

SIGNIFICANT PHILOSOPHIES OF THE MIND

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SIGNIFICANT PHILOSOPHIES OF THE MIND

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

This is a study of significant philosophies of mind and some of their influences upon education, religion and morals.

Method of Gathering Data

The material for this thesis has been gathered through extensive reading in the field of philosophy, written by outstanding philosophers, and books written about the leading philosophers both modern and medieval.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to collect information on the significant philosophies of the mind and make a comparison of these concepts and their relation to education, religion, and morals.

Limitations of the Study

Philosophers are agreed that one of the chief functions of philosophy is to formulate clearly and distinctly a theory of the nature and function of the mind. Educators are not agreed upon the methods that will work to the best

advantage upon the minds of the pupils.

Many writers, because of the complexity of the concepts of mind, avoid mention of it in order to be relieved of the responsibility of attempting an answer.

Unfortunately those who can think clearly on such abstract problems as the nature of mind, with rare exceptions are unable to explain it in such a way that even the better students can understand their views. It is not the purpose of this investigation to solve this difficult problem, but to discuss the fundamental theories involved.

Method of Procedure

The philosophical concepts of the mind as the idealist, realist, and pragmatist interpret it, and its relation to education, religion, and morals are discussed in this thesis. Chapter I presents the introduction, states the problem, gives method of collecting data, the purpose, and limitations of the study.

Chapter II presents the idealistic interpretation of the mind with a brief historical background which includes a discussion of platonic, subjective, and objective idealism.

Chapter III presents the neo-realist, naive realist, and critical realist's interpretation of mind and a discussion of the different conceptions within the realistic theory, and the realist's influence upon education.

Chapter IV presents the pragmatic conception of the mind and some applications of the pragmatic method to significant philosophical problems.

Chapter V presents a summary and conclusion relating to idealistic, realistic, and pragmatic conceptions of the mind and some influences upon education.

CHAPTER II

IDEALISTIC CONCEPTION OF MIND

The history of philosophy presents several systems of idealism. This study will deal with some of these interpretations which have had important influences on our understanding of mind. These are as follows: (1) Platonic idealism, (2) subjective idealism, (3) objective idealism, and (4) new idealism.

Platonic Idealism

Plato (428-348 B. C.), a Greek philosopher, believed the soul to be housed within the body with little in common with the mundane. He believed in the pre-existence of the soul before its entrance into the temporal body. With it he believed it brought a divine nature from its prior home. The soul is the source of bodily motions, knowledge, and aspirations.¹

Plato distinguishes three aspects of the soul which are now referred to as reason, will, and feeling. Will and feeling are referred to in relation to the body, which he believed to be mortal. Reason is regarded as divine and

¹George T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 213.

immortal, believed to be imprisoned within the body, but its ultimate destiny was eternal life in the "intelligible world of Ideas." Plato's marked distinction of soul and body was a later source of the dualistic theories of mind and body.

Subjective Idealism

Further steps were taken toward the development of idealism by the Irish philosopher, George Berkeley (1685-1753), who believed that sin and evil were due to the wrong kind of philosophy.² He held materialism responsible for all, and it was his aim to prove that matter did not exist as an inert substance independent of thought. He contended that the objects of experience were merely perceptions. An element exists, but its existence is not independent of mind. It is perceived by the mind. An element is a bundle of sensations which are wholly subjective, therefore the world is a mental world. Berkeley also believed only minds, souls, or spirits to be real. Nature is the action of God's mind upon one's finite mind. He did not teach that God is a deceiving God. He taught that objects are real, but not independent of mind. Before the existence of man, the trees, the mountains, the sun, moon and stars did not exist as such, because there was no one to perceive them. They were not colored because colors

²Ibid., p. 214.

are sensations and there was no eye to perceive their coloredness. External things are perceptions of the mind. This is Berkeley's subjective idealism.

Objective Idealism

Objective idealists believe that will is the fundamental thing in the world or universe, objectively considered. The essential thing in one's body is will and not intellect. The body is only the outward expression of one's will. The soul or spirit is activity, desiring, and striving. The will is psychic and the world which one hears, sees, and feels is the outer expression of universal will. It is objective because the world is not just an idea but has objective reality as its basis; that is to say, absolute will.

The founder of this school, the German philosopher Schopenhauer (1788-1860), in his book entitled The World as Will and Idea, brought the above theory forward in addition to changing Berkeley's subjective idealism to objective idealism.³ Schopenhauer was a successor of Kant, and his philosophy had its source in Kant.

Hegel suggested that all reality is thought and reason. The world is a thought process, or God thinking. Nature is thought from the outside. One has only to know the laws of the mind to know the laws of reality. Hegel thinks of the

³Ibid., p. 221.

universe in terms of development, but this development is considered a thought process. Platonic, subjective, and objective idealism lead to further advancement of the idealistic theory.

New Idealism

To the new idealist, the behavior and laws of the mind are purely spiritual, and in no way physical. Mind is a higher kind of life; he cannot bring himself to regard mind in a cold, impersonal, mathematical sort of way.

The idealist holds that life and mind are incurably specific. Even the lower animals live a specific kind of life, and if a species is lost, nothing else can make its contribution to the world. A cat lives a cat's life, and a human being lives a human being's life. No amount of one can be exchanged for any quantity of the other. They are qualitatively distinct. Each has something different to contribute to the world as a whole. If an individual is destroyed, nothing can take his place. The same is true of minds; they are not interchangeable. There is no substitution for a Plato or an Aristotle. Each individual has something about him which is unique, and irreplaceable. Objectively speaking, no one else can do another's work. One may do the same work, but it is different.

The idealist hesitates to speak of mind in connection with certain individuals, and there is definitely a doubt

about cats, dogs, and other animals. In fact, suspicion is cast upon the mentality of some human beings. They prefer to confine themselves to persons where there is no possible doubt, such as Plato. He had a mind, and by studying and reflecting upon its accomplishments, one can see what the life and function of the mind is really like. Again, the idealist points to the fact that no amount of Plato can be exchanged for so much Aristotle, and by studying the work of his mind, one can formulate the general laws of the life of the mind, which is in this case clearly exhibited.

Laws of the Mind

The idealistic philosophy of mind can be best comprehended through its application to certain standard areas, such as laws of the mind, theories of values, social values, logical values, religious values, moral values, and spiritual values.

The most universally recognized law of the mind is its unifying power. Most of the tests given by psychologists are intended to establish the mind's power of unifying, in a meaningful way, the factors of a novel situation. The person examined may be given a simple sentence, in disorder, and be asked to unify the words to bring out their meaning.

One may listen to a lecture and judge the quality of the speaker's mind largely by the way he unifies the various

parts of his discourse so that they give meaning to one another and bring out the full meaning of the subject.

The intelligent orchestra leader is the one who can unify the many performers so that they work together in harmony.

The idealist makes a distinction between the two most universally recognized subordinate laws, namely, analysis and synthesis; that is, taking apart and putting together. Each breaks down complex data into various parts and later rearranges them into the whole again.

Analysis is responsible for many of the successes of scientific experiments. Its value in the field of science is universally recognized.

Synthesis is something more than pulling apart and putting together again. The parts may be pulled asunder and united to make a new whole, or by omitting portions to make a new whole. Examples of the value of synthesis may be noted in the many flowering plants, new fruits and nuts, all of which owe their existence to synthetic botany. Synthetic chemistry is responsible for many new dyes and stronger alloys.

The musician realizes the element of choice in synthesis; he may simplify the composition by using only the simpler notes, or he may add more notes to the original composition, thus making it more complex. In either case,

synthesis is settled, not by the synthetic method as such, but by synthetic unity.

The idealist holds that mind is essentially selective, and by no means impartial. All are not welcome; its portals are strictly guarded. Reality in the rough is kept outside. It may be spoken of as a host who admits only those who are appropriately garbed, and behave in accordance with approved standards. Mind selects its guests, introduces them, and guides their intercourse in each case as it sees best. The guests are nature's noblemen, their nobility being conferred by mind, rather than by nature.

Idealistic Theory of Values

Esthetic values. -- Mind is essentially creative of values. Values are esthetic, social, logical, religious, and moral, and their source is invariably the mind. Everything that mind endows by the process of analysis and selective synthesis, or unity, receives esthetic value. The parts imply the whole, and the whole implies the parts, and in this synthetic unity, each part receives greater value which it did not possess within itself, that is, outside the relationship conferred by the mind. Each part is drawn from a limitless, whirling chaos, and strengthened by this embracing unity.

Social values. -- Synthetic unity bestows social values. The parts that are related to the same whole are related to

each other, and in that new relationship values are acquired which they would never have possessed apart from this co-operative relationship. In all societies, there exists a unifying principle which is sincerely spiritual. It is in this society that one receives social values from the association with others.

Logical values. -- Logic, or reasoning, is derived by synthetic unity. Classification is the putting together of the parts into a unified class. Division means breaking up a larger class into smaller meaningful units which within themselves make a unified whole. Definition means putting into its place within a single standardized system, or unified class. A concept is a unified class, or standardized system. Inference means the reading of the relations established by the parts within a whole. Such classifications are ideally considered the work of the mind.

Religious values. -- Mind is the source of religious values. The part-whole relationship is established by viewing human beings from the standpoint of synthetic unity. From the religious point of view, this takes the form of universal brotherhood of man. One can readily see that in the case of all value types, mind in its synthetic unity is their source.

In this creativity, mind functions much as a theatrical director, coordinating and systematizing as it seems best.

Without the work of the mind, the parts would be uncoordinated, unsystematized, unrelated, meaningless fragments.

The actor needs a director, a dramatic author, a costume designer, and many others in order to successfully produce his part in a drama.

It is the same in the educational institutions; the pupils need a teacher, the teacher needs an administrator, and so on in order to complete the whole educational system. The teacher without a school is like a school without a teacher. Neither is complete nor able to function apart from the other. Its values are undeveloped. In order to develop values, the ordering and administering work of the mind must be brought into play.

It has been stated that mind unifies, then selects, and creates values. It also creates itself. The idealist speaks of this in two ways. First, mind sets itself its own problems. It is not physical reality which orders the central nervous system to create Platonic dialogues. Only a Plato writes Platonic dialogues; only a Beethoven composes Beethoven symphonies. In creating these, the artist creates overt, physically objective expressions of his philosophy or music. He is also creating, expanding, and developing his mind and creative power. To illustrate: a man who builds one house, can build a better house. In this sense, mind creates itself.

Mind creates itself in another deeper sense. When one reflects, he becomes aware of himself in this or that relation. By the device of logical abstraction, one can distinguish two direction tendencies of the mind. Namely, the direction toward objects, and the direction toward the knowing self. Logical distinction is not temporary. One does not always view first the objects around him, and later himself. There is, in any activity of mind, a subjective and objective reference. A knowledge which is not your knowledge, or some else's, is not knowledge at all.

The idealist holds, too, that a knowledge of objects presupposes a knowing self, and objective knowledge is secondary. One may turn his mind to this or that object, but the turning is that of the mind. Mind is the central core, while the object is on the circumference. One may turn from various objects, but one can never get away from mind.

The idealist holds that mind is not dependent upon a physically objective world for something to think about. Mind can make itself its own objects, and discover its own laws. In the formal sciences, such as mathematics, mind is only concerned with itself and is entirely independent of physically actual reality. These are created out of the substance of mind by mind itself. Knowledge of this kind is not physical, but is spiritual and demonstrable to reason rather than sense perception.

The physical world is known and accepted as real, only

in so far as it responds to the demands which mind makes upon it. The actual physical world, in so far as it is orderly and systematic, logical, and mathematical, enters into what the idealist terms "knowledge and becomes accepted as real." Therefore, idealistic concepts intimate that knowledge is always reflective, and purely reflective knowledge is exemplified in formal disciplines of logic and mathematics. They conclude, further, that mind is capable of discovering the whole content of the ideal realm.

This implicit knowledge is made in the inter-activity of the physical world. The mind generates some improved technique when the need arises, but this new technique, or formula, is not a part of physical nature, but represents further growth of the mind. Science is not something physical, but the living and growing mind.

The idealist believes that mind is capable of answering any question which it is capable of raising, or solving any problem which it can within itself set. In creating mathematics, it creates itself, and in so doing, it creates mathematics.

Mind, to the idealist, is spiritual and in no way physical. Its laws are derived from its own inner core, rather than from the external physical world. They express mind's demands for unity; its methods of analysis and synthesis; its power of selecting; and its creativity which

includes its establishment of values, arts, and sciences, and its reflective creation of its own self.

The Theory of Moral Values

According to Barrett's idealistic theory, evil may be defined as "the degradation of the higher being to the lower."⁴ He believes evil to be directional, rather than a quality of particular things or experiences.

Differences of opinion as to what is high or lower involves differences of judgment as to what is evil. A man's condemnation is usually on the basis of the sort of self he has chosen to be, or not to be. Thus the problem arises as to what self should be affirmed, and what self should be denied.

The differences of opinion as to what standards should be set as the higher, or lower, level of living, bring another problem as to the fundamental conception of evil. Therefore, the degradational conception is necessary if one's philosophy of value is to have a guiding principle.

The idealist believes that a man's character is made up of the things that please him, and the first mark of a rise in moral standards is his dissatisfaction with a particular sort of life. The return of the prodigal son to his father is an example of the inference made here. He

⁴Clifford Barrett, Contemporary Idealism in America, p. 219.

repented of his swinish living and turned again to a higher level of living.

Virtue comes from convictions, satisfies the moral senses, and the conscience guides it; yet one may have "seared his conscience" to the extent that his conception of morals would not measure up to a high standard, yet it is of value in the formation of the moral standard. Conscience alone cannot be used as a yardstick.

The idealists hold that sense of duty is an important element of moral experiences, its resistance a moral hazard; yet dutifulness alone does not provide a standard of moral worth. Moral excellence may be exemplified by acts of love which do not involve a sense of obligation; therefore, a sense of duty is not enough. The idealist points to the fact that the moral standards in vogue are sometimes used as a yardstick for measuring one's status, but he does not believe this to be a satisfactory means of evaluation. The idealist refers to primitive tribesmen who felt no sense of guilt for their acts which caused some member of another tribe to suffer. The evolution of man's moral nature has led to the belief that any act which causes one's fellow-man to suffer is sinful or wrong.

In view of the above statements, the idealist believes there is no other alternative than to turn to some form of perfectionism for a valid theory of moral standards. The

moral value of an experience then must depend upon its role in the perfection of human nature. Barrett states:

Moral value here shows analogies to logical value. The truth of a theory depends on this -- whether it takes due account of all relevant evidence, with appropriate distribution of emphasis, and whether it can itself be a principle of relevance in the field of experience with which it deals, rendering that field more intelligible and opening new significant vistas of thought and problems. So with a valid ethical theory: the true moral evaluation of a man's act must be one that judges it in terms of what is relevantly and characteristically human. The good act is the act of a man who is not under misapprehension but truly knows what he is about. Aristotle's general definition of the good is to the point: the good in any field of experience is that which adequately performs its characteristic function. The good life thus regarded would be the humanly appropriate and abundant life. Moral judgment involves self-evaluation based on self-understanding and proceeding to discipline, expression, realization and enhancement of personality: the culture and enrichment of character.⁵

This general point of view brings the problem of confusing the description of human conduct with the evaluation of the act.

Moral judgment includes likes and dislikes, but it is mainly a judgment of approval or disapproval, and of preference not only felt, but judged to be defensible on whatever the judgment may be based, what is judged good over what evil is dominant. Man's moral convictions constitute his self-identification in the upward trend in the scale.

The idealist believes that a really scientific ethics deals with moral experience, and moral judgment; has a

⁵Ibid., p. 224.

balanced view of human nature which enters into the act; perceives that the act which one calls morally good satisfies all the demands which will be called upon to meet. In conclusion, the idealist believes that moral judgment is not only about things, but it is a judgment of and on things; a judgment which evaluates and renders a verdict of approval of things, or of condemnation, with sufficient freedom to enable an individual to perform the duties which he believes to be his duties that no one else in the universe, not even God so far as God is other than in himself, can do his duty for him. The idealist believes, too, that happiness, perfection, and duty must be the goal of systematic ethics. Morality integrates all of one's capacities and strives on man's intelligence in all the fields in which he receives values.

The evaluation, the moral view of things, consists just in the gradational recognition that something ought to be rather than other things, because that particular thing is worthier and higher than others.

Spirit

The idealist gives mind a privileged position. He believes that the world, or the universe, has a meaning, but it is viewed as a logical or spiritual totality, rather than mechanical in structure. The world is organic in that the parts within themselves make up a meaningful whole.

Mind, as mere intellect, becomes intelligible only when it is guided by spirit.

The word "spirit" simply means the acknowledgment of values, their existence, and something within one's self, that perceives and esteems them. Consciousness of meaning and purposiveness of value emerge as qualities of consciousness. This is a kind of high level of mind, which is what is meant by the term "spirit."

Spirit is an ultimate and irreducible category, and is part of the background of our thought; it can no more be reduced to intellect than mind to life, or life to matter. The same principle which makes matter not wholly intelligible until life enters in, or life until it finds expression in intelligence, requires that mind cannot be understood until interpreted by spirit.

The significance of this background of thought lies in the fact that it must be accepted independently of any specific metaphysical prejudices or presuppositions.

Spirit is unintelligible except for the acknowledgment of values and perhaps mind, and is not understandable except through the values upon which it is intentionally directed.

Consciousness

The idealist has difficulty with consciousness which seems to be in the concept itself. Its origin seems to be

popular rather than philosophic, which proves unsatisfactory when philosophers try to use it. Logicians say consciousness is indefinable; its species, sensations, emotions, and will are also indefinable.

The idealist approaches the question of consciousness from the side of the inner essence of experience. The central core of consciousness is the urge toward self-expression, toward projecting the mind into its environment, thus creating a part of itself. Mind is like an enzyme spreading around its principles of analysis and synthesis, yet never becoming exhausted in the process. Bosanquet says:

The power of self-consciousness is to make a self out of circumstances. The meaning of self-consciousness, the active form of totality, is to give everything its character, to be the centre in which everything in its degree tells on the import of the whole. Self-consciousness is, I do not say the ultimate form of experience, but the highest and most significant of its finite shapes. A true self is something to be made and won, to be held together with pains and labour, not something given to be enjoyed.⁶

The idealist does not elevate the linguistic medium above that of all other media. He believes that a Bach fugue or a Beethoven symphony has as much continuous thinking as a drama. Many of the master-pieces have as much refined technique as any prose or poetry. To reproduce into another medium, even that of words, is to lose some of the original vitality.

⁶B. Bosanquet, Principles of Individuality and Value, p. 365.

Bosanquet says:

Such media as sound, colour, form, rhythm, and metre have undoubtedly a logic and a necessity of their own. The universal -- the straining toward the whole -- is in them as in all experience; and it is idle to deny their constructive and creative nisus the name of thinking, because it does not operate through what we call "par excellence" logical language and conceptions attached to words. The rhythm that completes a rhythm, the sound that with other sounds satisfies the educated ear, the colour that is demanded by a colour-scheme, are I take it as necessary and as rational as the conclusion of a syllogism.⁷

As the idealist sees it, "consciousness" should not be restricted to a single medium of expression. It should be understood as the vital sense, which accompanies the inner nisus in all its activities. Wherever mind is present and active, creating values, creating a living and growing self, consciousness is also present whether expressed in words, action, or by some other means. Wherever mind is present, the self is also present. Consciousness in self-consciousness.

Mind and Nature

Any philosophy written in the tradition of historical idealism is in its totality of spirit; but in a narrower sense, spirit is only a part of this totality. The idealist gives spirit, or mind, a privileged position in its interpretation of the world. Over against it one must set in contrast the philosophy of nature. The idealist views the

⁷Ibid.

world as a totality which is organic rather than a mechanical aggregate, as mental rather than vital, and as spiritual rather than a system of abstract ideas.

Hegel states:

Life is the "truth" of matter, mind the "truth" of life, and of mind, in its subjective sense, the "truth" is mind objective and absolute. A philosophy of mind then, in the narrower sense, has as its problem the "place of mind in nature" or more broadly stated, the place of mind in reality.⁸

The idealist's view of this problem is that all reality has its source in the mind. He interprets the world in terms of consciousness, will, or experience. Nothing exists separate and apart from mind.

Education

The idealist regards education as a means, or tool, for making a certain type of individual rather than an end within itself. Lodge says the idealist defines education as "the guidance of the individual to full self-consciousness."⁹ The predominating factor in this guidance is the interactivity of other selves to help the individual pass from half-felt awareness to full consciousness or full knowledge and control of self.

To the idealist, science represents a wonderful adventure of the spirit. Brubacher states:

⁸Barrett, Contemporary Idealism in America, pp. 122-123.

⁹Rupert C. Lodge, Philosophy of Education, p. 72.

. . . to the idealists the facts of science, instead of being as concrete as they seem, are really the reactions of intelligence to the objective world. The word science, in fact, comes from a Latin root meaning to know. Any given science, then, such as botany, is what thought knows. It has more to do with ideas than plants. Indeed, according to this train of reasoning, the plant itself is basically ideal. The idea thus furnishes the basis for all education work. . . . Mind is a spectator. It literally "takes in" what goes on in the world about it.¹⁰

The idealist desires physics, mathematics, and chemistry to be included in the school curriculum, not because they are useful, but because they are an expression of the greatness and power of the mind.

To the idealist, knowledge is the outward expression of an inward growth on the part of the central self. The child is educated to become the self which he was meant to be. The soul, by instinct, strives for perfection.

The idealist sets as his goal perfection; both teacher and pupil are striving to reach the goal. He eliminates the things he cares least for and substitutes others that he does care for and gradually builds toward his beautiful ideals, or soul-images, or state of perfection. In this soul-image, that exerts such tremendous power over his life, he knows no limitations, feeling that mind would become stagnant and no progress would be made.

Erumbaugh has said:

Without ideals our minds would become like the wayside pool, stagnant and deadly. With ideals they become like mountain rills and leap from moss-rimmed

¹⁰John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education, p. 62.

rocks in endless showers of silver spray, clothed in rainbows, and bearing in their sweep life and beauty and grandeur. Happy the child whose unfettered spirit may build after its own plans the terraced slopes, the sun-crowned spires, the carved pillars, and the golden portals of the temple of truth.¹¹

The idealist believes the desire to build ideals is innate and that as mind creates "truth," he gathers inspiration for the highest achievements. Horne states:

Idealism finds ideas and purposes to be the realities of existence; and personality, which is the union of ideas and purposes, to be the ultimate reality. . . .

Educating is the purposeful providing of an environment that counts most, so education is really a relation between personalities of different degrees of maturity.¹²

The traditional idealist believes that the fundamental concern of educators is the guidance of learning and that the child is the primary consideration in the educational system. He thinks he can best achieve his goal by the use of subject-matter, authority, and discipline. The mind-idea-spirit self is developed by study of knowledge and facts, and submission to authority and to stick to the ideals which were born and proved in philosophies of the past. Books which have been proved to contain true facts, ideas, and ideals, were his source of knowledge, in his definite curriculum.

Present-day idealistic methods are less rigid, less authoritative, and less formal, but still hold to the belief

¹¹Marlin G. Brumbaugh, The Making of a Teacher, p. 70.

¹²Herman H. Horne, Idealism in Education, p. vii.

in the primacy of the mind-idea-spirit self. There is more freedom, more pupil initiative and activity, but self-realization is reached through the interactivity of the pupil's mind with others. The teacher is a dynamic, vital force in developing the child's mind-idea-spirit self. The child becomes conscious of this self through the example of the teacher's personality; therefore, the teacher must be a good example of moral character.

The idealistic teacher stresses the importance of the pupil learning to think for himself in order that "self-realization" may be fully accomplished.

The idealists have emerged from the "old school" into a broader, less rigid, more democratic, and more interesting curriculum, but personality, mental and spiritual development have not not ceased to be the aim of the idealistic school.

CHAPTER III

SOME REALISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MIND

Cartesianism

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) became dissatisfied with the lack of agreement among philosophers and came forward with a new mathematical method. He resolved to doubt everything that could not pass the test of his criterion of truth, namely, the clearness and distinctness of ideas. Any thing that passes this test is self-evident, and from these self-evident truths he deduced other truths which logically followed. Three kinds of ideas were distinguished, namely, innate, which means little more than the mental power to think things; adventitious, which came to him from without; and factitious, produced within his own mind.

His first reality discovered was the thinking self, yet he found himself in a position to doubt that he who was thinking, existed as a being and he knew that this could not be doubted.

As to the existence of God, Descartes, after trying to prove the Divine existence, concluded that he knew this also by an innate idea. But he could not find any clear

ideas of an extra-mental, bodily world. He suspected its existence but logical demonstration was needed to establish this truth. His adventitious ideas carry the vague suggestion that they are caused by bodies of an external world. He argued that God would be a deceiver should he allow him to think that bodies exist if they do not, therefore he concluded that bodies do exist. He then expressed the existence of three kinds of substance, namely, created spirits, the finite soul-substance of each man, Uncreated Spirit which is God, and bodies which are created, physical substance existing independently of human thought.

Sensations were viewed by Descartes as a function of the soul, but he was never able to explain the apparent fact that the soul is moved by the body when sensations occur.

He believed that error could be accounted for by his theory of assent, which makes judgment an act of will; where the will over-reaches intellect, judgment may be false. He admitted that conflicts may occur between human passions and human reason and that a virtuous life is made possible by a knowledge of what is right, and the control of the lower tendencies of nature.

He described six passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sorrow, and held that these are passive states of consciousness, partly caused by the body, acting through the animal spirits, and partly caused by the soul.

Neo-Realism

Neo-realists believe that all reality is ultimately physical, and that the reality of the mind is made up of the demonstrable physical changes which occur when mind is present and do not occur when it is absent.

Mind has no privileged place, but in order not to pre-judge the issue, Holt refers to reality as neutral rather than exclusively physical. Holt states that

Consciousness is a cross section of the Universe. Mind and matter consist of the same stuff. The neo-realist believes mind and matter to be neutral, being neither physical nor psychical, and that the dualism in the world is not entities but of casual laws, thus neo-realism is often termed "neutral monism."¹

Neo-realists believe that an external world can exist independent of our knowledge of it; and one may know some truths by perception and intuition.

According to Lodge, the neo-realist likes to compare the following physical situations in order to prove that mind and matter are physical:

In situation A the physically interacting factors are all inorganic. Their interactivity is permeated by physical laws and a physicist can predict with certainty the outcome of their interactivity. For instance, an astronomer can predict the eclipse of the heavenly bodies with mathematical certainty and his predictions are verifiable. In

¹E. B. Holt, The New Realism, pp. 354-355.

situation E, at least one of the physically interacting factors is a living organism, with a well-developed brain and nervous system. Its interaction is also permeated by physical laws. Any movement man makes is a physical movement, but it falls outside of physics to predict with certainty what those movements will be.

In the second situation the neo-realist chooses a more complex situation. He locates the mind "out there" where there is interactivity of organism with physical environment. He defines mind as "that interactivity itself," or as "the relation between the active organism and the acting environment." He then states that this relation is physical interactivity and these two ways of defining mind mean the same thing.

The neo-realist believes that all factors of the complex situation enter into the mind. The organic factors cannot deliberately be disregarded because without the complex organism no mind is present. Neither can one disregard the inorganic factors, because without them no life would be present; no living organism exists without sun and air. Mind is like life in that it emerges only when many factors are present, including organic and inorganic factors.

Neo-realists hold that all the factors which enter into physical interactivity with the brain and nervous system

are a part of the mind. One's own body, the building in which he teaches, the blackboard, the road by which he travels, are all considered a part of the mind, just as much as the formal training in which he participates. Holt says:

The consciousness that depends on any given living organism is the sum total of all . . . entities to which that living organism responds, and it is the system of these entities in just such and such quantities and just such spatial and temporal arrangement as the environment and the responses themselves define. . . . Consciousness is . . . that group of entities to which an organism responds.²

Mind is not always physical, but it is capable of considerable refinement in arts as well as science, but in the end the interactivity, in all respects, and without remainder, is physical.

Russell says: "What we call mental events, are part of the material of the physical world."³ How the organism behaves in situations which stimulate this interactivity is investigated by behaviorist psychology, but the realist adds here that the inorganic factors of the physical environment are a point not to be forgotten if he wishes to find the real and complete facts of behavior. He believes these to be no less important than the brain and nervous system of the living organism, which are constitutive parts of that behavior which is called "mind." Psychology is a

²Ibid., pp. 183-184.

³Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter, p. 387.

branch of physical science, and mind is physical. Russell says:

Inference from one event to another . . . seems only to acquire exactness when it can be stated in laws of physics. There are psychological laws . . . which cannot at present be reduced to physical laws. But none of them is exact and without exceptions; they state tendencies and averages rather than mathematical laws governing minimum events. Take, for example, the psychological laws of memory. . . . One supposes that in order to obtain an exact causal theory of memory, it would be necessary to know more about the nature of the brain. The ideal to be aimed at would be something like the physical explanation of fluorescence, which is a phenomenon in many ways analogous to memory.⁴

The neo-realist holds that most thinking is expressed by talking which is a physical movement. In the case of "silent thinking" and silent reading it expresses itself in "incipient movements," movements of the lips, palate, and larynx.

In the same way an image expresses itself in movements. An image of a lemon, thought of as cut and squeezed into a glass, and sipped in the mouth, expresses itself by the flow of saliva.

Consciousness

The neo-realist believes that human behavior can be explained in terms of physical reaction to physical stimulation, and that the "hypothesis" of "consciousness" is not needed. He believes that the real facts which underlie

⁴Ibid.

what common sense calls "consciousness" are the refined physical movements of talking, and that the content of "consciousness" is the refined and complex movement which the behaviorist identifies with emotions, imagination, and other kinds of action. These physical facts are the sole reality and the neo-realist regards "consciousness" as an exploded hypothesis.

In general, neo-realists maintain that "mind," in every detail of its behavior, is purely physical and that its behavior is purely physical, and that it can be explained without remainder by analyzing it into organic, or cerebral, and inorganic, or environmental factors in a state of interaction. Russell says:

We suppose that, given sufficient knowledge, we could infer the qualities of the events in our heads from their physical properties. This is what is really meant when it is said, loosely, that the state of the mind can be inferred from the state of the brain. . . . I think that this is probably true. . . . Even if we reject this view, physics may be unable to tell us what we shall see or "think," but it can tell us what we say or write, where we shall go, whether we shall commit murder or theft, and so on. . . . The thoughts of Shakespeare or Bach do not come within the scope of physics. But their thoughts are of no importance to us: their whole social efficacy depended upon certain black marks which they made on white paper. There seems no reason to suppose that physics does not apply to the making of these marks, which was a movement of matter, just as truly as the revolution of the earth in its orbit. . . . And no one can doubt that the causes of our emotions when we read Shakespeare or hear Bach are purely physical.⁵

⁵Ibid., pp. 391-393.

Russell's contention here is that reality is in no way mental, but physical throughout and can be explained by some mathematical method. What is lacking is a system of appropriate measurements.

Critical Realism

Critical realism is the belief that knowledge arises only through the selective and critical elaboration of the data of consciousness.

The critical realist keeps organic and inorganic factors as distinct as possible and restricts the term "mind" to the organic factors. He locates mind within the skull and identifies it with the brain or concrete cerebral hemisphere. Drake defines mind as follows:

A mind is simply a brain regarded from the inside. . . . The mind is embedded in the body; and the unity of the mind is a part of a larger unity, that of the organism as a whole, with its integrative nervous system. The mind constantly interacts with the other parts of the body; indeed its life consists in receiving messages through the afferent nerves and sending messages out through the efferent nerves.⁶

The critical realist rejects subjectivism and objectivism and accepts the objective existence of things because the view is plausible and works in practice. He holds that the outer object is independent of the perceiving mind, which is different to the perception of the object which reflects only a few of the many qualities of the object perceived. Patrick states:

⁶Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy.

The Critical Realist is, therefore, disposed to consider the sense data, or sense, as something intermediate between the perceiving mind and the physically existent thing. . . . The mind cannot reach out to the object itself; it reaches out to the essence, the datum.

Thus it seems that in the knowing situation there are three kinds of entities: first, the perceiving mind or the conscious organism; second, the outer object, the ultimate brute reality, having only the primary qualities, not immediately apprehended in knowledge; third, the datum perception, that which is immediately given to sense, named also the character-complex or essence. The latter is not mental, nor any part of the perceiving mind, nor is it a part or aspect of the outer object; it is an intermediate "logical entity."⁷

The critical realist does not believe consciousness to be an ultimate, unanalyzable thing, but a complex event which can be analyzed into simple events which occur in a simple spatio-temporal order. He does not believe that consciousness exists or that it can be found in the brain or outside it. Consciousness is a function possessed by a sentient organism.

Naive Realism

Naive realism is the view held by the plain or unthinking man. It may also be defined as the belief that "knowledge of the objective world arises immediately from direct awareness of objects." It is the view of the ordinary realist who has given little thought or comprehensive study to the realistic theory of philosophy.

The naive realist takes one thing more seriously than

⁷Ibid.

the theory of physical realism: he thinks it is his business to accept facts regardless of how awkward it may seem from the point of view of his theory; therefore, he accepts consciousness as a fact of direct experience, something that cannot be explained away. He believes this complication, as a fact, can be compatible with the other facts accepted by realism. He is a "factist" first and a "physicist" second. He believes that the only explanation of facts of any and every sort will be found ultimately to be the physical explanation. He considers himself a physical realist, and sets himself to describe the facts of mind as he sees them.

As the naive realist sees it, mind emerges in complex situations which contain a well-developed active brain and nervous system, as well as inorganic factors. In the situation mind is definitely present, but may be unconscious. It may be absorbed in the interaction, and may not be aware of itself or of the objective environmental factors of the situation. There are times when one "just sits" and other times when one "sits and thinks." Mind in either case is present; consciousness emerges when one becomes conscious of the situation and of one's self, and only when the organic and inorganic factors cease to flow in harmony, when there is some problem to be solved or some choice to be made.

According to the naive realist, consciousness is far narrower than mind and has two sides or aspects, an outer and an inner. Consciousness is an awareness which contemplates

or apprehends what is in the physical factors to be contemplated or apprehended. This is known as the outer objective side of consciousness. It is an awareness of its physically objective content. It contemplates redness of the sun, and similarly apprehends the other sense data. Its relation to them is one of togetherness; and in that com-
presence consciousness contributes nothing, physical reality everything, including form and content. Conscious attention is able to single out various factors for special emphasis; it can analyze, synthesize, and unify the factors in the situation before it, but these activities are not distinct from the strictly physical features of the situation. Consciousness can be aware of this or that feature because it is physically selectable, analyzable, and unifiable.

Consciousness does not do anything; it merely apprehends or contemplates. Its awareness or contemplation does not add anything physical to reality or constitute any additional physical factors. Objects apprehended by consciousness are not altered, or influenced, by being apprehended. This is what the naive realist terms the outer aspect of consciousness.

In the inner aspect one is believed to live his experience, or to realize it subjectively. The naive realist would say that he "enjoys" his apprehension or contemplation. He does not like to term this subjective experience

an "awareness" or "apprehension" of the self in its various activities, because this might concede an objective psychology on the basis of observation or apprehending introspectively what is there to be apprehended. The naive realist holds that this cannot be done and that, in its inner relation, one's experience is not a knowing but a living, not a contemplation but an enjoyment. He believes that science is not a complex of interacting language patterns, and knowledge to be something more than exclusively physical interactivities on the part of organisms with the brain. Thus he concludes that the physically real thing about science and knowledge is this physical interactivity, but there is more; one is conscious of the physical laws coordinated in the physical sciences. One contemplates and is aware of what is taking place; this makes no difference to the facts and laws apprehended, which remain objectively what they are; one enjoys his contemplation and lives his awareness.

Summary of Realistic Philosophers

Neo-realism was introduced in the early part of the twentieth century; it began as a movement against the wide influence of idealistic metaphysics.

Naive or objectively-minded realism is simply the view of the plain man who believes that his experiences extend beyond his body and include, in some of their aspects,

those outer subjects. He holds that the data of perception are the very physical existents which are believed to be surrounding and threatening his body. He contends that these physical objects get within experience and are directly apprehended. Their surfaces make up one's visual and tactile data. On the contrary, the subjectively-minded or neo-realists suppose that the data of perception are psychological existents, or so many pulses of a stream of psychic life. They are only copies or representatives of the outer objects.

Critical realism was introduced in an effort to expose the error in both neo-realism and naive realism and to unite realism as a whole.

The fundamental differences in realistic theories are:

1. The neo-realist holds that all factors which enter into the physical interactivity with the brain and nervous system are a part of mind and mind is always physical, whereas the critical realist locates mind within the skull and identifies it with the brain, and further states that mind cannot reach out to the object itself, but reaches out to the essence, the datum. He believes consciousness to be a function possessed by a sentient organism. The naive realist accepts consciousness as a fact and contends that all facts in the end will be found to be physical. He believes mind emerges in complex situations containing a well-developed brain and nervous system and inorganic factors.

He believes that mind is always present even though there may be times when one does not think.

2. The naive realist differs with his colleagues in the view of contemplation in which we become aware of the stimuli given and the reactions observed. Science is not a complex of interacting language patterns and knowledge is something more than exclusively physical interactivities on the part of the organism with the brain.

The neo-realist, critical realist, and naive realist, have differences of opinion as stated above, but they are all realists. They all maintain that the only reality one is capable of knowing is nature. The world is objective and factual, something which man must apprehend and conform to. It is what it is regardless of ideas, desires, or wishes, and should be studied factually and objectively. Everything personal, subjective, and emotional is kept out. Their aim is to see reality as it is in nature. The realist does not contemplate the world as a whole but tears it to bits and studies each part separately. He emphasizes the scientific and laboratory method of study and is satisfied with his record of facts and truths as they are. Since these facts are the best he has, they are considered as "practical" truths.

The realist lives in a world of natural beauty and systematic law and order, a world of unity, of purposes and organization.

Moral values. -- Realists reject the doctrine that things must be beautiful, good or spiritual in order to exist at all. They recognize the existence of things that are wholly non-spiritual and things that are accidentally spiritual. The universe contains things that are good, bad, and indifferent. Realism rejects the notion that things are good because they are thought to be so, but does not encourage the endeavor to make them good.

The realist contends that goodness is an indefinable quality which attaches to things independently of consciousness. If asked "what is good?" the realist's answer would be that good is good, and that it is not identical with being willed or felt in any way.

The realist holds that the being or nature of things is independent of their possessing values, but their possessing values is not independent of consciousness. Values are functions of consciousness and things do derive value from being desired and possess value in proportion as they are desired.

The realist has two conceptions of moral value, namely, rightness and comparative goodness. When one is confronted with an occasion in which he must choose this or that alternative for self-preservation, or self-destruction, the right act is the one which preserves his life. Right is the act which takes advantage of circumstances.

Right is not necessarily moral. Moral values appear

where there is a question of comparative value. Then the problem arises as to what is moral when the interest of more than one person is involved. An act may be right in that it promotes one's interest and wrong in that it injures another's interest. The realist answers this by saying that the same thing can possess several relations.

An act may be both right and wrong in that it conduces to the fulfillment of one's interest and is detrimental to another's interest, or it may be doubly right in that it conduces to the fulfillment of two interests. Then the conception of comparative goodness arises. Then the realist states that if the fulfillment of one interest is good, the fulfillment of two interests is better, and the fulfillment of all interests is best.

If the act which conduces to goodness is right, the act which conduces to more goodness is more right and the act which conduces to most goodness is most right. Perry states:

Morality is such performance as under the circumstances, and in view of all the interests affected, conduces to most goodness. In other words, that act is morally right which is most right.⁸

The realists believe that an act cannot be both right and wrong in a moral sense. Several acts may promote the maximum goodness and in such a case all acts would be morally right, but none could be morally wrong.

⁸Ralph F. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 334.

Religious values. -- The realist believes that what is indifferent will acquire value, and what is bad will be made good by agents on a pre-existing and independent environment. He states that he can support this belief in the fact that the good is objectively real and actually operative. He believes there is promise rather than discouragement in the fact that nature has yielded life, and that life once established has imposed its interests upon the environment. If man did not possess the world in the beginning, he must give up the hope of possession in the end. The truth-loving realist sacrifices hope for eternal life on the altar of science, and seeks what comfort nature can offer through freedom of reason; he believes this to be his duty. He does not concede the existence of God, because he cannot prove his existence, but if there is a God, he is placed on the same level with nature, and the realist believes he can gain his favor only by complete adjustment to the ways of this world.

In conclusion, the realist renounces every spiritual or moral ontology, and believes through the operation of moral agents nature, which is the pre-existing environment, will cause bad to be made good.

Education. -- The realistic schools give mathematics, science, and scientific methods the most prominent place in their curriculum.

Objects or problems are analyzed in piece-meal fashion

by the latest scientific methods. The curriculum consists of courses and textbooks containing the latest scientific information available. The facts in the books are stated systematically, concretely, and objectively. The pupil is to learn these facts in a systematic, orderly way, as they really appear in the universe. All personalities or subjectiveness is kept entirely out of the picture because they are incapable of scientific analysis and study.

The pupil with a realistic background would like to see the teacher's subjectiveness and personality vanish from the picture and be replaced by a radio, phonograph, or some other mechanical means of transferring facts and truths from nature to him.

The realist pupil expects the history teacher to confine her discussion to history. What he looks for is objective information, objectively expressed. He would like to see all courses depersonalized, so that nothing could come between himself and the information he desires. His main interests are in the field of science which deals with nature and unless he is studying history or sociology, he does not consider the past.

In the realistic school, authority and discipline come from nature in the form of natural laws which one is to discover, apprehend and make adjustments to. The purpose, then, of the realist's education is to measure, to organize,

to categorize, to apprehend, to understand, and to adjust
human beings to nature.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRAGMATIST AND HIS CONCEPTION OF THE MIND

Some Meanings of Pragmatism

Pragmatism is a new method of approach to philosophical problems; it always places emphasis on what is practical, useful, fruitful, and satisfying. The pragmatist believes that the world is to be made, or remodeled, according to his desires and wishes; the universe is something to be made more beautiful, rather than a something ready-made to be enjoyed, contemplated, or worshiped. His interests are in a human, industrial, social world which he believes he can make better. Patrick states:

Pragmatism is a tendency and a movement rather than a philosophy. In fact it holds philosophical systems in profound suspicion. It is more like a "corridor" through which one may enter upon philosophical studies. It is an attitude and a habit of thought -- a habit of looking forward to results rather than backward to consequences.¹

Pragmatism puts things to work, is adventurous and experiments with things that have some practical use or practical value, but the pragmatist has no use for idle disputes about things that have no practical values or consequences.

¹Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 366.

Pragmatic Theory of Truth

The pragmatist is not friendly with the notion of absolute truth. He prefers to accept a thing as true "if it leads to satisfactory consequences," or if it has practical value and works. Value is his measure of truth, and workableness is the nature of truth. Truth is made true; it happens and does not remain constant. It is constantly changing. What is true today may be only partially true tomorrow, or it may even become false.

It is necessary that pragmatism be thoroughly understood in order to avoid premature judgment of its true value and ideas. Pragmatists are not spineless, or "yes-men," as a little surface study might indicate. Pragmatism may justly be called a mediator. The writer can think of no better way of explaining the above statement than to quote William James' story of the squirrel:

Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel -- a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly around the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem is this: Does the man go around the squirrel or not? He goes around the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go around the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Every one had taken sides, and was

obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, when I appeared, appealed to me to make it a majority. Mindful of the scholastic adage that when ever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one as follows: "What party is right," I said, "depends on what you practically mean by going around the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go around him, for he occupies these successive positions. But on the contrary, if you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on the left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go around him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly toward the man all the time and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any further dispute. . . ."

The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.²

Pragmatic Interpretation of Mind

The pragmatist believes in taking things as he finds them in his experiences. What they are apart from entering into the tissue of stimulus and reaction he does not know. His experiences show him an interactivity of organism and environment, an interactivity which is biological and social. In this interactivity he finds himself experimenting with the consequences of behavior, and fighting his way through to some measure of control. He is an actor in the drama of life rather than a member of the audience.

Experience as Behavior

Experience as the pragmatist sees it is the interactivity of organism and environment. The environmental

²William James, Pragmatism, pp. 43-44.

factors stimulate, the organism responds, and its behavior is a tissue of reactions to stimulation. He distinguishes three levels of behavior, that which is vital but unconscious, that which is conscious and self-directed, and that which is purposive and indicates the presence of mind. At its lower level behavior tends to move toward vital behavior and it is difficult to say where consciousness begins to be present.

Vital Behavior

Vital behavior is the simplest, and whether or not mind and consciousness are present, experience is always taking place. Breathing, circulatory processes, and reflex actions are a part of vital behavior, and take place in response to environmental stimulation. They are generally automatic rather than directed responses. When one is unattentive, asleep, or under the influence of drugs, consciousness and purposive control may be absent, yet parts of the brain may be involved. At this level of behavior, life and experience emerge as functions of the environment which stimulate and support the organism. Life and experience consist of this interactivity which is vital or biological.

At this level of behavior, mind and consciousness are definitely present, comparing, selecting, directing, and controlling responses, until a satisfactory conclusion is reached. Consciousness is a social and vocal phenomenon,

in other words, it is a situation where man directs his responses through linguistic concepts. Consciousness is a form of internal speech which controls one's responses to the organism until satisfactory results are reached.

Between the two extremes there is a third level of behavior which may be exemplified by such activities as walking. One may set himself to walk to a certain place and then conscious and internal speech may lapse. The coordination of the movements of muscles and limbs is controlled by the cerebellum rather than the brain proper and the movements of walking are purposive in that one reaches his planned destination unless some obstacle calls for conscious attention to his walking.

An accomplished musician plays with no attention to physical movements after he "sets himself" to play a certain composition. This is not true with a beginner; conscious, purposive, direction is necessary.

It is especially in social situations, involving the activity of two or more persons, that mind makes its appearance. In situations where habitual routine governs one's behavior, reactions are purposive, but of the semi-conscious type. The head of a firm may react to the employees in the same way he reacts to the office furniture. His reactions to one may be as unconscious as his reactions to the other.

In situations in which everything flows smoothly there

is no call for the internal-speech level of directed activity. A pupil may be watching his teacher with apparent attention, but his conscious mind may be, if functioning at all, engaged in some other trend of thought. As long as things run smoothly the teacher may even have a lapse of consciousness, yet she may have all the appearances of professional alertness.

One can only focus attention on one thing at a time; therefore, the field of lapsed consciousness is greater than the field of focal consciousness.

In addition to lapsing to particular situations, consciousness may lapse to all situations over a period of time. When one is in a "reverie," there is no definite internal speech directing any problem. Attention is dispersed and consciousness wholly lapsed. Hypnotism, sleepiness, or drugs may produce this type of unconsciousness. There are also times when one just sits and does not think. In this case internal speech, planning, and directing activities are not present.

Social Behavior

When consciousness lapses, mind does not necessarily lapse; it may still direct one's behavior. Experimentation has shown that after consciousness in the form of internal speech directed toward controlling activity, has disappeared, the habitual way of reacting carries the organism

through most situations which arise in the ordinary course of events. These reactions are semi-automatic, but intelligent.

A tired hostess, after having given up any attempt at conscious control of the situation, still goes through the motions of welcoming the coming guests. She may still interact with others sufficiently enough to play a fair game of bridge, yet she may make no attempt to know what cards have been played.

Mind to the pragmatist is that form of behavior in which there is purpose and direction, even speech by linguistic concepts, but in which consciousness, in the sense of internal speech controlling the organism's reactions, is not always present.

Mind is behavior, activity, and interactivity with biological and social environment, rather than some form of passive contemplation or awareness. Lodge says:

Mind is a part of the tissue of events interactive with the rest of nature, and just as real and genuinely causative as anything else in rerum nature. In the second place, as behavior, as the interactivity of events which are all transient, mind is not something permanent, but changes as the elements which interact change, and comes and goes. Just as the behavior which we call our "form" at tennis, or at the piano, or at golf, is something which comes and goes, so it is with the behavior which we call "mind" or "thinking," and even with "consciousness."³

Mind, then, as the pragmatist sees it, is a function rather than a substance, a function which changes with the

³Lodge, Philosophy of Education, p. 148.

environment. Dewey says:

Mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their relationships to one another. To have a mind to do a thing is to foresee a future possibility; it is to have a plan for its accomplishment; it is to note the means which make the plan capable of execution and the obstructions in the way -- or if it is really a mind to do something and not a vague aspiration -- it is to have a plan which takes account of resources and difficulties. Mind is capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and future consequences to present conditions.⁴

These statements express the pragmatic views in that Dewey, too, believes that mind is purposeful activity.

Dewey states that:

. . . consciousness is to be aware of what we are about; consciousness signifies the deliberate, observant, planning traits of activity. Consciousness is nothing which we have which gazes idly on the scene around one or which has impressions made upon it by physical things; it is the name for the purposeful quality of activity, for the fact that it is directed by an aim.⁵

The pragmatist usually considers mind and consciousness together because it is difficult to say where consciousness begins to be present.

There are times when internal speech which can be detected by testing the incipient movements of the larynx and sometimes the lips and throat muscles, seems to be semi-automatic if not automatic. It is difficult to know what factors are essential to the appearance of consciousness,

⁴John Dewey, Democracy in Education, p. 120.

⁵Ibid., p. 121.

but internal speech level is accepted as good evidence.

James says:

For twenty years past I have mistrusted "consciousness" as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experiences. It seems to me that the time is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.⁶

James explains this statement by saying that thought does exist. He means only to deny that consciousness is a word which stands for an entity, but rather a function.

Religion

Religion to the pragmatist is an instrument made by the experiences of human beings. He may be a transcendentalist if that type of religion works for the betterment of the individual, but generally speaking, he does not take this position. He prefers to believe that religion is not something divine, but something developed as a result of human experiences. Religion is true in so far as it works, but to the pragmatist it is not a fixed set of laws, rules, and regulations to be adhered to strictly, but must be flexible enough for the individual to alter his behavior in accordance to what best satisfies his needs. James states:

If technological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how

⁶William James, Essay in Radical Empiricism, p. 3.

much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to other truths that also have to be acknowledged.⁷

What James has said here is that in so far as the idealistic views of God afford him comfort they are true, but he points to the phrase "true in so far forth" with a skeptical finger and frankly states his disbelief in the absolute and belief in taking "moral holidays," when necessary, for the betterment of the individual provided this "moral holiday" does not clash with some other vital benefit. One truth may be detrimental to the rest of one's truths which one does not wish to give up. James justifies his rejection of the absolute in that to accept it would mean entanglement in metaphysical paradoxes which he does not believe acceptable.⁸

Pragmatism "unstiffens" theories, has no prejudices and no obstructive dogmas; it will consider any "hypothesis" and James says this widens the field of search for God, rather than hampering it.⁹

His test of probable truth is the thing that works best; a thing is true if it can successfully combine with one's experiences and fits every part of life.

The pragmatist believes that it is better to yield to the hope that religion is true rather than fear that it is

⁷William James, Pragmatism, p. 73.

⁸Ibid., p. 79.

⁹Ibid., p. 80.

false. Religion is true in proportion to practical value to living.

Education

The pragmatic school is centered around the child and based upon experience, for it is through experience that the child gains knowledge or growth. The child is always busy on some project or activity, through which he learns to develop and solve problems. The child has freedom and is permitted to choose only that for which he has need or desires. The school may be compared to a cafeteria in which the child is not told what to choose or how much. Fate will take care of the future. It is the child's choosing, on a child's level.

The curriculum is developed as activity progresses. It is active and changes from day to day from pupil to pupil and from school to school. The needs for child life, child experiences, are realized and it is always kept on the child's level. He solves child problems when a child and learns to solve adult problems when an adult. Discipline and authority in the pragmatic school are only those which the child voluntarily recognizes; the school is very informal and experimental.

There are various aspects of progressive education which are representative features of the system. The emphasis is on pupil freedom. The child is not only encouraged

to exercise physical freedom but also to do his own independent thinking. He is encouraged to develop initiative and self-reliance. Individual differences are recognized and an effort is made to capitalize upon them.

The curriculum and methods are based on individual interests. This interest is guided by the pupil's own purposes. Problems encountered in every-day living afford challenges to learn, to apply one's intelligence to the control of the factors of environment. The pupil will have a felt need for the aid of the social heritage, and help or instruction from the teacher. Activities are selected for the development of the whole child. They include emotional, intellectual, and physical factors. The outcome of an activity is evaluated by the extent to which the purpose is accomplished.

There are also definite social implications. Society is the best means of development of personality, and democracy is favored as most in harmony with progressive principles.

The educational philosopher probes to examine the underpinning of this position. The pragmatist says that process implies change. Change further implies novelty. Novelty is set down as genuine rather than the revelation of an antecedently complete reality. Changes do not take place at the same time nor at the same rate.

Novelty is relative to the familiar. These two

characteristics furnish the basis for the progressive education which emphasizes the problem-solving attitude of the mind and develops initiative and self-reliance. The familiar is used as a means of exploring the novel and using it in order to meet future situations.

Individual differences are realized. There are both biological and social differences. Without individuality there would be no progress. For this reason progressive education lays stress on the cultivation of individual differences. This development is indispensable to self-realization.

From the pragmatic point of view values are instrumental. They implement a person to gain ends. Progress occurs if these ends are achieved. The progressive is always specific. He has no general formula for total progress because he has no final or fixed values. He sees a constantly emerging novelty.

The progressive educator gives much attention to pupil interest. It is the core of educational value theory. It is both a guide to the selection of curricular materials and the single best dynamo by which to motivate them. Children's interests vary as to time. Some have longer duration, and some children are more persistent in their study. The pragmatist or progressive holds that children should be taught persistence. The distinctive merit is

the fact that the child is driven to perseverance by values which he himself sees and voluntarily accepts as his own.

The progressive has no fixed aims or values in advance. Educational aims are not to be projected indefinitely into the future. They must be held subject to revision as one advances into the future. Educational aim is that of pupil growth. Education is its own end. Progressive education is not progressive because it is making steady advance toward some definite goal but because it is growing in whatever direction a novelly emerging future renders most feasible.

The educational ends are employed as means or instruments for finding the way. No way to education becomes the true way. To the pragmatist truth is to be conceived dynamically. What turns out to be true will depend, at least in part, on the aims or values with which one started. The truth the child learns will inescapably be affected by his purposes or aims.

The pragmatic theory of truth is to be thought of as an instrument of verification. Intelligence enables one to make satisfactory adaptation, to use the old and familiar as a tool for subjugating the novel and the contingent. It is the chief means of survival.

The pragmatist's way of gaining truth is by experimentation. The problem is set, the difficulty defined, the

available resources surveyed, and the hypothesis proposed. After this has been dramatically acted out in imagination, it is put to the test. Activities are overtly initiated in the precarious environment to see whether their consequences will correspond with those anticipated. Other activities are later undertaken to generalize the first result. This is the clue to the practices of progressive education. Activities are necessary both to make education lifelike and to make life yield the truth.

The pragmatist believes that knowledge is something which is wrought out in action. Before it is used it is merely information. Knowledge does not antedate learning but it is forged as the pupil and the teacher adapt means to ends as their project develops.

The pragmatist approaches both, value and truth, through individual experiences, but does not overlook the experience of others. Participation in society is considered one of the most important ways in which learning takes place. The more democratic the society, the more free and unimpeded is the sharing of these experiences and the greater is the educational opportunity.

Progressive education and the democratic process have much in common; they both encourage the individual to specialize in cultivating his unique talents. The more different individuals get to be, the more they have to share, and the more socially interdependent they necessarily become.

Pragmatic education is opposed to any barriers which inhibit the easy interchange of cultural viewpoints, such as segregation of the sexes or separate high schools for vocational and college preparation. Besides, in the classroom the progressive teacher democratically shares with the children as many decisions as to objectives, curriculum, and discipline as possible.

The pragmatic school has more freedom. Its effectiveness is in proportion to the richness of the culture that is appropriated through democratic sharing. Freedom is for the teacher and pupil. Without academic freedom the school is powerless to be an effective instrument of social progress. The efficiency of the democratic school in meeting social change lies in its insistence on a free flow of social intercourse.

Social orientation is the characteristic feature of the progressive religious and moral education. The pragmatist wants the child to be intelligent about the mores. However, they are to be applied tentatively and experimentally. Their sanction is to depend on their consequences, not on religion. Religious education is not essentially different from moral or even secular education. It, too, consists of participation in the community enterprises.

The aim of educational philosophy is the wholeness of viewpoint. The pragmatist recommends it as a way to enlighten learning activities in the school, the home, and

the community. Educational philosophy, then, like value and knowledge theory, is instrumental, pragmatic.

Whatever the child is striving to do must be because of some basic urge that is trying to assert itself. From child psychology a list of objectives for the school could be made. From its inventory of the instincts which are seeking expression, one can make up a list of child needs. These needs become the objective which education should try to liberate and satisfy.

Many progressive educators say that growth is measured by that which leads on to future growth. What promotes life becomes the measure of value.

The modern naturalistic educational philosophy accords the social process a more natural status in the education of the child than Rousseau. The natural rights of man are matched with a bill of rights of childhood. While discipline and self-restraint are worthy objectives, they are incidental to the more positive virtues of a school program emphasizing self-expression.

The progressives advocate that education be for life now rather than a preparation for adulthood or life at some contingent future date. If the child lives well in the present, he will be as well prepared as he can be for whatever the future has in store.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

The writer believes a summary of the positions of the idealist, realist, and pragmatist with regard to mind and related views will be valuable.

1. Plato believed in the pre-existence of the soul before its entrance into the temporal body. He distinguished three aspects of the soul which were reason, will, and feeling. This marked distinction of soul and body was a later source of the dualistic theories of mind and body.

2. The purpose of Berkeley's subjective idealism was to prove that matter did not exist as an inert substance, independent of thought. He contended that objects of experience were mere perceptions; an element exists, but not independent of mind; reality consists only of mind, soul, and spirit, and nature is the action of God's mind on one's finite mind.

3. Objective idealists hold that the essential thing in one's body is will, rather than intellect.

4. The new idealism takes the position that both the organism and its consciousness, if any, and the physical

environment, are empirical phenomena of a deeper reality which is spiritual. This deeper reality is "mind" in an ideal or transcendental sense, creating itself and its own problems, and in this creativity it creates the environment, with which the self it has created reacts. But the real life of mind, although exemplified in the movements of the space-time medium in which this life expresses itself, is not subject to the laws of the medium, but follows its own laws, which are spiritual.

5. The realist takes the position that mind is the interactivity of an organism having a well-developed brain and nervous system with its environment. Both organism and environment are thought of in terms of physical science, and the interactivity which constitutes mind is specifically physical activity. If consciousness is present, it is present as subjective non-physical awareness or contemplation, which neither adds nor subtracts anything in relation to the real factors of the objective situation which are all physical.

For the pragmatist, as for the realist, the empirical interaction of the organism and environment represents the only reality that exists, and the transcendental self or mind is just a myth. The pragmatist holds that the mind is biological and social rather than physical; consciousness may not be a substance; it may be a function, but when it is present it does function.

The idealist believes that the fundamental concern of the educator is the guidance of learning and that the child is the primary consideration in the educational system. He thinks he can best achieve his goal by the use of subject-matter, authority, and discipline. The mind-idea-spirit self is developed by study of knowledge and facts and submission to authority.

The idealistic school has a set or definite curriculum which is not flexible. Only books that have been proved to contain true facts, ideas, and ideals are used. The present-day idealistic method is less rigid, but still holds to the mind-idea-spirit self, personality; mental and spiritual development is the aim.

Science and the scientific method hold the most prominent place in the realistic school. The curriculum consists of courses and textbooks which contain the latest scientific information, stated systematically, concretely, and objectively as they naturally are in the universe. Subjectiveness is too unstable and is kept completely out of the picture. The realist prefers to depersonalize the whole setup and stick to concrete facts. Nature is held in high esteem and he contends that the whole of the universe is physical.

Authority and discipline come from nature, which comes from natural laws. He believes there are no absolute

truths, but truths may approach absolutes only as he is able to discover and apprehend the universe.

Major Points of Controversy

1. The idealist holds that the behavior and laws of the mind are purely spiritual. The pragmatist and the realist reject this point, but differ each from the other.

The realist believes mind and matter to be neutral, being neither physical nor psychical, and that the dualism in the world is not entities but of causal laws.

The pragmatist takes things as he finds them in experiences. What they are apart from experiences, he neither knows nor aspires to know.

2. The idealist makes a distinction between analysis and synthesis. The realist and the pragmatist believe this an unnecessary refinement.

3. The idealist believes mind to be a part of the whole, of the universe, whereas the realist locates mind only in such situations where there is interactivity of the organism with brain and physical environment "out there" which in reality means that mind cannot be localized.

4. The idealist believes that mind creates values and creates itself and is not dependent upon a physically object world for something to think about as the realist would have one believe.

5. The idealist holds that the physical world is, in

fact, known and accepted as real only in so far as it responds to the ideal demands which mind makes upon it. The realist differs sharply on this point. As far as he is concerned, mind is physical in that the interactivity of mind and the organism is in the end, always physical, and can be explained by analyzing into organic and inorganic factors.

6. The idealist holds that mind is spiritual. The realist insists that it is physical, and the pragmatist prefers to refer to mind as social and biological.

7. The idealist and the pragmatist doubt the existence of consciousness, whereas the realist believes that the real facts which underlie what common sense calls "consciousness" are the refined physical movements of talking and that the content of "consciousness" is the refined complex movement which the behaviorist identifies with emotions, imagination, and other kinds of actions.

Conclusion

Little can be said in esteem of the old traditional idealistic school, except that it was to some extent successful in transmitting the knowledge, the ideas, the progress, and the ideals of the race to a limited number of fortunate individuals. Most of the master-minds of the past were trained by this method. No matter how successful it may have been, very few, even the idealists, would want the traditional school maintained in this constantly changing

civilization. It was too rigid, too lifeless, too stiff, and certainly would be inadequate for present-day education.

The realist's school was found to be inadequate in that realists fail to recognize the human subjective mind with all its desires and emotions as being a part of the same universe. The realistic method is too cold and impersonal to meet present-day needs. One's emotions, desires, and dispositions perhaps render a greater influence upon the individual than does the total mass of one's ideas and knowledge. From this view the writer considers the realistic method incomplete.

The influences of pragmatism in the educational systems have been of practical value. It has awakened philosophers to the need of some far-reaching changes in educational philosophy, concepts, and practices. It has been instrumental in freeing the schools of some of the bad practices and concepts in the old traditional schools.

The pragmatic method has its weakness in that it lacks a set of standards, ideals, and values. Activity for activity's sake may be just as bad as discipline for discipline's sake. Danger lurks around the pragmatic school when pragmatism is placed in the hands of embryo teachers who are not educated to its true value and methods of practice.

The writer concludes that pragmatism is far superior to idealism and realism and promises much greater hope for continued growth in progressive methods in education.

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