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Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures

Suggestions for Northeast Asia

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Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures Suggestions for Northeast Asia

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Abstract

Relationships between countries generally exist somewhere in the grey area between war and peace. Crisis prevention activities are particularly important in this area, and should have two goals: stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war, and supporting or reinforcing efforts to move countries toward peace. A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) should facilitate efforts to achieve these goals. Its functions can be grouped into three broad, inter-related categories: establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries; supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues; and supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures.

Technology will play a critical role in a CPC. First, technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Second, technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. In addition, technology can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving relationships.

Establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Indeed, activities that occur under the auspices of a CPC, even highly formalized exchanges of agreed information, can increase transparency, and thereby pave the way for future regional cooperation.

Potential first steps for a CPC in Northeast Asia should include establishing communication channels and a dedicated communications center in each country, together with an agreement to use the system as a "Hot Line" in bilateral and multilateral emergency situations. A central CPC could also be established as a regional communications hub. The central CPC could coordinate a number of functions aimed at stabilizing regional tensions and supporting confidence building activities, perhaps initially in an unofficial capacity. Specific recommendations for confidence building measures are discussed.

Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures
Suggestions for Northeast Asia

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Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures


Suggestions for Northeast Asia

Arian L. Pregonzer

Executive Summary

Functions of a Crisis Prevention Center

Relationships between countries normally lie somewhere in the grey area between war and peace. Crisis prevention activities will be particularly important in this area, and should have two goals: (1) stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war and (2) supporting or reenforcing efforts to move countries toward a state of peace. A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) will facilitate efforts to achieve these goals and its functions can be grouped into three broad, inter-related categories: (1) establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries, (2) supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues, and (3) supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures. Appropriate activities in each of these categories will depend on the relations among participating countries. Between hostile states, a CPC may have the very restricted role of preventing unintentional war, much like the "Hot Line" communication system between the United States and the former Soviet Union. For states struggling to stabilize relations, the CPC should facilitate resolution of a broad range of contentious issues. As states enter into cooperative arrangements, a much broader role could be expected, including the implementation of systems for acquiring, analyzing, and sharing information obtained under the terms of confidence building agreements or treaties.



The Role of Technology

Technology will play a critical role in a CPC. Technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. In addition, technology itself can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving relationships.

Crisis Prevention in Northeast Asia

Establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Indeed, activities that occur under the auspices of a CPC, even highly formalized exchanges of agreed information, can increase transparency, and thereby pave the way for future regional cooperation. Major players in Northeast Asian security are Japan, Russia, China, North and South Korea, and the United States.

Potential first steps for a CPC in Northeast Asia should include establishing communication channels and a dedicated communications center in each country, together with an agreement to use the system as a "Hot Line" in bilateral and multilateral emergency situations. A central CPC could also be established as a regional communications hub. The central CPC could coordinate a number of functions aimed at stabilizing regional tensions and supporting confidence building activities, perhaps initially in an unofficial capacity. Specific recommendations are summarized below.

First Steps for a Northeast Asian CPC

Information Exchange

- "Hot Lines"
- Troop movements in unstable regions
- Large military exercises
- Regional disasters
- Ocean dumping of radioactive waste
- Export control infrastructure

Security Discussions

- Unofficial dialogue
- Bilateral and Multilateral discussions
- Conferences and symposia on regional issues (politico-military, cultural, environmental)

Collaborations

- Implementation of common treaties
- Environmental monitoring
- Joint military training for peace-keeping or emergency response
- Planning for implementation of regional CBMS
- Press coverage of tense situations

If Northeast Asia moves in the direction of regional cooperation on security issues, the number of activities supported by a CPC would increase. Planning for such activities, and establishing an architecture for their ultimate implementation will be critical.

Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures

Suggestions for Northeast Asia

Arian L. Pregenzer

I. Introduction

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist block has reduced the likelihood of global war, it has increased the likelihood of regional conflicts. Without the stability provided by a system of states dominated by two super-powers, local conflicts over resources, disputed territory, mass immigration, and ethnic and political antagonisms can escalate into regional wars. Regional wars can have global consequences, particularly if the countries involved possess weapons of mass destruction.


Relationships between countries lie on a spectrum ranging from outright war to peace. Some degree of tension between countries is normal, and most relationships lie somewhere in the grey area between the two extremes. Crisis prevention activities will be particularly important in this grey area, and should have two goals: (1) stabilizing tense situations that could push countries toward war and (2) supporting or reenforcing efforts to move countries toward a state of peace.

Knowledge of, and information about, potential adversaries are key elements of successful crisis prevention. Tensions are reduced between potential adversaries when they have adequate information about each other and understand each other well enough to accurately interpret the information they obtain. Lack of understanding of "the other," regarding military capabilities, threat perceptions, intentions, and values, has been a major contributor to decisions leading to unplanned war or escalation of war in this century¹. An understanding of the potential adversary is important for government officials, who are directly responsible for critical decisions that can lead to war or peace, and for citizens, whose opinions often influence the behavior of decision-makers. Communication is an

¹For example, see John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go To War*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1974.

important means of improving understanding and providing information, and can range from a very limited and formal information exchange about jointly perceived major threats, to extensive contact between countries.


Two concepts closely related to crisis prevention are "crisis management" and "peace management." Crisis management will be required when tensions escalate uncontrollably, and war seems imminent. Although stabilizing tensions will remain a primary goal of crisis management, activities will occur on a more rapid time scale and a different set of tools will be employed, possibly including military threats or coercion. On the other end of the spectrum, peace management will focus on enforcing and supporting the state of peace, with the goal of making peace irreversible. Figure 1 shows the relationship of crisis management, crisis prevention and peace management.



II. Functions of a Crisis Prevention Center

A Crisis Prevention Center (CPC) will facilitate efforts to reduce tension and to reinforce peace. Functions for a CPC can be grouped into three broad, inter-related categories: (1) establishing and facilitating communication among participating countries, (2) supporting negotiations and consensus-building on regional security issues, and

(3) supporting implementation of agreed confidence and security building measures. Appropriate activities in each of these categories will depend on the relations among participating countries. Among hostile states, a CPC may have the very restricted role of preventing unintentional war, much like the "Hot Line" communication system between the United States and the Soviet Union². For states struggling to achieve more stable relations, the CPC should facilitate resolution of a broad range of contentious issues. As states enter into cooperative arrangements, a much broader role could be expected, including the implementation of systems for acquiring, analyzing, and sharing information obtained under the terms of confidence building agreements or treaties. Figure 2 shows the association of these functions and their derivative activities with different stages of a regional security process.



Establishing a CPC requires only that states have a mutual desire to prevent the unintentional escalation of events to the stage of conflict and that they accept the tenet that

²See "Hot Line" Agreements in Appendix A.

better communication, even if it only entails sharing a limited set of information, can enhance their security. It does not require that states enter into a cooperative security arrangement, nor does it preclude war. Ample evidence of the value of crisis prevention activities between inimical states is provided by agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s aimed at preventing accidental war³. These agreements established direct communications between the capitals of the two countries, established commitments to improving security and control of nuclear arsenals, and established procedures to prevent provocations. Implementation was extremely formal, and involved little human contact. They represent one end of the spectrum of crisis prevention: establishment of communication channels and the exchange of a limited set of agreed information.

Although the existence of a cooperative security arrangement is not a prerequisite for a CPC, crisis prevention and cooperative security have overlapping goals⁴. One goal of a cooperative security regime is to prevent threats from arising by preventing the accumulation of the means for serious, deliberate, organized aggression. By providing the infrastructure for exchanging information on potentially threatening activities, and thereby preventing accidental escalation of tense situations, a CPC could be seen as a first step toward meeting the conditions for a cooperative security regime⁵. The cooperative security regime in Europe, known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and its associated Conflict Prevention Center are summarized in Appendix B as an illustrative example.


³Appendix A summarizes several of these agreements.

⁴See, for example, Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, The Brookings Institution, 1992; or Andrew Mack, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Summer 1992, p. 21 - 34.

⁵Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in *International Regimes*, ed. Krasner, p. 177. According to Jervis, a cooperative security regime has a good chance of forming if three conditions are satisfied: all states accept the status quo and modifications to it that can be achieved by peaceful means; states believe that other parties to the regime value mutual security and cooperation; and bilateral or unilateral pursuit of security is seen as prohibitively expensive.

Incorporating both official and unofficial, or "track two", activities under the auspices of a single Crisis Prevention Center would have several advantages. Prior to initiating an official security dialogue, or during times when the official dialogue is stalled, "track two" efforts can provide an important forum for continuing discussion. Unofficial discussions can provide a source of new ideas to the official dialogue and proximity of the two "tracks" will facilitate the exchange of ideas and reduce the possibility of interference of "track two" efforts with the official process. An unofficial forum also provides an opportunity for government officials, acting in an unofficial capacity, to experiment with new approaches. Finally, including a second "track" enhances the ability for building confidence among the citizens of the participating countries, as well as among the governments, which is an important element of the security process.

Technology will play a critical role in the CPC, as shown in Figure 3. In the first place, technology is required for establishing communication systems to ensure the timely flow of information between countries and to provide the means for organizing and analyzing this information. Second, technically-based cooperative monitoring can provide an objective source of information on mutually agreed issues, thereby supporting the implementation of confidence building measures and treaties. In addition, technology itself can be a neutral subject of interaction and collaboration between technical communities from different countries, thereby providing an important channel for improving understanding. The following paragraphs provide a discussion of activities that support one or more of the functions of a CPC and a brief explanation, where appropriate, of the technical requirements.



Communication Network A communication network will be a central element of the CPC. Although a central communications hub is not required, one could be established to act as a point through which all communications could be routed and to provide a center for regional crisis prevention activities. However, a first step would be to establish local CPCs in each participating country, each with agreed communications equipment and interconnected by satellite and wire communication links. Each country will require identical equipment and capabilities to assure equal access to all participants.

Relatively little equipment is required to support the exchange of routine, formalized information. For example, equipment at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the United States and Russia consists of computer monitors, word processors, facsimile machines, phone lines and printers; communication links are provided by satellite. Data transmission rates are relatively slow: approximately one page of text in thirty seconds. More sophisticated capabilities would be required to collect and transmit data from remote monitoring systems associated with confidence building measures or other agreements.

Topics for Information Exchange The establishment of a communication network implies that the participants have agreed to some limited form of communication, perhaps

only for emergency situations. Deciding a larger set of issues on which to exchange information could be the next step. A centrally located CPC could be the forum for these discussions, or they could occur on an *ad hoc* basis at a series of meetings in individual countries, as did initial discussions of confidence building measures in Europe. Information exchange on a wide-ranging set of issues would encourage developing a "basket approach" to regional security. Such exchanges would both increase understanding and serve a confidence-building function even in the absence of formal agreements. If formal agreements are attained, the CPC would be involved in transmitting any agreed information, such as notifications and declarations.

The number of communication channels at the CPC will depend on the number of different categories of exchanged information. Separate channels would be needed to support bilateral and multilateral communications, official and unofficial communications, and emergency and routine communications. The number of required staff will depend on the amount of information exchanged and the urgency of the communications.

Countries should not conclude that use of the communication network is a sign of weakness of imminent threat. Establishing procedures for routine use of the system will help prevent this from occurring⁶. Weekly routine communication, rotating among the participating countries, would enforce the habit of consultation and communication. Continuous test communication patterns would also be required to provide confidence about the state of health of the system.

To support unofficial dialogue, the network could also be used by the academic and research communities of the participating countries, both for communication and as a research tool. This communication could increase productivity and invite new ideas about areas for cooperation.

⁶This lesson was learned during the tense period between India and Pakistan in 1990, according to knowledgeable participants in a recent discussion held at the Stimson Center; Michael Krepon, private communication.

Information Management and Analysis An organized system for providing access to exchanged information is highly recommended. Data bases with text search and retrieval capabilities will be required for organizing basic information, such as points of contact in participating countries, the text of any mutual agreements, and reports on inspections or fact finding missions. If the CPC is involved in implementation of treaties or confidence building agreements, it could need data acquisition, integration, and analysis capabilities, which will require more sophisticated communication and software capabilities. Depending on the nature of the confidence building measures and the regional monitoring network, the CPC could receive data directly from the sensors deployed for cooperative monitoring applications, or such data could be transmitted to the CPC after being initially processed at local data acquisition centers. The communication network, already established as a first step for the CPC, could provide the basis for data transmission and communication of analytic results to local data centers in each country.

Education and Training Negotiators and decision-makers need adequate knowledge about procedures and technologies that could facilitate implementation of confidence building measures or treaties. A CPC could support educational efforts by providing a forum for experienced countries and organizations to share their expertise, including practical experience with basic monitoring hardware and software systems. The CPC could also arrange trips to other countries to facilitate the transfer of this experience base. Where possible, education should include hands-on experience with monitoring hardware and data, computer modeling and simulations, and information management and analysis techniques.

The CPC could also organize trial confidence building measures or exercises to increase regional familiarity with procedures and technologies that might be used during a transition to peaceful relations. Such exercises could be conducted outside the region, perhaps in conjunction with exercises taking place in other regions or countries, to alleviate

political concerns. Another option would be to simulate such exercises at the CPC, using either scripted procedures or computer simulations.

Collaborative Efforts Collaborations among technical, military and cultural communities emphasize commonalities within these communities and encourage cooperation. Any neutral subject, such as sports, the arts, or science and technology, can be the basis of confidence-building collaboration.

Because technology plays an important role in crisis prevention, it can be a particularly fruitful area for collaboration. Not only do technical collaborations provide neutral ground for interaction among scientific communities, they may also produce results that will aid in the implementation of future agreements. The work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva illustrates this point. Long before there was a negotiating mandate for a nuclear test ban at the CD, scientists from all participating countries collaborated on the technical issues associated with sharing seismic data internationally. Now that a comprehensive test ban is being negotiated in Geneva, the work of the GSE will provide valuable information about the structure of the verification system of this treaty. Collegial relationships that developed among participating scientists during previous collaborations will ease implementation of any agreed system.

Laboratory and office space will be required at the CPC to support technical collaborations. Laboratory equipment will depend on the specific application, whether it be the development of new sensor hardware, the development of more efficient algorithms for analyzing data, or the development of better data display capabilities. Computer and electronics laboratories would almost certainly be required.

Conferences and Symposia An important function of the CPC would be to sponsor conferences and symposia to increase understanding of a broad range of issues

that could affect present and future regional security, and to provide an intellectually stimulating environment for their serious consideration. As stated previously, the issues for discussion should not be restricted to the politico-military arena. Some analysts believe that tensions over environmental and resource issues may be at the top of the security agenda in the coming decades⁷. Terrorism, uncontrolled immigration, and human rights abuses are also appropriate candidates for discussion at a CPC.

A natural outcome of collaborative efforts and joint conferences will be suggestions for regional confidence building measures. Where appropriate, the suggestions could also include technical details for effective implementation that evolved from collaborations and symposia. The right mix of governmental, academic and technical expertise in the discussions would be essential for a viable set of recommendations. Suggestions arising from an unofficial track could lay the groundwork for subsequent official discussions.

Since technology can be expected to play a role in implementing agreements in both the arms control and environmental areas some conference activities should seek to promote communication between the political and technical communities. Such communication is important for two reasons: (1) awareness of the capabilities and limitations of monitoring technology can influence the attitude of decision-makers toward particular agreements and (2) knowledge about the specific issues under discussion helps steer technology down relevant paths.

Anticipating Future Needs A shift to peace could bring a new set of regional problems, or draw attention to existing problems whose solution requires cooperation. For example, when relations in a region improve, increased economic activity could stress the already fragile environment. Similarly, when people are no longer preoccupied with defending their borders against military attack, they may open their eyes to other potential

⁷For a discussion of the relationship between environmental and security issues, see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 76 - 116, Fall 1991.

crises, such as illegal migration and environmental degradation. Anticipating such problems and outlining a regional framework for preventing them from attaining crisis proportions, could be an important forward-looking function of the CPC. Managing the peace could be its ultimate role. To do this effectively, the infrastructure needs to be carefully planned to allow for communication and storage of relevant quantities and types of data, as well as its integration, analysis, and presentation to participants in a form that assists them make rational decisions.

Staffing of the CPC Staffing requirements become more complex with an increasing number of functions at the CPC. Computer hardware and software experts, data processing and analysis experts, and communications specialists will probably all be required. Staff with political and technical expertise about multilateral negotiations across a spectrum of issues will also be needed, and could have either permanent or rotating assignments at the CPC. Technical experts in monitoring technologies for arms control, environmental, and other applications will be required to support technical collaborations, as well as education and training. Technical expertise could be supplied by permanent residents of the center, sabbatical programs, or association with local laboratories. Representation of all participating countries would be expected.

III. Crisis Prevention for Northeast Asia

There is no established multilateral security regime in Northeast Asia, and great skepticism among all major players about the usefulness of such a regime. Several issues complicate the multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia. Andrew Mack points out that Northeast Asian security policy is heavily skewed toward deterrence, rather than reassurance which is a major objective of a cooperative security regime. Next, cooperative security stresses the need for military transparency and openness, rather than secrecy, as a means of providing reassurance, and there is no tradition of military openness in the

region. In addition, he notes that rather than being warm, relations among the countries in the region range from cool to hostile. He also points out that key Northeast Asian security issues are bilateral, rather than multilateral, for example: reunification of the Koreas, tensions between China and Taiwan, border disputes between the former Soviet Union and China, and the disagreement between Japan and Russia over the "Northern Territories"⁸.

It is worth noting, however, that crises resulting from any of these bilateral disputes would almost certainly have grave consequences for the entire region. In addition, there are a growing number of regional security and environmental issues whose solution may require multilateral collaboration. These include nonproliferation issues such as the current crisis over North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program, and environmental issues, such as disposal of radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan, air pollution across frontiers, depletion of fish in the North Pacific and East Asian seas, and the integration of sustainable development with rapid economic growth in the region⁹.

In the remainder of this section, previous proposals for an Asian security regime and possible reasons for their rejection are summarized. Possible first steps for crisis prevention activities in Northeast Asia are then discussed.

Proposals for an Asian Security Regime

As early as the 1970s the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of an Asian security regime, modeled loosely on the CSCE and termed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA)¹⁰. Early Soviet proposals were vague in terms of the charter of the organization, details of implementation and membership. The United States and pro-

⁸For a good discussion, see Andrew Mack, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Summer 1992, p. 21 - 34. It is worth noting that many of these issues also complicated East West relations in the previous two decades.

⁹For example, see Peter Hayes and Lyube Zarsky, "Regional Cooperation and Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia", Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 1993.

¹⁰For good discussions of CSCA proposals, see David Youtz and Paul Midford, "A Northeast Asian Security Regime: Prospects after the Cold War", Public Policy Paper 5, the Institute for EastWest Studies, 1992; and Andrew Mack, "Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Summer 1992, p. 21 - 34.

Western Asian countries rejected these proposals, primarily because United States military presence was considered to be the most important stabilizing influence in the region, and the Soviet proposals were aimed in part at reducing the influence of United States. Asian reactions emphasized the distinction between Asia and Europe and voiced indignation over the implication that Western ideas could be imported into their region, which they saw as implicit in the Soviet proposals.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russian proposals have become more specific. In 1990 and 1991, Gorbachev suggested that the Conflict Prevention Center at the CSCE could be adapted for the Asia-Pacific region¹¹. Gorbachev also argued that a CSCA could help solve regional conflicts, and would have value in resolving regional economic, ethnic, social, and ecological problems, all of which are tied to resolving regional security dilemmas. He emphasized an informal approach as a first step. In summer 1993, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev called for creating a conflict prevention center within the Asia-Pacific region to provide a mechanism for preventing crisis situations. Such a center would presuppose exchanges of military information, cooperation in settling dangerous incidents, and consultation in the event of unusual military activity¹².

Canada, Australia, South Korea, and Mongolia have also proposed Asian security regimes of one kind or another. All proposals included, as appropriate functions of a cooperative regime, discussions of regional confidence building measures and arms control and security issues. They also emphasized the importance of establishing informal security dialogues, or "track two" approaches, as the first step. The Mongolian and South Korean proposals both emphasized the importance and precedence of bilateral, relative to multilateral, discussions.

The United States, Japan, China and North Korea have continued to reject proposals for a CSCA. The United States has not wanted its regional influence eroded and

¹¹See Appendix B for a discussion of the Conflict Prevention Center of the CSCE.

¹²Russia-CIS Intelligence Report, "Options of Asia-Pacific Security System Eyed" August 5, 1993, International Intelligence Report, Inc.

sees this as a probable consequence of any multilateral regime. Since the Gulf War, however, where a multilateral approach proved valuable, the United States has expressed the willingness to participate in multilateral forums for specific issues on an *ad hoc* basis.

As an ally of the United States, Japan has not embraced proposals for a CSCA. Japan also rejects comparisons between Asia and Europe and has expressed the view that Asia is too complex for a security regime. Japan's security policy has been heavily focused on hostility to Russia, especially over the "Northern Territories". It has played a role in regional economic forums, however, and has lately emphasized "economic security" as an important dimension of "comprehensive security", which could signal its readiness to expand the multilateral dimension of its security policy.

China maintains official skepticism on the issue of a CSCA, and is thought to be particularly skeptical about Russian intentions. China has preferred bilateral channels to resolve its territorial disputes, and emphasizes that there is no simple East/West divide in Asia, as there is in Europe. However, China is concerned about the Korean peninsula and has recently participated in multi-power consultations with the United States, Russia, North and South Korea, China, and Japan regarding the Korean problem. In spite of its sensitivity to foreign interventions into its internal affairs, China could become more open to discussions about cooperative security.

First Steps for Crisis Prevention Centers in Northeast Asia

As discussed previously, establishing a CPC in Northeast Asia does not require the existence of an Asian security regime. Indeed, activities that occur under the auspices of a CPC, even highly formalized exchanges of agreed information, can increase transparency, and thereby pave the way for future regional cooperation. One primary objective of any crisis prevention activity in the foreseeable future should be reducing the alienation of North Korea.

Major players in Northeast Asian security are Japan, Russia, China, the two Koreas, and the United States¹³, and their participation in a regional CPC would be critical, even if only on an *ad hoc* basis, or initially in an unofficial capacity. Other countries could be invited to participate, but limiting membership will prevent excessive bureaucratization and improve chances for an effective organization in its early stages.

Establishing a Communication Network Establishing a dedicated communications center as local CPCs in each country would be a first step. Because of the bilateral nature of many concerns in the region, restricting communication to bilateral channels should be an option. A central communications hub also could be established to permit communication on issues of importance to more than two countries and to set the stage for more multilateral communication in the future. Establishing a central CPC would also emphasize and promote multilateral cooperative efforts.

Although the United States and Russia would likely be participants, a central Northeast Asian CPC should be located in an Asian country. Clearly, it would also be important to locate center in a relatively open society that does not unduly restrict the activities of either its citizens or foreign visitors. Technical sophistication of the host country would facilitate smooth functioning of the center. Other considerations might include whether or not the host country possesses nuclear weapons and the degree to which it is a proactive player in international politics. Locating the CPC in a non-participating, relatively neutral country, such as Singapore, might also be considered.

Agreeing on Topics for Information Exchange First steps might involve sharing information on reports of movements of troops and military equipment in potentially unstable regions, such as the border between North and South Korea. Similarly, notification of large regional military exercises would help reduce the possibility of

¹³Continued United States military presence in the region seems to be desirable to most countries and makes United States participation in any regional security forum an important element.

misinterpretation of these events as offensive developments. Other candidates for information exchange include: notification of regional disasters, advance notification of radioactive waste dumping in oceans and seas, information about indigenous export control infrastructure, and advance notification of civilian space launch testing activities. Not every country would necessarily be required to participate in such information sharing. Indeed, some exchanges might be purely bilateral in nature. However, to promote regional openness, attempts should be made to provide all countries with access to the data, wherever possible.

Forum for Discussion of Security Concerns Since many problems in the region are bilateral in nature, discussion of bilateral problems at the CPC should be a goal. Since some countries have bilateral problems with more than one country in the region, a central CPC could ease access to multiple partners. Again, where possible, reports on the results of bilateral discussions could be made available to the larger group as a sign of openness.

Inviting multilateral discussion of bilateral issues in an unofficial forum could also be a fruitful source of solutions. Details for implementing the agreed confidence building measures between North and South Korea is an example, as are possible solutions to the territorial disputes between China and the former Soviet Union or between Japan and Russia.

Exploring Areas of Common Ground The CPC could support activities required by existing or future treaties and agreements to which more than one of the Northeast Asian countries are party. The Transparency in Armaments Agreement, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and a Comprehensive Test Ban fall into this category. In addition to encouraging regional cooperation, centralizing such activities could reduce costs and improve efficiency for all members by taking advantage of economies of scale.

In some cases, countries might want to engage in joint planning for the implementation of a treaty. For example, China, Japan, Russia, the United States and South Korea all have legitimate concerns about protecting proprietary information during inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention. They could engage in joint trial inspections at a chemical plant in preparation for official inspections and explore the efficacy of certain procedures for protecting privacy. The CPC could provide logistical support to such trial inspections, capitalizing on United States and Russian experience.

Another example where countries could benefit from collaborative approaches to existing agreements is the enforcement of export controls. Several export control issues have caused regional tensions in the last year, including accusations that a Chinese ship was illegally carrying chemical weapons precursors, and the allegation that Japanese citizens had supplied financial resources to aid in the North Korean nuclear program. Many countries have agreed to control the export of sensitive technologies or materials but lack the legal and physical infrastructure needed for implementation and enforcement. A CPC could provide a forum for discussing a coordinated approach and providing technical support to any agreed system.

Scientific, Military, and Cultural Collaborations Collaborations among the military communities are particularly recommended as a means of increasing trust between potential adversaries. Joint planning or training for extra-regional peacekeeping activities, and joint training for emergency response activities, such as the clean up of oil spills, that could involve the military, are possible first steps.

Collaborative efforts among the press could promote balanced reporting of regional issues and discourage rhetorical and sensational reporting. This is especially important for tense situations such as that resulting from developments in North Korea.

Collaborations on technical monitoring systems could focus on areas outside the politico-military regime as a first step. There already exist several regional initiatives for

cooperation on environmental issues¹⁴, and the CPC could provide technical and logistical support for recommended activities. For example, the CPC could coordinate the development of common monitoring methodologies and techniques and could support data acquisition and analysis for baseline monitoring for acid rain and ecosystem impact studies in the region.

Future Steps for a Northeast Asian CPC

If Northeast Asia moves in the direction of regional cooperation, the emphasis of the security regime will shift from deterrence to reassurance. To provide such reassurance, there will be a push for military transparency and openness, for confidence and security building measures to reduce the risk of dangerous misunderstandings, for arms control, and possibly for a reconfiguration of armed forces to emphasize defense rather than offense. Perhaps China will join Russia and the United States in nuclear arms control treaties and nuclear weapon dismantlement activities. Ground forces might be relocated to reduce the chances for border misunderstandings. Limitations could be imposed on ballistic missile testing. Greater military-to-military contacts and planning dialogues could be expected, possibly including common warning and intelligence functions. All these activities could be supported by a CPC. Planning for these activities and establishing an architecture for their ultimate implementation will be critical.

¹⁴Refer to Hayes and Zarsky, op. cit.

Appendix A

Crisis Prevention Agreements Between the United States and the Soviet Union During the Cold War

The "Hot Line" Agreement

The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 underscored the importance of prompt, direct communication between heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union in times of crisis to reduce the risk that accident or miscalculation might trigger a nuclear war. In June 1963, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding, known as the "Hot Line" Agreement, agreeing to establish a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington to be used in times of emergency¹⁵. Because its use is restricted to emergencies, the "Hot Line" is regarded as being a tool for managing crises, rather than preventing them.

The original agreement established a full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit (Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow) and a full-time duplex radiotelegraph circuit (Washington-Tangier-Moscow) between the two capitals. The agreement was modernized in 1971, by establishing provisions for satellite communication links to replace the radio circuit. Such modernization was intended to increase the reliability and reduce the vulnerability of the communication system. In 1984, the system was upgraded to include facsimile equipment at the terminals, in addition to the teletype equipment stipulated in the original agreement. This increased the speed of communications and allowed for the transmission of graphic material such as maps and drawings.

¹⁵*Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990; p. 31 - 36, 122 - 128, and 314 - 318.

In the United States, the Hot Line is located in the Pentagon, whereas in the former Soviet Union it is located in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its use is restricted to the heads of state of the two governments. Although details are kept highly confidential, the "Hot Line" has been used on several occasions. For example, during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars it was used to prevent misunderstandings about United States fleet movements in the Mediterranean.

"Accidents Measures" Agreement

In recognition of the dire consequences of accidents involving nuclear weapon systems, both in terms of accidental detonations and in terms of unauthorized use of weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement aimed at reducing such risks in 1971¹⁶. The "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War" addresses three primary areas: (1) a commitment to improve organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; (2) arrangements for immediate notification if such incidents should occur and pose a risk of nuclear war, if unidentified objects are observed on early warning systems, or in case of any unauthorized or accidental incident involving possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and (3) agreement to notify in advance any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other. Originally, the "Hot Line" was designated as the vehicle for communication, but the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) was given this responsibility upon its establishment in 1988. The only information under this agreement that has been transmitted from the NRRC is the notification of strategic ballistic missile launches.

¹⁶*Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 1990; p. 118 - 121.

Incidents at Sea Agreement

During the 1960s the US and Soviet navies had several confrontations that raised concerns on both sides about the need for measures to prevent the escalation of such incidents. An agreement on naval confidence building measures, known as the Incidents at Sea Agreement, was reached in May 1972, and provided for measures to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis¹⁷. Among the provisions in the agreement are specific steps to avoid collisions between ships; the requirement that surveillance ships maintain a safe distance from the object under investigation; and prohibitions against simulating attacks at or launching objects toward ships belonging to the other party. The agreement also provides for advance notice of planned activities that might represent a danger to ships or aircraft, and annual meetings to review implementation of the agreement. Since its establishment, notifications have been transmitted through the NRRC.

This accord was promptly credited with improving relations between the Soviets and Americans and greatly reducing the number of naval incidents. Before this agreement, dangerous incidents occurred at the rate of tens per year. By 1990, the annual meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union treated only half as many. Both navies saw the Incidents at Sea Agreement as being in their best interest, which is a major reason for its success.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

After a series of discussions on reducing the risks of nuclear war in the mid-1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) in each capital and to establish special communication links between these

¹⁷*Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 1990; p. 142 - 149.

centers¹⁸. The equipment and communication lines utilized by the NRRC in both countries are identical to those of the "Hot Lines." In the United States, the NRRC is located in the State Department; in Russia, it is located in the Ministry of Defense.

The centers became operational in 1988 and are intended to supplement existing means of communication (such as the "Hot Line" and diplomatic channels) and to provide direct, reliable, high-speed systems for transmission of notifications and communications required under existing and possible future arms control and confidence-building agreements. At their initiation, there were no arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and the NRRCs were used only to notify ballistic missile launches required under the Accidents Measures Agreement and the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Now they are used to transmit information required under twelve different bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties, including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the nuclear testing treaties. They will also be used to transmit information required under START, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Open Skies Treaty. Separate communication channels and work areas within the NRRC are used for bilateral and multilateral agreements. Bilateral communications also require a higher degree of confidentiality. The center employs one watch officer for bilateral communications with the Russians, two watch officers for CSCE-related communications, and a technical support person. The center is staffed twenty four hours a day.

The NRRCs may also be used to transmit "good-will" messages as a confidence building measure. The conditions under which such good-will messages are appropriate are vaguely defined, and neither the United States or the Soviet Union transmitted any such messages for the first couple of years of operation. Such messages have been transmitted on a few occasions in the last few years, however. Although the nature of the actual

¹⁸*Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*; United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 1990; p. 336 - 344; and Harold Kowalski, Staff Director of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the United States, private communication.

messages is regarded as confidential, examples of appropriate subjects for good will messages include notification of a large disaster, such as the Chernobyl disaster, that affects the international community, or notification of the sinking of a nuclear submarine near the territory of another party.

The NRRCs have a narrowly defined role and are not intended to replace formal diplomatic channels of communication or the "Hot Line"; nor do they have a crisis management role. There is no provision for voice communication; and all routine written information is transmitted according to exact, negotiated formats. Formalized communications were favored because they lessen the probability of misinterpretation and remove personal bias from the system. Since communications are in multiple languages, exact formatting also makes possible computerized translation of notifications and other information.

In recognition of the importance of fostering understanding the United States and the Soviet Union, original planning for establishing the NRRC included provisions for research and discussion centers, in addition to the technical communication centers. At the time, out of mutual distrust, neither side was prepared to staff a center with a broader mandate and Geneva became the forum for discussions and consultations relating to mutual security. As relations between the two countries improved, the idea of a center for joint research on security issues re-emerged, but because of other existing forums neither side has seen it as a matter of particular importance or urgency.

Appendix B

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Conflict Prevention Center

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ¹⁹ (CSCE), whose current membership includes 52 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries, developed in the 1970s and is an example of a cooperative security regime. The goal of the CSCE is to reduce the risk of armed conflict by promoting dialogue and decreasing tensions between the East and West. It provides a political context for European cooperation in four major areas, or "Baskets:" (1) security issues and confidence building measures; (2) science, technology and economics; (3) humanitarian and other fields; and (4) implementation of current steps and additional negotiations. The Helsinki Final Act, a political commitment to make progress in the first three of these areas, was signed in August 1975. This broad security agenda, which recognizes the value to regional security of cooperation across a wide range of issues, became known as the "Helsinki Process." In recent years, several significant arms control agreements have been negotiated in the context of the CSCE in Vienna, including the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Open Skies Treaty.

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) is a subgroup of the CSCE devoted to issues in "Basket One." A major achievement of the CDE occurred in September 1986 with agreement on a set of politically binding confidence- and security- building measures (CSBMs), designed to increase openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. The principle measures call for states to: (1) refrain from the threat or use of force; (2) provide prior notification of

¹⁹*Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990, p. 319 - 335; Fact Sheet: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), U.S. Department of State Dispatch, v3, p. 915(2), Dec. 28, 1992; Michael R. Lucas, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, p. 32 - 34, November 1990.

certain military activities; (3) allow observation of certain military activities; (4) provide annual forecasts of notifiable military activities; and (5) allow on-site inspections from either the air or ground to verify compliance with the agreed measures. The underlying premise is that such openness will reduce the risk of armed conflict by providing reassurance to all parties about the non-offensive character of military activities in the region.

The CSCE Conflict Prevention Center

The CSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) was established in November 1990, and located in Vienna, Austria²⁰. Initially, it was envisioned as playing a large role in conflict prevention, which included technical activities such as establishing a communications network, and supporting implementation of CSBMs, as well as political activities such as providing a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities. In January 1992, the political role of the CPC was enhanced: it was named as the forum where CSCE States would hold regular consultations on security issues with politico-military implications and as the forum for consultation and implementation of decisions on crisis management. The CPC was also given the authority to initiate, execute, and monitor fact-finding missions as instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management.

As with most large bureaucratic organizations, the CSCE has many sub-organizations who compete for responsibilities and power. The broad and independent mandate given to the CPC in 1992 duplicated the efforts of other organizations and interfered with their authority. Some argued that the CPC removed conflict prevention activities from the broader political context and that it prescribed an unrealistic, mechanistic process for dealing with conflict. Such considerations led to a marked reduction in the CPC's mandate in December 1993. It now functions as a logistics support unit for other

²⁰John Borawski and Bruce George, MP, *Arms Control Today*, p. 13 - 16, Oct. 1993; and private communications with William Wood and Jonathon Cohen of the United States Department of State.

CSCE activities, such as the six preventive diplomacy missions that have been established in regions of conflict: Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, and Tajikistan. The CPC is responsible for purchasing, transporting, and maintaining equipment for the support missions.

It is under the auspices of these six CSCE missions that much crisis prevention actually occurs. Each mission resembles a small embassy, with between four and six staff officers, and a few local support personnel. Staff officers promote regional confidence building, with an emphasis on human rights. They travel the country and poll ordinary citizens, using the information to make policy recommendations to governments. For example, recent activities in Latvia have focused on the Latvian government's policy of sending expulsion notices to ethnic Russians. Although Latvia apparently has no intention of acting on these notices, the practice has produced great tension with Russia, where it is regarded as ethnic apartheid. Mission staff officers have gone before the Latvian government and recommended the termination of the practice, warning of the possibility of armed conflict with Russia. Their recommendations are influential, as they represent the views of the 52 CSCE member states.

In addition, the CPC prepares annual statistical surveys about the implementation of agreed CSBMs, takes part in CSBM-related activities such as observation of military activities or visits to airbases, and has established a data bank in which CSBM-related information is stored and easily retrieved. It also keeps up-to-date lists of points of contacts to be used in cases of hazardous military incidents and is connected to the CSCE Communications Network which allows for the quick transmission of all CSBM-related information to CSCE capitals. It circulates this information to participating states not connected to the network.

Crisis Prevention Centers as Confidence Building Measures: Suggestions for Northeast Asia

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