

It follows that the question of how mind and body interact, mentioned by Arnette, is pointless, and all the so-called mental phenomena, such as mood, emotion, and thought, are explicable in terms of body-based processes. The best explanation along this line that I have seen is the one offered by Jack Ornstein (1972). Very briefly, he suggested that a mental event like, for example, the feeling of pain, is the manner in which we become aware of a certain pattern of electrochemical activity in the brain. That is, the feeling of pain is the experiential or subjective aspect of the cerebral event. (There can be other aspects also, such as verbal and behavioral.) Some writers (e.g., Brown, 1980) have asked the question how a physical process such as electrochemical activity can be translated into a nonphysical subjective event. The answer is that no translation process takes place; the cerebral and subjective events are related to each other like the two sides of a coin, inseparable except conceptually. In Ornstein's view, then, the term "mental" simply means experiential or subjective; it does not imply that there is some autonomous entity called "mind."

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