷ Sulzer, “General Theory of the Fine Arts,” in *Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment*, translated and edited by Thomas Christensen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 33.

feelings. When one is inspired through the power of imagination, other feelings are brought forth from within that have some relationship to the present feeling of the soul, which can allow one to easily express:

the liveliness and power of the expression; the sweet talkativeness of tender affects; the wild, amazing, or heart-touching expression in severe passions; the great diversity of delightful or powerful images; various shades of feelings; the strange and dreamy connections of objects; the tone that is so exactly fitted to feeling; and everything, that otherwise reveals itself in this kind of inspiration.⁹⁸

Thus, the original feeling of the object sets off the imagination to create in the mind new and different impressions that otherwise would not have been possible without the force of the inspiration from the object. Both types of inspiration begin from the stimulation of the beauty of an object. Through the power of desire, the mind is completely suppressed and all feeling of the object take over, whereas with the power of the imagination, other feelings are brought into an interplay within the mind. Regardless of the type, the force of inspiration on the soul allows one to more easily express thoughts and ideas.

Sulzer writes that when poets want to express their feelings during inspired states they grab their lyre and sing hymns, odes, or elegies.⁹⁹ For composer-musicians such as Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, this type of inspired condition was expressed at the keyboard. There is evidence from contemporaneous accounts that Bach indeed entered into an inspired state during his improvisations. When Charles Burney visited Bach in Hamburg in 1772, he described an evening of improvised free fantasias by the composer, recalling:

⁹⁸ “die Lebhaftigkeit und Stärke des Ausdrucks; die süße Schwatzhaftigkeit in zärtlichen Affekten; der wilde, erstaunliche, oder herzzührende Ausdruck in heftigen Leidenschaften; die große Mannigfaltigkeit lieblicher oder starker Bilder; die vielfältigen Schattierungen der Empfindung; die seltsamen und träumerischen Verbindungen der Gegenstand; der, jeder Empfindung so genau angemessene, Ton, und alles, was sonst in dieser Art der Begeisterung sich offenbaret.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Begeisterung,” 1:350-351.

⁹⁹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Begeisterung,” 1:351.

After dinner...I prevailed upon him to sit down again to a clavichord, and he played, with little intermission, till near eleven o'clock at night. During this time, he grew so animated and possessed, that he not only played, but looked like one inspired. His eyes were fixed, his under lip fell, and drops of effervescence distilled from his countenance.¹⁰⁰

This and other accounts of Bach improvising at the keyboard by Carl Friedrich Cramer, and Johann Friedrich Reichardt connect music performance to the lower faculties of cognition and the state of inspiration. Burney wrote that Bach was “possessed,” and “looked like one inspired.”¹⁰¹ Reichardt recounted that Bach “puts his entire soul into [his improvisations], as is abundantly clear from the utter repose, one might almost say lifelessness of his body.”¹⁰² Cramer said that Bach improvises them when he is in “the right frame of mind for them.”¹⁰³ All three accounts suggest that Bach entered an altered psychological state during his improvisations, and, more specifically, Burney and Reichardt both imply a dreamlike or trance state, which indeed is the *empfindsam* state of inspiration. Feeling only from the essence of his soul, he demonstrated his ability to develop his *Empfindungen* from within himself.

If inspiration is a creative state from the lower powers of cognition, then invention, a term reserved for the arts according to Sulzer, is a product of reason.¹⁰⁴ While invention belongs to the higher faculties of cognition, the ultimate goal of inventing artistic ideas is to have an effect on the human temperament.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, the

¹⁰⁰ Charles Burney, *Dr. Burney's Musical Tours in Europe, Volume II An Eighteenth-Century Musical Tour in Central Europe and the Netherlands*, ed. Percy A. Scholes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 219.

¹⁰¹ Burney, 219.

¹⁰² Translated in Hans-Günter Ottenberg, *C.P.E. Bach*, trans. by Philip Whitmore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 169 from Johann Friedrich Reichardt, *Briefe eines aufmerksamen Reisenden die Musik betreffend*, v.2 (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1977 [reprint of Frankfurt and Breslau edition, 1776]), 15.

¹⁰³ Translated in Ottenberg, 167-168 from Carl Friedrich Cramer, *Magazin der Music*, v.2, (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1971 [reprint of Hamburg, 1786]), 871.

¹⁰⁴ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 55-56.

¹⁰⁵ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 55-56.

faculty of inspiration is for the artist to experience their own *Empfindungen*, whereas the higher powers of invention were to create artworks for influencing the *Empfindungen* of others.

2.4.2 Invention (*Erfindung*)

In her book *The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment*, Stephanie Buchenau posits that the origins of aesthetics in the eighteenth century stem from a philosophical problem of method and invention.¹⁰⁶ She suggests that Francis Bacon first identified the issue in the seventeenth century, and rational philosophers of the eighteenth century pursued resolutions, which lead to the development of aesthetic theories.¹⁰⁷ A critical distinction that Bacon makes in his definition of invention, according to Buchenau, is the purpose of invention. Formerly understood as part of the rhetorical process, invention was merely a method for presenting and classifying knowledge. In contrast, Bacon was interested in a method of invention that could lead to discovery of things not already known.¹⁰⁸ Invention as part of the rhetorical process was considered secondary, and merely a part of the art of discourse. Invention as discovery, on the other hand, was the “primary mode of the human experience.”¹⁰⁹ This change marks a shift away from mimetic concepts of art. Considering the argument from this new perspective of discovery, it is clear that Sulzer was also participating in the dialogue on the art of invention. In his definition of *Erfindung*, Sulzer recognizes the two types of invention, one of which can be understood as a part of the process of rhetoric, and the other as an act of discovery, and he gives precedence to the latter.

¹⁰⁶ Buchenau, *The Foundations of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment*.

¹⁰⁷ Buchenau, 18.

¹⁰⁸ Buchenau, 18-24.

¹⁰⁹ Bacon quoted in Buchenau, 19.

Invention, according to Sulzer, is always a product of reason. Using thought and reflection, an artist invents the artwork in order to express an idea. In the first type of invention, the goal of the work is already established, and one uses the process of invention to determine the means for obtaining that goal. The reverse is true of the second type of invention. This type of invention begins with an idea, and through reflection, one discovers how it can be used to obtain a specific goal.¹¹⁰ While both types of invention require the process of reason through thought and reflection, Sulzer writes that artists must also “possess experience, a rich and lively fantasy, and a refined sentiment.”¹¹¹ Through the artist’s imagination, sensible objects and ideas can be discovered, and the powers of reason determine which ideas are suitable for achieving the desired effect.¹¹²

When one has already decided the goal of an artwork, Sulzer specifies, the first type of invention is useful for choosing the path of towards that goal. He provides as examples the organization of speeches by orators or the setting of a pre-existing text to music by composers.¹¹³ This definition presents itself as a rhetorical type of invention, which is aimed towards creating a means for presenting ideas. These ideas can only become perfect if they are clear and distinct in the mind of the composer.¹¹⁴ In order to stimulate the power of invention, Sulzer suggests to:

banish all other thoughts, leaving only a clear conception of his goal in his soul. His attention should be focused only upon this. If this does not happen, she should withdraw himself to isolation. He will eventually begin to associate everything that comes to mind with his subject...If the spirit is disposed in just this way, he can be assured that what he seeks will reveal itself little by little. A host of useful ideas will slowly collect in his mind,

¹¹⁰ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 55-56.

¹¹¹ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 56.

¹¹² Sulzer, “General Theory,” 56.

¹¹³ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 56.

¹¹⁴ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 59.

and he will eventually be able to select the best of them without difficulty.¹¹⁵

This type of invention is only clarifying pre-existing ideas in order to determine how to present them in a logical fashion. Using the powers of reason, one focuses attention on the ideas at hand to try to understand them more clearly in order to make a logical presentation of those ideas.

Sulzer writes that the most important inventions come from the second type, in which the composer begins with an idea, and through a re-working of material, invents something entirely new.¹¹⁶ He explains that:

Whoever possesses this skill will not only be able to see beyond every clear idea to discover a further set of related ideas, but on other occasions be able to present it in an entirely new manner ideas that at one time seemed perfectly clear. In this way the power of invention can open up entirely new terrain.¹¹⁷

According to Buchenau, the significance in this discovery type of invention is a change from a closed concept of the universe to one where things can be discovered beyond the known human experience.¹¹⁸ Through his definition of invention, Sulzer acknowledges that the arts have the power to discover new knowledge. He also explains that a composer identified the second form of invention as a part of his compositional practice. First, according to this anonymous composer, the idea comes to him only dimly, but over time he can more clearly see the importance of the idea, and is able to set it in the proper light.¹¹⁹ Sulzer adds that a composer “never could have invented anything as good had he decided ahead of time to look for something having the identical character of

¹¹⁵ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 58.

¹¹⁶ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 57-61.

¹¹⁷ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 58.

¹¹⁸ Buchenau, 19-20.

¹¹⁹ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 61.

expression.”¹²⁰ Thus, Sulzer demonstrates that the second form of invention leads to more important ideas, since they are in fact discovering something new rather than replicating other ideas.

In his book on the principles of taste, *Grundbegriffe zur Philosophie über den Geschmack* (1785), Gotthilf Samuel Steinbart (1738-1809) also examined the role of invention in relation to the beautiful arts.¹²¹ He explains that before an artist can create a work of taste, he must first invent the main material. Invention, Steinbart writes, is the discovery of new truths (*Entdeckung neuer Wahrheiten*). This type of discovery, though rare he admits, increases the knowledge and arts for entire people.¹²² Just as explained by Sulzer, Steinbart also discusses two manners of invention. In the first manner, one invents the means for a pre-determined purpose. There is no uncertainty in the ideas of the artist; he must merely take these already-known concepts and connect them together in his mind for the purpose of his artwork.¹²³ This definition fits into the rhetorical tradition of invention, and he cites Quintilian and Johann Mattheson for the rules of invention in the disciplines of rhetoric and music, respectively.¹²⁴ In regards to the second type of invention, the artist

always carries the thought with himself to collect materials for artworks, and that he observes all new objects that occur to him in relationship to his art, and thinks about whether he could not use them with advantage to a work of Taste.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 61.

¹²¹ Gotthilf Samuel Steinbart, *Grundbegriffe zur Philosophie über den Geschmack* (Züllichau: im Verlag der Waysenhaus = und Frommanischen Buchhandlung, 1785).

¹²² Steinbart, 127.

¹²³ Steinbart, 127-128.

¹²⁴ Steinbart, 129.

¹²⁵ “er immer den Gedanken mit sich herumtrage, Materialien zu Kunstwerken zu sammeln, und daß er alle neue Gegenstände, die ihm vorkommen, in Beziehung auf seine Kunst betrachte, und darüber nachdenke, ob er sie nicht mit Vortheil zu einem Werke des Geschmacks gebrauchen könne.” Steinbart, 130.

Artists can see everything as a source for an invention of a new idea, thus must always be available to observe these sources and consider their potential use for works of art. Great artists usually discover their new inventions through approximate, rather than strong reflection (*Nachdenken*). For painters, this is through approximate views of features, expressions, or positions; for composers, one makes new discoveries "through approximate hearing of tones" of the passions of a man in order to invent his new piece of music.¹²⁶ Thus, Steinbart concludes, artists should always be collecting something that could be used later for works of art, for the artist could discover new ideas and things that he could never have found through a sharp pondering (*Nachsinnen*).¹²⁷ In this definition of invention the experience is much more spontaneous. New ideas are discovered on the fringes of already formed ideas and sounds, which are perceived in a special way by the artist.

Both Sulzer and Steinbart acknowledge in their definitions of invention that the arts have the power to discover new knowledge. In addition, both recognize the long rhetorical tradition of invention as a means for creating a convincing arguments; however, they also agree that the main purpose of invention is in the discovery of new knowledge, whether scientific or artistic, and this can occur through the perception of an object. The basis for this new knowledge begins first in the imagination, which originates in *Empfindungen*. A fundamental difference between inspiration and invention is the effect of the object on the individual. Through inspiration, one allows their perceptions of an object to effect their body as physical impressions of *Empfindungen*, which change the inner state of the soul. During the process of invention, regardless of the type, one

¹²⁶ "durch ungefähre Anhörung der Töne." Steinbart, 131.

¹²⁷ Steinbart, 131.

focuses attention on the object in order to make it clearer and to gain knowledge of it.

Both invention and inspiration have their origins in *Empfindungen*, and both are critical characteristics of an artistic genius.

2.4.3 Genius

Sulzer had great interest in the concept of the genius and dedicated numerous articles to defining its characteristics. In each Sulzer emphasizes that the genius is not only able to know and understand intellectual ideas, but more importantly for the artistic genius, is able to experience the power of *Empfindungen* on the soul.

In his article titled “Analyse du Génie,” published in 1757, Sulzer states that the essence of a genius is always marked by an active force of the soul that makes it “easier to feel within oneself.”¹²⁸ In addition, “the immediate effect of this intensity of the active force of the soul is a greater *sensibilité*.”¹²⁹ Therefore, a genius is one who possesses the ability to explore the inner self and can experience *Empfindungen* with a greater intensity. He writes in the *Allgemeine Theorie* that the attributes of a genius are both a natural inclination towards creation and a greater fertility of the spirit.¹³⁰ The genius is “master of the power of his soul (*Seelenkräfte*), knows and feels more sharply than others, and therefore, his ideas (*Vorstellungen*) and feelings (*Empfindungen*) are more in his power.”¹³¹ Sulzer explains that the genius is able to see things more brightly and clearly, which illuminates both the upper area of the spirit, having to do with abstract concepts, as well as sensory concepts (*sinnliche Begriffe*), which are part of the dark areas of

¹²⁸ Paraphrase of “C’est cette force active, qu’il est plus facile de sentir au dedans de soi-même,” in Johann Georg Sulzer, “Analyse de Génie,” in *Histoire de l’Académie Royale des Sciences et des Belle-Lettres de Berlin* (1757), 394.

¹²⁹ “L’effet immédiat de cette intensité de la force active de l’âme, est une plus grande sensibilité.” Sulzer “Analyse,” 395.

¹³⁰ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Genie,” 2:362-367.

¹³¹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Genie,” 2:362.

Empfindungen. Through this light the genius feels an inspired fire that makes the soul active, and the genius can discover thoughts from within himself.¹³² Therefore, the genius maintains a special effective power of the soul that allows for the discovery of truths through the sensory perception. These descriptions demonstrate the ability of the genius to develop both the upper and the lower cognitive faculties. Being able to see clearly the upper area of the spirit and understanding abstract concepts requires a higher level of cognition. Recalling the definition of invention, this ability is crucial to the discovery of new artworks. Through the development of sensory concepts of the dark areas of *Empfindungen*, the genius experiences the effects of inspiration through the powers of desire and the imagination. Therefore, a true genius, with highly developed upper and lower cognitive faculties, is one with a great intellect and emotions.

Sulzer further outlines the characteristics of a genius in his article “Entwicklung des Begriffs vom Genie.”¹³³ He writes that the word genius is used in many different ways, and cites the most well-known definition by Jean-Baptiste Du Bos, who specifies the skill and ease with which one of genius is able to carry out his work.¹³⁴ Sulzer, however, writes that there are numerous characteristics that must come together in a great genius, all of which he named are designated as upper and lower cognitive faculties in Wolffian/Baumgartian philosophy. These characteristics are: attention, reflection, imagination, wit, memory, and the faculty of judgment.¹³⁵ The most basic foundation for the ease and skill of a genius comes from a basic force (*Grundkraft*) of the soul that he,

¹³² Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Genie,” 2:363-363.

¹³³ Sulzer, “Entwicklung des Begriffs vom Genie,” in *Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte Philosophische Schriften aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt* (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1773), 307-322.

¹³⁴ Sulzer, “Entwicklung,” 308.

¹³⁵ Sulzer, “Entwicklung,” 308.

quoting Leibniz, calls the substance of the soul.¹³⁶ The basic substance of the soul, which Leibniz calls the monad (see Chapter 1.2.1), is inherent in a person; therefore, Sulzer is suggesting that one is born with the characteristics of the genius, rather than develops genius through skill or learning.

Sulzer explains that there are some who have a great ability in one or two areas, but these are not true geniuses.¹³⁷ Likewise, not everyone who is an artist has genius, but may still be able to compose good works. One with intellect but little feeling can compose pleasant music so long as they can stimulate pleasure on the system of the nerves. These works, says Sulzer, are likely not works of genius, and are mostly for the *Liebhaber*.¹³⁸ Furthermore, some works may appear to be of genius, but are merely mechanically following rules of harmony and rhythm and are devoid of the power of expression. Thus, while the work may appear perfect in its construction, it may not have the ability to effect the soul of the audience. For that reason, Sulzer writes, there are two ways to judge genius in a work of art: one is through the art itself, the other is through the material, which gives it a great soul.¹³⁹ Therefore, only a genius, who has developed both his powers of intellect and of feeling can create works of art that both follow the rules and can move the *Empfindungen* of the audience.

The title of genius was reserved for a select few in the eighteenth century, and Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach was identified in numerous sources as one of the greatest *Originalgenie* of his generation. Descriptions of Bach and his music further demonstrate the qualities Sulzer defines as essential characteristics of a genius. For example, Johann

¹³⁶ Sulzer, "Entwicklung," 309.

¹³⁷ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Genius," 2:363.

¹³⁸ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Genius," 2:364-365.

¹³⁹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Genius," 2:366.

Friedrich Reichardt wrote in 1775 that Bach's songs and harmonies have "originality, richness, the noblest and the most beautiful thoughts."¹⁴⁰ In relation to Bach's symphonies, Friedrich Nicolai called Bach a "truly great original composer."¹⁴¹ Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart described Bach's keyboard pieces as having the most extraordinary genius and richness in *Empfindungen*.¹⁴² Originality and feeling are two qualities that are mostly greatly emphasized in these selected quotations. These two qualities, which identify Bach as a true musical genius, attest to his greatly developed upper and lower cognitive faculties. The originality of his works shows his ability to discover new ideas through the faculty of invention. That his thoughts are described as most noble, beautiful, and rich suggests that Bach had a highly developed sense of *Empfindsamkeit*. The latter is also demonstrated in accounts of Bach improvising at the keyboard as discussed above.

While genius was considered an essential characteristic of artists in order to create truly original works and be able to move the audience, the effects of the work of art can only be felt if the audience has developed the sense to receive these effects. The growing number of musical amateurs and publications for this audience in the second half of the eighteenth century indicate that the arts were a crucial part in forming the sense of taste in the members of the social class, which was the overall goal of rational aesthetics.

¹⁴⁰ Hans-Günter Klein, ed., *Er ist Original!: Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach: sein musikalisches Werk in Autographen und Erstdrucken aus der Musikabteilung der Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz* (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1988), 11.

¹⁴¹ Klein, 11.

¹⁴² Klein, 11.

2.5 Taste, the Musical Amateur, and Identity Formation

2.5.1 Defining the Faculty Taste: An Inner *Gefühl*

The defining and acquisition of good taste was central to the discussion of aesthetics and bound up in the principles of beauty. It was considered a cognitive faculty that was to be cultivated in order to increase one's faculty of judgment and to more deeply feel the effective powers of the beautiful arts. The greater the faculty of taste, the more strongly one feels the *schönen Künste*, thus allowing one to feel the power of music. For example, one feels not just through the sensory feeling of the ears, but through the spiritual sense of the soul, as Junker described it. Through the effects on the soul, one can develop their moral sense, which is the ultimate goal of the arts in the second half of the eighteenth century. Thus, good taste enables the subjective response of the experience of beauty, for without a refined faculty of taste, one cannot fully experience the beauty of the object. Furthermore, the titles of *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* were designators of the level of one's faculty of taste and explain the ability to which one could be effected by the object, and ultimately one's ability to judge a work of the beautiful arts. Therefore, the basic principles of taste, just as in aesthetics as a whole, were not for the mere purpose of judging pleasure or displeasure produced from the perception of an artistic object, though this was considered the first level of the experience of a work of art. The basic function of the faculty of taste was to enable the full experience of the beauty of an object, allowing it to effect the spiritual sense and bring on an effective change in the individual: the higher the level of taste, the greater the capacity for moral development, which leads to a beautiful spirit. Developing good taste was, therefore, an essential part of the aesthetic program, since in order for the works of art to have an effect on society, individuals must have a developed sense of taste through the experience of *Empfindungen*.

Sulzer defines taste as:

in principle nothing other than the faculty to sense the Beautiful, just as reason is the faculty to perceive Truth, Perfection, and Correctness; [taste is] the moral sense (*Gefühl*), the ability to feel the Good.¹⁴³

Through this definition, Sulzer makes a correlation between taste and reason as opposite, but equal faculties, thus affirming the importance of aesthetics for an individual. He adds that through the faculty of taste, one is able to perceive the beautiful, which is not just experiencing the works of art as pleasant, but allowing the work to effect the moral feeling. He adds that the inner sense of taste is felt not merely in the imagination, but its beauty is felt as an effective power on the soul.¹⁴⁴ He later adds:

Taste is in principle nothing other than the inner sense (*innere Gefühl*), whereby one feels the stimulation of the true and good...At the same time it arouses such a correct sense of order (*Ordnung*), Beauty (*Schönheit*) and agreement (*Uebereinstimmung*), [and] the reluctance and contempt against the bad, disorderly and ugly.¹⁴⁵

Therefore, without a developed sense of taste, an individual cannot be fully effected by the work because they are not able to perceive its perfection. When the beauty of the work is fully experienced, one's moral sense is developed through the perception of perfection, which is the order, beauty, and agreement inherent in the beauty of the object. This conception of taste as being individual, dependent on the ability of the subject to perceive the object, reinforces Mendelssohn's statement that the judgment of an artwork is both objective, in the perfection of the construction of the work, and subjective, in the listener's perception of its beauty.

¹⁴³ “Der Geschmack ist im Grunde nichts anders, als das Vermögen das Schöne zu empfinden, so wie die Vernunft das Vermögen ist, das Wahre, Vollkommene und Richtige zu erkennen; das sittliche Gefühl, die Fähigkeit das Gute zu fühlen.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Geschmack,” 2:371.

¹⁴⁴ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Geschmack,” 2:371.

¹⁴⁵ “Der Geschmack ist im Grunde nichts, als das innere Gefühl, wodurch man die Reizung des Wahren und Guten empfindet...Zugleich erweckt er ein so richtiges Gefühl der Ordnung, Schönheit und Uebereinstimmung, daß Widerwillen und Verachtung gegen das Schlechte, Unordentliche und Häßliche.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Geschmack,” 2:375.

The idea of taste being an inner feeling was discussed in the inaugural issue of the monthly journal *Unterhaltungen* in January of 1766, published more than five years before Sulzer's *Allgemeine Theorie*.¹⁴⁶ This journal was dedicated to educating lay, enlightened readers on topics for social conversation, including articles on the arts and sciences, music and book reviews, and news from the large cities throughout Western Europe. The article, written by Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (1715-1769), was dedicated to defining taste and the judgment of works of music. It spanned the first two monthly issues, indicating the importance of this topic for the readers. The article's introduction provides a very basic definition of taste and taste in music:

Taste in general is the inner sense (*Gefühl*) and the judgment of those things that effect externally on our sensory work tools. This now applied to music, one can say: The musical taste exists in a judgment of the notes that are brought into our senses.¹⁴⁷

Taste, as an inner feeling, is a power of the soul, which enables one to judge the effect of a work of art on the senses. Gellert further explains that music, like the other beautiful arts, has its origin in nature, and the more similar the object is to nature, the more likely one will judge the work of art as good; therefore, the arts are governed by the rules of nature.¹⁴⁸ By relating the judgment of the music to nature, the author indicates the connection to the perfection of nature to the beautiful of works of art. This relation to nature does not mean that artworks were functioning under the principles of mimesis in the strict sense, only that they were like nature in their perfection. The article is then

¹⁴⁶ Christian Fürchtegott Gellert, "Abhandlung vom musikalische Geschmacke in einem Schreiben an einen Freund," *Unterhaltungen*, Erstes Stück (Januar 1766) – Zweites Stücke (Februar 1766). The name of the author, printed only as "Gellert," is not given until after the conclusion of the second part of the essay in the second issue, pg. 161.

¹⁴⁷ "Der Geschmack überhaupt ist das innere Gefühl, und die Beurtheilung derjenigen Dingen, die äußerlich auf unsre sinnlichen Werkzeuge würken. Diese nun auf die Musik angewendet, kann man sagen: Der musikalische Geschmack bestehe in einer Beurtheilung der in unsere Sinne gebrachten Töne." Gellert, *Erstes Stück* (Januar 1766), 41-42.

¹⁴⁸ Gellert, 42.

divided into three topics on the subject of taste: on national taste, accounting for the wide range of styles across the different countries throughout Europe; on the taste of specific provinces, which includes different cities within Germany and famous composers from those cities; and finally, on the taste of different temperaments. These divisions clearly demonstrate that taste is highly individual, determined by your nationality, city of origin, as well as natural temperament, all of which imply that certain aspects of taste are somewhat innate in an individual. Even if a piece of music follows correctly all of the rules of melody and harmony, contains the right affect, and uses appropriate rhythm, it may still not be perceived as pleasant if one's temperament is not in agreement with the work, according to Gellert.¹⁴⁹ Many publications during the Enlightenment emphasize a balance between the objective and subjective aspects of judging a work of art and the importance of developing the faculty of taste through both reason and feeling.

In 1777 the journal *Der teutsche Merkur* published an article titled "Gedanken über die Ideale der Alten," edited by Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813). The article, likely written by Wieland himself, is an explanation of an excerpt from Johann Kaspar Lavater's *Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe* (1775-1778).¹⁵⁰ Just as with *Unterhaltungen*, the audience of this journal was the German bourgeoisie. Like many Enlightenment publications in North Germany, *Der teutsche Merkur* provided its readership with selections from important literary and philosophical works. Through these journals, the complex philosophies of the time were

¹⁴⁹ Gellert, *Zweite Stücke* (Februar 1766), 159.

¹⁵⁰ Christoph Martin Wieland, "Gedanken über die Ideale der Alten," in *Der teutsche Merkur*, August 1777, 121-176; continued in September 1777, 198-228. The article signed only "W," though as publisher and editor, Wieland was likely the author. Johann Caspar Lavater, *Physiognomische Fragmente, zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntniß und Menschenliebe* (Leipzig und Winterthur: Bey Weidmanns Erben und Reich, und Heinrich Steiner und Compagnie 1775-1778).

made more easily accessible to the learned audience, with only those parts necessary for the education of the everyday public extracted. In the opening of "Gedanken" he discusses the influences on man's judgment of a speculative object. Wieland explains that:

His opinion is then the result of his individual type of thinking, his Feelings (*Empfindungen*), Experiences (*Erfahrungen*), Perceptions (*Wahrnehmungen*), mostly also other perceived opinions, favorite ideas, and involuntary inclinations and tendencies of the soul.¹⁵¹

Wieland's explanation of Lavater's analysis of the subjective in judgments gives an even greater sense of volition to the perceiver, naming not innate characteristics, such as nationality or inborn temperament, but those qualities that can be learned through experience. While those innate characteristics may still have an effect on one's taste, through Wieland's/Lavater's conception, judgments can become even more unique to the individual, allowing for one's own conception of the self to influence their faculty of taste. Furthermore, through the development of the self one can refine their sense of taste. After discussing the subjective qualities of taste, Wieland then attempts to explain the concept of beauty, which, according to Lavater, was perfected by the ancient Greeks, hence the title of the essay. The question of beauty is, on the other hand, rooted in objective concepts, and equally important in the judgment of taste.

Steinbart writes in the foreword of his *Grundbegriffe zur Philosophie über den Geschmack* that the purpose of his monograph is not to create a new philosophy of taste, rather to collect those concepts from the greater writers of the time for use as a *Lehrbuch* for his own lectures, and also as a source for those interested in increasing their

¹⁵¹ "Diese seine Meynung ist dann das Resultat seiner individuellen Art zu denken, seiner Empfindungen Erfahrungen, Wahrnehmungen, meistens auch anderer vorgefaßten Meynungen, Lieblings=Ideen, und unfreywilliger Neigung und Tendenz der Seele." Wieland, 122.

knowledge about the beautiful arts and sciences.¹⁵² Steinbart's understanding of the function of the *schönen Künste* is not just to take pleasure in the beautiful and displeasure in the ugly. This conception restricts one to only feel the temporary effects on the senses and not fully realizes the more noble purposes, which is to inspire one towards the morally good and against evil.¹⁵³ Thus, Steinbart's definition of taste is rooted in the basic principles and function of aesthetics. A majority of the first part of the book, dedicated to the general theory of taste, is concerned with defining a concept of the beautiful and the ugly. On beauty he cites the Baumgartian definition, writing, "Beauty is the Perfection, in so far as it is known sensorily."¹⁵⁴ He then goes on to clarify that beautiful works contain a diversity (*Mannigfaltigkeit*) of different things against one another, along with a harmonization (*Zusammenstimmung*) of that diversity to some greater purpose or whole. Finally, this harmonization of the variety is sensory (*sinnlich*), which has an effective power on an individual.¹⁵⁵ Agreeing with the previous authors, Steinbart explains that beauty is objective, in that it must be in the object in order to be perceived, but also subjective, in so far as one is receptive to the beauty.¹⁵⁶ A primary concern in this work, however, is the objective judgment of beauty, in which he discusses topics such as the aesthetic greatness of an object, the beautiful in uniformity and simplicity, as well as aesthetic truth and perfection.¹⁵⁷ Steinbart's inclusion of these topics on the beautiful makes his general theories on art closely aligned with a Baumgartian concept of aesthetics. In addition, the second part, in which he treats a more practical approach to

¹⁵² Steinbart, XII-XIII.

¹⁵³ Steinbart, 1-2.

¹⁵⁴ "Die Schönheit ist die Vollkommenheit, so fern sie sinnlich erkannt wird." Steinbart, 54.

¹⁵⁵ Steinbart, 54-57.

¹⁵⁶ Steinbart, 58.

¹⁵⁷ See for example Steinbart, §29 Von der ästhetischen Grösse überhaupt, §30 Dreifache Art der Grösse in den Objecten, §36 Von der Einförmigkeit, §36 Von der Schönen Einfalt, §40 Von der ästhetischen Wahrheit, and §43 Von dem Vollkommenen.

taste through the art of music (*Tonkunst*), also emphasizes the objective, with topics on the appropriate use of melody, harmony, rhythms, and other technical aspects of musical composition.¹⁵⁸ The discussion of these topics are similar to those found in amateur music treatises, giving a basic explanation of formation of melodies, the use of consonance and dissonance in harmony, the character of different meters, etc. Therefore, this work meant for teaching an amateur audience the foundational principles of music, from which they can base the objective part of their aesthetic judgment.

Sulzer describes taste as a link that connects the objective and subjective judgments. He explains, "that one cannot fight about taste, be right or wrong;"¹⁵⁹ however, taste is also a skill that unites the powers of reason and the moral sense (*sittliche Gefühl*). The powers of reason allow one to observe the perfection, truth, and correctness of the work of art, while the moral sense enables one to perceive the beautiful, the pleasant, and the moral good. Reason, the moral sense, and taste are thus not three separate powers, but in fact work together to form a judgment of an object.¹⁶⁰ In the production of works of art, an artist possesses all three skills (reason, the moral sense, and taste), for they each serve a critical part in creating aesthetic objects. Through reason the artist can invent the means to achieve his final purpose, while the moral sense makes the works good for the sentiments (*Gesinnungen*) of society life (*gesellschaftliche Leben*), but

¹⁵⁸ See for example Steinbart, §79 Von der Melodie oder dem Gesange überhaupt, §81 Vom Metrischem oder Rhythmischen und dem Takt, and §85 Vom Wohlklange, Consonanz und Harmonie

¹⁵⁹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, v. 2, "Geschmack," 371.

¹⁶⁰ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:374.

taste spreads convenience over reason and sense, gives both an agreeable power to effect on the mood. Thus man can only attain perfection through uniting these three gifts of the heavens.¹⁶¹

An artist, however, can never become great if he lacks understanding and genius. They create works that lack worth and are filled with only "fine and tasteful trifles," which are mere decorations.¹⁶² These types of works are empty, as they do not have the ability to effect the soul and do not transmit the moral good; furthermore, they not only lack taste, but are even harmful. Sulzer calls this "small and merely subtle Taste," meaning that the works are only entertainment, pleasing only to the ear in the case of music.¹⁶³ Therefore, works that are not created with both genius (the objective) and expression (the subjective) and only follow the mechanical rules are meant only for the *Liebhaber*. The implications of this statement are twofold: first, it confirms that there is a categorization of the taste of amateurs; and second, that the distinction of this categorization is in the ability to perceive aesthetic beauty of an artwork and to be effected by it.

2.5.2 *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* in Society

The designations of *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* are found throughout publications in the second half of the eighteenth century; the most prominent example in the discipline of music is the series of keyboard music C.P.E. Bach titled *für Kenner und Liebhaber*, published in the years 1779-1786. The six volumes are notable not just for the music, but also as a representative of the expanding market of amateur music publications in the eighteenth century. The clever titling of the collection appeals to all ranges of amateurs, thus expanding the sale potential to a wider audience. These titles, however, meant much

¹⁶¹ "Der Geschmack streuet über Vernunft und Gefühl Annehmlichkeit, giebt beyden eine einnehmende Kraft auf die Gemüther zu würken. Also kann der Mensch nur durch Vereinigung dieser drey Gaben des Himmels zur Vollkommenheit gelangen." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:374.

¹⁶² "Die feinen und geschmacksvollen Tändler." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:372.

¹⁶³ "...kleine und blos subtile Geschmack." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:376.

more than just a connoisseur/amateur distinction that indicate the skill level of the keyboardist. With his inclusive title, Bach implies that while *Liebhaber* may take pleasure in the pieces, *Kenner* will also be able to perceive the perfection, genius, and expression in the works, thus engaging their moral sense. The title *für Kenner und Liebhaber* did not distinguish the buying audience, per se; rather, Bach was concerned with calling attention to the status of the collection: his music belonged to the realm of the beautiful and was not filled with only "fine and tasteful trifles." Furthermore, by displaying his identity as a musical genius, Bach was appealing to the identity construction of both classes of amateurs. On the one hand, *Kenner* would have been fully aware of the significance of the title and recognized Bach's implicit ranking of his works therein over other amateur publications. On the other hand, *Liebhaber* could use the collection to aspire to the status of *Kenner*, and by performing these works may even believed themselves to have transcended their own perceived status.

The titles of *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* were indeed markers of identity, indicating the development of the sense of self. To consider oneself a *Liebhaber*, given the purpose of taste, was an admission not just of one's lack of skill, but of an undeveloped sense of the self and the moral good. Thus, *Kenner* was considered an aspirational status, proof of a highly developed moral sense, whereas a *Liebhaber* designation may be a sign of modesty. This is clear by Sulzer's discussion of *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* in the *Allgemeine Theorie*. William Weber, in *The Great transformation of Musical Taste* (2008), also considers Sulzer's analysis of the *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* as bound with a sense of

identity, although his interpretation appears to be contradictory to Sulzer's intentional meanings.¹⁶⁴ Weber, citing Sulzer, writes that

The *Liebhaber* possessed a "natural" listening, "a compulsive, unthinking attention mixed with astonishment." By contrast, Sulzer saw the *Kenner's* listening "accompanied by reflection," and therefore becoming "arbitrary," tending toward the egotistical because it "draws out all attention to itself." Thus was the musical community suspicious of claims to special learning; ultimately taste was thought to be rooted in a general public.¹⁶⁵

Weber's interpretation assumes that "natural listening" and "unthinking attention" were considered the optimal manner for listening to music and attentive and reflective listening to be too self-centered; however, according to Enlightenment philosophy, just the opposite is true. Sulzer writes that the *Liebhaber*:

judges the work only on unconsidered impressions that he makes from them; he first abandons himself to that which he feels by it, and then he praises that which has pleased him, and criticizes what has displeased him, without mentioning any further reasons for it.¹⁶⁶

This means that a *Liebhaber* can only feel the simple sense of pleasure in a work of art and is not capable of perceiving the beauty, thus unable to have their soul effected by the work. Furthermore, they are not even able to explain why the work pleases or displeases them. Sulzer himself is placing a judgment on the *Liebhaber*, indicating their lack of knowledge and moral development. The title of *Kenner*, on the other hand, is an earned one, and refers to one who:

¹⁶⁴ William Weber, *The Great Transformation of Musical Taste: Concert Programming from Haydn to Brahms* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

¹⁶⁵ Weber, 27.

¹⁶⁶ "Der Liebhaber beurtheilet das Werk blos nach den unüberlegten Eindrücken, die es auf ihn macht; er überläßt sich zuerst dem, was der dabey empfindet, und den lobt er das, was ihm gefallen, tadelt, was ihm mißfallen hat, ohne weitere Gründe davon anzuführen." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Kenner," 3:6.

can judge the works of art from their inner worth, and to value the different degrees of their perfection. He must understand the mechanics of the art, and also have the execution of it in his power.¹⁶⁷

In addition to knowing the mechanical rules of the art, they also have a "distant historical knowledge of artists and artworks" and are familiar with the taste of different eras.¹⁶⁸

Finally, the *Kenner* is able to feel the beauty because "his own senses are certain and well-considered."¹⁶⁹ Sulzer describes the perception of a perfectly formed and beautiful artwork by a *Kenner* in the same way he explains the aesthetic experience of inspiration.

He writes that:

The *Kenner* who perceives it is stimulate at once from all directions, and sets each faculty (*Vermögen*), each motivating force (*Triebfeder*) of the soul in effectiveness. From there arises then the inner pleasure, which sensitive souls have of such works.¹⁷⁰

The *Kenner* is overwhelmed by his *Empfindungen*, and because of his sensitive soul, he is capable of such an experience. By specifying the *Kenner* as a sensitive soul, Sulzer implies that the *Liebhaber* is not capable of experiencing the inner pleasure of the artwork, thus the aesthetic experience. Taken altogether, the judgments of the *Kenner* are ideal since they are capable of both understanding the objective truth of the work, as well as perceiving the perfection in it, making them capable of the true experience of the artwork.

Sulzer even goes so far as to value the judgment of the *Kenner* to be higher than that of the artist. The artist, he explains, is mostly concerned with following the rules of

¹⁶⁷ "die Werke der Kunst nach ihrem innerlichen Werth zu beurtheilen, und die verschiedenen Grade ihrer Vollkommenheit zu schätzen im Stand ist...Jener muß das Mechanische der Kunst verstehen, und auch die Ausführung desselben in seiner Gewalt haben." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Kenner," 3:5.

¹⁶⁸ "die weitläufige historische Kenntnisse von Künstlern und Kunstwerken haben." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Kenner," 3:6.

¹⁶⁹ "Sein eigener Geschmack ist sicher und überlegt." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Kenner," 3:6.

¹⁷⁰ "den Kenner, der es erblickt, auf einmal von allen Seiten reizt, und jedes Vermögen, jede Triebfeder der Seele in Würksamkeit setzt. Daher entsteht denn das innige Wolgefallen, welches empfindsame Seelen an solchen Werken haben." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:373.

art in creating his given representation. Because they are "very seldom free from certain prejudice," artists often lack the distance from the work at hand to be able to provide the best judgment.¹⁷¹ That is not to say that the artist is not capable of perceiving the subjective aspect of the work, rather that his attention is focused more on judging the mechanics and execution of art. The *Liebhaber*, considered on the other end of the judgment spectrum, can only judge the pleasures they receive from the object, lacking the skills necessary for judging the objective side of artistic creation. The *Kenner*, on the other hand, can judge both the mechanics and pleasures of a work of art and can provide from this point of view a true judgment on its intrinsic value; therefore, Sulzer explains, "the *Kenner* stands in the middle between the artist and the *Liebhaber*."¹⁷² The ideal position from which one can judge a work of art is thus as a *Kenner*, which, in turn, means that judgment of the *Kenner* was the most valued. The *Kenner* were indeed of the highest arbiters of taste in society and not considered egotistical. Furthermore, while the ideal taste of society may have been rooted in the judgments of *Kenner* and not the general public as suggested by Weber, taste was ultimately rooted in the individual, dependent on their own experiences and knowledge, and crafted as a part of their identity.

The *Kenner*, as possessors of the ideal level taste, were therefore considered necessary for the forming of a morally good society. The highly-valued judgments of the *Kenner* were spread to other members of society through social entertainment and discussion, which in turn increases the moral worth of that society. Without good taste,

¹⁷¹ "sie sehr selten von gewissen Vorurtheilen frei sind." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Kenner," 3:7.

¹⁷² "Der Kenner steht zwischen dem Künstler und dem Liebhaber in der Mitte." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Kenner," 3:5.

one partakes in mere sophistry, which is an empty experience rooted in a mere "false or small Taste."¹⁷³ Sulzer further explains that:

The beautiful arts are an excellent means to spread all useful knowledge and good sentiments (*Gesinnungen*) among people, to plant each useful truth and each good feeling as a living and effective power in his soul.¹⁷⁴

The greater the taste of a society in general, the more its members are able to be taught and bettered, making society as a whole more capable of feeling the good and the true.¹⁷⁵

The *Kenner* is disgusted by the "Overly-subtle (*Spitzfindige*), Sophistic (*Sophistische*), Strained (*Gezwungene*), and Unnatural (*Unnatürliche*);"¹⁷⁶ therefore, by spreading his own taste to society, he is preventing the culture from being infiltrated by empty, tasteless artworks, which only lead to a false pleasure without moral fulfillment.

The ability to judge a work of art is as much about the work of art in question as it is about the perceiver's ability to experience that work. This ability is dependent upon both increasing the knowledge base in order to recognize the use of the correct rules of art, as well as having a developed moral sense of the self. Having great taste was a true testament to an individual's moral development and identity construction. Even those who did not identify as a *Kenner* would strive towards this goal, as this was the ultimate aim of the arts. Finally, taste was an important faculty not just for building a strong moral character in an individual, but also for creating a morally good society.

¹⁷³ "ein falscher oder kleiner Geschmack." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:376.

¹⁷⁴ "die schönen Künste eines der vornehmsten Mittel sind, alle nützliche Kenntniß und guten Gesinnungen unter den Menschen auszubreiten, jede nützliche Wahrheit und jede gute Empfindung, als eine lebendige und wirksame Kraft in seine Seele zu pflanzen." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:374-375.

¹⁷⁵ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:375.

¹⁷⁶ "Ihm ekelt vor allem Spitzfindigen, Sophistischen, Gezwungenen und Unnatürlichen, in Gedanken und Handlugen." Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Geschmack," 2:375.

2.6 Conclusion

The moral significance of the beautiful arts, based in principles of *Empfindungen*, created an increased need for the study of the arts at an amateur level. The ability of an individual to develop feelings through the reading of poems and tragedies or the performance of music was not for mere pleasure, but for forming a morally good and beautiful soul. Rational philosophy had the greatest impact on the middle (*Bürger*) class through an increased number publications on aesthetics and the arts. This audience saw the arts as a means to develop their individual taste, which could then be spread to the social environment in order to create a morally good culture. Artistic geniuses created beautiful artworks that aroused a moral feeling, which could then be learned by musical amateurs with good taste.

It was considered necessary for members of the middle class to have a developed sense of taste through the arts, and music was one of the primary means for achieving this. The musical amateur could learn good taste through two complementary experiences: privately, through performance in the home, and socially, through the performance and discussion of music with others. For this reason, the number of amateur music instruction manuals and subscription series for both individual and ensemble playing significantly increased. Musical journals and periodicals became important sources for teaching amateurs musical aesthetics, history, theory, and other important topics for developing good taste both privately and socially. These sources taken together provide a view of rational aesthetics through the experiences of the musical amateur.

CHAPTER 3 PRIVATE *EMPFINDUNGEN* AND THE FREE FANTASIA

3.1 Introduction

As a result of Baumgartian aesthetics, the Enlightenment concept of music perception shifted from the realm of thinking, the *res cogitans* in Cartesian theory, to feeling (*Empfindung*) in a lower cognitive state. (see Chapters 1.1.2 and 2.2). This shift carried with it consequences on the prevalence of certain genres. One major genre that rose to prominence as a result of Baumgartian aesthetics is the free fantasia. While having roots that trace back nearly a century, it did not emerge as an independent genre until around 1750. The rise of this genre corresponds to the changing aesthetics and can be seen as a musical representation of the philosophy of the *Empfindungen*. During the North German Enlightenment, the free fantasia developed into a free improvisation that could enable the aesthetic experience of *Empfindungen*. Free of a strict meter or melody, and based on a loose harmonic plan using frequent modulations, the fantasia allowed a performer to express any and all *Empfindungen* without restraint. From the perspective of aesthetics, solitude and private performance in the home were the ideal means for developing taste and a beautiful soul through music, and the unique intimacy of the clavichord was the primary channel for such an expression. The free fantasia of the Enlightenment, when considered through the lens of rational aesthetics, was primarily experienced privately by an individual and fulfilled the aesthetic need for personal development. For this reason, the free fantasia became the highest form of personal expression through music because it was the only genre that allowed the performer to freely develop their *Empfindungen* in an inspired, *empfindsam* state.

3.2 The Development of Genre of the Free Fantasia

Peter Schleuning's *Die Freie Fantasie* (1973) documents the development of the free fantasia and is to date the most expansive monograph on the genre.¹ Schleuning writes a long history of the fantasia that begins with its roots in the sixteenth century and traces the threads of both the composed, free types of genres, including the prelude, capriccio, toccata, etc., and the *phantastische Stil* as described in treatises from the time. He considers these two traditions as precursors to the free fantasia, which emerged as its own independent genre around 1750.

The defining the genre in the seventeenth century was treated by theorists such as Michael Praetorius and Athanasius Kircher; however, the topic was introduced to amateur keyboardists by the second half of the eighteenth century.² This shift towards amateurs is an indicator that by mid-century the free fantasia became primarily the domain of private performance in the home. The instigation for this shift can be identified aesthetically: the free fantasia was a pathway to inspiration in a performer, which was considered a means to develop good taste and a beautiful soul. Therefore, in order to define the free fantasia in the Enlightenment, it must be considered according to how it satisfied the aesthetic experience, which transferred the practice from the thinking realm to a feeling one.

¹ Peter Schleuning, *Die Freie Fantasie: ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der klassischen Klaviermusik* (Göppingen: A. Kümmerle, 1973).

² See for example Michael Praetorius, *Syntagma Musicum III*, (Wolfenbüttel: Michael Praetorius, 1619) and Athanasius Kircher, *Musurgia Universalis* (Rome: Francesco Corbelli, 1650). A discussion of free and improvisatory genres and the use of the term *stylus phantasticus* before 1750 can be found in Paul Collins, *The Stylus Phantasticus and free keyboard music of the North German Baroque* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).

3.2.1 From *Ingenium* to *Empfindungen*

The historical development of the free fantasia witnesses a paradigmatic shift in aesthetics, which is represented on three different, though related, levels. First, the perception of music shifted from a thinking art in the seventeenth century to a feeling art by the middle of the eighteenth century. Before the Enlightenment, sources denote the importance of the *ingenium*, or intellect, in the production of music. After 1750, theoretical and philosophical sources emphasize feelings, or *Empfindungen*, on the experience of music.³ This coincides with a second shift, in which the free fantasia transitions from a sacred, churchly genre to one performed in the home. The earlier, pre-1750 fantasia exhibits characteristics common to other sacred genres, such as the prevailing use of contrapuntal writing, sequencing, and incidental imitation, all of which signify the sacred.⁴ On the other hand, the secular form of the fantasia as described in sources after 1750 emphasizes harmony, which will be discussed in more detail below (see Chapter 3.4). The final marker that denotes a changing conception of the genre and the experience of music is related to the shift of mode of performance. The pre-Enlightenment fantasia was meant to be a publically performed genre, usually in a sacred context, whereas the fantasia after 1750 became an introspective, private, and intimate experience meant only for the performer without a viewing audience. All three of these shifts are made apparent by the sudden publication of fantasias and treatises meant to teach the practice to amateur musicians.

³ For a discussion of composition and the concept of *ingenium* in the seventeenth century see Collins, 29-32.

⁴ For a discussion of the use of intellect and contrapuntal improvisation in Gioseffo Zarlino (1517-1590), Michael Praetorius (1571-1621), and Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680) see Collins. 29-52.

Improvisation before 1750 was thus considered an exclusive practice of professional musicians who, through their great intellects, had special access to knowledge of counterpoint, the most complex style of music thought to represent the sacred. The genius musician could display this knowledge of complex contrapuntal structures during an improvisation or a performance of a work composed in an improvisatory style, such as the toccata, revealing to the audience his *ingenium*.

Johannes Mattheson (1681-1764) stands as a transitional figure in the shift of improvisation from a thinking to a feeling practice. In his earlier works published in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, he inherited the older definition of fantasia as an esoteric category of genres performed by professional musicians. Mattheson left the fantasia out of his first *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre* (1713), which was written for the *galant homme*. For that reason, Mattheson may have considered the topic to be beyond the amateur's capacity for understanding.⁵ In *Der Vollkommene Capellmeister* (1739), Mattheson explained that it is a style used in the theater, church, and chamber and names genres such as the prelude, capriccio, and toccata.⁶ He also describes it as a type of improvisatory performance that uses no imitative counterpoint as its prominent feature. Mattheson writes that while motives or subjects should not be ignored, they should also not be treated to sequencing or repeated with any regularity. Formal fugues, he explains, are in contradiction to the style.⁷ Mattheson's definition shows a loosening of the concept of imagination and genius from the intellect.

⁵ Collins, 56.

⁶ Collins, 60-62; Johannes Mattheson, *Der Vollkommene Capellmeister* (Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1739), 232.

⁷ Collins, 60-62.

Beginning in the 1750s Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach (1714-1788) began to publish works that he called fantasia and were considerably different from works representing the improvised-style by his predecessors. In the following decade, he published a chapter in part two of his *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen* (1762) detailing how to freely improvise fantasias.⁸ The audience of the treatise was not comprised of professional musicians, but amateur keyboardists. Therefore, this treatise extended the skill of the free fantasia to the *Kenner* and *Liebhaber*, taking it out of the realm of the esoteric.

How one could realize their fantasy in performance remained somewhat elusive in the eighteenth century, especially to Mattheson, who complains that there are no clear guidelines. This problem was not relieved until C.P.E. Bach's examination of the technical aspects of improvising a free fantasia in the *Versuch*. However, the fleeting effect of the performance remained problematic for contemporary authors, such as Johann Friedrich Unger, who comments on the difficulty in notating music that resulted from the act of improvisation.⁹ The cause of the problem seems to be the manner in which the performer draws on their inspiration. Rather than relying on an active, thinking mind to create imitative counterpoint during improvisatory music performance, performers were suppressing their intellects and subsiding to their *Empfindungen* during an inspired state.

In his effort to capture the fleeting musical imaginations of fantasists, Unger, a German inventor, attempted to create a machine that could be attached to a keyboard in

⁸ Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, part II (Berlin: Bach, 1762). English translation consulted Bach, *Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments*, trans. and ed. by William J. Mitchell (New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), 325-341.

⁹ Johann Friedrich Unger, *Entwurf einer Maschine* (Braunschweig: Fürsl Waisenhaus=Buchhandlung, 1774), 10.

order to record the performance of free fantasias. He first presented his findings to the *Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaft zu Berlin* in 1752, but unfortunately his invention was considered a failure. While it could record notes, the fantasy machine was criticized for being unable to capture nuanced details, indeed a significant aspect in such a performance.¹⁰ In 1774 he published an article discussing his invention titled *Entwurf einer Maschine*, in which he explains the need for such a machine. He writes that while a composer sat at the clavier, “he is writing (*dichtet*), and while he grasps the quill, he has already in turn forgotten the best by the fourth measure. The more often he repeats this, the less like his entire work it will become.”¹¹ The act of repetition and the writing down of an idea requires a more active mind, which prevents fantasists from allowing their *Empfindungen* to guide their playing.

Unger also explains that the closer the ideas remain in the pull of free will, the more “fiery” they are. He relates the experience of the fantasist to nightwalkers. The more one avoids “scary places,” writes Unger, the less they are by themselves.¹² By scary places, he is referring to the lower cognitive state of feeling, which is an internal reflection. If one never enters this lower cognitive state, one never truly experiences their own inner self. Unger adds that “the steps become more uncertain the more they leave their insensitivity (*Fühllosigkeit*)”.¹³ Through this analogy, he identifies the intuitive nature of improvisatory performance. One is less likely to follow the direction of their intuitive feelings, which are led by the faculty of desire, if they are made more aware of

¹⁰ Annette Richards, *The Free Fantasia and the Musical Picturesque*, 78-79.

¹¹ “Der Componist sitzt beim Clavier, er dichtet, und indem er die Feder ergreift, so hat er beim vierten Tact schon das beste wiederum vergessen. Je öfter er dieses wiederholet, desto unähnlicher wird sich sein ganzes Werk selbst werden.” Unger, 4.

¹² Unger, 5.

¹³ Unger, 5.

their surroundings. When one enters into uncertain territory, one leaves what he calls their insensitivity. By this Unger means that one enters into the realm of the upper cognitive faculties, which emphasizes the thinking mind over feeling. Unger believed that with the fantasy machine a composer could instill in his works the initial fire that the imagination, or the enthusiasm of the heart, created from the drive of the will in a sensitive, or lower cognitive state. The fiery quality of the idea was lost when the composer had to enter into a more rational state of mind in order to write it down, he explains. Unger believed that the composer could better record the inspired ideas if they were notated by a machine while he performed in the fantasy state, thereby hindering the need to continuously transition between upper rational thinking and lower emotional feeling states of mind during the process.

Through the genre of the free fantasia, one can witness the philosophical shift of music as a thinking art to a feeling art. Both the pre-Enlightenment and post-1750 conceptions of improvisatory performance were intended to demonstrate the genius of the composer/performer. The difference is in what the genius represented and displayed through their improvisations and inventions. In the seventeenth century, the genius displayed the ingenuity and complexity of the thinking mind. This places the process of invention of such works as a part of the rhetorical process: composing/improvising as an ordering and classification of knowledge through a complex system of rules. By the middle of the eighteenth century, it was the intuitive feeling of the sensitive soul that was cultivated by the genius. Without the limitation of contrapuntal rules, the composer/performer could discover through invention what was not already known.

One of the greatest distinctions between the two generations is in the role of the performer. Before 1750, the listening audience was placed in the forefront because of the interest in displaying the intricacies of counterpoint created by the thinking genius. During the Enlightenment, on the other hand, the free fantasia was regarded as an aesthetic experience of a feeling performer who expressed their *Empfindungen* through harmony, which was driven by the imagination. The aesthetic function of the free fantasia was thus considered a means for moral development, which was related to a practice promoted as solitude during the Enlightenment.

3.3 Meditation and Free Expression at the Clavichord

3.3.1 Solitude: the Free Fantasia as Meditation

The North German philosopher and physician Johann Georg Ritter von Zimmermann (1728-1795) spread the philosophical and moral need for the practice of meditation through solitude in his two publications, *Betrachtungen über die Einsamkeit* (1756) and *Über die Einsamkeit* (1784).¹⁴ Both works were very popular and had multiple re-issues and translations published throughout Europe and the Americas. Zimmermann's description of the experience of solitude teaches a more general population the advantages of such a practice and how to obtain its greatest benefits through solitary meditation. He was primarily promoting an ethical discipline of reflection for the development of a moral sensitivity. While there is no mention of music

¹⁴ Johann Georg Ritter von Zimmermann, *Betrachtungen über die Einsamkeit* (Zürich: Heidegger & Co., 1756), Zimmermann, *Über die Einsamkeit* (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1784). English language translations consulted include: Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered with Respect to its Influence upon the Mind and the Heart*, translated from the French of J.B. Mercier, third edition (London: C. Dilly, 1794) of *Betrachtungen über die Einsamkeit*; and Zimmermann, *Solitude; written originally by J.G. Zimmermann. To which are added, the life of the author; notes historical and explanatory; and seven beautiful engravings by Ridley*, vol. II (London: Printed for Vernor and Hood, J.Cuthell, J.Walker, Lackington, Allen, and Co. et al., 1799) of *Über die Einsamkeit*.

in his essays, the description of the experience of feelings and the means of strengthening them correlates to the aesthetic experience. Furthermore, the practice of the free fantasia can be seen as a musical act of solitude, meant for the refinement of *Empfindsamkeit*. Zimmermann's works on solitude not only prove the importance of this practice by his readers for their moral development, but also serve as an analogy to the purpose and practice of the free fantasia and the new prominence of the so-called "cult of the clavichordists" of this era.

Zimmerman's essays were intended for society people to teach them the importance of experiencing the private act of solitude as a converse, yet complimentary practice to public entertainment; both experiences, public and private, were diametrically opposed in their function for refining and developing moral character. While one finds some happiness in society, Zimmermann writes, leaving all happiness to society's pleasures means that one is not actually happy in oneself. On the other hand, if one leads a life of complete solitude, one would become a misanthrope full of remorse.¹⁵ Thus, both practices are essential for a well-rounded member of society.¹⁶ One could use the solitary act of performing a free fantasia as a means to develop their personal *Empfindungen*.

Zimmermann's definition of solitude bears a resemblance to the aesthetic experience of inspiration as described by Sulzer. He writes:

Solitude is a state in which the soul freely resigns itself to its own reflections. The sage...banishes from his mind all recollection of external objects.¹⁷

¹⁵ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 3.

¹⁶ Moral refinement through social pleasure and entertainment will be treated in the subsequent chapter dealing with more public experiences of music.

¹⁷ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 2.

Zimmermann's definition of inspiration uses some of the same concepts found Sulzer's own writing on the topic. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, Sulzer describes as the "enthusiasm of the heart" a state in which the soul is all feeling with nothing considered outside of itself.¹⁸ This means that when one is inspired, not only are the upper cognitive states repressed through an overwhelming experience of *Empfindungen*, but the soul is only contemplating those ideas that lay within the soul and nothing external. Zimmermann also expresses this in his definition by stating that the soul only contemplates its own internal reflections and not external objects. This can be experienced in music by the performer through improvising the free fantasia, a genre uniquely equipped to allow one to ponder on musical ideas through reflection and not through prewritten music.

Zimmermann adds that through solitude,

The mind surrenders itself in retirement to the unrestrained enjoyment of its own ideas, and adopts without limitations or restraint the sentiments which the taste, the temper, the inclination, and the genius of its possessor inspire.¹⁹

This further description of the experience of solitude includes in it the trope of the genius that was so popularly discussed in contemporaneous publications, as explained in Chapter Two. Again the emphasis is on the ideas that arise through the sentiments, or sensations, from within the self. The genius, in particular, is most capable of being inspired by these internal ideas and sentiments. As Sulzer explained, the genius can more easily feel from within, which creates an active force on the soul that results in a greater *sensibilité*. Those with a great *sensibilité*, which is the goal of solitude and an essential characteristic of a genius, possess the ability to explore the inner self through the powers of inspiration.

¹⁸ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Begeisterung," 1:350.

¹⁹ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 2.

The ultimate purpose of solitude, or experiencing the self from within, is to cultivate morality, which leads to a happiness and well-roundedness that can only be developed through such a personal experience. Zimmermann writes:

That [solitude] adds dignity to his character, and gives fresh vigour to the powers of his mind; that he cannot in another situation acquire so perfect a knowledge about himself; that it enlarges the sphere of attention, and ripens the seeds of judgment: in short, that it is from the influence of Solitude alone that man can hope for the fruition of unbroken pleasures and never fading felicity.²⁰

Without solitude, an individual will spend all of his energy on “trifling objects” that “lock up functions of his soul” so that he “cannot endure being by himself.”²¹ The importance of solitude is paramount to balancing a social identity with a moral one. Zimmermann criticizes those who believe the experience of sentiments to be unnatural and only find pleasures in luxury: those who do not find value in solitude have no virtue and lack the pleasures of the mind that lead to true happiness.²² Sulzer also warned of the danger of the mere decorations of the “fine and tasteful trifles,” which lead to an empty taste. Those who only pursue pleasure through “trifling” entertainment will, in the end, lose all enjoyment and power of the imagination, which ultimately creates the feeling of discontent that cannot be relieved through the luxuries that initially provided such an empty happiness.²³ Thus, those who lack sensitivity, Zimmermann writes, are “vacant souls [that] are always burthensome to their possessors.”²⁴

²⁰ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 12.

²¹ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 19.

²² Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 11.

²³ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 12.

²⁴ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 16.

On the other hand, one of the dangers of too much solitude is that it can lead one to become misanthropic.²⁵ This must have been a great concern of the readers, for the translator of the French edition warned that the author himself is not a misanthrope, nor is he wishing to inspire melancholy and unfavorable ideas in others. Rather, the purpose of solitude, the translator assures, is the attainment of happiness.²⁶ Thus, Zimmermann is proposing a balance in an individual between a public and private morality. The private morality, learned through solitude, increases the capacity for judgment, which is necessary for the development of good taste, an important trait in the forming a sensitive character and greatly desired by members of the social class. Baumgarten's original purpose for his project on aesthetics was in the building of a moral character, judgment, and taste. Therefore, the concept solitude is an extension of Baumgarten's plan and serves as a means for achieving the true balance of a rational mind and a beautiful spirit. One acquires a rational mind through intellectual knowledge, whereas a beautiful spirit is learned aesthetically through an internal development of sensate cognition. Zimmermann directs the reader on a means for achieving the latter through the act of solitude.

The benefits of solitude are not only moral pleasures, but also contribute to social pleasures. He writes that those qualities achieved through solitude enhance interactions with other noble and dignified men and women.²⁷ The "soul [becomes] animated by the joys of friendship," thus further extending the moral benefits of solitude.²⁸ Zimmermann explains, "how tiresome do all the pleasures of the world appear, when compared to the

²⁵ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 3.

²⁶ J.B. Mercier, introduction to Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered*, trans. to English (1794), iii.

²⁷ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 21-22.

²⁸ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 23-24.

happiness of a faithful, tender, and enlightened friendship!”²⁹ Happiness is achieved by both solitude and interactions with others who have the same moral values, which further multiplies the effect on an individual and creates a more fulfilling social experience.

Zimmermann frequently uses the word pleasure to denote empty, meaningless amusement. For example, those who “dread the intrusion of rational sentiment, these numerous and noisy places of public resort appear like temples dedicated to their idol, PLEASURE.”³⁰ Furthermore, these “frivolous pursuits” waste time and attention and do not lead to real happiness.³¹ Comments such as these are repeated throughout literature from the era. Both Sulzer and Junker, as discussed in Chapter Two, write that the importance in the beautiful arts was not merely for pleasure, but for a higher, moral purpose. Sulzer identified as the source of power of the beautiful arts its ability to express to the senses the highest philosophical concepts. Designating the arts as pleasing or amusing was degrading to this greater purpose. Likewise, Junker classified the arts as useful not just for their pleasures, but for the cognition of its perfection transmitted through them. All three authors recognize a distinction between empty pleasure and pleasure that inspires a moral development. The latter can be achieved either through solitude or the beautiful arts when used correctly, which exemplifies the philosophical correlation between these two practices.

Zimmermann identifies and explains the benefits of the experience of solitude on both the heart and the imagination throughout both of his publications on the topic. It is

²⁹ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 23-24.

³⁰ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 19, emphasis given.

³¹ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 19.

through the experience of solitude that the powers of imagination are inspired, which in turn creates the highest enjoyments of the heart.³²

The touching aspect of delightful nature...ravish the soul so entirely, and absorb in such a manner all our faculties, that the sentiments of the mind are instantly converted into sensations of the heart...all of this produced by the charms of imagination.³³

Imagination, he writes, is like memory in that it begins with a recall of ideas that have been imprinted on the mind, but the imagination takes those ideas and alters, enlarges, diversifies, and distorts them.³⁴ Through solitude, the powers of the imagination are strengthened, and with this greater strength the powers of reason can be controlled and weakened. By weakening reason, he explains, no longer must ideas be examined and compared through the upper faculties; rather, the imagination can create things in the mind that are unknown in nature.³⁵

One of the benefits of imagination is its ability to excite an enthusiasm, or ecstasy of the mind. This enthusiasm is brought on by the contemplation of a great and noble object, which inspires a sense of repose. Those that possess this ability, Zimmermann writes, are called inspired.³⁶ These descriptions of the effect of the imagination and the enthusiasm of the heart are a more practical application to Sulzer's philosophical description as discussed in the previous chapter. The experience the enthusiasm of the heart inspires a "devotional, mannered, tender, or cheerful rapture," Sulzer writes.³⁷ Zimmermann suggests that this can be achieved not only through solitude, but also through the arts. He writes,

³² Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered*, (1794), 241.

³³ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered*, (1794), 241.

³⁴ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 140.

³⁵ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 139-140.

³⁶ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 143-144.

³⁷ Sulzer, "General Theory," 32.

Imagination usurps the throne of reason, and all the feeble faculties of the mind obey her dictates, until her voice becomes despotic. If these high powers be exercised on agreeable appearances of nature, and the various entertainments poetry, painting, and or any of the elegant arts are capable of affording, then the inexpressive strain diffuses its enchantment...the intellectual power bends from his awful throne a wondering ear and smiles: the passions, gently smoothed away, sing to divine repose, and love and joy alone are waking.³⁸

Here Zimmermann places the arts, which includes music, as a possible source of inspiration that can bring one into a state repose through the experience of solitude. In addition, the genius, and in particular, the artistic genius, is one who is most apt at attaining this inspired state.³⁹ Bach, an *Originalgenie* of music, was witnessed in such a state during his improvisations, which is evidence that the genre of the improvised free fantasia is intended for achieving a musical solitude. Further supporting this connection between solitude and the improvised free fantasia, Zimmermann writes that through the experience of solitude, a “man in a perfect freedom possesses an innate right to follow the suggestions of his fancy.”⁴⁰ Therefore, the free fantasia can be defined as an unrestrained interplay of feelings through the power of the imagination: a musical solitude expressed through improvisation.

The improvised free fantasia provides a unique musical expression through the predominance of the faculty of imagination. This faculty enables a performer to follow their own inner moods spontaneously through their imagination. The growing interest in solitude during this era can explain why the clavichord was the preferred instrument for the free fantasia. The timbre, softness, and sensitivity of the instrument, as frequently

³⁸ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 160.

³⁹ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 145.

⁴⁰ Zimmermann, *Solitude Considered* (1794), 3. In the original German publication, the word “mood” (*Laune*) is used in place of fancy. Zimmermann, *Über die Einsamkeit, Erster Theil* (Troppau: Königlich Großbritannischen Hofrath und Leibarzt in Hannover, 1785), 4.

noted by contemporaries, provides a sense of intimacy necessary for the inwardness of musical meditation. The expressed moods, however, need not be exclusively melancholic, a trope often repeated and emphasized in contemporary literature regarding the clavichord and improvisation. This becomes clear when examining different types of published free fantasias, to be discussed later in the chapter. Solitude, musical or otherwise, was for obtaining a noble and moral character and deriving pleasure from within and not from frivolous activities. The free fantasia provides one outlet for achieving this, and contemporaneous descriptions of the clavichord explain why it was the perfect instrument for achieving a musical solitude.

3.3.2 Personal Expression ‘*An das Clavier*’

By the middle of the eighteenth century there were numerous types of keyboard instruments available for use in the home, including the harpsichord, the fortepiano, and the clavichord. Among them, the clavichord was consistently praised as the greatest instrument for expression among contemporaneous German writers on the topic. While the clavichord had waned in popularity in other parts of Europe, the instrument dominated the market in Germany and remained the favorite instrument of composers and amateurs for private performance in the home.⁴¹ There were an increased number of well-known clavichord makers during this time, and the instruments themselves were of a higher quality than in other generations.⁴² Makers such as Silbermann, Stein, Frizen, and Spath were named as some of the greatest clavichord builders in the second half of the

⁴¹ Bernard Brauchli, *The Clavichord* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136-137.

⁴² Brauchli, 145.

eighteenth century.⁴³ C.P.E. Bach was so attached to his Silbermann clavichord that upon its sale to Dietrich Ewald von Grotthuss in 1781 he wrote a farewell Rondo to his favorite instrument, “Abschied von meinem Silbermannschen Claviere.”⁴⁴ There was precedent for such dedications, as the love for one’s clavichord spawned an entirely new subgenre of German songs, often titled ‘An das Clavier,’ written in dedication to the instrument.⁴⁵ This sudden rise of interest in the clavichord in Germany can be explained in relation to early Enlightenment aesthetics: the qualities of the instrument created an intimate experience and enabled a musical solitude in the player. These characteristics, as described by contemporaneous writers at the pinnacle of the use of the instrument, name the clavichord as the most suitable for freely expressing *Empfindungen*, thus the genre of the free fantasia performed on the clavichord became the most important musical experience for individual expression and moral development.

Historical writers on musical aesthetics, including Carl Friedrich Daniel Schubart, Johann Philipp Kirnberger, and Junker, all specifically name the clavichord as the greatest keyboard instrument over the harpsichord and fortepiano because of its supreme capacity for musical expression.⁴⁶ Furthermore, all of the authors demonstrate that the personal expression that can be achieved by a performer on this instrument is much more powerful and subtle than its counterparts, which allows for a greater and more direct

⁴³ C.F.D. Schubart names instrument makers in “Klavierrezepte” in *Musikalsiche Rhapsodien*, vol. 3 (1786) and in “vom Flügel oder dem Klavier” in *Ideen zur einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst* (written 1784-85, publ. posth. 1801) (Leipzig: Wolkenwanderer-Verlag, 1924), 173.

⁴⁴ Annette Richards, “C.P.E. Bach’s ‘Farewell’ and the Speaking Clavichord,” in *De Clavicordio IV: Proceedings of the IV International Clavichord Symposium* (1999), edited by Berard Brauchli, Susan Brauchli, and Alberto Galazzo, 24-25.

⁴⁵ For information about clavichord songs see Annette Richards, “C.P.E. Bach’s ‘Farewell’ and the Speaking Clavichord” and Richards, *The Free Fantasia and the Musical Picturesque*.

⁴⁶ Some of the following quotations can be found in English translation in Brauchli, *The Clavichord* and Hanns Neupert, *The Clavichord*, trans. Ann P.P. Feldberg (New York: Bärenreiter, 1965), though I have provided my own translations.

transmission of one's *Empfindungen*. In his comparison of the three instruments, Schubart ranks the harpsichord (*der Flügel*) the lowest because it is only able to provide a simple outline and is incapable of providing any shading in the sound. The fortepiano is placed second because, he writes, it can give greater coloring to the sound compared to the harpsichord.⁴⁷ But the "clavichord, this solitary (*einsame*), melancholic, unspeakably sweet instrument, if it is built by a master, has advantages over the harpsichord and fortepiano," which mostly have to do with the feel of the clavichord under the fingers.⁴⁸ Kirnberger remarks that the clavichord, the "mother of all instruments," is superior to the harpsichord, fortepiano, and the pantalon because it can play melody and harmony at the same time, and also "because of the speaking tone, through which true feeling itself (*wahre Empfindung*), by means of the proper use, can develop them and portray musical characters."⁴⁹ Both of these authors emphasize the ability of the player to express themselves through the instrument. Schubart's use of the word solitary (*einsame*), when considered in relation to Zimmermann's writing on solitude, alludes to the singularity and intimacy of the experience of performing on the clavichord. Kirnberger stresses the instrument's ability to express true feeling, implying that the expression of feeling comes from within and is not artificially contrived. As previously discussed, both solitude and true feeling are important concepts to aesthetic theories at the time.

⁴⁷ Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, *Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst*, 171-173.

⁴⁸ Schubart, *Ideen*, "Klavichord, diese einsame, melancholische, unaussprechlich süße Instrument, wenn es von einem Meister verfertigt ist, hat Vorzüge vor dem Flügel und dem Fortepiano," 174.

⁴⁹ "Das Clavier ist die Mutter aller musicalischen Instrumente, sowohl wegen der Melodie und Harmonie, welche auf demselben zugleich ausgeübet werden kann, als wegen der sprechenden Töne, durch welche sich wahre Empfindung, mittelst des richtigen Gebrauchs desselben entwickeln und Charactere musicalisch schildern lassen." Johann Philipp Kirnberger, "Johann Philipp Kirnbergers Nachricht über die Herausgabe neuer Clavier=Compositionen," in *Magazin der Musik*, Bd.1 1783, Hälfte 1, edited by Carl Friedrich Cramer, 512.

An article attributed to Junker titled “Aesthetic der Instrumentalverhältnisse” appearing in the *Musikalisches Handbuch auf das Jahr 1782* also ranks the three keyboard instruments in this order.⁵⁰ As with Schubart, Junker comments on the lack of shading that is possible on the harpsichord. The fortepiano is capable of expressing various *Empfindungen* and can give greater light and shade than the harpsichord,

But it still has no shades between light and dark (*Mitteltinten*), can still not drive away, melt vague colors in colors, can still not spread over the whole the last breath of sensuality, in short, it still feels a certain smallness in the beauty.⁵¹

Thus, while the fortepiano is more varied in its sound from the harpsichord, it does not have the full range of color needed to effectively express all sensitive, or sensual, feelings; its beauty is not complete. In contrast, while the clavichord must be excluded from public concert because of its limited volume, it is “all the more awe-inspiring confidant (*schauerliche Vertraute*) of solitude.”⁵² Here Junker places performing at the clavichord into the framework of solitude, which, as explained above, implies a type of personal development and exploration of one’s imagination. Only through performing on such a sensitive instrument such as the clavichord is the player able to be inspired to explore the depths of their imagination and enter into a rapture, or enthusiasm of the heart. This experience is so personal that Junker calls the instrument his “awe-inspiring confidant,” which explains Bach’s deep connection to his instrument and the abundance of ‘*an das Klavier*’ songs published during this time. One brought to their confidant, the

⁵⁰ Karl Ludwig Junker, “Aesthetik der Instrumentalverhältnisse,” in *Musikalisches Handbuch aus das Jahre 1782* (Alenthinopel, 1782), 82-96. The article was published anonymously, but attribution to Junker can be found in Julia Gregory, *Catalogue of Books on Music (Before 1800)* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), 191.

⁵¹ “Aber keine Mitteltinten hat es noch nicht, kann noch nicht vertreiben, verblasen, Farb in Farb schmelzen, noch nicht den letzten Hauch der Wollust übers Ganze verbreiten; kurz, gewisse Kleinheitsschönheiten fehlen noch.” Junker, “Aestetik,” 84.

⁵² “aber desto mehr der schauerliche Vertraute der Einsamkeit.” Junker, “Aesthtik,” 84.

clavichord, one's innermost feelings that could not be outwardly expressed to another person. This takes as a basic assumption that one is in a state of inspiration, since the player is bringing only what is truly felt from the inside and not outside of the self. This most personal expression of feeling could only be shared with one's closest confidant, in this case, the clavichord.

Schubart also suggests the wide range of expressive possibilities on the clavichord. He writes that if the instrument is well-made, it is:

Soft and receptive for each breath of the soul; so you find here the soundboard of your heart... Sweet melancholy, languishing love, flutters of resignation (*Abschiedswehen*), whispers of the soul with God, sensuous foreboding (*schwüle Ahndung*), moments in paradise through the sudden rip in the clouds, sweet trickles of weeping (*Thränengerisel*)...all of this lies in the clavichord.⁵³

All of these experiences can be described as *Empfindungen* felt through the imagination, which suggests that only through performing on the clavichord, and on no other keyboard instrument, can this overflow of *Empfindungen* be achieved.

The sound of the instrument was not the only unique aspect of the instrument. An additional feature that is exclusive to the clavichord is its touch and the feel of the string under the fingers. Bach suggests in his *Versuch* that all keyboardists should own both a good harpsichord and a good clavichord because of the different skills they require. A harpsichordist is only able to play in one color, but has the right hard attack of the fingers. The clavichordist who does not play the harpsichord may grow too accustomed

⁵³ “–weich und für jeden Hauch der Seele empfänglich; so findest du hier deines Herzens Resonanzboden...Süsse Schwermuth, schmachtende Liebe, Abschiedswehen, Seelengelispel mit Gott, schwüle Ahndung, Blike in Paradis durch jäh zerrisnes Gewölk, süßes Thränengerisel...all dies liegt im Klavichorde.” Schubart, *Musikalische Rhapsodien*.

to “flattering” (*schmeicheln*) the keys.⁵⁴ Bach emphasizes the differences in playing these instruments as the touch of keyboard. A modern writer on historical keyboard playing, Hans Neupert, also comments on the different feel of the clavichord compared to the harpsichord and fortepiano. He explains that the difference lies in the player’s contact with the string. On a harpsichord, after the quill plucks, the contact with the string is lost. The fortepiano does not have any contact because the key is activating a hammer that strikes the string. The clavichord, however, maintains a direct contact with the string as long as the key is depressed. This intimate contact allows one to have a greater expressive control on the sound, which he explains results “in a genuine, direct and living feel of the string.”⁵⁵ The previously cited historical authors on the subject also noted this unique feel of the string, and the techniques that it enables is what creates great expression in the sound.

Junker writes that on the clavichord:

I can shade the tone through all various swellings, I am able to drop, tremble, shake, and die; here I can supply the impression of my heart; not only can I imagine, but also disperse, make vague, blend; [I can] display here all of the smallest beauties.⁵⁶

All of these effects he his naming, trembling, shaking, making the string die out, blending the sounds together, are all techniques particular to the direct contact of the key to the string. He writes that he cannot only imagine at the keyboard, but even bring the smallest beauties to life. These types of techniques may be what Kirnberger implied when he said

⁵⁴ Bach, *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen, erster und zweiter Tiel*, edited by von Lothar Hoffmann-Erbrecht (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1957 [facsimile reprint of the first editions of part I, Berlin: Königl. Hof-Buchdrucker Christian Friedrich Henning, 1753; and part II, Berlin: George Ludewig Winter, 1762]), part I., 11.

⁵⁵ Neupert, 38-39.

⁵⁶ “hier kann ich den Ton durch alle mannigfaltigen Schwellungen schattieren, kann ihn fallen, zittern, beben, sterben lassen; hier kann ich den Abdruck meines Herzens liefern, kann nicht nur ausmalen, sondern auch vertreiben, verblasen, verschmelzen; hier alle Kleinheitschönheiten anbringen.” Junker, “Aesthetic,” 85-86.

that clavichord was “speaking,” since the variety of touch allows for a more varied and articulate quality that is not possible on the harpsichord or the fortepiano. Schubart adds that embellishments are much more expressive in their manner of execution, such as in the dying away of trills and fluttering (*schmeichelnden*) appoggiaturas. He also names similar techniques as Junker, which he calls “surprising and soft string and key effects,” including a beating (*Schwebung*), a type of articulation called the “Tragen,” shaking (*Beben*), a half or whole contact with the string, pizzicato, and vibrato.⁵⁷ Bach explains some of these techniques in his *Versuch*. The *Tragen der Töne*, indicated by a slur and a dot over a series of pitches, is an articulation in which the notes are connected, but there is a marked pressure on the pitch itself. The *Bebung* is used on long, *affetuoso* notes and is played by shaking the finger while the key is depressed (See Example 3.1).⁵⁸ All of these techniques named, which are unique to the instrument, are a result of a greater contact with the string, thus the performer can feel, through touch, a greater physical connection to the instrument. This feeling, in turn, creates in the mind of the performer a greater psychological connection to the expression of their imagination, making literal the commonly repeated phrase of music touching the strings of the heart.

Example 3.1 Notation of “Tragen der Töne” and “Bebung” according to C.P.E. Bach’s *Versuch*, Supplement “List of Figures,” Fig. IV.



⁵⁷ “dieser überraschenden Saiten- und leisen Tastenbestreifung.” Schubart, “Klavierrezepte,” *Musikalische Rhapsodien*.

⁵⁸ Bach, *Versuch*, part. I, 126.

While performers at home had music available from a variety of genres composed for the clavichord, including sonatas, *Lieder*, and rondos, contemporaneous writers name improvising free fantasias as having the greatest capacity for personal expression. The author Jean Paul, who admitted to spending many hours at his clavichord, wrote:

When I want to express a particular feeling that seizes me, it strives to find not words but sounds, and I crave to express it on the clavichord (*Clavier*). As soon as I shed tears at the clavichord over my intention, the creative process is over and feeling takes command. Nothing exhausts me as much, nothing soothes me more than improvising at the clavichord. I could improvise myself to death.⁵⁹

Jean Paul discusses feelings that cannot be expressed in words, but only in sounds. In the novel *Hesperus*, he frequently uses the imagery of tears to depict both joyful and sad emotions by characters who cannot express themselves in words. For example, in the opening of the novel Jean Paul describes the reuniting of the childhood friends and main characters Viktor and Flamin as “souls that had no words, but only tears of joy.”⁶⁰ Thus, tears represent for Jean Paul an overwhelming emotional experience that cannot be communicated through words. These feelings are not only expressed on the clavichord, but are even soothed through the act of improvisation, or musical solitude.

Schubart also uses vivid imagery, and suggests to his readers that when playing the clavichord:

If you fantasize by the shining moon, or cool yourself in the summer night, or celebrate the spring evening—ah, yearn not for the roaring piano. Behold, your clavichord breathes as gently as your soul.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Quoted in Neupart with no citation given. Richards, *Free Fantasia* quotes Neupart (pg. 175) and infers from him that it comes from the *Hesperus* novel; however, the quote cannot be located in the novel, nor does Neupart specify where Jean Paul wrote this about himself.

⁶⁰ Jean Paul, *Hesperus, or Forty-Five Dog-Post Days*, 14.

⁶¹ “...wenn du alleine vom Monde beschienen fantasirt, oder dich kühlst in der Sommernacht, oder Frühlingsabende feierst,—ach, da sehne dich nicht nach dem Flügelgestöse. Sich, dein Klavikord athmet ja so sanft, wie dein Herz.” Schubart, “Klavierrezepte.”

In writing about his own experiences playing keyboard instruments in his semi-autobiographical “Leben und Gesinnungen,” Schubart says of himself:

[I] fantasized with fiery power of invention (*Erfindungskraft*)...I could play myself in the fire so much—the chief characteristic of the musical genius—that everything around me faded and I lived only in the sounds that my imagination created.⁶²

Schubart speaks of fantasizing at the keyboard at night with a clavichord instead of a roaring piano, suggesting the intimacy of such an experience. He personifies the clavichord through a simile with the breathing of the soul, identifying a direct connection in this experience between improviser and confidant, the clavichord, through the medium of fantasizing. Schubart also states more directly in his autobiography that fantasizing at the clavichord uses the power invention. In this case, invention should be understood as discovery and not the rhetorical process as explained in Chapter Two (see Chapter 2.4.2). The discovery type of invention begins with an idea and uses it to create something entirely new and to explore an “entirely new terrain.”⁶³ This new terrain, discovered through invention, enabled Schubart to feel only the sounds in his imagination. Furthermore, he relates his description to the concept of inspiration and rapture, in which all feeling takes over and the rational powers are suppressed. He specifically explains that his musical genius is proven by his ability to access his powers of invention, the imagination, and the ability to fantasize and the clavichord freely through his *Empfindungen*. These are all named the key characteristics of a musical genius by Sulzer,

⁶² “...phantasierte mit feuriger Erfindungskraft...Ich konnte mich so ins Feuer spielen – der Hauptzug des musikalischen Genies – daß Alles um mich schwand, und ich nur noch in den Tönen lebte, die meine Einbildungskraft schuf.” Schubart, “Schubart’s Leben und Gesinnungen,” *Gesammelte Schiften und Schicksale*, erster Band (Stuttgart: J. Scheible’s Buchhandlung, 1839), 50.

⁶³ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 58.

and were also described of C.P.E. Bach in descriptions of his improvised free fantasias (see Chapter 2.4).

Schubart's and Jean Paul's writings, which specifically refer to both performance on a clavichord and fantasizing or improvising, make use of the language of aesthetics, thereby demonstrating the prominence of philosophical theories in everyday culture. Through sources such as these, the amateur public learned of the aesthetic function and experience of the free fantasia, thus encouraging them to aspire to such performances themselves. The *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* would then turn to treatises and published fantasias to realize their own musical solitude.

3.4 Manifestations of the Free Fantasia

The difficulty in determining exactly what a free fantasia is has been noted by both modern and historical authors on the topic. Johann Mattheson's *Der vollkommene Capellmeister* (1739) is one of the earlier works that discusses the free fantasia at a time when the term was used both broadly as a style and very loosely to describe a collection of genres. Proving the complication in explaining the realization of the free fantasia, the author remarks "What a shame that no rules exist for such fantasy arts!"⁶⁴ C.P.E. Bach's extensive chapter on the genre in his *Versuch* is the only publication of the time that goes beyond a simple definition and attempts to teach his readers how to create free fantasias. To add to the difficulty, Bach published works he called *fantasia* and *freie fantasia*. This creates two problems. First, a composed fantasia stands in opposition to the genre as an improvised one meant for freely playing according to one's *Empfindugen*. Second, there

⁶⁴ "Nur Schade, daß keine Regeln von solcher Fantasie-Kunst vorhanden!" Johannes Matthesohn, *Der vollkommene Capellmeister*, 88.

is a great variety in the types of composed fantasias he published, so much so that some do not necessarily follow the rules of the genre as laid out in the *Versuch*. In order to understand these differences, I will distinguish between the improvised free fantasia and composed fantasias as separate types of fantasias. There is precedent for understanding it in this way beyond the fact that Bach published non-improvised works with fantasia in the title. For example, Daniel Gottlieb Türk wrote in his *Klavier Schule* (1789) that fantasias are first contrived in performance, but there are some that have already been composed and notated.⁶⁵ I will further categorize the composed fantasias as simple composed or complex composed to identify the variety in Bach's published works. Each of these three types of fantasias appears to have different functions, which will be examined for the remainder of the chapter.⁶⁶

3.4.1 The Improvised Free Fantasia

Evidence that the free fantasia was indeed an improvised art form can be seen in definitions found in keyboard treatises throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. The earliest definition that distinguishes specifically improvised free fantasias from other improvised genres is Bach's *Versuch*. Mattheson's definition in *Der Vollkommene Capellmeister*, dating a little more than twenty years earlier, and like those

⁶⁵ Daniel Gottlob Türk, *Klavierschule, oder Anweisung zum Klavierspielen für Lehrer und Lernende, mit kritischen Anmerkungen* (Leipzig und Halle: Auf Kosten des Verfassers; in Kommission bey Schwickert in Leipzig, und bey Hemmerde und Schwetschke in Halle, 1789), §35, 388.

⁶⁶ C.P.E. Bach also published a Fantasia and Fugue in C minor (H.75.5/Wq.119.7), which does not fall into any of the three categories; rather, the genre of the fantasia and fugue follows in the church tradition of prelude and fugue, which continued in the sacred context through the eighteenth century. An additional example is a fantasia and fugue, the manuscript of which is held in D-B Mus.ms.23435, by Johann Friedrich Lebrecht Zachariae (1753-1807), a working church organist in Magdeburg. The manuscript has been attributed in RISM as having been composed by Justus Friedrich Wilhelm Zacharia (1726-1777), writer, poet, and amateur composer. On the top of the manuscript is written "Fantasia vom Music Director Zachariae in Magdeburg." This notation clearly is clearly referencing Johann Friedrich Lebrecht Zachariae, who is listed as the music director of the French church in Magdeburg in SL (Erich Valentin), "Magdeburg," in *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, (Kassel: Barenreiter, 1994-2007), Sachteil, 5:1570-1571.

describing fantasia before him, he names genres such as the boutade, capriccio, toccata, prelude, and ritornello as types of fantasias.⁶⁷ Bach, on the other hand, dedicates an entire chapter to the free fantasia in the second part of the treatise, signifying its importance for performers by the time of its publication in 1762. He specifies that improvised performance before a composed piece is not a fantasia, but a prelude (*Vorspiel*), distinguishing it from a free-standing improvised performance.⁶⁸ Furthermore, nowhere in his chapter does he mention the name of other types of fantasias as Mattheson did in his treatise. This signifies that not shortly after Mattheson's work, the free fantasia began to rise in importance and surpass the other types of improvised genres to become a genre of its own.

While Bach's description of the genre is quite extensive, the basic requirements he names for a free fantasia are common to those writers that follow him in the next few decades. Bach writes that the fantasia is free when it is improvised, unmeasured, has a greater variety of harmony, and makes use of frequent modulations.⁶⁹ Georg Simon Löhlein writes forty years later in his *Clavierschule* (1779) that the fantasia is played extemporaneously and invented from a free spirit.⁷⁰ It has a freedom of melody that is restricted in written-down melodies, and regarding organ fantasies, they are more harmonic than melodic. Finally, there are no rules for ordering measures or rhythms, though it must follow a harmonic ordering.⁷¹ Ten years later, Türk's definition is in

⁶⁷ Mattheson, *Der Vollkommene Capellmeister*, 232.

⁶⁸ Bach, *Versuch*, 327.

⁶⁹ Bach, *Versuch*, 325-327.

⁷⁰ Georg Simon Löhlein, *Clavier Schule*, Bd. I, (Leipzig und Züllichau: auf Kosten der Waisenhaus- und Frommannischen Buchhandlung, 1779), 179.

⁷¹ Löhlein, *Clavier Schule*, Bd. I, 189.

agreement with those before him. He writes that a fantasia is first contrived in performance, and that it is free (as opposed to composed) when:

The inventor binds himself neither to a main subject, nor meter nor rhythm (although a meter could be found instead of individual thoughts); if he roams around in respect to modulations, if he expresses various and often contrasting characters; in short, if he leads himself completely on his moods to perform without a specific plan.⁷²

Türk, however, delegates the free fantasia to a paragraph in the third of five appendices that defines instrumental genres, perhaps signifying the decline of the genre as it no longer demands its own chapter in a book on clavier playing. He also included two other improvised genres in his list, the prelude and the capriccio, but their separation confirms that the free fantasia has already been fully emancipated from them as its own genre. A closer look at Bach's chapter, written during the height of the genre, will demonstrate the connection of the free fantasia to aesthetic philosophy.

Throughout his *Versuch* Bach emphasizes the importance of the free fantasia as a principal skill necessary for great performers and composers alike. Furthermore, through this genre, the *Originalgenie* could achieve the highest level of art music, establishing the fantasia the primary outlet of individual expression for the artist.⁷³ In his autobiography Bach wrote that many of his works were restrained in their style because they were written either for individuals or the general public.⁷⁴ The free fantasia, according to Bach, is a unique form of improvisation as it allows the performer to be completely free of constraints, unlike the improvised prelude, whose construction is restricted by the piece it

⁷² "...sich der Erfinder weder an einen gewissen Hauptsatz (Thema), noch an den Takt oder Rhythmus bindet (obgleich bei einzelnen Gedanken eine Taktart statt finden kann), wenn er in Ansehung der Modulation ausschweift, wenn er verschiedene, oft entgegen gesetzte Charakter ausdrückt; kurz, wenn er sich völlig seiner Laune überläßt, ohne einen bestimmten Plan auszuführen." Türk, 395-396.

⁷³ Matthew Head, "Fantasy in the Instrumental Music of C.P.E. Bach" (PhD diss, Yale University, 1995), 2, 9.

⁷⁴ English translation with preface in William S. Newman, "Emanuel Bach's Autobiography," in *The Musical Quarterly* 51 (1965), 371.

prefaces.⁷⁵ As suggested by the contemporary author Matthew Head, the free fantasia was the only genre in which Bach could write solely for himself.⁷⁶ Perhaps it is so personal because it represents his innermost expressions during a moment of musical solitude.

The free fantasia is exceptional in that it is the only genre exclusive to the composer-performer. The accounts of Bach improvising at the keyboard suggest that the performance of free fantasias played a significant role in establishing Bach as an *Originalgenie* (see Chapter 2.4.3). In particular, he demonstrated himself as one who has the capacity to explore the inner self, experiences *Empfindungen* with greater intensity, and possesses an active force of the soul that arouses inspiration from within. Burney observed the mark of a genius by describing Bach as one who looked inspired. Reichardt wrote that Bach put his entire soul into his improvisations. Thus, while improvising a free fantasia in an inspired, *empfindsam* state a genius explore the inner self, and the ultimate result is an intensely personal expression that embodies the soul. From this perspective, Bach's description of how to improvise a fantasia is an instruction on how to arouse an *empfindsam* state in a performer. While his rules for improvisation may at times seem complex in their technical application, they appear to serve three overall purposes: to develop ideas from within the self, to explore a variety of affects in juxtaposition, and to present aesthetic (i.e. clear but confused) ideas.

One of Bach's primary requirements for the improviser of a free fantasia is the elimination of outside influences, which ensures that the performer is expressing only their own *Empfindungen*. For example, Bach specifies that the free fantasia should not contain passages taken from other works, but rather "must come out of a good musical

⁷⁵ Bach, *Essay*, 431.

⁷⁶ Head, 9.

soul.”⁷⁷ In addition, he adds that the fantasia must be unbarred because meters contain their own type of compulsion.⁷⁸ By eliminating barring, a clear sense of meter, and ideas taken from other composers, the performer is not motivated by an outside force, but is compelled only by the force of inspiration from within the soul.

Schubart also discusses the importance of fantasizing from your own sense of self, he writes:

Study the works of the masters...But in order to also bring out your “I-ness” (Ichheit) in the music, think, discover, fantasize yourself. You will always best bring forth your own creation that is thus completed adapted to yourself. Perpetual copying, or performance of the works of others is a disgrace for the spirit.⁷⁹

Sulzer explains that you can learn about music through the studying of works by the masters and names keyboardists such as C.P.E. Bach, Johann Gottfried Eckardt, W.A. Mozart, and Muzio Clementi; however, you need to put your own sense of self into the music. By discovering and fantasizing at the keyboard, one can go beyond just copying to learn about one’s inner self, which can be infused into one’s own performances in order to make it a unique personal expression.

With regards to harmony, Bach writes that the free fantasia goes through more keys than is customary and consists of varied harmonic progressions that are expressed through figuration.⁸⁰ In addition, modulation is not confined to closely related keys, but rather should be taken to distant keys if time is not limited.⁸¹ In the free fantasia the keyboardist is to move “audaciously from one affect to another,” which can be achieved,

⁷⁷ “...sondern aus einer guten musikalischen Seele herkommen müssen...” Bach *Versuch*, 123.

⁷⁸ Bach *Essay*, 153.

⁷⁹ “Studiere die Werke groser Meister... Um aber deine Ichheit auch in der Musik herauszutreiben; so denke, erfinde, fantasire selber. Dein eignes, dir so ganz anpassendes Gemächt wirst du immer am besten herausbringen. Ewiges Kopiren, oder Vortag fremden Gewerks ist Schmach für den Geist.” Schubart, *Musikalische Rhapsodien*.

⁸⁰ Bach, *Essay*, 430.

⁸¹ Bach, *Essay*, 431-434.

according to Bach, through harmony and modulation.⁸² Sulzer writes that each key has its own special character, and that it is important to choose a key whose mood agrees with the thoughts one wants to portray in order to reinforce the true expression of feeling.⁸³ The idea that each key has its own mood was an established concept in the eighteenth century. Johann Mattheson describes the affects of each key in his 1713 publication *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre*.⁸⁴ Schubart's *Ideen zur einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst*, written in 1785-1786 but not published until 1806, also includes a list of the different colors and characteristics of each tonality.⁸⁵ In 1787 Koch writes of the importance of the affects of keys and the effect of modulation on the listener in his *Versuch einer Anleitung zur Composition*.⁸⁶ The ability for each tonality to express different feelings provides the performer with yet another tool for personal expression beyond major or minor. By exploring as many keys as time will allow, the improviser can move through many different affects. Bach writes that it is important to clearly establish the tonic in the beginning and end.⁸⁷ In doing so, one creates an affect that functions as the foundation of the fantasia. Through the modulation to different key areas, the performer juxtaposes different affects against one another and against the foundational affect in a way that no other musical genre permits. When one improvises in an *empfindsam* state, the performer allows their own sensations and *Empfindungen* to guide the harmonic progression rather

⁸² Bach, *Essay*, 153.

⁸³ Paraphrased from “Wenn also unter den mannichfaltigen Tonleitern, deren jede ihren besondern Charakter hat, diejenige allemal ausgesucht wird, deren Stimmung mit dem Gepräge jeder einzeln Gedanken übereinkommt, so wird dadurch der wahre Ausdruck der Empfindung noch mehr verstärkt.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste*, “Musik,” 3:268.

⁸⁴ Johann Mattheson's discussion of the affects in relation to keys can be found in “Von der Musicalischen Tohne Eigenschaft und Wirkung in Ausdrückung der Affecten,” in *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre* (Hamburg: Benjamin Schiller, 1713): 231-253.

⁸⁵ Schubart, *Ideen*, 261-266.

⁸⁶ Nancy Kovaleff Baker, introduction to “Introductory Essay on Composition, Vol. II (1787)” by Heinrich Koch in *Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment*, ed. Ian Bent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 131.

⁸⁷ Bach, *Essay*, 431.

than the rules of composition (though rules of harmony do apply). Bach strategically places his discussion of the free fantasia as the last chapter in a volume that teaches his readers about types of chord qualities. Clearly he believes that one cannot master the fantasia without first knowing about harmony and the forming of chords.

Georg Andreas Sorge (1703-1778), a keyboardist, composer, and theorist based in the Thuringian region of central Germany, published his *Anleitung zur Fantasie* (1767) a few years after the second part of Bach's *Versuch* was published.⁸⁸ Sorge's aim was to introduce to the skills required to play free fantasias, which are primarily rooted in harmony. He discusses, for example, intervals, types of chords, tonality, and the use of secondary keys. In his final point, titled "what a fantasizing clavierist must understand to excite and to still express the affects," Sorge explains that "someone who is strong of harmony and all tonalities, of which nothing must be difficult to express emotions (*Gemüthsbewegungen*)."⁸⁹ Mattheson, he explains, has a limited conception of harmony as either happy (major keys) and sad (minor keys). Instead, Sorge broadens the importance of tonalities to express many varied types emotions and also includes the ordering of chords and secondary key areas as having particular expressive capabilities.⁹⁰

Bach's and Sorge's emphasis on harmony rather than melody is in opposition to Sulzer's conclusions that harmony is not an essential characteristic of music.⁹¹ Bach does not mention of the construction of melodies in his chapter on the free fantasia, only that

⁸⁸ Georg Andreas Sorge, *Anleitung zur Fantasie oder zu der schönen Kunst, das Clavier, wie auch andere Instrumente aus dem Kopfe zu spielen* (Lobenstein: Georg Andreas Sorge, [1767]).

⁸⁹ "Daß ein fantasirender Clavierspieler die Affecten auszudrucken, zu erregen und zu stillen verstehen müsse." "Wer der Harmonie und aller Tonarten mächtig ist, dem muß es nichts schweres seyn, die Gemüthsbewegungen auszudrucken." Sorge, 72.

⁹⁰ Sorge, 72-74.

⁹¹ Sulzer, "General Theory," 97. In his article on "Harmony," Sulzer concludes that beautiful melodies can exist without a bass or harmonic accompaniment using the example of dance melodies and concludes that harmony is not essential to music.

the harmony is expressed through a variety of figurations. While Sulzer suggests that melody is the most important musical characteristic for stirring the passions, he admits that, “a strong element of expressivity is already inherent to harmony itself. A powerful harmony, without the aid of melody, movement and rhythm, can express many passions and agitate or calm one’s soul in many ways.”⁹² When considered from the perspective of the Baumgarten’s definition of ideas, the difference between figured harmony and a melody is in the level of distinction of the representation: a melody can be understood as a more focused representation of the affect presented by the harmony. Sulzer writes that a melody must be in a single key so it can modulate appropriately and it must have a perceptible meter.⁹³ Figuration in a free fantasia, on the other hand, is less distinct as it is not bound by meter and does not limit the performer from freely modulating. Bach writes that a performer should vary the figuration, dynamics, and register to represent the affect at any given moment.⁹⁴ Furthermore, “one also feels the beauty of the diversity (*Schöne der Mannigfaltigkeit*) in the Fantasie. From the latter must occur all types of figures and all types of good performances.”⁹⁵ The phrase “beauty of the diversity” comes directly from the concepts of aesthetic beauty, further emphasizing the importance of this genre. It is the variety of the figuration, an expression of the harmony according to the given mood in the moment, which gives the fantasia its beauty (see Example 3.2). Bach writes:

All chords could be broken in various ways, and be expressed in swift and slow figures. The breaking of a chord, whereby both the main and certain secondary intervals are repeated, are particularly pleasant, because they bring forth more changes than a simple arpeggio.⁹⁶

⁹² Sulzer, “General Theory,” 99.

⁹³ Sulzer, “General Theory,” 92.

⁹⁴ Bach, *Essay*, 439.

⁹⁵ “Das Schöne der Mannigfaltigkeit empfindet man auch bey der Fantasie. Bey der letztern müssen allerhand Figuren, und alle Arten des guten Vortrages vorkommen.” Bach, *Versuch*, 336.

⁹⁶ “Alle Accorde können auf vielerley Art gebrochen, und in geschwinden und langsamen Figuren ausgedruckt werden. Die Brechnung eines Accordes, wobei sowohl dessen Haupt=als auch gewisse

The free fantasia removes the limitations created by the melody and, in turn, creates the most confused kind of musical representations. The lack of distinction is perhaps due to the function of the free fantasia; namely, for an individual to experience one's own *Empfindungen*. While in *empfindsam* states, performers are concerned not with the perception of ideas by an audience, but with developing their own sensations; therefore, ideas in a free fantasia can be less distinct.

Example 3.2 Examples of Figuration in the Free Fantasia from C.P.E. Bach's *Versuch*, part II, 338-339.

The image displays six staves of musical notation from C.P.E. Bach's 'Versuch', part II, 338-339. The notation is in bass clef with a key signature of one flat (B-flat). The staves illustrate various figurations:

- Staff 1: Features a series of sixteenth-note runs in the right hand, with some notes beamed together.
- Staff 2: Shows a continuous sixteenth-note run in the right hand, with a thick black bar above it indicating a specific section.
- Staff 3: Displays a sequence of notes with various accidentals (sharps and flats) and stems, possibly representing a chromatic or diatonic scale.
- Staff 4: Contains a series of sixteenth-note runs in the right hand, with some notes beamed together.
- Staff 5: Shows a series of notes with various accidentals and stems, including some notes with a '2' above them, possibly indicating a second ending or a specific fingering.
- Staff 6: Features a series of notes with various accidentals and stems, including a long horizontal line above the staff, possibly indicating a sustained note or a specific fingering.

Nebenintervallen wiederholt werden, sind besonders angenehm, weil sie mehr Veränderungen hervor bringen, als ein simples Harpeggio." Bach, *Versuch*, 337.

Considered from the practical and moral purposes of aesthetics, the free fantasia allows a performer to develop the complex inner relationships of their *Empfindungen* without constraints: without the intrusion of outside influences, free of limitations on how and where one is guided by their *Empfindungen*, and not obliged to create ideas distinct enough for others to understand. Thus, the improvised free fantasia, as the primary outlet for individual expression, embodies the soul of the performer.

3.4.2 The Simple-Composed Fantasia for Forming *Empfindungen*

The fantasias published by Bach in the early part of his career represent the simple-composed type and coincide with his work on pedagogical treatise and music collections meant for performance by amateurs at a beginner level. The only exception is the third movement of Sonata VI (Wq.63.6/H.75), published as a supplement to the first part of his *Versuch in Achtzehn Probe-Stücke in Sechs Sonaten* (1753).⁹⁷ This fantasia-movement is not classified as a simple-composed fantasia because of its more complex style and construction, and its containment as a movement within a larger, more advanced sonata, which is not meant for beginner keyboardists. Therefore, this fantasia movement is not pedagogical, but a complex-composed fantasia, to be discussed below.

The collections containing the simple-composed fantasia, all published between 1762 and 1770, include the following: one at the end part two of the *Versuch* (Wq.117.14/H.160), three in *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art* (Wq.112.2/H.144, Wq.112.8/H.146, Wq.112.15/H.148), one in each of *Kurz und Leicht I* and *II* (Wq.113.3/H.195, Wq.114.7/H.234), and three in *Musikalisches Viereley*

⁹⁷ C.P.E. Bach, *Exempel nebst achtzehn Probe-Stück in Sechs Sonaten* (Berlin: In Verlegung des Auctoris, gedruckt bey C.F. Henning, 1753).

(Wq.117.11/H.223, Wq.117.12/H.224, Wq.117.13/H.225).⁹⁸ All nine fantasias found in these publications share significant features with each other, but differ greatly from the longer, complex-composed fantasias published in the last five years of Bach's life in his *Kenner und Liebhaber* collections. Aimed towards beginners, the simple-composed fantasias are pedagogical exercises meant to teach about the free fantasia for those incapable of improvising themselves, and are therefore composed for the *Liebhaber* rather than the *Kenner*. A closer look at the overall contents of these publications will establish the skill level of a typical consumer, or the *Liebhaber*, and demonstrate the pedagogical function of the simple-composed fantasia.

Clavierstücke verschiedener Art includes three multi-movement works called concerto, sonata, and sinfonia. In addition are single-movement pieces such as minuets, always with its contrasting pair; alla polaccas; solfeggios; fantasias; *Lieder*, which he titles *Singodes*; and finally, the collection concludes with a fugue. While the multi-movement works and the fugue are more challenging than the single-movement pieces, all of the included pieces remain within the realm of the amateur. The single-movement works are quite short, with two or three set on a single page. By including solfeggios, with its long-standing tradition as a technical exercise, Bach denotes clearly the pedagogical function of this collection. In the introduction to the complete works edition of the *Clavierstücke*, Peter Wollny determined the Fantasia in F major (Wq. 112.15/H.148) to be composed as early as 1759, which coincides with Bach's work on

⁹⁸ C.P.E Bach, *Versuch; Clavierstücke verschiedner Art* (Berlin: George Ludewig Winter, 1765); *Kurz und Leicht Clavierstücke mit veränderten Reprisen und beygefügter Fingersetzung für Anfänger* (Berlin: George Ludewig Winter, 1766); *Kurz und Leicht Clavierstücke mit veränderten Reprisen und beygefügter Fingersetzung für Anfänger zweyte Sammlung* (Berlin: George Ludewig Winter, 1768); C.P.E. Bach, ed., *Musikalisches Vielerley* (Hamburg: Bach, 1770).

Part II of his *Versuch*.⁹⁹ For this reason Wollny asserts that some of the works contained within it, including the Fantasia in F major, were initially intended as an appendix to the *Versuch*.¹⁰⁰ The ordering and variety of this particular collection is of particular interest, the significance of which will be examined below.

Both volumes of the *Kurz und Leicht* collections are made up of only single-movement pieces with generic titles, including minuets with its contrasting pair; alla pollacas; as well as Italian character pieces with titles such as allegro, allegretto, andante, presto, etc. With the exception of the final allegro in the collection, all pieces are short, each fitting on a single page. Bach also provides fingerings for the performer, again highlighting the didactic purpose of this collection.

Finally, *Musikalisches Vielerley* is different from the other collections in that it contains pieces by C.P.E. Bach, who edited and self-published this compilation, as well as numerous works by his contemporaries. It is considerably longer than the other two, with 72 pieces on over 200 pages of music compared to the twelve pieces in each of the *Kurz und Leicht* and nineteen in the *Clavierstücke*. As the title suggests, *Musikalisches Vielerley* contains a more varied compilation of genres and instrumentations. The collection includes single-movement works such as *Lieder*, minuets, alla polaccas, fantasias, allegros, and theme and variations; multi-movement sonatas for keyboard alone or with one or two solo instruments like violin, flute, or oboe; as well as organ preludes and a canzonetta for two voices over a bass line. *Musikalisches Vielerley* is therefore multi-functional: some works could be used for one's own private practicing, with

⁹⁹ Peter Wollny, introduction to *The Complete Works, I/8.1*, by Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, ed. Darrell Berg (Los Altos, CA: The Packard Humanities Institute, 2005), xiv. The final chapter in Part II of the *Versuch* discusses the free fantasia.

¹⁰⁰ Wollny, xiv.

didactic pieces such as “Clavierstücke für die rechte oder linke Hand allein,” while others are a source for entertainment to be performed socially with guests.

Further confirming the didactic function and beginner status of these fantasias is their containment in manuscripts of the same type. A collection containing 110 keyboard pieces owned by Rosina Elisabetha von Münch dating from around 1777 includes two of Bach’s fantasias from *Musikalisches Vielerley*.¹⁰¹ Many of the pieces included in this manuscript do not indicate the name of the composer, though Bach, no doubt due to his achieved status of *Originalgenie* by that time, is attributed to his two fantasias. Rosina Elisabetha’s collection includes many of the same type of generic, single-movement, and amateur-level pieces such as those found in the three previously-discussed publications, including minuets, allegros, andantes, alla polaccas, as well as a few multi-movement sinfonie for keyboard. Given that this is a private collection owned by an amateur, this collection provides the modern viewer with a more accurate glimpse at the private performing life of a *Liebhaberin* keyboardist.

A few questions arise when considering the generic stamp of fantasia to these nine works: how do they compare to Bach’s definition of the genre in his *Versuch*; why are they called fantasia and what distinguishes them from titles such as solfeggio or allegro; and finally, if these are pedagogical forms of the genre, what exactly are they teaching? The answering of the first and second questions will indeed lead to a resolution of the third.

Considering the simple-composed fantasias from the rules of the improvised free fantasia as named above (developing ideas from within the self, exploring a variety of affects in juxtaposition, and presenting aesthetic ideas) these fantasias as a whole do not

¹⁰¹Rosina Elisabetha von Münch, owner, “100 Keyboard Pieces,” D-B Mus.ms. 30327.

appear to be conforming to them on the surface. First, if they are composed by Bach, then they are not ideas formed from within the self of the performer. Next, a common feature of these fantasias is that they are limited in their modulations, with usually only a single modulation to a closely related key. Finally, some of these fantasias seem to be providing the performer with clearer melodic ideas and not the hazy, unclear aesthetic ideas as characterized by freely-figured harmony and expected in an improvisation. In order to understand these pieces as fantasias, thus adhering to the principles of the genre, they must be refashioned as starting points for the novice improviser and not hard-and-fast pieces that require a rigorous adherence to the score. In other words, these pieces should be considered merely to serve as a foundation to inspire improvisations for those less skilled or ambitious with harmony. The simple-composed fantasia can aid a performer by providing pre-performative material that can serve as the basis of an improvisation. This function of the simple-composed fantasia is why, I posit, Bach did not call, for example, Fantasia in D minor (Wq. 113.3/H.195) by its Italian tempo/character marking of *Allegro assai*.

Many pieces in the collections by Bach include Italian tempo/character markings, yet to some he added the title fantasia, to others *solfeggio*, and still others maintained their Italianate title. This labeling signified the function of the particular piece to its player. The *solfeggio* served the singular purpose of teaching finger technique, as had been standardized in over 200 years of various instrumental and vocal pedagogical treatises. Those with only an Italian generic name offered examples of movement types in sonatas and other multi-movement pieces and served to teach the character of such movement types. Finally, the title of fantasia indicated to the performer an opportunity to

learn how to improvise on the one hand, and how to be inspired to explore the inner self through improvisation on the other.

There are two manners of teaching improvisation that can be observed through these pieces. In the first manner, Bach offers a harmonic structure that can be used by the improviser as the foundation of an improvisation, such as in his *Fantasia in F major* (Wq.112.15/H.148) (see Example 3.3). He opens the fantasy by clearly establishing the key with a tonicizing chord progression over a tonic pedal point in the opening, and a dominant pedal point (line 3) at the end, which Bach suggests in his *Versuch* is an appropriate beginning of a fantasia.¹⁰² The remainder of the fantasia explores harmonic relationships to the tonic F major. Bach indicates in the score that the chords should be arpeggiated; yet, as Bach wrote of the improvised free fantasia, this should not be taken so literally. He complained in his autobiography that “it seems to me that music primarily must touch the heart, and the claviersist never can accomplish that through a mere bluster, drumming, and arpeggiating, at least not in my opinion.”¹⁰³ In other words, while Bach wrote that this should be arpeggiated, performers should vary the arpeggiation and figuration, among other things, as the affect moves them. It is for this reason Bach provided examples in his *Versuch* of various manners for arpeggiation, emphasizing the need for variety in expressing the harmony. Therefore, even with the *Allegretto* tempo, one need not merely roll the chords, as may be the tendency for modern performers who interpret the score literally. The *Allegretto* indication does not necessarily require that one quickly change from chord to chord, rather it is indicative of a character that one should

¹⁰² Bach, *Essay*, 431-432.

¹⁰³ Translation in William S. Newman, “Emanuel Bach’s Autobiography,” 372.

bring to the performance of this semi-improvised fantasia, and one manner for achieving this is through the type of arpeggiation chosen.

Example 3.3 C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in F major (Wq.112.15/H.148)

The image displays three systems of musical notation for C.P.E. Bach's Fantasia in F major. The first system is titled "Allegretto" and features a series of arpeggiated chords in both the treble and bass staves, with dynamic markings of *p* and *f* alternating. The second system shows a more complex texture with a rapid sixteenth-note arpeggio in the bass and a melodic line in the treble, including a *pp* marking. The third system continues with arpeggiated chords in the bass and a melodic line in the treble, also marked with "arpeggio".

The other indication of the character of this piece, aside from its Italianate title, is through the chosen tonality. Tonality was an important compositional tool for portraying affect. The affective characteristics of key areas was discussed by many music theorists throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such as Mattheson, Jean-Philippe Rameau, and Schubart, though there was no standard interpretation.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ See for example, Mattheson, *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre*, 236-252; Jean-Philippe Rameau, *Traité de L'Harmonie Reduite à ses Principes naturels* (Paris: Jean-Babtiste-Christophe Ballard, 1722), 157; and Schubart, *Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst*, 261-266. For a survey of the historical description of the

Mattheson characterizes F major with the words generosity (*Großmuth*), steadfastness (*Standhaftigkeit*), and love (*Liebe*).¹⁰⁵ As a point of comparison with other major tonalities as described by Mattheson, he defines D major as sharp (*scharff*) and obstinate (*eigensinnig*), while B-flat major is very entertaining (*sehr divertissant*) and magnificent (*prächtig*).¹⁰⁶ Schubart describes F major as pleasantness and quiet (*Gefälligkeit und Ruhe*) and D major as the sound of triumph, of Halleluiahs (*Der Ton des Triumphes, des Hallelujas*).¹⁰⁷ Regardless of how literal any of these descriptions should or would have been understood, the tonality of F major in combination with the *Allegretto* tempo indication determines a basic affect for the performer in order to arouse inspiration and sensations. Bach provides merely the affect and harmonic progression as an apparatus for learning how to improvise a fantasia, and the performer is to internalize it, reflect on it from within, and elaborate on it based on their own desires and impulses. Leaving nearly all performance aspects undefined, i.e. figuration, register, dynamics, rhythms, etc., the musician is free to elaborate on the harmonic progression following their own *Empfindungen* and could even, through practicing such types of improvisations, attempt new modulations or be inspired to create ideas of their own.

Bach's Fantasy in D minor (Wq.113.3/H.195) is an example for the second manner of teaching improvisation, in which he teaches improvisation through a singular idea (see Example 3.4). The idea for Fantasy in D minor is a continuous string of triplet-sixteenth notes that is treated to a standard harmonic pattern in a tempo marked *Allegro*

affects of keys, see Rita Steblin, *A History of Key Characteristics in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2002); and for a chart comparing affect and tonality of composers in the Baroque Era, see Mary Cyr, *Performing Baroque Music* (Portland, OR: Amadeus Press, 1992), 32-34.

¹⁰⁵ Mattheson, *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre*, 241.

¹⁰⁶ Mattheson, *Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre*, 241, 249.

¹⁰⁷ Schubart, *Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst*, 261.

assai. This short fantasia, unlike the previous, includes barlines and is strictly measured. The first two measures tonicize D minor with an alternation between D minor and A major and the harmonic rhythm moves every half measure. The triplet pattern is then elaborated on through a harmonic sequence at a faster harmonic rhythm, moving by the quarter note, before quickly returning to the tonic in the seventh and final measure. This fantasia can be interpreted as a short play of triplets in the right hand while the left hand keeps the harmonic motion in order, thus exhibiting how one, when armed with knowledge of harmony, can freely improvise with a simple idea. In this case, Bach's use of a very fast tempo in the key of D minor and triplet-sixteenth notes results in a very spirited and fiery affect. A student of improvisation, after playing through Bach's version, can attempt modifications to the fantasia by changing elements such as the tempo, the rhythm of the idea, tonality, or even expanding the harmonic progression to include modulations to other keys. As with the previous fantasia, this can also serve as a starting point for an improviser, who can then elaborate on it according to their own *Empfindungen*.

Returning to Bach's three basic rules for the free fantasia, by contextualizing the simple-composed fantasia as a pedagogical model or source on which an improvisation

Example 3.4 C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in D minor (Wq.113.3/H.195)

can be based, it can be seen that the three rules are indeed observed. The first rule, developing ideas from within the self, is achieved by offering to the keyboardist an idea for inspiring contemplation, which can then be internalized and developed from within the self. Contemplation of an object presented by an artist is one of the basic purposes for works of art. The subject perceives the object, not to understand the object more clearly, but rather to enliven one's feelings and explore them within the soul through the "enthusiasm of the heart." Through this inspired state, the improviser can explore a variety of affects in juxtaposition, the second requirement of a free fantasia, by

elaborating on and altering Bach's composed fantasia, thus making the fantasia belonging to the *Empfindungen* of the performer. Finally, even when Bach provides a melodic fragment in his simple-composed fantasias, they are neither fully developed melodic ideas, nor treated to formal procedure: instead they are a means for expressing the harmony and character. For that reason, they can be understood as aesthetic (i.e. clear but confused) ideas.

What then is actually being taught through the simple-composed fantasias? This form of the free fantasia offers to the *Liebhaber* an outlet into experiencing an introspective, musical solitude. Through solitude, one develops their skills of imagination and inspiration in lower cognitive states, and experiences one's own *Empfindungen* from within that could otherwise not be accessed. As explained by Sulzer's discussion of inspiration, by enlivening one's feelings of an object, in this case Bach's simple-composed fantasia, one allows the aesthetic object to make an impression on their soul. This impression can effect a change on the soul, which leads to the moral development of the performer. Thus, the simple-composed fantasia serves as a means to teach an amateur musician the forming of their *empfindsam* and—more importantly—moral self.

3.4.3 Case Study: *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art* as "*vollkommene Bildung*"

As has been discussed, the beautiful arts were not merely for the purpose of pleasure, but more so for the forming of a beautiful spirit and a high moral worth. This moral worth is achieved through a repetition of moral feelings, through which a proficiency is obtained, thus giving the perceiver easier access to these feelings and a direction towards moral actions. The definition of beauty, according to rational philosophy, is the perception of perfection, and perfection is created through unity in

variety or multiplicity. The perceiver, upon experiencing the sensory beauty in the object through lower cognitive states, intuits the perfection, which is then internalized for inward reflection and moral development of the self. An individual should also develop and experience a variety of *Empfindungen* in order to cultivate a complete sense of the self. The greater variety of *Empfindungen* possessed by an individual, the greater their sense of taste and their ability to recognize beauty in objects. Perhaps Bach had this in mind when he organized his *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art* (Wq.112).

The *Clavierstücke* collection was without a doubt intended for amateurs. This designation can be determined by the genres of keyboard works included, such as solfeggi and fantasias, both of which, as discussed above, are didactic in function. The technical level of these pieces is for slightly-advanced amateurs, especially in the multi-movement pieces. What can be seen in the collection, unlike the other early publications by Bach, is a careful organization that provides a unity in diversity. On the title page are pieces with italicized titles, the concerto, sonata, sinfonia, and fugue, which stand out as clear delineations in the collection (see Figure 3.1). For the multi-movement works, Bach differentiates the movement names within the larger works by italicizing the work title and indenting the movement titles. Therefore, either Bach or his printer Winter uses font to clearly differentiate the multi-movement works from the single-movement pieces. It is not immediately clear, however, why Bach also chose italicize the title of fugue, which is a single-movement work. I suggest that the italicization is not merely for title hierarchy, but to mark off three distinct sets of works, each of which would be followed by the concluding fugue. When viewed in this manner, it becomes clear that each of the three sets can function as a whole that contains perfectly ordered and varied

Figure 3.1 Contents Page of C.P.E. Bach, *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art*, erste Sammlung (Berlin: George Ludewig Winter, 1765)

<u>I n h a l t.</u>			
<i>C O N C E R T O,</i>		pag.	
Allegretto.	- - -	1	Minuetto I. - - - 27
Largo.	- - -	8	Minuetto II. - - - 27
Allegro.	- - -	11	Solfeggio. - - - 28
Fantasia.	- - -	18	Alla Polacca. - - - 29
Minuetto I.	- - -	18	Singode. - - - 30
Minuetto II.	- - -	18	<i>S I N F O N I A,</i>
Solfeggio.	- - -	19	Allegro di molto. - - - 31
Alla Polacca.	- - -	19	Largo. - - - 36
Singode.	- - -	20	Allegro affai. - - - 38
<i>S O N A T A,</i>			Singode. - - - 41
Allegretto.	- - -	21	Fantasia. - - - 42
Poco adagio.	- - -	23	Minuetto I. - - - 42
Allegro.	- - -	24	Minuetto II. - - - 43
Fantasia.	- - -	26	Alla Polacca. - - - 43
			Solfeggio. - - - 44
			<i>F U G A.</i> - - - 45

genres with a diversity of affects, thus conforming to the requirements of works of the beautiful arts to be perfect, ordered, and diverse.

All three sets begin with a multi-movement work and include, each with its own ordering, a fantasia, a minuet with its counter-minuet, a solfeggio, an alla polacca, and a *Singode*. All of the different movement types provide varying manners for experiencing *Empfindungen*. Furthermore, each set provides different examples of all of the genres, thus making each set unique in its perfection. The concerto, sonata, and sinfonia are three

different types of three-movement works that emerged from different traditions. Both the concerto and the sinfonia come from a more public performing space, whereas the sonata was often considered by this time a genre for the home. Bach differentiates the style of each of the three genres, which is demonstrated in their opening movements.

The concerto creates the symphonic atmosphere with clearly defined tutti and solo sections performed by the lone keyboardist, who embodies the roles of both members of opposing orchestral forces (see Example 3.5). The orchestral tutti is signified in the opening *allegretto* with a melody of dotted rhythms played in octaves. The separating of the right and left hand indicate soloist and orchestra respectively, with both working together in the opening ritornello. The shift to the first solo episode is made clear not only through change of melodic material, but also through the shift in prominence given to the upper staff representing the soloist. At first, the soloist is accompanied by short harmonic points made by the left hand (m. 8-10), but beginning in m. 11 the soloist has an extended unaccompanied solo. Again, the solo part is restricted to the top staff, even when the selection requires both right and left hand. The choice of typesetting in tandem with the stylistic attributes of the piece are significant features for creating the psychological experience of the concerto for the keyboardist. The solo and tutti are clearly delineated sections, which are signified both aurally, through the change in texture and increased virtuosity, as well as visually, separating the two groups to their respective staves. As a result, the performer can imagine the experience of a concertist in performance even as a *Liebhaber*.

The sonata, on the other hand, immediately gives away its private status through the articulation in the opening figure. Slurring sixteenth notes in groups of two was

Example 3.5 C.P.E. Bach, Concerto per il Cembalo solo (Wq.112.1/H.190), *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art*, mm. 1-13.



frequently described as a sighing figure, a very personal, emotive expression compared to the more regal and strong dotted rhythms in the opening of the concerto (see Example 3.6). Bach also takes care to write in more ornaments and articulations in the *Allegretto* of the sonata, which can serve as another marker for the intricate and close experience of smaller, private performance, where attention to refined detail was more valued.

Finally, the *Allegro di molto* of the *Sinfonia* signifies the unified harmony of an orchestra by equally distributing a number of voices of the orchestra across both staves (see Example 3.7). For example, when imagining an orchestral scoring in the opening of the movement for strings, the chord is distributed among the strings with the first violins playing the exclamatory and introductory sixteenth-note arpeggios. In m. 3 it is transferred to a lower string group, likely the cellos, while the first and second violins

Example 3.6 C.P.E. Bach, Sonata per il Cembalo solo (Wq.112.7/H.179), in *Clavierstücke verschiedene Art*, mm. 1-12.



provide a harmonic accompaniment, which is played by the right hand on the keyboard. Which instrument takes priority constantly switches in this movement, thus representing the equality of the members of the orchestra, which is then embodied by the performer.

With these three, seemingly similar, multi-movement genres, Bach creates through style three different performing experiences that can be imagined by the keyboardist. This kind of variety continues when comparing each of the other five genres in this collection, though the differences among the individual pieces are made according to their functions. As already discussed above, the fantasia provides a basis for one of the two manners of teaching improvisations. The minuets and *alla polaccas*, both melodically-identified and rhythmically-characteristic genres, portray their respective dances through their melodic gestures, articulations, and tonality.

Example 3.7 C.P.E. Bach, Sinfonia (Wq.112.13/H.191), *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art*, mm. 1-11.



Each of the three solfeggi have at their basis a technical skill. The solfeggio from the second set (Wq. 112.10/H.147), provides practice mostly for scalar types of movements in the right hand, first as a turn indicated by an ornament on quarter notes, then through sixteenth-note passages, such as mm. 3 and 4, next as mordents on eighth notes, as in m. 5, and finally as sextuplets in mm. 17-20. The final solfeggio in the collection offers an example of imitation between the right and left hands, perhaps as an exercise for both strengthening the left hand and connecting the two hands together in their imitative passagework (see Examples 3.8 and 3.8).

The three *Singoden* can be more obviously contrasted by their texts, which are set in varying tempos, meters, and tonalities to fit the textual meaning. "Die Landschaft," a typical topic for *Lieder* in the era, presents its G major pastoral theme in a triple meter. In contrast, "Belinda," a warning about choosing money over virtues, is set in a more somber E minor.

Example 3.8 C.P.E. Bach, Solfeggio (Wq. 112.10/H.147), *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art*, mm. 1-19.

28 *Allegro di molto.* S O L F E G G I O.

Example 3.9 C.P.E. Bach, Solfeggio (Wq. 112.18/H.148), *Clavierstücke verschiedener Art*, mm. 1-23.

44 *Allegro.* S O L F E G G I O.

Considering the collection as a whole, the variety within each set is compounded when the three sets are played together. Each set contains a variety of the genres, and within the collection as a whole each of the genres are also varied. Thus, the sets are unified in themselves and with each other through their variety. The concluding *Fugue* signifies the older, sacred style of keyboard playing, which perhaps references the greatest unity in diversity that lay at the foundation of all rational aesthetics: the Godly.

Thus, this collection, though seemingly simple in its execution, represents the ultimate perfect ordering. All arts strive for this perfection, for perfection was the beautiful, which inspires beautiful thinking and leads to the development of a moral soul. The arts, as an ethical discipline, sought to teach morality through the experience of *Empfindungen*, and this collection, aimed at musical amateurs, intended to do the same.

3.4.4 The Complex-Composed Fantasia: The *Originalgenie* and Identity Construction

Bach also composed fantasias whose structures are much more complicated than those of the simple-composed type. These works are more advanced in their technical requirements and demonstrate a different aesthetic function compared to the simple-composed and freely-improvised fantasias. The complex-composed fantasia does not have the same pedagogical function of the simply-composed type in that it no longer intends to teach one to improvise, rather it serves more as a representation of Bach the *Originalgenie*. Bach alludes to this by describing his fantasias as works of "dark fantasy" in a letter to Johann Forkel in 1775, implying that they contain those feelings from deep within his soul and are not focused through clear understanding.¹⁰⁸ He published fantasias of this type, though apparently with some reluctance. Bach asked of Forkel on the

¹⁰⁸ Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach to Johann Nikolaus Forkel, Hamburg, 10 February 1775, in *The Letters of C.P.E. Bach*, trans. and ed. Stephen L. Clark (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 76.

publications of his fantasias, "but how many are there who love, understand, and play that sort of thing well?"¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, in his autobiography Bach wrote that many of his works were restrained in their style because they were written either for individuals or the general public.¹¹⁰ He seemed to show much less restraint in the free fantasias of the *Kenner und Liebhaber* collections. Even though these collections were composed for the general public, he was concerned for the public's ability to understand them. Bach's comments taken altogether suggest that his composed free fantasias are both his most complex and most personal works.

The fantasias that belong to the category of complex-composed fantasias include six from the *Kenner und Liebhaber* collection published between 1783 and 1787: two from each of collections IV (H.277/Wq.58 No. 6 and H.278/Wq.58 No. 7), V (H.279/Wq.59 No. 5) and H.284/Wq.59 No. 6) and VI (H.289/Wq.61 No. 3 and H.291/Wq.61 No. 6). The third movement of Sonata VI (H.75/Wq.63 No. 6) from *Achtzehn Probe-stücke* (1753), composed as a supplement to the first part of the *Versuch*, also belongs to this category even though it is not an independent work, which is uncharacteristic for the genre. Finally, there are two fantasias that were never published in Bach's time. The earliest is Fantasia in E-flat major (H.348) dating from between 1745 and 1755. Bach never included this fantasia in his list of works, and it was likely given to a colleague while he was working in Berlin.¹¹¹ The Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300)

¹⁰⁹ Bach to Forkel, 76.

¹¹⁰ Newman, "Emanuel Bach's Autobiography," 371.

¹¹¹ Wollny, Introduction, *The Complete Works*, I/8.1, xviii. and Sources, 130-131. It is believed that he gifted this fantasia to the other court accompanist in Berlin and former student of J.S. Bach in Leipzig, Christoph Nichelmann (1717-1762), in whose name the manuscript is now titled, D-B Mus.ms. Nichelmann N 1.

originated in 1770 and was later arranged by Bach for violin and keyboard (Wq.80), the manuscript to which he added the subtitle "C.P.E. Bachs Empfindungen."

The circumstances surrounding all of these works suggests that Bach himself believed the fantasia to be a medium for constructing an identity that displayed not only his genius, but also his personality through his *Empfindungen*, beginning with his earliest fantasia, H.348. During the decade in which this work was written Bach was establishing himself in Berlin as a keyboardist and composer through the publication of keyboard music while working at the Prussian court. For that reason, Bach may have used this work as a means to display his keyboard and compositional abilities to his colleagues. The fantasia contained in H.75/Wq.63 No. 6 for the *Probe-stücke*, meant to accompany his *Versuch*, is one of the first pieces Bach published that was not intended only for amateurs, thus this movement could have been an early example of Bach presenting this side of himself to the public. While circumstances surrounding composition of the F-sharp minor fantasia (H.300/Wq.67) are not known, his notation of "C.P.E. Bachs Empfindungen" certainly explains that he meant it as a representation of himself.

By the time Bach published the last three of his *Kenner und Liebhaber* collections he was well established as an *Originalgenie*. His reluctance to publish fantasias aside, this was an opportunity for him at the end of his life to present to his devoted public, who had heard of this side of his genius through accounts of his improvisations from Burney, Reichardt, and others, his true musical identity. Due to the great complexity of these works, they were likely composed for musical *Kenner*, though a *Liebhaber* may have studied and aspired to perform them. Bach used the title fantasia to signify the intimacy intended in such a work to his audience, who would perform them or even only attempt

to perform them. The performers could feel the keyboard in their fingers as Bach would have while he was improvising, almost experiencing an embodiment of Bach himself through his music. In that experience, the fantasia, now manifested through the performer, became the performer's unique perception of Bach through a combination of his fantasia and their own imagination. Bach facilitated this experience by his manner of presenting the musical material in his complex composed fantasias. This is most evident in the Fantasia in F-sharp Minor (H.300/Wq.67), the most personal of all of Bach's output.

The Fantasia in F-sharp Minor, in comparison with the simple-composed fantasia, is written in much more detail and does not appear to conform to the specifications laid out in the *Versuch*, particularly in the use of large-scale coherence and meter. Other sources attempt to formally analyze the fantasias according to standard formal structures, suggesting they follow rondo, sonata, and/or da capo forms as overarching structural elements.¹¹² As a point of comparison, the rondo, of which Bach published many in his lifetime, treats the musical material in a very different manner from the complex-composed fantasia. An examination of the Rondo I in C major (Wq. 56.1/H.260) from the second *Kenner und Liebhaber* collection in relation to the Fantasia in F-sharp Minor will show how these two genres fundamentally differ in their psychological experience of the musical material its treatment and demonstrate further the aesthetic function of the complex-composed fantasia.¹¹³ While the free fantasia appears to demonstrate the feeling

¹¹² See for example Peter Wollny, Introduction, *The Complete Works I/8.1*, xviii; David Schulenburg, *Instrumental Music of Carl Philip Emanuel Bach*, 153-157; and Schleuning, *Die Freie Fantasie*, "Die Freien Fantasien aus den Sammlungen für *Kenner und Liebhaber* (1783-1787)" and "Die fis-Moll-Fantasie von 1787," 234-283.

¹¹³ Bach, "Rondo I," from *Clavier-Sonaten nebst Eigenen Rondos fürs Forte-piano für Kenner und Liebhaber, zweyte Sammlung* (Leipzig: im Verlag des Autors, 1780), 1-7.

of a psychological transformation through the constant change of the musical material, the Rondo intends to show the opposite. Bach's Rondo I in C major uses the main theme to represent an idea that remains stubbornly unchanging, despite attempted influence from the alternating and increasingly diverse material.

The theme of Rondo I in C major, given the tempo indication of *Allegretto*, is a simple, eight-measure periodic phrase in 6/8 meter (see Example 3.10). As is typical of rondos, the theme is light and easily recognizable. In this case, the characteristic rhythm of the opening two measures, which returns in the second half of the periodic structure, is easy to discern, making the rondo structure audibly apparent to the performer. Also typical of a rondo theme is the harmonic structure, leading in measure four to V, and then returning to I in measure eight. Unlike the treatment of material in the complex-composed fantasia, this rondo theme never develops, even when it is treated to different tonalities throughout the piece. The second statement of the rondo theme, after a modulation in the previous episode, goes to G major (m. 21) (see Example 3.11). In the third statement the rondo returns to C major (beginning in m. 34), this time adding a four-measure afterthought, with three measures over a C pedal before restating the V-I cadence (mm. 40-43) (see Example 3.12). This short segment returns once more as a coda that ends the entire piece.

This harmonic progression of the rondo theme is typical of the genre; however, Bach proves the immutable nature of his theme through his unusual treatment in subsequent restatements. Bach attempts to surprise the performer in the next statement when, after two measures of the opening of theme in E minor, it comes to an abrupt stop with a full measure rest (m. 52.) (see Example 3.13). The statement is immediately

Example 3.10 C.P.E. Bach, Rondo I (Wq. 56.1/H.260) from *Clavier-Sonaten nebst einigen Rondos fürs Forte-Piano für Kenner und Liebhaber, Zweite Sammlung*, mm. 1-8.

1 Allegretto

p *f*

5

p *f*

Detailed description: This musical score is for measures 1-8 of Example 3.10. It is in 6/8 time and marked 'Allegretto'. The piece begins with a piano (*p*) dynamic. The right hand features a melody with eighth and sixteenth notes, while the left hand provides a steady accompaniment of eighth notes. At measure 3, the dynamic shifts to forte (*f*), and the right hand introduces a more complex, rhythmic pattern. The score concludes at measure 8.

Example 3.11 C.P.E. Bach, Rondo I (Wq. 56.1/H.260) from *Kenner und Liebhaber, Zweite Sammlung*, mm. 21-24.

21

p *f*

Detailed description: This musical score covers measures 21-24 of Example 3.11. It continues in 6/8 time. The right hand has a melodic line with some chromaticism, and the left hand has a bass line with chords and moving lines. The dynamic changes from piano (*p*) to forte (*f*) at measure 22. The piece ends at measure 24.

Example 3.12 C.P.E. Bach, Rondo I (Wq. 56.1/H.260) from *Kenner und Liebhaber, Zweite Sammlung*, mm. 34-45.

35

p *f*

39

p *ff*

43

p *pp*

Detailed description: This musical score covers measures 34-45 of Example 3.12. It is in 6/8 time. The right hand has a melodic line with some chromaticism, and the left hand has a bass line with chords and moving lines. The dynamic changes from piano (*p*) to forte (*f*) at measure 35. At measure 39, the dynamic changes to fortissimo (*ff*). At measure 43, the dynamic changes to piano (*p*), and at measure 44, it changes to pianissimo (*pp*). The piece ends at measure 45.

repeated, however this time transposed up a half step to F major, followed again by a measure rest. A short episode then interrupts, which is also halted by rests. The rondo theme again attempts to restart for two measures in a minor. Finally, it regains momentum with a full statement in B-flat major (beginning in m. 71), now comprised of the entire eight-measures rondo theme played in the lowest octave on the keyboard, which gives a greater strength to the theme. Even through interruptions of the theme with silence, modulation, and an episode, the rondo theme is able to remain intact, and in each occurrence it is recognizable as the same theme as it was heard in the opening measures. This statement in B-flat major, however, stands to be challenged in its final measure, when instead of a perfect authentic cadence, the harmony goes from vi to V (m. 78), giving room for the melody to spin off into another episode. Bach uses this same device of eliding the end of theme into the in the episode in the next three statements of the rondo theme (beginning in mm. 96, 114, and 144). Regardless of the change made to the end of theme, in each restatement the characteristic opening two measures are always kept untouched and easily recognizable. As the movement progresses, the material placed against the main theme no longer resembles the contrasting themes and appear more as passagework, making the rondo theme even more distinguishable from the episodes. Ultimately, the steadfast, single-minded, and almost stubborn nature of the rondo theme prevents any feeling of psychological transformation. The experience is instead cyclical: regardless of the context of the main material and any changes that may occur around it, it maintains its fundamental characteristic throughout.

Example 3.12 C.P.E. Bach, Rondo I (Wq. 56.1/H.260) from *Kenner und Liebhaber*, *Zweite Sammlung*, mm. 54-79.

On the contrary, the complex-composed fantasia reveals the transformative power of inner reflection. To serve as an example, Bach's F-sharp minor fantasia creates a sense in the performer of a teleological development of the self through the transformation of the musical material. Bach presents three main sections consecutively from the beginning of the fantasia, Adagio (m. 1), Allegretto (m. 4a), and Largo (m. 5). These three sections will serve as the foundational material for the entire fantasia (see Examples 3.14-3.16).

Example 3.14 C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300), mm. 1-3a.

Adagio

pp *mf*

te - - nu - - te

3a

f *p* *f* *p* *f*

Example 3.15 C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300), mm. 4-4c.

Allegretto

4a

f

4b

p

4c

f

Example 3.16 C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300), mm. 5-9.

While the majority of the work does not have a specified meter, the opening of the Adagio is presented in 4/4 meter and the Largo is in 12/8 meter. By composing out a fantasia with specified sections, meters, and melodies, Bach has fundamentally changed the genre. Bach wrote that performers must be able to feel the affects they wish to arouse in their audiences and assume the emotions the composer intended. In the case of the Fantasia in F-sharp minor, the performer is taken through a variety of affects— a much more difficult task for less experienced musicians. Bach achieves this by limiting the material to four basic ideas, which act as a guide to arouse *Empfindungen* in the performer. These four ideas, which I label as *a-d*, are clearly presented in the opening of the fantasia and all serve quite different functions (for a reduction of the four ideas see Example 3.17).

In the opening Adagio, idea *a* establishes the key with a pedal on F sharp, indicated with the word “tenute” under the bass line (m. 1-2), and a tonicizing harmonic progression, as in the Fantasia in F major (see Example 3.17a). This idea serves as a stable return throughout the fantasia. Idea *b*, which begins in the second part of the

Adagio in m. 3a, is an elaborated appoggiatura that is continuously sequenced, making it harmonically unstable (see Example 3.17b). Idea *c* in the Allegretto is made up of three distinct representations, though they are all unified by very fast and erratic passagework, and unstable and quickly moving harmony (see Example 3.17c). The passages are presented as either ascending with a chromatic half step, appoggiated, or scalar. In contrast, idea *d* presented in the Largo is in 12/8 meter, slow, and the most melodic idea presented (see example 3.17d). Idea *d* has a balanced phrase structure with a melody in the upper voice and bass line in the lower voice.

Example 3.17 Reduction of the Four Ideas of C.P.E. Bach's Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300)

3.17a

Adagio ^a

3.17b

Adagio ^b

3.17c

Allegretto

^{c1} ^{c2} ^{c3}

3.17d

Largo ^d

With each subsequent occurrence the ideas are re-contextualized through changes in figuration, harmony, key, or disposition and never return exactly the same. By placing the ideas in new contexts, a performer can create new interpretations of them. For example, when the Adagio returns in m. 15, Bach undermines the function of *a*: where it was initially for the purpose of establishing stability, it is now made less harmonically stable. Idea *a* first returns on a D-major triad (m. 15); however it is missing some of its characteristic features (see Example 3.18). For example, there is no pedal point, nor is there an authentic cadence to fully establish the key of D major. An authentic cadence at m. 20 tonicizes E flat minor, which is then followed by a progression over an E flat pedal point. This new and distantly related key area changes the initial character of the idea.

The context of the ideas can also be altered through their disposition, which adds a deeper layer of complexity to the ideas. Unlike the initial presentation of *a*, this Adagio does not conclude with *b*, rather it is followed immediately by *d* (m. 23). Idea *d*, however, does not provide the sense of stability one would expect due to its quick juxtaposition with *c* (m. 24). By placing *c* immediately after *d*, *c* creates an interruption to *d*, both melodically and harmonically. *D* begins in B-flat minor, though after one measure of *c* it returns in C minor (m. 25). With a modulation to D minor, *c* interrupts a second time before *d* is extended in m. 27.

It is not just the surface level harmony and melody that are altered, but, with their new dispositions, *c* and *d* influence one another and take on the characteristics of the other. For example, on the one hand, *d* comes across as less stable because the interruption of idea *c* requires it to constantly modulate, thus somewhat taking on the

Example 3.18 C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300), mm. 15-36.

Adagio

15 *f* *p* *tenute* *p* *f* *tenute*

18 *cres - can - do* *ff* *p* *pp* *to - tum - to*

21 *mf* *f*

Largo

23 *pp* *p* *mf* *f* *p*

25 *p* *mf* *f* *p*

Example 3.18 (cont'd) C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in F-sharp minor (H.300), mm. 15-36.

The image displays a musical score for C.P.E. Bach's Fantasia in F-sharp minor, measures 27 through 36. The score is written for piano and consists of five systems of two staves each (treble and bass clef). The key signature is one sharp (F#) and the time signature is common time (C). The piece is in a minor mode. The dynamics are marked as *pp*, *mf*, *f*, *p*, and *f*. The score includes various musical notations such as slurs, ties, and fingerings. A prominent feature is a long, continuous sixteenth-note run in the right hand starting at measure 33, which is highlighted with a thick black bar. This run is marked with a '6' for fingering. The piece concludes with a final cadence in measure 36.

functional characteristic of *c*. On the other hand, *c* is made seemingly more lyrical due to the influence of the Largo tempo indication and character of *d*. One would presumably return to a faster tempo (though it is not indicated) gradually beginning around m. 36 where *c* completely takes over.

Bach continues to re-contextualize the four musical ideas in each of their subsequent occurrences through a variety of techniques as demonstrated in Table 3.1. To be sure, each new context is not necessarily shocking to the performer or listener, as many sources suggest about Bach’s music and the supposed *empfindsamer Stil*. Rather, the re-contextualization enriches the character of the ideas, which in turn creates more complex and deeper impressions for the performer to experience. By limiting the basic material of the entire fantasia to only four ideas, Bach provides a degree of clarity that allows the performer to interpret new meanings and *Empfindungen* from the ideas in different contexts, whether through changes in figuration, harmony, key, or disposition. With each new context, the ideas guide the performer through various affects and sensations; therefore, the ideas serve as objects of inspiration for the performer to explore their own *Empfindungen*. Because the aim of aesthetics was to develop a depth of character in an individual; the free fantasia, in its ability to facilitate such development through the senses, served the larger moral purpose of cultivating a beautiful soul.

Table 3.1 Disposition of Musical Ideas in Fantasia in F-sharp minor

Section	Measure	Idea	Description
Adagio	1	<i>a</i> *	Harmonically stable; tonicizing F sharp minor
	3a	<i>b</i> *	Modulatory
	3d	<i>a</i>	Tonicizing B minor
	3d	<i>b</i>	Modulatory; ends on a half cadence in A major in m. 3h
Allegretto	4a	<i>c</i> *	Modulatory; all three forms of <i>c</i> ; harmonic rhythm at the eighth note
Largo	5	<i>d</i> *	B minor
Adagio	15	<i>a</i>	Begins on D major triad at m. 15; pedal point on E flat at m. 20; presented without idea <i>b</i>
Largo	23	<i>d/c</i>	Alternation of ideas <i>d</i> and <i>c</i>
Adagio	39	<i>a/b</i>	Transposition of first Adagio from F sharp minor to B minor until m. 41d
Allegretto	42a	<i>c3</i>	Only <i>c3</i>
Adagio	42f	<i>B</i>	Presented without idea <i>a</i>
Allegretto	43b	<i>C</i>	Transitional
	43c	<i>C</i>	Harmonic rhythm at the quarter note
Largo	44	<i>D</i>	F sharp minor

* First presentation of idea.

The complex composed fantasia, though seemingly detailed in its composition, still allows the performer a significant amount of freedom. A majority of the work is unmetred, durations of notes should be considered approximate, and the dynamics merely scratch the surface of possibilities. Bach wrote that when a person of “delicate, sensitive insight” performs, “the composer will learn to his astonishment that there is more in his music than he had ever known or believed.”¹¹⁴ In the act of performance, when the performer is taken into an *empfindsam* state, the fantasia is no longer Bach’s *Empfindungen*, but the performer’s perception of them. Therefore, what began for Bach as a means for constructing his own identity, becomes a means for the performer to construct their own. After a performer attempts to feel Bach’s *Empfindungen* through their fingers at the clavichord, they can be taken into an *empfindsam* state. Bach’s *Empfindungen* are first taken into the soul, then inspire the imagination, which finally leads to an effective change in the soul of the performer.

3.5 Conclusion

While other genres could serve as sources for one’s private moral development, the free fantasia has proven to be the most important for the free expression of *Empfindungen*. A shift in the conception of the origins of a musical genius from the intellect to feelings prompted a change in the manner in which one presents their genius. Thus, the experience and portrayal of *Empfindungen* through a free improvisation based in harmonic figuration became the means for displaying the musical genius instead of the artificial and cerebral counterpoint of the previous century. The brief rise of the genre of

¹¹⁴ Bach, *Essay*, 153.

free fantasia, along with the highly expressive and private instrument of the clavichord, can only be understood in the context of the aesthetic function of musical solitude during the North German Enlightenment. Furthermore, the great significance placed on music as a means for moral development increased the number of amateur musicians, thus creating a need for teaching the practice of the fantasia through musical treatises and amateur music publications. These sources, when examined through the lens of rational aesthetics, help to explain the greater function and importance of private music performance in the forming of personal taste and morality.

Great taste was also developed and spread in society through social entertainment and music making. Society was considered a complimentary experience to solitude for identity formation, and numerous publications in the eighteenth century sought to educate the public on the noblest manners for engaging with the public in the forming a moral culture. The following chapter will explore the aesthetic need for society and examine in more detail how good taste could be spread through the experience of music.

CHAPTER 4 SHARED *EMPFINDUNGEN*: MUSIC AND SOCIAL PLEASURE

4.1 Introduction

Music played a significant role in social activities during the second half of the eighteenth century not just for the aristocracy, as it had done for many centuries, but it also entered into the literate tradition in the social meetings of the newly-formed bourgeoisie class. Most importantly, it served the function of furthering self-development and the creation of a moral culture. Social interactions in general provide a space for the discussion of important topics about the arts, therefore served as a means for spreading good taste. Engaging in lively conversations, for example, about the judgment of a work of art or a performance of an opera could lead to a greater understanding of the artworks in question, and even to a further discovery of the self through the discussion. These experiences were considered a complimentary method to solitude for expanding one's taste.

Performing music grew to become an important aspect of social life in private homes as well as in newly-formed musical societies. Whether participating as a performer or as a listener, one could use music as a means for spreading good taste through shared *Empfindungen*. A performer may express his or her *Empfindungen* in an expressive performance of a *Lied* or sonata; likewise, together a group of singers may share their religious sentiments in the singing of a chorale. By sharing one's *Empfindungen* through performance, or experiencing the *Empfindungen* of others during these social activities, one could develop the moral self in a way they could not through solitude. Furthermore, the moral fabric of society and culture could be strengthened

through social activities and the spreading of taste, which was supported by the increased number of serial publications.

Journals published by leading music writers, theorists, and critics covered topics such as music composition, history, biographies of composers, and reviews of recent music publications and performances. These journals, along with books and treatises on music, educated the community about the present state of music, giving them a basis for establishing their own taste, as well as providing topics for discussion in social gatherings. The second half of the eighteenth century also saw a rise in serial publications of music. The contents of these collections, published on a monthly or weekly basis, were varied in their inclusion of genres and instrumentation, and would likely have been used for private social gatherings as *Hausmusik* to be performed by amateur musicians in attendance. Through these publications, the experience of music as an expansion of the development of taste and culture within the context of social gatherings can be constructed.

4.2 Society in the Age of Enlightenment

4.2.1 Social Pleasures for Moral Development and Culture

In order to find the perfect balance in the moral development of an individual, it was considered that one must experience solitude on the one hand, and social pleasures on the other. In the introduction to the second volume of his book on solitude titled *Über die Einsamkeit*, Zimmermann recognized the draw to the pleasures of society from solitude in the opening pages:

An inclination to exercise the faculty of speech, to interchange the sentiments of the mind, to indulge the affections of the heart, and to receive themselves, while they bestow on others, a kind assistance and

support, drives men, by an ever active, and almost irresistible impulse, from SOLITUDE to SOCIETY.¹

Society thus serves an important function for an individual. While alone in a state of solitude, one may consider objects and ideas and contemplate their own feelings of the heart in order to develop the mind and the soul. Conversely, society provides the possibility to expand on those feelings and ideas with others, which in turn creates further opportunities for individual growth and for spreading taste. Without social pleasures, one can become a misanthrope, lacking "those high delights which ever accompany congenial sentiment and mutual affection" with "no kindred bosoms to participate its joys, and sympathize in its sorrows."² Thus, participation in a social life enabled a further development of *Empfindungen* through shared experiences. Without the support of society, Zimmermann writes, those experiences of solitude may have less of an impact on an individual:

The profoundest deductions of reason, the highest flights of fancy, the finest sensibilities of the heart, the happiest discoveries of science, and the most valuable productions of art, are feebly felt, and imperfectly enjoyed, in the cold and cheerless region of Solitude.³

Both intellectual and aesthetic discoveries must be shared with others in order to gain the greatest benefits from them. This is only possible, however, under ideal conditions, as not all social environments are capable of true and engaging interactions of the heart and the mind.

Zimmermann was, indeed, quite critical of society in its then-current conditions, referring to the "idle ceremonies and parade of company."⁴ First, there are those who only

¹ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 1-2. Capitalization given.

² Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 3.

³ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 2-3.

⁴ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 8.

experience society without opportunity for internal reflection in solitude. These "Characters," as he calls them, seek all of their happiness in the entertainments of society rather than fulfilling this need in themselves or through relations with their family.⁵ People who have not cultivated their own sense of happiness are the second problem of society. These community members do not contribute to the spreading of their sensibilities, discoveries in the sciences, or of beautiful artworks. In other words, they do not create a cultured society, in which ideas and *Empfindungen* are spread for the greater moral good.

To combat the latter problem, Zimmermann suggests seeking true friendships. He explains that "SOCIAL HAPPINESS, true and essential social happiness resides only in the bosom of LOVE and in the arms of FRIENDSHIP."⁶ A true friendship with an "amiable being...[can] awaken all the virtues, and call forth the best and strongest energies of the soul!"⁷ Through the mutual influence of a friendship individuals could not only form a good moral soul within themselves, but were also more likely to promote the happiness of the others by encouraging intellectual pursuits and talents.⁸ When society is based on true friendships and has the common goal of moral development, it is capable of producing many pleasures for its members.

Zimmermann explains, a society whose members are wise and good:

conveys valuable information to the mind, and virtuous feelings to the breast. Their experience imparts its wisdom in a manner equally engaging and impressive; faculties are improved; and knowledge increased.⁹

⁵ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 10.

⁶ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 5. Capitalization given.

⁷ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 6.

⁸ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 6.

⁹ Zimmermann, *Solitude*, v.II (1799), 18.

A society that is wise and good is grounded in intellectual knowledge and morality, meaning it is equally developed in both the rational and beautiful disciplines, satisfying the Baumgartian principal of balancing the cultivation of logical truths through the higher cognitive powers and aesthetic truths through the lower cognitive powers. Therefore, participation in such a society is a necessary part of an individual's development of the self. Zimmermann, however, was only introducing the role of social pleasures on an individual as a means to explain the greater importance of solitude, and was not concerned with teaching the larger function of society, nor does he explain how society could enable one to achieve these goals.

Christian Garve (1742-1798) expanded on Zimmerman's work in his book *Ueber Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit* (1797); he was, however, more interested in promoting a greater balance between the experiences of society and solitude.¹⁰ Although this publication did not appear until very late in the century, the basic ideas within it were by that time already commonly accepted. Garve advocated for the betterment of society through the teaching of moral philosophy in his publications. He was one of the more prominent authors in the Popular Philosophy movement of the last quarter of the century, seeking to educate the middle class on philosophical topics.¹¹

Garve explains that:

Society and Solitude are important for the life of Mankind and thus also worth the examination of the philosophies: either in so far as it has

¹⁰ Christian Garve, *Ueber Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit*. Erster Band (Breslau: Wilhelm Gottlieb Korn, 1797), 1.

¹¹Fania Oz-Salzberger, "Christian Garve," in *Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

influence on the spiritual forming (*Bildung*) of Mankind, or on his Bliss (*Glückseligkeit*).¹²

The latter of the two, the influence on an individual's bliss, or happiness, is easy to achieve, he explains.¹³ This quick dismissal of *Glückseligkeit* is parallel to Sulzer's critique of the arts as being solely for the experience of pleasure (see Chapter 2.3.1). The greater function of society, solitude, and the beautiful arts is in the forming (*Bildung*) of the individual; happiness or pleasure is only the first and simplest degree of achieving an effective change. Garve explains that there are three clearly different ways in which the complementary experiences of society and solitude can aid in the forming of an individual: on the intellect (*des Verstandes*), in the character (*in des Charakters*), and in the expressed manners, or morals (*in der äußern Sitten*).¹⁴ Thus, Garve's main points are, just like Zimmermann's, to guide his lay readers toward moral development, which he believes could be achieved through experiences both in society and in solitude. He also has the further aim of cultivating a moral society. For this reason, Garve determines as the final benefit of both practices to be the improvement of the expressed manners of the individual and of the social group as a whole, which play a part in the forming of a cultured society. Garve treats each of the three effects of society and solitude to an extensive analysis with the intention of facilitating their greatest benefits.

The influences of society and solitude on the forming of the intellect (*Verstand*) are twofold: on the collection of knowledge and on the practice of mind. Of the first, one collects knowledge through experiences with various types of people and characters in

¹² “Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit wird für das Leben der Menschen wichtig und also auch der Untersuchung des Philosophen werth: entweder, insofern sie auf die geistige Bildung des Menschen, oder insofern sie auf seine Glückseligkeit Einfluß hat.” Garve, 1:2.

¹³ Garve, 1:2.

¹⁴ Garve, 1:2-3.

society, which enables the study of human nature.¹⁵ He writes that "a man is but not merely an important object of knowledge for others, but he is also the natural teacher of the same."¹⁶ Through interactions with others, one can learn of different types of topics from the participants, with each participant conveying knowledge from their own experiences. Furthermore, these interactions impart a type of knowledge Garve calls practical knowledge of Man (*praktische Menschenkenntniß*), which is not learnable through books or self-contemplation, and only occurs through real interaction (*wirklichen Umgang*).¹⁷ This knowledge not only teaches an individual about others, but also provides an opportunity for one to learn more about themselves. Garve explains that "men become certain, namely in their decisions, through the peculiarities of their way of thinking, their passions, and their character."¹⁸ Thus, social meetings are not merely for pleasure, but are opportunities for self-development and identity formation through interactions with others.

Knowledge about things or subjects can be learned through a variety of means, each of which provide a different perspective on the subject at hand. Learning from books, Garve explains, provides opportunities for long, solitary meditations about the object, which gives one sharper reflections; however, the knowledge that is transmitted through books comes mostly from craftsman who learned about the subject in a scholastic way. During an interaction among people, "one experiences the object as it appears to people," thus those experiences provide unique perspectives on the object.¹⁹

¹⁵ Garve, 1:9.

¹⁶ "Ein Mensch ist aber für den andern nicht bloß ein wichtiger Gegenstand der Erkenntniß, sondern er ist auch der natürliche Lehrer desselben." Garve, 1:9.

¹⁷ Garve, 1:12.

¹⁸ "Die Menschen werden nemlich in ihren Entschlüssen durch das Eigenthümliche ihrer Denkungsart, ihrer Leidenschaften und ihrer Charaktere bestimmt." Garve, 1:12.

¹⁹ "Man erfährt, wie die Gegenstände Menschen erscheinen." Garve, 1:24.

Both experiences, either through reading books followed by meditation or through social conversation, are useful, as they can provide different insights.²⁰ While the first teaches about the object itself, the second demonstrates other's perceptions of that object. Thus, it is in this manner that the interaction teaches more about the human condition through the object than it does about the object itself.

Knowledge is also passed through the experience of the *schönen Künste*. Garve asks:

Can the visual artist express the permanent outlines of human character, or the temporary human passions successfully through brush and chisel, be ignorant in the philosophy of life, which is the foundation of true sociability (*Geselligkeit*) and the main fabric of interesting talks?²¹

He further explains through examples that an artist must have thought about the relationship between politics and war in order to give his historical painting “a noble and expressive representation,” or have felt the beauty of nature in his heart for a true depiction of a scene from nature.²² Likewise, a composer must have his object as a dark feeling (*dunkles Gefühl*) that is left behind in his mind, which he then works out through music. This reference to a dark feeling correlates directly to rational theories, in which sensory concepts are relegated to the dark areas of *Empfindungen*. These dark areas cannot be clearly distinguished through the upper cognitive faculties, rather only sensed. Music, Garve explains, though not expressed with words, can still serve as a means for communicating thoughts with others.²³ The music can, in turn, be an object for discussion during an interaction in order to understand not only the work at hand, but also others'

²⁰ Garve, 1:24.

²¹ “Kann der bildende Künstler, welcher die bleibenden Züge menschlicher Charaktere, oder die vorübergehenden menschlichen Leidenschaften glücklich durch Pinsel und Meißel ausdrückt, unwissend in der Philosophie des Lebens seyn, welche der Grund der wahren Geselligkeit und der Hauptstoff des interessanten Gesprächs ist?” Garve, 1:45.

²² “...eine edle und ausdrückende Darstellung.” Garve, 1:45.

²³ Garve, 1:45-46.

experience of it, just as in the experience of scientific knowledge. The beautiful arts are indispensable to social interaction, Garve explains, and

the practice of the beautiful arts may enrich the spirit of Man with imagination (*Vorstellung*) and may refine [it] with feeling (*Empfindungen*); nevertheless, only society and the study of speech form the same, and that imagination and feeling increases to the clarity of generally communicated knowledge.²⁴

Therefore, the full advantages of the beautiful arts can only be reached if one experiences them within the realm of society and if one is practiced in the art of communication.

Using a work of art or a piece of music as a subject for the interaction, one can increase their power of imagination and their feeling. Most significantly, what is being communicated, according to Garve, is knowledge. Thus, by placing the arts into the context of society it can become a further means for learning and developing the self that cannot be achieved by experiencing the work of art alone.

The second influence of society and solitude on understanding is through the practice of the mind. Garve explains that in solitude, one is to meditate on thoughts in a self-conversation (*Selbstgespräch*), which creates merely a collection of fragmented thoughts. One can achieve clarity in their thoughts by practicing them with others through an interaction, which enables one to learn how to express their own thoughts.²⁵ Therefore, one must begin with individual meditation and study, then complete the forming of his intellectual culture (*Geisteskultur*) in society.²⁶ Though Garve does not make such a direct correlation, it can be inferred that the same exercise could indeed be applied to music. One would begin with the practice of music through self-study and meditation.

²⁴ “die Ausübung der schönen Künste den Geist des Menschen mit Vorstellung bereichern und durch Empfindungen veredeln mag; so kann doch nur die Gesellschaft und das Studieren die Rede desselben bilden, und jene Vorstellungen und Empfindungen zu der Deutlichkeit allgemein mittheilbarer Kenntnisse erhöhen.” Garve, 1:46-47.

²⁵ Garve, 1:155-156.

²⁶ Garve, 1:188.

The initial type of practice would occur through the reading of musical treatises, journals, reviews, and the practice of technical exercises. This would be followed with meditation achieved through act of free improvisation, as discussed in the previous chapter, in which one could allow a free interplay of ideas and collect their own musical thoughts. Once one has developed these skills alone, in self-study, one can then turn to society in order to expand their knowledge even further through conversation, or, in discipline of music, through performance. Taken altogether, both solitude and society create a more well-rounded understanding and experience of music for the expansion of one's imagination and feelings.

Society, Garve explains, also has an influence on moral character; however, the appropriateness of such experiences, as well as the ability for them to influence the forming of the moral character depends on the social class. The lower class, who he says is forbidden from engaging in social pleasures, does not have the time, the financial means, nor the appropriate morals for such socializing.²⁷ Of this last point, a clear judgment of the lower class, Garve adds that if one does not have access to a society with "good moral and respectable past times," then one should limit their experiences to seclusion and domesticity.²⁸ The court and aristocracy views itself as having "the truly good Society."²⁹ Furthermore,

only in their meetings, they believe, could one learn the genuine refinement of the way of life, the truly good tone of conversation, which [has] the proper mixing of modesty and frankness to perfect manners.³⁰

²⁷ Garve, 1:195-199.

²⁸ "...artige Sitten|und|anständige Zeitvertreibe." Garve, 1:199.

²⁹ "die eigentlich gute Gesellschaft." Garve, 1:202.

³⁰ "Nur in ihren Zusammenkünften, glauben sie, könne man die ächte Feinheit der Lebensart, den wahrhaft guten Gesprächston, die zum vollkommnen Anstande gehörige Mischung von Bescheidenheit und Freymüthigkeit erlernen." Garve, 1:202.

For this reason, the use of society at court is for the refinement of its moral formation (*Sittenbildung*). They are able to recognize those that do not have a developed sense of taste and who cannot judge what is good and beautiful; therefore, members of the aristocracy are always sure to associate only with those with refined morals.³¹ Garve's high opinion of court and aristocratic culture suggests they should serve as models of the ideal type of social interaction for the middle class, who is the intended audience of his publication.

The middle class, Garve explains, is more susceptible to the negative effects of social interaction because there is such a variety of positions and experiences that constitute that class. For that reason, members of this class must seek out the best societies with which to associate in order to avoid those circumstances that could be harmful to an individual's morality.³² Social interaction is only morally useful if the members are good. Such societies are considered harmful if the people are spoiled in spirit and morals (*Geist und Sitten*) or are uneducated (*ungebildet*). Garve explains, "the proverb says: people make people," meaning that people become more and more similar to those with whom they are most frequently in society.³³ Therefore, one's choice of social interactions, which was much less standardized in the middle class than at court, was most important in its ability to contribute to moral formation.

Within social interactions, even with close friends, the topic of morality of individuals is not often outwardly discussed, regardless of the actions of other members. Therefore, Garve explains, it is most important that one must consider their own performance (*Aufführung*), as he calls it, and know their position and their characteristics

³¹ Garve, 1:203-204.

³² Garve, 1:205.

³³ "Das Sprichwort sagt: Leute machen Leuté." Garve, 1:208.

for proper behavior in society. In an interaction with true, intimate friendships (*innige Freundschaften*), however, they can discuss their virtues and mistakes and consider improvements for future performance (*künftige Aufführung*). In this sense, speech can be used as a means for influencing the morality. Thus, the experience of social interaction is closely related to solitude (*Einsamkeit*) in its ability to have a direct influence on morality. It also provides the opportunity for one to draw on their experiences from solitude and hand them down to others who have a similar way of thinking (*Denkungsart*), attitudes (*Gesinnungen*), or are attracted to achieving higher merits.³⁴

Garve also emphasizes the importance of solitude for forming one's moral principles, remarking that it is occasionally necessary in order to prevent the three harmful effects of forming such principles in society alone, which are: carelessness and frivolity, an interest in sensory objects that are not virtuous, and the forming of opinions that are assumed from the world.³⁵ Thus, society is not a replacement for solitude (*Einsamkeit*) in the forming of one's morality, but instead should be considered a supplement to self-reflection and a means for one to practice their moral feelings. Society does, however, offer some benefits over complete solitude. For example, one makes their own observations of things in solitude; however, a society that is not frivolous can challenge one's observations and teach more about of the opinions of others. Thus, Garve writes, society has a double influence, on the knowledge of thing itself and on the public opinion of that thing, repeating the same comments from Zimmermann.³⁶

Not only is it important for one to seek out a morally good society for their own moral bettering, but an individual with a highly developed moral worth can also have a

³⁴ Garve, 1:240-241.

³⁵ Garve, 1:242-243.

³⁶ Garve, 1:245-247.

great impact on the forming of such a society and morality in others. It is impossible for a person "with noble desires to moral perfection" to not always consider the difference of good and evil and the higher and lower degrees of perfection.³⁷ When someone of high moral development is active in society, they always have their own morals in consideration. For this reason, they can affect the society through their moral worth and contribute to morals of others, and thus serve as a model for society.

Another benefit of society is in the observation of others who can contribute to the moral forming of an individual. Garve writes that "our moral, just as our physical knowledge is increased through experiences and through attempts."³⁸ For this reason, reading the philosophy of moral nature or the history of ancient men is less impactful in learning the sublimity and depravity of men than if one "studies current men in the moment in which their activity is expressed in the liveliest."³⁹ Therefore, the lively expression of the physical actions of others can have a greater impact than merely reading about those actions. This concept is related to Sulzer's idea that the impressions of physical sensations are felt livelier than if one were to recall a memory of those sensations (see Chapter 2.2.1). Likewise, the experience of the actions of others in the present moment gives a more powerful impression on an individual than reading or studying about the actions of historical characters because they can be seen and felt through the senses. Through reading and studying alone, the faculties of imagination and memory would be required to construct an impression in the mind rather than experience the actual physical feelings. Garve continues that we receive less information about the

³⁷ "mit dem edlen Triebe nach moralischer Vollkommenheit." Garve, 1:253.

³⁸ "Unsere moralischen, so wie unsere physischen Kenntnisse werden durch Erfahrungen und durch Versuche vermehrt." Garve, 1:255.

³⁹ "die gegenwärtigen Menschen in den Augenblicken studieren, in welchen sich ihre Thätigkeit am lebhaftesten äußert." Garve, 1:255.

sublimity and depravity of men through experiences with a few, but respectable tradesmen than if we associate with "a great diversity of more excellent or more repulsive Characters."⁴⁰ He further clarifies that "the movement of our own heart becomes more noticeable to ourselves if they are stirred by great objects, than if they are small and originate from small causes."⁴¹ Garve, therefore, views the other members of a society as objects, or subjects in this case, for transmitting physical and/or moral knowledge, just as the experience of works of the beautiful arts also transmits such knowledge. Garve concludes:

With one word, the Moral System, which a man, equipped with Reason (*Verstand*) and Moral Sense (*sittlichem Gefühle*) of nature, forms for himself in the world and in the contact with men, the self-knowledge (*Selbstkenntniß*), to which he is attaining here, and the rules, which he abstracts himself here for his performance (*Aufführung*), are of an entirely other completeness and practical usefulness, than they would have become through solitary study and perpetual self-observation, in a little-occupied and little-alternated life.⁴²

Therefore, the variety of experiences provided by society enables a more complete forming of the self when one already has a developed moral system, which includes both reason and the moral sense.

In addition to society's influence on the knowledge and morality on individuals, it also has an influence on the expressed manners, or morals (*äußern Sitten*), and on the

⁴⁰ "eine große Mannigfaltigkeit vortrefflicher, oder abscheulicher Charaktere." Garve, 1:256.

⁴¹ "Die Bewegungen unsers eignen Herzens werden uns bemerkbarer, wenn sie von großen Gegenständen gereizt werden, als wenn sie selbst klein sind und aus kleinen Veranlassungen entstehn." Garve, 1:256.

⁴² "Mit einem Worte, das Moral=System, welches ein, von der Natur mit Verstand und sittlichem Gefühle ausgerüsteter, Mann, in der Welt und im Umgange mit Menschen sich bildet, die Selbstkenntniß, zu welcher er hier gelangt, und die Regeln, welche er sich hier für seine Aufführung abstrahirt, sind von einer ganz andern Vollständigkeit und praktischen Brauchbarkeit, als sie, durch einsames Studium und durch immerwährende Selbstbetrachtungen, in einem wenig beschäftigten und wenig abwechselnden Leben geworden seyn würden." Garve, 1:257.

decency and civility of a society as a whole.⁴³ Garve immediately recognizes an ambiguity in the meaning of the word *Sitten* that is unique to the German language; however, he states that both of the meanings are indeed related and useful in explaining the concept. One can understand the first definition of the word as *sittlich* (morally) or *Sittlichkeit* (morality), meaning the concept of right and wrong, or virtue and vice. By the second meaning, it is known as a *Sitte* (custom), by which is understood the habit (*Gewohnlichkeit*), customs (*Herkommen*), and agreement (*Uebereinkunft*) of many men in their manner of behavior as agreed upon by a society. Garve proposes that the *äußern Sitten* should be defined in this context as a unification of both meanings: as expressions of virtue with an observation of customs (*Aeuserungen der Tugend mit Beobachtung eines Herkommens*) in order to best understand the emergence and forming of the *äußern Sitten* of Men.⁴⁴

Just as with the concept of taste (see Chapter 2.5), the defining of the *äußern Sitten* of a society are based in the principles of the beautiful and the ugly. These foundational principles of the beautiful and ugly are, likewise, rooted in rational aesthetic theory. Garve explains that the societal demand for decency (*Anstand*) arose from the need to conceal from others the ugly or the shameful of oneself, and to show the beautiful or to beautify what is capable of being made more beautiful.⁴⁵ Thus, the need for and subsequent development of manners, or expressed morals, is rooted in societal interactions, without which these manners would not be necessary.

⁴³ Garve, *Ueber Gesellschaft und Einsamkeit*, Zweyter Band (Breslau: bei Wilhelm Gottlieb Korn, 1800), 17.

⁴⁴ Garve, 2:2-3.

⁴⁵ Garve, 2:4.

Garve traces a brief history of the growing need for *äußern Sitten* as societies formed, both politically and for protection of the society from crime. With the creation of the newly emerging bourgeoisie society (*bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*) in the eighteenth century arose the need for concepts of decency and morality. The social conventions of ceremony and politeness were, at court, markers for differentiating the tasteful from the unnatural or ugly; hence, the bourgeoisie, not dependent on these traditions within their own societal gatherings, needed to create their own manner for basing these judgments. Garve explains that it is for this reason the arts and sciences became a prominent part of the establishing of the bourgeois culture.⁴⁶ Handy-work (*Handarbeiten*) and diligence in the arts (*Kunstfleiß*) are related to the forming of the concepts of the arts and sciences in that they are able to effect the forming of the spirit (*Ausbildung des Geistes*) and the practice of the limbs (*Uebung der Gliedmaßen*).⁴⁷ Through the disciplines of the arts and sciences, objects were created and perfected in the highest degree. The bourgeois society need not rely the “tiresome and not useful court ceremonies” in determining their basis for judgments of the beautiful and knowledge of nature because it has formed their own system for judgment in the context of that society.⁴⁸ Garve writes that:

Through the arts the judgment of the Beautiful becomes more correct, and through the sciences men learn to better recognize their nature and their societal relationship, but the uniting of both parts, the Beautiful and the usefulness, determines the nature of good decency in the expressed conduct.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Garve, 2:15-16.

⁴⁷ Garve, 2:15.

⁴⁸ “...die lästigen und unnützen Ceremonien der Höflichkeit.” Garve, 2:16.

⁴⁹ “...durch die Künste das Urtheil über das Schöne richtiger wird, und durch die Wissenschaften die Menschen ihre Natur und ihre gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse besser einsehn lernen, die Vereinigung beyder Stücke aber, der Schönheit und der Zweckmäßigkeit, das Wesen des guten Anstandes in dem äußern Betragen ausmacht.” Garve, 2:16.

The arts then began their development to a new, higher degree within non-courtly social environments as a social need for the newly formed middle class, who used them as a basis for forming agreed upon concepts of taste and judgment. Furthermore, Garve writes that the use of the arts and sciences in this way brought on a sources for social pleasures, creating new reasons to seek out and form social meetings, which in turn furthers the advancement of a cultured society.⁵⁰

Garve's philosophical history of decency (*Anstand*) explains the sudden interest in the use of music as an integral part of social interactions for the bourgeois class. Music, as a beautiful object, could serve as a means for teaching and spreading good taste where social conventions for judging the beautiful were not already in place. Furthermore, since decency and manners were based in the forming of morality through the *äußern Sitten*, music as a social practice also became a critical means for spreading morality in society. There were many types of societies that saw their emergence during the second half of the eighteenth century, and one would seek out the most appropriate for their own social and moral development.

4.2.2 Societies for Pleasure

Unlike academic, religious, and trade societies, the most useful for understanding the function of the arts and the judgment of the beautiful are those societies that were created for pleasure, which enabled the spreading of good taste. Garve names a variety of societies for pleasure (*Gesellschaften zum Vergnügen*) that were commonly available at the time, defines, and discusses their uses; only those that are most relevant to the study of music and its incorporation into social functions will be included here.

⁵⁰ Garve, 2:17.

Although not a part of the middle class, Garve discusses the ideal characteristics of court societies, perhaps modeling for the middle class readers the proper and optimal interaction at societal meetings. The customs of court etiquette were part of a long tradition based on good manners and behavior. Garve explains that the court can at times be the most constrained or forced (*zwangvollsten*) of societies, which are “the emptiest at witty conversation” when the collection of people includes members from other societies or unfamiliar people in general.⁵¹ The light conversation with unfamiliar people, where luxury and pleasure dominates over intellectual interactions, makes these meetings less amusing. If there is more equality among members, however, there is more freedom in the conversation, making discussions more pleasant and casual. Oftentimes in these social situations, the members will divide into smaller groups where they can have more intimate conversations, then alternate with other members, thus providing a various social experience.⁵²

Garve is critical of those who hold social gatherings only to satisfy one’s own vanity (*Eitelkeit*), which, he warns his readers, is found mostly in the distinguished and rich middle class (*der vornehmen und reichen Bürger=Class*).⁵³ In addition, one must not hold social gatherings as a means to show off their wealth or merely serve the vanity of their guests, who “want to satisfy their claims of access to his house,” a typical problem of the noble class.⁵⁴ Garve also chastises the middle class for their “counterfeit splendor gatherings” (*die nachgeahmten Prunkgesellschaften*), who copy the conventions, restraints, and rules of the court, but do not have any of the elegance. Because these

⁵¹ “...die leersten an geistreichen Gesprächen.” Garve, 2:57-58.

⁵² Garve, 2:59-61.

⁵³ Garve, 2:61.

⁵⁴ “...ihre Ansprüche auf Zutritt in sein Haus befriedigen will.” Garve, 2:61.

societies do not have anything interesting to offer to conversations, they lack the means for creating a pleasing society.⁵⁵ The best societies are those where the groups are smaller, so that one can have a pleasant interaction and a lively conversation (*Unterhaltung*).⁵⁶ Furthermore,

These gatherings are only pleasant, where neither host nor guest think of honor, of duty, or of gratitude and so forth, both believe each other to be guilty of nothing, and only bring together the hope of their own pleasures, the demands for conversation, jest and merriment of society.⁵⁷

Garve exemplifies for the middle class the ideal means for creating social gatherings through descriptions of court gatherings. He recommends not following the court's strict rules and customs, but rather modeling the types of pleasant conversation found at court that can only be had with the right gathering of people. Through an assembly of close friends, social gatherings are most likely to result in true and enjoyable conversation instead of empty discussion.

The most common social experience for the middle class (*Bürgerstande*) is in family gatherings (*Familien=Gesellschaften*), or what the French call the *Coterie*. Despite the title, these are not necessarily societies made up of only families, but could also include neighbors or acquaintances through business. Without a single principal that unifies them, these societies are diverse in their formation; therefore, no two societies are alike. If there is confidentiality or familiarity among the people, there can be all the most pleasant (*allerangenehmsten*) and wittiest (*geistreichsten*) experiences; or, with the wrong

⁵⁵ Garve, 2:63.

⁵⁶ Garve, 2:62.

⁵⁷ "...sind nur diejenigen Gesellschaften angenehm, wo weder Wirth noch Gäste an Ehre, an Pflicht, an Erkenntlichkeit u.s.w. gedenken, beyde sich einander nichts schuldig zu seyn glauben, und nur die Hoffnung des eignen Vergnügens, das Verlangen nach Unterhaltung, Scherz und Fröhlichkeit die Gesellschaft zusammen bringt." Garve, 2:62.

assembly of people, it could be the most outrageous and stiff.⁵⁸ These societies may not last long if they do not have the right collection of people, who should be similar in rank and in wealth. The women should gather in the *Frauenzimmer*, separate from the men unless they are playing cards.⁵⁹ The activities of these societies should include performing or listening to music and readings, or other types of communal pastimes (*gemeinschaftlicher Zeitvertreib*).⁶⁰ Family societies such as these were the most commonly attended among the middle class, so had the greatest impact on the social and moral development of the individual. In addition to performances of music and readings of poetry and short stories, these interactions would also include lively discussions of current events, history, and the arts and sciences. Publications aimed towards this type of social interaction provide examples of the types of music, readings, and topics for discussion, enabling a reconstruction of the experiences of family societies, to be discussed below.

The other type of societies that could have music as an important aspect of their activities were learned clubs (*gelehrte Clubs*). These clubs met to discuss one particular topic in more detail and at a higher level of understanding than one could attempt in a family society because they were made up of people (very likely men) who took great pleasure in learning about a topic to a higher degree. Men who participated in such clubs would have called themselves *Kenner* (see Chapter 2.5.2) and used the meetings as a means to learn more about the topic at hand. Garve explains that the purpose of the learned club is not to discuss what would be considered common knowledge about a subject, nor the scientific explanations about them; rather, the members would discuss

⁵⁸ Garve, 2:63-64.

⁵⁹ Garve, 2:64.

⁶⁰ Garve, 2:64-65.

literary reviews and judgments on certain subjects as a means to form their own judgments. For example, if there is a new product that draws the attention of the group, the members would take aims to dissect it, and praise or censure its benefits or disadvantages with their own anecdotes, giving life to the conversation. These conversations, particularly on news of the arts, theater, and books, moved along quickly with little break in the discussion, Garve explains.⁶¹ The discourse on a topic would often begin with a reading, which is then followed by lectures made by members of the society, in which they provide their own commentary and judgments. After the lectures, Garve writes, follows the most interesting part of the meeting, in which the members of the society provide their own judgments on the clarifications of the author's lecture.⁶² Therefore, through these meetings, the members of the society do not just explain a topic, but give their judgments on it, which leads to further conversation among the group. This experience gives the opportunity to explore both the topic at hand, as well as share and debate opinions on that topic. Thus, as both Garve and Zimmermann named as a benefit of the social pleasures, one can learn both about the object at hand, as well as about others through their judgments and communication thereof. The second half of the eighteenth saw the forming of the first learned musical societies in Germany, which will be discussed below.

There is one more type of social setting where one may have heard music; however, Garve does not recommend these types of gatherings for his readers, which are found at coffee and public houses.⁶³ These meetings are not pre-arranged, and in them, Garve writes, one typically finds men with low morals, because they are not judged so

⁶¹ Garve, 2:78-79.

⁶² Garve, 2:80-81.

⁶³ Garve, 2:65.

harshly; timid men, because in these establishments they can go unnoticed; and people who hate the mere discomfort of other types of societies. Oftentimes one finds here eccentric people and gamblers by profession, whom Garve calls are “seldom pleasant people.”⁶⁴ Furthermore, these societies are based on commerce, where the businessman can make friends with other tradesmen.⁶⁵ It is more common to find people entertaining at coffee or public houses in England or Italy because in these countries, the members are either more frugal, so do not want to host parties in their own houses, or they do not want to have foreign visitors in their homes. Garve gives further reasons for a difference in social taste in these countries, such as whether it is acceptable to include women. Unlike in private homes, in coffee and public houses men and women typically gather together, which is a less accepted practice in Germany. Furthermore, some societies prefer the public houses because the members shy away from the effort required to form private gatherings.⁶⁶ This is not the case, however, in Germany or France, where private societies are favored over public ones. Garve explains that those countries with social meetings in private houses are best because people live more pleasantly.⁶⁷ Clearly Garve, a North German, favors his own societal norms over those of other countries, viewing Germany as one of the most enlightened countries. Those societies that he deems appropriate include the noblest and greatest character-forming types of interactions. His reasons for finding family gatherings and learned clubs in Germany the highest societies for pleasure are based in what he believes is the function of society as a whole: for the forming and growth of an individual's and a culture's moral foundation.

⁶⁴ “...selten angenehme Leute.” Garve, 2:66n.

⁶⁵ Garve, 2:68.

⁶⁶ Garve, 2:68-69.

⁶⁷ Garve, 2:69-70.

Therefore, private meetings, whether in family gatherings or learned clubs, were considered the noblest forms of social interaction; the inclusion of discussions and performances of music in these meetings served an important part in the forming of the social and moral fabric of these societies. A closer look at use of music and musical topics for discussions within the context of both types of societies demonstrates its social and moral function during the Enlightenment.

4.3 Music in Society

The German noun *Unterhaltung* was the title of a popular entertainment periodical in the second half of the eighteenth century.⁶⁸ This title can be understood as having two meanings: the first definition is as a conversation or talk, the second as entertainment. The two meanings of this word are not in themselves mutually exclusive. While they are entertainments in the sense that they are enjoyable, this can be achieved through a lively performance and/or discussion of music. These social practices were a critical aspect of spreading culture and taste in North Germany. An examination of the aesthetic function of social participation in music can enable a construction of the use of music in the meetings of learned clubs and family gatherings.

With the exception of the Gewandhaus in Leipzig, which opened its doors to the public for its first subscription concert season in 1781, paid public concerts were not a common part of North German social life.⁶⁹ The reason for this can be deduced from Garve's explanation that in Germany, communing in paid public spaces was not appropriate for people of good morals and taste. This was not the case in England and

⁶⁸ Michael Christian Bock, hrsg., *Unterhaltungen* (Hamburg: gedruckt und verlegt von Mich. Christ. Bock, 1766-1770).

⁶⁹ William Weber, *The Great Transformation of Musical Taste*, 23-24.

Italy, where it was more common for the middle class to gather in public houses; as a result, the paid concert series was an integral aspect of social life in those countries. For North Germany, on the other hand, the experience of music as public was either in the context of in the newly emerging learned musical societies and in family societies as *Hausmusik*, or in the context of liturgical or devotional church music. In addition, participation in society meetings was an active one, in which members fervently contributed to performances and discussions of music. These meetings were not merely considered entertainment; rather, they served a greater function of identity formation through a unified a social group and the spreading good taste.

4.3.1 The Aesthetics of Social Participation in Performance

In order to fully understand the experience of music in these societies, it is necessary to recognize both a flexible idea of performance, and a broader concept of the different roles in which one could participate. Only through this flexible concept can be understood what and how music communicated. Performance and listening to music was an active experience, mostly based in an individual's ability to portray and/or receive *Empfindungen*, depending on their participatory role. Furthermore, considering the use music as a part of the social practice in the North German Enlightenment, the defining of the concept of performance must be understood in the context of the family society or learned club. In these societies, music was a shared activity in which all members would have taken part and was not passively consumed, as in the nineteenth-century concert model. It is only through a participatory concept of musical activity that the true experience of *Empfindungen* can be shared within a group in order to achieve the aesthetic function of social music, i.e. the forming of the self and a morally good culture.

The concept of participatory music making is discussed by Thomas Turino in *Music as Social Life: The Politics of Participation* (2008).⁷⁰ Turino explains that:

participatory performance is a special type of artistic practice in which there are no artist-audience distinctions, only participants and potential participants performing different roles, and the primary goal is to involve the maximum number of people in some performance role.⁷¹

In contrast to this is a *presentational performance*, in which one group, made up of artists, provides music for another group, the audience, who does not participate in any way.⁷² Turino's theory explains how cultural groups can be unified in their identity through the practice of social music. He writes that a cultural phenomenon consists of "habits of thought and practice shared among individuals."⁷³ An individual's identity is the formation of habits of thought, which is made up of a numerous and varied "constellation of habits."⁷⁴ Habits shared among individuals unify members into a cultural group, which are developed through similar experiences and social positions.⁷⁵ The number of shared habits individuals may have with others varies from very few to a majority of habits. For this reason, Turino distinguishes between cultural cohorts and cultural formations. Cultural cohorts are social groups that share habits that form only a specific part of one's identity, which may not be shared by a larger social group.⁷⁶ Members of cultural formations share a majority of habits. Habits of formations are more pervasive and constitute the foundation of thoughts and actions.⁷⁷ Within a society, individuals can be members of numerous cultural cohorts, but the habits of their cultural

⁷⁰ Thomas Turino, *Music as Social Life: The Politics of Participation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

⁷¹ Turino, 26. Italics given.

⁷² Turino, 26.

⁷³ Turino, 109.

⁷⁴ Turino, 100-101.

⁷⁵ Turino, 110.

⁷⁶ Turino, 111-112.

⁷⁷ Turino, 112.

formations will function within all of their individual cohorts.⁷⁸ Music and other arts can serve to project indices of identity within cohorts and formations.⁷⁹ Indices, the concurrent connection of a sign to the object it stands for, are established through shared experiences; thus, they function to unify and confirm individual identities within cohorts or formations.⁸⁰

Considering this theory from the perspective of the eighteenth-century family and learned societies further explains the role of social music in identity formation. As previously discussed, the middle class did not have a continued tradition of social decorum as was found in the courts; therefore, they needed manuals to teach the proper modes of interaction, such as that of Garve. Music became an agreed upon practice that served as a means for developing these modes, which, in turn, became a habit of the social groups in order to form their unified cultural identity. It allowed for the forming of taste, an essential characteristic of an enlightened member of the middle (*Bürger*) class, which enabled the mutual identification of the beautiful. As Garve explained, the purpose of the arts and sciences was indeed for such identification within a society. Members of the society had multiple means for participation in these cultural habits: through the performing of music, through listening to music, and by taking part in the discussion of music. The first two of these habits created among society members a sense of shared *Empfindungen* through an expressive performance, which transmits the beautiful either to other performers or to the listeners. The habit of discussing music enables the society to come to an agreed upon sense of the beautiful. If music was to achieve the aesthetic goals of forming a moral self, and ultimately a moral society, then there could not have been

⁷⁸ Turino, 113.

⁷⁹ Turino, 106-107.

⁸⁰ Turino, 8-9, 106-107.

any performance barriers as found in presentational music among the members of the society, regardless of their chosen mode of participation. The discussion of music allowed for an even larger participatory environment, giving others who do not perform an opportunity to discuss aspects of the music and its performance. Not only can more members be engaged in the experience, but the group can come to an agreement together on questions of the beautiful, which further develops the sense of good taste and culture. Additionally, part of proving oneself to be a well-formed member of society is displaying and sharing one's taste, thus demonstrating one's morally-good soul. Through these experiences the society itself could achieve its status as a moral culture, which would require the participation of all members of the social group.

As previously discussed, music was one of the most effective means for transmitting *Empfindungen* (see Chapter 2.3). This is achieved through the stimulation of first of the ears, then of the heart of the listener, which then causes an effective change on the individual. The means for transmitting these *Empfindungen* in performance, according to Sulzer, is through appropriate expression (*Ausdruck*) of the character of the piece. He writes that it is only through performance that the true thoughts and feelings the composer instilled in his piece can be communicated. For this reason, he explains, the performance of music is the most important practical aspect of music instruction.⁸¹ Sulzer names three necessary elements for achieving a well-communicated performance: clarity (*Deutlichkeit*), expression, and decoration, the last of which is an even further demonstration of the expression. The clarity of a performance is in the correct pronunciation of the melody, namely in the observance of phrases, periods, accents, etc. These elements are only the body of the performance, where the expression of the music

⁸¹ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Vortrag," 4:700.

is its soul and gives the piece true life. Every piece has its own character, and it is up to the performer to be able to transmit it, even if it is not so clearly indicated in the music itself.⁸² Sulzer writes,

That is why it is necessary both of the singer and the player in respect to the expression of the performance that he has beyond a skill and a correct feeling of an adequate fluency in musical speech himself, namely, that he reads through not only notes, phrases, and periods, but understands the sense (*Sinn*) of the same, [that he feels] the expression that lies in it, [and that he observes] their relationship among each other and to the whole; and that he knows the particular character of the musical piece already from experience.⁸³

In order to be able to express the character, one must first be able to feel the sense within it, which is learned through experience. One must already have a highly developed sense of feeling and taste so as to recognize them in the piece, identify what is to be expressed, and consequently know how to express them. With the right expression, the music can compel the listener “to be tender, then courageous and steadfast. Sometimes it stirs us to pity, and sometimes to admiration.”⁸⁴ Therefore, the correct expression of the music is crucial to the transmission of *Empfindungen*, which, in turn, is the sole means for enabling an effective change on the listener.

While the performance of music in a family gathering or even a learned club was not likely at the level of professional musicians, performing with one’s friends could still contribute to the spread of *Empfindungen*, regardless of the participatory role of the member. Performers would work together to play a sonata or sing a *Lied*, expressing their

⁸² Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Vortrag,” 4:706; and “Ausdruck in der Musik,” 1:271.

⁸³ “Daher ist sowol dem Sanger als Spieler in Absicht auf den Ausdruck des Vortrags nothwendig, da er auer der Fertigkeit und einem richtigen Gefuhl eine hinlangliche Gelufigkeit in der musikalischen Sprache selbst habe, namlich, da er nicht allein Noten, Phrasen und Perioden fertig lese, sondern den Sinn derselben verstehe, den Ausdruck, der in ihnen liegt, fuhle ihre Beziehung auf einander und auf das Ganze bemerkt; und da er das eigenthumliche des Charakters des Tonstucks schon aus der Erfahrung kenne.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Vortrag,” 4:707.

⁸⁴ “zartlich, denn beherzt und standhaft zu seyn. Bald reizet sie uns zum Mitleiden, bald zur Bewundrung.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Ausdruck in der Musik,” 1:271.

own interpretation of the character of the piece with their ensemble. Since these pieces were likely not rehearsed before the given performance, the musicians could spontaneously experience the expression of the other performers, which would then initiate a cycle of responses among the musicians, leading to a very lively, active, and ever-changing interaction through music. Thus, the performers are sharing their *Empfindungen* as though in a lively conversation. This could also be witnessed by the other participants, who may add a verbal commentary about how to express certain feelings or characters, which would then lead to an even further interpretation of the music and what it intended to express.

Whether in the context of a learned club or family meeting, the *Kenner* and *Liebhaber*, respectively form their identities through cultural cohorts by creating a shared means of expression. The performance and discussion of music is one such practice for achieving a unified taste and culture. By actively participating through various roles in music performance, the expression of beauty is communicated, and through shared habits, the group agrees upon definitions of the beautiful and taste. A conception of shared *Empfindungen* could only be fully realized in a participatory model of music performance, in which all members of the given society take an active part in the experience of music and the spreading of good taste.

4.3.2 *Hausmusik* in Family Gatherings

Garve writes that the greatest impact of social gatherings is on the forming of moral character, and the use of music within family gatherings was aimed towards that final purpose. Unlike the learned musical society, to be discussed below, there is no direct evidence of how and what music was performed, as well as the general role of the

participants in this context. Music publications may provide the greatest clues for reconstructing the use of music in family gatherings and suggest how they fulfilled the aesthetic requirements of forming a moral character.

Publications of music could be purchased on a subscription, with delivery of volumes on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis. Much of the music printing was based in Berlin, with publishers such as Georg Ludwig Winter, who was one of C.P.E. Bach's publishers, Johann Carl Friedrich Rellstab, Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, and Georg Jacob Decker. The best-known publishing firm in North Germany, run by Johann Gottlob Immanuel Breitkopf, was based in Leipzig. While some publications contained only keyboard works or *Lieder*, there were many subscription series that included a wide variety of genres, for example the *Musikalisches Allerley von verschiedenen Tonkünstlern* published by Birnstiel (1761-1763) and the *Musikalische Mancherley* by Winter (1762-1763).⁸⁵ The generic variety, along with the instrumental and vocal combinations required to perform the music of these publications, suggests they were issued for members of family societies to perform together in their regular meetings.

The great variety available in these publications was often marketed as one of their most significant features, as can be seen in the title of these collections. The question of musical miscellany was treated by William Weber in *The Great Transformation of Musical Taste* (2008), in which he explains that the concept of miscellany, whether in musical publications or public concerts, should be understood as a cultural principle. Miscellany, he claims, "carried with it a welcoming connotation, telling the reader that the work would please the tastes of different people or the varied

⁸⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, ed., *Musikalisches Allerley von verschiedenen Tonkünstlern* (Berlin: bey Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, Königl. privileg. Buchdrucker, 1761); and George Ludewig Winter, ed., *Musikalisches Mancherley* (Berlin: bey Georg Ludewig Winter, 1762).

needs of any one person."⁸⁶ Weber further argues that the reason for this kind of diversity is that there was not yet a work concept to serve as a unifying principle; miscellany was "the main principle governing taste...[and] served as the predecessor to the concept of the artwork as an indivisible whole," which provided a regulative concept governing the rules of music in society.⁸⁷ In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, miscellany could serve this regulatory need, Weber explains, because it was all-inclusive. The work concept, as the nineteenth century proceeded, became an exclusive one, with its own hierarchical ordering of genres and taste. He adds, "the work concept invested an aesthetic authority in the gaining of systematic musical knowledge, which was less the case in the eighteenth century."⁸⁸ While the concept of miscellany was a defining feature of musical taste in the second half of the eighteenth century, and indeed served as a means for unifying a whole, the purpose was to satisfy the requirement of aesthetic objects. In order for objects to be beautiful, they must comprise a unity in diversity, which is perfection (see Chapters 1.2.3 and 2.5.1). Therefore, Weber's interpretation of miscellany as devoid of an aesthetic theory, which he sees would eventually be fulfilled by the work concept, is mistaken. On the contrary, these publications satisfied the aesthetic inclination to perfection.

Finally, from a more functional need, Weber explains that,

miscellany dictated that members of the musical community had to accommodate one another's taste and social etiquette. All who entered a concert knew that they were expected to defer to the wishes of others to some extent. That meant being willing to hear music of varied genres, periods, tastes, and regional origins.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Weber, 13-14.

⁸⁷ Weber, 15-16.

⁸⁸ Weber, 16.

⁸⁹ Weber, 16.

Weber's assessment brings with it an evaluative judgment on eighteenth century taste. He concludes that concerts without an organizing convention based on a single genre, period, taste, or regional origin could not have been fully enjoyed by all in society because of what he perceives as a lack of a unifying work principle. However, from the basis of rational aesthetics, it can be seen that it was the great diversity of musical genres, styles, etc. that served as the basis for taste of the society, and was a necessary part in the enjoyment of the whole. While individuals may not have necessarily liked all pieces that were performed, they could take pleasure in the variety. Furthermore, they would likely not have seen this kind of generic diversity as pandering to a lower taste so as to be all-inclusive. The great importance and function of this variety, particularly as it pertains to music publications, which had a great impact on the North German middle class, can only be understood in the context of Enlightenment aesthetics: it served as a means to share a variety of *Empfindungen* with others through a diversity of genres, styles, moods, and combinations of instruments. Taken altogether, publications such as those by Birnstiel, Winter, and others could be interpreted as a unity in diversity, which is perfection and the beautiful, thus fulfilling the definition of aesthetic taste. Used in the context of a family gathering as social music, music periodicals were published with the intention of spreading good taste for the creation of a morally good society and culture.

Johann Carl Friedrich Rellstab makes clear the intentions of his collection in the preface to his *Clavier-Magazin für Kenner und Liebhaber* (1787). While it does not have the variety of instrumentation as found in the previously-mentioned collections, this publication contains German Lieder; French airs; piano character pieces; single movement Italianate genres, such as Allegros and Allegrettos; movements from

symphonies transcribed for keyboard; minuets; and the occasional flute sonata. Variety of genres and moods are built into its structure. Rellstab writes in the preface:

It is my firm intention to give all possible perfection (*Vollkommenheit*) to this periodical document and I can say with confidence that the second quarter will far exceed the first. As much as was possible to me to hear judgment (*Urtheil*) about the published pieces, one is contented with the setting (*Einrichtung*), diversity (*Mannigfaltigkeit*) and choice (*Wahl*) of the things.⁹⁰

Rellstab is marketing the aesthetics of the Enlightenment by using keywords from rational aesthetic philosophy. He notes the *perfection* of the publications, which has already been *judged* by its *diversity*. The diversity therein, through his personal choice of musical pieces, is what makes the publication perfect, thus worthy of a judgment, which could only have been made with a good taste. His subscribers, therefore, could themselves learn good taste through the publication, and even more so by subscribing to it, since he writes that future issues would be even more perfect.

The great advantage of the diversity in music publications is remarked in the first issue of Winter's *Musikalische Mancherley* (1762), whose title also indicates this importance. Winter not only mentions the variety, but how this diversity can be useful for the individual:

Music either serves the *Kenner*, may he be a natural or learned one, merely only to delight with their art, just pleasing as a well-built house, a regularly-created garden; or it is the language of feeling (*Empfindung*). Thus roar revenge-pregnant tones, thus sadness drags itself from the strings, thus thrusts the fiery anger into the air, so throbs the joy in the ether, thus sighs the tender sound of friendship and love, and thus bring

⁹⁰ “Es ist mein fester Vorsatz dieser periodischen Schrift alle mögliche Vollkommenheit zu geben und ich kann mit Zuversicht sagen, daß das zweite Vierteljahr das Erste weit übertreffen wird. So viel es mir möglich gewesen, Urtheil über die erschienenen Stücke zu hören, so ist man mit der Einrichtung, Mannigfaltigkeit und Wahl der Sachen zufrieden.” Johann Carl Friedrich Rellstab, hrsg., “Nachricht,” in *Clavier-Magazin für Kenner und Liebhaber*, Erstes Vierteljahr (Berlin: Rellstab Musikhandlung und verbesserten Musikdruckerey, 1787).

the lively tones praise and thanks from the full heart, and from the tongues of men to the seat of the Almighty, and part the clouds.⁹¹

Interestingly, Winter is critical of the *Kenner*, as though he is only able to judge construction of a work. Winter instead implies that his reader can gain so much more from performing the pieces therein. While the true definition of *Kenner*, as it was known at the time, would not have excluded him (or her) from being able to understand this "language of feeling," Winter uses this designation as a way to appeal to those with less theoretical musical knowledge. Therefore, this foreword could be seen as a marketing tool, indicating to the reader that he or she need not be so knowledgeable in the technical aspects of music in order to earn the benefits of the feeling and emotions that are portrayed by the pieces it contains. He elevates the experience of *Empfindungen* above knowledge of its construction, and provides in descriptive detail how these different emotions are brought forth in the individual. One can achieve the complete experience of *Empfindungen* by performing this publication through the roaring tones of revenge, dragging sadness, thrusting fiery anger, throbbing joy, sighing friendship and love, and lively tones of praise of thanks. Each of these descriptive pairs of adjectives and nouns correlate to their musical representation. Furthermore, now having achieved a "full heart" by performing these pieces, one can gain access to the Godly and heavenly from their mouths to the "seat of the Almighty." Thus, experiencing the *Empfindungen* through the music found in this publication arouses a spiritual feeling in the individual, which develops one's morality, the ultimate goal of aesthetics.

⁹¹ "Die Musik dient entweder den Kenner, er mag ein natürlicher oder gelernter seyn, mit ihrer Kunst bloß nur zu ergötzen, so wie ein wohl gebautes Haus, ein regelmäßig angelegter Garten vernüget; oder sie ist die Sprache der Empfindung. So rauschen Racheschwangere Töne, so schleppt sich die Traurigkeit auf den Sayten, so wirft der Zorn feurig die Luft, so wallet die Freude im Aether, so seufzet der zärtliche Ton Freundschaft und Liebe, und so bringen die belebten Töne Lob und Dank aus dem vollen Herzen, und auf den Zungen der Menschen zu dem Sitze der Allmacht, und theilen die Wolken." Georg Ludewig Winter, hrsg, "Vorbericht," in *Musikalisches Mancherley*, Erstes Vierteljahr (Berlin, Georg Ludewig Winter, 1762).

To be sure, the principle of miscellany in music can be demonstrated not just in music publications, but also through the variety presented in those public concerts that did occur in North Germany. While the actual genres may vary, the aesthetic significance of miscellany is maintained. For example, the typical ordering of genres in the *Abonnement-Concerte* of the Leipzig Gewandhaus between 1781 and 1820 was as follows: overture or symphony, solo opera aria, concerto, opera ensemble, intermission, overture or symphony, opera aria, operatic choral movement, and finally a symphony.⁹² Variety can be seen first in the different organizational possibilities of the large ensemble. Either the entire group plays together, as in the symphony, overture, or choral movement, or a solo voice or instrument is contrasted by the large ensemble. Typically, the programs would include composers from many different national origins, thus providing stylistic variety.⁹³ Excerpts from Italian and French opera were heard alongside symphonies by German composers. Furthermore, it was not uncommon to include cantata settings of religious texts by German composers, satisfying more directly a sacred need next to the then-considered frivolous Italian opera aria.⁹⁴ Finally, the genres themselves are also varied in their presented affects. The overture provides an atmosphere of beginning, preparing the listeners for what will follow. The three-movement symphony not only gives the same sense of beginning in the first movement, but the second and third movements are opportunities for varying affects. The second movement was typically an Adagio of a sweet or languishing character; the third movement was often a dance, such

⁹² Weber, 43.

⁹³ Weber, 44.

⁹⁴ Weber, 52. A discussion of the perceived frivolity of Italian opera in North German society and the bad morals associated with its performers can be found in Ernst Christoph Dreßler, *Fragmente einiger Gedanken des Musikalischen Zuschauers die bessere Aufnahme der Musik in Deutschland betreffend* (Gotha, Germany: Christian Mevius, 1767), 4-11.

as a *gigue*.⁹⁵ Finally, each opera scene would represent a different affect through the recitative and its paired aria. Though the public concert series was not very common in North Germany, those genres that were chosen prove the organizing principles to be based in a diversity that comes together to form a unifying whole. According to rational aesthetics, unity in diversity is an aspect of the beautiful because it is a perfection; therefore, forming the public concert, likewise music publications, on a principle of variety or diversity is necessary in satisfying the moral aesthetic needs of society by offering its audience a varied experience of *Empfindungen*.

From the perspective of concert ordering, one can consequently view the music subscription series as a means for creating varied and well-organized *Hausmusik* for performance in the family society. To serve as an example, the *Musikalisches Allerley von verschiedenen Tonkünstlern* (1760-1763), published in Berlin by Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, can be interpreted as providing an evening of diverse participatory musical entertainment. The preface reads:

These pages will be set forth every Saturday evening and are intended to collect and to bring gradually to the fore the newest musical experiments of good masters of music (*Tonmeister*) in sing and play things, clavier, violin and flute pieces, and small and large compositions, odes, arias, and polonaises, minuets, marches, and duets, trios, fugues, and symphonies, and character piece and sonatas, in German, Italian and French taste. I recommend them to the benevolent approval of the *Kenner* and *Liebhaber*, and hope for the same all the more because the collection will be undertaken with choice and testing, and not every piece will be included without distinction.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, "Symphonie," 4:478-479.

⁹⁶ "Diese Blätter werden alle Sonnabende fortgesetzt, und sind dazu bestimmt, die neuesten musikalischen Versuche gutter Tonmeister in Sing= und Spielsachen, Clavier=Violin= und Flötenstücken, u. kleinern und größern Aufsätzen, Oden, Arien, u. Polonoisen, Menuetten, Märchen, u. Duetten, Trios, Fugen und Synfonien, u. characterisirten Stücken und Sonaten, im deutschen, italienischen und französischen Geschmack, zu sammeln, und nach und nach zum Vorschein zu bringen. Ich empfehle sie dem gütigen Beyfalle der Kenner und Liebhaber, und verspreche mir selbigen um desto eher, weil die Sammlung mit

Birnstiel is marketing to his *Kenner* and *Liebhaber* audience not just the newness of the material that he is printing, but also its variety in genres, instrumentations, and style, including national style. Each of the nine volumes (*Sammlungen*) were issued weekly as issues (*Stück*), with seven issues comprising a volume and each issue containing two or three short pieces. There is a contents page and list of printing errors at the beginning of each volume, indicating that they could have been bound and constituted as volumes after all of the individual issues were released, as had become common practice by the time. The page and issue numbers continue consecutively, which further unifies the volumes.⁹⁷ Considering each volume as a whole, the variety found therein is its unifying feature (see Table 4.1).

Birnstiel provides continuity in the first volume through the recurring incorporations of variations on the tune “Ich schlief, da träumte mir,” by Johann Philipp Kirnberger. This popular tune was treated to variations by numerous composers, including C.P.E. Bach, whose fourteen variations were featured in a later volume of the collection. Kirnberger’s setting of the tune and first two variations are included in the first issue, and the remaining four variations are found in subsequent issues of the first volume. This dispersal of the variations gives the impression that the tune could serve as a main theme that is marked throughout the entire musical performance over the course of the evening. Some pieces may even span across several volumes. The Sonata a 3 by

Wahl und Prüfung unternommen, und nicht jeder Aufsatz ohne Unterscheid in selbige aufgenommen werden wird.” Birnstiel, “Nachricht,” in *Musikalisches Allerley*, 1stes Stück (2 November 1760).

⁹⁷ Ulrich Leisinger, ed., “Critical Report,” in Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, *The Complete Works*, (Los Altos, CA: The Packard Humanities Institute, 2014), “Variations,” ser. 1, v.7, 108.

Table 4.1 Contents of *Musikalisches Allerley von verschiedenen Tonkünstlern*, volume I (issues 1-7), Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, editor. (Berlin: bey Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, Königl. privileg. Buchdrucker, 1761).

Issue	Title	Composer	Genre	Instrumentation
1	Veränderungen über “Ich schlief, da träumte mir” (Theme, var. 1 & 2)	Kirnberger, Johann Philipp	Theme and variations	keyboard
1	Marsch	Kirnberger	March	Keyboard
1	“Wünsche und Gesundheitien”	Marpurg, Friedrich Wilhelm, music; Friederich von Hagedorn, text	Strophic Lied	Voice and Keyboard
2	Duett für zwo Flöten: Allegro, Affetuoso, Presto	Riedt, Friedrich Wilhelm	Duet	Two flutes
3	“Ich schlief” (Var. 3 & 4)	Kirnberger	Variations	Keyboard
3	La Xenophon (Allegretto I) & La Sybille (Allegretto II) (return to Allegretto I)	Bach, Carl Philipp Emanuel	Piano character piece	Keyboard
3	“Der drey und zwanzigste Psalm”	Graun, Carl Heinrich, music; Kramer, text.	Strophic psalm	Two voices and basso continuo
4	Polonois I/II (return to I)	Kirnberger	Polonaise	Keyboard
4	Marsch	Herbing, August Bernhard Valentin	March	Keyboard
4	Der neun und dreißigste Psalm	Marpurg, music; Kramer, text	Choral psalm setting	Four voices (SATB)
5	Text for Der neun und dreißigste Psalm			
5	“La Complaisante,” Allegretto grazioso	Bach, C.P.E.	Keyboard character piece	Keyboard
5	Allemande	Kirnberger	Stylized dance movement	Keyboard
5	“Das schlechte Jahr”	Marpurg	Strophic Lied	Voice and keyboard
6	“Die seltene Liebe”	Marpurg	Strophic Lied	Voice and Keyboard
6	“La Capricieuse” <i>Allegro</i>	Bach, C.P.E.	Keyboard character piece	Keyboard
6	“Gelobet seyst du, Jesu Christ”	Kirnberger	Chorale prelude	Keyboard
6	Gigue	Kirnberger	Stylized dance movement	Keyboard
7	“Neujahrswunsch des Nachstwächters zu Ternate”	Marpurg	Strophic Lied	Voice and Keyboard
7	Sonata a 3 per l’Organo, Poco Largo	Janitsch, Johann Gottlieb	Sonata	Organ (or two treble instruments and basso continuo)
7	Marsch	Kirnberger	March	Keyboard
7	“Ich schlief” (Var. 5 & 6)	Kirnberger	Variations	Keyboard
7	“La Gaillarde & la Tendre”	Nichelmann, Christoph	Keyboard character piece	Keyboard

Johann Gottlieb Janitsch (1708-c1763), for example, begins in the seventh issue of the first volume and is continued across two issues of the second volume. Thus, one could also combine volumes for a longer evening of music.

Most of the pieces in the first volume are short and are either binary or da-capo forms, with the exception of the *Lied* and psalm settings, both of which are strophic. Altogether, this volume may take roughly one hour to perform, and the generic and technical variety enables an inclusive experience for all performing members of the society. Since most amateur musicians were keyboardists, there are included a great number of solo keyboard pieces, the playing of which could be alternated by numerous members of the society throughout the evening. Although a majority of the pieces are for keyboard alone, the upper line could also have been doubled by violin or flute, a suggestion made for a Polonoise in the fifth volume.⁹⁸ The addition of a flute duet in this volume and flute sonatas in others suggests that the flute was also popular instrument to perform in these societies. Singers could also partake in the performance, either in the solo songs or in multi-voiced settings of Psalms. The four-part setting (SATB) of Psalm 39 by Marpurg is the most inclusive of the volume, allowing all members of the group to sing together in homophonic harmony. This would also enable non-musicians to take part in the singing of the familiar psalm tune.

In order to display and expand the taste of the group, Birnstiel includes in this collection both French and German styles. Other collections may also contain Italian

⁹⁸ [Johann Philipp] Sack, "Polonoise," in *Musikalisches Allerley*, 35tes Stück (25ten Julius 1761): 129. Just above the staff on the left is written "Flöte oder Clavier," likely referring only to the top voice since the bottom voice is in bass clef and at times playing chords.

arias.⁹⁹ The French taste is represented by the piano character pieces with French titles, as well as keyboard settings of stylized dance movements, such as the Allemande and the Gigue. All of the pieces in French style, however, are written by German composers; therefore, the appropriate German interpretation of the French style is presented. Other genres such as the *Lied*, the march, and the Polonaise are more exclusive to the German style. Each of the genres selected for the collection also provide specific characters and affects crucial to the development of *Empfindungen* and taste.

The singing of *Lieder* was probably one of the most important genres for the direct communication of *Empfindungen* in a social setting. Johann Adam Hiller also recognizes the importance of *Lieder* for improving social communication in his review of a collection of songs published by Georg Ludwig Winter in 1767.¹⁰⁰ In response to Winter's preface, which reads that "these songs should be sung during walks, at tables, in random society,"¹⁰¹ Hiller enthusiastically recommends this collection to his readers, writing:

We wish in the activity of this collection such a happiness; because our walks, our tables, our societies are often so empty of a decent conversation (*Unterhaltung*), that one made himself deserving to the dear Germans, if one would find such a songbook in all houses, where some friends come together around the table.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ See for example Winter, *Musikalisches Mancherley*, erstes Stück (1762), in which the publisher includes a setting of a scene from Pietro Metastasio's *Temistocle* for soprano and bass along with a scene description and translation of the text to German. Other scenes are offered in later issues. No composer name is provided by the publisher, though it determined not to be the 1736 setting by Antonio Caldara and is published before the more well-known 1772 setting by Johann Christian Bach.

¹⁰⁰ Johann Adam Hiller, "Lieder der Deutschen mit Melodien, erstes Buch. Bey George Ludewig Winter 1767. zwölf Bogen in Octav," in *Wöchentliche Nachrichten und Anmerkungen die Musik betreffend*, zwölftes Stück (21ten Sept. 1767): 93.

¹⁰¹ "...diese Lieder bey Spaziergängen, an Tafeln, in zufälliger Gesellschaft gesungen werden sollen." Hiller, "Lieder der Deutschen..." 93.

¹⁰² "Wir wünschen in der Tat dieser Sammlung ein solches Glück; denn unsere Spaziergänge, unsers Tafeln, unsere Gesellschaften sind öfters von einer anständigen Unterhaltung so leer, daß man sich um die lieben Deutschen verdient machte, wenn man ein solches Gesangbuch in allen Häusern, wo einige Freunde zusammen kommen, auf dem Tische fände." Hiller, "Lieder der Deutschen," 93.

Thus, according to Hiller, the appropriate *Lieder* sung in these more private social situations, such as those that would be experienced in the family society, can enable a happiness among the members, create decent conversation, and make one deserving of the company of others, and in particular, other Germans. Each song in the first volume of the Birnstiel collection offers a different affect. Typical themes for *Lieder* include love, as unrequited, of the youth, or mutual; friendship; death; a season or month of the year; or a time of day, to name a few. Birnstiel offered four songs in his first volume. The first, thirteen-strophe song is titled “Wünsch und Gesundheiten” (“Wishes and Toasts”), which encourages the expression of affection and happiness with friends during the Christmas season. The second song, “Das schlechte Jahr” (“The Bad Year”), offers a comic relief just before the heartfelt *Lied* “Die seltene Liebe” (“The Rare Love”) on the character of Phyllis. The final song in the volume, marked “lively” (“Munter”), is titled “Neujahrswunsch des Nachtwächters zu Ternate” (“New Year’s wish of the Night Watchmen of Ternate”). Issued in the seventh volume on 3 January 1761, this song provides a festive affect to the New Year’s celebrations.

Piano character pieces and free-standing Italianate movements, all of which included a specific character expression, could also transmit *Empfindungen* in a social setting. As with *Lieder*, the piano character pieces were just as diverse in the characters they expressed. For example, C.P.E. Bach set a pair of Allegrettos he titled “La Xenophon” and “La Sybille.” Bach draws on the French tradition of titling keyboard works with the name of an individual to give the character of the movement; however, his choice of names are unique to North German aesthetics. Not only are these two movements, performed Allegretto I–Allegretto II–Allegretto I, contrasting in key, with

“La Xenophon” in C-sharp major, and “La Sybille” in the parallel minor, but their character titles provide a unique opposition that can be explained with a philosophical underpinning (see Examples 4.1 and 4.2). Xenophon and the Sibyls are characters from ancient Greece and Rome, respectively. Xenophon, a man, was a historian, writer, and military leader, while the Sibyls were women who prophesized during states of inspiration.¹⁰³ The title “La Xenophon” characterizes a rational male, represented by stoic half notes held steady by a walking bass line. The character of “La Sybill,” the inspired and sensitive woman, is immediately evoked by the C-sharp minor tonality and much more elaborate musical line with written-in ornamentation. Through the use of diversity and contrast, Bach provides an opportunity to demonstrate the diametrically opposed musical qualities of reason and sensitivity, or, in this case, the male and female.

Example 4.1 C.P.E. Bach, “La Xenophone,” in *Musikalisches Allerley von versckhiedenen Tonküntlern*, vol. I, issue 3, 10, mm. 9-16.

Allegretto I

¹⁰³ “Xenophon,” in *Dictionary of World History*, 2nd Edition, ed. by Edmund Wright, Oxford University Press, accessed 4 May 2015, <http://libproxy.library.unt.edu:2105/view/10.1093/acref/9780192807007.001.0001/acref-9780192807007-e-3992?rskey=CuiwQh&result=10>; “Sibyl,” in *Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World*, edited by John Roberts, Oxford University Press, accessed 4 May 2015, <http://libproxy.library.unt.edu:2105/view/10.1093/acref/9780192801463.001.0001/acref-9780192801463-e-2039?rskey=AjyOmH&result=5>.

Example 4.2 C.P.E. Bach, “La Sybille,” in *Musikalisches Allerley von verscshiedenen Tonküntlern*, vol. I, issue 3, 9, mm. 9-12.

Whether in German or French style, the use of dance movements is prominent in this collection and others like it. The consumption of stylized dance music, that which is not intended to be danced, was popularized in the seventeenth century; however, its aesthetic function in the North German Enlightenment can explain its continued prominence in the context of social music making. Sulzer writes that the importance of dance is in the movement (*Bewegung*) of the body. He explains that social dance, while not the noblest activity, does have a great power in the expression and transmission of moral feelings. The physical sensation of bodily movement felt in combination with the music creates in the body a very lively impression. This lively impression can, in turn, “awaken various passionate and moral feelings.”¹⁰⁴ For that reason, the genre of dance music, Sulzer writes, “is not unimportant and can be especially useful for the forming of the mind (*Gemüth*).”¹⁰⁵ While these pieces are not likely being danced to, the listening and playing of a dance movement, of which all genres would have been familiar to the members of society, could still create the same impression and resulting effect. Though

¹⁰⁴ “...mancherley leidenschaftliche und sittliche Empfindungen zu erwecken.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Musik,” 3:431.

¹⁰⁵ “...so wird diese Gattung der Musik nicht unwichtig, und könnte besonders auch zu Bildung der Gemüther angewendet werden.” Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Musik,” 3:431.

not physically danced, the memory of the dance could be stirred in the mind of the listener/performer. As Sulzer wrote of the faculty of memory, it may not provide as strong of a physical impression on the body because it is experienced in the shadow of the original feeling itself, but it can still have an effect (see Chapter 2.2.1). Thus, the physical experience of the music felt in combination with the mental memory of the physical experience of the dance could create a lively impression on the body and mind of the listeners/performers. Because lively impression can transmit moral feelings, thus sensory cognition, they contribute to the forming of a morally good soul in particular, and society in general. This aesthetic function explains why stylized dance movements of all types continued to play a significant part in the publications of music used for social entertainment.

This collection also provides an opportunity for a more direct expression of morality and Christianity through sacred music. The inclusion of genres such as psalm settings or chorale preludes, and the use of imitative counterpoint in the Sonata a 3 indicate the omnipresence of religious attitudes, even in a social setting, in North Germany. The psalm settings are the most inclusive pieces in the collection; in particular, the four-part setting of Psalm 39 by Marpurg would have encouraged the participation of all in attendance. Likewise, the choral prelude, based on a tune familiar to all of the listeners, would have made present in the imaginations of the society members the accompanying texts, thus adding a further degree of engagement with the meaning and moral sentiments of the performance. The choral tune and text on which Kirnberger based his prelude, “Gelobet seyst du, Jesus Christ,” is a hymn written by Martin Luther for Christmas Day in the celebration of the birth of Jesus. The issue that included the

chorale prelude was released on the 27th of December; due to its proximity to Christmas celebrations, perhaps the members of the family society may have followed the choral prelude with the singing of the chorale itself, a common tradition in Lutheran Germany.

Serial music publications, which served a particular aesthetic function for the performance within a society of friends, were a crucial part of the forming of a beautiful soul. Through these pieces one could not only demonstrate their musical abilities, but also display, express, and transmit their *Empfindungen*. This experience provides an opportunity for personal growth through social interaction whether as a performer or listener, and ultimately forms a morally good society through the development of taste. Hiller anonymously wrote and published an article that expands on the importance of the expression of true feeling titled “Anmerkung über den musikalischen Vortrag” (“Remarks about Musical Performance”) in the *Wöchentliche Nachrichten*, a journal intended to be read by amateur musicians.¹⁰⁶ He writes that a good performance is not limited to the correct execution of the technical requirements of the composition. A musical piece “is not observed with stimulus and to the capturing of the heart, if one does not view the complete mind of the composer, and penetrate up into the spirit of the same.”¹⁰⁷ Hiller emphasizes the importance of truly comprehending the underlying character and spirit of the composer, which can only be understood with good taste. He writes that:

¹⁰⁶ Johann Adam Hiller, “Fortsetzung der Anmerkungen über den musikalischen Vortrag,” in *Wöchentliche Nachrichten und Anmerkungen die Musik betreffend*, Jg. 2, Fünftehnte Stück (12ten Oktober 1767): 111-118. This article was published across multiple issues during the first and second yearly volumes. The quotes used here all come from the issue cited above.

¹⁰⁷ “...werden nicht mit Reiz und zum Einnehmen des Herzens beobachtet, wenn man nicht den völligen Sinn des Componisten einsiehet, und bis in den Geist desselben dringet.” Hiller, “Fortsetzung der Anmerkungen,” 116.

Never does one communicate something in its power and its size, until one feels it correctly in oneself; and no one can read an author that he does not understand and completely and with taste.¹⁰⁸

In the preface to his collection of *Lieder*, published in 1781, Johann Karl Gottlieb Spazier suggests to his audience a means for achieving this expression. He writes,

Just as the declamation of your poem, of a speech demands, if it is to be full of spirit, and should correspond to the contents and the ideas of the authors, that our hearts in general may be receptive to the good and the beautiful, and capable of a certain degree of inspiration, and in order to happily express the feeling again, one must study himself entirely into the spirit of the author: equally as much a song that represents a poetic main idea, wants to be sensualized and should be lead through the ear closer to the heart may first be read more often, felt and properly thought out, before it can be that which it should be.¹⁰⁹

Instructions such as these inform the lay musical audience of both the importance of understanding the underlying meaning within a musical work and the means for expressing it. Thus, even for the amateur, an important aspect of performance is first and foremost the ability to connect with the author in order to understand the content and ideas in the work. Doing so touches the heart of the performer so that the performer can most fully express the affect. This can only be achieved by performers with good taste; in other words, those with the ability to observe the beautiful. Only when one performs a work with this level of understanding can they truly communicate it to and have an effect on the audience. Hiller explains,

¹⁰⁸ “Nie theilet man etwas in seiner Stärke und in seinem Umfange mit, biß man es selbst recht empfindet; und niemand kann einen Schriftsteller lesen, den er nicht vollkommen und mit Geschmack versteht.” Hiller, “Fortsetzung der Anmerkungen,” 116.

¹⁰⁹ “So wie die Deklamation deines Gedichts, einer Rede, wenn sie geistvoll sein, und ihrem Inhalte und der Idee des Verfassers entsprechen soll, erfordert, daß unser Herz überhaupt des Guten und Schönen empfänglich und eines gewissen Grades der Begeisterung fähig sein, und, um das Empfundne glücklich wieder auszudrücken, man sich ganz in den Geist des Verfassers hineinstudiren muß: eben so sehr will ein Lied, das einen poetischen Hauptgedanken darstellen, versinnlichen und durch das Ohr näher zum Herzen führen soll, erst öfter gelesen, empfunden und durchdacht sein, ehe es das sein kann, was es sein soll.” Johann Karl Gottlieb Spazier, “Vorbericht,” *Lieder und Gesänge am Klavier* (Halle: Auf Kosten des Verfassers und in Commission der Buchhandlung der Gelehrten zu Dessau, 1781).

Only he who is convinced of the truth of that which he is saying, and who cares for it from the heart, speaks with that natural intensity that pleases so infinitely more than all effort of the spirit through following of the art and its rules. Only by means of such conviction of the fluent sympathy of the heart and the natural intensity can our performance succeed to make others also feel it.¹¹⁰

Therefore, a performance based in truth and from the heart was valued more highly than one that was performed merely correctly and according to the rules of the art. In a good performance, truth is communicated to others, which was, indeed, the ultimate purpose of the beautiful arts.

Through the performance of a variety of genres that contain a diversity of moods, topics, etc. over the course of the evening, society members could share a multitude of *Empfindungen*, allowing for a well-rounded forming of the spirit. Thus, the “miscellany” found musical publications intended for social performance served as the collection’s organizing principle to appeal to the important aesthetic function of music in the forming of the taste and character of the participants. As Garve explains, the ultimate purpose of society meetings is in the forming of moral character and customs. Through music publications, society members could form customs of performance, which are based in agreed upon definitions of taste and the Beautiful. The culture is connected through the social practice of participatory performance, and the identity of the members of the group is unified by their shared habits within the cultural cohort.

The forming of good taste through social interaction was also achieved through discussions of music. Music periodicals, such as those discussed above, provided

¹¹⁰ “Nur der, welcher von der Wahrheit dessen, was er sagt überzeugt, und von Herzen darum besorgt ist, redet mit der natürlichen Heftigkeit, die unendlich mehr gefällt, als alle Anstrengung des Geistes, in Folge der Kunst und ihrer Regeln. Nur mittelst solcher Ueberzeugung der daher fließenden Theilnehmung des Herzens und der natürlichen Heftigkeit kann es unserm Vortrage gelingen, daß ihn andere auch empfinden.” Hiller, “Fortsetzung der Anmerkung,” 116.

opportunities for expansion in the public realm. Considering Garve's requirements for social interactions (see above), it must first impact the intellect, in the collection of knowledge and on the practice of mind, in the forming of a moral character, and finally in the creation of the expressed manners, or morals of society. All three of these requirements are satisfied by social discussions of music, which can be demonstrated with an article from the first issue of *Musikalisches Kunstmagazin* titled "Merkwürdige Stücke großer Meister verschiedener Zeiten und Völker" ("Extraordinary Pieces of Great Masters of different Times and Peoples").¹¹¹

After first reading the articles individually, the members could then gather to discuss them further in a social setting. The article provides an opportunity to expand one's knowledge of a topic through conversation, thereby impacting the intellect of the society members. In the article, Reichardt discusses a few composers, provides a specific musical example for each, and makes suggestions for the performance and analysis of that piece. For example, Reichardt examines Reinhard Keiser (1674-1739), a German composer who wrote church music, cantatas, and opera, and performed at the Hamburg Theater.¹¹² Reichardt also provides a German aria by Keiser and discusses it at length.¹¹³ Within a society meeting, this article, having first been read by the members, could lead to a further discussion on the biography and works of the composer, history of the theater in Hamburg, or music in Hamburg in general. Thus, the members could expand their knowledge about music from the recent past and further understand the history of music.

¹¹¹ Reichardt, "Merkwürdige Stücke großer Meister verschiedener Zeiten und Völker," *Musikalisches Kunstmagazin*, Erster Band (Berlin: Im Verlage des Verfassers, 1782): 34-45.

¹¹² Reichardt spells his name Reinhardt Kaiser.

¹¹³ Reichardt, "Merkwürdige Stücke," 36.

Discussions such as this could also provide the members with an opportunity for practice of the mind with new concepts, also a requirement Garve names as the impact on the intellect within social interactions. In this example, Reichardt uses Keiser's song as an example of noble simplicity. He suggest and further explains four qualities of noble simplicity: "Truth in the accentuation of the words, naturally and pleasant series of tones, equality of rhythm and order of its different parts, and unity of natural harmony."¹¹⁴ These four qualities can be viewed as principles for songs with the character of noble simplicity, and could be, for the reader, a new concept for them in music. Perhaps, after having just learned this concept, one could engage in a conversation that would allow them to practice using it by applying the concept of noble simplicity to other pieces of music or by expanding on the idea.

Garve's second requirement for social interactions is the forming of moral character. An explanation of taste lies at the core of a discussion of a piece that characterized a noble simplicity, which is ultimately based in morality, therefore, further developing the morality of the members. After discussing how the piece is constructed, the members can determine how to express its character in performance. The opening section of this German aria is provided with a keyboard accompaniment. The group can decide in general the most effective way to perform the aria, but also attempt different means for expressing its character. Various members could give their own interpretation, therefore allowing through performance a further transmission taste, hence morally good feelings. Finally, through discussions and performances such as this, the society is

¹¹⁴ "Wahrheit in der Akzentuazion der Worte; Natürliche und angenehme Folge der Töne; Gleichheit der Rhythmen und Ordnung in den Einschnitten; Einheit der natürlichen Harmonie." Reichardt, "Merkwürdige Stücke," 37.

actively forming their own habits, customs, and moral expressions; taken altogether these constitute the *äußern Sitten*, the final requirement of a morally good society.

Family gatherings provided numerous ways for transmitting the morally good and forming expressed social customs through music. Whether by performing or listening to *Hausmusik*, or a discussion about music and the arts in general, an active participatory environment enabled the society to create culture-forming habits. Family gatherings were likely the most impactful societies for pleasure in North Germany, since they are the most inclusive, limited only by the shared desire towards moral betterment. Members would likely identify as *Liebhaber*, and though their knowledge was not as specialized, they would have certainly understood the aesthetic function of music within the social environment. *Kenner*, on the other hand, were able to advance their knowledge and experience, and solidify their identity as such through the more exclusive cohort of the musical society.

4.3.3 The Emergence of Musical Societies

The first musical society in Berlin, *Die Musikübende Gesellschaft* (The Music Practicing Society), was formed in 1749 by Johann Philip Sack for the purpose of gathering amateur musicians together to perform music. This was both an exclusive and serious society requiring paid membership, and charging its members if they were late. In the first year it included only seven members, who met every Sunday for a three-hour evening of music performance. These performances, however, were not made public. On rare occasion they opened their doors for a fee to close friends and family members to watch them play, but the purpose of the society was exclusively for the performing of music with and for the members of the society. In other words, the performing of music

was a social pleasure to be shared with a very small and exclusive group of friends. So small, in fact, that in the group's beginnings it was held in the apartment of Sack himself.¹¹⁵

The society's membership, which grew to about a sixteen by 1754, was made up of mostly high-ranking military or court officers, church directors, and one or two of the professional and elite tradesmen of the city. There were a few professional musicians in the group, as well: Sack himself, who was organist of the Berlin Cathedral, as well as Johann Gabriel Seyffart, who was a court chamber musician and later took over Sack's position as the third and final director of the group.¹¹⁶ These members, with the exception of the professional musicians, would have considered themselves *Kenner*. While the group may have been financially restrictive, considering Garve's definition of the *Gelehrte Club*, it is likely that it also limited its membership to those who were highly knowledgeable about music, fairly skillful on their instruments, and interested in studying and discussing music at a high degree; these three characteristics would define the members as musical *Kenner*.

While there is no specific evidence of what music was played by *Die Musikübende Gesellschaft*, it is known what genres they performed.¹¹⁷ The group always began their meetings with an orchestral overture or *Sinfonie*, which was followed by seven to eight pieces that included concerti, solos, and trios on flute, violin, and/or keyboard.¹¹⁸ It is not known which instrument each of the attendees played; however, it is

¹¹⁵ Siegber Loewenthal, *Die Musikübende Gesellschaft zu Berlin und die Mitglieder Joh. Philipp Sack, Fr. Wilh. Reidt und Joh. Gabr. Seyffarth* (Bern: der Polygraphischen Gesellschaft Laupen bei Bern, 1928), 6-10.

¹¹⁶ Loewenthal, 8-9, 65.

¹¹⁷ Loewenthal, 11.

¹¹⁸ Loewenthal, 10.

likely that, even with only seven members in the society's earliest years, there were enough members for at least one-on-a-part orchestral playing. The choice of an overture or *sinfonie* to open the meeting is an expected one, as this was a custom practice of opera or other court performances in Germany and of public concerts in other countries. The genres of the overture and symphony could provide the ceremonial atmosphere of a beginning. Sulzer confirms this, writing that the overture begins a performance of large concerts, staged works, or free performances of music.¹¹⁹ The *Symphonie*, he writes, can replace the overture; the purpose of both is to prepare the listener for an important piece of music by summoning up all the splendor of instrumental music. The symphony was at this time a standard three-movement structure and, according to Sulzer, should possess a great and fiery character so that it could prepare the state of mind (*Gemüthsverfassung*) of the listener for the music to follow.¹²⁰ When played the context of a music society, the performance of an overture or symphony would unite the players together in the same state of mind by feeling the character of the music and preparing the members for the rest of the session to follow. Furthermore, performing a work in which everyone participates would create a sense of unity among the members as they work together through the piece. It can be assumed that the group was lead at the keyboard by Sack, who would have done the same in his position as organist in the church; therefore, the members would be performing in what we would now consider a chamber-like setting, relying on a direct communication among the players. The performance can thus be understood as serving as a means for the members to form and develop their close friendships through the communicative channel of music. Furthermore, it is achieved not only through the

¹¹⁹ Sulzer, "Ouverture," *Allgemeine Theorie*, 3:643.

¹²⁰ Sulzer, "Symphonie," *Allgemeine Theorie*, 4:478-479.

more intimate space of the chamber-music setting, but also through the genres of the overture or symphony, by then considered genres of equality. The concerto, in comparison, would emphasize an individual or small group against a supporting ensemble. Unlike in the performance of an overture, the concerto gives greater attention to a select few while placing others in subsidiary roles, thereby no longer creating a sense of equality among the members. Therefore, a symphony or overture was chosen to open the meetings as a means to initially unify the group, both psychologically and symbolically, in their mutual aims towards a higher sensitive, intellectual, and moral development.

The other works that followed, concerti, solos, and trios, give the members the opportunity to prove their dexterity and expressive capacities on their instruments and divide into different instrumental combinations. This means that at times some members may have only been listening while a smaller group played a trio sonata, for example. It is not known if this group actually rehearsed the pieces or merely played through them. Given the three-hour meeting time and number of pieces performed (seven or eight), it is likely that they did more than just play through the music. In addition to rehearsing them, it is also possible that the pieces and their performances could have served as a means for discussion and analysis of the music, either in its construction or its expression in terms of its beauty. Furthermore, the members could have considered a range of topics on music that do not relate particularly to the piece at hand, such as those topics found in weekly musical newspapers and journals.

In addition to discussions of specific pieces, members of a music society may also have been concerned with other topics, such as those on music composition, history,

theory, and aesthetics. When discussed in the context of a music society, these topics could be used to promote the sharing of judgments and the development of the taste of the individuals. As previously discussed, the defining features of a *Kenner* is in his ability to perceive the perfection, genius, and expression in musical works, which engages the moral sense (see Chapter 2.5). Furthermore, to be considered the status of a *Kenner*, one must possess a distant historical knowledge of artists and artworks and be familiar with the taste of different eras. Within the context of a music society, where its members identified themselves as *Kenner*, an important aspect of the social meetings would be to engage in conversations about the arts and sciences. This is made clear by the popularity of music journals and other periodicals that included articles on topics of music. When considering the aesthetic function of society, the importance of these discussions was learning not merely about those topics in particular. Through participatory discussions in music societies, one could learn about the opinions and ideas of others in society, hence about the human condition, and form social habits that unify the group in their shared practices and expressions. The foundation for these discussions was likely through music periodicals, which can serve to demonstrate how learned societies may have talked about music and formed their identity as musical *Kenner*.

Some of the most influential music journals were published by famous music theorists and composers of the time. For example, the leading journals in the second half of the eighteenth century include *Kritische Briefe* (Marpurg), *Wöchentliche Nachrichten* (Hiller), *Musikalischer Almanach für Deutschland* (Johann Nikolaus Forkel), *Musikalisches Kunstmagazin* (Reichardt), and *Magazin der Musik* (Cramer). Mary Sue Morrow, who conducted a detailed survey of instrumental music criticism in North

Germany in her *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century*, provides a survey of music criticism in periodicals and suggests that they served the function of creating a unified aesthetic for Germany.¹²¹ Rather than using the word aesthetic, which had a very specific meaning during the Enlightenment, these publications provided an opportunity to create a unified *taste* in Germany. By forming the taste of its readers, music publications contributed to the larger aesthetic function of music by creating a morally good society and culture. These journals include articles on music composition; biographies of famous composers, singers, and instrumentalists in Germany; and news and reviews about music publications and performances around Europe. In addition, many journals included articles meant to teach the reader on a specific subject, such as music history or theory. As examples of good taste, the publisher would at times include short, single-movement keyboard pieces or songs. Taken as a whole, music periodicals satisfied many elements in the forming the taste of a musical *Kenner*.

For other types of societies, whose members may not have had a specific interest in subscribing to a music periodical but still wanted to participate in discussions on the arts, one could develop their taste in entertainment, learned, and political newspapers, which also included music reviews and articles on aesthetics. For example, *Unterhaltungen* (1766-1770), a more entertainment-focused publications, provided for its readers articles on aesthetics, the arts in general, literature, reviews of music performances, and news on the arts and sciences in the large cities throughout Europe.¹²²

¹²¹ Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20. Morrow was primarily concerned with an assessment of music reviews of instrumental music and not of the other types of articles or reviews found in these periodicals. For a full list of the primary sources she used see 21-22.

¹²² Michael Christian Bock, hrsg., *Unterhaltungen* (Hamburg: gedruckt und verlegt von Mich. Christ. Bock, 1766-1770).

Publications such as this often included poems and short musical pieces, which could have been enjoyed in the company of friends. Some of the most prominent learned periodicals of the time include the *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften*, *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, and *Der teutsche Merkur*, and contained articles providing a higher level of knowledge for its readership.¹²³

Political newspapers, which occasionally included reviews of music publications and notices of performances in the major cities around Europe, include the *Hamburgische Correspondent* and *Berlinische Nachrichten*.¹²⁴ These articles tended to be shorter and less technical so as to appeal to and teach those who were not so knowledgeable in music.¹²⁵ The types of reviews enabled the less-informed *Liebhaber* to still participate in the social conversation on music. To be sure, music periodicals provided the most well-rounded approach to teaching its readers the aesthetics and taste of music. Discussions of music could be found in all types of periodicals, thus these periodicals played a very active part of North German Enlightenment thought, entertainment, education, and society as a whole.

The general categories of articles found in music periodicals ensured that readers had the opportunity to fully develop and enrich themselves in music. Topics included aesthetics in general, music theory, analysis, history, criticism of publications and performances, and music news from all of the major cities around Europe. These topics

¹²³ Friedrich Nicolai and Moses Mendelssohn, ed., *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste* (Leipzig: verlegt Johann Gottfried Dyck, 1757-1765); Nicolai, *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (Berlin und Stettin: verlegt Friedrich Nicolai, 1765-1794, 1796, 1771-1791); Michael Christian Bock, *Unterhaltungen* (Hamburg: gedruckt und verlegt von Mich. Christ. Bock, 1766-1770); and Christoph Martin Wieland, *Der teutsche Merkur* (Frankfurt und Leipzig: Im Verlag der Gesellschaft, 1773-1789).

¹²⁴ M. Christian Ziegra, ed., *Hamburgische Nachrichten aus dem Reiche der Gelehrsamkeit* (Hamburg: Christian Simon Schröder, 1760-1771); and *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen* (Berlin, 1761-1798).

¹²⁵ Morrow, 31.

taken altogether satisfy the requirements for the forming of good taste. Therefore, these publications function for an individual to develop their own sense of taste, through which they form their own personal identity. By reading about these varied topics, an individual can first and foremost discover the function and meaning of music through the study of aesthetics, learn the rules of music, obtain a distant historical knowledge of art and artworks, discern the taste of different eras and places, and read about the opinions of famous music theorists and composers. All of these topics play an important role in the forming of an individual's musical taste, and are the defining characteristics of a musical *Kenner*. Finally, when discussed in the context of a social meeting, the members can then share their opinions on the articles and learn the opinions and taste of others. Through this experience, not only does the group share their knowledge of the topic, but they also discover the taste of others.

Journals emphasize in their preface, just as serial music publications, the great variety found in the articles as their selling point. Cramer writes in the preface to his inaugural issue of *Magazin der Musik* that it is expected in the compilation of a musical magazine that there be diversity (*Mannigfaltigkeit*) and perfection (*Vollkommenheit*), to which he endeavors.¹²⁶ He then goes on to explain how he achieves this diversity and perfection. Within his publications, Cramer writes, one will find the musical lyrics and dramatic stories from a variety of different genres, such as Odes, Lieder, Oratorios, Operas, etc. In addition, he promises to give news and judgments on these types of works. He also provides longer and shorter reviews of both old and new musical theoretical writings and compositions of songs and instrumental music, because “that one hereby takes excellent consideration on the appeal and newness, and wishes to keep pace

¹²⁶ Cramer, “Vorbericht,” in *Magazin der Musik*, Jg.1 (1783), v.

with the products of the day, goes without saying.”¹²⁷ His periodical also includes articles on the history of music, such as biographies, which may include sketches of their musical character, judgments of their music, and directories of their works. In addition, news about operas from playhouses, activities in church music, the deaths of composers, and vacancies in musical offices can be found therein. Cramer also includes discussions of new musical inventions and other news-worthy notices. He adds that he will also answer questions and give remarks on theoretical and practical musical material, on taste, on performances, and on the betterment of music. Finally, Cramer explains that he will include short musical pieces, both songs and excerpts set for Clavier, in order for the subscribers to collect them as an anthology.¹²⁸ Thus, Cramer, in his attempt to give his publication both diversity and perfection, provides articles on all areas of music, teaching his readers taste through reviews, history, theoretical and practical musical questions, and music itself, all while keeping the reader up-to-date on new publications and events in music.

Reichardt, in the preface to the first issue of *Musikalisches Kunstmagazin* (1782) also writes that the purpose of his publication is in the education of his readers in all areas. He explains that he:

attempts to arouse high artistry, high inspiration in the artists, to create awareness of the high grandeur and soul-uplifting power of church music, of the more noble, striking, musical poetry, of noble, great song, of edification and early education through music, of the more noble, high feeling of artistry and taste-inspiring singing drama (*Singeschauspiel*), of the great truth, emotion and song spreading lesser singing drama, from the noble simplicity and truth of folk-uplifting folksong and folk dance, of the bettering of the song in general through song schools, of more determined meaning of instrumental music, of the importance and difficulty of good

¹²⁷ “Daß man hierbey vorzüglich auf den Reiz der Neuheit Rücksicht zu nehmen, und mit den Producten des Tages Schritt zu halten Wünsch, versteht sich von selbst.” Cramer, “Vorbericht,” vii.

¹²⁸ Cramer, “Vorbericht,” vii–ix.

noble, performance, of common application of the instrument, of the perfection of the instrument itself, on effectuated structures, and finally – whereupon lastly almost everything [is] based, of the better, more functional, noble education of the artists. I have through example from the works of the greatest German, Italian, and French composers tried to raise the spirit of my contemporaries engrossed in frivolities.¹²⁹

Reichardt is critical of his contemporaries, suggesting that they are only composing frivolous music that is not infused with high artistry of nobility. He aims to train his musical public in all areas of music, whether it be through songs, musical dramas, folk song and dance, or instrumental music, in the French, German, or Italian style in order to form the taste of his audience. Reichardt thinks that the solution to the frivolity of contemporary music is in teaching both future musicians and the general public, which is achieved not merely by

educating theoretically and practically with sense (*Einsicht*) and feeling and taste, wherever his heart is ennobled and greatly formed through true religion, pleasure in nature (*Naturgenuß*), history and examples of noble teachers, his head is enlightened through knowledge of nature, the ancients and the world and thus higher nobler artistry is generated in him.¹³⁰

Thus, Reichardt considers as his task to inform his musical public on not just theoretical and practical aspects of music, but also the aesthetic ones, by ennobling both the head and the heart of the musician. The latter is achieved through religious sentiments, which

¹²⁹ “versucht hohen Kunstsinn, hohe Begeisterung im Künstler zu wecken, aufmerksam zu machen auf die hohe Würde und seelerhebende Macht der Kirchenmusik, auf edlere, treffende, musikalische Poesie, auf edlen, großen Gesang, auf Erbauung und frühe Bildung durch Musik, auf das edlere, hohe Gefühle Kunstsinn und großen Geschmack wirkende Singeschauspiel, auf grössere Wahrheit, Rührung und Gesangverbreitung im kleineren Singeschauspiel, auf die edle Einfalt und Wahrheit des Volkbeglückenden Volkgesanges und Volktauzes, auf Verbesserung des Gesanges überhaupt durch Singeschulen, auf bestimtere Bedeutung der Instrumentalmusik, auf die Wichtigkeit und Schwierigkeit der guten edlen Ausführung, auf zweckmäßigere Anwendung der Instrumente, auf Vervollkommung der Instrumente selbst, auf effektuierende Gebäude, und endlich – worauf zuletzt fast alles beruht, auf die besser zweckmäßigere edlere Erziehung des Künstlers. Ich habe durch Beispiele aus den Werken der größten deutschen italienischen und französischen Tonkünstler den Geist meiner in Spielereien versunkenen Zeitgenossen zu heben versucht.” Johann Friedrich Reichardt, *Musikalisches Kunst Magazin*, Bd. 1, (Berlin: Im verlage des Verfassers, 1782), vi.

¹³⁰ “theoretisch und praktisch mit Einsicht und Gefühl und Geschmack unterrichtet wird, wo auch sein Herz durch ächte Religion, Naturgenuß, Geschichte und Beispiel edler Lehrer edel und groß gebildet, sein Kopf durch Kenntniß der Natur, der Alten und der Welt aufgeklärt und so hoher edler Kunstsinn in ihm erzeugt wird.” Reichardt, vii.

reinforces the moral purpose of the arts. He emphasizes the artist's pleasure in and knowledge of nature, which is an important aspect in the recognition of perfection because nature is both perfect and beautiful. The final requirement for the full forming a musician is knowledge of the ancients, or the history of music. Reichardt, through his weekly music magazine, attempts to educate his readership in all of these ways by including articles that discuss theoretical, practical, and aesthetic applications of music.

Both Reichardt and Cramer published their music journals as a means to develop the taste of their readership by educating them in all areas of music in order to achieve diversity and perfection. By viewing music publications as a means for forming social conversation on music, it is clear that these meetings satisfied the function of aesthetics. A *Kenner* is one who is well-rounded and has developed a diversity of knowledge on a topic. In order to identify as a musical *Kenner*, one must be knowledgeable about music history, theory, analysis, aesthetics, criticism, etc., and communicate that knowledge within the context of a learned society.

For example, a music society may choose to discuss an analysis of particular pieces of music, such as the scathing review of a recent publication of six keyboard sonatas by Vincenzo Manfredini in an issue of Johann Adam Hillers *Wöchentliche Nachrichten und Anmerkung die Musik betreffend* (1766).¹³¹ The article opens, “Tut, tut! an Italian, a Russian imperial Capellmeister! and makes no better sonatas! That is sad! His poor concept of order, symmetry, rhythm, modulation, correct and pure harmony!”¹³² Hiller supports his judgment of the collection with examples, through which he points out

¹³¹ Johann Adam Hiller, “Sei Sonate da Clavecimbala,” *Wöchentliche Nachrichten und Anmerkungen die Musik betreffend, Siebzehntes Stück* (Leipzig den 21ten October, 1766), 127-131.

¹³² “Ey, ey! ein Italiäner, ein Russisch kaiserlicher Capellmeister! and macht keine bessern Sonaten! das ist traurig! Ihr armen Begriffe von Ordnung, Symmetrie, Rhythmus, Modulation, richtiger und reiner Harmonie!” Hiller, “Sei Sonate,” 127.

for his readers those specific compositional errors that he recognizes. He poses questions to his audience, such as “can one perceive of these other than common, empty, and childish?”¹³³ He then follows with more specific, theoretical questions, identifying particular compositional issues for the reader to discover. This review is not merely on the compositional ability of the composer, however. It also considers taste, and, in particular, national taste. After his extensive critique, Hiller asks, “should then in Russia the keyboard works of Bach, Benda, Wagenseil, Runz, Binder, and other German masters not be known?”¹³⁴ This article could open a discussion among the members of the society about not only theoretical issues, but also questions of taste, national or otherwise. The members could have first performed a movement from the collection, then concern themselves with issues discussed by Hiller. They could then expand on Hiller’s analysis by finding their own examples in this collection or from other pieces by this or other composers, thus taking the conversation beyond the article at hand.

While we cannot know exactly what occurred in these meetings beyond the types of repertoire that was performed, the function of such a society was indeed for the forming of good musical taste. One developed good taste through the music itself and the sharing of *Empfindungen* in the performance, both while playing in the group and through the expressive performances of others. Furthermore, if the music was also discussed, one could learn about issues of composition and taste. The musical society can be understood as a means for developing and spreading great taste among its members by satisfying all of the needs for the development of the *Kenner*.

¹³³ “Kann man dieses anders als alltaglich, leer, und kindisch finden?” Hiller, “Sei Sonate,” 129.

¹³⁴ “Sollten denn in Rußland die Clavierarbeiten eines Bach, Benda Wagenseil, Runz, Binder, und anderer deutschen Meister nicht bekannt sein?” Hiller, “Sei Sonate,” 131.

Die Musikübende Gesellschaft began offering public performances on special occasions, the most well known being the 1755 performance of Carl Heinrich Graun's *Der Tod Jesu* at the Domkirche, which was reviewed in numerous sources at the time and became an annual tradition for Berlin.¹³⁵ This performance included famous professional musicians, such as C.P.E. Bach playing keyboard, Graun leading the violins, Agricola giving the beat and singing tenor, and Agricola's wife and sister singing soprano.¹³⁶ While public performances were considered by Garve in bad taste, it is likely that an exception was made for this circumstance. Due to the religious context of Graun's passion oratorio, one of the most popular at the time, a public performance of it would certainly have been an acceptable form of public entertainment. Beginning in 1763, as their performances gained in popularity, an enthusiast of the group began a winter concert series that included a *Der Tod Jesu*, and the society renamed itself to the *Musikalische Gesellschaft*. It is not known if the group continued their regular meetings as they did in the beginning, in which they would perform music only for themselves. It appears that as the group grew it became more of a public society; however, the public concerts were still very exclusive. While it may not have been so exclusive as to admit only *Kenner*, the performances were not completely open. The use of music in family societies, on the other hand, was not so restrictive, permitting all members of enlightened society to take part.

Garve's writing on society can tell us that the middle class had to be instructed on how to interact in society and why these meetings were important for both the individual and for the culture as a whole. As discussed above, the court had a long-established

¹³⁵ Loewenthal, 13.

¹³⁶ Loewenthal, 14.

tradition of appropriate behavior and decorum; the middle class, however, had to form their own customs, including the use and practice of music within their social meetings. Published music and music journals at the time can, for this reason, be seen as instructional devices for teaching the appropriate behavior, topics for conversation, and activities in such gatherings. Therefore, these sources serve as a means for understanding the experience music in society, both in conversation and in performance.

4.3.4 Case Study: Music at the Court of Herzogin Anna Amalia of Sachsen-Weimar

Herzogin Anna Amalia of Sachsen-Weimar, known as one of the greatest patrons of the arts and sciences in Germany in the eighteenth century, can provide for the modern reader a construction of the ideal social experience of a member of an enlightened society. While the duchess had unique privileges and means as a result of her aristocratic position, and therefore is not a direct representation of the middle (*Bürger*) class, she modeled for the middle class how a learned *Kennerin* could engage on all levels in society through the discipline of music. As discussed above, Garve recommended to his middle class readers to look to court culture for the ideal type of social communication. Anna Amalia developed her own aesthetic of music based in the tradition of rational philosophy from Baumgarten, Sulzer, and others, which she laid out in her essay “Gedanken über die Musick” (ca. 1798-1799).¹³⁷

¹³⁷ The two extant versions of the essay are found in Herzogin Anna Amalia, D-WR1 HAA XVIII 129 and D-WR1 HAA XVIII: 150a. The first, XVIII 129, has been transcribed to modern script in Eleonore Bojanowski, “Äußerungen Anna Amaliens und Herders über die Musik,” in *Goethe-Jahrbuch* 30 (1909), 55-66 and Wolfram Huschke, “Anna Amalia und die Musick ihrer Zeit.” In *Wolfenbütteler Beiträge* 9 (1994): 123-151; DWR1 HAA XVIII: 150c was transcribed in Sandra Dreise-Beckmann, *Herzogin Anna Amalia von Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach (1739-1807): Musikliebhaberin und Mäzenin* (Schneeverdigen, Germany: Karl Dieter Wagner, 2004). Dreise-Beckmann determined that 150a is the final, authorial version because it is more cleanly written and without corrections, with both version written around 1798-1799. Modern transcriptions of each of two different versions of the essay in Dreise-Beckman, 189.

As a female monarch, Anna Amalia was in a unique position to create a musical and literary society at her court according to her own principles of taste. Unlike the traditional monarchy, she chose to form a culture of the arts based on rational aesthetic principles, rather than a purely representational one. Her uncle, Frederick the Great, known for his great musical talent, used his reign to create a splendid musical court of the greatest musicians and composers, representing both the power and wealth of his court. Anna Amalia, on the other hand, also a trained musician in her youth, sought to form her court with great intellects who could further advance the study of the arts and sciences. By taking part in the activity herself, Anna Amalia developed her own taste through the study of the arts and aesthetics. She not only created for herself a unique opportunity to form her own aesthetic of music, but was also in the position to model those aesthetics for her constituents through her court activity.

Anna Amalia's aesthetics were greatly influenced by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who was working in her court beginning in 1776. Herder was a proponent of the rational philosophy of Baumgarten and Mendelssohn and, most significantly, believed in the ability of the arts to teach morality through the acquisition of sensory cognition.¹³⁸ Anna Amalia agreed with Herder's position on the function of the *schönen Künste* and of music in particular, writing:

Feeling and taste are very considerable properties of the art of music...If the *Gefühl* is pure and true, so is also certainly the taste, which is lead through the same to feel the good and the true, love for the Beautiful (*Schönheit*), Agreement (*Übereinstimmung*) and Order (*Ordnung*), but also to instill contempt for and reluctance towards the evil in him; what

¹³⁸ Steven Martinson, "Herder's Life and Works," in *A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried Herder*, edited by Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 37.

hereby arises one calls the great taste. Which also has a powerful influence on moral character.¹³⁹

The duchess takes as a foundational principle of her philosophy that if a beautiful object is perceived by someone of taste, it can communicate to them the pure and true feeling of its beauty and ordering. This experience, by affecting the soul, builds a strong moral character. She saw the arts as a necessary means for not only developing morality in an individual, but forming a morally good culture, which she found lacking in modern society. She expressed this concern in another incomplete essay, also housed at the Thüringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv and likely written around 1799.¹⁴⁰ Anna Amalia wrote:

the purpose of the culture of Man exists in ennobling himself, hence is grounded in morality. Everything else that is not aimed to that is nothing other than misunderstood culture...Everything which nowadays one acquires for adornment in terms of *Cultur*, *Aufklärung*, and *Humanität*, and whereby man decorates himself is made of *sound* and *appearance*.¹⁴¹

Anna Amalia was concerned with the current moral state of society as a whole, believing that many took elaborate decoration as a false display of taste, which is not rooted in morality. Her great belief that the arts, and music in particular, could impact the morality of individuals and society as a whole lead the duchess to cultivate an active musical atmosphere in her court.

¹³⁹ "Gefühl und Geschmack sind sehr wesentliche Eigenschaften der Tonkunst...Wen das Gefühl rein und wahr ist so ist es auch gewiß der Geschmack welcher durch dasselbe geleitet wird das gute und wahre zu Empfinden, liebe zur Schönheit, uebereinstimmung u Ordnung, aber gegen das schlecht Verachtung u widerwillen ihm ein zuflößen; hierdurch entstehet was man den grossen Geschmack nennet. Welcher auch auf den Sittlichen Carackter einen Mächtigen Einfluss haben." Dreise-Beckmann, 189. Many of Anna Amalia's writings have an unfinished character, including those that were made into clean copies. It is apparent that German may not have been her first language. Regardless, she chose to write these essays in German rather than French, the traditional language of nobility, perhaps signifying the importance for her of German as a literary and academic language.

¹⁴⁰ Anna Amalia, D-WR1 HAA HXVIII: 150a, 25-29.

¹⁴¹ " Die bestimmung der Culture des Menschen bestehet in der veredelung desselben daher gründet sich auf moralität. Alles andern was nicht dahin zielt ist nicht als eine missverstandene Culture.... Alles was heute zu legen man sich schmücken Culture Aufklärung u Humanität nimmt u womit der Mensch sich schmückt ist aus Klang u Schein." Anna Amalia, D-WR1 HAA XVIII 150a, 45r.

The use of music at her court in Weimar was not merely for ceremonial purposes. Instead, Anna Amalia created within the larger court culture societies that functioned at times as a family society, and in other instances as a learned musical club. Through these varied societies, she created numerous opportunities for the members to experience music in a participatory manner: through listening, performance, and active discussion. While no exact records exist of the musical experience in the family societies or learned clubs of the middle class, Anna Amalia's court can serve as a representation of the ideal use of music in these contexts, and thus can provide a unique access into these experiences.

Throughout her reign the Weimar court regularly put on performances of *Singspiel*, including those with texts by resident poets, such as Christoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813) and Johann Adam Hiller (1728-1824), as well as a musical setting by Anna Amalia herself of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) *Erwin und Elmira*, first performed in 1776.¹⁴² In addition, there were many concerts put on by the *Hofkapelle* that included large ensemble works such keyboard concertos and symphonies, chamber music, as well as vocal music such as Italian arias and *Lieder*. These types of concerts, a common practice in aristocratic courts, were more public events with both the aristocracy and the city's bourgeoisie in attendance.¹⁴³ The *Liebhabertheater* was created for a smaller group of non-professional citizens and nobles who put on their own performances of theater works and *Singspiel* for a select audience. The short-lived *Liebhaberkonzert* combined amateur musicians in concert with the professional musicians of *Hofkapelle*.¹⁴⁴ There is also significant evidence of many houses in Weimar hosting the more private

¹⁴² Dreise-Beckmann, 145.

¹⁴³ Reichard, Kathryn Louise, "Aspects of Weimar's Musical Life, 1775-1807" (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University 1980), 231

¹⁴⁴ Reichard, 242.

functions of *Hausmusik*, including Herder, Goethe, and of course Anna Amalia, as those described by Garve of the family society.¹⁴⁵ A smaller, more intimate audience would gather to play chamber music and sing *Lieder* together. Anna Amalia herself was known to play at the keyboard in these more intimate musical experiences.¹⁴⁶ All of these types of musical events provide a variety of experiences and interactions with the music, either as a performer or a listener.

The duchess also hosted a series of round-table discussions, much like those that would be found in the learned clubs throughout North Germany. Included were the greatest intellects of her court such as Wieland, Herder, and Goethe, who gathered in the palace of Anna Amalia to discuss important and highly intellectual topics on the arts, including those specific to music about aesthetics, taste, and the physical and psychological effects of music.¹⁴⁷ The *Liebhabetheater* would sometimes perform collaborative works that came out of these discussions, and Anna Amalia would publish essays, poems, stories, and *Lieder* by anonymous writers in the *Journal von Tiefurt*, an exclusive and handwritten newsletter that circulated from 1781-1784.¹⁴⁸ It is thought that Anna Amalia's "Gedanken" could have been written for one of these round-table sessions.¹⁴⁹

In addition to the duchess's writings on aesthetics, the *Journal von Tiefurt* can also provide insight into the topics of discussion in the round-table discussions. Included are poems, short stories, *Lieder*, and articles pertaining to topics on the arts and sciences.

¹⁴⁵ Reichard, 321, 323, 327,

¹⁴⁶ Dreise-Beckmann, 34-35.

¹⁴⁷ Dreise-Beckmann, 28-29.

¹⁴⁸ Dreise-Beckmann, 29; Jutta Heinz and Jochen Golz, publishers, *'Es ward als ein Wochenblatt zum Scherze angefangen': Das Journal von Tiefurt* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011), 11.

¹⁴⁹ Dreise-Beckmann, 94.

An example of the latter is a topic that was treated by two anonymous authors over the course of two issues titled, “First Attempt on the Question: What has the most powerful effect on the Human Soul, Painting or Music?”¹⁵⁰ The variety of topics on the arts and sciences, as well as the inclusion of different types of both prose and poetry identifies the types of activities found in these meetings and represents the ideal manner of interactions among a learned group seeking to further expand their knowledge and taste. This was achieved through the reading of poetry and plays, the singing of songs, the discussion of literature and history, as well as debates on aesthetics. The members of Anna Amalia’s “learned club” could further develop themselves in order to achieve the highest status of *Kenner/in*. This was a priority for Anna Amalia because she was witnessing what she believed to be the decline of society and culture due to a lack of morality in society. In her unique position as a duchess, perhaps she believed by forming both a morally good society at court and herself as a *Kennerin*, she could prevent the decline of culture.

Anna Amalia writes that many "decorate their heads with beautiful things," and with "arbitrariness, [they] will reason and criticize art, science, and literature, in a dictatorial tone one seeks to make [criticisms] valid from one’s pleasures."¹⁵¹ She adds that "the best and good are subject to misuse, and are misunderstood through sophistry."¹⁵² Over and over Anna Amalia concerns herself with the misuse of the arts as

¹⁵⁰ Musophilus, “Erster Versuch über die Frage: Was würkt am stärksten auf des Menschen Seele, Mahlerey oder Musik?” in *Das Journal von Tiefurt mit einer Einleitung von Bernhard Suphan*, hrsg. Eduard von der Hellen (Weimar: Verlag der Goethe-Gesellschaft, 1892), Sechstes Stück (1781): 52-57; and Anonymous, “Über die Fragen: Was würkt am stärksten auf uns, Musik oder Mahlerey, und unter welchen Umständen sind beyde geschickter auf uns zu würken? Beyde physisch und metaphysisch betrachtet,” Siebentes Stück (1781): 64-72.

¹⁵¹ “man schmückt sein Kopf mit manchem schöne Dinge; mit wilkühr, wird raisonnert critiszert über Kunst wissenschaften u Literature, in Dictatorische Ton, sucht man auf den seinen Vergnugen gelten zu machen.” Anna Amalia, DWR1 HAA VIII 150a, 56r.

¹⁵² “das Besten und Guten den misbrauch unterworfen, und durch Sophisterei misgedeutet wird.” Anna Amalia, DWR1 HAA VIII 150a, 52r.

a means to brag about one's so-called cultivation to society, even though these are empty, baseless judgments due to a general ignorance of the fundamental principles of the arts and the moral need for them. The greatest problem, she explains, is that this creates a culture "without Energy," and "without energy culture is nothing;" this leads to "a false culture that [mis]represents the world as bad and probably makes it worse."¹⁵³ Clearly Anna Amalia sees the arts, when developed on true principles and understanding, as a way towards not only personal development of morality, but also the bettering of humanity as a whole.

As a duchess, she must have had a greater interest in the cultural and moral development of humanity. Her court "entertainment" can be read as not for sheer enjoyment, or even an expression of her wealth, rather, it was a means for acquiring and spreading good taste, hence morality, in an attempt to inspire a greater value on humanity as a whole. Thus, Anna Amalia was the ideal *Kennerin* because it was in her belief structure to be: as a person of good taste and high morality, acquired through her experiences of the arts, and music in particular, she represented by example the ideal and true *Kennerin*.

From the perspective of rational aesthetics, Anna Amalia encouraged participatory performance of music in her court for the spread of culture and great taste. She promoted a culture at her court that understood the true principles of the arts so that these could be used to form a society rooted in morality. The primary purpose of the arts, according to Baumgarten, was to form a morally good soul through the perception and recognition of the beautiful. Anna Amalia took Baumgarten's principles, expanded on

¹⁵³ "Ohne Energie ist das Cultur nichts...es eine falsche Cultur die die Welt mehr schlecht u auch in wohl schlechter macht." Anna Amalia DWR1 HAA VIII 150a, 53r.

them, and created a society at court based on the original purpose of his aesthetics; therefore, the court of Weimar can be viewed as an idealistic realization of Baumgarten's principles.

4.4 Conclusion

The use of music in society was not for mere pleasure or entertainment; it served the important function of forming a morally good culture through the sharing of knowledge and *Empfindungen*. This could only be achieved in music through a participatory model of performance and discussion, in which there are no barriers among members of the society. In such an environment, a society forms shared habits, which in turn creates a unified sense of identity. The typical social experience of music was not public paid concerts, such as those in London in Paris. Rather, music was experienced in a more intimate environment, to be shared in private spaces such as the family society or learned club. The reason for this sense of privacy is the moral function of society. In order to form a morally good soul, one must learn about human nature through a close community of like-minded friends. Thus, the type of music that had the greatest influence on everyday society were those pieces published with the intention of being performed in these more private places. The music and articles in serial publications demonstrates its use in social meetings, identifies the moral function of certain genres and topics, and their contribution to the formation of North German culture.

The paired practices of solitude and society, considered in relation to North German Enlightenment aesthetics, were significant for the moral forming of an individual. By first studying the arts privately, through the solitary act of improvisation, one develops their inner *Empfindungen*, which prepares them for the experience of those

feelings in other contexts. Brought into the social realm within a participatory environment in which all members take part, music is a means for communicating *Empfindungen* and forming a unified sense of taste and culture through the shared practice music performance and discussion. Therefore, musical solitude practiced in tandem with social music making served as a means for achieving this moral balance.

The writings of Immanuel Kant at the end of the century begin to break down the metaphysical framework of rational philosophy. He no longer views the experience of *Empfindungen* as having a moral value or sensations as able to communicate sensory cognition. As a result, music was no longer considered to have the power to form a morally good soul or culture.

CHAPTER 5 CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT AND THE END OF RATIONAL AESTHETICS

5.1 Introduction

Modern constructions of the philosophical history of the Enlightenment place Kant at the apex of rational thought. While Kant was trained in the Wolffian and Baumgartian tradition, he fundamentally changed the metaphysical framework for analyzing the concepts of beauty and aesthetic judgment. Kant's was not the only voice, but it was the most influential on modern reconstructions of the Enlightenment. As Frederick Beiser explains,

for two centuries it has been the nearly unanimous verdict of Kant scholars that Kant's critique of aesthetic rationalism has been decisive. And so it has been, at least if we consider its historical influence alone.¹

An examination of those concepts that radically departed from the rational tradition demonstrates the controversial nature of his philosophy at the time. While Kant was still considered a part of the Enlightenment tradition in that he attempted to explain things according to reason, his greatest shift is in the denial of feeling as a part of the cognitive process. This fundamentally changed the metaphysical framework for understanding the experiences of pleasure and beauty, and his concept of aesthetic judgment.

5.2 Kant's Critique of Rational Aesthetics

5.2.1 The Faculty of Judgment: Pleasure, Beauty, and Perfection

Kant's controversial *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (*Critique of Judgment*) (1790) challenged basic principles of rational aesthetics, in particular the definition of aesthetic

¹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 16.

pleasure and the notion that beautiful objects could transmit truths and knowledge.² He considers as a central premise of his theory that the feelings of pleasure and pain are not a part of the cognitive process, which stands against the principle of rational thought that all mental states, including the feeling of pleasure, are representative of something.³

Frederick Beiser summarizes the resulting repercussions of Kant's analysis as follows:

the aesthetic judgment is only subjective; that beauty is not an attribute of objects; that the rationalists search for principles of taste is pointless; that the concept of perfection plays no role in pure aesthetic judgments.⁴

Each of these statements stands in direct opposition to rational aesthetic theory, which is mostly due to his change in the metaphysical framework of his philosophy. Rather than recognizing a single cognitive process that begins with a sensation of the object and leads to understanding, as discussed of the Wolffian model (see Chapter 1.4), or parallel lower and upper cognitive processes like that of Baumgarten (see Chapter 1.5), Kant recognizes three faculties: cognitive, which leads to understanding; the feeling of pleasure and pain, which allows for judgment; and the faculty of desire, which is based in reason.⁵ In this construction, feeling cannot lead to understanding because it is part of a different cognitive process. Furthermore, Kant defines pleasure, the beautiful, and perfection as three mutually-exclusive concepts.

Kant claims two arguments against rational approaches to aesthetic judgments.

First, he denies that an object can be judged as beautiful by reasoning or its conformity to rules.⁶ This means that there can be no predetermined rules by which a beautiful work of

² Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (Berlin und Libau: bey Lagarde und Friederich, 1790). English translation consulted Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

³ Frederick Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 16.

⁴ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 16.

⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 32.

⁶ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 17.

art must be judged. Second, works of art are not judged according to conformity to concepts, but whether they can induce a free play of imagination and understanding.⁷ In his first claim, which could be understood as a challenge to rational philosophy, Kant assumes that a rational judgment of a work of art was based purely on the object itself. However, according to rational principles, the judgment was determined by the experience of pleasure of the object. Furthermore, rationalists did not believe that an objective conformity to the rules caused pleasure, but merely accounted for it.⁸ Of the second claim, Beiser suggests that while aesthetic pleasure is devoid of definite concepts, it can still be judged according to rules and standards.⁹ A further explanation of Kant's concepts of pleasure, beauty, and perfection and his account of the faculty of judgment demonstrates his departure from the Wolffian/Baumgartian model of rational aesthetics.

Kant considers the experience of pleasure and pain as purely subjective, but an aesthetic judgment must be intersubjective, meaning universally agreed upon by others. In order for others to agree on the judgment, there must be a concept or purpose by which the object can be judged that is measured by *a priori* principles. He created the faculty of judgment as a way to mediate the two cognitive realms, the faculty of understanding, which explains nature's conformity to law, and the faculty of desire, which is legislated by reason and the morality in the obeying of laws. Both of the faculties of understanding and desire are based in a formal purposiveness represented by *a priori* principles specified by nature.¹⁰ Purposiveness is defined as the conformity of an object to an end.¹¹ The faculty of judgment is also based in *a priori* principles; however, the experience of

⁷ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 17.

⁸ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 17.

⁹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 17.

¹⁰ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction V, 16-21.

¹¹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 18.

an aesthetic representation through an object is subjective, determined in reference to the perceiving subject and not the object. The purposiveness of a judgment is not a characteristic of the object, but it is inferred through the cognition of the object.¹² The aesthetic representation of the purposiveness of the object is only possible when the representation is combined with the feeling of pleasure.¹³ Kant devises a system that begins with the experience of pleasure of an object in the subject, but the aesthetic judgment can be made only through a reflective judgment of the experience of pleasure; therefore, the judgment is of the ability of the object to bring about the subjective experience and not of the object itself.

Reflective judgment is required when a particular is given and one must seek the universal concept by which it should be judged.¹⁴ In the process of seeking the universal, one goes into a subjective state of mind in which there is a free play of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding. This free play is originally brought on by the subjective experience of pleasure in the object.¹⁵ The judgment of taste is made from reflection on the free play of the cognitive faculties. If the feeling of pleasure is attributed to this free play, then the pleasure can also be felt in others, thus it has an intersubjective validity.¹⁶ The universality of the judgment is based on whether the object can bring forth the free play of cognitive states, which is initiated by the experience of pleasure in the object and is not a judgment of the object itself. Finally, when the judgment of the object

¹² Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction VII, 23-24.

¹³ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction VII, 24-25.

¹⁴ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction IV, 15-16.

¹⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §9, 48-49.

¹⁶ Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7-8.

is determined to be intersubjectively valid, the object is considered beautiful, and the faculty of judgment is called taste.¹⁷

Kant's explanation of the judgment of taste may begin with the object, but the judgment itself is based on a cognitive analysis of the experience of pleasure. The faculty of judgment determines whether the object fulfills the purposiveness of nature, which is based in *a priori* principles, in bringing forth a cognitive free play of imagination and understanding. The defining of the beautiful is therefore based on whether these objects can universally bring forth this free play in others. This is a stark contrast from rational theory, which posits that the beautiful is the intuition of perfection, or unity in diversity. Kant specifically writes that the judgment of taste is independent of the concept of perfection.¹⁸

Perfection is defined by Kant as an intrinsic objective purposiveness. It is objective, meaning the purposiveness is in the object and not the subject, and it is intrinsic, because the object is achieving an end internally within itself and not for some external purpose.¹⁹ In order to judge the internal objective purposiveness of the thing there must be an internal concept that is the ground of the object.²⁰ On the other hand, the judgment of taste is aesthetic, based first on subjective grounds. Kant writes that "beauty, therefore, as a formal subjective purposiveness, involves no thought whatsoever on the perfection of the object."²¹ Furthermore, an aesthetic judgment

affords absolutely no (not even a confused) knowledge of the object. It is only through logical judgment that we get knowledge. The aesthetic judgment, on the other hand, refers to the representation, by which an

¹⁷ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction VII, 26-27.

¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §15, 57.

¹⁹ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 18.

²⁰ Kant *Critique of Judgment*, §15, 58.

²¹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §15, 59.

object is given, solely to the subject, and brings to our notice no character of the object...²²

Therefore, Kant's formulation of perfection has nothing to do with the beautiful because the two concepts are judged on different grounds.

The foundation of all of Kant's concepts stands in opposition to rational aesthetics on several levels. First, he separates the experience of pleasure in an object from the beautiful and the morally good. Pleasure is the subjective response to an object, whereas the beauty of an object must be proven to be universally held, which has no relation to its perfection. Therefore, pleasure is known only through experience, the beautiful can be known through cognitive faculties, which is separate from the concept of pleasure, and neither can be understood as perfection. In addition, he not only denounces the notion that an aesthetic judgment can transmit knowledge of the object itself, but also makes no claim in its ability to transmit moral cognition through confused representations, which is the final purpose of rational aesthetics. Finally, his insistence that reflective judgment is the interplay of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding is contradictory the rational formulation of the aesthetic state being in the realm of the lower cognitive faculties based in feeling. Kant's account of the beautiful, perfection, and the faculty of judgment completely breaks down the rational framework of the aesthetic experience and the moral function of taste, and thus marks a schism in North German aesthetics.

Kant believed he was solving a problem of rational judgment. He determined that rational thought placed the judgment solely on the object and did not take into account the subjective experience; however, as discussed previously, Mendelssohn confirms the perceiving subject as integral to the experience of the beautiful (see Chapter 2.2.3).

²² Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §15, 59.

Furthermore, the rationalists did not necessarily view Kant's concerns about taste as a problem. They deemed that the universality of taste could be explained according to the monadological metaphysics of pre-established harmony.²³ While the rationalists recognized that each individual may perceive a different representation of an object, and thus create unique aesthetic responses, they are unified through a divine, pre-established harmony of the monads, meaning they were in agreement as different views of the same perfection.²⁴

Since Kant no longer considers the experience of pleasure as having the capacity to lead to the morally good, he determines a completely different conception of the arts. His definition of the *schönen Künste* is at times contradictory to the rational aesthetics before him, particularly in his rejection of its ability to convey sensory cognition and the relationships between the beautiful, perfection, and the experience of the work of art.

5.2.2 Kant and the *schönen Künste*

While there are some principles in common between rational and Kantian aesthetics, the point where they depart has a significant impact on the defining of the beautiful arts and the aesthetic experience of them. Kant's rejection of knowledge through experience means that a judgment must come from *a priori* principles. The same distrust of empirical knowledge leads him to an Aristotelian principle of the beautiful arts that emphasizes a combination of form and content in creating an aesthetic idea.

Kant's basic definition of the beautiful arts does not contrast with that of the rationalists. He recognizes three distinctions in the identification of something as an artwork. This first is that art, unlike nature, is produced through the freedom and work of

²³ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 6.

²⁴ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 6.

an individual. Second, art is a practical human skill, as opposed to science, which emphasizes theoretical knowledge. Finally, the basic requirement of art is that it is free and not a handicraft, meaning it is not considered a functional device created through labor. Kant explains that free art has a spirit, which gives life to a work of art.²⁵ On these three points in defining art a rationalist would likely not disagree.

Both Kant and the rationalists also find agreement on the distinction between what is pleasurable and what is truly considered a beautiful art. Sulzer wrote that to designate the term beautiful arts to works that were meant simply to please or amuse is degrading.²⁶ Kant also defines a lower degree of art that is merely pleasing and felt only as sensations.²⁷ The philosophies differ in the defining of the beautiful artwork.

According to Sulzer, a sensory object as a work of art that is pleasing can lead to the feeling of the beautiful. By directing one's attention of the sensation internally, impressions are created inside the perceiver, which arouses a feeling within and effects a change in the individual (see Chapter 2.3.1). The feeling of the beautiful, as experienced from the work of art, is the feeling of the morally good. All of this process occurs within lower cognitive states and is grounded in the feeling of sensations in the body. Kant, however, distinguishes between the experience of the beautiful of nature on the one hand, and of art on the other.

In direct contradiction to Sulzer, Kant explains that "the interest in the beautiful of art...gives no evidence at all of a habit of mind attached to the morally good. But, on the other hand, I do maintain that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature...is

²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §43, 132-134.

²⁶ Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 122.

²⁷ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §44, 134.

always a mark of a good soul.”²⁸ It is nature, not art that can convey the morally good, and this because of how the two are experienced. One finds beauty in the form of nature and in its mere existence without any concern for a final purpose.²⁹ For the rationalists, all things determined to be beautiful are a representation of nature as a perfection; therefore, the experience of the beautiful in nature and the beautiful in art are one in the same.

As discussed above, Kant defines the experience of the beautiful arts as a free play of the imagination and understanding. The free play is a result of a cognitive process created by the union of the form and content of the work at hand.³⁰ Kant explains that all beautiful arts have a concept it intends to portray. The form of the work is the vehicle for communicating that concept, and the presentation of the content gives the work its spirit (*Geist*). It is a play between the rational idea, presented as the theme of the work, and the provided imagery, which is its content. The imagery instigates further related images in the imagination of the perceiver. The aesthetic idea occurs in the combining and relating of a rational idea within the active imagination of an individual.³¹ Kant explains that the end result of this process is an expression of an aesthetically expanded concept that exceeds the content of a determinate concept.³² This means that the artwork, through the combination of the rational idea and the imagination, has the unique ability to depict a far greater idea than a determinate, closed concept.³³ Thus, as with the faculty of judgment, the aesthetic experience is one rooted a higher cognitive process. While one may

²⁸ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §42, 128.

²⁹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §42.

³⁰ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 356.

³¹ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 358.

³² Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 359.

³³ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 359.

experience pleasure in the sensations aroused by the beautiful artwork, those sensations play no role in the perception of its beauty.

According to Kant, only a genius is capable of producing works of beautiful art. Sulzer also states that a truly original work can only be created by the genius. In addition, both Sulzer and Kant agree that the genius possesses a special innate quality that allows them to produce beautiful artworks. Sulzer locates the genius within the basic force (*Grundkraft*) of soul, which is its foundational substance; Kant, on the other hand, identifies a predisposition of the mind (*Gemüthsanlage, Ingenium*) that gives rules to the art.³⁴ By locating the genius within the soul, Sulzer recalls the Leibnizian theory of the monad. The entire universe, including God as the primary monad, is connected through a system of monads. Therefore, the genius, with a stronger, innate *Grundkraft* of the soul, has a greater connection to the powers of God and the universe, which informs all of his activities (see Chapter 1.3). Kant's concept of the genius emphasizes the ability of the intellect, which allows him to inherently know the rules of art, which are based in nature. While Kant's genius also gives him access to special knowledge of the universe through nature, this knowledge is intellectually known. The genius according to Sulzer, on the other hand, enables one to know things both through the intellect and the senses. This distinction is not surprising, since Kant does not recognize sensations as a means for acquiring knowledge. This can be further observed in a comparison of Kant's and Sulzer's descriptions of the artistic process of the genius.

³⁴ In the original German he uses the word *Gemüthsanlage* after which he places *ingenium* in parenthesis. Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, §46, 179.

As discussed previously, Sulzer explains that an artistic genius has an active force of the soul that makes it “easier to feel within oneself” giving one “a greater *sensibilité*.”³⁵ Furthermore, he is “master of the power of his soul (*Seelenkräfte*), knows and feels more sharply than others, and therefore, his ideas (*Vorstellungen*) and feelings (*Empfindungen*) are more in his power” (see Chapter 2.4.3).³⁶ Sulzer emphasizes the ability to experience both feelings and rational ideas. These two diametrically opposed concepts form the paired creative means of inspiration and invention. The former uses the powers of feeling to discover truths through sensory perceptions; the latter engages the intellect, a higher cognitive power, to discover ideas. Nowhere in his explanation of the work of a genius does Kant describe an inspired state. Alternatively, Kant explains that the genius uses his intellectual powers to make rational ideas sensitive.³⁷ Therefore, the artistic genius uses cognitive faculties to create the form and content of the work of art.

The form, writes Kant, is the means by which a concept is universally communicated. It is not created through inspiration in a free swing of the powers of the mind, but through “a slow and even painful process of improvement.”³⁸ An artist uses taste to determine the form, but taste is not a productive faculty. The imagination is the productive faculty of cognition, which aids the artist in determining the content of the work. The imagination approximates a presentation of rational ideas, which are intellectual ideas, in order to make them sensible.³⁹ No concept, explains Kant, can be completely represented through internal intuitions, such as rational ideas of invisible

³⁵ “L’effet immédiat de cette intensité de la force active de l’âme, est une plus grande sensibilité.” Sulzer “Analyse,” 395.

³⁶ Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, “Genie,” v. 2, 362.

³⁷ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §49, 143.

³⁸ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §48, 141.

³⁹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §49, 143.

things, like heaven and hell. For this reason, the artist must at times use his imagination to transgress the limits of experience in order to present the rational idea. The faculty of aesthetic ideas is also a learned one, which requires talent.⁴⁰ Therefore, for Kant, the genius possesses both an innate knowledge of the rules of art that allows one to properly combine form and content in creating the aesthetic idea, as well as the learned skills of the faculties needed for the creation itself. Nothing is discovered through sense perception, but through faculties of reason, thus using only the powers of the mind.

Another distinction between Sulzer's and Kant's theories of the beautiful arts is in the relation of the feeling of pleasure and of the beautiful. For Sulzer, a pleasant feeling aroused by a beautiful artwork can lead to a moral one if the object is beautiful and the perceiver has taste. There is a direct relation between the feeling of pleasure and the beautiful, and the ultimate result of this process is the acquisition of sensory cognition. At the basis of this experience are *Empfindungen*, which are felt in the realm of the lower cognitive states. No knowledge can be learned through artworks according to Kant's theory, and the feeling of pleasure and pain is inconsequential to the experience of a beautiful artwork. One can take pleasure in an artwork, but a beautiful work of art is one that creates a free play between the cognitive states of imagination and reason. In both cases, an object that is pleasant is not necessarily beautiful, but for Sulzer, the pleasant is the first level of feeling leading to the beautiful, whereas for Kant, the faculty for experiencing the pleasant is wholly different from that which judges the beauty. Furthermore, for Sulzer, one need not know a reason for a work of art, nor have any upper cognitive experience of it in order to feel its moral worth. Kant, on the other hand, only recognizes the beautiful if the work brings about a free play between the imagination

⁴⁰ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §49, 143.

and reason that is universal for all, and this process does not lead to a moral feeling or knowledge of anything other than itself.

While the framework for each of their arguments may seem similar, by eliminating the experience of the lower cognitive states from the faculty of judgment Kant's philosophy fundamentally changes the way one perceives and judges the beautiful in artworks. His distrust of knowledge gained through experience means that works of art cannot communicate knowledge, or cognition, through the senses, and aesthetics objects cannot have a moral worth. In his categorizing the beautiful arts, Kant sees limits on the presentation of aesthetic ideas in music.

5.2.3 Kant, Music, and a Hierarchy of the Arts

Kant chooses to classify the arts according to the mode of expression, although he admits that other classifications are possible. The first class is word, which is represented through speech and the arts of rhetoric and poetry. The second is gesture, a formative mode used in the arts of sculpture and painting. Finally, the expressive mode of tone is a beautiful play of sensations, as is found in music and the art of color.⁴¹ The most significant for this study is in his definition of the experience of music. By beautiful play of sensations, Kant means those sensations that arise from external stimulation. He explains that when the sensations are at play they can communicate something universal, but this is only concerning "the proportion of the different degrees of attunement (tension) in the sense to which the sensation belongs."⁴² In the case of music this refers to the sense of hearing. The difficulty with the senses of hearing and sight is that they cause a secondary sensation that cannot be firmly identified as either a sensation or a reflection.

⁴¹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §51, 149-152.

⁴² Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §51, 152-153.

This difficulty means that one cannot discern whether the sensation is merely agreeable or beautiful.⁴³ In addition, one does not take into consideration the experience of the sensations over time into the judgment of music; this is, in combination with the sound itself, merely a part of the experience of the agreeable. The play of sensations one experiences in music is therefore not the beautiful, because sensations only fall into the realm of the agreeable.⁴⁴ Kant's definition of the beautiful requires a cognitive interaction between the imagination and understanding and does not involve the experience of sensations. As Herman Parret recognizes, Kant seems indecisive in whether the experience of music should be considered only agreeable or if it has the power to be beautiful, and for that reason Kant devalues music in his hierarchy of the arts.⁴⁵ Music, unlike the other arts, does not involve the mind and it cannot be based on a concept; therefore, for Kant, this art has less value.

Kant provides two manners of creating his hierarchy of the arts. The first is according its ability to create aesthetic ideas, and the second is based on its cultural value. In the first ordering, the ability of the art to create aesthetic ideas, he considers poetry the highest of the arts because "it expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination," and has a "boundless multiplicity of possible forms in accordance with a given concept."⁴⁶ Taken together, these two characteristics of poetry can be combined to create a "wealth of thought to which no verbal expression is completely adequate, and by thus rising aesthetically to ideas."⁴⁷ This assessment means that poetry can, through the

⁴³ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §51, 153.

⁴⁴ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §51, 153.

⁴⁵ Herman Parret, "Kant on Music and the Hierarchy of the Arts," in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 56 (Summer 1998), 254.

⁴⁶ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §53, 155.

⁴⁷ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §53, 155.

combination of its form and concept, create an aesthetic experience of an idea that goes beyond what can be portrayed of a determinate concept, thereby creating a free play of the imagination and understanding, which allows for the judgment of the beautiful.

Music, if charm and the capacity to move the mind are taken into account, is placed second according to hierarchical organization of the arts by Kant. Although music is based in sensations and not concepts, it still has the ability to move the mind. The mind is moved, however, without cognitive thought, so it is considered merely an enjoyment and has little value on the judgment of reason.⁴⁸ Kant views music as unable to express concepts of determinate thoughts, but also acknowledges it as a language of affects that can communicate that which is inexpressible.⁴⁹ The aesthetic ideas of music are presented through the arrangement of melody and harmony, which represent the affect of the piece.⁵⁰

While the ability to communicate the inexpressible is an asset according to this ordering, Kant considers it a detriment to a hierarchy determined by the cultural value of art. Music has the least cultural value and influence on the faculty of judgment, according to Kant. All of the other arts carry “serious business” because they put into play the imagination and understanding, and thus promote the development of the higher faculties of cognition.⁵¹ Music is too volatile, lacking any sophistication required for serious culture, writes Kant.⁵² Since music only communicates sensations, it gives fleeting impressions that either vanish entirely or are involuntarily recalled in the imagination.

⁴⁸ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §53, 156-157.

⁴⁹ Parret, 255.

⁵⁰ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §53, 157.

⁵¹ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §53, 158.

⁵² Parret, 255.

These impressions can be “more oppressive to us than agreeable,” he explains.⁵³ Therefore, the experience of music is an agreeable one, based in the pleasurable sensations of the body, but because it does not involve the intellect, it has a low cultural value.⁵⁴ In addition, the combining of arts into a single art form does not necessarily make it more beautiful, according to Kant.⁵⁵ He explains that, on the contrary, the combination of multiple art forms, such as in opera, leads only to a greater abundance of pleasure and enjoyment and leaves nothing for judgment.⁵⁶

Many of Kant’s devaluations of music are in direct opposition to the writings of rational philosophers, who attribute the high value of music to its ability to communicate the inexpressible. Rational aesthetics is not concerned with the ability to communicate determinate concepts, which is an essential characteristic of judgment in Kant’s aesthetic plan. Music is valued highly by Junker because the sense of hearing, a noble sense, is able to more closely touch the soul and arouse a moral feeling (see Chapter 2.3.2). Furthermore, Kant finds the consideration of the temporality of music a hindrance, calling it transitory and therefore not durable. For Junker, it is exactly this characteristic that provides music with the most power of all of the arts. The experience of time instilled the aesthetic experience with a great richness because the mind could be supplied with an ever vivid and changing imaginative response. Finally, Sulzer considers the combination of text with expressive music as the highest art form because it can portray something more complex than is possible through a single type of art alone. Opera especially, Sulzer writes, has the highest potential for moving the mind and the

⁵³ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §53, 158.

⁵⁴ Parret, 256.

⁵⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §52, 154-155.

⁵⁶ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §52, 154.

heart through the poetry, music, acting, dance, painting, etc. because it can join together the philosophical insights of all of the creators.⁵⁷

Kant did not find cultural value in the arts because it cannot express a determinate concept, and no art is able to express a moral value. Thus music is, for Kant, mere pleasure. Moments of beauty that occur in music cannot be clearly distinguished, so he considered its status as a beautiful art a tentative one. With a shift in the metaphysical framework by Kant and others, the tradition of rational aesthetics begins to breakdown, though not without an attempt to win back rational thought before its final demise.

5.3 The Demise of Rational Aesthetics

Rational philosophers were fighting for the validity of their claims throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, mostly against competing philosophies. One of the greatest defenders of rational philosophy, Moses Mendelssohn, was defending rational thought in works such as *Über die Empfindungen* and *Rhapsodie* as previously discussed (see Chapter 2.2.3). Mendelssohn died before Kant's *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, therefore his opinions on Kant's concepts of the beautiful and perfection cannot be known. The most prolific and strongest opponent of Kant was Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Herder is one of the final rationalists that still found valid Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, which is consistently found evident in his writings throughout the second half of the century. His three-volume *Kalligone* (1800) was written as a direct criticism of the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, and may represent the final word on rational aesthetics.

⁵⁷ Sulzer, "Von der Kraft," 144.

5.3.1 Herder's Defense against Kant

Herder was a Baumgartian, though considered a radical successor, and believed in a naturalism, to which Kant was opposed.⁵⁸ Herder believed that everything can be explained through nature and that sensations are important in discovery of truths. In the last decade of the 18th century, he was strongly defending his views of aesthetics against the growing predominance of Kantian influence in his writings, and in 1800 he wrote his *Kalligone* as a criticism of the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*.⁵⁹ Among the main criticisms that he addressed in the work are Kant's conceptions of beauty, the sublime, and most importantly, the role of morality in the arts.⁶⁰ Herder interpreted Kant's idea of disinterested pleasure as removing the acquisition of knowledge and truth from the definition of the aesthetic experience.⁶¹ This stands against the foundational principles of the Baumgartian model of aesthetics, by which Herder was greatly influenced.

One of Herder's primary criticisms of Kant is of his methodology. Herder's own methodology can be seen in one of his earliest writings on aesthetic theory, *Kritische Wälder: Viertes Wäldchen*, written in 1769 and published posthumously.⁶² The theories Herder lays out in this work, explained through a criticism of Friedrich Justus Riedel's (1742-1785) *Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (1767), can demonstrate the reason for why he stood so firmly against Kant's analysis of judgment and theory of

⁵⁸ Beiser, *Diotima's Children*, 155.

⁵⁹ Johann Gottfried Herder, *Kalligone* (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknock, 1800).

⁶⁰ Steven Martinson, "Herder's Life and Works," in *A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried Herder*, edited by Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 37.

⁶¹ Paul Guyer, "Free Play and True Well-Being: Herder's Critique of Kant's Aesthetics," in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65 (2007): 353-368, 357.

⁶² First published in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Johann Gottfried Herders Lebensbild*, ed. Emil Gottfried Herder (Erlangen, 1846), 1:217-520; modern edition consulted Herder, "Critical Forests: Fourth Grove, on Riedel's *Theory of the Beaux Arts*," in *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*, trans. and ed. by Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

the beautiful.⁶³ Herder accuses Riedel of beginning first with arbitrary concepts that have arbitrary rules, which he finds too abstract. In contrast, Herder's method begins with examining the object through experience and determining concepts from them.⁶⁴ He finds the same problem in Kant's methodology, which "come about *a priori* from a supposedly empty spot; a play of wit and acuity that is purposelessly-purposive and purposively-purposeless."⁶⁵ Playing with Kant's own terminology, Herder acknowledges a methodology based first on concepts rather than on experience as empty with little means for uncovering any theory.

In the *Viertes Wäldchen* Herder demonstrates the process of acquiring taste through the experience of sensations, which is based on the Wolffian model.⁶⁶ Just as with his methodology, Herder bases the acquisition of taste first on experience, which, in turn, develops into principles. Therefore, he recognizes in this process a direct connection between the mind and body, which Kant rejects in his explanation of the faculty of judgment. According to Herder, through the process of experiencing sensation one gains the capacity to experience and judge the beautiful. In his model, the mind and body are connected in acquiring knowledge and the capacity to judge; on the other hand, Kant emphasizes a dualism, in which the mind and body are separated. Herder writes that the sensuous powers of the soul are felt with the greatest intensity, and the obscure ideas of

⁶³ Friedrich Just Riedel, *Theorie der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (Jena: bey Christian Heinrich Cuno, 1767).

⁶⁴ Herder, "Critical Forests," 188.

⁶⁵ Quoted in translation in Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 357 of Johann Gottfried Herder, *Kalligone*, in *Werke*, ed. Günter Arnold et. al., vol. 8 of *Schriften zu Literatur und Philosophie 1792-1800*, ed. Hans Dietrich Irmscher (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1988), 747-748.

⁶⁶ First published in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Johann Gottfried Herders Lebensbild*, ed. Emil Gottfried Herder (Erlangen, 1846), 1:217-520; modern edition consulted "Critical Forests: Fourth Grove, on Riedel's *Theory of the Beaux Arts*," in *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*, trans. and ed. by Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 206).

sensations are the ground of the soul.⁶⁷ His description of the process of acquiring knowledge and judgment is told through the experience of infancy and childhood.

Herder writes that as infants, during the stage of vegetative feeling with no sentiment, one only receives sensations, which, through repetition, develops in a judgment. Through the external influence of sensations, one develops their internal feeling. A judgment originates as a habit, and the habit is preserved in its application. Through this process, the origin of the feeling becomes obscure, and only content remains, which becomes the sensation.⁶⁸ The sum of these sensations is the basis for all objective certainty; as the soul develops through obtaining, comparing, and ordering ideas, it learns to intuit the good and pleasure of the thing. Through this process the concepts of order, conformity, perfection, and beauty as sensuous perfection are also acquired.⁶⁹ Taste is a habitual application of the judgments of the beautiful. It is not, as Kant determines, a fundamental faculty of the soul.⁷⁰ Everyone is born with the ability to perceive the beautiful, explains Herder, though with different degrees and inclinations so that each person will develop a unique sense of taste.⁷¹ Therefore, “taste is as varied as human sensibility,” and the feeling of beauty is inborn in the capacity of the organs to perceive sensuous perfection.⁷² This also means that there is an infinite diversity in the judgments of the beautiful.⁷³ In addition, through the inner feeling of sensuous perfection, which begins as an impression or sensation, individuals can develop their powers of cognition. Through force of habit, these sensations form the basis of their moral

⁶⁷ Herder, “Critical Forests,” 192.

⁶⁸ Herder, “Critical Forests,” 194.

⁶⁹ Herder, “Critical Forests,” 195.

⁷⁰ Herder, “Critical Forests,” 199.

⁷¹ Herder, “Critical Forests,” 193, 200.

⁷² Herder, “Critical Forests,” 197.

⁷³ Herder, “Critical Forests,” 199.

principles and judgments.⁷⁴ This action also aids in the forming of the *sensus communis* (common sense), a state of mind between clear and distinct ideas in which one learns right and wrong. Common sense is developed and practiced through the habitual judgments of objects.⁷⁵ Therefore, concepts of perfection, beauty, and taste are bound up with moral principles through the experience of sensations.

Herder's explanation of the connection of sensations to the development and recognition of the beautiful stands in opposition to Kant's, who bases judgments of the beautiful on the supersensible. In the preface to *Kalligone*, Herder criticizes Kant for his transcendental approach to aesthetics. He rejects Kant's definition of the experience of the beautiful as supersensible and writes that "the correspondence of objects without powers, the harmony of our power with objects, do not refer us beyond but keeps us firmly within the boundaries of nature; and where is the moral in this supersensible-arrogant feeling?"⁷⁶ The criticism of the moral feeling shows that Herder connects the sensory feeling of the object to the feeling of the morally good. Furthermore, he writes that "beauty is the subjective response to the perception of an object of harmony." This principle demonstrates that the feeling of the beautiful and morally good is in the relation of the object to the soul, a theory that both Mendelssohn and Sulzer upheld.

Herder's conception of the aesthetic experience also leads him to reject Kant's notions of disinterested pleasure and free play. An individual's interest in the beautiful, he explains in *Kalligone*, is in the interest of life itself. Herder does not see distinctions between the agreeable, good, and beautiful as is found in the theories of Kant. Instead he

⁷⁴ Herder, "Critical Forests," 197-199.

⁷⁵ Herder, "Critical Forests," 181.

⁷⁶ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 357; translation of Herder, *Kalligone*, 954-955 in Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 358.

views the experience of the beautiful as leading to the perception of the morally good.⁷⁷ In relation to Kant's concept of free play, Herder does not separate the experiences of pleasure and the beautiful; therefore, an object that is beautiful is accompanied by the feeling of its pleasure.⁷⁸ He adds "that something could please without a concept, and indeed pleases universally, is contrary to nature and experience."⁷⁹ The concept is the substance, or the essence, of the thing, and truth is in the ground of everything agreeable or disagreeable.⁸⁰ Therefore, through the experience of the object one feels pleasure, can sense its beauty, and learn truths through its concept. This is the aesthetic experience as Herder describes it in the *Viertes Waldchen*. In contrast, because Kant does not recognize determinate concepts in artworks, the experience of an object does not lead to truths.

Herder also criticizes Kant's division of the arts. In the *Viertes Waldchen*, he creates his own divisions according to their sensory experience, which he calls the "gateways to aesthetics."⁸¹ The three gateways are sight, hearing, and touch, which lead to three classes of objects according to space. Sight is the perception of things alongside one another, which are surfaces; hearing is of things in succession, which are tones; and touch is the perception of depth, which constitutes bodies. Surfaces correspond to the art of painting, tones to music, and depth to sculpture.⁸² Each has its own distinct sense of beauty, which Herder then treats to a detailed examination according to the experience of the object, following his established methodology.⁸³ As discussed above, Kant chooses to categorize the arts based on the mode of expression (word, gesture, and tone) and does

⁷⁷ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 359.

⁷⁸ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 361.

⁷⁹ Translation of Herder, *Kalligone*, 688 in Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 361.

⁸⁰ Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 361.

⁸¹ Herder, "Critical Forests, 204.

⁸² Herder, "Critical Forests, 216.

⁸³ Herder, "Critical Forests, 204-260.

not take sensation into his formulation. Kant's classification "throws us back into old chaos," according to Herder, and tells nothing of the essence of the type of art.⁸⁴ The basis for Kant's division of the arts, i.e. his lack of dependence on sensations, also informed his devaluation of music, a consideration to which Herder also strongly opposed.

5.3.2 Herder's Defense of Music

Herder's writings before *Kalligone* show that he not only believed in the moral value of sensations, but also that music was the greatest at touching the heart and producing an effective change in an individual. In his essay, "Ob Mahlerey oder Tonkunst eine größere Wirkung gewähre? Ein Götterspräch" ("Does Painting or Music Have a Greater Effect: A Divine Colloquy"), Herder attempts to determine which of the two arts has the greater effect on the human soul.⁸⁵ He does this through a conversation between the Muses, each of the two defending their art with interventions by Poetry and Apollo. Herder's description of music shows his emphasis on the experience of sensations in the ability for a perceiver to receive its effects, placing his aesthetics in line with those of the pre-Kantian rationalists. In the end, the Muses finally agree that painting and music operate in different ways: painting effects the understanding, while music has its greatest impact on the heart.⁸⁶ This is determined by Music's characterization of the aesthetic experience of music.

⁸⁴ Translation of Herder, *Kalligone*, 939 in Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 359.

⁸⁵ Johann Gottfried Herder, "Ob Mahlerey oder Tonkunst eine größere Wirkung gewähre? Ein Götterspräch," in *Zerstreute Blätter*, Erste Sammlung (Gotha: Carl Wilhelm Ettinger, 1785), 133-164. Translated and consulted Herder, "Does Painting or Music have a Greater Effect? A Divine Colloquy," in *Selected Writings on Aesthetics*, trans. and ed. by Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 347.

⁸⁶ Herder, "Does Painting or Music," 356.

The experience of music is more inward, capable of immediately affecting the heart, Herder explains. Painting, on the other hand, is only able to depict the external aspects of an object, therefore can only have a modest effect.⁸⁷ This great effect on the heart is through sensations. Music says to Painting “to see is not to be moved, and the clearest and most enduring cognition is not sensation.”⁸⁸ Painting affects the understanding more than the heart, according to Poetry, because it is providing a clearer representation, whereas music is a sensual arousal through obscure representations.⁸⁹ Apollo concludes the argument by stating that these two arts operate in different ways. They are both able to affect the human soul, yet in contrasting manners—painting through understanding and music through the heart.⁹⁰ Herder sees value in both arts, which ultimately means that engaging both the intellect and heart, or understanding and sensations, are equally important. Although it is not explicitly stated, he implies that truths can be perceived through both the mind and the senses, since both experiences can affect the human soul. Herder’s allegory confirms his stance on Baumgartian principles of aesthetics and the need for one to have developed both the faculty of the intellect and of sensations.

As discussed above, Kant considered two means for arranging a hierarchy of the arts. In the first, according to type of aesthetic ideas, music is ranked second because of its ability to express the inexpressible. However, according to its contribution to culture, music has the least value. Herder addresses many of Kant’s claims against music directly,

⁸⁷ Herder, “Does Painting or Music,” 347.

⁸⁸ Herder, “Does Painting or Music,” 348.

⁸⁹ Herder, “Does Painting or Music,” 351.

⁹⁰ Herder, “Does Painting or Music,” 355-356.

particularly the communicability of sensations and its value for culture in his chapter dedicated to the topic in *Kalligone*.

One of Herder's foremost criticisms is Kant's claim that the sensations of music are externally produced. Herder explains that sensations are not external, but occur internally. What is outside is tonal sonority, which excites harmonically and melodically those that are susceptible those sounds.⁹¹ The organ of hearing "reaches most deeply into the interior of the head, approaching first of all his perceptive organ of common sense, and spreads out in such a way that, as experiments reveal, we hear almost everything with our whole body."⁹² Herder calls the feeling of sounds throughout the entire mind and body a harmonious motion.⁹³ Furthermore, contrary to Kant's philosophy, music surpasses the other arts in its ability to communicate that which is not communicable.⁹⁴ Music belongs to the realm of reverence, which "has all the feelings at its disposal."⁹⁵ Herder places music above words and gestures because it is only tones left in the feeling.⁹⁶ Therefore, Herder believes that through sensation, music has the greatest power of communication.

Herder also finds false Kant's notions that music "merely plays with sensations," are transitory, and its involuntary repetition as burdensome rather than pleasing.⁹⁷ He considers these opinions true in only two circumstances: when the music is extremely

⁹¹ Herder, "Kalligone (1800) Part II Section 2 Chapter IV On Music" in *Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader*, v. II The Nineteenth Century, ed. by Edward A. Lippman (Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1988), §5, 35.

⁹² Herder, "On Music," §2, 34.

⁹³ Herder, "On Music," §6, 35-36.

⁹⁴ Herder, "On Music," §15, 40.

⁹⁵ Herder, "On Music," §12, 38.

⁹⁶ Herder, "On Music," §15, 40.

⁹⁷ Herder, "On Music," 42-43.

bad, or if one has a toneless heart and hears only a play of sensations.⁹⁸ In other words, music that is perceived as beautiful by someone with a developed taste for music is neither a mere play of sensations, nor considered burdensome when repeated in the imagination.

As a final disagreement with Kant, Herder considers the evaluation of music in the lowest rank in regards to its impact on culture. Of this, Herder writes:

If one was to gather together without all the fables the effects that tones and songs have produced on the human heart individually and in families, groups, and nations, a series of tales of wonder would raise music from the lowest position in which it was placed high aloft also in respect of the *culture of mankind*.⁹⁹

What Kant denies of music, its ability to communicate through sensations, Herder attempts to salvage. Kant never acknowledged that one could gain knowledge through experience, and since music could not communicate distinct concepts, he ranked it as the lowest of the arts. Herder believed that music could communicate moral truths through sensations; however, as the last *Aufklärer*, both his and Kant's views would be surpassed by the first generation of *Romantiker*, who lost faith in the authority and critical methodology of reason.

5.3.3 What is Enlightenment?

Both Kant and Mendelssohn wrote essays to be published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* as a response to the question posed by the journal's editor, Johann Friedrich Zöllner (1753-1804).¹⁰⁰ In a footnote Zöllner asks:

⁹⁸ Herder, "On Music," 42-43.

⁹⁹ Herder, "On Music," 42. Italics given.

¹⁰⁰ Johann Friedrich Zöllner, "Ist es rathsam, das Ehebündniß nicht ferner durch die Religion zu sanciren?" in *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Bd. 2, hrsg. F. Gedike und J.E. Biester (Berlin: Bei Haude und Spener, 1783): 508-517.

What is Enlightenment? This question, that is almost as important as what is Truth, should really be well-answered before one begins to enlighten! And still I have not found it answered anywhere!¹⁰¹

Mendelssohn's initial response was in a lecture given in May 1784, which was then turned into an essay and published in the following September.¹⁰² Kant's answer was issued four months later in December of the same year, though he claims he wrote it without knowledge of Mendelssohn's article.¹⁰³ Their essays came during a pivotal turning point for rational aesthetics: after Kant adopted a new metaphysics in his three critiques, but while rationalists such as Mendelssohn and Herder were still defending their position against Kant. The manner in which the two opposing philosophers approach their inquiries into defining the Enlightenment demonstrates the clear ideological break that occurred at the end of the century.

The focus of Mendelssohn's essay is on what he sees as the three related concepts of Enlightenment, Culture, and Education (*Bildung*). He writes that these three words are synonyms that promote the betterment of social life and "the more the social conditions of a people are brought, through art and industry, into harmony with the Destiny of Man (*Bestimmung des Menschen*), the more education this people has."¹⁰⁴ Mendelssohn frequently uses the phrase "Destiny of Man" as a motto in other writings, which he

¹⁰¹ "Was ist Aufklärung? Diese Frage, die beinahe so wichtig ist, als: was ist Wahrheit, sollte doch wol beantwortet werden, ehe man aufzuklären anfinge! Und noch habe ich sie nirgends beantwortet gefunden!" Zöllner, 516 n.

¹⁰² Mendelssohn, "Ueber die Frage: Was heißt aufklären?" in *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Bd. 4, hrsg. F. Gedike und J.E. Biester (Berlin: Bei Haude und Spener, 1784) 193-200. English translation consulted, Mendelssohn, "On the Question: What is Enlightenment," trans. by James Schmidt in *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, ed. by James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

¹⁰³ Kant, "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" in *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Bd. 4, hrsg. F. Gedike und J.E. Biester (Berlin: Bei Haude und Spener, 1784), 481-494. . English translation consulted, Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment," trans. by James Schmidt in *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, ed. by James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

¹⁰⁴ Mendelssohn, "On the Question: What is Enlightenment," 53.

borrowed from Johann Joachim Spalding.¹⁰⁵ The full motto reads “Destiny of Man: to search for truth, to love the beautiful, to will the good, to do the best.”¹⁰⁶ Used in the context of relating Enlightenment, Culture, and Education, the motto proves his continued belief in the Baumgartian principle of balancing reason with feeling (as truth and beautiful), and its greater purpose for forming not just the individual, but society as a whole.¹⁰⁷

Mendelssohn sees Culture and Enlightenment as two balanced ends of Education (*Bildung*). Culture is, on the one hand, more practical, concerning refinement, beauty in the arts, social mores, facility in the arts, etc. On the other hand, Enlightenment is theoretical, regarding rational knowledge and rational reflection on human life.¹⁰⁸ It is important to have a balance of Culture and Enlightenment in a society or it can become superficial, according to Mendelssohn. He adds, “Enlightenment is related to Culture as theory to practice, as knowledge to ethics, as criticism to virtuosity. Regarded (objectively) in and for themselves, they stand in the closest connection, although subjectively they very often are separated.”¹⁰⁹ Thus, Enlightenment and Culture represent equal but opposite ends of Education; a deficiency in either would lead to a superficial culture that does not fulfill the Destiny of Man.

Where Mendelssohn uses these three complimentary concepts, supported by both reason and experience, as the basis for an Enlightened, Cultured, and good society, Kant finds himself only limited by the constraints of society. He considers the rational as too

¹⁰⁵ James Schmidt, “What Enlightenment Was: How Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant Answered the *Berlinische Monatschrift*,” in *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 30 (1992), 82-83.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in Schmidt, 83.

¹⁰⁷ Mendelssohn, “On the Question: What is Enlightenment,” 53.

¹⁰⁸ Mendelssohn, “On the Question: What is Enlightenment,” 53-54.

¹⁰⁹ Mendelssohn, “On the Question: What is Enlightenment,” 54.

mechanistic, taking away the freedom of thought and use of reason.¹¹⁰ Kant's definition of Enlightenment is concerned with escaping the bounds of the dogma of reason that turns people into "mechanical instruments" unable to think freely.¹¹¹ His concern is only with the advancement of the individual that can go beyond the realm of society, while Mendelssohn sees Enlightenment as an aspect of society to achieve the highest destiny. Furthermore, Kant does not see the arts as playing any role in the advancement of an individual or society, thus has no concerns with the culture.

These two essays, written only a few months apart, demonstrate how wide the divide became from the original aims of rational theory through Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, to Kant's use of reason at the end of the century. This shift had its greatest impact on the arts, both in the experience thereof and its functional use in society. Therefore, the growing acceptance of Kantian theory at the end of the eighteenth century, especially in its metaphysical framework, can mark the closing boundaries of rational aesthetics.

The last decade of the eighteenth century proved to be the final demise of rational aesthetics. Herder was alone in his continued reliance on Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, and Kant's rejection of it led to a crisis in rational philosophy, which Frederick Beiser has called a challenge to the "authority of reason."¹¹² Already in the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* Kant limits the boundaries of rational aesthetics by denying the experience of sensations as having the capacity for knowledge, thus devaluing the social

¹¹⁰ Kant, "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment," 59.

¹¹¹ Schmidt, 88-90.

¹¹² Frederick Beiser, *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 1.

and moral benefits of the arts. His critical method required that everything had to be subjected to the principles of reason in order to be known. Beiser explains of this era,

if the Enlightenment was “the age of criticism,” then the last decades of the eighteenth century marked the beginning of a new age, “the age of meta-criticism.” Intellectuals began to suffer a crisis of conscious and question their own faith in the powers of criticism.¹¹³

One of the main issues leading to this crisis was Kant’s dependence on *a priori* principles of knowledge, creating a shift in the metaphysical framework. According to the Kantian model, one can only know something if it can be explained on *a priori* grounds. Since the existence of God or concepts such as immortality and other religious beliefs could not be known *a priori*, his philosophy was subject to solipsism, the idea that all that can proven as existing is the self.¹¹⁴ The rational tradition under Kantian dogmatic principles could no longer continue without Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, which had built into its system an acceptance of *a priori* knowledge of the existence of God, etc, without nihilist tendencies.¹¹⁵

The points at which rational philosophy begins to lose its hold can help identify the boundaries of Enlightenment and rational aesthetics, as well as the limits of its usefulness for modern understandings of eighteenth-century music. Kant proved that rationalism devoid of Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics could lead to nihilism, therefore marking the end of functional rational aesthetics as it was defined by Baumgarten. On the other hand, although Kant’s philosophy was extremely divergent from rational aesthetics, his formalism may have had an impact on music at the turn of the century, and therefore warrants further study. In order to define the North German Enlightenment, however, as

¹¹³ Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, 1.

¹¹⁴ Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, 2-4.

¹¹⁵ Beiser, *The Fate of Reason*, 4.

its own distinct era, it must be considered from the principles outlined by the pre-Kantian, rational philosophers.

To cite Mendelssohn, Enlightenment is a type of education that is counterbalanced with culture. Experiencing beautiful objects such as music is one way to achieve a morally good culture. Mendelssohn writes that “the language of a people is the best indicator of its education, of culture, as well as of enlightenment, in both breadth and intensity.”¹¹⁶ The language surrounding the culture of rational aesthetics was both rich and widespread; its concepts were developed in philosophy and spread to the public in journals, encyclopedias, periodicals, books, etc. Proven by the prefaces of such publications, members of the middle class knew and engaged with the language of aesthetics. Therefore, rational aesthetics can be defined by its education of culture and enlightenment, which are rooted in rational philosophy and served the purpose of forming beautiful souls within a morally good society. A more cohesive picture of the era can thus be formed by defining the period according to the forces at play at the time, and according to the criteria given by the one of the most important figures of the Enlightenment.

The outer limits of rational aesthetics must, therefore, coincide with a shift in metaphysical conceptions of aesthetics. This naturally lines up with Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* (1790), however his theories were not so readily accepted. Furthermore, considering his low valuation of the arts and music in particular, Kant’s theories likely had little impact on concepts of the arts. Instead he represents the slow breakdown of the metaphysical framework of aesthetics, which is then radically changed by the

¹¹⁶ Mendelssohn, “On the Question: What is Enlightenment,” 54.

Frühromantiker in the last years of the century, marking the true demise of rational aesthetics.

5.4 Conclusion: The Era of Rational Aesthetics

5.4.1 The Periodization of Rational Aesthetics

The era that encompasses the North German Enlightenment (ca.1750-ca.1781) has been traditionally defined in the study of music history as the pre-classical era. A consistent problem with this designation is that it is judged according to a teleological aim towards the Viennese Classical style. Therefore, this period, lying between the High Baroque and Viennese Classical styles, is often considered transitional. Typically, secondary sources describe it as either a forerunner to the High Classical style or a lingering of the High Baroque style. Using C.P.E. Bach as the generation's most prominent representative, secondary sources tend to either emphasize traces of his father's contrapuntal style or recognize precursors to the classical simplicity of Mozart and Haydn. Ultimately, the resulting analysis finds C.P.E. Bach as a transitional figure that falls in neither tradition. This teleological approach proves problematic, as it tends to be concerned only with those elements that will culminate in the High Classical style and does not consider the music of this period on its own terms.

Most of the secondary sources on the eighteenth century, following the traditional divisions of the High Baroque and Viennese Classical, are limited to a stylistic approach of this music in general. This leads to only a surface-level examination of the period, not considering the aesthetic aims of the arts. For example, in *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*, Charles Rosen describes the years 1755-1775 as a period of incoherent styles. Rosen writes that composers were either concerned with “dramatic

surprise or formal perfection” and could “rarely have both at once.”¹¹⁷ He redefines this era as a “mannerist” period due to the lack of uniformity of style, suggesting that composers were working with a highly individual manner of composition and that “no composer had sufficient command over all the elements of music for his personal style to bear the weight of a large series of works, a genuine *oeuvre*.”¹¹⁸ In addition, “the personal style, or ‘manner,’ of composers then was defined almost in a void, or, better, against a chaotic background of Baroque workmanship and tradition and half-understood classic and *galant* aspirations.”¹¹⁹ What Rosen describes as “weak” during this period is the lack of coordination between phrase rhythm, accent, and harmonic rhythm, and it is this aspect of C.P.E. Bach’s music that he defines *Empfindsamkeit* as a musical style.¹²⁰

The problem of periodizing the eighteenth century was raised by Carl Dahlhaus in his introduction to volume five of his *Neues Handbuch der Musikwissenschaft*.¹²¹ Recognizing the difficulty of presenting the music of the eighteenth century as one continuous period that is divided by the death of J.S. Bach, Dahlhaus argues that the problem lies in the emphasis on musical “heros,” which ultimately results in the “amalgamation of normative and descriptive criteria.”¹²² James Webster takes up the task of resolving the problems laid out by Dahlhaus and suggests a tripartite interpretation of the “long” eighteenth century (ca.1670 – ca.1830).¹²³ He writes that at the center of this division is a distinct period in its own right: the years 1720-1780 are unified intellectually

¹¹⁷ Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*, 44.

¹¹⁸ Rosen, 47-48.

¹¹⁹ Rosen, 48.

¹²⁰ Rosen, 48.

¹²¹ Carl Dahlhaus. “Das 18. Jahrhundert als musikgeschichtliche Epoche,” in *Die Musik des 18. Jahrhundert* (Laaber: Laaber, 1985). Translation of this essay is available as “The Eighteenth Century as a Music-Historical Epoch,” trans. by Ernest Harriss, in *College of Music Symposium* 26 (1986): 1-6.

¹²² Dahlhaus, trans. by Harriss, 5.

¹²³ James Webster, “The Eighteenth Century as a Music-Historical Period?” in *Eighteenth-Century Music* 1 (2004): 47-60.

by the Enlightenment, and aesthetically and stylistically by the ideals of neoclassicism and the galant.¹²⁴ Webster's method provides a welcomed alternative to a purely stylistic division; however, to unify the North German Enlightenment requires different aesthetical criteria. Encompassing a period according to the historical definition and practice of rational aesthetics proves to be a more unifying approach to music in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Based on the metaphysical criteria of rational aesthetics, the beginning of the era is nebulous. While many of the philosophical underpinnings were first proposed in the early part of the century, the true birth of rational aesthetics as defined by Baumgarten, an aesthetic based in Wolffian metaphysics and emphasizing the experience of sensations, only came to fruition in 1750 with the publication of *Aesthetica*. These theories began to spread into practice over the next decade as post-Baumgartian philosophers expanded on his concepts of aesthetics, theoreticians developed practical applications in various fields of the arts, and finally learned publications distributed these theories to a wider, non-specialist audience. While rational aesthetics had its greatest influence around the years 1750-1780, the metaphysical framework was in place as early as the 1730s in the works of Wolff and remained as late as the 1790s in Herder's writings.

The most unifying feature of rational aesthetics is its metaphysical and empirical framework. The Wolffian model of cognition not only places physical sensation as a part of the cognitive process, but also considers the lowest level of perception as ultimately directed towards understanding and the creation of ideas. Baumgarten's emphasis on the lower cognitive states in his definition of aesthetics leads to the designation of the *schönen Künste*, and the experience of music as *Empfindungen* in the arts as the

¹²⁴ Webster, 54.

counterbalance to rational thinking. Furthermore, because Baumgarten's plan considered the experience of beautiful sensations as the perception of perfection and beautiful truths, *Empfindungen* had the power to convey not only beauty, but also knowledge. The arts, therefore, became an important practice for the spreading and obtaining the morally good. Also a unifying feature of rational aesthetics is the location of the beautiful in the experience of an artwork. Mendelssohn defends criticism from the empiricists by locating the beautiful as occurring between a beautiful artwork and a beautiful soul, therefore accounting for both the objective and subjective in such a judgment. Kant, on the other hand, considered the judgment to be placed on in the experience of the mind of the perceiver, thereby eliminating the object and the feeling of it.

Distinct from the surrounding periods, rational aesthetics is unified by its foundational principles, which define how the arts were experienced and what was conveyed through them (i.e. *Empfindungen* and morally good truths). As a result, the arts were a necessary practice for those who wished to form a beautiful soul. Music became an essential practice both privately and socially for the forming of good taste, which led to a prominence of certain genres, especially for musical amateurs. Publications became an important aspect of musical practice for the amateur, from which they could learn knowledge about music by reading articles, and through music in its performance. Private performance, equivalent to solitude, was an opportunity for one to develop their own *Empfindungen*, and improvising a free fantasia was the most advanced means for doing so. Those genres that could easily portray certain characters and feelings were the most popular in the social setting, such as *Lieder*, piano character pieces, sonatas, chorales, etc. In order to fulfill the aesthetic function of social music, i.e. the forming of culture, a

diversity of *Empfindungen* had to be transmitted through performance, which was fulfilled by the numerous types of genres found in publications.

Modern histories consider the surprising musical effects in works by C.P.E. Bach as a defining feature of the era, which is often referred to as the *empfindsamer Stil*.¹²⁵ Rather than looking at this single stylistic feature to characterize the era, it is more productive to examine the underlying motivation for such effects. Eighteenth-century sources emphasize the importance of expression in music, which was necessary to convey affect, facilitate the experience of *Empfindungen*, and arouse contemplation. Sulzer identifies surprising musical passages as the weakest means for producing this effect (see Chapter 2.3.1). Therefore, to consider musical surprise as a defining stylistic feature of the entire era would be misrepresentative of aesthetic expression. Sulzer explains that “expression is the soul of music.”¹²⁶ In addition, expression is required to arouse feelings in the audience, which should be ever changing. For example, the use of repetition weakens the expression of a piece of music because it is unnatural.¹²⁷ Sulzer explains that

there are other emotions in which one’s impression are always changing, sometimes becoming stronger, sometimes weaker, or sometimes transforming by degrees into something entirely different.¹²⁸

Therefore, the music of this era can be characterized by its expression, which is intended to arouse a feeling of contemplation in the listener through a natural progression of affects.

¹²⁵ See for example Ratner, *Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style*, and Rosen.

¹²⁶ Sulzer, “General Theory of the Fine Arts,” 51.

¹²⁷ Sulzer, “General Theory of the Fine Arts,” 53-54.

¹²⁸ Sulzer, “General Theory of the Fine Arts,” 54.

The limited scope of this project considered the region of North Germany and the experience of music privately, through the free fantasia, and socially, as *Hausmusik*. This music is especially represented in the works of C.P.E. Bach and Johann Philipp Kirnberger, who were the most prominent composers in publications at the time. Other composers who published in collections of keyboard pieces and *Lieder* include Johann Adam Hiller, Carl Friedrich Cramer, Johann Gabriel Seyffarth, Carl Friedrich Christian Fasch, and Christian Gottlob Neefe.

Yet to be examined is the impact of rational aesthetics on public genres, such as the symphony and opera, as well as music in regions outside of North Germany. The aesthetic function of public music could be explained through the genre of the symphony in the works of composers such as C.P.E. Bach, Carl Philipp Stamitz, Carl Heinrich Graun, and Franz Benda. In particular, each of the three movements in the symphony, the allegro, adagio, and dance movements, served specific aesthetic purposes in moving the affects of the audience. Also to be considered is how North German aesthetic principles affected the composition of the symphony outside of Germany, such as those by Johann Christian Bach during his time in London. Having studied with his brother, Johann Christian must have been influenced by Carl Philipp Emanuel before continuing his studies in Italy, and then establishing himself as a symphonic composer in England.

The impact of aesthetics on the genre of the opera, both inside and outside of Germany, must also be investigated. For example, still to be considered are questions regarding the means for expressing character, its varied affects, as well as the aesthetic content through the aria. No longer limited by the singularity of affect required in the da-capo form, the aria could have the potential to display a more natural progression of

feelings, and thus represent to an audience the experience of internal reflection within the framework of rational aesthetic.

Finally, an understanding of the aesthetic principles of the North German Enlightenment can further advance the study of performance practices of eighteenth-century music. As was suggested by Sulzer, one achieves good expression not only by performing the piece correctly according to the mechanical aspects of music, such as pitch, rhythm, melody, etc., but a performer must also understand the sense of the piece, feel the expression, and know the character that needs to be expressed. (see Chapter 4.3.1). Analysis according to these principles can inform the modern performer in how to identify the character of the piece and properly express its affects in order to move the audience.

Rather than seeking a stylistic or formal unity to define the music of this period, which Rosen deemed lacking, the era of rational aesthetics is unified in its principles of expression and its function to inspire a contemplative state through *Empfindungen*. Music was not merely in a “sensitive style,” considered so personal to the composer that it could not be understood. By examining the music of the North German Enlightenment on its own terms, this era is no longer viewed as transitional, but based on rational aesthetic principles, which are the basic underlying motivation of music for the discovery and development of the self. Furthermore, rational aesthetics is unified by the culture of the Enlightenment. Music played a significant part in the forming of a morally good society, and thus was considered an indispensable practice. Therefore, identifying the aesthetic principles and function of music in the North German Enlightenment enables a genuine approach to defining the era of rational aesthetics.

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