Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

June 22, 2015
Summary

Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—have reemerged to fuel a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite-dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL). Iraq’s Kurds have been separately embroiled in political and territorial disputes with Baghdad, although those differences have been downplayed by the common struggle by the Kurds and the central government against the Islamic State.

As part of an overarching effort to defeat the Islamic State, the United States is helping the Iraqi government try to recapture territories in Iraq that have fallen under Islamic State control. The United States is conducting airstrikes against the group and has deployed 3,100 U.S. military personnel to advise and training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the peshmerga militia of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Sunni tribal fighters. Partner countries are contributing 1,500 advisers and trainers for these purposes. The United States is also proceeding with pre-existing foreign military sales of combat aircraft, as well as with new sales of tanks and armored vehicles to replenish the equipment lost during the 2014 ISF partial collapse.

U.S. officials assert that defeating the Islamic State will also require the Iraqi government to gain the loyalty of Iraq’s Sunnis and resolve differences with the KRG. This political component of U.S. strategy began to show success in 2014 the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with another Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi appears more willing than was Maliki to compromise with Sunni interests and with those of the KRG. In November 2014, Baghdad and the KRG reached a temporary agreement on the KRG’s exportation of oil separately from Baghdad.

With one year since the Islamic State gains elapsed, U.S. strategy in Iraq has had mixed come into question. The Defense Department asserted in mid-April 2015 that about 30% of the territory in Iraq seized by the Islamic State had been retaken, including the key Sunni-inhabited city of Tikrit. However, on May 18, 2015, the Islamic State captured Ramadi, the capital of the overwhelmingly Sunni-inhabited province of Anbar, suggesting that U.S. and Iraqi efforts have not crippled the Islamic State’s fighting ability or caused a dramatic Sunni shift back to the government. That setback caused the United States to limit its refusal to support any Shiite militia forces to only those militias that are advised and trained by Iran. The Shiite militias provide crucial armed capability to the government but they have committed human rights abuses against some Sunni communities and thereby hinder efforts to win back Sunni loyalties. In early June 2015, the Administration announced the deployment of an additional 450 military personnel to Iraq, with the potential to add further, as part of an initiative to have U.S. advisers and trainers work directly with a wider array of Iraqi forces, particularly Sunni tribal fighters.

Some experts have suggested that a substantial change in U.S. strategy is required to accomplish the stated goal of defeating the Islamic State. Still others argue that the stated goal might be unrealistic and that an alternative approach could consist of containing the Islamic State’s area of control within Iraq, or even accepting a de facto partition of Iraq. See also CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
# Contents

Brief Historical Overview................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
The U.S. Intervention and Post-Saddam Transition................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
  Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System........................................................................................................... 2
  Permanent Constitution................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
  December 15, 2005, Elections Put Maliki at the Helm............................................................................................................................... 4
  Governance Strengthens and Sectarian Conflict Abates........................................................................................................... 6
  Second Provincial Elections in 2009........................................................................................................................................................................... 6
  The March 7, 2010 National Elections........................................................................................................................................................................... 7
U.S. Involvement Winds Down: 2009-2011................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
  The Post-2011 Diplomatic and Economic Relationship............................................................................................................................. 9
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Post-Withdrawal U.S. Support........................................................................................................................................................................ 10
  Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)............................................................................................................................ 11
  Major Arms Sales 2011-2013.................................................................................................................................................................................. 11
  Other Post-2011 Security Assistance and Training Programs........................................................................................................ 12
  Post-2011 Regional Reinforcement Capability............................................................................................................................. 13
Political and Security Threats Remaining at the Time of the U.S. Withdrawal.................................................................................................................. 14
  Armed Sunni Groups........................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
  Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State.............................................................................................................. 14
  Naqshabandi Order (JRTN) and Ex-Saddam Military Commanders .............................................................................................................. 15
  Sunni Tribal Leaders/Sons of Iraq Fighters.............................................................................................................................. 15
  The Sadr Faction and Shiite Militias........................................................................................................................................................................... 16
  Sadrist and other Shiite Militias/Popular Mobilization Forces........................................................................................................... 16
  The Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)......................................................................................................................... 18
  KRG Structure/Intra-Kurdish Divisions........................................................................................................................................................................... 18
  KRG-Baghdad Disputes.................................................................................................................................................................................. 19
  KRG Oil Exports............................................................................................................................................................................................ 19
  Tier Three Designations of the KDP and PUK.............................................................................................................................. 21
Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Unraveling.................................................................................................................................................................................. 21
  Insurrection Escalates in 2013.................................................................................................................................................................................. 21
Islamic State Challenge to Iraq’s Stability.................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
  Government Formation Process Amidst Security Collapse................................................................................................................ 24
U.S. Policy Response to the Islamic State in Iraq.................................................................................................................................................................................. 28
  U.S. Military Involvement Since Mid-2014........................................................................................................................................................................ 29
    Advice and Training........................................................................................................................................................................... 29
    Air Strikes................................................................................................................................................................................................. 30
    Weapons Resupply.................................................................................................................................................................................. 30
    Funding Issues............................................................................................................................................................................................ 31
  Results of the Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Way Forward.................................................................................................. 31
Economic Resources and Human Rights Issues.................................................................................................................................................................................. 34
  Economic Development and the Energy Sector......................................................................................................................... 34
  General Human Rights Issues........................................................................................................................................................................ 35
  Trafficking in Persons.................................................................................................................................................................................. 35
  Media and Free Expression........................................................................................................................................................................... 36
Corruption ........................................................................................................................................... 36
Religious Freedom/Situation of Religious Minorities ............................................................................. 36
Women’s Rights ....................................................................................................................................... 37
Mass Graves ......................................................................................................................................... 38
Regional Relationships .......................................................................................................................... 38
Iran ....................................................................................................................................................... 38
Syria ....................................................................................................................................................... 39
Turkey .................................................................................................................................................... 40
Gulf States ........................................................................................................................................... 41

Tables

Table 1. Major Political Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq ........................................................................ 3
Table 2. Major Coalitions in April 30, 2014, COR Elections ................................................................. 26
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq Since FY2003 .................................................................................... 42

Contacts

Author Contact Information .................................................................................................................. 43
Brief Historical Overview

The territory that is now Iraq fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century, divided into three provinces: Mosul Province, Baghdad Province, and Basra Province. Ottoman rule lasted until World War I, in which that empire was defeated and its dominions in the Middle East were taken over by the European powers that had defeated the Ottomans in the war. Britain took over Iraq (then still called “Mesopotamia”) under a League of Nations mandate, but ruled by Faysal I, a leader of the Hashemite family (which still rules modern-day Jordan). Iraq gained independence in 1932, with Faysal as King. Arab nationalist military leaders led by Abd al-Qarim Qasim overthrew the monarchy (King Faysal II) in July 1958, proclaiming a republic. Qasim invited Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani to return to Iraq but, beginning in 1961, he led Kurdish forces in a significant war for autonomy from Baghdad, with the ultimate objective of forming a separate Kurdish state. The Ba’th (“Renaissance”) Party organized against Qasim and took power briefly in a 1963 coup, but the first Ba’thist government was ousted in late 1963 by nationalist military leaders, who ruled until a successful second Ba’th takeover in 1968. In July 1979, Saddam Hussein ousted then-President Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr and assumed his position.

Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq about six months after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution ousted the U.S.-backed Shah in neighboring Iran. Saddam apparently perceived Iran’s revolution as an existential threat for its potential to inspire a Shiite-led revolution in Iraq, which is about 60% Shiite Arab, 20% Sunni Arab, and 18% Kurdish. In September 1980, Saddam launched war against Iran, but the war bogged down into a rough stalemate until the summer of 1988, when Iran accepted a ceasefire encapsulated in U.N. Security Council Resolution 598, adopted a year prior. Perhaps seeking a broader hegemony in the Gulf, in August 1990, Saddam ordered an invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which along with the other Persian Gulf monarchies had underwritten Iraq’s war effort against Iran. A U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces by the end of March 1991, and Iraq accepted an intrusive U.N.-led inspection regime to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including a nuclear program that apparently was close to producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. By the end of the 1990s, the inspection regime broke down over Iraqi objections to its intrusiveness and stated frustrations about a worldwide economic embargo imposed on Iraq after the Kuwait invasion. However, Iraq’s WMD program, it was later determined, had not been revived to any meaningful extent.

The U.S. Intervention and Post-Saddam Transition

A U.S.-led military coalition that included about 250,000 U.S. troops crossed the border from Kuwait into Iraq on March 19, 2003, to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein and eliminate suspected WMD programs that were retained. After several weeks of combat, the regime of Saddam Hussein fell on April 9, 2003. During the 2003-2011 presence of U.S. forces, Iraq completed a transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural political system in which varying sects and ideological and political factions compete in elections. A series of elections began in 2005, after a one-year occupation period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-governance that gave each community a share of power and prestige to promote cooperation and unity. Still, disputes over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq and were never fully resolved. These unresolved differences—muted during the last years of the U.S. military presence—reemerged in mid-2012 and have since returned Iraq to major conflict.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, all U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, removing impediments to U.S. business dealings with Iraq. During 2003-2004, Iraq was removed from the “terrorism list,” and the Iraq Sanctions Act (Sections 586-586J of P.L. 101-513), which codified a U.S. trade embargo imposed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, was terminated. In subsequent years, a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions removed most remaining “Chapter VII” U.N. sanctions against Iraq that stemmed from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait—opening Iraq to receiving arms from any country. Iraq still is required to comply with international proliferation regimes that bar it from reconstituting Saddam-era weapons of mass destruction programs, and still pays into a U.N.-run fund to compensate victims of the 1990 Kuwait invasion. On October 24, 2012, Iraq demonstrated its commitment to compliance with proliferation restrictions by signing the “Additional Protocol” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System

After the fall of Saddam’s regime, the United States set up an occupation structure based on concerns that immediate sovereignty would favor established Islamist and pro-Iranian factions over nascent pro-Western secular parties. In May 2003, President Bush named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer to head a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was recognized by the United Nations as an occupation authority. In July 2003, Bremer ended Iraqi transition negotiations and appointed a non-sovereign Iraqi advisory body, the 25-member Iraq Governing Council (IGC). U.S. and Iraqi negotiators, advised by a wide range of international officials and experts, drafted a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, interim constitution), which became effective on March 4, 2004.¹

On June 28, 2004, Bremer appointed an Iraqi interim government, ending the occupation period. The TAL also laid out a 2005 elections roadmap, based on agreement among all Iraqi factions that elections should determine future political outcomes. The interim government was headed by a prime minister (Iyad al-Allawi) and a president (Sunni tribalist Ghazi al-Yawar). It was heavily populated by parties and factions that had long campaigned to oust Saddam.

In accordance with the dates specified in the TAL, the first elections process, on January 30, 2005, produced a 275-seat transitional parliament and government that supervised writing a new constitution, held a public referendum on a new constitution, and then held elections for a full-term government. Elections for four-year-term provincial councils in all 18 provinces (“provincial elections”) and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111 seats) were held concurrently. The election was conducted according to the “proportional representation/closed list” election system, in which voters chose among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or people). The ballot included 111 entities, nine of which were multi-party coalitions. Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population) boycotted and won only 17 seats in the transitional parliament. The government included PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president and Da’wa party leader Ibrahim al-Jafari as prime minister. Sunni Arabs held the posts of parliament speaker, deputy president, one of the deputy prime ministers, and six ministers, including defense.

¹ Text, in English, is at http://www.constitution.org/cons/iraq/TAL.html.
Table 1. Major Political Factions in Post-Saddam Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Leadership/Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Da’wa Party/State of Law Coalition</td>
<td>The largest faction of the Da’wa Party has been led since 2006 by Nuri al-Maliki, who displaced former Da’wa leader (and former Prime Minister) Ibrahim al-Jaafari. Da’wa was active against Saddam but also had operatives in some Persian Gulf states, including Kuwait, where they committed attacks against the ruling family during the 1980s. Da’wa is the core of the “State of Law” political coalition. Iraq’s current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abadi, is a Da’wa member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)</td>
<td>Current leader is Ammar al-Hakim, who succeeded his father Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim upon his death in 2009. The Hakims descend from the revered late Grand Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, who hosted Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he was in exile in Iraq during 1964-1978. Abd al-Aziz’s elder brother, Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim, headed the movement when it was an underground armed opposition group against Saddam, but he was killed outside a Najaf mosque shortly after returning to Iraq following Saddam’s overthrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadrists</td>
<td>Thirty-two year old Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr leads a sizeable Shiite political faction. Sadr is the son of revered Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al Sadr, who was killed by Saddam’s security forces in 1999, and a relative of Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, a Shiite theoretician and contemporary and colleague of Ayatollah Khomeini. Moqtada formed a Shiite militia called the Mahdi Army during the U.S. military presence, which was formally disbanded in 2009 but has regrouped under an alternate name to combat the Islamic State organization. The Sadrists have competed in all Iraqi elections since 2006. In 2014, the group competed under the “Al Ahrar” (Liberal) banner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish Factions: Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and Gorran</td>
<td>Masoud Barzani heads the KDP and is the elected President of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The PUK is led by Jalal Talabani, who was President of Iraq until the 2014 government section process. Iraq’s current president, Fouad Masoum, is a senior PUK leader as well. Gorran (“Change”) is an offshoot of the PUK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Alliance/“Iraqiya”</td>
<td>Led by Iyad al-Allawi, a longtime anti-Saddam activist who was transitional Prime Minister during June 2004-February 2005. Allawi is a Shiite Muslim but most of his bloc’s supporters are Sunnis, of which many are ex-Baath Party members. Iraqyya bloc fractured after the 2010 national election into blocs loyal to Allawi and to various Sunni leaders including ex-COR peaker Osama al-Nujaifi and deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq. Allawi and Nujaifi are both vice presidents in the government formed in September 2014, and Mutlaq has retained his deputy prime ministerial post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Islamic Party</td>
<td>Sunni Islamist faction that was underground during Saddam’s rule, joined post-Saddam politics, and was headed by then Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. The group was part of the Iraqyya alliance in the 2010 election. Hashimi fled a Maliki-ordered arrest warrant in late 2011 and has remained mostly in Turkey since.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Various press reports and author conversations with Iraq experts.

Permanent Constitution

A 55-member drafting committee—in which Sunnis were underrepresented—produced a draft constitution, which was adopted in a public referendum of October 15, 2005. It major provisions are as follows:

2 Text of the Iraqi constitution is at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html.
• It does not stipulate any ethnic or sectarian-based distribution of positions. An informal agreement developed in the process of forming successive governments in which a Shiite Muslim is Prime Minister, a Kurd is President, and a Sunni is Speaker of the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament).

• In Article 113, it acknowledges that the three Kurdish-controlled provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah constitute a legal “region” administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Legal regions are able to organize internal security forces, legitimizing the Kurds’ fielding of their peshmerga militia (Article 117). This continued a TAL provision. There would be a December 31, 2007, deadline to hold a referendum on whether Kirkuk (Tamim Province) would join the Kurdish region (Article 140).

• Any two or more provinces may join together to form a new “region,” according to an October 2006 law on formation of regions. Holding a referendum on region formation requires obtaining signatures of 10% of the provinces’ voters, or the support of one-third of the members of their provincial councils.

• Islam was designated as “a main source” of legislation.

• It stipulates that a “Federation Council” (Article 62) would be formed by future law as a second parliamentary chamber with size and powers to be determined. The body has not been formed to date.

• It sets a 25% electoral goal for women (Article 47).

• Families are to choose which courts to use for family issues (Article 41), and only primary education is mandatory (Article 34). Islamic law experts and civil law judges would serve on the federal supreme court (Article 89).

• The central government is to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields” in proportion to population, and “regions” will have a role in allocating revenues from new energy discoveries (Article 109).

These provisions left many disputes unresolved, particularly the balance between central government and regional and local authority. The TAL made approval of the constitution subject to a veto if a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces voted it down. Sunnis registered in large numbers (70%-85%) to try to defeat the constitution, despite a U.S.-mediated agreement of October 11, 2005, to have a future vote on amendments to the constitution. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively, but the constitution was adopted because Nineveh Province voted 55% “no”—short of the two-thirds “no” majority needed to vote the constitution down.

December 15, 2005, Elections Put Maliki at the Helm

The December 15, 2005, elections were for a full-term (four-year) national government (also in line with the schedule laid out in the TAL). Each province contributed a set number of seats to a “Council of Representatives” (COR), a formula adopted to attract Sunni participation. There were 361 political “entities,” including 19 multi-party coalitions, competing in a “closed list” voting system (in which votes are cast only for parties and coalitions, not individual candidates). The Shiites and Kurds again emerged dominant. The COR was inaugurated on March 16, 2006, and Jafari was replaced with a then-obscure Da’wa figure, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, as Prime Minister. Talabani was selected to continue as president, with deputies Adel Abd al-Mahdi (incumbent) of
ISCI and Tariq al-Hashimi, leader of the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Of the 37 Cabinet posts, there were 19 Shiites; 9 Sunnis; 8 Kurds; and 1 Christian. Four were women.


The election did not resolve the Sunnis’ grievances over their diminished positions in the power structure, and subsequent events reinforced their political weakness and sense of resentment. The bombing of a major Shiite shrine (Al Askari Mosque) in the Sunni-dominated city of Samarra (Salahuddin Province) in February 2006 set off major Sunni-Shiite violence that became so serious that many experts, by the end of 2006, were considering the U.S. mission as failing. The “Iraq Study Group” concluded that U.S. policy required major change.3

In August 2006, the United States and Iraq agreed on “benchmarks” that, if implemented, might achieve political reconciliation. Under Section 1314 of a FY2007 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 110-28), “progress” on 18 political and security benchmarks—as assessed in Administration reports due by July 15, 2007, and September 15, 2007—was required for the United States to provide $1.5 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Iraq.4 In early 2007, the United States began a “surge” of about 30,000 additional U.S. forces—bringing U.S. troop levels from their 2004-2006 levels of 138,000 to a high of about 170,000—intended to blunt insurgent momentum and take advantage of growing Sunni Arab rejection of Islamist extremist groups. The Administration cited as partial justification for the surge the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation of such a step. As 2008 progressed, citing the achievement of many of the agreed benchmarks and a dramatic drop in sectarian violence, the Bush Administration asserted that political reconciliation was advancing. However, U.S. officials maintained that the extent and durability of the reconciliation would depend on further compromises among ethnic groups.

---

**United Nations Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI)**

The United Nations contributes to political reconciliation through its U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI). The head of UNAMI is also the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Iraq. The mandate of UNAMI was established in 2003 and has been renewed each July since in a U.N. Security Council resolution. UNAMI’s primary activities have been to help build civil society, assist vulnerable populations, consult on possible solutions to the Arab-Kurd dispute over Kirkuk Province, and resolve the status of the Iranian opposition group People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran that remains in Iraq (see below). The first head of the office was killed in a car bombing on his headquarters in August 2003. In February 2015, Jan Kubis, the former head of UNAMA in Afghanistan, replaced Bulgarian diplomat Nickolay Mladenov as head of UNAMI.

---

3 “The Iraq Study Group Report.” Vintage Books, 2006. The Iraq Study Group was funded by the conference report on P.L. 109-234, FY2006 supplemental, which provided $1 million to the U.S. Institute of Peace for operations of an Iraq Study Group. The legislation did not specify the Group’s exact mandate or its composition.

4 President Bush exercised the waiver provision of that law in order to provide that aid. The law also mandated an assessment by the Government Accountability Office, by September 1, 2007, of Iraqi performance on the benchmarks, as well as an outside assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Governance Strengthens and Sectarian Conflict Abates

The passage of Iraqi laws in 2008 that were considered crucial to reconciliation, continued reductions in violence accomplished by the U.S. surge, and the Sunni militant turn away from violence, facilitated political stabilization. A March 2008 offensive ordered by Maliki against the Sadr faction and other militants in Basra and environs (Operation Charge of the Knights) pacified the city and caused many Sunnis and Kurds to see Maliki as willing to take on armed groups even if they were Shiite. This contributed to a decision in July 2008 by several Sunni ministers to end a one-year boycott of the Cabinet.

U.S. officials also pressed Maliki to devolve power from Baghdad, in large part to give Iraq’s Sunnis more ownership of their own affairs and regions. Such devolution could take the form of establishment of new “regions,” modeled along the lines of the KRG, or allowing provinces or groups of provinces more autonomy and powers. Opponents of that proposal asserted that devolving power from the central government would lead to the breakup of Iraq.

In part to address U.S. advice, in 2008, a “provincial powers law” (Law Number 21) was adopted to decentralize governance by delineating substantial powers for provincial governing councils, such as enacting provincial legislation, regulations, and procedures, and choosing the province’s governor and two deputy governors. The provincial administrations, which serve four-year terms, draft provincial budgets and implement federal policies. Some central government funds are given as grants directly to provincial administrations for their use. Provinces have a greater claim on Iraqi financial resources than do districts, and many communities support converting their areas into provinces. The 2008 law replaced a 1969 Provinces Law (Number 159).

Law 21 has been amended on several occasions to try to accommodate restive areas of Iraq. A June 2013 amendment gave provincial governments substantially more power, a move intended to satisfy Sunnis. In December 2013, the central government announced it would convert the district of Halabja into a separate province—Halabja is symbolic to the Kurds because of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons there in 1988. In January 2014, the government announced other districts that would undergo similar conversions: Fallujah (in Anbar Province), a hotbed of Sunni restiveness; Tuz Khurmato (in Salahuddin Province) and Tal Affar (in Nineveh Province), both of which have Turkmen majorities; and the Nineveh Plains (also in Nineveh), which has a mostly Assyrian Christian population. These announcements appeared intended to keep minorities and Sunnis on the side of the government, but have not been implemented to date.

Second Provincial Elections in 2009

The second set of provincial elections were planned for October 1, 2008, but were postponed when Kurdish opposition caused a presidential veto of a July 2008 draft election law that would have diluted Kurdish dominance of the Kirkuk provincial government. On September 24, 2008, the COR adopted an election law, providing for the provincial elections by January 31, 2009, but postponing provincial elections in Kirkuk and the three KRG provinces. About 14,500 candidates (including 4,000 women) vied for the 440 provincial council seats in the 14 Arab-dominated provinces of Iraq. About 17 million Iraqis (any Iraqi 18 years of age or older) were eligible for the vote, which was run by the Iraqi Higher Election Commission (IHEC). Pre-election violence was minimal but turnout was lower than expected at about 51%.

The certified vote totals (March 29, 2009) gave Maliki’s State of Law Coalition a very strong 126 out of the 440 seats available (28%). Its main Shiite rival, ISCI, went from 200 council seats to
only 50, a result observers attributed to its perceived close ties to Iran. Iyad al-Allawi’s faction won 26 seats, a gain of 8 seats, and a Sunni faction loyal to Tariq al-Hashimi won 32 seats, a loss of 15. Sunni tribal leaders who boycotted the 2005 elections participated in the 2009 elections. Their slate came in first in Anbar Province. Although Maliki’s State of Law coalition fared well, his party still needed to strike bargains with rival factions to form provincial administrations.

The March 7, 2010 National Elections

With the strong showing of his slate in the provincial elections, Maliki was favored to retain his position in the March 7, 2010 COR elections and retain his post. Yet, as 2009 progressed, Maliki’s image as protector of law and order was tarnished by several high-profile attacks, including major bombings in Baghdad on August 20, 2009, in which the buildings housing the Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs were heavily damaged. As Maliki’s image faded, Shiite unity broke down and a strong rival Shiite slate took shape—the “Iraqi National Alliance (INA)” consisting of ISCI, the Sadrists, and other Shiite figures. Sunni Arabs rallied around the outwardly cross-sectarian but mostly Sunni “Iraq National Movement” (Iraqiyia) of former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi.

The election law passed by the COR in November 2009 expanded the size of the COR to 325 total seats. Of these, 310 were allocated by province, with the constituency sizes ranging from Baghdad’s 68 seats to Muthanna’s seven. The remaining 15 seats were minority reserved seats and “compensatory seats”—seats allocated from “leftover” votes for parties and slates that did not meet a minimum threshold to win a seat.

Still, the goal of bringing Sunni Arabs further into the political structure was jeopardized when the Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC, the successor to the De-Baathification Commission that worked since the fall of Saddam to purge former Baathists from government) invalidated the candidacies of 499 individuals (out of 6,500 candidates running) on various slates. Appeals reinstated many of them. Maliki later named the Minister for Human Rights to also serve as JAC chairman. The JAC continues to vet candidates.

The final candidate list contained about 6,170 total candidates spanning 85 coalitions. Total turnout was about 62%, and certified results were announced on June 1, 2010, showing Iraqiyia winning two seats more than did State of Law. The Iraqi constitution (Article 73) mandates that the COR “bloc with the largest number” of members should be afforded the first opportunity to form a government. However, on March 28, 2010, Iraq’s Supreme Court ruled that a coalition that forms after the election could be deemed to meet that requirement. On October 1, 2010, a six-month deadlock among major blocs over major positions broke when Maliki received the backing of most of the 40 COR Sadrist deputies. The Obama Administration initially appeared to favor Allawi’s efforts to form a governing coalition but, as Alawi’s effort failed, the Administration acquiesced to a second Maliki term.

On November 10, 2010, an “Irbil Agreement” was reached in which (1) Maliki and Talabani would serve another term; (2) Iraqiyia would be extensively represented in government—one of its figures would become COR Speaker, another would be defense minister, and another (presumably Allawi himself) would chair an oversight body called the “National Council for Strategic Policies”;5 and (3) de-Baathification laws would be eased. At the November 11, 2010,

COR session to implement the agreement, Iraqiyya figure Usama al-Nujaifi (brother of Nineveh Governor Atheel Nujaifi) was elected COR speaker. Several days later, Talabani was reelected president and subsequently tapped Maliki as prime minister-designate. Maliki met the December 25, 2010 to achieve COR confirmation of a Cabinet, which divided the positions among the major factions, but Maliki formally held the positions of Defense Minister, Interior Minister, and Minister of State for National Security. Other officials headed these ministries on an “acting” basis, without the full authority they would normally have as COR-approved ministers.

**U.S. Involvement Winds Down: 2009-2011**

As the second full term government took shape in Iraq, the United States began implementing its long-planned military withdrawal from Iraq. A November 2008 U.S.-Iraq “Security Agreement” (SA), which took effect on January 1, 2009, stipulated that the withdrawal was to be completed by the end of 2011. On February 27, 2009, President Obama announced that U.S. troop levels in Iraq would decline to 50,000 by September 2010 (from 138,000 in early 2009) and the U.S. mission would shift from combat to training the ISF. By the formal end of the U.S. combat mission on August 31, 2010, the size of the U.S. force was 47,000 and it declined steadily thereafter until the last U.S. troop contingent crossed into Kuwait on December 18, 2011.

With the final withdrawal deadline approaching, fears of expanded Iranian influence and perceived remaining deficiencies in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) caused U.S. officials to seek to revise the SA to keep some U.S. troops in Iraq after 2011. Some U.S. experts feared the rifts among major ethnic and sectarian communities were still wide enough that Iraq could still become a “failed state” unless some U.S. troops remained. U.S. officials emphasized that the ISF remained unable to defend Iraq’s airspace and borders, and Iraqi commanders indicated that the ISF would be unable to execute full external defense until 2020-2024. Renegotiating the SA to allow for a continued U.S. troop presence required discussions with the Iraqi government and a ratification vote of the Iraqi COR; Iraq’s constitution requires a COR vote on formal bilateral agreements with foreign countries.

Several high-level U.S. visits and statements urged the Iraqis to consider extending the U.S. troop presence. Maliki told Speaker of the House John Boehner during his April 16, 2011, visit to Baghdad that Iraq would welcome U.S. training and arms after that time. Subsequently, Maliki stated that a continued U.S. troops presence would require a “consensus” among political blocs (which he later defined as at least 70% concurrence)—an apparent effort to isolate the Sadr faction, the most vocal opponent of a continuing U.S. presence. On August 3, 2011, most major factions gave Maliki their backing to negotiate an SA extension, but Sadr threatened to activate his Mahdi Army militia to oppose any extension of the U.S. presence. As U.S.-Iraq negotiations on a post-2011 U.S. presence got underway, scenarios and proposals ranging from 3,000 to 15,000 remaining U.S. troops were widely discussed.

---

With Sadrist opposition unyielding, on October 5, 2011, Iraq stated that it would not extend the legal protections contained in the existing SA. That stipulation failed to meet the Defense Department requirements that U.S. soldiers not be subject to prosecution under Iraq’s constitution and its laws. On October 21, 2011, President Obama announced that the United States and Iraq had agreed that, in accordance with the SA, all U.S. troops would be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Whether the Obama Administration made substantial efforts to overcome the Iraqi resistance remains an issue of debate. In his 2011 Iraq withdrawal announcement, President Obama stated that, through U.S. assistance programs, the United States would be able to continue to develop all facets of the bilateral relationship with Iraq and help strengthen its institutions. He and other U.S. officials asserted that the United States would continue to help Iraq secure itself, but using programs commonly provided for other countries. Administration officials stressed that the U.S. political and residual security-related presence would be sufficient to ensure that Iraq remained stable, allied to the United States, continuing to move toward full democracy, and economically growing.

The Post-2011 Diplomatic and Economic Relationship

The cornerstone of the bilateral relationship was to be the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which entered into effect at the same time as the SA. The SFA outlined long-term U.S.-Iraqi relations with the intent of orienting Iraq’s politics and its economy toward the West and the developed nations, and reducing its reliance on Iran or other regional states. The SFA set up a Higher Coordination Committee (HCC) as an institutional framework for high-level U.S.-Iraq meetings, and subordinate Joint Coordinating Committees.

The SFA provides for the following (among other provisions):

- U.S.-Iraq cooperation “based on mutual respect,” and that the United States will not use Iraqi facilities to launch any attacks against third countries, and will not seek permanent bases.
- U.S. support for Iraqi democracy and support for Iraq in regional and international organizations.
- U.S.-Iraqi dialogue to increase Iraq’s economic development, including through the Dialogue on Economic Cooperation and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The United States and Iraq announced on March 6, 2013, that a bilateral TIFA had been finalized.
- Promotion of Iraq’s development of its electricity, oil, and gas sector.
- U.S.-Iraq dialogue on agricultural issues and promotion of Iraqi participation in agricultural programs run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and USAID.
- Cultural cooperation through several exchange programs, such as the Youth Exchange and Study Program and the International Visitor Leadership Program. At least 1,000 Iraqi students are studying in the United States.

State Department-run aid programs, implemented mainly through Economic Support Funds (ESF), are intended to fulfill the objectives of the SFA, according to State Department budget
documents. Most U.S. economic aid to Iraq now goes to programs to promote democracy, adherence to international standards of human rights, rule of law, and conflict resolution. Programs funded by the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) focus on rule of law, moving away from previous use of INL funds for police training. Funding continues for counterterrorism operations (NADR funds), and for anti-corruption initiatives. U.S. officials stress that, for programs run by USAID in Iraq, Iraq matches one-for-one the U.S. funding contribution.

The State Department became the lead U.S. agency in Iraq as of October 1, 2011, and closed its “Office of the Iraq Transition Coordinator” in March 2012. In July 2011, as part of the transition to State leadership in Iraq, the United States formally opened consulates in Basra, Irbil, and Kirkuk. An embassy branch office was considered for Mosul but cost and security issues kept the U.S. facility there limited to a diplomatic office. The Kirkuk consulate closed at the end of July 2012 in part to save costs. The State Department has planned to replace the U.S. consulate in Irbil with a New Consulate Compound in Irbil, and the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriation, P.L. 113-76, provided $250 million for that purpose. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, built at a cost of about $750 million, controlled over 16,000 personnel at the time of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal—about half of which were contractors—a number that fell to about 5,500 at the end of 2013.11 Of the contractors, most were on missions to protect the U.S. Embassy and consulates, and other U.S. personnel and facilities throughout Iraq. The U.S. Ambassador in Iraq is Stuart Jones, who was sworn in on September 17, 2014.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Post-Withdrawal U.S. Support

At the time of the U.S. withdrawal, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was assessed as a relatively well-trained and disciplined force of about 800,000, of which about 350,000 were Iraqi Army and the remainder were mostly Iraqi Police Service personnel. Of the military forces, a mostly-Shiite Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), of which about 4,100 are Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), were considered highly capable but reported directly to Maliki’s “Office of the Commander-in-Chief. The ISF ground forces were also relatively well armed, utilizing heavy armor supplied by the United States. However, the Air Force remained limited at the time of the withdrawal, utilizing mostly propeller-driven aircraft.

Following the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, competent commanders were in some cases replaced by Maliki loyalists, and corruption was considered rife by all accounts. Many commanders viewed their positions as financial and political rewards rather than tasks and responsibilities to be managed. By many accounts, the force numbers on the payrolls far exceeded the numbers actively serving: Iraqi investigations in 2014 found that much of the ISF personnel were “ghost” or “no-show” forces. During his April 2014 visit to the United States, Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi did not dispute assertions that the Iraqi military is about 80% Shiite Muslim—possibly explaining why some Iraqi Sunnis say they consider the ISF an “occupation force” or an “Iranian force.” The collapse of the ISF in northern Iraq in the face of the Islamic State offensive in 2014 might have left the Iraqi Army regular force with as few as 50,000 personnel.

---

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)

The Office of Security Cooperation—Iraq (OSC-I), operating under the authority of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, was to be the primary Iraq-based U.S. entity tasked with interacting with the post-2011 Iraqi military. Its primary mission is to administer the foreign military sales (FMS) programs (U.S. arms sales to Iraq). It is funded with foreign military financing (FMF) funds, discussed in the aid table below. Prior to the 2014 ISIL-led challenge, it worked out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and five other locations around Iraq (Kirkuk Regional Airport Base, Tikrit, Besmaya, Umm Qasr, and Taji). It left the facility in Tikrit before the Islamic State captured that city in June 2014, and has not returned to it despite Tikrit’s recapture in April 2015.

Total OCS-I personnel number over 3,500, most of which are security contractors. Of the staff, about 175 are U.S. military personnel and an additional 45 are Defense Department civilians. Some of these personnel have been seconded to the anti-Islamic State missions discussed below, but some remain as OSC-I personnel performing the functions they have since 2012. About 46 members of the staff administer the FMS program and other security assistance programs such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

Major Arms Sales 2011-2013

One pillar of the U.S. security effort for Iraq after the withdrawal was to continue to supply Iraq with substantial quantities of arms. In August 2012, the United States completed delivery to Iraq of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks. Iraq paid for $800 million of the $860 million cost of the tanks with national funds. In December 2012, the U.S. Navy delivered two support ships to Iraq to assist Iraq’s fast-attack and patrol boats in securing its offshore oil platforms and other coastal locations. The United States also sold Iraq equipment that its security forces can use to restrict the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to move contraband across Iraq’s borders and checkpoints (RAPISCAN system vehicles), at a cost of about $600 million. Some refurbished air defense guns were provided gratis as excess defense articles (EDA).

F-16s

The largest FMS case is the sale of 36 U.S.-made F-16 combat aircraft to Iraq, notified to Congress in two equal tranches, the latest of which was made on December 12, 2011 (Transmittal No. 11-46). The total value of the sale of 36 F-16s is up to $6.5 billion when all parts, training, and weaponry are included. As noted above, deliveries of the aircraft began in July 2014, although the planes are being delivered to Iraqi control at a U.S. air base in Arizona prior to securing from the Islamic State the area around their permanent home at Balad Air Base, north of Baghdad. The aircraft and their trained pilots are expected to deploy to Iraq later in 2015.

Apache Attack Helicopters, Air Defense Equipment, and Stingers

In 2013 Iraq requested to purchase from the United States the Integrated Air Defense System and Apache attack helicopters. The sale of the Air Defense system was notified to Congress on August 5, 2013, with a value of $2.4 billion, including 681 Stinger shoulder held units, three Hawk anti-aircraft batteries, and other equipment. DSCA simultaneously notified about $2.3

billion worth of additional sales to Iraq including of Stryker nuclear, chemical, and biological equipment reconnaissance vehicles, 12 Bell helicopters, the Mobile Troposscatter Radio System, and maintenance support.

The provision of Apaches was to involve leasing of six of the helicopters, with an estimated cost of about $1.37 billion, and the sale of 24 more, with an estimated value of $4.8 billion. As noted below, the provision of the Apaches was held up by some in Congress until the December 2013 Islamic State-led offensive in Anbar Province. However, Iraq subsequently allowed the deal to lapse, possibly because of a lack of trained manpower to use the weapon effectively.13

Other Suppliers. The United States is not the only arms supplier to Iraq. In October 2012, Iraq and Russia signed deals for Russian arms worth about $4.2 billion. In November 2013, Russia delivered four Mi-35 attack helicopters to Iraq, and Russia quickly delivered several combat aircraft in late June 2014 that Iraq sought to fill a gap in its air attack capabilities. In October 2012, Iraq agreed to buy 28 Czech-made military aircraft, a deal valued at about $1 billion.14 In December 12, 2013, South Korea signed a deal to export 24 FA-50 light fighter jets to Iraq at an estimated cost of $1.1 billion; the aircraft will be delivered between 2015 and 2016.15

Other Post-2011 Security Assistance and Training Programs

OSC-I’s mandate included training and assistance programs for the Iraq military. Because the United States and Iraq did not conclude a long term Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that granted legal immunities to U.S. military personnel, the 160 OSC-I personnel involved in these programs, which focused mostly on counterterrorism and naval and air defense, were mostly contractors. Some were embedded with Iraqi forces not only tactically, but at the institutional level by advising Iraqi security ministries and its command structure.

As Sunni unrest increased in 2012, Iraq sought additional security cooperation with the United States. In August 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey said that “I think [Iraqi leaders] recognize their capabilities may require yet more additional development and I think they’re reaching out to us to see if we can help them with that.”16 Iraq reportedly expressed to Dempsey interest in expanded U.S. training of the ISF and joint exercises. Subsequently, a unit of Army Special Operations forces reportedly deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and help with intelligence against AQ-I/ISIL.17 (These forces operated under a limited SOFA or related understanding crafted for this purpose.) Other reports suggest that, in late 2012, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary forces assumed some of the DOD mission of helping Iraqi counter-terrorism forces (CTS) against ISIL in western Iraq, while also potentially working against ISIL in Syria as well.

During December 5-6, 2012, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller and acting Under Secretary of State for International Security Rose Gottemoeller visited Iraq and a

13 http://www.janes.com/article/43680/iraq-passes-on-apache-buy
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with Iraq, appearing to address many of the issues that were hampering OSC-I from performing its mission to its full potential. The MoU provided for

- high level U.S.-Iraq military exchanges,
- professional military education cooperation,
- counter-terrorism cooperation,
- the development of defense intelligence capabilities, and
- joint exercises.

The concept of enhanced U.S.-Iraq cooperation gained further consideration in 2013. During his November 1, 2013, meeting with President Obama, Maliki reportedly discussed enhanced security cooperation, including expanded access to U.S. intelligence. The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Maliki’s meeting with President Obama did not specify any U.S. commitments to this level of cooperation, but did express a “shared assessment of al Qaida affiliated groups threatening Iraq.”

Aside from increasing U.S. training for the ISF, the U.S. military subsequently sought to integrate the ISF into regional security exercises. The United States arranged Iraq’s participation in the regional Eager Lion military exercise series in Jordan. Iraq also participated in the U.S.-led international mine countermeasures exercise off Bahrain in 2013. In July 2013, the United States convened a strategic dialogue that includes Iraq, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt joined the subsequent session of the dialogue the week of November 18, 2013.

**Police Development Program**

A separate program, the Police Development Program, was intended to maintain the proficiency of Iraq’s police forces. It was the largest program that in 2012 transitioned from DOD to State Department lead, using International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds. However, Iraq’s drive to emerge from U.S. tutelage produced apparent Iraqi disinterest in the PDP. By late 2012, it consisted of only 36 advisers, about 10% of what was envisioned as an advisory force of 350, and it is being phased out entirely during 2013. Two facilities built with over $200 million in U.S. funds (Baghdad Police College Annex and part of the U.S. consulate in Basra) were turned over to the Iraqi government by the end of 2012. The program was later discontinued.

**Post-2011 Regional Reinforcement Capability**

At the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, U.S. officials asserted that the United States also would retain a significant force in the Persian Gulf, capable of intervening in Iraq if ordered. The United States has maintained about 35,000 military personnel in the region, including about 10,000 mostly U.S. Army forces in Kuwait, about 40% of which are combat-ready rather than purely support forces. There is also prepositioned armor there and in Qatar. There are about 7,000 mostly Air Force personnel in Qatar; 5,000 mostly Navy personnel in Bahrain; and about 5,000

---


mostly Air Force and Navy in the UAE, with very small numbers in Saudi Arabia and Oman. The rest are part of at least one aircraft carrier task force in or near the Gulf at any given time. The forces are in the Gulf under bilateral defense cooperation agreements with all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that give the United States access to military facilities to station forces and preposition some heavy armor.

**Political and Security Threats Remaining at the Time of the U.S. Withdrawal**

Even though overall violence in Iraq was relatively low at the time of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, numerous armed groups remained, and the grievances that appeared to be managed or attenuated by the U.S. military presence remained unresolved. The sections below discuss the various threats to the political and security situation, and the positions and actions of some of the groups in causing and responding to the Islamic State challenge to the integrity of the Iraqi state.

**Armed Sunni Groups**

At the time of the completion of the U.S. withdrawal, some Sunni antigovernment armed groups were still operating, although at low levels of activity. Such groups included Baath Party and Saddam Hussein supporters as well as hardline Islamists, some of whom were linked to Al Qaeda. After the U.S. military departure in 2011, these groups increased their armed opposition to the Maliki government, drawing on increasing Sunni resentment of Shiite political domination.

**Al Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Islamic State**

Iraq’s one-time Al Qaeda affiliate constitutes the most violent component of the Sunni rebellion that has become a major threat to Iraqi stability. Its antecedent called itself Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I), which was led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death by U.S. airstrike in 2006. In 2013 it adopted the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or, alternately, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In June 2014, the group changed its name to the Islamic State (IS), and declared its leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, as the “Commander of the Faithful”—a term essentially declaring him leader of all Muslims. It also declared a caliphate in the territory it controls in Iraq and Syria. AQ-I was an Al Qaeda affiliate, but the Islamic State has publicly broken with Al Qaeda leaders based in Pakistan.

Baghdadi asserts a vision of an Islamic caliphate spanning the Islamic world. A major question is whether it has ambitions to attack the U.S. homeland, U.S. facilities or personnel in or outside the Middle East, or other non-Muslim countries. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the Islamic State can “muster” between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in both Iraq and Syria. In October 2012, Jordanian authorities disrupted an alleged plot by AQ-I to bomb multiple targets in Amman, Jordan, possibly including the U.S. Embassy there.

---

21 An antecedent of AQ-I was named by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in March 2004 and the designation applies to AQ-I and now the Islamic State.

Largely dormant during 2009-2012, ISIL-initiated attacks escalated significantly after an assault on Sunni protesters in the town of Hawija on April 23, 2013. The group increased its violent activity to about 40 mass casualty attacks per month, far more than the 10 per month of 2010, and including attacks spanning multiple cities. In 2013, the group began asserting control of territory and operating training camps close to the Syria border. The head of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matt Olsen, told Congress on November 14, 2013, that ISIL was the strongest it had been since its peak in 2006. Its capture of large portions of Iraqi territory since mid-2014 is discussed below.

**Naqshabandi Order (JRTN) and Ex-Saddam Military Commanders**

Some insurgent groups are composed of members of the Saddam-era regime or Iraqi military. These groups include the 1920 Revolution Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, and, most prominently, the Naqshabandi Order—known by its Arabic acronym “JRTN.” The JRTN, based primarily in Nineveh Province, has been designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The groups disagree with the Islamic State’s ideology but apparently support it as a Sunni organization opposed to the Iraqi government.

In mid-2012, JRTN attacks on U.S. facilities in northern Iraq apparently contributed to the State Department decision to close the Kirkuk consulate. In February 2013 Sunnis linked to the JRTN circulated praise for the protests from the highest-ranking Saddam regime figure still at large, Izzat Ibrahim al Duri. He reportedly issued anti-Iraq government statements during the course of the 2014 Islamic State offensive. Iraqi officials say they killed Duri during a battle in northern Iraq in early May 2015, but that claim awaits confirmation.

Some JRTN ex-Saddam military officers operate under a separate structure called the “General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries,” which includes Sunni tribal fighters and other ex-insurgent figures. Some of these ex-military officers reportedly are helping the Islamic State by providing tactical and strategic military planning.

**Sunni Tribal Leaders/Sons of Iraq Fighters**

Approximately 100,000 Iraqi Sunnis are known as “Sons of Iraq,” also called Awakening, or “Sahwa” fighters—gunmen who fought the U.S. military during 2003-2006 but then cooperated with U.S. forces against AQ-I. The Iraqi government had promised all of the Sons of Iraq integration into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or government jobs but, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, only about two-thirds of the Sons had received these benefits. The remainder continued to man checkpoints in Sunni areas and were paid about $500 per month by the government but were not formally added to security ministry rolls. As a result, some of these fighters became disillusioned with the Maliki government and some (numbers unknown) reportedly joined the Islamic State offensives in 2014.

---


26 The acronym stands for Jaysh al-Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi, which translated means Army of the Men of the Naqshabandi Order.
Many of the Sons of Iraq belong to the tribes of Anbar Province that seek a more representative central government in Baghdad but, for the most part, oppose the Islamic State. The tribal leaders include Ahmad Abu Risha, Ali Hatem Suleiman al-Dulaymi, and Majid al-Ali al-Sulayman al-Dulaymi. Abu Risha is the brother of the slain tribal leader Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who, with Ali Hatem, were key figures in starting the Awakening movement that aligned Sunni insurgents with the U.S. military. Anbar tribal figures generally oppose the involvement of Shiite militiamen in Iraqi efforts to recapture Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State, and instead are trying to recruit Sunni tribal fighters to spearhead government offensives against Islamic State positions. Some Anbar tribal leaders and other Sunni figures have visited Washington D.C. in the spring of 2015, in part requesting direct transfer of U.S. weaponry to Sunnis who oppose the Islamic State.

Some of the Sons of Iraq and their tribal recruiters support Sunni Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Scholars Association (MSA). The MSA is led by Harith al-Dari, who in 2006 fled U.S. counter-insurgency operations to live in Jordan. Harith al-Dari’s son, Muthana, reportedly is active against the government. The degree to which supporters of the MSA and the Dari clan are supporting the Islamic State offensive, if at all, is unclear.

The Sadr Faction and Shiite Militias

The 2006-2008 period of sectarian conflict was fueled in part by Shiite militias, such as those formed by Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Sadr is considered an Iraqi “nationalist,” who did not go into exile during Saddam’s rule, and his following is particularly strong among lower class Shiites. Sadr has sometimes tried to reach out to Sunni leaders in an effort to demonstrate opposition to sectarianism and bolster his nationalist credentials.

Sadr’s professed nationalism in part explains his opposition to the United States for most of the period of the large U.S. military presence in Iraq. Sadr formed his large Mahdi Army militia in 2004 to combat the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and U.S. troops fought several major battles with the Mahdi Army and an offshoot, called the “Special Groups,” from 2004 to 2008. Sadr, through demonstrations and threats of armed action by militias under his control, pressed for the full U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011.

Sadr’s campaign meshed with Iran’s policy to ensure that the United States completely withdrew from Iraq. U.S. officials accused Shiite militias of causing an elevated level of U.S. troop deaths in June 2011 (14 killed), and Iran of arming these militias with upgraded rocket-propelled munitions, such as Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions (IRAMs). The United States pressed the Iraqi government to insist that Iran to stop aiding the militias but, until the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, rocket attacks continued against the U.S. consulate in Basra.

Sadrists and other Shiite Militias/Popular Mobilization Forces

The Sadrist pressure on the United States was amplified by the activities of several other Shiite militias, some of which left Sadr’s control. These include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH, League of the Family of the Righteous), Khata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Battalions), and the Promised Day Brigade, the latter organization of which still answers to Sadr. In June 2009, Khata’ib Hezbollah was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). On November 8, 2012, the Treasury Department designated several Khata’ib Hezbollah operatives as terrorism supporting entities under Executive Order 13224. AAH’s leader, Qais al-Khazali, took refuge in
Iran in 2010 after three years in U.S. custody for his alleged role in a 2005 raid that killed five American soldiers.

After the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, most Shiite militia activity subsided. Much of the Mahdi Army had already been slowly integrating into the political process as a charity and employment network called *Mumahidoon* ("those who pave the way"). In 2011, AAH’s leaders, including Khazali, returned from Iran and opened political offices to recruit loyalists and set up social service programs. The group did not compete in April 2013 provincial elections, but allied with Maliki in the 2014 elections (Al Sadiqun, “the Friends,” slate 218).  

One major Shiite militia is not a Sadrist offshoot, and did not conduct attacks against the United States during 2003-11. The Badr Organization was the armed wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a mainstream Shiite party, headed now by Ammar al-Hakim. The Badr Organization largely disarmed after Saddam’s fall and integrated into the political process. Its leader is Hadi al-Amiri, an elected member of the National Assembly who is viewed as a hardliner advocating extensive use of the Shiite militias to recapture Sunni-inhabited areas. It has approximately 30,000 militia fighters.

All the established Shiite militias began to reactivate as unrest in the Sunni areas escalated during 2012-2014, and particularly following the 2014 Islamic State offensive. After the Islamic State capture of Mosul, the militias mobilized were joined by Shiite “Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF) answering Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call for Shiites to rally to fight the Islamic State. Former Mahdi Army militiamen reorganized as the “Salaam (Peace) Brigade.” Some Shiite militia forces returned from Syria, where they were protecting Shiite shrines and conducting other combat in support of the government of Bashar Al Assad.

The established militias—the Salaam Brigades, Badr Organization, Khata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl Al Haq, and the Promised Day Brigades are considered armed and trained by Iran. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2014, released on June 19, 2015, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC-QF) advises, arms, and trains these militia.

The Popular Mobilization Forces operate under a variety of names. They are generally commanded by ISF forces, although some might also supply manpower to the more established militias. Some Sunni fighters are included in the PMF, for the primary purpose of freeing Sunni inhabited areas from Islamic State rule. The United States has said as of May 2015 that it would provide to Shiite militias that are under ISF command.

Current estimates of the total Shiite militiamen available to assist the ISF—including the Sadrist militia, the Sadrist offshoots, the Badr Organization, and Popular Mobilization Forces operating under various names—number about 100,000.

*Lebanese Hezbollah.* Hezbollah has long been involved in assisting Iraq’s Shiite militias, in part because Hezbollah members speak Arabic, whereas Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard personnel speak mostly Persian (although many speak Arabic as well). In February 2015, Hezbollah leader

---

Hassan Nasrallah publicly acknowledged that Hezbollah had sent personnel to Iraq to help the ISF and the Shiite militias to combat the Islamic State.

The Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)30

Since the end of the U.S.-led war to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in early 1991, the United States has helped ensure Iraqi Kurdish autonomy, while insisting that Iraq’s territorial integrity not be compromised by an Iraqi Kurdish move toward independence. Iraq’s Kurds have tried to preserve a “special relationship” with the United States and use it to their advantage. The collapse of the ISF in northern Iraq enabled the Kurds to seize long-coveted Kirkuk and many of its oilfields. However, the collapse of Baghdad’s forces also contributed to the advance of the Islamic State force close to the KRG capital Irbil before U.S. airstrikes beginning on August 8, 2014, drove Islamic State fighters away from KRG-controlled territory.

KRG threats to seek outright independence had been increasing in recent years as the issues dividing the KRG and Baghdad have expanded. A key issue dividing the KRG and the central government has been the KRG’s assertion of the right to export oil produced in the KRG region—which Baghdad strongly opposes. The seizure of Kirkuk gives the Kurds even more control over economic resources, so much so that in June 2014, Kurdish leaders indicated the region might hold a referendum on independence within a few months. However, the subsequent Islamic State threat to KRG-controlled territory muted further public discussion of Iraqi Kurdish independence.

As permitted in the Iraqi constitution, the KRG fields its own force of peshmerga and Zeravani ground forces, which together number about 150,000 active duty fighters. The KRG has about 350 tanks and 40 helicopter gunships, but has not been eligible to separately purchase additional U.S. weaponry. The Kurdish militias are under the KRG’s Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and are paid out of the KRG budget. Prior to the June 2014 Islamic State offensive, the KRG had made some headway in its plans to transform the peshmerga into a smaller but more professional and well trained force, and the peshmerga is benefitting from the U.S. training discussed below.

KRG Structure/Intra-Kurdish Divisions

The Iraqi Kurds’ two main factions—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—are the dominant factions in the KRG. Barzani, the son of the revered Kurdish resistance fighter Mullah Mustafa Barzani, is not only President of the KRG but also head of the KDP. The PUK is led by Jalal Talabani, who served two terms as Iraq’s President and is ailing following a 2012 stroke. Masoud Barzani is President of the KRG, directly elected in July 2009. The KRG has an elected Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA, sometimes called the Kurdistan Parliament of Iraq, or KPI), and an appointed Prime Minister. Since January 2012, the KRG Prime Minister has been Nechirvan Barzani (Masoud’s nephew), who replaced PUK senior figure Barham Salih. Masoud Barzani’s son, Suroor, heads KRG security issues. On July 1, 2013, the KNA voted to extend Barzani’s term two years, until August 19, 2015. There reportedly are disputes within the KRG over whether to extend his term further or to hold elections for the post after that date. The KDP, which apparently feels it would win a KRG popular election, is pushing for an election process to choose a replacement. The PUK and Gorran, which together control

---

30 For more information on Kurd-Baghdad disputes, see CRS Report RS22079, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman.
more seats in the KNA than does the KDP, want the KNA to choose a replacement. In July 2014, another senior PUK figure, Fouad Masoum, succeeded Talabani as Iraq’s President—continuing the informal understanding that a PUK figure be Iraq’s President.

The KDP and PUK have sometimes clashed over territorial control and resources, and a serious armed conflict between them flared in 1996. Since the fall of Saddam, the two parties have generally abided by a power-sharing arrangement. However, a new faction emerged in 2005 and has become a significant factor in Kurdish politics—Gorran (Change), a PUK breakaway. It is headed by Neshirvan Mustafa, a longtime critic of the PUK. Aram al-Sheikh Mohammad, a Gorran leader, became second deputy COR speaker, becoming the first Gorran leader to obtain a senior leadership post in the central government.

The latest KNA elections were held on September 21, 2013. About 1,130 candidates registered to run for the 111 available seats, 11 of which are reserved for minority communities such as Yazidis, Shabaks, Assyrians, and others. Gorran continued to increase its political strength, winning 24 seats, second to the KDP’s 38 (which was up from 30 in 2010) and ahead of the PUK that won only 18 seats (down from 29 in the 2010 election). In part because of Gorran’s increased representation, the Kurds did not agree on a new government for the KRG region until June 2014. Nechirvan Barzani remained KRG prime minister. Jalal Talabani’s son, Qubad, who headed the KRG representative office in Washington, DC, until 2012, became deputy prime minister of the KRG. Provincial elections in the KRG-controlled provinces were held concurrent with the Iraq-wide parliamentary elections on April 30, 2014.

**KRG-Baghdad Disputes**

There has been little progress in permanently resolving the various territorial disputes between the Kurds and the central government dominated by Iraq’s Arabs. The most emotional of these is the Kurdish insistence that Tamim/Kirkuk Province (which includes oil-rich Kirkuk city) is “Kurdish land” and must be formally affiliated to the KRG. Most of the oil in northern Iraq is in Kirkuk, and legal KRG control over the province would give the KRG substantial economic leverage. However, the Kirkuk dispute may have been mooted by the Kurds’ seizure of Kirkuk in the face of the ISF collapse in the Islamic State offensive of June 2014. Many experts assess that the Kurds will be hesitant to yield back their positions to the central government.

Under the Iraqi constitution, there was to be a census and referendum on the affiliation of the province by December 31, 2007 (Article 140), but the Kurds agreed to repeated delays in order to avoid antagonizing Iraq’s Arabs. Nor has the national census that is pivotal to any such referendum been conducted; it was scheduled for October 24, 2010, but then repeatedly postponed by the broader political crises. On the other hand, a Property Claims Commission that is adjudicating claims from the Saddam regime’s forced resettlement of Arabs into the KRG region is functioning.

**KRG Oil Exports**

The KRG and Baghdad have been at odds over the Kurds’ insistence on being able to export oil that is discovered and extracted in the KRG region. Baghdad terms the KRG’s separate oil exports and energy development deals with international firms “illegal,” insisting that all KRG oil exports go through the national oil export pipeline grid and that revenues earned under that arrangement go to the central government. Under an agreement forged shortly after the fall of
Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy

Saddam, a fixed 17% share of those revenues goes to the KRG. The Obama Administration has generally sided with Baghdad’s position that all Iraqi energy projects and exports be implemented through a unified central government.

In recent years, KRG oil exports through this system have been repeatedly suspended over KRG-central government disputes on related issues, such as Baghdad’s arrears due to the international firms operating Kurdish-controlled oil fields. In January 2014, the Iraqi government suspended almost all of its payments to the KRG of about $1 billion per month on the grounds that the KRG was not contributing oil revenue to the national coffers. In what it described as an effort to compensate for that loss of revenue, the KRG began exporting oil through a newly constructed pipeline to Turkey that bypasses the Iraqi national grid. The pipeline is capable of carrying 300,000 barrels per day of oil. Some shipments were initially not offloaded as a result of an Iraqi government legal challenge to the KRG right to sell that oil, but eventually international buyers bought all the exports.

The need to cooperate against the Islamic State organization apparently paved the way for a resolution of the oil export dispute. In November 2014, the KRG provided 150,000 barrels of oil to Iraq’s state marketing organization (SOMO) in exchange for a one-time payment from Baghdad to the KRG of $500 million. On December 2, the KRG and Baghdad signed a broader deal under which the KRG would provide to SOMO 550,000 barrels per day of oil (300,000 from the Kirkuk fields now controlled by the KRG and 250,000 barrels from fields in the KRG itself) in exchange for a restoration of the 17% share of national revenues (which will amount to about $600 million per month at current oil prices.) In addition, Baghdad will provide the KRG with approximately $100 million per month to pay for peshmerga salaries and weapons purchases. Baghdad also agreed to facilitate the transfer of some U.S. weapons to the peshmerga. The agreement is incorporated into the 2015 Iraqi budget, adopted by the COR on January 29, 2015. The Kurds have complained that Baghdad has been slow to remit promised payments, but press reports indicate that payments to the KRG are being made under the pact.

KRG fields, excluding those in Kirkuk, have the potential to export 500,000 barrels per day and are expected to eventually be able to increase exports to 1 million barrels per day. It appears that the KRG would be able to separately export any amounts over the 250,000 barrels per day that the December deal requires the KRG to transfer to Baghdad’s control. Left unresolved was the disagreement over separate foreign firm investment deals with the KRG. Baghdad has sought to deny energy deals with the central government to any company that signs a separate development deal with the KRG. This dispute has affected such firms as Exxon-Mobil and Total SA of France.

---

31 Much of the dispute centers on differing interpretations of a 1976 Iraq-Turkey treaty, which was extended in 2010, and which defines “Iraq” (for purposes of oil issues) as the “Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq.” See “Analysis: Iraq-Turkey Treaty Restricts Kurdistan Exports.” Iraq Oil Report, April 18, 2014.
33 Ibid.
Tier Three Designations of the KDP and PUK

Since 2001, U.S. immigration officials have placed the KDP and PUK in a Tier Three category that makes it difficult for members of the parties to obtain visas to enter the United States. The categorization is a determination that the two parties are “groups of concern”—meaning some of their members committed acts of political violence. The designation was based on the fact that the Kurdish parties, particularly their peshmerga, had used violence to try to overthrow Saddam. A provision of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) gave the Administration authority, without judicial review, to revoke the Tier 3 designation. The designated was subsequently removed.

Post-U.S. Withdrawal Political Unraveling

The fragile power-sharing arrangement among all Iraqi factions agreed in 2010 largely unraveled in 2011-12, casting doubt on President Obama’s assertion, stated at the time of the final U.S. withdrawal, that Iraq is now “sovereign, stable, and self-reliant.” On December 19, 2011, the day after the final U.S. withdrawal (December 18, 2011)—and one week after Maliki met with President Obama in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2011—the government announced an arrest warrant against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a major Sunni figure, for allegedly ordering his security staff to commit acts of assassination. Hashimi fled to the KRG region and refused to return to face trial in Baghdad unless his conditions for a fair trial there were met. A trial in absentia in Baghdad convicted him and sentenced him to death on September 9, 2012, for the alleged killing of two Iraqis. Hashimi remains in Turkey. Maliki’s opponents also cited his retaining the three main security portfolios for himself as an indication that he sought to concentrate power.

In an effort to try to restore Sunni trust in the Maliki government, U.S. officials intervened with various political factions and obtained Maliki’s agreement to release some Baathists prisoners and to give provinces more autonomy (discussed above). The concessions prompted Sunni COR members and ministers to resume their duties. In March 2012, all factions tentatively agreed to hold a “national conference” to try to reach a durable political solution. However, late that month KRG President Barzani accused Maliki of a “power grab” and the conference was not held. Maliki critics subsequently collected signatures from 176 COR deputies to request a no-confidence vote against Maliki. Under Article 61 of the constitution, signatures of 20% of the 325 COR deputies (65 signatures) are needed to trigger a vote, but then President Talabani stated on June 10, 2012, that there were an insufficient number of valid signatures to proceed.

Insurrection Escalates in 2013

The disputes flared again after Talabani suffered a stroke on December 18, 2012, and left Iraq for treatment in Germany. On December 20, 2012, Maliki moved against another major Sunni figure, Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, by arresting 10 of his bodyguards. Al Issawi took refuge in

36 Sadun Dulaymi, a Sunni Arab, is acting Defense Minister; Falih al-Fayad, a Shiite, is acting Minister of State for National Security; and Adnan al-Asadi, another Shiite, is acting Interior Minister.
Anbar Province with Sunni tribal leaders, sparking anti-Maliki demonstrations in the Sunni cities in several provinces and in Sunni districts of Baghdad. Demonstrators demanded the release of prisoners; repeal of Article 4 antiterrorism laws under which many Sunnis are incarcerated; reform or end to the de-Baathification laws that has been used against Sunnis; and improved government services in Sunni areas.39

During January-March 2013, the use of small amounts of force against demonstrators caused the unrest to worsen. On January 25, 2013, the ISF killed nine protesters on a day when oppositionists killed two ISF police officers. Sunni demonstrators set up encampments in some cities. The unrest, coupled with the U.S. departure, provided “political space” for extremist Sunni elements such as ISIL (now called the Islamic State) to step up attacks on the ISF.

Hawijah Incident. On April 23, 2013, three days after the first group of provinces voted in provincial elections, the ISF stormed a Sunni protest camp in the town of Hawijah and killed about 40 civilians. In the following days, many Sunni demonstrators and tribal leaders took up arms, and some gunmen took over government buildings in the town of Suleiman Pak. U.S. officials reportedly pressed Maliki not to use the military to suppress Sunni protests but rather to work with Sunni tribal leaders to appeal for calm. Maliki undertook some conciliatory gestures, including amending (in June 2013) the 2008 provincial powers law (No. 21, see above) to give the provinces substantially more authority, such as control over security forces (Article 31-10); to specify a share of revenue to be given to the provinces; and to mandate that province-based operations of central government ministries be transferred to the provincial governments.40 In July 2013, the Cabinet approved a package of reforms easing de-Baathification laws to allow many former Baathists to serve in government.

April 2013 Provincial Elections Occur Amid the Tensions. The escalating violence only slightly affected the April 2013 provincial elections. The government postponed the elections in two Sunni provinces, Anbar and Nineveh, until June 20, 2013, but the election in the remaining provinces went forward as planned on April 20, 2013. The COR’s law to govern the election for the 447 provincial council seats (including those in Anbar and Nineveh that voted on June 20, 2013), passed in December 2012, provided for an open list vote. A total of 50 coalitions registered, including 261 political entities as part of those coalitions or running separately, and comprising about 8,150 individual candidates.

With the April 20, 2013, vote being held mostly in Shiite areas, the election was largely a test of Maliki’s popularity. Maliki’s State of Law coalition remained relatively intact, including Fadilah (virtue) and the ISCI-offshoot the Badr Organization. It won 112 of the 447 seats up for election, a decrease from 2009. ISCI registered its own Citizen Coalition, which won 75 seats. Sadr registered a separate Coalition of Liberals and it won 59 seats.

Among the mostly Sunni groupings, Allawi’s Iraqiyya and 18 smaller entities ran as the Iraqi National United Coalition. A separate United Coalition consisted of supporters of the Nujaifi brothers (then COR speaker Osama and Nineveh governor Aheel), Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, and Rafi al-Issawi. A third Sunni coalition was loyal to Saleh al-Mutlaq. The two main Kurdish parties ran under the Co-Existence and Fraternity Alliance. The June 20, 2013, election

39 Author conversations with Human Rights Watch researchers, March 2013.
in Anbar and Nineveh was primarily a contest among these blocs. In Anbar, the Nujaifis won a slight plurality, but in Nineveh, where the Nujaifis previously held an outright majority of provincial council seats (19 or 37), Kurds won 11 out of the province’s 39 seats and the Nujaifis came in second with eight seats. However, Atheel Nujaifi was selected to another term as Nineveh governor. The results suggested to some experts that many Sunnis want to avoid a return to sectarian conflict.41

Unrest in Sunni areas escalated sharply at the end of 2013, after yet another arrest order by Maliki against a prominent Sunni leader—parliamentarian Ahmad al-Alwani. The order, which followed an ISIL attack that killed 17 ISF officers, prompted a gun battle with security forces that killed Alwani’s brother and several of his bodyguards. Maliki subsequently ordered security forces to close down a protest tent camp in Ramadi (capital of Anbar Province), prompting ISIL to attack, and to at least temporarily, take over Ramadi, Fallujah, and some smaller Anbar cities. ISIL fighters were joined by some Sunni protesters, defectors from the ISF, and some Sons of Iraq and other tribal fighters.

Partly at the urging of U.S. officials, Maliki opted primarily to arm and fund loyal Sunni tribal leaders and Sons of Iraq fighters to help them expel the ISIL fighters. By early January 2014, these loyalists had helped the government regain most of Ramadi, but Fallujah remained in insurgent hands. In April 2014, ISIL-led insurgents also established a presence in Abu Ghraib, only about 10 miles from Baghdad, prompting the government to close the prison. Some ISF officers told journalists that the ISF effort to recapture Fallujah and other opposition-controlled areas suffered from disorganization and ineffectiveness.42

Islamic State Challenge to Iraq’s Stability

By the time the April 30, 2014, national (COR) elections were held, the ISIL-led insurrection in Anbar appeared contained. That assessment was upended on June 10, 2014, when Islamic State fighters—apparently assisted by large numbers of its fighters moving into Iraq from the Syria theater—captured the large city of Mosul amid mass surrenders and desertions by the ISF. The group later that month formally changed its name to “The Islamic State.” Apparently supported by many Iraqi Sunni residents, Islamic State-led fighters subsequently advanced down the Tigris River valley as far as Tikrit as well as east into Diyala Province. The offensive captured the Mosul Dam and enabled Islamic State fighters to loot banks, free prisoners, and capture U.S.- supplied military equipment such as Humvees, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. From positions around Abu Ghraib, IS-led forces moved to within striking distance of Baghdad International Airport, which is southwest of the city. The Islamic State, along with its partners, also expanded previous gains in Anbar Province, including encroaching on the Haditha Dam.

By the end of June, Shiite militias had mobilized in large numbers to assist the ISF and the remaining ISF regrouped to some extent. These developments, coupled with the fact that Islamic State fighters faced resistance from any location not dominated by Sunni inhabitants, appeared to lessen the threat to Baghdad itself. The defense of Baghdad was aided by U.S. advisers (discussed below), as well as by Iran’s sending of military equipment as well as Islamic Revolutionary

Guard-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) units into Iraq. The ISF was able to prevent IS-led forces from capturing the Baiji refinery, which produces about one-third of Iraq’s gasoline supplies.

The KRG came under major threat by August 2014 when IS-led forces advanced into territory controlled by the 
peshmerga. The relatively lightly armed Kurdish forces withdrew under pressure from numerous towns (Sinjar, Zumar, Wana, and Qaraqosh) inhabited mostly by Christians and other Iraqi minorities, particularly the Yazidis—a Kurdish-speaking people who practice a mix of ancient religions, including Zoroastrianism, which held sway in Iran before the advent of Islam. Fearing IS threats to execute them if they refused its demands that they convert to Islam, about 35,000-50,000 Yazidis fled to Sinjar Mountain, where they were surrounded by Islamic State forces. By August 8, 2014, IS-led fighters had advanced to within about 30 miles of the KRG capital of Irbil, causing substantial panic among Iraq’s Kurds, who had long thought the KRG region secure, and causing U.S. concern about the security of U.S. diplomatic and military personnel there. The threat to the KRG and the humanitarian crisis prompted U.S. military action that is discussed in greater detail below.

**Government Formation Process Amidst Security Collapse**

U.S. officials considered the outcome of the April 30, 2014, national elections as crucial to reversing Islamic State gains by giving Sunni voters an opportunity to signal a rejection of Sunni extremist violence. An election law to regulate the vote, passed on November 4, 2013, expanded the COR to 328 seats (from 325). A total of 39 coalitions, comprising 275 political entities (parties), registered. The campaign period nationwide began on April 1. Turnout on election day was about 62%, about the same level as in the 2010 COR elections, and violence was unexpectedly minimal. Elections for 89 total seats on the provincial councils in the three KRG provinces were held simultaneously.

Maliki appeared positioned to secure a third term because his State of Law bloc had remained relatively intact, whereas rival blocs had fractured. On June 17, 2014, the Independent Higher Election Commission (IHEC) announced certified election results showing Maliki’s State of Law winning 92 seats—three more than it won in 2010 and far more than those won by ISCI (29) or the Sadrists (32). Major Sunni slates won a combined 53 seats—far fewer than the 91 seats they won in 2010 as part of the Iraqiyya bloc. The Kurdish slates collectively won about 62 seats. Maliki’s individual candidate vote reportedly was exceptionally strong, most notably in Baghdad Province, which sends 69 deputies to the COR—results that had appeared to put Maliki in a commanding position to retain his post.

Maliki’s route to a third term was upended by the June 2014 IS-led offensive. U.S. officials largely blamed the offensive’s success on Maliki’s efforts to marginalize Sunni leaders and citizens. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani appeared to undermine Maliki by calling for an inclusive government that “avoids mistakes of the past.” The factions ultimately agreed to start filling some key positions before reaching consensus on a Prime Minister. The process unfolded as follows:

- On July 15, the COR named Salim al-Jabburi, a moderate Sunni Islamist (IIP), as speaker. The two deputy speakers selected were Aram al-Sheikh Mohammad of

---


the Kurdish Gorran party and Haydar al-Abbadi of Maliki’s Shiite Da’wa Party. Jabbburi is about 44 years old and worked as a law professor at the University of Mesopotamia. He visited the United States in early June 2015.

- On July 24, the COR selected a senior PUK leader, Fouad Masoum, as Iraq’s President. No deputy presidential slots were selected. Masoum is about 76 years old and helped draft Iraq’s constitution. He is a close ally of Jalal Talabani.

- On August 11, Masoum tapped deputy COR speaker Abbadi as leader of the “largest bloc” in the COR as Prime Minister-designate, giving him a 30-day period specified by the constitution (until September 10) to achieve COR confirmation of a government. Abbadi’s designation came after several senior figures in the State of Law bloc abandoned Maliki—apparently bowing to pressure from the United States, Iran, Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds, and others. Maliki initially called the designation “illegal” on the grounds that Masoum was required to tap him first as Prime Minister-designate as leader of the largest bloc elected, but U.S. officials and Iranian officials welcomed the Abbadi designation and Maliki’s support collapsed.

The Cabinet. Abbadi obtained COR confirmation of a new government on September 8, two days ahead of the constitutional deadline. The Cabinet appeared to satisfy U.S. and Iraqi factional demands for inclusiveness of the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds. Factional disputes caused Abbadi to avoid naming choices for the key security posts of Defense and Interior ministers, and agreement on the two posts was not achieved until October 23, when the COR confirmed Mohammad Salem al-Ghabban as Interior Minister and Khalid al-Ubaydi as Defense Minister. The selection of Ghabban drew criticism from many Sunni figures because he is a leader of the Badr Organization, the political arm of the Shiite militia of the same name. Badr is headed by Hadi Al-Amiri, who many Shiites were suggesting be named Interior Minister, but who was strongly opposed by Sunnis because of the militia’s abuses of Sunnis during the sectarian conflict of 2006-2008. Ubaydi, a Sunni, was an aircraft engineer during the rule of Saddam Hussein, and became a university professor after Saddam’s downfall.

A major feature of the Abbadi government is that it incorporates many senior faction leaders, although some posts lack significant authority. Among the major government posts are:

- Maliki, Iyad al-Allawi, and Osama al-Nujaifi, all major faction leaders, became Vice Presidents—a position that lacks authority but ensured that their views are heard in government deliberations. Maliki reportedly has used his vice presidential post to exert authority independently, perhaps to the detriment of Abbadi’s authority, by holding meetings of the State of Law political bloc.

- Ex-Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, a KDP leader whom Maliki ousted in mid-2014 over a KRG-Baghdad rift, became deputy prime minister and Finance Minister. The two other deputy prime ministers are Saleh al-Mutlaq (Sunni Arab, discussed above) and Baha al-Araji, who heads the Sadrist bloc in the COR.

- Ibrahim al-Jafari, who served as transitional Prime Minister in 2005 and part of 2006, is Foreign Minister.

- A senior leader of ISCI, Adel Abdul Mahdi, is Minister of Oil.

- Hussein Shahristani, a senior member of Maliki’s State of Law bloc, is Minister of Higher Education.
Table 2. Major Coalitions in April 30, 2014, COR Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Leaders and Components</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of Law (277)</td>
<td>Maliki and Da’wa Party; deputy P.M. Shahristani; Badr Organization</td>
<td>92-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muwatin (Citizens Coalition) (273)</td>
<td>ISCI list. Includes former Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh; Ahmad Chalabi; many Basra politicians</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Ahrar (Liberals) (214)</td>
<td>Sadrists. Allied with ISCI in 2010 but separate in 2014.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wataniya (Nationalists) (239)</td>
<td>Iyad al-Allawi (ran in Baghdad). Includes Allawi followers from former Iraqiyya bloc</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutahiddun (United Ones) (259)</td>
<td>COR Speaker Nujaifi (ran in Nineveh). No candidates in Shiite-dominated provinces. Was part of Allawi Iraqiyya bloc in 2010.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabiyya (Arabs) (255)</td>
<td>Deputy P.M. Saleh al-Mutlaq (ran in Baghdad). Also limited to mostly Sunni provinces. Was part of Iraqiyya bloc in 2010.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish parties</td>
<td>KDP, PUK, and Gorran ran separately in most constituencies.</td>
<td>62 (combined)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadilah (219)</td>
<td>Shiite faction, was allied with ISCI in 2010 election but ran separately in 2014.</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da’wa (Jaafari) (205)</td>
<td>Da’wa faction of former P.M. Ibrahim al-Jafari (who ran in Karbala). Was allied with ISCI in 2010.</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reidar Vissar, “Iraq and Gulf Analysis.”

Abdali’s Governing Style and Policies

U.S. officials say that Abbadi is adopting policies intended to win back Sunni support, such as ordering the ISF to cease shelling Sunni-inhabited areas that are under the control of Islamic State forces and abolishing the “Office of the Commander-in-Chief.” In November 2014, he replaced 36 Iraqi Army commanders and 24 Interior Ministry officials. Abbadi has also sought to publicly disclose significant instances of corruption; he announced in November 2014 that 50,000 ISF personnel on the payrolls were not actually performing military service.

In an attempt to alter Sunni opinion, Abbadi has also announced that a “National Guard” force would be established in which locally recruited fighters, reporting to provincial governments, to protect their home provinces from the Islamic State. The program appears mostly intended to blunt Islamic State influence from Sunni-inhabited areas, and appears as an attempt to revive the concept of the earlier U.S.-led “Awakening”/Sons of Iraq program. The announced program received Cabinet approval in February 2015 but has stalled in the COR, where the dominant Shiite factions apparently do not want to arm Sunni fighters extensively. The program is planned...
to also apply to Shiite militias who want to secure Shiite areas. In February 2015, the Cabinet approved an amendment to the “de-Baathification” laws (see above) to further re-integrate former members of Saddam’s Baath Party into the political process and presumably reduce Sunni resentment of the government. However, that effort, including an effort to offer amnesty to those who served in the Saddam Hussein regime, has also been stalled by the COR and by objections raised by Iraqi courts to whom the issue has been referred. In February 2015, Abbadi lifted the long-standing Baghdad curfew as part of an effort to reduce the sense of Islamic State siege on the government.

As a result of Abbadi’s efforts to promote inclusiveness, President Obama praised Abbadi in the course of their bilateral meeting at the White House on April 14, 2015, saying:

And in a significant change from some past practices, I think both Sunni leaders and Kurdish leaders feel that they are heard in the halls of power, that they are participating in governance in Baghdad ... Prime Minister Abbadi has kept true to his commitments to reach out to them and to respond to their concerns and to make sure that power is not solely concentrated within Baghdad....

On the other hand, continued Sunni mistrust of Baghdad appears to be slowing any broad Sunni shift to cooperate with the government against the Islamic State. Abbadi’s visits to Iran (October 2014 and June 2015) continue to fuel Sunni suspicions that Abbadi is susceptible to arguments from some Iranian leaders not to compromise with Sunni factions. The Iraqi decision in late March 2015 to move forward with an attempt to take back the city of Tikrit with Shiite militia and Iranian advisory help—rather than the assistance of the U.S.-led coalition—caused many experts to assess that Abbadi remains dependent politically and militarily on the Shiite militias. Abbadi addressed this perception in an April 3, 2015, interview in the German newspaper Spiegel by indicating that “[the militias] are very powerful because they are ideologically motivated. Honestly, it would be a challenge to deal with this.”

Abbadi’s attempts to address Sunni demands have also caused agitation among his core Shiite base. Some observers report that former Prime Minister Maliki continues to seek to exert his influence by holding meetings of the State of Law parliamentary bloc, by working with harder line Shiite figures to undermine Abbadi, and by cultivating an image of personal affinity for and control over Popular Mobilization Shiite militia forces that are helping counter the Islamic State challenge. Some observers indicate that Maliki might be plotting to try to return to the prime ministership by undermining Abbadi. These political forces benefitted—and Abbadi suffered—from the inability of the U.S.-led coalition to prevent the Islamic State’s takeover of Ramadi in May 2015. Activists in Basra Province, through which the majority of Iraq’s oil is exported, are attempting to revive a 2008 effort to convert the province into an autonomous region similar to the KRG. Those supporting forming a region assert that the province does not receive a fair share of national revenues.

46 White House. “President Obama Holds a Media Availability with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. April 14, 2015.
Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi

Abbadi is about 62 years old and holds a doctorate in engineering from the University of Manchester. He is from a traditional elite family. He is a longtime Da’wa Party member but his exile during the Saddam Hussein regime was spent mostly in London, and not in Iran or Syria. He is fluent in English language and often speaks in English in press conferences in Western countries.

During his time as a Da’wa underground activist, he assisted the party by writing tracts and promoting its message, and he apparently was not involved in planning or executing any of the attacks carried out by the Da’wa Party in Iraq or Kuwait during the 1980s. His familiarity with Western culture and his lack of ties to senior Iranian leaders apparently contributed to Iran’s initial reluctance to support him for the prime ministership. However, Abbadi reportedly attracted strong support from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and within Da’wa ranks, and Iran acquiesced to his selection.

U.S. Policy Response to the Islamic State in Iraq

The gains by the Islamic State in Iraq since June 2014 have caused the Obama Administration to resume an active military role in Iraq, pursuant to a strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State articulated by President Obama on September 10, 2014. However, there is debate over whether the policy is succeeding in Iraq, and over potential new policy directions.

As the seriousness of the ISIL challenge became evident in late 2013, the United States increased its efforts to assist the Iraqi government militarily. From late 2013 until the ISIL capture of Mosul in June 2014, the United States took the following actions:

- **Delivered and sold additional weaponry.** The Defense Department supplied Iraq with several hundred HELLFIRE air-to-surface missiles for use against ISIL training camps. The Administration also obtained the concurrence of Congress to release for sale and lease of the 30 Apache attack helicopters discussed above. In May 2014, DSCA notified Congress of potential sales to Iraq of up to 200 Humvee armored vehicles, up to 24 propeller-driven AT-6C Texan II military aircraft, and related equipment with a total estimated value of about $1 billion.

- **Sales of Drones.** The United States sold Iraq several unmanned aerial vehicles to perform surveillance of Islamic State camps in western Anbar Province. In early 2014, the United States provided 10 Scaneeagle aerial vehicles.

---


49 For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. policy against the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.


52 DSCA notifications to Congress: Transmittal Nos. 13-79; 14-04; and 14-03. May 13, 2014.

• **Additional Training.** The Department of Defense increased bilateral and regional training opportunities for Iraqi counterterrorism (CTS) units to help burnish ISF counter-insurgency skills. By June 2014, U.S. Special Operations Forces had conducted two sessions of training for Iraqi CT forces in Jordan.\(^{54}\)

### U.S. Military Involvement Since Mid-2014

After the Islamic State’s capture of Mosul in June 2014—and particularly after the August 2014 move by the group toward Irbil and its beheadings of two captured U.S. citizens—the U.S. response broadened significantly. President Obama presented a multifaceted strategy to defeat the Islamic State in a speech on September 10, 2014—after Abbadi’s accession and the formation of the relatively inclusive government met U.S. conditions for additional assistance against the Islamic State. The operation to defeat the Islamic State, termed “Operation Inherent Resolve,” is run by U.S. Central Command and commanded by Lieutenant General James Terry, who leads Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve. His headquarters is based in the Camp Arijan facility in Kuwait that is used by the U.S. military under a bilateral accord with Kuwait.

#### Advice and Training

President Obama has deployed 3,100 U.S. military personnel to train and advise the ISF, peshmerga forces, and Sunni tribal fighters; gather intelligence on the Islamic State; and protect U.S. facilities and personnel. Of these personnel, 1,500 deployed subsequent to congressional approval of a requested $1.6 billion in train and equip funds, to “expand our advise and assist mission and initiate a comprehensive training effort for Iraqi forces.”\(^ {55}\) Those funds were authorized and appropriated by P.L. 113-291 and the FY2015 appropriations act (P.L. 113-235). About 820 of the U.S. personnel are securing the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. facilities in Baghdad and Irbil.

The mission of the U.S. force includes advising the ISF and peshmerga at the brigade level, working out of two “Joint Operations Centers” (one with the ISF in Baghdad and one with the peshmerga in Irbil). About 1,000 personnel of the U.S. force are training nine ISF brigades (about 20,000 troops) and three peshmerga brigades (about 5,000 forces). Training sites in Baghdad (two sites), Irbil (for the peshmerga), Taji (north of Baghdad), Al Asad (in Anbar Province), and Besmaya, south of Baghdad, reportedly were all established as of the end of February 2015 and are currently staffed. The site at Al Asad hosts about 300 U.S. military personnel and has been under some threat from Islamic State fire. The U.S. trainers are being joined by about 1,500 trainers from coalition partner countries including the U.K., Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and Spain.\(^{56}\) The mission has trained about 9,000 ISF personnel as of late May 2015, according to press accounts, although Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter testified on June 16, 2015 that this effort will fall far short of the 24,000 that were to be trained by the fall of 2015, in large part because Iraq has not furnished the requisite number of recruits.

---


\(^{56}\) Comments by Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey. CNN, April 16, 2015.
On June 10, 2015, after the fall of the city of Ramadi to Islamic State forces in May 2015, the Administration announced that an additional 450 military personnel would deploy to Taqaddum air base that is located near Ramadi, in large part to work with Sunni fighters who want to expel the Islamic State from Anbar Province and other Sunni-inhabited areas. These fighters are considered a key component of the effort because Sunni tribal fighters are supported by many Sunni inhabitants now living under Islamic State rule.

**Air Strikes**

Since August 8, 2014, U.S. military action in Iraq has included airstrikes on Islamic State positions and infrastructure. U.S. air assets also have dropped humanitarian aid to vulnerable minorities affected by Islamic State gains. Other countries conducting air strikes in Iraq include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Britain. One Arab country, Jordan, is conducting air strikes in Iraq as well, although the bulk of Jordan’s air activity is against Islamic State forces in Syria. The U.S. mission, as currently constituted, has not included a component that some advocate—the deployment of U.S. “forward air controllers”—spotters at or close to the front line that would guide air strikes.

**Weapons Resupply**

Since mid-2014, the United States reportedly has sold Iraq at least 5,000 HELLFIRE missiles. The F-16s and Apaches previously purchased (see above) are in the process of delivery, but the F-16s are being delivered to Iraqi control, and training for the Iraq pilots is being provided, in the United States (Arizona) because the key airbase at Balad is surrounded by the Islamic State. In December 2014, the Defense Department notified to Congress potential sales to Iraq that may be worth nearly $3 billion for 1,000 M1151AI Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and 175 M1A1 tanks with spare parts, communications, and ammunition. The tank sale would more than replace the tanks the ISF lost during the ISF offensive in June 2014; the ISF reportedly lost as much as half of the 140 tanks it had received from the United States as of 2012. During his mid-April 2015 visit to Washington, DC, Prime Minister Abbadi denied asking for additional U.S. weaponry, and no new U.S. sales were announced, but he says he requested that delivery of purchased new weaponry be completed expeditiously. In late May 2015, after the fall of Ramadi, the United States announced it would expedite delivery of 2,000 shoulder-held anti-armor rocket launchers.

In addition to support for the ISF, the Administration also reportedly has supplied mostly lighter weaponry and ammunition directly to the security forces (peshmerga) of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), through the Central Intelligence Agency. The Administration also has, with Iraqi government concurrence, delivered some of the ISF’s weaponry stockpiles to the peshmerga. A number of European countries, such as the U.K, Germany, and France, also have been supplying weaponry to the peshmerga.

However, the Administration has been unable to date to provide U.S. weapons to the KRG or Sunni tribal fighters, and KRG President Masoud Barzani’s visit to Washington, DC, in early May

---

57 That channel is a means of adapting to U.S. law and policy that requires all U.S. foreign military sales (FMS, run by the Defense Department) to be provided to a country’s central government, and not to subnational forces. Craig Whitlock and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Directly Arms Kurdish Forces,” *Washington Post*, August 12, 2014.
2015 focused heavily on the KRG request for an independent and direct supply of U.S. weapons. Such direct supply would, according to the KRG, be commensurate with the leading role of the peshmerga in pushing back Islamic State forces in the north. Under the Arms Export Control Act, all U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) go to central governments, not sub-national forces. A provision of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291) permits direct U.S. provision of U.S. arms to the peshmerga for the limited purpose of training three peshmerga brigades. A provision of the House-passed version of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1735) would provide broader authority for the President to directly arm the peshmerga as well as Sunni tribal security forces “with a national security mission;” and the yet-to-be-formed “Iraqi Sunni National Guard.”

Funding Issues

The Administration requested authority and $1.618 billion in FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operation funding for an “Iraq Train and Equip Fund” to support the expanded training mission—part of a broader $5.6 billion request for the anti-IS mission for FY2015. As noted above, the funds were authorized and appropriated at the end of the 113th Congress. Of that $1.6 billion in train-and-equip funding, the Administration plans to use $1.23 billion for the ISF; $354 million for the peshmerga; and $24 million for the Sunni tribal fighters. The Administration funding request stipulated that 40% of the requested U.S. train-and-equip funds would not be eligible to be expended unless foreign contributions equal to 40% of the $1.618 billion are contributed (of which half that contributed amount would come from the Iraqi government). P.L. 113-291 includes this cost-sharing provision, but would also limit the availability of funds for newly authorized Iraq training program to 25% until the Administration submits required program and strategy reports to Congress. That law also requires 90-day progress reporting. For FY2016, the Administration has requested $715 million in train and equip funds for Iraq, for the same uses, supplemented by a request for $250 million in foreign military financing for FY2016.

Results of the Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Way Forward

U.S. officials have asserted that Operation Inherent Resolve has, to date, halted IS fighters’ momentum, severely reduced their weapons arsenal and infrastructure, and placed them in a largely defensive posture. The Department of Defense stated in March 2015 that Iraqi forces—ISF, peshmerga, Shiite militia forces, and some Sunni tribal forces—have thus far recaptured about 30% of the territory taken by the Islamic State. In April 2015, the key Sunni-inhabited town of Tikrit in Salah ad-Din Province.

The relatively optimistic U.S. assessments were dampened by the Islamic State capture of the city of Ramadi, capital of the key Anbar Province, in late May 2015. The capture was significant to the extent that it again called into question the commitment of the ISF to the battle; Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated on May 24, 2015, that the ISF showed no “will to fight” in

---

59 CENTCOM Background Briefing, February 19, 2015.
abandoning their positions there even though they significantly outnumbered the Islamic State attacking force.

The fall of Ramadi raised questions about the efficacy of U.S. strategy. Some interpreted that battle as evidence that there has not been a noticeable major shift of Sunnis to support of the Iraqi government. Others attributed the defeat to U.S. insistence on supporting only the ISF, and not Shiite militia/Popular Mobilization Forces that now comprise a large part of Iraq’s overall combat capability against the Islamic State. Some Iraqi commentators suggested that the loss was caused by insufficient supplies of U.S. weapons and an airstrike strategy that insists on minimizing any incidental civilian casualties. Some U.S. military officials asserted that the ISF’s poor command and control structure contributed to the loss of Ramadi. Some experts said the significance of the Ramadi loss has been overstated and does not affect the trajectory of the conflict.61

**Potential Strategy or Tactics Changes?**

Prior to the Islamic State capture of Ramadi, U.S. officials and outside experts had publicly speculated about next steps in the Iraq campaign, based on an assumption that existing strategy and resource levels would eventually defeat the Islamic State in Iraq. There had been a debate over whether Iraq and the coalition should focus on liberating Mosul, or instead on expelling the Islamic State from Anbar Province. The fall of Ramadi prompted speculation that, to accomplish the stated objective of defeating the Islamic State, U.S. strategy and resource levels might change. However, White House spokesman Josh Earnest indicated following a May 19, 2015, meeting of the U.S. national security leadership team that U.S. strategy would not change.62 The following are options being recommended by experts and some Members of Congress:

*Deploy Ground Combat Units.* Some recommend that the need to defeat the Islamic State is sufficiently critical to merit reintroduction of ground combat troops to Iraq. President Obama has repeatedly ruled out the deployment of ground combat units, maintaining that U.S. troops will not fix the underlying political problems that facilitated or caused the IS-led insurrection.

*Move U.S. Advisers Closer to the Frontline.* Outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey acknowledged in November 2014 that as the campaign requires more complex operations by Iraqi Security Forces, he might recommend that U.S. advisers accompany Iraqi forces. After the fall of Ramadi, Administration officials stated that they had not adopted this option, but the deployment of an additional 450 trainers to Taqaddum, announced on June 10, 2015, suggests possible movement toward this option. The trainers are to work with anti-Islamic State Sunni forces at a base close enough to Ramadi to potentially position the Sunnis to recapture that city. Subsequently, statements by Secretary Carter, Chairman Dempsey, and other U.S. officials indicated the United States might deploy additional U.S. personnel to other bases in Iraq to develop a network of locations close to areas where Iraqi forces might undertake new operations against the Islamic State. Some experts refer to this as a “lilypad” strategy.

---

Emplace Airstrike Targeters Closer to Front Lines. A related recommendation some military experts make is to position U.S. military personnel as “forward air controllers” to be able to better target Islamic State forces. The option has not been adopted, to date.

Arm and Train Sunni Tribal Fighters. Some suggest that the key to defeating the Islamic State is to use many of the same Sunni tribal fighters that helped U.S. forces defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq during 2006-2011. Those who advocate this option assert that it is an extension of existing U.S. efforts to persuade Iraq’s Shiite leadership to devolve power to Sunni areas and to undertake additional steps to win Sunni loyalties. The deployment of the additional 450 military personnel to Taqaddum air base, discussed above, suggests adoption of this option, at least to some extent.

Support Shiite Militia Forces. Another option proposed by some Iraqi officials and outside experts would be to drop U.S. objections to supporting with airstrikes operations by Shiite militia and Popular Mobilization Forces. Suggesting some Administration attraction to forms of this option, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones reportedly told some Iraqi Sunni figures that the United States would conduct airstrikes in support of Shiite militia forces that are under Iraq command, but not those under the command of Iranian advisers.

Strategy Change: Containment of the Islamic State. Some experts assert that the existing or likely level of U.S. resources devoted to the anti-Islamic State mission in Iraq is unlikely to defeat the Islamic State, given the dynamics in Iraq that are driving its successes. Some who agree with that assessment argue that the U.S. goal should be adjusted to containing the Islamic State—for example by using U.S. direct military action primarily to prevent the Islamic State from seizing Baghdad or areas controlled by the Kurds or other minority communities, or attacking countries bordering Iraq. A component of a containment strategy would be to try to prevent Islamic State fighters from transiting from the Iraq (or Syria) battlefields to Europe, the United States, or elsewhere for the purpose of conducting terrorist attacks. The containment policy, according to advocates of this approach, would provide time for Iraqi politicians to take the steps required to defeat the organization long term.

Strategy Change: Support “Federalism” or “Soft-Partition” of Iraq. An option related to “containment” would be to support a de facto partition, or “soft-partition” of Iraq by supporting the concept of “federalism.” This option would envision accepting Iraq’s decentralization along ethnic and sectarian lines, potentially including the formation of legal Sunni autonomous “region” similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government already formed by Iraq’s Kurds. This option could conceivably entail a de facto acceptance of a role for—or domination by—the Islamic State in the Sunni areas. Many experts and U.S. officials might oppose this option as an abandonment of the goal of defeating the Islamic State, perhaps based on an uncertain hope that moderate Sunni forces living under Islamic State control might be able to moderate the group’s ideology and goals over time.

63 Gen. Dempsey told the House Armed Services Committee on November 13, “I’m not predicting, at this point, that I would recommend that those [Iraqi] forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by U.S. forces, but we’re certainly considering it.”
65 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-best-strategy-handle-isis-good-old-containment-11341
Economic Resources and Human Rights Issues

Iraq has not developed well-established institutions and rule of law, perhaps in part because of the state of nearly nonstop internal conflict in Iraq since 2003. However, the success of Iraq’s energy sector has enabled Iraq’s economy to continue to develop despite the setbacks on governance and human rights.

Economic Development and the Energy Sector

The growth of oil exports has fueled rapid expansion of the economy. Iraqi officials estimated that growth was about 9% for 2013, and averaged 5% growth per year during 2004-2014. The more stable areas of Iraq, such as the Shiite south, have experienced an economic boom as they accommodate increasing numbers of Shiite pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala. GDP reached about $150 billion by the end of 2013. However, violence slowed Iraq’s economy dramatically in 2014 to zero growth or perhaps even slight contraction. Iraq implemented a $150 billion budget for 2014, but, addressing falling oil prices, on January 29, 2015, the COR adopted a much smaller $105 billion budget for 2015.

During Prime Minister Abbadi’s visit to Washington, DC in mid-April, Iraqi officials estimated that they face a $22 billion budget deficit for 2015 and the visit includes talks with the IMF and major multi-national banks to discuss possible bond issues and loans. In his meeting with Abbadi on April 14, 2015, President Obama did not announce any additional major economic aid to Iraq but he did announce a new grant of $200 million in humanitarian aid to help the Iraqi government cope with the financial burden of assisting persons displaced by the Islamic State’s offensives. Iraq also sought $500 million in short-term funding from the Export-Import Bank to purchase Boeing commercial aircraft for a reviving Iraqi Airways, but such a benefit was not announced in the official documents resulting from the Abbadi visit.

Iraq’s economy remains dependent on the energy sector, which provides 90% of Iraq’s budget. Iraq possesses a proven 143 billion barrels of oil. After long remaining below the levels achieved prior to the ouster of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s oil exports recovered to Saddam-era levels of about 2.1 million barrels per day by March 2012. Production reached the milestone 3 million barrels per day mark in February 2012, and expanded further to about 3.6 million barrels per day as of mid-2014. The Islamic State offensive interrupted export of Iraqi oil through the northern route (25% of total exports), but exports from the south of the country (75% of Iraq’s totals) have been unaffected. The group also captured some small oil fields from which the Islamic State reportedly produces about 20,000-30,000 barrels per day of crude oil. The loss of revenue from the northern route apparently contributed to the KRG-Baghdad oil sales deal for 2015, discussed above.

Iraqi leaders say they plan to increase production to over 10 million barrels per day by 2017. The International Energy Agency estimates more modest but still significant gains: it sees Iraq reaching 6 mbd of production by 2020 if it attracts $25 billion in investment per year, and potentially 8 mbd by 2035. What is helping the Iraqi production is the involvement of foreign firms, including BP, Exxon-Mobil, Occidental, and Chinese firms. China now buys about half of Iraq’s oil exports. Reaching the production goals is likely predicated on the defeat of the Islamic State organization.

Adopting national oil laws has been considered key to developing and establishing rule of law and transparency in a key sector. Substantial progress appeared near in August 2011 when both
the COR and the Cabinet drafted the oil laws long in the works to rationalize the energy sector and clarify the rules for foreign investors. However, there were differences in their individual versions: the version drafted by the Oil and Natural Resources Committee was presented to the full COR on August 17, 2011. The Cabinet adopted its separate version on August 28, 2011—a version that the KRG opposed as favoring too much “centralization” (i.e., Baghdad control) in the energy sector. A 2012 KRG-Baghdad agreement on KRG oil exports included a provision to set up a six-member committee to review the different versions of the oil laws under consideration and decide which version to submit to the COR for formal consideration. There was little subsequent movement on this issue, but the KRG-Baghdad interim deal on oil sales—coupled with an improved working relationship between the KRG and the Abbadi government as compared to the Maliki government—increases the potential for agreement on the issue.

General Human Rights Issues

The State Department human rights report for 2013, released February 27, 2014, largely repeated the previous years’ criticisms of Iraq’s human rights record. The report for 2013 states that a “culture of impunity” largely protected members of the security services and others in government from accountability or punishment for abuses. The State Department report cited a wide range of human rights problems committed by Iraqi government security and law enforcement personnel—as well as by KRG security institutions—including unlawful killings; torture and other cruel punishments; poor conditions in prison facilities; denial of fair public trials; arbitrary arrest; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; limits on freedoms of speech, assembly, and association due to sectarianism and extremist threats; lack of protection of stateless persons; wide scale governmental corruption; human trafficking; and limited exercise of labor rights. Many of these same abuses and deficiencies are alleged in reports by outside groups such as Human Rights Watch.

Additional human rights issues have arisen from the reemergence of the Shiite militias. Some of these militias reportedly have executed Sunnis for alleged collaboration with the Islamic State. The militias have also, in some cases, allegedly prevented Sunnis from returning to their homes in towns recaptured from the Islamic State. Such actions have been reported in the case of Jurf al-Sakhar, see above, a mostly Sunni town that was recaptured from the Islamic State in November 2014. Curbing militia abuses by bringing them more firmly under control was reportedly a focus of Prime Minister Abbadi’s meeting with President Obama on April 14, 2015.

Trafficking in Persons

The State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report for 2014, released in June 2014, again places Iraq in Tier 2, as did the report for 2013. The Tier 2 placement of 2013 was an upgrade from the Tier 2 Watch List rating for Iraq for four previous years. The upgrade was a product of the U.S. assessment that Iraq is making “significant efforts” to comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Previously, Iraq received a waiver from automatic downgrading to Tier 3 (which happens if a country is “watchlisted” for three straight years)


because it had developed a plan to make significant efforts to meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and was devoting significant resources to that plan. On April 30, 2012, the COR enacted a law to facilitate elimination of trafficking in persons, both sexual and labor-related.

**Media and Free Expression**

While State Department and other reports attribute most of Iraq’s human rights difficulties to the security situation and factional infighting, apparent curbs on free expression appear independent of such factors. Human rights activists criticized a law, passed by the COR in August 2011, called the Journalist Rights Law. It purported to protect journalists, but left many of the provisions of Saddam-era libel and defamation laws in place, such as imprisonment for publicly insulting the government. The State Department human rights reports have noted continuing instances of harassment and intimidation of journalists who write about corruption and the lack of government services. Much of the private media that operate is controlled by individual factions or powerful personalities. There are no overt government restrictions on access to the Internet.

In early 2013, the COR adopted an Information Crimes Law to regulate the use of information networks, computers, and other electronic devices and systems. Human Rights Watch and other groups criticized that law as “violat[ing] international standards protecting due process, freedom of speech, and freedom of association,”69 and the COR revoked it February 2013.

**Corruption**

The State Department human rights report for 2013 repeated previous years’ reports that political interference and other factors such as tribal and family relationships regularly thwart the efforts of anti-corruption institutions, such as the Commission on Integrity (COI). The report says that corruption among officials across government agencies was widespread. A Joint Anti-Corruption Council, which reports to the Cabinet, is tasked with implementing the government’s 2010-2014 Anti-Corruption Strategy. Another body is the Supreme Board of Audits, which monitors the use of government funds. The COR has its own Integrity Committee that oversees the executive branch and the governmental anti-corruption bodies. The KRG has its own separate anti-corruption institutions, including an Office of Governance and Integrity in the KRG Cabinet.

**Religious Freedom/Situation of Religious Minorities**

The Iraqi constitution provides for religious freedom and the government generally respected religious freedom, according to the State Department’s report on International Religious Freedom for 2013, released July 28, 2014.70 However, reflecting the conservative Islamic attitudes of many Iraqis, Shiite and Sunni clerics seek to enforce aspects of Islamic law and customs, sometimes coming into conflict with Iraq’s generally secular traditions as well as constitutional protections. In February 2014, the Cabinet adopted a Shiite “personal status law” that would permit underage marriages—reportedly an attempt by Maliki to shore up electoral support among Shiite Islamists.


A major concern is the safety and security of Iraq’s Christian and other religious minority populations which are concentrated in northern Iraq as well as in Baghdad. These other groups include most notably the Yazidis, which number about 500,000-700,000; the Shabaks, which number about 200,000-500,000 and most of whom are Shiites; the Sabean, who number about 4,000; the Bahai’s that number about 2,000; and the Kakai of Kirkuk, which number about 24,000. Conditions for these communities have deteriorated sharply since the Islamic State-led offensives that began in June 2014. See also CRS Report IN10111, *Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Implications for Religious Minorities*, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

**Christians.** Even before the 2014 Islamic State-led offensives, recent estimates indicate that the Christian population of Iraq had been reduced to 400,000-850,000, from an estimated 1 million-1.5 million during Saddam’s time. About 10,000 Christians in northern Iraq, fearing bombings and intimidation, fled the areas near Kirkuk during October-December 2009. On October 31, 2010, a major attack on Christians occurred when a church in Baghdad (Sayidat al-Najat Church) was besieged by militants and as many as 60 worshippers were killed. Partly as a result, subsequent Christian celebrations of Christmas were said to be subdued, and other attacks targeting Iraqi Christians have taken place since. After the Islamic State capture of Mosul in June 2014, the city’s remaining Christians were expelled and some of their churches and other symbolic locations destroyed.

Prior to the Islamic State capture of much of Nineveh Province, Iraqi Assyrian Christian groups advocated a Nineveh Plains Province Solution, in which the Nineveh Plains would be turned into a self-administering region, possibly its own province. Supporters of the idea claimed such a zone would pose no threat to the integrity of Iraq, but others say the plan’s inclusion of a separate Christian security force could set the scene for violence and confrontation. The Iraqi government adopted a form of the plan in its January 2014 announcement that the Cabinet had decided to convert the Nineveh Plains into a new province. The Islamic State’s takeover of much of the north has probably mooted this concept. One prominent Iraqi human rights NGO, the Hammurabi Organization, is largely run by Iraqi Assyrians.

Even at the height of the U.S. military presence in Iraq, U.S. forces did not specifically protect Christian sites at all times, partly because Christian leaders do not want to appear closely allied with the United States. The State Department religious freedom report for 2011 said that during 2011, U.S. Embassy Baghdad designated a “special coordinator” to oversee U.S. funding, program implementation, and advocacy to address minority concerns.

**Funding Issues.** Appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009 each earmarked $10 million in ESF to assist the Nineveh Plain Christians. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) made a similar provision for FY2010, although focused on Middle East minorities generally and without a specific dollar figure mandated for Iraqi Christians. The State Department International Religious Freedom report for 2012 said that the United States funded more than $73 million for projects to support minority communities in Iraq from 2003 up to that time.

**Women’s Rights**

Iraq has a tradition of secularism and liberalism, and women’s rights issues have not been as large a concern for international observers and rights groups as they have in Afghanistan or the Persian Gulf states, for example. Women serve at many levels of government, as discussed above, and are well integrated into the work force in all types of jobs and professions. By tradition, many Iraqi women wear traditional coverings but many adopt Western dress. In October 2011, the COR
passed legislation to lift Iraq’s reservation to Article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Mass Graves

As is noted in State Department reports on human rights in Iraq, the Iraqi government continues to uncover mass graves of Iraqi victims of the Saddam regime. This effort is under the authority of the Human Rights Ministry. The largest to date was a mass grave in Mahawil, near Hilla, that contained 3,000 bodies, discovered shortly after the fall of Saddam’s regime. In July 2012, a mass grave was discovered near Najaf, containing the bodies of about 500 Iraqi Shiites killed during the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein. Excavations of mass graves in Wasit and Dhi Qar Provinces took place in April and May 2013, respectively.

Regional Relationships

Iraq’s neighbors, both Sunni and Shiite-led, have significant interest in Iraq’s stability and in defeating the Islamic State. The Sunni Arab states have joined efforts to defeat the Islamic State, despite continuing reservations about the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Iraq’s instability has interrupted its efforts to reintegrate into the Arab fold after more than 20 years of ostracism following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. That reintegration took a large step forward with the holding of an Arab League summit in Baghdad during March 27-29, 2012, even though only nine heads of state out of the 22 Arab League members attended. Only one of them was a Persian Gulf state leader (Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah of Kuwait). On May 23-24, 2012, Iraq hosted nuclear talks between Iran and six negotiating powers. Iraq has also begun to assist other Arab states, for example by assisting post-Qadhafi authorities in Libya destroy chemical weapons stockpiles from the Qadhafi regime.

Iran

Iran is the chief regional supporter and ally of the Baghdad government; its influence in Iraq has increased steadily since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the accession of Shiite Muslim factions in Baghdad. Iran’s leverage over Baghdad has increased further since mid-2014 as a result of Tehran’s military assistance to the Iraqi government against the Islamic State. Iran has reportedly sent as many as 1,000 advisers from the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF) to help organize the defense of Baghdad and ISF counterattacks, in part by reactivating the established Iraqi Shiite militia forces that had largely been dormant since 2011, as discussed above. Prime Minister Abbadi, during his U.S. visit in April 2015, put that number at 110—possibly an attempt to downplay Tehran’s involvement in Iraq for U.S. official audiences.

Iran also has provided to Baghdad substantial quantities of military equipment including a reported five to seven Su-25 combat aircraft; flown drone surveillance flights over Iraq; and conducted at least one airstrike (December 2014) directly against Islamic State forces near Iran’s border. The aircraft Iran has provided to Iraq might have been from among 100+ combat aircraft that Iraq flew to Iran at the beginning of the 1991 war against the United States and which Iran integrated into its own air force.71 (Iran had not previously returned the jets, asserting that they

represented “reparations” for Saddam’s invasion of Iran in 1980.) KRG leaders have also praised Tehran for delivering military equipment to the peshmerga almost immediately after the Islamic State’s major offensive in northern Iraq began in mid-2014.

Iran’s military assistance to Iraq furthers the overall U.S. objective in Iraq of countering the Islamic State. And, by many accounts, Iran cooperated with U.S. efforts to achieve a replacement for Maliki as Prime Minister. Senior U.S. officials have reportedly discussed Iraq’s situation with Iranian officials on the sidelines of talks on Iran’s nuclear program, although U.S. officials have said there is no formal U.S. coordination with Iran in Iraq and Iran is not formally part of the 60-nation anti-Islamic State coalition. U.S. officials also have said that there is no linkage between any Iranian cooperation on Iraq and the substance of the nuclear negotiations. Still, after the fall of Ramadi in May 2015, U.S. officials stated that they would support operations by Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces that are commanded by the ISF, but not those commanded by or trained by Iran. This shift represented an apparent U.S. calculation that Iraqi forces would not be successful against the Islamic State without at least some help from Shiite militia forces.

Iran has also apparently viewed Iraq as an avenue for reducing the effects of international sanctions. Some reports say Iraq is enabling Iran’s efforts by allowing it to interact with Iraq’s energy sector and its banking system. In July 2012, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Elaf Islamic Bank of Iraq for allegedly conducting financial transactions with the Iranian banking system in violation of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195). Those sanctions were lifted in May 2013 when Elaf reduced its involvement in Iran’s financial sector.

The Iraqi government treatment of the population of Camp Ashraf and Camp Hurriya, camps in which over 2,700 Iranian oppositionists (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI) still reside, is another indicator of the government’s close ties to Iran. The residents of the camps accuse the Iraqi government of recent attacks on residents. This issue is discussed in substantial detail in CRS Report RL32048, Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. Iran has periodically acted against other Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq, including the Free Life Party (PJAK) that consists of Iranian Kurds and is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that opposes the government of Turkey. Iran has shelled purported camps of the group on several occasions. Iran is also reportedly attempting to pressure the bases and offices in Iraq of such Iranian Kurdish parties as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and Komaleh.

The close Iran-Iraq relationship today contrast sharply with the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which an estimated 300,000 Iraqi military personnel (Shiite and Sunni) died. Still, Iraq’s Shiite clerics resist Iranian interference and take pride in Najaf as a more prominent center of Shiite theology than the Iranian holy city of Qom.

Syria

One of the major disagreements between the United States and the government of Iraq has been on Syria. U.S. policy is to achieve the ouster of President Bashar Al Assad, whereas Iraq’s government apparently sees Assad as an ally that is, like Iraq, governed by Shiite leaders. (Assad’s Alawite community practices a religion that is an offshoot of Shiism.) Iraq has generally refrained from criticizing Assad’s military tactics, and it abstained on an Arab League vote in November 2011 to suspend Syria’s membership. Perhaps to ensure Arab participation at the March 2012 Arab League summit in Baghdad, Iraq voted for a January 22, 2012, Arab League plan for a transition of power in Syria. As an indication of Iraq’s policy of simultaneously
engaging with the United States on the Syria issue, Iraqi officials have attended meetings of countries that are seeking a political transition in Syria.

An issue that divided Iraq and the United States in 2012-2014 was Iraq’s reported permission for Iranian arms supplies to overfly Iraq en route to Syria. Iraqi searched a few of these flights, particularly after specific high-level U.S. requests to do so, but routinely allowed the aircraft to proceed after finding no arms aboard, sometimes because the Iranian aircraft had already dropped off their cargo in Syria. Following a March 24, 2013 visit of Secretary of State Kerry to Baghdad, the United States agreed to provide Iraq with information on the likely contents of the Iranian flights, and the overflights decreased in frequency.

The unrest in Syria has involved Iraqi factions. As noted above, the Islamic State operates on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border and Iraqi Shiite militiamen from groups discussed above went to Syria to fight on behalf of the Assad regime, although many returned to Iraq in 2014 to counter the Islamic State’s offensive. The KRG has trained some Syrian Kurdish militia forces to secure an autonomous Kurdish area if Assad loses control and sent about 200 peshmerga to assist Syrian Kurdish forces (YPG, a successor to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK) in the successful defense of the town of Kobane in 2014-15.

**Turkey**

Turkey’s policy toward Iraq has historically focused almost exclusively on the Iraqi Kurdish insistence on autonomy and possible push for independence. Turkey has always expressed concern that Iraqi Kurdish independence could embolden Kurdish oppositionists in Turkey. The anti-Turkey Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has long maintained camps inside Iraq, along the border with Turkey, and during the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey conducted periodic cross-border military operations against the group’s camps in Iraq. More recently, the PKK issue has not prevented Turkey from building a pragmatic and positive relationship with the KRG and becoming the largest outside investor in northern Iraq. Turkey did not openly oppose the KRG’s seizure of Kirkuk in June 2014, even though the capture would help a KRG independence drive.

Turkey’s positive relations with the KRG have complicated relations between Turkey and the Iraqi government. On August 2, 2012, then Turkish Foreign Minister (now Prime Minister) Ahmet Davotoglu visited the disputed city of Kirkuk, prompting Iraq’s Foreign Ministry to criticize the visit as an inappropriate interference in Iraqi affairs. In an effort to improve relations with Baghdad, Davotoglu visited Baghdad in mid-November 2013 and, aside from meeting Iraqi leaders, visited Najaf and Karbala—Iraqi cities holy to Shiites. That visit appeared intended to signal Turkish evenhandedness with regard to sectarian disputes in Iraq and to minimize any dispute with Baghdad over KRG oil exports through Turkey. During that visit, Maliki reportedly proposed to develop a “north-south” energy corridor through which Iraqi energy exports could flow to Europe via Turkey, but Davotoglu apparently did not commit to the proposal. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Brett McGurk testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 13, 2013, that the United States supports that concept as well as another export pipeline that would carry Iraqi oil to Jordan’s Red Sea outlet at Aqaba.

---

Gulf States

Most of the Sunni-led Persian Gulf states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) have not fully accepted Iraq’s domination by Shiite factions. Iraq-GCC relations worsened during 2012-2014 as the Maliki government marginalized Iraq’s Sunni leaders. Amir Sabah of Kuwait was the only Gulf head of state to attend the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad; the other Gulf states sent low-level delegations. The GCC states have joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, but have to date limited their airstrikes to Syria, not Iraq, apparently not wanting to directly support the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad.

Saudi Arabia had been widely criticized by Iraqi leaders for delaying opening an embassy in Baghdad, a move Saudi Arabia pledged in 2008. This issue faded somewhat after February 2012, when Saudi Arabia announced that it had named its ambassador to Jordan, Fahd al-Zaid, to serve as a nonresident ambassador to Iraq concurrently—although still not opening an embassy in Baghdad. On September 15, 2014, Saudi Arabia announced that it would open an embassy in Baghdad and, during the visit of Prime Minister Abbadi to Washington, DC in mid-April 2015, Saudi Arabia named a resident Ambassador to Iraq. The appointment coincided with comments by Abbadi during his U.S. visit that were critical of Saudi intervention against advancing Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen. Using language similar to that used by Iran about the Saudi intervention, Abbadi said “There is no logic to the [Saudi] operation [in Yemen] at all in the first place.” The other Gulf countries have opened embassies and all except the UAE have appointed full ambassadors to Iraq.

Iraq’s relationship with Kuwait is always fraught with sensitivity because of the legacy of the 1990 Iraqi invasion. However, greater acceptance of the Iraqi government was demonstrated by the visit of Kuwait’s then prime minister to Iraq on January 12, 2011. Maliki subsequently visited Kuwait on February 16, 2011, and, as noted, the Amir of Kuwait attended the Arab League summit in Baghdad in March 2012. The current Prime Minister of Kuwait visited in June 2013, producing an agreement to remove the outstanding issues of Kuwaiti persons and property missing from the Iraqi invasion from U.N. Security Council (Chapter VII) to oversight by UNAMI under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. This transition was implemented by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2107 of June 27, 2013. The two countries have also resolved the outstanding issues of maintenance of border demarcation. In late October 2013, the Iraqi Cabinet voted to allow Kuwait to open consulates in Basra and Irbil. These issues are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

### Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Iraq Since FY2003

(appropriations/allocations in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY '03</th>
<th>04</th>
<th>05</th>
<th>06</th>
<th>07</th>
<th>08</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>18,389</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,535.4</td>
<td>1,677</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>541.5</td>
<td>382.5</td>
<td>325.7</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Fund</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFTA (Treasury Dept. Asst.)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Accounts (MRA and ERMA)</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other USAID Funds</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD—ISFF Funds</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5391</td>
<td>3007</td>
<td>5542</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1618</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD—Iraq Army</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD—CERP</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD—Oil Repair</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD—Business Support</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,859</td>
<td>18548</td>
<td>6329</td>
<td>5365</td>
<td>8584</td>
<td>5042</td>
<td>2323</td>
<td>2738</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1519</td>
<td>589.4</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** State Department FY2015 budget documents, and CRS calculations. Figures include regular and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.

**Notes:** Table prepared by Curt Tarnoff, Specialist in Foreign Affairs. This table does not contain separate agency operational costs. IMET=International Military Education and Training; IRRF=Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Fund; ISF=Iraq Security Force; NADR=Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related; ESF=Economic Support Fund; IDA=International Disaster Assistance; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; ISF=Iraqi Security Forces. FY2015 and 2016 ISF funding are funds to equip and train the ISF, peshmerga, and Sunni tribal fighters.
Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612