FCC Record, Volume 30, No. 10, Pages 7818 to 8098, Supplement (June - July 2015) Page: 8,020

114. We conclude that by addressing a message using the consumer's wireless telephone
number (e.g., 5555551111 (disprint.messaging.net or entering a message on a web portal to be sent to a
consumer's wireless telephone number) and sending a text message to the consumer's wireless telephone
number, the equipment dials a telephone number and the user of such technology thereby makes a
telephone call to a number assigned to a wireless service as contemplated in section 227(b)(1) of the
Act.392 We disagree, therefore, with the commenter who suggests that equipment used to originate
Internet-to-phone text messages does not meet the second element of the TCPA's autodialer definition
because that technology does not use a "traditional" dialing technique.393
115. From the recipient's perspective, Internet-to-phone text messaging is functionally
equivalent to phone-to-phone text messaging, which the Commission has already confirmed falls within
the TCPA's protection. 94 And the potential harm is identical to consumers; unwanted text messages pose
the same cost and annoyance to consumers, regardless of whether they originate from a phone or the
Internet. Finding otherwise-that merely adding a domain to the telephone number means the number
has not been "dialed"-when the effect on the recipient is identical, would elevate form over substance,
thwart Congressional intent that evolving technologies not deprive mobile consumers of the TCPA's
protections, and potentially open a floodgate of unwanted text messages to wireless consumers.
116. Consistent with this analysis, we clarify that other types of text messages that pose the
same consumer harms are subject to TCPA consumer protections.395 Specifically, consumer consent is
required for text messages sent from text messaging apps that enable entities to send text messages to all
or substantially all text-capable U.S. telephone numbers, including through the use of autodialer
applications downloaded or otherwise installed on mobile phones.396 Consumers face the same privacy
impact and may incur data costs from such texts. To free these texts from the TCPA's protection would
leave a glaring gap in the statute's coverage.
117. Our finding is consistent with the First Amendment. The TCPA's protections have been
in place for over two decades and have withstood multiple First Amendment challenges.397 We see no
new constitutional issue posed by the application of this restriction on Internet-to-phone text messaging
technology and note that the TCPA's restriction on the use of autodialers to contact wireless numbers
creates a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on speech. Such a restriction survives a First
Amendment challenge if it "furthers an important governmental interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no
392 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1).
393 See ccAdvertising Comments on Revolution Petition at 10.
394 See 2003 TCPA Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 14115, para. 165.
395 See id. ("This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for example, short
message service (SMS) calls, provided the call is made to a telephone number assigned to such service.") (emphasis
added).
396 47 C.F.R. 20.18(n)(1).
397 See, e.g., Joffe, 121 P.3d at 841-43 (concluding that application of the TCPA's restrictions on autodialed calls to
wireless numbers contacted via Internet-to-phone messaging did not violate any First Amendment rights); Wreyford
v. Citizens for Transp. Mobility, Inc., 1:12-CV-2524-RLV, 2013 WL 3965244 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2013); In re Jiffy
Lube Intern., Inc., Text Spam Litigation, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc.,
759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169-70 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d
999, 1010-12 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, 2009 WL 4884471, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009);
Strickler v. Bijora, Inc., 2012 WL 5386089, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2012); Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc.,
729 F.3d 370, 377 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that TCPA's disclosure requirements in Section 227(d) are
constitutional).

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