PROSPERITY BELIEF AND LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM: A STUDY OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES IN GUATEMALA

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Globalization has facilitated the growth of “market-friendly” religions throughout the world, but especially in developing societies in the global South. A popular belief among these movements is prosperity belief. Prosperity belief has several characteristics which make it compatible with liberal individualism, the dominant value in a globalized society. At the same time, its compatibility with this value may be limited, extending only to economic liberalism, but not to liberal attitudes on social issues. Data from the Pew Forum on Religious and Public Life’s 2006 survey Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala is used to conduct a quantitative analysis regarding the economic and social attitudes of prosperity belief adherents in Guatemala in order to examine the potential, as well as the limits, of this belief’s compatibility with liberal individualism. Results suggest that support for liberal individualism is bifurcated. On one hand there is some support for the positive influence of prosperity belief on economic liberalism in regards to matters of free trade, but on the other hand, prosperity belief adherents continue to maintain conservative attitudes in regards to social issues. As prosperity belief and liberal individualism continue to grow along global capitalism, these findings have implications for the future of market-friendly religions and for the societies of the global South.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose and Importance of Study

Prosperity belief is a popular religious belief in the global South, and its growth has been facilitated mainly through the explosion of Pentecostalism in this geographic region over the past thirty years. Although prosperity belief is discussed in more detail below, in short this doctrine holds that God blesses believers with economic prosperity if they have enough faith (Suazo, 2009). In Guatemala, it is estimated that about 71% of Guatemalans agree with prosperity belief (Lugo et al., 2007). It is necessary that more scholarly attention be given to prosperity belief, not only due to its popularity, but because it is also said to be an economic and political force (Nolivos, 2012; Miller, 2013; Woodberry, 2013; Jenkins, 2002; Smith, 2009).

Nevertheless, while some scholars have sought to understand this phenomenon, (Bowler, 2011, 2013; Mora, 2008; Haynes, 2012; Murray, 2012), the existing studies tend to be mainly qualitative or theoretical in nature, with very little quantitative analysis. For example, case studies have been utilized to study individual congregations in Nigeria (Folarin, 2007), Zimbabwe (Maxwell, 1998), Zambia (Haynes, 2012), Guatemala (Girard, 2013; O’Neill, 2009), South Korea (Kim, 2012) and Brazil (Mora, 2003). While case studies provide valuable insight into prosperity belief in very specific contexts, it is difficult to generalize from these studies. On the other hand, only six known studies utilize quantitative methods to examine prosperity belief (Schieman & Jung, 2012; Koch, 2009; Lugo et al, 2006; Pew Hispanic Research Center 2007; Pew Research Center, 2014; Johnson, 2014). Schieman and Jung (2012) and Koch (2009) focus only on prosperity belief in the United States, not in the global South. While the Pew Center (2006, 2007, 2014) has released valuable reports based on their own data, they utilize only very
elementary statistical methods such as percentages and other descriptive statistics. Moreover, these studies remain lacking in that they seek to determine primarily the demographic characteristics of prosperity belief adherents rather than link prosperity belief to global social phenomena. There have been theoretical attempts to link prosperity belief and neoliberalism (Murray, 2012; Brouwer, Gifford, & Rose, 1996; Hunt, 2000); nevertheless, these studies lack the support that quantitative analysis can provide and also tend to portray global Pentecostals and Charismatics as a monolithic group.

The purpose of this study is to utilize advanced quantitative analysis in order to examine the extent to which prosperity belief in Guatemala is compatible with liberal individualism, which is the dominant philosophy in the modern world (Bird, 1999; Lukes, 2006). Liberal individualism is an ideology which views humans in the modern world as autonomous and agentic individuals. As economic globalization continues to grow, fueled by neoliberalism, market-friendly beliefs such as prosperity belief may play an important role in influencing societal response to global capitalism (Murray, 2012; Nolivos, 2012; Kim, 2012). At the same time, however, prosperity belief is only one belief within larger systems of religious beliefs such as Pentecostalism. Therefore, while on one hand these belief systems may encourage liberal attitudes in regards to economic behavior, on the other, they may discourage liberal attitudes in regards to social behavior (Miller, 2013; Lugo et al., 2007; Pew Research Center, 2014; Murray, 2012). Nevertheless, due to the limitations of existing research, it is not clear whether prosperity belief adherents tend to be more open to liberal individualism than non-prosperity belief adherents. Therefore, the goal of this study is to better understand to what extent prosperity belief is compatible with liberal individualism, and the implications of this relationship for future societal trends.
1.2 Definition of Terms

Robbins (2004) recognizes the complexity in defining such widely used terms as Pentecostal and Charismatic, since there has been little standardization of these terms in social science research. Therefore, before proceeding, it is necessary to define these terms as used in this study. Pentecostal, while certainly not referring to a monolithic group, generally refers to evangelical Christians who have traditionally emphasized the experiential aspect of religion, which is facilitated by the Holy Spirit. In recent years, a related term, neo-Pentecostal, has been coined. The terms, Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal, are sometimes used by scholars to describe the same population; however, when neo-Pentecostalism is used, it almost always refers to the most recent wave of Pentecostalism which is associated with urban megachurches and an emphasis on prosperity belief. Another religious group that is sometimes included in studies on prosperity is Charismatics. In general, Pentecostals are evangelical and Charismatics are Catholics who have a Pentecostal-like style of worship. This study includes both Pentecostals and Charismatics. As mentioned earlier, another term, liberal individualism, refers to the economic, political, and social ideology that currently runs the contemporary world. The main premise of liberal individualism is that humans are autonomous and agentic individuals who have rights and responsibilities to pursue their own ideals for life. How this concept translates into the economic, political, and social realms will be discussed later.

1.3 Research Question

The research question has been derived from the literature review and the theoretical framework. The literature review focuses on prosperity belief, liberal individualism and the possible relationship between the two. The theoretical framework consists of two major
perspectives. The first is based on Turner’s (1974a, 1974b) interpretation of Weber’s fourth thesis, as well as the concept of ‘market-friendly’ religions as developed by Haenni (2005) and Ignatow and Johnson (2014). This theoretical perspective holds that while prosperity belief may be compatible with the economic aspect of liberal individualism, other elements, including religious values and beliefs, may cause adherents to reject the social aspects of liberal individualism. In contrast, the second perspective, based on moral cosmologies, developed by Davis and Robinson (1999), and institutional theories, developed by Meyer and Jepperson (2000) and Meyer (2010), suggests that prosperity belief, as part of a modern quasi-religious system, functions to aid individuals in the transition to liberal individualism in a globalized society. A review of the existing literature, as well as these theoretical frameworks, leads to the main research question: Is prosperity belief compatible with liberal individualism?
2.1 Prosperity Belief

The roots of prosperity belief are found in mid-20th century Faith movement and American preachers such as Kenneth Hagin, Kenneth Copeland, Robert Schuller, and Oral Roberts (Nolivios, 2012; Yong, 2012; Rosin, 2009; Hunt, 2000; Gifford, 2007), and continues today by Jesse Duplantis, Creflo Dollar (Walton, 2012; Gifford, 2007; Bowler, 2013) and Joel Osteen (Rosin, 2009; Gifford, 2007; Bowler, 2013). Other terms that have been used to refer to prosperity belief are “prosperity gospel,” the “health and wealth” gospel, the “name it and claim it” gospel and the “faith movement” (Hunt, 2000; Mora, 2008; Koch, 2009). Prosperity belief claims that God’s favor rests upon believers who have enough faith and manifests itself in the form of economic prosperity (Suazo, 2009). In some strands of Pentecostalism, there is also the belief that along with economic prosperity, believers can experience physical healing if they have enough faith. Prosperity belief is also related to success in relationships (Kim, 2012). Conversely, since prosperity is believed to be the result of faith, poverty and sickness are sometimes attributed to sin in an individual’s life, or from a lack of faith.

Prosperity belief is justified using Christian scriptures from both the Old and New Testaments. Pentecostals usually point to the economic prosperity of ancient Israel and its patriarchs such as Abraham and King David, as found in the Old Testament (Hunt, 2000). Furthermore, the “law of the harvest” found in 2 Corinthians 2:9 of the New Testament is also used to justify prosperity belief. It reads: “Remember this: Whoever sows sparingly will also reap sparingly, and whoever sows generously will also reap generously.” This verse is often
interpreted from a materialist perspective and used to encourage believers to donate to the church with the assurance that God will bless them with a larger return (Girard, 2013; Haynes, 2012).

Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that although these tend to be themes integral to prosperity belief, as prosperity belief takes root in different global localities, it tends to be contextualized in the culture of those locations (Hunt, 2000). For that very reason it is important to take a look at the history of Pentecostalism and prosperity belief in Guatemala.

2.2 History of Pentecostalism and Prosperity Belief in Guatemala

Although Pentecostalism was originally brought to Central America by foreign missionaries before the middle of the 20th century, its development over subsequent years was spearheaded by Guatemalan nationals. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the recent trend of prosperity belief growth is due to the U.S. or Guatemalan influence. As indicated above, it is estimated that 71% of Guatemalans adhere to prosperity belief (Lugo et al., 2007). More specifically, 82% of Pentecostals agree with prosperity belief, 71% of Charismatics agree with prosperity belief, and 68% of all Christians agree with prosperity belief (Lugo et al., 2007). Some have argued that prosperity belief has grown due to U.S. influence (Robbins, 2004; Hunt, 2000). Hunt (2000) argues that American prosperity belief was “exported” to different cultural environments around the globe. While still retaining national leadership, and even domestic financing, the third-wave of Pentecostalism, which began in the 1970s and 1980s, reflects the megachurch model used in the U.S. In contrast, Martin (2006) and Adogame (2006) argue that growth of Pentecostals and Charismatics around the world is not the result of U.S. imperialism, but instead can better be understood as a transnational social movement facilitated by
globalization (Murray, 2012). Nevertheless, regardless of the debates regarding the source of prosperity belief, researchers have been more interested in identifying the causes of its growth.

There are several theories that seek to explain why Guatemala has experienced an explosion of Pentecostalism in recent years. Some have attributed it to the breakdown of traditional society as a result of the civil war (Garrard-Burnett, 1998). During the 1970s and 1980s, Guatemala experienced militarization of the state, an increase in public violence, migration and the processes of development (Garrard-Burnett, 1998). Therefore, historian Garrard-Burnett believes that conversion to Pentecostalism was “a way to re-create some sense of order, identity and belonging” in the midst of this social change (1998, p. xiii). Moreover, Gooren (2001) and Stoll (1990) point to the influence of the numerous Protestant missionaries that came as relief workers after a major earthquake hit Guatemala in 1976. It is thought that their influence contributed to the growth of Pentecostalism in Guatemala.

In order to better understand the development of Pentecostalism and prosperity belief in Guatemala, it is important to take into consideration the political influence of the United States in Guatemalan politics. In 1954, the CIA organized a coup d'état that overthrew President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán due to fears of his socialist policies at the time of the Cold War. In the subsequent decades, as mentioned above, Guatemala was wracked with political violence as dictators and corrupt presidents took turns destroying the fabric of national social life. In 1996, the Peace Accords were signed between the government and the guerrillas putting an end to a bloody civil war that lasted from 1960-1996. Overall it is estimated that in Guatemala about 150,000 people were killed and over a million displaced during this period. Therefore, the strong influence of the United States government cannot be neglected when examining recent Guatemalan history. Furthermore, it can be understood that the ability of United States
missionaries to enter Guatemala is due in part to the strong political influence of the United States government.

In addition to the social changes that were occurring within Guatemala, changes in the international scene must be considered as well. The explosion of Pentecostalism occurred about the same time as the third wave of democratization occurred in the developing world, including Guatemala in 1986. During this time, not only did Guatemala experience more political freedom, but the nation’s economy was opened up to the global market through reforms which promoted free trade and economic globalization. This brought economic development after having experienced a stagnant economy due to the import substitution policy of the 1970s (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003; Taylor, 1998). Moreover, Guatemala joined the World Trade Organization in 1995 and CAFTA-DR in 2005. While it is impossible to determine a direct cause of the explosion of Pentecostal growth in Guatemala, it is important to note that the nation was experiencing immense social, political, and economic change at the time. Furthermore, Guatemala seems to share this pattern with other nations in the global South and in South Korea (Kim, 2012). It seems as though the explosion of Pentecostalism in the global South occurred at roughly the same time as economic liberalization in this region as well.

2.3 Contemporary Pentecostalism in Guatemala

Since prosperity belief originated in the Pentecostal tradition, and continues to be central to its teachings, a closer look at Pentecostalism in Guatemala lends itself to developing a better understanding of prosperity belief. In comparison to other Christian groups, historically, the Holy Spirit has played a central role in Pentecostalism. This emphasis on the Holy Spirit is congruent with their emphasis on experiential worship, which can include speaking in tongues.
and spiritual warfare (Miller, 2013; Lugo et al., 2007). These are individual experiences, although they also often occur when meeting with other believers. In fact, 24% of Guatemalan Protestants say they have spoken or prayed in tongues (Pew Research Center, 2014). Furthermore, Pentecostalism emphasizes the priesthood of believers, which contributes to the idea that individual believers can have direct access to God without the mediation of a priest (Miller and Yamamori, 2013). Despite the evolution of Pentecostalism over the years, most Pentecostals retain conservative morals and theological beliefs, such as rejecting divorce, abortion and sex outside of marriage (Miller, 2013; Murray, 2012; Lugo et al., 2007). Although scholars have theorized this for years, the Pew Research Center (2014) recently corroborated the conservative social values of Latin American Protestants.

Despite these shared characteristics among Pentecostals, they cannot be considered a monolithic group. This is one of the major weaknesses in Murray’s (2012) study on global Charismatic Christianity and neoliberalism. He overgeneralizes his understanding of Charismatics. In fact, in Guatemala alone, it has been argued there are two major “brands” of Pentecostalism today (2009). One of the two main “brands” of Pentecostals is the version that follows classical Pentecostalism, such as speaking in tongues and is most commonly practiced by poor, rural, and indigenous believers (Smith, 2009).

The second “brand” of Pentecostalism in Guatemala, which developed during the third, or most recent, wave of Pentecostalism is the one that is most pertinent to this study. This type of Pentecostalism is also called neo-Pentecostalism (Smith, 2009). Neo-Pentecostalism is more likely to be associated with the urban megachurches in Guatemala City, such as Verbo, La Fraternidad Cristiana, La Mega Frater, Casa de Dios, and Familia de Dios, as well as with their satellites outside the capital. The majority of these churches are commonly associated with
prosperity belief, especially Casa de Dios. These churches dedicate significant efforts to using technology to enhance their worship services, to broadcast their messages, and to market their church via radio, television, and the internet. Citing Iannaccone, Olson, and Stark (1995) and Perrin, Kennedy, and Miller’s (1997) description of the Church Growth movement, Murray (2012) argues that Pentecostal and Charismatic churches use small business strategies to promote growth and that often results in multinational megachurches. Murray (2012) argues that the Church Growth strategy is a neoliberal form of proselyting and mission work (p. 268). Several of these churches also have their own in-house bookstores, where congregants can find books on leadership (Miller, 2013). Furthermore, neo-Pentecostalism has also been viewed as a modernizing belief system because of the changes made to traditional Pentecostal beliefs as well as the large, impressive church structures of the megachurches (Girard, 2013).

Pastors of neo-Pentecostal megachurches dress like white-collar professionals and executives (Bastian, 2001), and gain favor from their followers through a type of charismatic authority (Gifford, 2007). A trend among the leadership of these megachurches is the value of personal charisma over formal theological training in legitimating the authority of pastors (Miller, 2013; Chestnut, 2013). This is perhaps due in part to the origins of Pentecostalism which valued inspiration by the Spirit over educational qualifications (Robbins, 2004). The most well-known Guatemalan pastor associated with prosperity belief is Cash Luna, pastor of Casa de Dios, a mega-church located on the outskirts of Guatemala City; however, there are several pastors which preach prosperity. Moreover, while the origins of Pentecostalism were very much decentralized (Robbins, 2004), neo-Pentecostal mega-churches very much represent a more hierarchical model, with power being concentrated with the pastor and the mother church in Guatemala City, versus the satellite churches outside the capital.
Megachurches, and prosperity belief, are thought to be attractive to the middle class and the upwardly mobile of the developing world (Martin, 1990; Miller, 2013; Smith, 2009), although Johnson (2014) found that prosperity belief is more likely to be widely distributed among the Guatemalan population, and even more popular among those with less education. In contrast to the former wave of Pentecostalism, the role of the Holy Spirit is less evident in Guatemala’s megachurches. For example, in some megachurches, speaking in tongues is “carefully orchestrated and confined to a few minutes…during Sunday morning services” and exorcisms and healings often occur outside the main services, so as not to scare off potential converts (Miller, 2013, p. 12). This, combined with the advanced technological tools and modern church structures, suggest that Guatemalan mega-churches tend adopt a more rational, less-enchanted approach to church ministry (Hunt, 2000).

Furthermore, Steigenga (2007) found that there is a trend of “‘pentecostalization’ in religious practice, beliefs, and intensity cross religious affiliations in Guatemala” (p. 262). Miller (2013) also recognizes this, arguing that “the line between Pentecostals and evangelicals is ‘blurring’ since many evangelical congregations have “Pentecostalized” their worship (p. 7). Not only has Pentecostalism diffused to other Christian denominations, but Gooren (2010) argues that there has been a “pentecostalization” of society. Due to the diffusion of Pentecostal beliefs to other religious groups, as well as to perhaps the larger Guatemalan society, these observations point to the even greater importance of taking a look at prosperity belief in Guatemala.

Moreover, this diffusion could mean that prosperity belief has diffused to the greater Guatemalan population as well, which would support the examination of prosperity belief adherents, rather than limited only to Pentecostals or Charismatics. Furthermore, since it was found in a recent survey by the Pew Research Center (2014), that 68% of all Christians in Guatemala adhere to
prosperity belief, this further strengthens the rationale for examining prosperity belief adherents rather than a particular religious group.

There are several similarities between prosperity belief found in Guatemala and its counterpart in the United States, as well as some differences. Kate Bowler has dedicated several years to researching prosperity gospel in the American context. She argues that the general theme of the prosperity gospel is: “God wants to bless you” (Bowler, 2013, p. 6), along with four major hallmarks: faith, wealth, health and victory (Bowler, 2013). As seen above these themes are also found in prosperity belief in Guatemala. Furthermore, Bowler (2013) also argues that oftentimes, prosperity is not necessarily about acquiring wealth, but rather about surviving, economically, therefore suggesting that prosperity gospel is more popular among the economically vulnerable.

This supports what Schieman and Jung (2012) found regarding their quantitative research on prosperity gospel in the United States. Using data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life’s 2006 Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in the United States, they found that education and income are negatively associated with prosperity gospel. As mentioned above, in Guatemala this contrasts with those who argue that prosperity belief tends to be higher among the upwardly socially mobile (Martin, 1990; Miller, 2013; Smith, 2009); however, is congruent with Johnson’s (2013) contention that, while prosperity belief is likely to be widely dispersed in Guatemalan society in regards to income, it seems to be especially popular among those with low education. Nevertheless, prosperity belief institutions in both countries tend to maximize use of technology through internet and television broadcasting to disseminate their messages.
2.4 Liberal Individualism

A better understanding of liberal individualism is necessary before discussing its compatibility with prosperity belief. It has been said that the philosophy of liberal individualism is represented succinctly in John D. Rockefeller’s famous words, “I believe in the supreme worth of the individual, and in his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (Bird, 1999). Certainly liberal individualism is a Western ideology which views humans in the modern world as autonomous and agentic individuals. The key values of liberal individualism are self-determination (Clark, 2005), individual self-sufficiency (Christman, 2004), self-reliance and independence (Bird, 1999).

According to Lukes (2006), it was not until the last quarter of the 20th century that liberal individualism took off due to the crisis of the welfare state and the fall of communism, and with it, declining confidence in socialism. The major forefathers of this line of philosophical thought are considered to be Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Karl Popper, among others (Bird, 1999). They considered the opposite of liberal individualism to be totalitarianism, nationalism, authoritarianism, socialism, corporatism, the command economy, the welfare state, etc. (Bird, 1999). Instead of viewing collectivities, such as states and social groups, as being able to take action, these philosophers argued that it is the individuals within these collectivities that are the real actors. From this perspective, the individual is elevated above collectivities, since collectivities are just the result of the individuals that comprise them. Hence, individuals do not have a responsibility to the collective.

The elevation of the individual over the collective, and the subsequent abnegation of the responsibility of the individual to the state, and of the state to the individual, becomes more apparent when examining the economic and political dimensions of liberal individualism. Liberal
individualism arguably is the philosophy underpinning the spread of neoliberalism and global capitalism in the modern world. Along with the push for a free market global economy, neoliberalism also seeks to reduce nation-states’ control of the market through privatization as well as through cuts to social spending. As reflected in the values described above, individuals and families, rather than nation-states, are now responsible for providing for their own welfare in society (Clark, 2005).

There are also social dimensions to liberal individualism regarding attitudes about moral behavior. These attitudes are associated with the value of human rights and the autonomy of the individual in regards to moral decision-making. Liberal individualism assumes that individuals have sovereignty over their own lives and to pursue what they define as the ideals of good (cited in Bird, 1999, p. 34). However, because individuals are unique, there will be a diversity of ideals of goods and values. Therefore, liberal individualism believes it is the responsibility of the state to protect the individual’s right to believe and to act upon their own sense of morality.

2.5 Prosperity Belief and Liberal Individualism

2.5.1 Individualism and Prosperity Belief in Pentecostalism

Prosperity belief, and Pentecostalism in general, seem to be compatible with individualism. In Pentecostal theology, the individual is central to the act of conversion (Miller and Yamamori, 2013). Pentecostalism places a high value on individual experiential spirituality, such as speaking in tongues, baptism of the Holy Spirit, and healings. As noted above, Pentecostalism values the priesthood of believers, which contributes to the idea that individual believers can have direct access to God without the mediation of a priest (Miller and Yamamori, 2013). In fact, according to the Pew Center (2014), the majority of Catholic-to-Protestant
converts in Guatemala say they converted because of their desire to have a more personal experience with God (p. 31).

Furthermore, Pentecostalism also incorporates empowerment discourse which affirms the self-worth of the individual, allowing them to take better control of the course of their lives, including their moral and economic success (Miller and Yamamori, 2013). In fact, Kim (2012) believes that individualism as promoted by Pentecostalism is required for the market’s development. Perhaps this emphasis on individualism contributes to Protestants’ belief that social problems can be solved by reaching individuals rather than by taking a more structural stance (Miller, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2014).

There have been other theological responses to the expansion of neoliberalism in Latin America. The most famous of these is liberation theology, which also utilized empowerment discourse. Liberation theology emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a Catholic response to the economic and political oppression that had characterized Latin America in recent centuries. Theologians such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Enrique Dussel, Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino are commonly associated with the development of this thought.

Chestnut (2012) argues that prosperity belief is “diametrically opposed” to Catholic liberation theology (p. 216). While prosperity theology teaches the benefits of embracing capitalism and wealth, liberation theology expounded the merits of socialism for meeting the needs of the “disenfranchised masses” (Chestnut, 2012, p. 216). Moreover, it sought to show solidarity with the poor. In fact, liberation theologians often drew upon Karl Marx, and in some strains of Catholic liberation theology, capitalism was meant to be overthrown in favor of socialist regimes. In recent years; however, liberation theology has lost quite a bit of its
popularity. In fact it is commonly said that, “The Church opted for the poor, and the poor opted for Pentecostalism.”

2.5.2 Prosperity Belief and Adaptation to the Contemporary Neoliberal Economy

Most often deprivation and disorganization theories have been offered to explain conversion to Pentecostalism among the economically vulnerable (Robbins, 2004). In Chile, Pentecostalism has grown among individuals marginalized by modernization and globalization (Nolivos, 2012). It is believed that the norms and values of Pentecostalism encourage adherents to adopt economic behaviors of initiative and independence, which in turn, help them to survive in the informal economy and poverty (Nolivos, 2012). In fact, some have argued that prosperity belief leads to a better work ethic, and therefore, economic prosperity and social mobility are unintended consequences of embracing this belief (Hunt, 2000), while others believe these changes are conscious efforts to secure the benefits of living in a neoliberal economy (Berger, 2008). Furthermore, it is thought that Pentecostalism is attractive to rural migrants to urban areas, because it helps them establish a sense of community and belonging, as well as to make sense of their life situation (Nolivos, 2012; Murray, 2012; Miller, 2013; Smith, 2009).

However, Pentecostalism has been found not only to help the poor but also the middle class. Examining Heavenly Hands Touch Ministry (HTM), a neo-Pentecostal congregation in Seoul, South Korea, Kim (2012) argues that neo-Pentecostal beliefs equip middle-class believers that are experiencing economic hardship. He says that this belief system understands self in a way that provides a religious experience that “provides the believer a way out of any general sense of impotence in hard, neo-liberal economic situations” (Kim, 2012, p. 52) and that prosperity belief empowers people who feel financially or culturally marginalized to believe they
can change their situation in order to be successful. In fact, Kim (2012) goes as far as to say that the HTM ministry in South Korea is a product of neoliberal globalization.

In the global South, prosperity belief has found adherents among the upwardly mobile and is thought to help people accept, and transition to, the modern world (Nolivos, 2012; Giford, 2007). Martin (1990, 2006) has also examined the capacity for Pentecostalism to aid in the transition of individuals to the global capitalist economy.

2.5.3 Prosperity Belief as a Tool of Neoliberal Hegemony

In contrast, other explanations explain the growth of prosperity belief as a tool of hegemonic neoliberalism (Brouwer et al., 1996; Murray, 2012). In more recent years, the historic Catholic presence in Latin America has been blamed for the lack of economic progress. In fact, it has been argued that Catholicism “shackled” progress, and that indigenous people have been lazy and lacked entrepreneurial spirit in Central America (Girard, 2013, p. 392). In contrast, prosperity belief is believed to be especially popular among the middle-class, which has emerged in the growing neoliberal economy (Brouwer et al., 1996; Kim, 2012). Moreover, it is believed that Pentecostalism serves to legitimate individuals’ pursuit of prosperity and development in Latin America (Nolivos, 2012). In fact, Nolivos (2012) believes that it is “the uninhibited economic nature of neo-Pentecostalism” that enables it to be one of the “major forces of capitalist development in the region” (2012, p. 100). Moreover, Hunt (2000) argues that the principal doctrines of the prosperity gospel are the “cultural and ideological underpinnings of both components of capitalism: the ethic of consumerism and the entrepreneurial spirit” and that health and wealth are available immediately through the “‘currency’ of faith” (p. 334).
Moreover, it has been argued that prosperity belief is compatible with American individualism and materialism (Hunt, 2000). Likewise, Kim (2012) believes that Pentecostalism is “tailor-made for the consumer culture” (p. 52) and the “commercialization and self-centered materialism of contemporary evangelical Christianity” (p. 53). Furthermore, Ignatow and Johnson (2014) find support for the idea that leaders of neo-Pentecostal churches tend to consume international, luxury goods. Likewise, Girard’s (2013) found that neo-Pentecostal congregants in rural Honduras often wore designer clothes and shoes, shiny jewelry and modern haircuts and that the pastor drove a nice SUV. In the denomination’s branch in a more developed area, Guatemala City, the parking lot was filled with high-end cars such as Mercedes, BMW, and Lexus SUVS. Therefore, this communicates that the consumption of high-end and imported goods, as well as modeling the latest fashion, are important social markers for prosperity belief adherents. According to Robbins (2004), prosperity belief adherents have been accused of flaunting their wealth and neglecting community obligations. Murray (2012) argues that the institutions to which prosperity belief adherents belong have assimilated elements of neoliberal philosophy. In fact, he argues that the prosperity gospel has “emerged from the philosophy of Christian Renewalism and its fusion with neoliberal hegemony” (Murray, 2012, p. 269). He also suggests that the prosperity belief has served to legitimatize Christian individualism and the pursuit of material gain by the burgeoning middle classes in developing societies (Murray, 2012).

Moreover, prosperity belief discourse among Hispanic religious communities in the U.S. has been associated with the American Dream and in some instances has been associated with economic risk-taking, especially in regards to taking out volatile loans by first-generation Hispanic immigrants (Rosin, 2009; Ignatow & Johnson, 2014). According to the Pew Center
(2007), approximately 73% of religious Latinos in the U.S. adhere to prosperity belief.

Utilizing Gramsci’s analytical tool of ‘conceptions of the world,’ Murray (2012) argues that global Charismatic Christianity “plays key roles in the fashioning of neoliberal hegemony” (p. 266). In fact, while several religious movements have reacted negatively towards globalization, Murray (2012) argues that the Charismatic movement is a facilitator and beneficiary of globalization (p. 265). He also argues that Charismatic Christians intentionally attempt to intervene in local, state, and larger marketplaces as well as to organize collectivities of global Christian business associations in order to have more influence in the marketplaces (Murray, 2012). Moreover, Freston argues that an accompaniment to prosperity belief, dominion theology, is a “vision of dominion in which believers take power and remold society from above” (2001, p. 26). Freston argues that this theology may be more attractive to middle class and elite professionals due to the “rhetoric of empowerment” (Freston, 2001, p. 279-280). Furthermore, it has been argued that neo-Pentecostal mega-churches have served as sources of social capital for the elite, giving them “a new social base for matrimonial and inter-class alliances, with the objective of maintaining hegemony and preserving their power” (Casaus, qtd. in Freston, 2001, p. 263). Evidence of the arguments made by Murray (2012) and Freston (2001) can be seen by taking a historical glance at recent political activity in Guatemala.

Francisco Bianchi, a secretary of former President Ríos Montt, who also had ties with neo-Pentecostal megachurch, Verbo, participated in the organization, Asociación LIDER, a Christian political association targeting businessmen and religious leaders. He was a presidential candidate in 1999 for the ARDE (Democratic Reconciling Action) Party. ARDE was not affiliated with a religious group, but did identify itself as a “party of biblical principles” (Samson, 2008, p. 74). Former President Jorge Serrano, member of Elim, a neo-Pentecostal
megachurch in Guatemala City, promoted free-market economics. More recently, in 2007, Harold Caballeros left the pastorate at neo-Pentecostal megachurch, El Shaddai, to found a new political party, Visión con Valores, which emphasizes moral values as well as capitalism and free trade as solutions to Guatemala’s desperate economic situation. Interestingly, O’Neill (2009) in his ethnography on El Shaddai, argues that neo-Pentecostalism provides an alternative framework for citizenship which emphasizes religious experience as integral to responsible citizenship. Furthermore, Steigenga (2007) found that neo-Pentecostals have less favorable evaluations of the poor than other Pentecostals and Christian denominations, and tend to be farther right, ideologically.

Nevertheless, Hunt (2000) is critical of efforts to explain the growth of prosperity belief through the lens of a hegemonic, neoliberal model. He believes these arguments simplify the complexity and paradoxes of prosperity belief due to its contextualization in diverse global cultures (Hunt, 2000). One example of this complexity could be concerning the responsibilities of the state in developing countries. Typically neoliberalism is against government regulation and government-sponsored social programs, however, in Guatemala, where 71% of the population supports a free-market economy, the majority also seems to believe that the state has a responsibility to help those living in poverty (Pew Research Center, 2014). This is an example of the paradoxes that accompany prosperity belief as it takes root in, and interacts with, diverse cultural and socio-historical contexts; a type of ‘glocalization’ (Hunt, 2000, p. 335). Glocalization refers to the varied manifestations of a global phenomenon as a result of its interaction with local cultures. Nevertheless, he does conclude that “Pentecostalism serves to develop attributes, motivations and personalities adapted to the exigencies of the de-regulated global market (Hunt, 2000, p. 344).
2.5.4 Prosperity Belief and Social Issues

As seen above, there is quite a bit of literature on the economic aspects of liberal individualism and prosperity belief; however, there has been significantly less written on prosperity belief adherents’ attitudes towards the social aspects of liberal individualism. It has been noted that Pentecostals, and Protestants in general, tend to maintain conservative social attitudes regarding sexual behaviors, divorce, and abortion (Miller, 2013; Lugo et al., 2007). In O’Neill’s (2009) ethnographic study of El Shaddai church, he found that problematic fatherhood was given as an explanation for homosexuality. In a 2014 study by the Pew Research Center, it is estimated that in Latin America, Protestants are more likely than Catholics to believe that abortion should be illegal and disapprove of same-sex marriage. However, it should be noted that lack of support for abortion and homosexuality is widespread in Guatemala, and in Latin America in general (Pew Research Center, 2014). According to the Pew Research Center (2014), even people who do not self-identify with a religion tend to believe that abortion is immoral; however, across the board, they are more accepting of other moral issues such as drinking alcohol, having sexual relations outside of marriage and using artificial means of birth control than are Catholics and Protestants (p. 77).

2.6 Gaps in the Literature

As mentioned in the introduction, while several scholars have conducted research on prosperity belief in the global South, their work is often limited to case studies, to theoretical analysis, or to limited quantitative research that is often lacking in sophisticated statistical analysis. This has led to circumscribed understandings of prosperity belief, as well as global Pentecostalism. Considering the budding work linking prosperity belief to neoliberalism, and the
continued growth of both phenomena, it is important now, more than ever to apply more rigorous social science research methods to the study of prosperity belief and liberal individualism.

2.7 Why Study Guatemala?

Choosing Guatemala as the country of study has both theoretical and methodological advantages. First, as mentioned above, studies from the Pew Research Center (2006, 2014) reveal that prosperity belief is very strong there. Second, as shown in the literature, Guatemala serves as a very appropriate location of study due to the historical timing of the explosion of prosperity belief along with democratization and legislation opening up the country to free trade and greater economic development. In fact, for these reasons Berger (1999) has theorized that Weber’s Protestant Ethic is “alive and well” in Guatemala. Finally, by selecting Guatemala, this study allows for the development of a base upon which future research can build easily due to the continuing studies in Guatemala by the Pew Center as well as the country’s rather close geographic proximity to the United States which could facilitate future field research.
3.1 Introduction

There are two contrasting theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between prosperity belief and liberal individualism. The first categorizes prosperity movement as “market-friendly,” postulating that there is an affinity between prosperity belief and economic liberalism. Nevertheless, at the same time, while prosperity belief may be compatible with the economic liberal individualism, other components of the larger belief system to which prosperity belief is linked, may cause prosperity belief adherents to reject the social aspects of liberal individualism. This theoretical approach is based predominantly on Turner’s (1974) exegesis of Weber, as well as, Haenni’s (2005) and Ignatow and Johnson’s (2014) concept of “market-friendly religions.”

The second major theoretical approach to understanding the relationship between prosperity belief and liberal individualism is based on the idea that prosperity belief functions to aid individuals in the transition to the modern world. For example, Davis and Robinson’s (1999) research reveals the importance of moral cosmologies in influencing social and economic attitudes. Since their findings suggest that religious cosmologies are not necessarily compatible with liberal individualism, it is possible that prosperity belief may not be either. On the contrary, since prosperity belief does demonstrate some compatibility with individualism and economic liberalism, it is possible that adherents to this religious movement are more likely to reflect the modern values of liberal individualism. In addition, institutional theories, mainly based off of Meyer and Jepperson (2000) and Meyer (2010), postulate that modern institutions, especially non-governmental organizations, influence individuals, making them better actors in the modern
world. These theoretical approaches as they relate to prosperity belief and liberal individualism will be explained and compared below.

3.2 Turner’s Exegesis of Weber

In Turner’s (1979b) theoretical treatise on Weber’s study of Islam, Turner frames his study by first refuting common, and in his opinion, faulty, interpretations of Weber’s Protestant Ethic and its influence on the take-off of capitalism in Western Europe. First, Turner (1979a, 1979b) is quite critical of interpretations that understand Weber as attributing a causal relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. Turner (1974b) believes this is a simplification of the Protestant Ethic, and of Weber’s thought in general. Secondly, Turner (1979b) is also critical of interpretations that point to the “complex ‘affinities’ or ‘congruences’” between the social meanings embedded in those acting out the Protestant Ethic and the rise of capitalism, (p. 10) as well as the idea that “certain ideas and certain social processes ‘seek each other out’ in history” (Turner, 1979b, p. 11). Although this is also a popular interpretation of Weber, it fails to see Weber’s own inconsistencies in applying verstehen, especially in his writings on religion (Turner, 1974b). Thirdly, to counter these interpretations, Turner cites Weber’s lecture at Freiburg in 1896 which revealed “a consistent Marxist undercurrent” (Turner, 1974a, p. 233), specifically in regards to Marx’s ideological superstructure as well as other Marxist themes (Turner, 1974b). Nevertheless, Turner (1974b) rejects interpretations that equate Weber’s thought completely with Marx’s economic determinism.

To develop his own interpretation of Weber, Turner (1974a, 1974b) instead draws upon Walton’s (1971) use of Mills’ (1940) sociology of motives. Drawing from Walton (1971), Turner (1974a, 1974b) argues that Weber saw actions as being laden with motives that were
socially constructed. In order to strengthen his argument, Turner (1974b) follows Mills, who argues that social groups contain “vocabularies of motive” (p. 18). Nevertheless, the weakness Turner (1974b) sees with this interpretation is that Weber did not come up with a theory of motives from the perspective of the actor. Building on these theoretical perspectives, Turner offers his own interpretation of Weber’s understanding of the relationship between the Protestant Ethic and the rise of capitalism. He states Weber’s fourth thesis as such:

… to explain actions we need to understand the subjective meanings and subjective motives of social actions, but the languages which are available for describing and explaining actions are themselves determined by social and economic conditions. (Turner, 1979b, p. 20)

In other words, the motives and worldviews of social actors are shaped by the interests of the socioeconomic environment and social strata that carry these worldviews as they change over time. As motives lose their relevance due to changing social and economic conditions, new motives rise up to respond to the economic system. Not only does Turner’s (1974a, 1974b) interpretation position Weber in a moderate relationship with Marx, compared to earlier interpretations, but at the same time stays true to the multidimensionality that often characterizes Weberian thought.

Based on Turner’s (1974a, 1974b) interpretation of Weber, several points can be harnessed as a theoretical framework for the present study. One, like the Protestant Ethic, it is likely that there are elective affinities between prosperity belief and global capitalism, specifically in regards to legitimizing consumption and economic pursuit. Two, in order for global capitalism to be successful, and thus, for corporate elites to profit, prosperity belief provides “vocabularies of motive” (Mills, 1940), which influence adherents’ consumption and economic pursuit. Three, taking into account the explosion of prosperity belief in the global South about the same time as neoliberal reforms in these countries, it can be understood that
prosperity belief provides a new motive, or worldview, that has appeared due to the emergence of global capitalism.

3.3 Market-Friendly Religions

Although this study analyzes Pentecostalism as a market-friendly religion, Haenni (2005) previously examined the concept of market-friendly religions in regards to the relationship between Islam and capitalism in recent religious movements in Turkey, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In fact, he refers to these movements as *l'Islam de marché* (‘market Islam’) or “*religiosité* ‘market-friendly’” (Haenni, 2005, p. 59). Building on Haenni’s (2005) ideas, Ignatow and Johnson (2014) examine the doctrine, organizational and communications strategies, adherents, political stance, and religious pluralism and democratization of neo-Pentecostals in Guatemala. They argue that Haenni’s conclusions align with Turner’s (1974) interpretation of Weber (Ignatow & Johnson, 2014). Both studies demonstrate that recent religious developments within Islam and Pentecostalism hold a type of prosperity belief which is compatible with global capitalism, as well as with the aspirations of the burgeoning middle classes and elites. While prosperity belief has commonly been associated with the poor (Nolivos, 2012; Murray, 2012), based on the theoretical contributions by Haenni (2005) and Ignatow and Johnson, (2014), it is quite possible that prosperity belief may serve to legitimize the pursuit of wealth by the newly emerging middle classes in the global South. Nevertheless, through quantitative analysis, Johnson (2014) found that prosperity belief is widely distributed among social classes in Guatemala; pointing to the flexibility of this belief to attract people of various socioeconomic statuses.
3.4 Moral Cosmologies

The importance of religious values in affecting social attitudes is compatible with what Davis and Robinson (1999) found when examining the effects of moral cosmologies on cultural and economic attitudes in the context of Italy. They divide moral cosmologies into two categories: modernist and orthodox. Modernists tend to be theological individualists, meaning that they tend to see the world as human-centered and human directed, and therefore, relativistic and circumstantial (Davis & Robinson, 1999, p. 343). On the other hand, the orthodox perspective holds that reality should be interpreted based on the existence of a personal, active God who has established absolute and ageless standards that can be known through biblical literalism (Davis & Robinson, 1999, p. 343).

In line with their hypotheses, they find that modernists are more likely than the religiously orthodox to be culturally individualistic, which they measured by scoring liberal on indicators such as attitudes towards abortion, sexual behaviors, prayer in school, and gender roles (Davis & Robinson, 1999). Moreover, Davis and Robinson (1999) find that those that hold to a modernist perspective, rather than to an orthodox perspective, are also more likely to be economically individualistic. In fact, when measuring economic equality, they found that being orthodox was the most important predictor, meaning that the religiously orthodox tend to support government responsibility to the poor more so than modernists. Therefore, their results highlight two important contributions to the research at hand. First, the religiously orthodox do not tend to support liberal individualism, both in their social and economic attitudes, while modernists do. Second, their findings highlight the continuing importance of moral cosmologies in influencing social and economic attitudes. Since their findings suggest that moral cosmologies are not necessarily compatible with liberal individualism, it is possible that prosperity belief may not be
either. On the contrary, since prosperity belief has emerged in the modern world, and demonstrates some compatibility with individualism and economic liberalism, it is possible that adherents to this religious movement are more likely to reflect the modern values of liberal individualism.

3.5 Institutional Theories

Meyer and Jepperson (2000) and Meyer (2010) identify the influence of institutions on individuals. Theirs is a reaction to realist approaches which view individuals as agentic actors existing autonomous from social institutions. In fact, realists postulate that social institutions result from the actions of actors. Liberal individualism tends to embrace this realist, actor-centered explanation. However, Meyer (2010) is highly critical of this perspective. He argues for identifying the patterns that “constrain and empower very agentic, autonomous, bounded, and purposive actors” (Meyer, 2010, p. 3), and believes modern institutions are responsible for creating and encouraging models of “proper human actors.” Individuals are embedded in social institutions, which have the appearance of producing agentic, independently motivated individuals. Meyer (2010) argues that part of the “liberal modern order” is to make actors appear as though they are “purposive, competent, and motivated actors who appear to choose the correct and required actions” (p. 5); however, in reality organizations create scripts for actors, so individuals are not acting completely independently.

Meyer (2010) argues that since World War II and the subsequent weakening of nation-states, national citizenship is no longer the master-identity of individuals. Therefore, the state is no longer the main institution responsible for influencing the scripts and actions of actors. Meyer (2010) argues that in the absence of the state from this role, several professional and
organizational social structures have appeared to fill this gap. These institutions act as
disinterested actors, instead communicating interest in collective goods such as world peace,
human rights, or models of economic growth (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000). Since the individual
has been sacralized during this period as well, several of these non-governmental organizations
posture themselves as dedicated to helping individuals with self-improvement. Meyer (2010)
also cites how these seemingly disinterested organizations are among the fastest growing
worldwide today. The prosperity movement, as housed in modern religious institutions, could be
considered one of these non-governmental organizations.

While Meyer and Jepperson (2000) and Meyer (2010) present a valuable perspective of
the influence of institutions on the individual in modern society, nonetheless, there is a potential
major weakness in their theoretical stance. They perhaps succumb to the modern binary which
assumes that all organizations help individuals in the transition into secularization or the
legitimacy of a scientific cosmology. As the literature review reveals, it is likely that prosperity
belief adherents embrace rationalization in terms of economic liberalism, it is not as likely to
show the same evidence for helping the transition to the social aspects of liberal individualism.

3.6 Research Questions

Based on the literature review and the theoretical framework, a main pertinent research
question is formed: Is prosperity belief compatible with liberal individualism? The following
provides a subset of questions that are more specifically address the main research question in
light of the specific theories utilized in this study.

First, as was mentioned above, based on Turner’s (1974) exegesis of Weber, as well as,
Haenni (2005) and Ignatow and Johnson’s (2014) concept of “market-friendly religions,” it is
evident that prosperity belief adherents are likely to embrace the economic aspects of liberal individualism, but reject the social aspects of liberal individualism. It is predicted that due to the “this-worldly” orientation of prosperity belief adherents, as well as to their religious beliefs, they, like Calvinist Protestants are likely to continue to adhere to conservative social attitudes. Therefore, the first research question is, following Turner (1974; 2010), Ignatow and Johnson (2014), and Haenni (2005), is prosperity belief compatible with economic liberalism, yet resistant to liberal attitudes on social issues?

Secondly, prosperity belief adherents tend to be theologically conservative, and perhaps could be described as religiously orthodox according to Davis and Robinson (1999). At the same time prosperity belief is a rather recent religious belief within Pentecostalism. Therefore, although the literature review suggests that prosperity belief is compatible with liberal individualism, it is unclear what influence their religious cosmology will have on their economic and social attitudes. Following Davis and Robinson (1999), does the religious cosmology of prosperity belief adherents influence their social and economic attitudes in such a way as to encourage or discourage liberal individualism?

Thirdly, there is some indication that prosperity belief may ease the transition of individuals into a globalized society. As was seen above, the literature seems to support the idea that prosperity belief is compatible with individualism, specifically in regards to religious beliefs. Furthermore, prosperity belief seems to be compatible with economic liberalism. Nevertheless, prosperity belief adherents seem to maintain conservative social attitudes. Therefore, following Meyer and Jepperson (2000) and Meyer (2010), does prosperity belief function to aid in the transition to a globalized society by promoting liberal individualism?
CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES

Based on the literature review and theoretical framework, the main research question has been operationalized into the following hypotheses. Each hypothesis represents a different way to conceptualize liberal individualism.

4.1 Hypothesis 1

As adherence to prosperity belief increases, the likelihood that support for economic liberalism increases, \textit{ceteris paribus}.

Economic liberalism is operationalized into one dependent variable, which measures a free market economy. The hypothesis using this indicator is given below.

Hypothesis 1A: As adherence to prosperity belief increases, the likelihood that support for the statement, “Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor,” will increase, \textit{ceteris paribus}.

Support for a free market economy would indicate compatibility with the economic aspect of liberal individualism. A positive relationship can be expected, because, as discussed in detail above, several scholars have theorized the compatibility between neo-Pentecostalism and economic liberalism (Murray, 2012; Brouwer et al., 1996; Hunt, 2000). Therefore, it is likely that prosperity belief adherents will be friendlier towards a free market economy.

4.2 Hypothesis 2

As adherence to prosperity belief increases, the likelihood that support for liberal attitudes towards social issues decreases, \textit{ceteris paribus}. This is expected because, as mentioned above, several scholars have noted the sustained conservative social attitudes among neo-
Pentecostals (Miller, 2013; Lugo et al., 2007). Two variables have been used to operationalize social issues in this study. Hypotheses concerning each of these variables is given below.

**H2A:** As adherence to prosperity belief increases, the likelihood that support for acceptance of abortion will decrease, *ceteris paribus.*

**H2B:** As adherence to prosperity belief increases, the likelihood that support for acceptance of homosexuality will decrease, *ceteris paribus.*
CHAPTER 5
DATA AND METHODS

5.1 Description of Sample

The data set to be used in this study is Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in Guatemala, commissioned by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in the year 2006. This is the only publicly available data set that contains data related to prosperity belief in Guatemala. The survey contains cross-sectional data and has a total sample size is 1,005 (N=1,005). The units of analysis are Guatemalan adults, ages 18 and older, and in order to achieve a national probability sample, face-to-face interviews were conducted in Spanish. There is an over-sampling of renewalists, which are individuals that have had Pentecostal or Charismatic-like experiences. The margin of error for the sample is 3% for the general public, 5% for Pentecostals, and 4% for Charismatics. For this study, cases with missing values are excluded, including responses “don’t know” and “refused.” Due to sparse categories, the sample is restricted to Catholic, Protestant, and secular affiliation, as well as to ladinos and indigenous persons. Data was accessed online through the Association of Religion Data Archives’ website (http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/PENT GUA.asp) and analyzed using SPSS. The translation of the English version of the survey was compared with the original Spanish version to verify the wording of the questions.

Since the research was completed using three separate analyses, the sample size and the sample bias will differ between each one. More information to this regard will be given below. Nevertheless, in all the analyses, the sample was weighted using the weight variable, GPWGT, and filters were used to limit the sample due to sparse categories of the race and religious affiliation variables. In regards to race, individuals that self-identified as indigenous or ladino
were included while those that self-identified as Garifuna, which is a minority population of African descent, were omitted from the sample. This reduced the sample by 5 cases. In regards to religious affiliation, only respondents who self-identified as Protestant, Catholic, or no religious affiliation were included. Therefore, respondents who self-identified as Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Mayan traditional religion, and Jewish were omitted. This reduced the sample by 33 cases.

Information regarding the recoding of the variables is given in Table 5.1 and the description of the independent variables is given in Table 5.2. According to Table 5.2, overall, those included in the sample mostly agree with prosperity belief (Mean= 3.167, $SD$: 1.151). Table 5.3 contains the percentage distributions for adherence to prosperity belief. It should be noted that about 59% of the respondents completely agree with prosperity belief.

According to the descriptive statistics of the additional independent variables in Table 5.2, both men and women are about equally represented in the sample (Mean= .500, $SD$: .500). The majority of those included in the sample are ladino (Mean= .800, $SD$: .400), are between 25-29 years old (Mean= 2.760, $SD$: 1.658) and reside outside the capital (Mean= .280, $SD$: .450). Moreover, the average completed education for those included in the sample is incomplete secondary, which included both the university preparation track and the vocational track (Mean= 3.245, $SD$: 1.438). The average income is Q1601-3200 quetzales a month, which at the current exchange rate of Q7.65 to every US$1.00 is equivalent to US$209.28 - $418.30 a month (Mean= 2.771, $SD$: 1.426). The current minimum wage in Guatemala is Q2394.40 or about US$313 (www.wageindicator.org). Therefore, this indicates that the majority of the sample was making about minimum wage, with some making a little more and some making a little less. Those included in the sample have an average church attendance of one to two times a year (Mean=
4.370, \( SD: 1.581 \)). About half of the sample self-identifies as Catholic (Mean= .493, \( SD: .500 \)), and very few do not belong to any religion (Mean= .158, \( SD: .365 \)).

Table 5.4 contains information regarding the description of the dependent variables. Overall, those included in the sample support a free market economy (Mean= .747, \( SD: .435 \)), are not likely to accept abortion (Mean= .133, \( SD: .340 \)) or homosexuality (Mean= .345, \( SD: .475 \)). Nevertheless, when comparing the means, there is indication that homosexuality is more accepted than abortion.

Due to a large number of missing cases, cross-tabulation and \( t \)-tests was completed in order to compare the final sample of each analysis with the cases that are missing. This reveals that there is some sampling bias. In the first analysis regarding support for free markets, those included in the sample when compared to those that were excluded, were more likely to live outside the capital, be younger, and have a stronger adherence to prosperity belief. In the second analysis regarding attitudes towards abortion, those included in the sample were less likely to support abortion, were more likely to live outside the capital, be younger, and have a stronger adherence to prosperity belief than those excluded from the analysis. Finally, in the third analysis regarding attitudes towards homosexuality, those included in the sample were more likely to reside outside the capital than those excluded from the analysis. Nevertheless, although these are significant differences, they are not believed to have a strong influence on the findings of this study.

5.2 Dependent Variables

Due to the skewed distribution of cases on the dependent variables, all dependent variables were dichotomized into binary variables. The complete information of how the coding
was determined can be found in Table 5.1. The dependent variable used to operationalize economic liberalism seeks to measure whether respondents support a free market economy. This variable is useful, because as noted above, liberal individualism is the dominant philosophy of global capitalism, of which a free market economy is an essential part. To measure support for a free market economy, respondents were asked whether they completely agreed, mostly agreed, mostly disagreed or completely disagreed with the following statement: “Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.” It was converted into a dichotomous, dummy variable (FREEMARKET) with 1 = agree and disagree as the reference category. Again, this reflects what can be expected from the literature review and the theoretical framework.

There are two variables that were used to measure attitudes towards social issues: acceptance of abortion (ABORTION1) and acceptance of homosexuality (HOMOSEXU1). These measures are used by Starks and Robinson (2009) for measuring liberalism on cultural issues. These are both ordinal variables that ask the respondents whether they think the item can always be justified, sometimes be justified, or never be justified. In order to reflect liberal attitudes towards social issues, they were recoded into dichotomous, dummy variables with 1 = always or sometimes be justified and never justified as the reference category.

5.3 Predictor Variables

The main predictor variable used in the analysis is adherence to prosperity belief. In order to identify prosperity belief adherents, an ordinal variable (PBELIEF) was created measuring how much a respondent agreed with the following statement, “God will grant material prosperity to all believers who have enough faith.” The original variable (PROSPER) was measured at the
ordinal level with possible responses being “completely agree” = 1, “mostly agree” = 2, “mostly disagree” = 3, and “completely disagree” = 4, but was reverse recoded in order to measure the amount of agreement with the statement. This statement was only asked of those who indicated that they believed in God or belonged to a religion. Because of this, a total of five cases were included in the missing cases.

Several control variables are included in the analysis such as gender, race, age, region, education, income, religiosity and religious affiliation. In regards to the nominal variables, gender is a binary variable coded for male (MALE), race is a binary variable coded for ladino (LADINO), and region was coded for residing in the capital city (CAPITAL). Coding for the capital city makes sense for three reasons. First, as shown in the literature review, prosperity belief is thought to be housed in the megachurches of Guatemala City (Smith, 2009). Second, Lipton (1977) argues that due to urban bias in developing countries, there is a great divide between the urban and rural areas. Third, a closer look at the population distribution among the regions surveyed, reveal that there is a natural dichotomous division between Guatemala City and the rest of the municipalities listed. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Guatemala, the population for the municipality of Guatemala City in 2012 was 992,541, while the next highest population in Cobán at 232,703 and the lowest population in Mazatenango at 94,054. Therefore, differences between those that reside in Guatemala City, and those that reside in the rest of the country can be expected due to urban bias and to the stark population divide. In regards to religious affiliation, Protestantism is the reference category, with Catholic and no religious affiliation (SECULAR) recoded into binary variables. This is because, as shown above, the literature surrounding prosperity belief associates it mainly with the Pentecostal tradition, which is a subcategory of Protestantism (Smith, 2009).
The ordinal control variables that have been included are age (I@AGE), education (EDUC), income (INCOME) and religiosity (ATTEND1). As can be seen in Table 5.1, due to sparse categories, education was recoded so that those that had either no formal education or incomplete primary were combined. Also, the categories of incomplete secondary vocational and incomplete secondary university prep were combined with each other, as were complete vocational and complete university. In regards to income, respondents with a household income of 8,001 quetzales or above were combined into one category due to sparse categories. Lastly, religiosity is measured by church attendance. Church attendance is frequently used as an appropriate measure of religiosity (Starks & Robinson, 2009). Again, more detailed information about the recoding of the variables, as well as descriptive statistics can be found in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

5.4 Methods
5.4.1 Bivariate Analysis

First, a correlation matrix was constructed in order to determine the degree of correlation between the dependent variables used to measure liberal individualism. Second, in each separate analysis, a $t$-test was used to determine the effects of adherence to prosperity belief (PBELIEF), age (I@AGE), education (EDUC), income (INCOME) and religiosity (ATTEND1) on the dependent variable. Cross-tabulation was used to analyze the bivariate relationship between the dependent variable and the nominal control variables of gender (MALE), race (LADINO), region (CAPITAL), Catholic (CATHOLIC) and secular (SECTORAL).
5.4.2 Bivariate and Multivariate Regression

In order to complete the analysis, three separate analyzes with a total of six models were constructed. Since the dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression was the method utilized in each multivariate analysis. In the first model of each analysis, bivariate regression was used to analyze the relationship between the main predictor, adherence to prosperity belief (PBELIEF), and the corresponding dependent variable. The control variables were added in the second model. Again, the sample was restricted to Catholic, Protestant, and secular affiliation, as well as to ladinos and indigenous persons due to sparse categories. Cases with missing values were excluded; however, the cases included in the final sample were compared to the cases omitted from the sample.

A test for multicollinearity among the predictor variables using Allison’s (1999) tolerance value measurements revealed that there were no problems with multicollinearity in any of the analyses since all tolerance values were above .40 and all the variance inflation factors were below 2.50. The Mahalanobis test, recommended by Mertler and Vannatta (2010), revealed that there was one outlier in the second analysis of the dependent variable, acceptance of abortion (ABORTION1). When all the variables were regressed on the respondent ID number, a value of 33.712 was produced for the Mahalanobis distance indicator. Since this value was greater than the corresponding chi-square value of 31.264 ($df= 11$), the results indicated that there was one outlier present in the regression. After omitting the outlier and running the model again, it was determined that the outlier did have a significant effect on the multivariate predictors. Therefore, the results from the model in which the outlier was omitted were selected for interpretation, although a brief explanation of the changes will be included. No outliers were identified in any of the other analyses.
### Table 5.1

**Variable Recodes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Variable</th>
<th>Dependent or Independent</th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
<th>Recoded name</th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Most people better off in free market economy even if some are rich and some are poor (GOV_MARK) | Dependent | 1= completely agree  
2= mostly agree  
3= mostly disagree  
4= completely disagree  
8 Don’t know  
9 Refused | FREEMARKET  
1=1  
2=1  
3=0  
4=0  
8=sysmiss  
9=sysmiss | 1= Agree  
0= Disagree |
| Justification for Abortion (ABORTION) | Dependent | 1 Always justified  
2 Sometimes justified  
3 Never justified  
8 Don’t know  
9 Refused | ABORTION1  
1= 1  
2=1  
3=0  
8=sysmiss  
9=sysmiss | 1= Always or sometimes justified  
0= Never justified |
| Justification for Homosexuality (HOMOSEXU) | Dependent | 1 Always justified  
2 Sometimes justified  
3 Never justified  
8 Don’t know  
9 Refused | HOMOSEXU1  
1= 1  
2=1  
3=0  
8=sysmiss  
9=sysmiss | 1= Always or sometimes justified  
0= Never justified |
| Prosperity Belief (PROSPER) | Independent | 1 Completely Agree  
2 Mostly Agree  
3 Mostly Disagree  
4 Completely Disagree  
98 Don’t know  
99 Refused | PBELIEF  
1=4  
2=3  
3=2  
4=1  
98=sysmiss  
99=sysmiss | 1= Completely disagree  
2= Mostly disagree  
3= Mostly agree  
4= Completely agree |
| Gender (GENDER) | Control | 1 Male  
2 Female | MALE  
1=1  
2=0 | 1= Male  
0= Female |

*(table continues)*
Table 5.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Variable</th>
<th>Dependent or Independent</th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
<th>Recoded name</th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race (ETH_GUA)</strong></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>1 Indigenous</td>
<td>LADINO</td>
<td>1= Ladino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Ladino/Mixed</td>
<td>0= Indigenous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (I@AGE)</strong></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>1 18-24</td>
<td>I@AGE</td>
<td>1 18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 25-29</td>
<td>2 25-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 30-39</td>
<td>3 30-39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 40-49</td>
<td>4 40-49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 50-59</td>
<td>5 50-59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 60+</td>
<td>6 60+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region (REG_GUA)</strong></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>1 Capital City</td>
<td>CAPITAL</td>
<td>1=Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Quetzaltenango</td>
<td>0= Outside capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Chimaltenango</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Escuintla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Mazatenango</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Coban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Puerto Barrios</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Chiquimula</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Jutiapa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education (EDUC_GUA)</strong></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>1 No formal education</td>
<td>EDUC</td>
<td>1= None or incomplete primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Incomplete primary</td>
<td>2= Complete primary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Complete primary</td>
<td>3= Incomplete secondary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Incomplete secondary: vocational</td>
<td>4= Complete secondary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 Complete secondary: vocational</td>
<td>5= Some university</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Incomplete secondary: university prep</td>
<td>6= Complete university</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Complete secondary: university prep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 Some university</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 Complete university</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99 Refused</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(table continues)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Variable</th>
<th>Dependent or Independent</th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
<th>Recoded name</th>
<th>Response Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Household Income (INC_GUA)  | Control                  | 1 <1600  
2 1601-3200  
3 3201-4800  
4 4801-6400  
5 6401-8000  
6 8001-12000  
7 12001-16000  
8 16001-20000  
9 20001-24000  
10 24001-28000  
11 28001+  
98=Don’t Know  
99=Refused | INCOME  
1-5= same  
6-9 =6  
98=sysmiss  
99=sysmiss | 1 (<1600  
2 1601-3200  
3 3201-4800  
4 4801-6400  
5 6401-8000  
6 above 8,000) |
| Church Attendance (ATTEND)  | Control                  | 1 More than once a week  
2 Once a week  
3 Once or twice a month  
4 A few times a year  
5 Seldom  
6 Never  
8 Don’t Know  
9 Refused | ATTEND1  
1=6  
2=5  
3=4  
4=3  
5=2  
6=1  
8= sysmiss  
9= sysmiss | 1= Never  
2= Seldom  
3= A few times a year  
4= Once or twice a year  
5= Once a week  
6= More than once a week |
| Religious Affiliation (Q3GUA) | Control                  | 1 Roman Catholic  
2 Evangelical/Protestant  
8 No religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic | Catholic  
1=1  
2=0  
8=0  
Secular  
1=0  
2=0  
8=1 | 1=Catholic  
0=Not Catholic  
1=Secular  
0=Not secular |
Table 5.2

Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum Value</th>
<th>Maximum Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity Belief (PBELIEF)</td>
<td>3.167</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (MALE)</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (LADINO)</td>
<td>.800</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (I@AGE)</td>
<td>2.760</td>
<td>1.658</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (CAPITAL)</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (EDUC)</td>
<td>3.245</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income (INCOME)</td>
<td>2.771</td>
<td>1.426</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance (ATTEND)</td>
<td>4.370</td>
<td>1.581</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATHOLIC</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECULAR</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 760
Table 5.3

*Percentage Distribution for Main Predictor: Adherence to Prosperity Belief*

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely Disagree</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Disagree</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Agree</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely Agree</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4

*Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum Value</th>
<th>Maximum Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for Free Market (FREEMARKET)</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>.747</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Abortion (ABORTION1)</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.340</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Homosexuality (HOMOSEXU1)</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1 Bivariate Analysis

6.1.1 Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables

First, a correlation matrix was constructed in order to determine the degree of correlation between the dependent variables used to measure liberal individualism. Contrary to expectations, the dependent variables measuring liberal individualism are weakly correlated, as can be seen from the results in the correlation matrix in Table 6.1. Therefore, a factor analysis could not be conducted on the dependent variables. Nevertheless, the correlation matrix revealed that there is one significant relationship among the dependent variables.

Table 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables and Main Predictor Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for a Free Market Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for a Free Market Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Abortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to Prosperity Belief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .01  ***p ≤ .001

There is a highly significant, yet weak relationship between acceptance of abortion (ABORTION1) and acceptance of homosexuality (HOMOSEXU1) \( (p \leq 0.01) \). The correlation matrix also reveals that there is a slightly significant, weak relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and the dependent variable of support for free markets. It also reveals that there is a highly significant, yet weak relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and the dependent variables of acceptance of abortion and acceptance of homosexuality.

6.1.2 Analysis 1 Support for Free Markets

Bivariate analysis using cross-tabulations and independent-sample \( t \)-tests were conducted in all analyses to analyze the bivariate relationships between the respective dependent variables and the main predictor, adherence to prosperity belief, as well as the control variables. In the first analysis, in which the dependent variable is support for a free market economy (FREEMARKET), the only significant bivariate relationship was with the main predictor variable, adherence to prosperity belief (PBELIEF) \( (N = 742) \). Using an independent-sample \( t \)-test, it was found that there is a significant difference in support for a free market economy between levels of adherence to prosperity belief. In Table 6.2, respondents that support for a free market economy have a mean frequency of adherence to prosperity belief of 3.2304, which corresponds to mostly agreeing with prosperity belief. This is a stronger adherence to prosperity belief than those who do not support a free market economy. Those that do not support a free market economy have a mean adherence to prosperity belief of 2.9945, which also shows mostly agreeing with prosperity belief, but with a lesser mean. This finding supports Hypothesis 1A which argues that there is a significant, positive relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and support for free markets.
Table 6.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for a Free Market Economy</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean PBELIEF</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>tα</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>3.2304</td>
<td>1.10882</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>2.9945</td>
<td>1.25040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>.2359</td>
<td>2.271</td>
<td>279.429</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

α Based on the assumption that variances in Support for Free Markets are not equal between different levels of prosperity belief adherence.


6.1.3 Analysis 2 Acceptance of Abortion

In the second analysis, in which the dependent variable is acceptance of abortion (ABORTION1), there were several predictors with which it has a significant bivariate relationship: adherence to prosperity belief, age, education, race, and region (N = 752). An independent t-test was used with the adherence to prosperity belief, age, and education. First, it was found that there is a significant difference in acceptance of abortion between levels of adherence to prosperity belief. In Table 6.3, respondents that believe abortion is justifiable have a mean frequency of adherence to prosperity belief of 2.8667, which corresponds to almost mostly agreeing with prosperity belief. This is a weaker adherence to prosperity belief than those who do not believe abortion is justifiable. Those that do not believe abortion is justifiable have a mean of 3.2085, which also shows mostly agreeing to prosperity belief, but with a greater mean. This finding supports Hypothesis 2A, since it was predicted that there would be negative relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and acceptance of abortion.

Second, there is a significant difference in acceptance of abortion between levels of age. In Table 6.4, respondents that believe abortion is justifiable have a mean of 2.41, which
corresponds to between the ages of 25-29. Those that do not believe abortion is justifiable have a mean of 2.80, which also corresponds to 25-29, but is a greater mean, indicating that they tend to be older. Third, there is a significant difference in acceptance of abortion between levels of education. In Table 6.5, those that believe abortion is justifiable have a mean of 3.6444, which corresponds to incomplete secondary. Those that do not believe abortion is justifiable have a mean of 3.1979, which also corresponds to incomplete secondary, but due to a lesser mean, indicates lower education.

Table 6.3
$t$-Test Results Comparing Difference between Prosperity Belief in Acceptance of Abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance of Abortion</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean PBELIEF</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>$t^{a}$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2.8667</td>
<td>1.16310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>3.2085</td>
<td>1.14675</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>.3418</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.260</td>
<td>113.810</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{a}$ Based on the assumption that variances in Acceptance of Abortion are not equal between different levels of prosperity belief.

Table 6.4
$t$-Test Results Comparing Difference between Age in Acceptance of Abortion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance of Abortion</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Age</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>$t^{a}$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.528</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.260</td>
<td>119.882</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{a}$ Based on the assumption that variances in Acceptance of Abortion are not equal between different levels of age.
In regards to the cross-tabulation between being ladino (LADINO) and acceptance of abortion, it appears that there is a significant, positive relationship between these two variables. Table 6.6 indicates that the obtained chi-square is 4.750 which is significant at the .05 level. The gamma value is .356 which indicates that ladinos are more likely to think that abortion is justifiable than people who are indigenous, but this is a moderately weak relationship.

About 13.2% of Ladinos believe that abortion is justifiable, while only 6.8% of people who are indigenous believe abortion is justifiable. In regards to the cross-tabulation between residing in
the capital (CAPITAL) and acceptance of abortion, it appears there is a significant, positive relationship between these two variables as well. Table 6.7 indicates that the obtained chi-square is 13.599 which is highly significant at the .001 level. The gamma value is .393 which indicates that those that reside in the capital are more accepting of abortion than those that reside outside the capital; however this is a moderately weak relationship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Distribution of Acceptance of Abortion by Capital, Guatemalan Adults, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Abortion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 13.599, \text{ df}= 1, p < .001 \]
Gamma = .393, \( p = .001 \)

6.1.4 Analysis 3 Acceptance of Homosexuality

In the third analysis, in which the dependent variable is acceptance of homosexuality (HOMOSEXU1), there were several predictors with which it has a bivariate relationship: adherence to prosperity belief, age, education, region and Catholic (\( N = 740 \)). An independent \( t \)-test was used with the adherence to prosperity belief, age, and education. First, it was found that there is a significant difference in acceptance of homosexuality between levels of adherence to prosperity belief. In Table 6.8, respondents that believe homosexuality is justifiable have a mean frequency of adherence to prosperity belief of 2.8612, which corresponds to almost mostly
agreeing with prosperity belief. This is a weaker adherence to prosperity belief than those who do not believe homosexuality is justifiable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>t-Test Results Comparing Difference between Prosperity Belief in Acceptance of Homosexuality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Based on the assumption that variances in Acceptance of Homosexuality are not equal between different levels of prosperity belief.


Those that do not believe homosexuality is justifiable have a mean of 3.3030, which shows mostly agreeing to prosperity belief, but with a greater mean. This finding supports Hypothesis 2B, since it was predicted that there would be negative relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and acceptance of homosexuality.

Second, there is a significant difference in acceptance of homosexuality between levels of age. In Table 6.9, respondents that believe homosexuality is justifiable have a mean of 2.32, which corresponds to between the ages of 25-29. Those that do not believe abortion is justifiable have a mean of 2.98, which also corresponds to 25-29, but is a greater mean, indicating that they tend to be older. Third, there is a significant difference in acceptance of homosexuality between levels of education. In Table 6.10, those that believe homosexuality is justifiable have a mean of 3.4245, which corresponds to incomplete secondary. Those that do not believe homosexuality is justifiable have a mean of 3.1556, which also corresponds to incomplete secondary, but due to a lesser mean, indicates lower education.
Table 6.9

**t-Test Results Comparing Difference between Age in Acceptance of Homosexuality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance of Homosexuality</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Age</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1.453</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>1.713</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-5.468</td>
<td>563.316</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Based on the assumption that variances in Acceptance of Homosexuality are not equal between different levels of age.


Table 6.10

**t-Test Results Comparing Difference between Education in Acceptance of Homosexuality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance of Homosexuality</th>
<th>Mean Education</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>t&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>3.4245</td>
<td>1.37581</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>3.1556</td>
<td>1.44887</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>2689</td>
<td>2.458</td>
<td>509.557</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Based on the assumption that variances in Acceptance of Homosexuality are not equal between different levels of education.


In regards to the cross-tabulation between residing in the capital (CAPITAL) and acceptance of homosexuality, it appears that there is a significant, positive relationship between these two variables. Table 6.11 indicates that the obtained chi-square is 5.737 which is significant at the .05 level. The gamma value is .200 which indicates that those that reside in the capital are more likely to think that homosexuality is justifiable than people who reside outside the capital, but this is a weak relationship. About 39.7% of those that reside in the capital believe that homosexuality is justifiable, while 30.5% of people who reside outside the capital believe that homosexuality is justifiable. In regards to the cross-tabulation between being Catholic (CATHOLIC) and acceptance of homosexuality, it appears there is a significant, positive
relationship between these two variables as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage Distribution of Acceptance of Homosexuality by Capital, Guatemalan Adults, 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2 = 5.737$, df = 1, $p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma = .200, $p &lt; .05$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12 indicates that the obtained chi-square is 11.271 which is highly significant at the .001 level. The gamma value is .258 which indicates that Catholics are more accepting of homosexuality than non-Catholics; however this is a weak relationship. About 39% of Catholics believe homosexuality is justifiable, while about 27.4% of non-Catholics believe homosexuality is justifiable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage Distribution of Acceptance of Homosexuality by Catholic, Guatemalan Adults, 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Homosexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2 = 11.271$, df = 1, $p &lt; .001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma = .258, $p = .001$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1.5 Summary of Bivariate Results

In conclusion, the bivariate results reveal that there is a positive relationship between support for a free market economy and adherence to prosperity belief. This confirms Hypothesis 1A. The hypotheses regarding attitudes towards social attitudes were both confirmed. There is a negative relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and acceptance of abortion and acceptance of homosexuality. This confirms Hypothesis 2A and 2B.

6.2 Bivariate and Multivariate Regression

6.2.1 Analysis 1 Support for Free Markets

Table 6.13 presents the results of regressing support for a free market economy on the main predictor variable of adherence to prosperity belief in Model 1 and the full model, with the control variables being added in Model 2 ($N = 742$). Unfortunately, as Table 6.13 shows, when the controls are added in Model 2, the model is no longer significant ($\chi^2 = 12.056$, $df=10$, $p > .05$). Therefore Model 1 is the best model to be utilized for interpretation. According to Model 1, the results indicate that as a whole the model is significant ($\chi^2 = 5.625$, $df=1$, $p < .05$). Nevertheless, as hypothesized, adherence to prosperity belief (WALD-chi-square = 5.746, $p < .05$), has a statistically significant effect on support for a free market economy. Model 1 indicates that the odds of supporting a free market economy are expected to increase 18.7% with each additional level of adherence to prosperity belief. This shows bivariate support for Hypothesis 1 regarding economic liberalism and, more specifically, Hypothesis 1A.
Table 6.13

*Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting Support for a Free Market Economy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to Prosperity Belief</td>
<td>.171*</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>.169*</td>
<td>1.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td>-.233</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>1.059</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resides in Capital</td>
<td>-.259</td>
<td>.190</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>1.031</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>1.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.236</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>1.038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.590*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| -2 Log likelihood          | 821.101 | 814.670 |
| Model $\chi^2$            | 5.625*  | 12.056  |
| Pseudo R$^2$               | .011    | .024    |
| Degrees of freedom         | 1       | 10      |
| N                          | 742     | 742     |

* $p \leq .05$  ** $p \leq .01$  *** $p \leq .001$

Notes: The odds ratio is the antilog of B, and the standard errors are in parentheses. Nagelkerke used for Pseudo R$^2$ value.

6.2.2 Analysis 2 Acceptance of Abortion

Table 6.14 presents the results of regressing acceptance of abortion on the main predictor variable of adherence to prosperity belief in Model 1 and the full model, with the control...
variables being added in Model 2 ($N = 751$). As mentioned above, an outlier has been omitted from this analysis since it unduly influenced the results.

Table 6.14

*Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting Attitudes towards Abortion*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to Prosperity Belief</td>
<td>-.223* (.091)</td>
<td>.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td></td>
<td>.504 (.363)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.109 (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resides in Capital</td>
<td>.752** (.240)</td>
<td>2.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.104 (.099)</td>
<td>1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.047 (.089)</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
<td>-.013 (.100)</td>
<td>.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.131 (.284)</td>
<td>.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>.228 (.459)</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.326***</td>
<td>-2.435**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>540.894</td>
<td>515.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>5.749*</td>
<td>31.528***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of freedom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .01  ***p ≤ .001
Notes: The odds ratio is the antilog of B, and the standard errors are in parentheses. Nagelkerke used for Pseudo $R^2$ value.

When the outlier is included, adherence to prosperity belief is significant in both models, but when the outlier is omitted, adherence to prosperity belief is only significant in the first model,
and is no longer significant in the second model. Therefore, as mentioned above, the outlier has been omitted from the analysis used in this study.

According to Model 1, the results indicate that as a whole the model is significant ($\chi^2 = 5.749, df=1, p < .05$). Table 6.14 reveals that adherence to prosperity belief (WALD-chi-square = 5.988, $p < .05$), has a statistically significant effect on whether a respondent is accepting of abortion. Model 1 indicates that the odds of being accepting of abortion are expected to decrease about 20% with each additional level of agreement with prosperity belief.

Nevertheless, adding the control variables in Model 2 significantly improves the fit ($\chi^2 = 25.78, df = 9, p < .01$). Nevertheless, adherence to prosperity belief no longer has a significant effect on acceptance of abortion once controlling for other predictors (WALD-chi-square = 3.467, $p < .05$). Since this main predictor is not significant in the better-fitting model, the second main hypothesis, and more specifically, Hypothesis 2A, are not supported. However, region is significant and indicates that people who reside in the capital are 1.12 times more likely than those who reside outside the capital to be accepting of abortion (WALD-chi-square = 9.787, $p < .01$).

6.2.3 Analysis 3 Acceptance of Homosexuality

Table 6.15 presents the results of regressing acceptance of homosexuality on the main predictor variable of adherence to prosperity belief in Model 1 and the full model, with the control variables being added in Model 2 ($N = 740$). According to Model 1, the results indicate that as a whole the model is highly significant ($\chi^2 = 23.223, df=1, p < .001$). The analysis reveals that as hypothesized, adherence to prosperity belief (WALD-chi-square = 23.233, $p < .001$), has a highly statistically significant effect on acceptance of homosexuality. In Model 1, with every
one-level increase in adherence to prosperity belief, the odds of thinking that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, decreases by 27.3% ($p \leq .001$).

Nevertheless, Table 6.15 indicates that Model 2 significantly improves the fit ($\chi^2 = 53.248, df = 9, p < .001$). The model as a whole is highly significant ($\chi^2 = 76.471, df = 10, p < .001$). The main predictor continues to be highly significant in Model 2. With every one-level increase in adherence to prosperity belief, the odds of thinking that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, decreases by 27.4%, all else equal ($WALD$-chi-square = 19.161, $p \leq .001$). Again, shows support for the second main hypothesis, and more specifically it shows support for Hypothesis 2B.

As shown in Table 6.15, five additional predictors have a significant effect on acceptance of homosexuality: age, region, church attendance, Catholic and no religious affiliation. Age is highly significant at the .001 level. For each one-level increase in age, the odds of thinking that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, decreases by 26.6%, all else equal ($WALD$-chi-square = 28.656, $p \leq .001$). People who reside in the capital are 50.3% more likely than those that do not reside in the capital, to think that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, all else equal ($WALD$-chi-square = 5.005, $p \leq .05$). With every one-level increase in church attendance, the odds of thinking that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, decreases by 13.3%, all else equal ($WALD$-chi-square = 3.883, $p \leq .05$). Catholics are 50.8% more likely than Protestants to think that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, all else equal ($WALD$-chi-square = 4.373, $p \leq .05$). However, people that do not belong to a religion (SECULAR) are 52.3% less likely than Protestants to think that homosexuality can always, or sometimes, be justified, all else equal ($WALD$-chi-square = 4.405, $p \leq .05$).
Table 6.15

Logistic Regression Estimates Predicting Prosperity Belief Adherents Attitudes towards Homosexuality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adherence to Prosperity Belief</td>
<td>-.319*** (.066)</td>
<td>.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>- .321 (.171)</td>
<td>.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td>- .048 (.218)</td>
<td>.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>- .309*** (.058)</td>
<td>.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resides in Capital</td>
<td>.407* (.182)</td>
<td>1.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>- .023 (.182)</td>
<td>.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.023 (.065)</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Attendance</td>
<td>-.143* (.072)</td>
<td>.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.411* (.197)</td>
<td>1.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>- .739* (.352)</td>
<td>.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>1.697**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Log likelihood: 916.491  863.243
Model $\chi^2$: 23.223***  76.471***
Pseudo R$^2$: .043  .137
Degrees of freedom: 1  10
N: 740  740

* $p \leq .05$  ** $p \leq .01$  *** $p \leq .001$

Notes: The odds ratio is the antilog of B, and the standard errors are in parentheses. Nagelkerke used for Pseudo R$^2$ value.

6.2.4 Summary of Regression Analyses

In conclusion, the multivariate results indicate that the bivariate findings regarding the positive relationship between support for a free market economy and prosperity belief continue, even when controls are added in the multivariate analysis. In contrast, the negative relationship between prosperity belief and acceptance of abortion, while significant at the bivariate level, disappears when control variables are introduced at the multivariate level. Nevertheless, the
relationship between prosperity belief and acceptance of homosexuality continues at the multivariate level, with prosperity belief being negatively associated with support for homosexuality.
7.1 Discussion

Based on the analyses above, it can tentatively be concluded that there is some support for the argument that prosperity belief is compatible with certain aspects of liberal individualism, most notably, economic liberalism. Nevertheless, in regards to whether prosperity belief is likely to be negatively associated with liberal attitudes on social issues, this argument is not very clear. It appears that greater adherence to prosperity belief is associated with being less likely to believe that homosexuality is always, or sometimes, justified. Nevertheless, in regards to acceptance of abortion, the relationship is not quite as clear. At the bivariate level, there is a negative, significant relationship between adherence to prosperity belief and acceptance of abortion. Nevertheless, this relationship seems to disappear at the multivariate level, when controlling for other predictors. Therefore, prosperity belief is likely not to be compatible with all aspects of liberal individualism.

Other findings, although not a part of the main focus of this study, are worth mentioning here. In regards to measures of social issues, it is not surprising that Guatemalans who live in the capital are more accepting of abortion and homosexuality than are Guatemalans who live outside the capital, since urban dwellers tend to have more cosmopolitan attitudes. Nor is it surprising that the older people are, the less likely they are to be accepting of homosexuality considering that older people tend to have more conservative attitudes on issues regarding sexual behavior. This was also supported by the findings from the 2014 survey in Latin America by the Pew Research Center. Moreover, it is not a surprise that the more frequently people attend church, the
less accepting of homosexuality they tend to be, since most religious groups tend to be disapproving of homosexuality.

Nevertheless, it may be surprising that Catholics are more likely than Protestants to think that homosexuality can be justified, considering the teachings of the Catholic Church. Again, it could be that since Catholicism is a strong part of Guatemalan identity or culture, this result could be attributed to high levels of nominalism. However, even more surprising is the result that people of no religious affiliation are less likely than Protestants to think that homosexuality can be justified. While it is surprising to find this result, there could be two reasons for this. One, North American researchers cannot place their own understanding of the non-religiously affiliated population in the United States onto their Guatemalan counterparts. There could be something else culturally going on here that is beyond the scope of the data. On the other hand, since the non-religiously affiliated respondents are only 15% of the sample, this result could be due to the low sample size. More in-depth research focusing on this specific population would need to be conducted in order to gain more conclusive results.

In light of the above findings and discussion, perhaps Turner (1974a, 1974b), Ignatow and Johnson (2014), and Haenni (2005) provide the best theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between prosperity belief and liberal individualism. While the results do not show a strong relationship between prosperity belief and economic liberalism, there is some indication that adherence to prosperity belief is positively related to economic liberalism. This specifically concurs with the concept of market-friendly religions as explained by Haenni (2005) and the theoretical contribution of Ignatow and Johnson (2014) in their study on neo-Pentecostalism in Guatemala and the Gulen Movement among Muslims.
Moreover, applying Turner’s (1974a, 1974b) interpretation of Weber, it can be understood that there is some indication of elective affinities between prosperity belief and economic liberalism. This is especially apparent in the value of consumption as a sign of God’s favor for prosperity belief adherents and as a necessity of the global capitalist system. Moreover, it is apparent that prosperity belief discourse provides “vocabularies of motive” (Mills, 1940), which serve to encourage, and even to justify, adherents’ consumption and economic pursuit. Lastly, these new “vocabularies of motive” have appeared about the same time as the explosion of prosperity belief in the global South, as well as about the same time as neoliberal reforms in this region. Nevertheless, while these “vocabularies of motive” may be compatible with economic liberalism, they do not seem to be compatible with liberal attitudes on social issues, at least regarding homosexuality. Therefore, prosperity belief adherents may be equipped with motives that legitimize economic liberalism, but not necessarily with liberal attitudes on social issues.

The results also support Davis and Robinson’s (1999) theory of religious cosmology. Although prosperity belief is a rather recent phenomenon, it is evident that adherents tend to retain conservative attitudes on social issues such as homosexuality and abortion, although the latter is questionable considering the results from this study. In other words, prosperity belief adherents do not seem to deviate much in their attitudes on social issues from earlier generations of Pentecostals. Therefore, their moral cosmology continues to play an important role in determining their attitudes towards social issues in particular.

Lastly, perhaps the theoretical framework that is least supported by the results is institutional theories. Although there is indication that prosperity belief adherents have transitioned somewhat to the modern world in regards to embracing modern economic attitudes,
there is little evidence that they have transitioned to the modern world by embracing liberal individualism in regards to social issues. In fact, it is evident that they tend to retain social attitudes that are not congruent with liberal individualism. Nevertheless, institutional theories may help explain the role of prosperity belief institutions as sources of master-identity in light of the weakening of the nation-state. This can be evidenced by the nationalistic discourse that can be found in Guatemalan megachurches (see Johnson, 2014).

In conclusion, this study presents a more complex picture of prosperity belief adherents and their attitudes towards liberal individualism than have previous studies. The results suggest that support for liberal individualism is bifurcated among prosperity belief adherents. On one hand there is some support for the positive influence of prosperity belief on economic liberalism in regards to matters of a free market economy, but on the other hand, prosperity belief adherents continue to maintain conservative attitudes in regards to social issues, especially homosexuality. What is confirmed by this study, though, is that as prosperity belief and liberal individualism continue to grow alongside each other in the global capitalist marketplace, these findings tentatively predict the growing influence of prosperity belief on political and social life in the societies of the global South.

Moreover, since the growth of Pentecostalism, and prosperity belief, do not seem to be leveling out anytime soon, it can be expected that the influence of these beliefs will continue to play an important role in the public life of Guatemala, and in other societies of the global South. Whereas in the United States, Pentecostals do not seem to pursue political leadership, the opposite seems to be true in Guatemala. Furthermore, rather than embrace a libertarian approach that argues for restricted governmental control over moral issues, such as abortion and homosexuality, it could very well be that prosperity belief adherents will seek to utilize political
routes to maintain conservative legislation on these issues. In 2014, due to religious pressure, Uganda passed the Anti-Homosexuality Act, which criminalizes homosexual behavior. While Guatemala is not expected to follow suit, as mentioned above, Freston (2001) points to the desire of Pentecostals to set up a Christian government, known as dominion theology. Again, Pentecostalism in the global South appears to be more politically active than Pentecostalism in the United States. As these societies continue to economically develop, and as Pentecostals become a more powerful force, it will be interesting to see how religious and political ideals play out differently in the public realm in comparison to what has occurred in the United States.

7.2 Limitations of the Study

It is important to recognize the limitations of quantitative data for capturing a robust picture of the effects of prosperity belief on liberal individualism. Perhaps the most concerning limitation is the potential of survey methods to measure economic and social attitudes. One obvious problematic element of this is the influence of social desirability. If conservative social attitudes on hot button issues such as abortion and homosexuality are widely distributed in Guatemala, respondents may not feel comfortable revealing more liberal attitudes for fear of social sanctioning or disapproval. Secondly, in regards to the questions measuring economic attitudes, it is questionable whether regular people on the street are knowledgeable about free trade to such a degree as to have an informed opinion regarding such issues. Does the public discourse surrounding discussions of free trade reach all sectors of the Guatemalan population? Therefore, due to social desirability, respondents may give a response regardless of whether that response accurately represents their opinions. Moreover, another limitation is in regards to the weak, or in some cases, non-existent, relationships between the dependent variables, or the
measures of liberal individualism. Therefore, this points to the gap between theory and methods. Although the measures selected for this study are supported by the literature and theoretical framework, they share little statistical relationship. While quantitative research is necessary to better understand prosperity belief adherents, perhaps a qualitative component could be added to this study in order to gauge the accuracy of the findings. Moreover, a qualitative component may reveal some points that the survey did not take into consideration, leading to a more robust picture of the effects of prosperity belief on liberal individualism.

Moreover, the sample presents some challenges to confident interpretation. First, a larger sample size would need to be collected in order to get more confident results. The sample sizes from the analyses conducted range from $N = 740$ to $N = 751$. Therefore, although this is an acceptable sample size, a larger sample size would produce more reliable results. Second, more recent data is needed. Although the data used in this survey is less than ten years old, since Pentecostalism continues to rapidly grow, as well as does global capitalism, more recent data could shed a more accurate light on the effects of prosperity belief on liberal individualism. Third, as discussed above, each analysis contains a sample bias, especially in regards to location of residence, age and adherence to prosperity belief. Sample bias is often an unavoidable pitfall in secondary quantitative data analysis, since the researcher is limited to the data that has already been collected. Sample bias should be acknowledged and addressed, but considering the value that quantitative analysis offers, this method cannot be abandoned.

Lastly, this study only examined the effects of prosperity belief on liberal individualism in one country. Due to limitations of time, it was not possible to examine all eleven countries in which this survey was conducted. Nevertheless, due to the prevalence of prosperity belief in Guatemala, it was most likely the best country selected to analyze the research question.
7.3 Future Research

Considering the last limitation mentioned above, a recommendation for future research would be to conduct a comparative study among two similar countries from the Spirit and Power survey (Lugo et al, 2006) or to even attempt a comparative study of all the countries included in the study. Since overall adherence to prosperity belief tends to be stronger in some countries more than others, it would be interesting to find out the nuances of these differences among countries. Furthermore, this would help to better understand the relationship between prosperity belief and liberal individualism in general.

Secondly, a recommendation for future research would be to examine the influence of prosperity belief on political attitudes. Considering that recently there has been a rise in political participation among Pentecostals, at least among Pentecostal leaders in Guatemala, perhaps a more specific study examining the political attitudes and activities of prosperity belief adherents could help clarify the role of this religious belief in politics, and its potential to have a stronger influence on the future of Guatemala. A study such as this would have great relevance for Guatemala, the global South and for the world in general, considering the participation of these actors in the world capitalist market.
REFERENCES


Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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