Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much? Page: 11 of 81
- Highlighting On/Off
- Adjust Image
- Rotate Left
- Rotate Right
- Brightness, Contrast, etc. (Experimental)
- Download Sizes
- Preview all sizes/dimensions or...
- Download Thumbnail
- Download Small
- Download Medium
- Download Large
- High Resolution Files
- IIIF Image URL
- View Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
conflicts. Too few forces capable of a wide range of operations results in high
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO for those qualified units, and missed opportunities for the
nation. Force structure options under consideration by DoD and the Congress center
on practical ways to reduce the forces required for major contingencies; to reduce the
time and effort required to prepare for them; to increase the number of units capable
of executing multiple types of non-combat operations; and to increase the
participation of the reserve components. Force structure actions benefit from taking
into account both OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO limits, and budget and readiness
considerations. The following relationships are pertinent (assuming demand remains
constant or increases):
" As force size decreases, OPTEMPO generally increases.
" As active force size decreases in favor of the reserve components, OPTEMPO
tends to increase due to the limitations on the availability of the Guard and
" As the number of specialized units increases, OPTEMPO for those types of
units decreases; however, with a finite force structure, the increase in such
units is at the expense of other types of units.
" New units with missions similar to high OPTEMPO units might reduce the
latter's overall OPTEMPO; however, recent experience with both the Joint
Stars ground surveillance aircraft and the Predator UAV suggests that this is
" As new weapons and capabilities that reduce manpower and support
requirements come on line, PERSTEMPO decreases.
" As long as very high demand for deployments of military force exists, whether
for military or foreign policy purposes, efforts to reduce OPTEMPO and
PERSTEMPO will be difficult.
" Increasing the size of the National Guard and Reserve at the expense of the
active force will generally result in higher tempos, as the reserve components
are generally less available than the active force. Many defense observers see
support and specialized functions in the reserve components as a key building
block in developing the affordable force, operating at acceptable OPTEMPOs,
that is required. Some movement in this area is underway. At the same time,
there is a widely held perception that the reserve component should "never be
viewed as the key building block"3 because its near-term warfighting capability
cannot match that of the active force.
The Quadrennial Defense Review debate may help. The debate over the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will help clarify the problem and the range of
options. Real solutions may be difficult to divine as the specifics of measuring the
3According to the planning staff of the National Guard Bureau in response to a draft of this
Here’s what’s next.
This report can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Matching Search ResultsView 50 places within this report that match your search.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Report.
Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Forces Doing Too Much?, report, January 14, 1998; Washington D.C.. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc818917/m1/11/?q=optempo: accessed February 20, 2019), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.