THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS FOREIGN POLICIES

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THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS FOREIGN POLICIES

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Theodore Roosevelt came to the Presidency at a very
significant moment in the history of the United States. The
old era of isolation was giving way to a new period of ex-
pansion, foreseen by discriminating students and definitely
launched by the unanticipated results of the war with Spain.
In the development of the movement the young president, with
his vigor, ambition, and fearlessness occupied an important
place.

Roosevelt's policy was not due to lack of vision or
purpose. His policy was rather the outgrowth of his con-
ception of the nature and limitations of democracy. In most
instances Roosevelt's policy was guided or dominated by his
devotion to the cause of national defense. With Theodore
Roosevelt national defense was a passion, it was almost a
religion. No language was too forceful to express his
scorn of national weakness nor his admiration for national
strength.

He once said, "No friendliness with other nations, no
good will for them or by them, can take the place of national
self-reliance. We must work out our destiny by our own strength."\(^1\) At another time he said, "Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it; the diplomat is the servant, not the master of the soldier."\(^2\)

Theodore Roosevelt believed that in public, as in private life, a bold front tended to insure peace and not strife. His prime interest, from the point of view of preparedness, lay in the navy. His sense of proportion told him that an efficient navy was the nation's first line of defense. He advocated preparation for war in order to avert war; and he would never have advocated war unless it had been the only alternative to dishonor. Theodore Roosevelt thought that the United States needed a great navy to protect its shores and to protect our interests in the islands which made it possible to safeguard our shores.

He realized that the people in the United States could not sit huddled within our own borders and acknowledge frankly ourselves merely an assemblage of well-to-do hucksters who care nothing for what happens beyond. Such a policy would defeat even its own ends; for as the nations grow to have ever wider and wider interests and are brought into closer and closer contact, if we are to hold our own in the struggle for naval and commercial supremacy, we must

\(^1\)H. C. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean, p. 200.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 201.
build up our power without our own borders. We must build
the Isthmian Canal, and we must grasp the points of vantage
which will enable us to have a voice in deciding the destiny
of the oceans of the west and the east. This indicated
Roosevelt's attitude toward the territories newly acquired
from Spain. It expressed his view concerning the part that
the United States should henceforth play in world affairs.
It also reflected his realization of the truth that nation-
al isolation had passed and that the world was fast coming
to be one economic unit.

The expansion of American commerce; the growing rival-
ry between America and other nations in economic matters;
the extension of American claims and interests in the Pa-
cific; the development of railroads, telegraph, and cables;
the realization by the American manufacturers of the increas-
ing necessity for foreign markets and by American financiers
of the growing need of foreign fields for investment; the
Samoa, Hawaiian, and Venezuelan episodes all combined to
break down the American sense of isolation both political
and economic from the rest of the world. Such was the
character of the period when Roosevelt began to play an im-
portant part in national affairs.

Rooseveltian imperialism as manifested in the Carib-
bean was opportunist in character, not planned or predeter-
mined. Roosevelt was led from one action to another by the
swift current of events which during his administration seemed to change with kaleidoscopic rapidity. He came to the Presidency when the government was engaged in measures initiated by his predecessor. Launched upon the project of an isthmian canal, which he had advocated for years, Roosevelt soon found himself engaged in problems arising from the relationship which that enterprise bore to the wider circle of the Caribbean. Thus he became involved first in Colombia, next in Venezuela, then in Santo Domingo, and finally in Central America. With each problem he dealt in the manner of the practical man of affairs rather than in the fashion of the doctrinaire.

President Roosevelt resorted to mediation, intervention, or political or financial supervision over the weaker republics in order to create political and economic stability and public order. Although the Monroe Doctrine was a policy of defense, it had grown to meet the world forces by transformations which caused it to vary widely from its original purpose. Roosevelt justified his interpretation on the ground that if he had refused to apply the Monroe Doctrine to changing conditions, it would now be completely out-worn, it would not meet any of the needs of the present day, and indeed it would probably by this time have sunk into complete oblivion. In adopting such measures, Roosevelt usually paid little attention to the far-reaching
issues involved or the influence his action might have on his successors.

His whole point of view was to do things and at the same time to make clear to the world his reasons for doing them. He was ambitious to codify the American Doctrine, to exclude everything that had found its way into the mass of official statements which was out-worn or out of keeping. At the same time, he tried to employ phrases and ideas that would cover the conditions of America as he found them. It was known by all that he stood in no awe of wealth and that he believed law and justice the only sound basis of national well-being.

Roosevelt's policy does not seem to have been influenced to any marked degree by a desire to stimulate the economic penetration of the Caribbean, of the Central American countries, or of foreign countries by American business men and American corporations. In furtherance of his political ends, he frequently pointed out the commercial advantages that would come to the United States from the measures he commended. But for all the actions and relationship mentioned, political rather than economic considerations seem to have determined Roosevelt's course. In his course of action President Roosevelt ever held in the foreground the needs of national defense.
CHAPTER II

THE PANAMA CANAL

In the early part of the nineteenth century, the Government of the United States became interested in the possibility of building a transisthmian canal. It was equally concerned with the problem of assuring to American citizens the free use of any canal which might be built. The people of Colombia had failed in securing with Great Britain and France, either singly or jointly, a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the isthmus, and the sovereignty of Colombian territory there, a treaty to which the United States and other maritime powers could adhere. The Colombian Government then turned to the United States for outside protection, and offered to yield the point of preferential duties and to cede a right of way across the Isthmus of Panama, in exchange for a guaranty of Colombia's sovereign rights over the transit together with the neutrality of the Isthmus.

The American Government had shown its interest repeatedly in an interoceanic canal. As early as 1835 the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing the President to enter
into negotiations with other countries, particularly Colombia and the governments of Central America, with a view to give protection to individuals or corporations which might undertake to open communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Nothing definite was accomplished until December 12, 1846, when an American diplomatist, Benjamin A. Bidlack, made a treaty of amity and commerce with Colombia (New Granada) at Bogota.

The treaty with New Granada in 1846 stipulated "that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States," in return for which the United States Government guaranteed the neutrality of the isthmus and the freedom of transit there, as well as the rights of sovereignty and property of Colombia therein.¹

The thirty-fifth article of the treaty contained a stipulation which was to serve in the future on numerous occasions as the basis for important action by the American Government. The article also played a most significant part in President Roosevelt's policy in regard to Colombia and Panama. The vital feature of this stipulation was as follows:

¹Dana G. Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Sea, p. 63.
The government of New Granada guarantees to the government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes or communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States; and, in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.2

The feeling strengthened year by year in the United States that any Isthmian Canal should be built and controlled by the American Government, but the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, ratified in 1850 between the United States and Great Britain, stood in the way. The provisions of this treaty in brief terms are:

1. Great Britain and the United States bound themselves never to obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the said ship canal.
2. The canal should be neutral in time of war between the contracting parties.
3. It guaranteed protection for the persons and property of the countries legally undertaking the building of the canal.
4. The parties building the canal should gain the consent of the states whose territory the canal should traverse.
5. It provided for the neutralization and protection of the canal so long as it was managed without discrimination against either of the contracting parties.

2Hill, op. cit., p. 39.
6. The contracting parties promised to invite every state with which they were on terms of friendly intercourse to accede to the convention.

7. The contracting parties would lend their support to the first company offering to build the canal in accordance with the spirit and intention of the convention.

8. It declared that the governments of the United States and Great Britain had not only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle.3

Such are the main terms of the celebrated Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which remained in force until 1901, and which during that period caused a great deal of discussion.

The Isthmus of Panama was for many years the objective point of all canal schemes, but as the engineering difficulties of this route began to appear, attention was directed more and more to a canal through Nicaragua. A treaty between Nicaragua and the United States, covering the case of an interoceanic canal, was negotiated and ratified in 1857. This treaty, like the treaty with Colombia, in 1846, and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in 1850, contemplated the neutralization of the canal.

President Roosevelt's first important public expression concerning the canal was an adverse comment upon the first Hay-Paunceforte Treaty negotiated in 1900. In the eyes of Roosevelt and others, the proposed arrangement was fundamentally defective in failing to authorize the

3John H. Latane, American Foreign Policy, pp. 314-315.
United States to build, control, and fortify the canal. 

President Roosevelt expressed his dissatisfaction in this statement:

My objections are twofold. First, as to naval policy. If that canal is open to the warships of an enemy, it is a menace to us in time of war; it is an added burden, an additional strategic point to be guarded by our fleet. If fortified by us, it becomes one of the most potent sources of our possible sea strength. Unless so fortified it strengthens against us every nation whose fleet is larger than ours. Secondly, as to the Monroe Doctrine. If we invite foreign powers to a joint ownership, a joint guarantee, how can we possibly object to similar joint action say in Brazil or Argentina? To my mind, we should consistently refuse to all European powers the right to control, in any shape, any territory in the Western Hemisphere which they do not already hold. A treaty can always be honorably abrogated though it must never be abrogated in dishonest fashion.⁴

President Roosevelt was willing to guarantee neutrality to ships of commerce but he insisted that the canal be absolutely in American control in a military sense.

The second Hay-Fauncefote Treaty, which was ratified December 16, 1901, removed the obstacles in the Clayton-Bulwer Convention for the construction of an interoceanic canal by the United States. This removed the first diplomatic barrier to the undertaking.

The way was now clear so far as the Old World was concerned, for the United States to construct a canal. The United States now had the exclusive rights of providing for the regulation and management of the canal. The parties

⁴Hill, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
urged their claims; one advocated the route through Nicaragua, and the other the route through Panama. In Congress there was a strong sentiment in favor of the Nicaraguan route, and Nicaragua was willing to grant us such conditions as we considered necessary.

The Spooner Act was passed June 25, 1902. This law authorized the President to purchase the concessions and properties of the New Panama Canal Company at a cost not to exceed $40,000,000 and to acquire from Colombia, upon such terms as he might deem reasonable, perpetual control of, and jurisdiction over, a strip of land, not less than six miles in width, across the Isthmus of Panama; should he be unable to obtain a satisfactory title for the property of the French company and the control of the necessary strip of land from Colombia within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, the act directed him to secure control of the necessary territory from Costa Rica and Nicaragua and to proceed to construct a canal by the Nicaragua route. 5

Events from 1846 to 1903 indicated that the United States by the provisions of the treaty of 1846 bound itself as follows:

First, to protect the neutrality of Panama against foreign attack; second, to maintain the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus from foreign

5 Ibid., p. 35.
aggression; third, with the approval of the Colombian
government to preserve freedom of transit from inter-
ruption due to internal disorder beyond the power of
the Colombian authorities to control; fourth, to ac-
cord interference with the movement of Colombian
armed forces.\(^6\)

President Roosevelt had no desire for any delay by
Congress in considering the canal matter. He preferred
that the question be decided by Congress, but in case it
should seem best for Congress to leave the decision of the
route which the canal should take to him, he would not evade
the responsibility.

Trouble arose over the negotiation of a treaty with
the republic of Colombia of which Panama was one of the con-
stituent states. President Roosevelt had Secretary Hay ar-
range a satisfactory treaty with Herran, the Colombian min-
ister. The Hay-Herran Treaty provided for the lease to the
United States of a strip of land six miles wide across the
Isthmus, and for the payment to Colombia of $10,000,000
down and $250,000 a year beginning nine years later.\(^7\) The
treaty was promptly ratified by the United States Senate,
but the Colombian Senate rejected the treaty. The dominant
motive for the rejection was greed. They thought that, hav-
ing committed the United States to accept the Panama route,
they could extortion any price they chose, and they planned to

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\(^6\)Ibid., p. 46.

\(^7\)Harold Howe, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Times*, p. 176.
hold up the treaty until they could get all they could. The failure of Colombia to act was directly contrary to the interests of the French company, of the United States, and of the people of Panama.

In his annual speech to Congress, Theodore Roosevelt said:

A treaty concluded between the Representative of Colombia and of our Government was ratified by the Senate. In drawing up this treaty every concession was made to the people and to the Government of Colombia. We were more than just in dealing with them. We yielded in all possible ways to her desires in drawing up the treaty. Nevertheless the Government of Colombia not merely repudiated the treaty, but repudiated it in such a manner as to make it evident by the time the Colombian Congress adjourned, that not the scantiest hope remained of ever getting a satisfactory treaty from them. The Government of Colombia made the treaty, and yet when the Colombian Congress was called to ratify it the vote against ratification was unanimous. It does not appear that the Government made any real effort to secure ratification.⁸

Roosevelt thought Colombia was incapable of building a canal out of its own means, had not credit to borrow the necessary money, and could not protect and defend the canal when finished. Hence it had no right to hold the strip available for an Isthmian Canal against a nation which could bring to bear the necessary energy and capital and military power.

The people of Panama had insistently demanded the ratification of the Hay-Herran Treaty, and the danger of a

⁸House Reports, 58th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 11.
separatist movement on the isthmus if the treaty was defeated had been realized. Within the space of two years, 1899 to 1901, the Panamanians showed signs of restlessness and talked more and more openly of independence, which would enable them to make the canal agreement with the United States, receive the $10,000,000 to be paid for the concession, and enjoy ever after whatever benefits the canal might bring to the Isthmus. The people of Panama wanted the canal, so they quietly organized the revolution. It was a matter of common knowledge that it was coming, and President Roosevelt knew it and believed in the virtue of being wise in time and prepared for it.

Upon defeat of the treaty, investors who were financially interested in the Panama route as well as other individuals who had other reasons for wishing to see the isthmus independent began to push their plans for an insurrection.

When the treaty was rejected by Colombia, President Roosevelt had only two alternatives in Panama; either he could wait until the isthmus declared itself independent and then make a treaty with the new state or he could under the treaty of 1846 legally coerce Colombia to obtain control over the territory required for the operation of the canal.

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Roosevelt said if under the treaty of 1846 we had a color of right to start building a canal, that his off-hand judgment would favor such proceedings.¹⁰ Such was the decision the President finally reached. Roosevelt recommended that the United States buy all the rights of the Panama Company and without any further parley with Colombia, enter upon the completion of the canal which the French company had begun.

Through the efforts of M. Pansau-Varilla and two American officers, Captain Humphrey and Lieutenant Murphy, President Roosevelt heard that various revolutionary movements were being inaugurated and that a revolution certainly would occur. He was considering what action the United States would take when it came and whether, under the treaty of 1846, Colombia could be prevented from putting down the rebellion and how to protect the lives of American citizens if a revolutionary outbreak should begin.

Fully alert to the possibilities, the administration watched the Isthmus. Three United States warships were ordered to the probable scene of hostilities. On November 2, 1903, the naval officer commanding the United States observation squadron was ordered: "Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile

¹⁰Hill, op. cit., p. 59.
intent either government or insurgent either at Colon or other points.\textsuperscript{11}

The relation of Panama to Colombia had actually varied from independence to incorporation as a department. To suggest that an outside power might take cognizance of such internal conditions was obviously inconsistent with our policy.

The revolution was bloodless, for the American naval forces fulfilling the treaty obligations of the United States prevented the Colombian troops on one side of the Isthmus from using the Panama Railroad to cross to the other side where the revolutionists were, and consequently the revolutionists were undisturbed. A republic was immediately declared and immediately recognized by the United States. A treaty with the new Republic, which guaranteed its independence and secured the cession of a zone ten miles wide across the Isthmus, was drawn up within two weeks and ratified by both Senates within three months. Then a new minister was appointed.

The revolution came off promptly as expected. The Hay-Herran Treaty was rejected August 12, the Colombian Congress adjourned October 31, the people of Panama revolted November 11, and a treaty satisfactory to the United States in every respect was concluded with the new Republic of

\textsuperscript{11}Carl R. Fish, \textit{American Diplomacy}, p. 441.
Panama November 18, 1903.\(^\text{12}\)

President Roosevelt in his message to Congress explained his action as follows:

Every effort has been made by the Government of the United States to follow a course which was essentially not only to our interest and to the interests of the world, but to the interests of Colombia itself. These efforts have failed and Colombia by her persistence in repulsing the advances that have been made, has forced us, for the sake of our own honor, and of the interest of well-being of the people of Panama and of the people of the civilized countries of the world, to take decisive steps to bring to an end a condition of affairs which had become intolerable. The new Republic of Panama immediately offered to negotiate a treaty with us. By it our interests are better safeguarded than in the treaty with Colombia. It is better in its terms than the treaties offered to us by the Republics of Nicaragua or Costa Rica. At last the right to begin this undertaking is available. Panama has done her part. All that remains is for the American Congress to do its part.

By the provision of the treaty the United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. There is granted to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying outside of the zone necessary for the construction of the canal, or for its auxiliary works and with the islands in the Bay of Panama.\(^\text{13}\)

President Roosevelt's action in connection with the independence of Panama was severely criticized. Colombia insinuated that the revolutionary movement in Panama had been instigated and encouraged by interests in the United States and by American officials, and insisted that the "premature

\(^{12}\)Hill, op. cit., p. 54.

\(^{13}\)House Reports, 58th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 11.
recognition" of Panama's independence and the military measures which had been taken were violations of the treaty of 1846, under which the United States had guaranteed "the rights of sovereignty and property" of Colombia in the Isthmus. The United States emphatically defended the legality and fairness of the course pursued. The United States denied that any responsible official of the United States Government had been in communication with the revolutionists in Panama. The revolution created a situation which deeply concerned the United States, especially in view of its obligation under the treaty of 1846, the main purpose of which had been the construction of an interoceanic canal. The canal which the American government planned was for the benefit of the entire world.

The Constitution of Panama contained the following clause:

The Government of the United States of America may intervene anywhere in the Republic of Panama for the re-establishment of constitutional peace and order, if this should be disturbed, provided that by virtue of public treaty said nation should assume or have assumed to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of this republic.14

Yet it can hardly be denied that by the events of 1903 the United States acquired in the Canal Zone a colony, and in Panama a protectorate. It was worth noting that between

14Fish, op. cit., p. 443.
1846 and 1903 there were about fifty-three riots and revolutions on the Isthmus, and since then, peace.

Was President Roosevelt justified in preventing the Colombian Government from fighting on the Isthmus to put down the unanimous revolution of the people of Panama? That is what Roosevelt did.

Theodore Roosevelt himself summed up the action of the United States in the Panama situation in this way:

From the beginning to the end our course was straight-forward and in absolute accord with the highest of standards of international morality. To have acted otherwise than I did would have been on my part betrayal of the interests of Panama, and recesancy to the interests of the world at large. Colombia had forfeited every claim to consideration; she had so acted that yielding to her would have meant on our part that culpable form of weakness which stands on a level with wickedness. We gave to the people of Panama self-government, and freed them from subjection to alien oppressors. We did our best to get Colombia to let us treat her with more than generous justice; we exercised patience to beyond the verge of proper forbearance. I deeply regretted the fact that the Colombian government rendered it necessary for me to take the action I took; but I had no alternative, consistent with the full performance of my duty to my own people, and to the nations of mankind.\(^\text{15}\)

The building of the Panama Canal, a vital link in our economic communications and a strategic factor which enabled us to provide for our defense with hardly more than half the fleet we should otherwise require, had given new significance to the Caribbean Sea from a strategic point of

\(^{15}\text{Howland, op. cit., p. 182.}\)
view. The defense of the Caribbean and the Canal was quite as important to us as the defense of our own coasts. No administration is apt to stray far from the course of action which we have consistently followed throughout our national life.

Theodore Roosevelt said laconically, "I took Panama." In fact, he did nothing of the kind, but it was like him to meet his critics on their own ground. It was as though he said to them:

You denounce me for what I did at the time of the revolution which established the Republic of Panama. You declared my acts were contrary to international law and international morals. I have a splendid technical defense on the legal side, but I care little about technicalities when compared with reality. I took Panama, but the taking was a righteous act.16

Nothing in Roosevelt's public career seemed to have given him more gratification or to have been regarded by him as of greater importance than the construction of the Panama Canal. He always felt that the one act for which he deserved most credit was his seizing the psychological moment to get complete control of the Isthmus.

President Roosevelt believed that the acquisition of the canal and the building of the canal, in all details, was as free from scandal as any of the public acts. Every action taken was not merely proper, but was carried out in

16 Ibid., p. 276.
accordance with the highest, the finest, and the nicest standards of public and governmental ethics. The United States has had many honorable chapters in its history, but no more honorable than that which tells of the way in which our right to dig the Panama Canal was secured.

None of Roosevelt's other acts, in so far as his conduct of foreign affairs was concerned, proved so far-reaching in its influence upon his later policy as his course in Panama. At the same time nothing that he did has been the object of such severe denunciation by his critics.

Theodore Roosevelt invented the American policy in the Panama Canal and carried through a program which was at least vigorous and productive of immediate results. Roosevelt's great contribution to American public life was the stimulation of healthy interest in public affairs and the development of a striking type of efficient democratic leadership of a kind sorely needed in the days of popular vote.

Many years after his administration, Roosevelt summed up his work in Panama in this way:

I was interested in the Panama Canal because I started it. If I had followed traditional conservative methods I would have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Congress, and the debate on it would be going on yet; but I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate and while the debate goes on the Canal does too.17

17Hill, op. cit., p. 68.
Panama was the first instance of the swinging of the "Big Stick" in international affairs.

But no portrait of Theodore Roosevelt, and no picture of his time, can be complete without the bold, firm outlines of his Panama policy set as near as may be in their proper perspective.

In the subsequent chapter you see President Roosevelt's intervention in the Venezuela episode, which he regarded as a real test of the Monroe Doctrine.
CHAPTER III

VENEZUELA EPISODE

Cipriano Castro became President of Venezuela in 1899 by the traditional South American revolution, and his rule failed to bring an era of peace and prosperity. Large debts were contracted for public works, and by the year 1901 the foreign concessionaries were asking their governments for assistance in collecting the debts. They made repeated attempts to obtain payment, but were blocked by a tendency on the part of Venezuelan officials to answer, "Tomorrow." Nationals of England and Germany seemed to have been abused the most, although claims against the Castro government had also been filed by business men in the United States, Italy, France, Belgium, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Norway.

Throughout much of Venezuelan history both the people and their resources have been the prey of adventurers and unprincipled, self-seeking men. Under such conditions numerous insurrections and disorders arose, which resulted in injuries to the persons and property of aliens and to alien corporations, and led to extensive claims for indemnity
which, in most instances, were supported by the respective governments of the claimants. This was the situation which led Great Britain, Germany, and Italy to take the action which brought about the Venezuelan crisis of 1902.

Nothing in the Monroe Doctrine as it was universally understood in 1901 blocked the path of foreign nations to debt collection. Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt wrote, "If any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it." The chastisement could include a blockade, the seizure of custom receipts to satisfy obligations, a bombardment of coast cities; in brief, any form of coercion or destruction. There was but one limitation. The United States would not permit a European country permanently to occupy new territory in Central America or South America or in the Caribbean region. The Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt explained in his first message to Congress, had "nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power provided it does not take the form of acquisition of territory."2)

In an attempt to arrive at an understanding of what really occurred during 1901 and 1902 the story would be simplified to limit the narrative to the actions of England and Germany.

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1 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 283.
2 Ibid., p. 284.
The leader in the coercive measure against Venezuela in 1902, at least in the early phases of the controversy, was Great Britain, not Germany. The British dispatches to the Venezuelan Government were usually stern rather than conciliatory. The German Government on at least one occasion (July 6, 1901) urged upon Venezuela in friendly terms the examination of the German claims by joint arbitrators, with the suggestion that, in case the arbitrators could not come to an agreement, the claims on which they differed could be made the subject of special conferences between the imperial legation and the Venezuelan Government. Germany further suggested that the disagreement should be submitted to the decision of the Hague Tribunal.

In spite of the moderation which marked the tone of the communication, Germany had for months contemplated a resort to stern measures which included possibly the temporary occupation of Venezuelan soil; however, almost a year elapsed before Germany resorted to coercion. The Kaiser apparently counted on the resistance of the Venezuelans to furnish him a pretext for occupying one or more of their seaboard towns. In order to disguise the fact that this was a German undertaking, he looked about for accomplices who would give to it an international appearance.

3Hill, op. cit., p. 110.
It happened just at this time that Germany found herself isolated, since France and Russia had renewed their bond of friendship. England, who was always suspicious of Russia and then irritated by France, seemed to be looking for a friend. By some means Germany persuaded England to draw closer to her. The immediate result of this adventure in international agreement was the joint demand of Germany and England on Venezuela to pay them their dues.

The patience of these two powers was strained by 1901. In the latter part of this year Baron von Holleben, German Ambassador to the United States, informed Secretary of State John Hay that coercion against Venezuela might be undertaken. He specified that the acquisition of territory or the permanent occupation of portions of Venezuela would under no circumstances be considered by Germany.

Great Britain meanwhile was nursing grievances, which she believed were more serious than Germany's. In addition to owing money to her citizens and refusing to pay, Venezuela had jeopardized British prestige by the seizure of ships flying the Union Jack. Her attitude changed later, but Germany was at first inclined to conciliation. In January, 1902, Count von Bulow, the German Chancellor, asked the Kaiser whether cooperative action with Great Britain against Venezuela could be undertaken and the Kaiser replied that it would be unwise to wait until after the visit of
Prince Henry to the United States. An offensive, he felt, might further damage the standing of Germany in the United States; thus, it was that England stood alone during the first part of 1902 in addressing several sharp notes to President Cipriano Castro.

After several months had passed since Germany's suggestion for arbitration, joint irritation drew the two countries together. Count Metternich, German Ambassador at London, informed Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, that pressure upon Venezuela seemed to be the only solution.4

During November, 1902, the two governments completed their arrangements to proceed against Venezuela. Final ultimatums were delivered to the Venezuelan Government on December 7, 1902, by the British and German representatives. On the following day, no satisfactory reply having been received, both legations withdrew from Caracas.

The plan of the allied powers was first to seize and retain the Venezuelan gunboats and then if Venezuela did not submit to their demands, to blockade the Venezuelan ports.

Following the severance of diplomatic relations with Venezuela, events moved very rapidly. The allied forces seized four Venezuelan gunboats and ordered a blockade of five Venezuelan ports. The approach of the German and

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4Pringle, op. cit., p. 284.
English warships was enough to break President Castro's spirit. On December 31, 1902, when British guns bombarded Puerto Cabello because of an alleged insult to the flag, President Castro hurried to offer the arbitration he had once spurned.

Just what President Castro proposed to submit to arbitration is not clear. The Venezuelan Government, basing its contention on the Calvo Doctrine, maintained that the settlement of claims of aliens was an internal affair, subject to Venezuelan laws and the decisions of Venezuelan courts and in no sense an issue proper for diplomatic arrangement. Castro's position was denied by the European states chiefly on the ground that justice could not be obtained under Venezuelan legislation and jurisprudence.

What was President Roosevelt doing while these belligerent gestures were being carried out? Officially he was doing very little. Privately, through Speck von Sternberg, and probably through conversation with Von Holleben, he expressed emphatic disapproval. The United States tried to persuade the blockaders of the unwisdom of their action. The United States urged arbitration.

England and Italy, who had joined in the action against Venezuela, were willing to come to an understanding, but Germany refused. Germany stated that if she took possession of any territory, such possession would only be temporary;
but such possession could easily become permanent. It was difficult to trust to guarantees that might be treated as "scraps of paper."

The test of the Monroe Doctrine had arrived; if the United States permitted foreign nations, under the pretense of supporting their creditors' claims to invade a weak debtor state by naval or military expedition, and to take possession of its territory, what would become of the Monroe Doctrine? President Roosevelt at this point directed the American policy.

President Roosevelt did not shirk his task. He summoned Von Holleben, German Ambassador, to the White House and told him that unless Germany consented to arbitration, ten days later the American squadron under Admiral Dewey would be given orders to proceed to the Venezuelan coast and prevent anyone taking possession of Venezuelan territory. Von Holleben began to protest that his Emperor, having once refused to arbitrate, would not change his mind. The President refused to argue, because arguments had already gone on until no useful purpose would be served by repeating them. Roosevelt was simply giving information which Von Holleben might think important to transmit to the Kaiser. A week later, Von Holleben called on President Roosevelt again, but said nothing about the Venezuelan question. When Von Holleben rose to go, President Roosevelt asked
him about the Venezuelan question and he replied that he had received nothing from his Government. The President informed him in substance that, in view of the fact, Admiral Dewey would be instructed to sail a day earlier than the day the President had originally mentioned. Ambassador Von Holleben protested, but Roosevelt informed him that not a line had been put on paper, that if the Kaiser would agree to arbitrate, he, the President, would heartily praise him for such action, and would treat it as taken on Germany's initiative but that within forty-eight hours there must be an offer to arbitrate or Dewey would sail with the orders indicated. Thirty-six hours later, the Kaiser agreed to arbitrate. Neither Admiral Dewey nor anyone else knew of the step that was to be taken; the naval authorities were merely required to be in readiness, but were not told what for.5

President Roosevelt publicly complimented the Kaiser on being such an advocate of arbitration, on the announcement that Germany had consented to arbitrate. The Kaiser suggested that President Roosevelt should act as arbiter, but the President declined to serve as it would be improper for the United States, which also had claims against Venezuela, to sit in judgment on the case. After some interchange of views, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Venezuela

agreed to submit certain claims to the decision of the Hague Tribunal.

The five main points upon which President Roosevelt laid emphasis were: first, Germany was the leader in the enterprise; second, her purpose was to seize Venezuelan territory and convert it into a German dependency; third, Germany flatly refused to arbitrate her controversy with Venezuela; fourth, the President thereupon delivered an ultimatum to the German Ambassador to the effect that Germany must submit the issue with Venezuela to arbitration or Admiral Dewey would be ordered to the Venezuelan coast to prevent the German forces from taking possession of any territory; and fifth, the German Ambassador, after a second interview, notified the President that the Kaiser had agreed to arbitrate.\(^6\)

The question of preferential treatment together with the related problem of the manner in which the revenues for the payment of claims should be divided among the various powers were the only matters submitted to the Hague Tribunal. At the suggestion of the Venezuelan Government it had previously been agreed that all claims, excepting those designated as "first claims," be divided by mixed commissions. The final arrangement was incorporated in a number of protocols, each of which provided that, with the exceptions

\(^6\)Hill, op. cit., p. 128.
above, all claims should be settled at Caracas by mixed commissions composed of two members: one appointed by the Venezuelan Government and the other appointed by the government representing all claimants. All the disagreements between the commissioners were to be settled by an umpire, to be selected by the chief magistrate of a third nation named in the treaty.

In the arbitration proceedings at the Hague Tribunal in 1903 to 1904, the counsel for both sides agreed that international law afforded no clear rule for the decision of the controversy as to preferential payment, nor could any similar case be cited by either side. On February 22, 1904, the tribunal gave an unanimous decision in favor of the blockading powers. The verdict completed the series of defeats met by Venezuela, and the decision was received with no small degree of criticism.

The crisis of the modern American Doctrine, which is erroneously called the Monroe Doctrine, was reached when the United States under President Roosevelt laid down the terms on which England, Germany, and Italy might approach the coast of Venezuela with hostile warships. The precautions and limitations and agreements that no forces should be landed and no territory should be occupied were intended not so much for the welfare of Venezuela as for the peace of mind of the United States. In the case of Venezuela, the
foreign powers galvanized the delinquent state into agreeing that the pending claims should be submitted to arbitration. Before the tribunal in 1904 the three powers secured the further principle that other debtor nations could not come in and take advantage of the settlement, to obtain which they had spent no money. This was a suggestion that any European power whose citizens could not collect debts from Latin-American governments or their people, had only to send a warship, make a bluster, and they would receive attention and payments.

President Theodore Roosevelt saw that point and also perceived the only rational way of preventing armed interventions, which was to put pressure on American states to be good and stop making trouble. If they would not be good for the United States, then they were to be made to behave. This was the famous doctrine of the "Big Stick." It involved the idea that all Latin-American countries not capable of managing their own affairs must accept the counsels, reproofs, and discipline tendered from time to time by the United States. Upon this question President Roosevelt dwelt in his message of 1904:

If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere,
ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly in flagrant cases of such wrong doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.\footnote{Howland, op. cit., p. 325.}

Watchful vigilance was the way President Roosevelt styled his attitude in the Venezuelan crisis. In the Venezuelan affair he had confined himself to negative and mediation measures. Once the blockage was established he had at first transmitted the Venezuelan request for arbitration without comment, and subsequently had used his influence to secure a peaceful solution of the controversy.

President Roosevelt's comment on this situation later in history was as follows:

When we were menaced with trouble I acted up to my theory that the proper way of handling international relations was by speaking softly and carrying a big stick. In this particular case Admiral Dewey and the American fleet represented the big stick. I asked on behalf of the nation, the things to which we were entitled. I was as courteous as possible. I not only acted with justice, but with courtesy toward them.\footnote{Istane, op. cit., p. 493.}

Both England and Germany assured us in explicit terms that there was not the slightest intention on their part to violate the Monroe Doctrine, and this assurance was kept with an honorable good faith which merits full acknowledgment on our part. The Monroe Doctrine was just as unequiv-
ocally invoked and just as inflexibly upheld as it had been by President Cleveland eight years before in another Venezuelan case. The quiet private warning had been substituted for the loud public threat.
CHAPTER IV

COLLECTION OF SANTO DOMINGO DEBT

Not long after the Venezuelan incident, in which the rights of the United States, as set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, to prevent European powers from occupying territory in the Western Hemisphere was successfully upheld, an occasion arose nearer home not only to insist upon rights but also to assume the duties involved. No other Latin-American country had suffered more than Santo Domingo from internal disorder, financial exploitation, and foreign intervention.

The Dominican Government was forced to sign an agreement with French and Belgian bondholders in 1901, under which a specific mortgage on the custom revenues at Santo Domingo City and Macoris was created for the latter's benefit, and in July, 1903, the German, Italian, and Spanish governments compelled the negotiations of diplomatic protocols providing for the payment of specific monthly sums to their nationals.¹

¹Munro, op. cit., p. 104.
Santo Domingo had long been a prey to self-seeking adventurers and a victim of disorders and insurrections. The stakes for which the rival forces were continually fighting were the custom houses, for they were the only certain sources of revenues and their receipts were the only reliable security which could be offered to foreign capitalists in support of loans. At this time there were two rival "governments" in the island and a revolution had arisen and was going on against each. The national debt of the Republic had mounted to $32,280,000, of which something like $22,000,000 was owed to European creditors. The interest due on it in the year 1905 was two and a half million dollars. The whole situation was ripe for intervention by one or more European governments. The question was how far would these creditors go in forcing payment without violating the Monroe Doctrine.

President Roosevelt could not permit intervention, yet he could not ignore the validity of the debts which the Republic had contracted for various purposes, or the justice of the demands for the payment of at least the interest. President Roosevelt said, "It cannot in the long run prove possible for the United States to protect delinquent American nations from punishment for the non-performance of their duties unless she undertakes to make them perform their duties."

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2Howland, op. cit., p. 165.
Discouraged at the outlook, President Morales was at first disposed to let matters take their course. But the danger of European intervention and of internal insurrection finally brought him to the conclusion that with the help of the United States he might find a way out of the morass. He believed that a guaranty against insurrection would be afforded by placing the custom houses in charge of financial agents responsible to and protected by the American Government.

At first, President Roosevelt declined the offer of the Dominican Republic to turn over all the custom houses, but when the financial problems of the island republic became critical in the latter part of 1904, President Roosevelt finally became convinced that he must act.

In a message to the Senate in February, 1905, President Roosevelt thus outlined his conception of the dual nature of the Monroe Doctrine:

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains finally to collect it is a blockade or bombardment or seizure of the custom houses, and this means . . . what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of territory. The United States then becomes a party of interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such seizure of territory offers
the only way in which the power in question can collect its debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States.  

President Roosevelt had already found such interference necessary in the case of Germany and Venezuela. But it had been interference in a purely negative sense. He had merely insisted that the European power should not occupy American territory even temporarily. In the case of the Republic of Santo Domingo he supplemented this negative interference with positive action based upon his conviction of the inseparable nature of rights and obligations.

President Roosevelt sent as special commissioner to the Republic of Santo Domingo, a naval officer, Commander Dillingham, who possessed wide knowledge of conditions in the island. Dillingham was detached to Santo Domingo to assist the American minister, T. C. Dawson. After Dillingham's arrival negotiations proceeded rapidly, and an agreement known as the Dillingham-Sanchez protocol was signed providing for a guaranty by the United States of the territorial integrity of the custom houses in Santo Domingo, forty-five per cent of the revenue to be turned over to the government of Santo Domingo and fifty-five per cent of the proceeds would be held in trust in New York pending a final adjustment of the debt. President Morales approved such an arrangement by decree, and Colonel Colton was nominated by

3Ibid., p. 166.
the President of the United States to take over the Customs
 Receivership.

Carlos Morales, who had obtained a precarious hold on
the presidency, was willing to place the custom houses under
American control. He had, in fact, believed that revolu-
tionary movements might be discouraged if insurgent leaders
could no longer obtain the custom revenues at ports which
they might seize. On February 7, 1905, a treaty was signed
by which the United States undertook to attempt the adjust-
ment of all the financial obligations of the Santo Domingo
Republic and to assume the collection of all the custom
revenues.

The Senate denounced President Roosevelt's course as
unconstitutional, declaring that he had put into execution
a treaty which the Senate had refused to approve and that
he had established a protectorate over Santo Domingo. Presi-
dent Roosevelt went ahead on his own authority. Only the
presence of American warships, it was maintained, enabled
Colton and his assistants to act as collectors of customs,
a fact which was openly accepted in the Senate by President
Roosevelt's followers. Without question the presence of
American warships in the Santo Domingo waters discouraged
insurrections. President Roosevelt said that the American
citizens were in the custom houses to stay until the United
States took them out, and that no revolutionists would be
allowed to interfere with them.\textsuperscript{4}

The Senators' chief cause of opposition to the \textit{modus vivendi} was not only because they regarded Roosevelt's action as an exercise of unconstitutional authority, but also because the phase relating to the maintenance of the \textit{status quo} as meaning that the United States would support the existing government of Santo Domingo against any insurrectionary movement thereby established in fact the very protectorate to which they objected.

The struggle in the Senate of the United States over the affairs in Santo Domingo continued. The original Dillingham-Sanchez protocol drafted January 20, 1905, was so objectionable that President Roosevelt never submitted it to the Senate. The arrangement of February 7, 1905, which in all essential respects was put into operation by the \textit{modus vivendi}, was so severely attacked that President Roosevelt became convinced finally that changes would have to be made to secure its ratification. Accordingly negotiations were renewed, alterations were made, and in the amended form the protocol was approved by the Senate of the United States on February 25, 1907.

The treaty of 1907 differed from that signed in 1905 in that it simply committed the United States to aid in carrying out arrangements already effected by direct negotiation

\textsuperscript{4}Hill, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 164.
between the Dominican Republic and its creditors on the one side and between the representatives and American bankers on the other, instead of obligating the United States itself to attempt the adjustment of the debt of Santo Domingo. In Roosevelt's opinion these modifications in the protocol detracted nothing from the original plan. He ascribed the delay in the ratification of the treaty to partisanship and bitterness against himself; and it is certainly true that most of the treaty's opponents were his consistent critics on other grounds. He also confessed that he did not much admire the Senate, because it was such a helpless body when efficient work for good is to be done.

Under the new treaty the President of the United States was to appoint a General Receiver of Dominican Customs with the necessary assistants and employees. Payments of interest and sinking fund on the bonds issued under the plan of adjustment were to be made by the Receiver before paying any of the custom receipts to the Government of Santo Domingo. Until the whole amount of the bonds issued under the treaty had been paid, the Republic of Santo Domingo was not to increase its public debt except by previous agreement with the government of the United States.

In a little more than two years Santo Domingo was transformed from a bankrupt island, without credit abroad or stability at home, into a prosperous and peaceful country,
with revenues more than sufficient for ordinary expenses, and President Roosevelt congratulated himself that he had put the affairs of the island on a better basis than they had been for a century. The prime motive of the arrangement was to prevent a descent on a Latin-American state by a European state; the people of Santo Domingo were benefited by peace and order in their revenue. The system has stood the test of experience and is now the accepted policy of the government.

Roosevelt did not approve of the use of force by the United States for the collection of the contractual claims of American citizens in other lands. Nor did he endorse intervention for such purposes by other governments. All in all, the Roosevelt policy and action in regard to the collection of debts involving nations was promotive of international amity and peace.

The following chapter will present the accounts of President Roosevelt's intervention in the Alaskan boundary dispute and the decision reached was looked upon as a triumph of American diplomacy. Yet it was a great disappointment to the Canadians, as they felt their interests had been sacrificed to promote the British policy of friendly relations with the United States.

CHAPTER V

ALASKAN BOUNDARY

The Alaskan boundary proved to be a stumbling block. The question of the location of the eastern boundary of the panhandle of Alaska was a subject of serious controversy. It had its origin in the language and purpose of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 which determined the American claim under the Russo-American Treaty of 1867. Probably it could have been satisfactorily settled without serious difficulty concerning interpretation of treaty provisions, if a joint survey had been arranged promptly after the American purchase. Unfortunately, it was left unsettled, until it became involved in new problems resulting from new conditions and new developments.

It was on the wording of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of February 26, 1825, that all the subsequent debate over the exact boundary of Alaska was based. Articles III and IV contained the passages which were so variously interpreted. Their importance justifies quotation in full:

Article III: Commencing from the southern most part of the island called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel 54°40', and between the 131st and 133rd degrees of west longitude (meridian of Greenwich) the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel as far as
the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude. From this last mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude (of the same meridian), and, finally, from the said point of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st degree in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the limit between the Russian and British possessions on the continent of America to the northwest.

Article IV: With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the previous article it is understood: 1st. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia, 2nd. That whenever the summit of the mountains which extent in the direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude shall prove to be at a distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the ocean the limit between the British possessions and the line of the coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the coast, and shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom. 1

Due to a meager knowledge of the country and to a general lack of interest, no disputes arose concerning this boundary between 1825 and 1867, with the single exception of a trivial altercation over the right of navigation on the Stikine River. In 1867, however, the Dominion of Canada was formed, and the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. Four years later British Columbia entered the Dominion. Thus the stage was prepared.

The immediate cause of the boundary dispute was the discovery of gold in the Klondike in 1897. The shortest and

1The Case of His Britannic Majesty before the Alaska Boundary Tribunal, Appendix I, p. 37, quoted in Hugh Keenleyside, Canada and the United States, p. 212.
the quickest route to the gold-bearing region lay through the southern strip of Alaska by way of Dyea and Skagway on the headwaters of Lynn Canal. At this time the boundary line between this coastal strip of British Columbia had never been surveyed. With the rush of gold hunters to the Klondike the question of determining the boundary assumed an unforeseen importance.

The Canadians had set up an entirely new theory as to the meaning of the treaty of 1825.

They contended that the ten marine leagues should be measured from the general line of the ocean coast and not from tide water. This interpretation would throw the boundary line across the heads of inlets and channels in such a way as to give the Canadians access to deep water.²

The matter had been argued prior to Roosevelt's accession to the Presidency. In 1899, Secretary Hay had denounced as "ridiculous and preposterous" the contention that Russia or any other nation would have agreed to a boundary that left her, as a result, only a few promontories in the Pacific.

In its early stages the dispute was linked with other matters under consideration between the United States and Great Britain, among them the Newfoundland fisheries and revision of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Great Britain suggested that all these matters be referred to an impartial

²Istane, op. cit., p. 474.
tribunal. Secretary Hay declined to admit that concessions could be made on Alaska. The United States especially objected to the proposed settlement concerning territory which they insisted had been in practically unchallenged and unquestioned American possession for thirty years, and which since 1825 had constituted part of a solid coast barrier around the head of the inlets of which Russia had intended to shut Canada from the coast harbors. The Americans were unwilling to subject to the peril of arbitration the territory upon which (under American authority) cities and towns had been built, and valuable interests and industries established without a word of protest from either the British or Canadian governments.3

After unavailing attempts to reach an understanding through a Joint High Committee, followed by prolonged negotiations conducted in an amicable spirit, Roosevelt finally agreed to refer the dispute to a joint tribunal composed of three "impartial jurists of repute" from each nation. Secretary Hay explained to President Roosevelt that by submitting the question to a mixed tribunal with provision for a majority decision, it would be impossible for the United States to lose and not at all impossible that a majority would give a verdict in the American favor. On January 24,

3James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations, p. 472.
1903, Roosevelt agreed to a joint judicial tribunal of six members to meet at London to consider judicially the question involved in the interpretation of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825 and to settle the boundary line. The President promptly applied his efforts to secure the assent of the Senate which he secured on February 11, 1903, with unusual promptness and little debate.\(^4\)

After President Roosevelt learned that the members of the Supreme Court had expressed doubt as to whether they could consistently accept an invitation to sit on a diplomatic and political tribunal, and in accord with an understanding with the leaders in the Senate, the President selected as the American members of the tribunal Secretary of War, Root, Senator Lodge, and Senator Turner. Roosevelt felt that no three men in the United States could be found who would be more anxious than the ones he appointed to do justice to the British claim on all points where there was even a color of right on the British side.\(^5\)

Roosevelt's appointments caused a great deal of embarrassment, some dismay, as well as surprise. Canada's protest to the home government had been violent and it was difficult not to say impossible for the British Government to maintain that Root, Lodge, and Turner were impartial in

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 482. \(^5\)Thayer, op. cit., p. 209.
the sense required by the treaty. Some thought that in making this selection the United States Government dishonored its own treaty. Every member of the American trio was a politician. President Roosevelt explained his choice by the statement that "no three men fit for the position could be found in all the United States who had not already come to some conclusion" on this subject.6

For British members of the mixed judicial tribunal, King Edward appointed Baron Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England, Lieutenant-Governor Louis Jette of Quebec, and Allen Bristol Aylesworth of the Ontario bar.

Roosevelt at once let the British know that this was his last effort to bring about an agreement through a commission. He informed Britain that if there was any disagreement not only would there be no arbitration of the matter but that in his message to Congress he would take a position which would prevent any possibility of arbitration hereafter and which would give the authority to run the line as we claimed it without any further regard to the attitude of England and of Canada. It was this sentiment as well as the real need for greater police protection that led President Roosevelt to dispatch a large body of troops to Alaska at this time.7 Some people thought this showed President Roosevelt's inability to see more than one side

6Keenleyside, op. cit., p. 218. 7Ibid., p. 221.
of any given question.

On September 3 the joint judicial tribunal was satisfactorily organized at London with Lord Alverstone as president. There was little doubt as to the position of the three Americans and the two Canadians of the tribunal. From the beginning the Canadians had feared that Lord Alverstone would be influenced by political motives, directed toward better relations with the United States. The case was really before Lord Alverstone. If he decided in favor of the claims of the United States, that would have been the end of the controversy. If he sustained the Canadian view, there would be an even division and the United States could make good its claims only by force. The proceedings of the tribunal were expeditious, and marked by a friendly and conscientious spirit. Certainly the evidence was overwhelmingly on the side of the American claims in Alaska. Even British maps, until the dispute arose, had substantiated them.

On October 20, 1903, the tribunal gave a decision of four to two in favor of the American claims. The three American commissioners naturally voted in favor of the majority decision. Jette and Aylesworth declined to sign it. Lord Alverstone, by voting with the Americans, lived up to

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8House Reports, 58th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 5.
9Pringle, op. cit., p. 292.
the obligation of his judicial office by basing his decision on the law and the evidence.

This decision was a great disappointment to the Canadians, some of whom felt that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed their interests to promote the British policy of friendly relations with the United States. In connection with this John Basset Moore said:

In reality, the Canadian contentions in regard to the Alaskan boundary fundamentally lacked merit, and, like those of the United States in the fur-seal arbitration, derived color chiefly from the fact that a government was willing to take the chance of presenting them.\(^{10}\)

The whole adjudication was looked upon as a triumph of American diplomacy. Had the United States submitted the case to The Hague, or to an impartial judicial body, as Canada had desired, the result would have been the same, in all probability, except that the Canadians would not have felt that they had been unfairly treated. The United States had the better case. President Roosevelt said, "The result is satisfactory in every way. It has removed from the field of discussion and possible danger a question liable to become more acutely accentuated with each passing year."\(^{11}\)

It had furnished a signal proof of the fairness and good will which two friendly nations can approach and determine

\(^{10}\)Latane, op. cit., p. 476.

\(^{11}\)House Reports, 58th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 5.
issues involving national sovereignty and by their nature incapable of submission to a third power for adjudication.

By the year 1905 President Roosevelt had earned the confidence and the respect of the statesmen of other nations. The next chapter shows how he brought about peace between Russia and Japan in the conflict then raging in the Far East.
CHAPTER VI

PEACE OF PORTSMOUTH

For the first time the United States had a President whom the rulers of Europe looked upon as one of themselves, and who could play their game with their weapons. Roosevelt loved to inject his personality into world politics.

President Roosevelt said:

As long as England succeeds in keeping up the balance of power in Europe, not only in principle, but in reality, well and good; should she, however, for some reason or other fail in doing so, the United States would be obliged to step in at least temporarily, in order to re-establish the balance of power in Europe, never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed. In fact, we ourselves are becoming, owing to our strength and geographical position, more and more the balance of power of the whole globe.¹

This quotation supplies us with a complete key to the interpretation of President Roosevelt's intervention in the affairs of Europe and in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905.

Twice during the Russo-Japanese War he intimated to restless Europe that when a power seized the opportunity to

¹Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 2.
profit by the existing disorder, it would have to reckon with the most positive opposition of the United States. He did not believe in taking advantage of a weaker country in time of turmoil.

President Roosevelt was not tempted to sacrifice the interests of either Asia or Europe to the political or commercial advantages of the United States. From the Peace of Portsmouth the United States derived no material advantage of any sort. In his mind commerce and diplomacy were plainly not closely associated, a fact which separated his statesmanship from the statesmanship of Europe, as far as the West is from the East.

If two thoughts in the back of Roosevelt's mind are recalled, his efforts to end the Russo-Japanese War will be more clearly understood. The first was his conviction that the safety of American interests in the Far East rested upon a balance of power between Russia and Japan. The second was his belief, despite the blandishments of the Kaiser, that of the two powers Russia was the more dangerous. His first thoughts of peace were by no means those of an impartial mediator. Roosevelt did confide to Secretary Hay that the United States might be of genuine service, if Japan wins out, in preventing interference to rob her of the fruits of her victory.²

²Pringle, op. cit., p. 379.
When Roosevelt was invited to become peacemaker in Asia, he was also presented with what appeared to him an opportunity to avert war in Europe. The Moroccan crisis and the Russo-Japanese conflict overlapped each other in time, but this was no mere coincidence. These two events were integral parts of world politics which already enfolded the malodorous embryo of what became ten years later the world's pestilence.

When President Roosevelt came to deal with questions of world politics, he did not have at his command a diplomatic organization which could supply him with accurate information or advice. Instead of being able to draw upon a corps of experienced and trusted public servants to aid him, it became necessary for Roosevelt to gather, almost on the spur of the moment, a group of personal assistants. No man in whom he trusted played him false, but taken all together, fine and loyal as they were, these friends were no adequate substitute for a competent American diplomatic service. Roosevelt was often left to grope blindly in the dark, and that he did not make great mistakes was due solely to providence and to a canny political instinct which often guided him when his information was defective or inadequate.

The Russo-Japanese War did not rise to action suddenly in 1904. The conflict had been maturing for a number of years. The origin of the Russo-Japanese War lies more in
Europe than in Asia. Originally the conflict was between England and Russia. More immediately it was between Germany and all the European countries which stood in the way of her ambitions.

War in the Far East, with Russia involved, was the last thing desired by France, who looked to Russia for protection against Germany. England could expect little benefit and much injury; therefore, England appears to have preferred peace to the many uncertainties of such a conflict.

To the American Government this possibility of European intervention had two aspects. First, it was not to American interests that Russia be permitted to consolidate her position in the Far East. Second, European intervention probably would have involved compensation for all the powers, and in fact would have provided the long-expected opportunity for the division of the Chinese Empire.

In making the peace there were two regular channels of communication, either through the diplomatic representatives at Washington or through the corresponding foreign offices. To President Roosevelt the choice in each case was important, and he did not leave it to chance.

President Roosevelt sent George von L. Meyer, the American Ambassador, to St. Petersburg, which he considered the most important diplomatic post in Europe at that time.

Jusserand, French minister, and Von Sternberg, German
minister, were among Roosevelt's most intimate companions in Washington. Practically all of the important diplomatic communication between Berlin and Paris, respectively, and Washington was through these two men.

The Japanese Government likewise had selected Washington as its point of transmission for communication to Roosevelt. Mr. Takahira had the double advantage of being fully trusted by his own government and by President Roosevelt.

President Roosevelt had some difficulty in establishing acceptable relations with Great Britain; Sir Mortimer Durand, British Ambassador at Washington, was an estimable gentleman who commanded respect, but unfortunately he was not of a temperament to understand Roosevelt or win his intimacy. While Roosevelt never quite distrusted the British Government, he was not, on the other hand, any admirer of the British foreign policy.

This sketch of the European background of the Russo-Japanese War shows the conditions of distrust, suspicion, and misinformation under which President Roosevelt began the task of bringing Russia and Japan together for peace negotiations.

Efforts to restore peace between Japan and Russia almost never ceased from the outbreak of hostilities. Four different methods of peacemaking were advocated: international conference; mediation through England and France,
the allies of the belligerents; mediation by the United States; and direct negotiations between Russia and Japan. Over all hung the shadow of intervention by a concert of powers.

The American Government might justly be suspicious of any plan emanating from Europe, for Japan was without friends there. To Russia, to Japan, to the United States, and to Germany, though for a different reason, direct negotiation between the belligerents was the most satisfactory procedure.

It must have been reasonably clear both to the Japanese Government and to President Roosevelt that in case the good offices of any power were utilized in making peace the choice would lie between France and the United States. Russia plainly made an overture for peace through France. President Roosevelt's hand was forced both by the French overtures and by the expression of a Japanese preference for American rather than the French good offices.

Japan formally and definitely asked President Roosevelt directly and of his own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together, for the purpose of direct negotiations. This was the action for which President Roosevelt had been waiting patiently.

The Kaiser pointed out to the Czar of Russia that
President Roosevelt was the person to persuade Japan to make reasonable proposals for peace. President Roosevelt answered this by, "This did not meet my views, for I did not desire to be asked to squeeze out of Japan terms favorable to Russia."  

The Czar's consent to the invitation for peace negotiations having been confirmed and Japan's assent having been included in the formal request, the way was now clear for the formal invitation which was made on June 8, 1905.

On June 8, 1905, President Roosevelt sent to both the Russian and Japanese Governments an identical note in which he urged them "not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world to open direct negotiations for peace with each other." But the President had already conducted, with the utmost secrecy, confidential negotiations with Tokyo and with St. Petersburg to induce both belligerents to consent to a face-to-face discussion of peace. Each government was assured that no word of the matter would be made public until both nations had signified their willingness to negotiate. Neither nation was to know anything of the other's readiness until both had committed themselves. These advances appear to have been made following a suggestion from Japan that Roosevelt should attempt to secure peace. The Japanese were more clear-sighted.

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3Dennett, op. cit., p. 196.
4Howland, op. cit., p. 171.
than the Russian bureaucracy. The Japanese realized that they had gained so much already that there was nothing to be won by further fighting.

When the public invitation to peace negotiations was extended, the conference had already been arranged and the confidential assent of both governments needed only to be made formal. Russia wished the meeting to take place in Paris; Japan preferred Chifu, in China. Neither liked the other's suggestion, so Roosevelt's invitation to come to Washington, with the privilege of adjourning to some place in New England if the weather was too hot, was finally accepted. The formal meeting between the plenipotentiaries took place at Oyster Bay on board the Presidential yacht, The Mayflower. President Roosevelt received his guests in the cabin and proposed a toast in these words:

Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there will be no answer and which I ask you to drink in silence, standing. I drink to the welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and the people of the two great nations whose representatives have met one another on this ship. It is my earnest hope and prayer, in the interest not only of these two great powers, but of all civilized mankind, that a just and lasting peace may speedily be concluded between them.5

The two groups of plenipotentiaries were carried, each on an American naval vessel, to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and there, at the Navy Yard, began their conference.

It was to the advantage of none of the neutral powers

5Ibid., p. 173.
that the war be continued. All the powers most directly interested had reasons to desire peace. The French, threatened by Germany in Morocco and not yet out from under the shadow, greatly wished that Russia might be freed to perform its functions under the Dual Alliance. Germany wanted peace because the purpose to weaken Russia had already been achieved. England likewise desired peace.

The American people wished for peace not so much because of any direct national interest in the Far East as because war was horrible and costly in human life. Once the plenipotentiaries were gathered at the peace table, American public opinion could be counted on to demand peace, and would be turned heavily against whichever power obstructed the conclusion of a treaty.

The decisive factor was President Roosevelt himself. He had no vain ambition to be a peacemaker. This alluring role does not appear to have seemed attractive to him. There is no trace in his letters that he entered upon his work to bring the belligerents together with any personal motive. He did not shrink from a public service, and when the opportunity was placed in his hand he welcomed it, though with no great expectation of success.

There was nothing ignoble or selfish in Roosevelt's efforts; once the consent of the belligerents to peace parleys had been obtained the President assumed a grave personal
responsibility. From that moment on he had a large personal
stake in making peace, because failure could make him ridicu-
losous in his time and in history. England did not appear to
be cooperating. The German Emperor was whispering that
both France and England expected President Roosevelt to
fail and were waiting to step in and make a profit out of
his failure. Even in the United States there was no lack
of critics who, for various reasons, freely predicted his
failure. The Portsmouth Conference presented a challenge
to a man of determination who did not easily accept defeat.

When the sessions at Portsmouth got under way, the hos-
tility soon became apparent. There were twelve sessions
of the conference, and there were twelve items in the Japa-
nese peace terms as presented. Eight of these demands were
disposed of in the first eight sessions, which marked a
definite phase of the proceedings. The last four sessions
may be described almost as a new conference in which Presi-
dent Roosevelt had become, though not actually present, a
dictator.

The terms discussed and tentatively settled in the
first eight sessions of the conference were as follows:

1. Peace and amity between Russia and Japan.
2. Japan's place in Korea.
3. The evacuation and restoration of Manchuria.
4. The freedom of China to take measures to develop the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

5. The transfer of the leased area from Russia to Japan, subject to the consent of China.

6. The transfer of the greater part of the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the mining concessions to Japan, Russia retaining the Chinese Eastern Railroad, that is, the segment of the trans-Siberian system in northern Manchuria which provided a short cut to Vladivostok and a spur to the south as far as Khanchengtze.

7. Mutual engagement not to exploit the Manchuria railways for strategical purposes.

8. Agreement to enter into a separate convention for the regulation of railway services.6

Two thirds of the terms proposed by Japan were promptly accepted by the Russian envoys. But a probable split on the remainder seemed inevitable. As the argument continued American public opinion shifted to favor Russia. President Roosevelt had been right, as Japan's demand for an indemnity proved highly unpopular. Roosevelt felt that failure was probable, that neither side would give in, and that the war would go on. After prolonged discussion, two points remained. The first was the transfer of the island of Sakhalin,

6Dennett, op. cit., p. 248.
off Siberia, to Russia. The second was the money indemnity to Japan. Other disputed questions could easily be settled if only these two important points could be taken care of.

At this period President Roosevelt decided to intervene. Roosevelt sent an outline of a proposed compromise to the Czar as a personal suggestion. Roosevelt proposed that Russia agree to the division of Sakhalin, since the Japanese were already in possession and there were racial and historical grounds for considering the southern half of the island logically Japanese territory. He suggested that Russia might with propriety buy it back from Japan for a sum to be fixed after a commission of neutrals had reviewed the facts. Roosevelt argued that such a procedure would prevent the breaking up of the conference. The delay thus obtained would operate in Russia's favor.

President Roosevelt warned the Japanese of complaint among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. Roosevelt stated that Russia had absolutely refused to pay a large indemnity. Moreover, a continuance of the war would eat up as much indemnity as could ever be exacted and then Japan would still have to pay for the expenses already incurred.

The envoys met again. Russia offered her most favorable terms. Meanwhile Roosevelt sent a message to the Emperor of Japan in which he reiterated his arguments and appealed
to Japan to take Sakhalin and relinquish all demands for indemnity. Roosevelt concluded with an impassioned appeal to which Japan would be by no means insensible, for Japan desired above many other things to be respected and well regarded among the nations.

The Japanese proposed to retrocede to Russia the northern half of the island of Sakhalin and would agree that the amount of money to be paid by Russia to redeem it could be settled by a neutral commission. This sum would take the place of all indemnity. It produced no effect on the Czar of Russia.

At last the Japanese Government, having for its aim the restoration of peace and the bringing of the negotiations to a successful conclusion, expressed its consent to Russia's proposal to divide Sakhalin in two, without indemnity being paid. The line of demarcation of Sakhalin would be the fiftieth degree.

Japan had won the first victories between 1900 and 1904 when she had convinced the world that Russia was threatening to take Korea as well as Manchuria. Yet now at the end although Japan had won the material victory, she lost the battle for public opinion not only in the United States but, what was more serious, in Japan as well. So great was the disappointment of the Japanese people at not getting the indemnity that the Treaty of Portsmouth was received
with denunciations and the commissioners tried to shift
the blame to President Roosevelt, who had advised them to
abandon the claim to indemnity. President Roosevelt's ad-
vice was probably sound, for the opinion was expressed by
many of the foreign military observers that if the war had
lasted six weeks longer the tide would have turned in favor
of Russia.

President Roosevelt did not escape the usual lot of
peacemakers. Although the signing of the treaty was greeted
with almost world-wide joy, within a short time Roosevelt
found himself being severely criticized by both Japanese
and Russians and by their friends. He was accused of hav-
ing robbed both Japan and Russia of the benefits of the
advantageous positions which the two powers were assumed
by their friends to have occupied at the opening of the
Portsmouth Conference.

Professor Paul S. Reinsch of the University of Wis-
consin was one of the first to criticize President Roose-
velt. He charged that the peace treaty would impose upon
Japan a heavy burden of military preparation for the next
struggle with Russia, which he regarded as certain to come.

George Kennan, another critic, published an article in
the Outlook, October 14, 1905, called "The Sword of Peace
in Japan." In this article he described the riots in the
capital which broke out as soon as the terms of the treaty
were made known in Japan. He was vexed by the way in which the hopes of the Japanese populace had been built up, showing that even the more intelligent classes had much sympathy with the disappointment of the mob, a sympathy which he shared.

This article and criticism drew from President Roosevelt an answer to the charge. President Roosevelt wrote:

As far as I am concerned it is of exceedingly little importance what anyone says about the peace negotiations. My object in bringing them together was not my own personal credit or even the advancement of this country, but the securing of peace. Peace was secured. Personally I believe that the credit of this country was greatly increased by it, and as far as I am personally affected I have received infinitely more praise for it than in my opinion I deserve, and I have not been greatly concerned as to whether I was praised or blamed. I acted at the time I did at the written request of Japan and when Japan made the request I explained to the Japanese Government that in my judgment she would not get an indemnity, and she asked me to bring about the peace, meeting with full knowledge of the fact that in my opinion she neither deserved nor would get an indemnity. It is simply nonsense for anyone to talk of the Japanese being in a position to demand an indemnity. No nation that does not give up something ever gets an indemnity in such circumstances nor ever could get it unless the other nation was hopelessly frightened. In recent time no sensible nation has made such a request. I believe that Japan was partly influenced by proper motives of humanity and by the desire to have the respect of the nations as a whole, and that this feeling had its weight in influencing the Japanese statesmen who knew the facts to disregard the views held by the Tokyo mob.

But the main factor in influencing Japan was undoubtedly the fact that to go on with the war meant such an enormous loss, such an enormous cost to her, that she could not afford to incur it save from dire need.
The peace negotiations were entered into by me at the insistence of Japan. The treaty of peace was finally made by Japan because it was greatly to her interests to make it then, and in the shape in which it was made. Japan was not entitled to an indemnity, and in my judgment it is so absurd to suppose that she was entitled to an indemnity as to make the man making the claim as either utterly ignorant of the facts or not competent to pass upon the facts. The peace was made on practically the terms on which it should have been made. It was for the interests of Japan; it was for the interests of Russia; it was for the interests of the world.\(^7\)

The criticism of both Reinsch and Kennan grew not more out of their Japanese sympathies than out of their utter dislike of the old Russian autocracy. This leads us to examine the other charge, namely, that by causing the war to come to an end Roosevelt really was the means of bolstering up the Russian bureaucracy when it was about to yield to the constitutionalist party.

The President received his information about Russia mainly from four sources: Spring-Rice, Ambassador Meyer, the Russian Embassy in Washington, and the public press. The President relied mostly on Spring-Rice and Meyer. Spring-Rice had little to say about the Russian revolutionary movements, therefore President Roosevelt depended on the reports of Ambassador Meyer in reference to the Russian domestic movement.

When the Japanese Government first intimated to President Roosevelt that his good offices would be desired in the

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 288.
establishment of direct peace negotiations, the despatches from the American Embassy in St. Petersburg appear to have contained nothing which would have made it appear likely that the revolutionary movement would mature in such a form as to make it a factor in the peace movement.

It was after the arrangements for the peace conference had been fully completed before Ambassador Meyer began to report any alarm as to the Russian domestic condition. If the Peace of Portsmouth had depended upon the condition of the Russian revolution we should have to admit that the Ambassador's ignorance would have been deplorable. Even the one American Ambassador in Europe in whose reports President Roosevelt placed great confidence had given too little attention to the development of an important political event about which his government should have been better informed. The President in turn gave only the most casual consideration to the subject. As for the revolutionary leaders, President Roosevelt had hardly more confidence in them than in the bureaucracy.

From the beginning until the close of the Portsmouth Conference the choice was not between war and peace, but between peace by the good offices of Roosevelt, mediation, or intervention of the powers. Peace by the latter method would probably have meant a settlement more favorable to Russia. It would doubtless have taken the form of a support
of the Russian bureaucracy. It might have caused a world war. Under these circumstances it seems, while President Roosevelt was ill informed and working blindly, he could hardly have taken a different course if he had known all the facts.

Surely one could hardly have expected President Roosevelt, faced by all the uncertainties of 1905, to gamble in human blood by permitting the war to continue even if he had it within his power to do so.

The Japanese statesmen were well aware of the condition in which they found themselves in the summer of 1905. The war was costly, requiring approximately $1,000,000 a day. The condition of Japanese finances became a subject for investigation by foreigners in 1905. Japanese credit was already so exhausted that no further foreign loan of any large size could be possible. Likewise Japanese manpower was becoming exhausted.

The Paris bankers had told the Japanese that they could expect no more loans from France to carry on the war. Added to this, Russia had a revolution on its hands. Russia had greater reserves of manpower, but she had lost control of the sea and between her and the battlefields of Siberia was but a single-track broken-down railway. Are we not forced to the conclusion that, according to the judgment of their own respective leaders, neither side
believed that it could resume the war with any prospect of success?

The key to President Roosevelt's success in the Far East in 1905 is to be found in the fact that he had preceded it with what amounted to a declaration that he could be counted upon to aid in preserving the peace of Europe and that he would come to the aid of Japan in case a third power joined Russia. President Roosevelt had made the American Government an unsigned member of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Depending on this assurance, Japan counted upon the support of the United States for the Japanese policy in Manchuria in 1906-1910. Of course, President Roosevelt had not intended to commit his government virtually to an approval of the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which in turn supported the Japanese policy in Manchuria. Regardless of all the assurances and promises which had been given, neither Europe nor Japan cared very much for the abstract principle of the integrity of China, so President Roosevelt sought to preserve China by cooperative methods.

From the earliest days of American intercourse with the Far East, down through the period which now engages our attention, the great obstacle to American commercial interests was not any government in Asia but rather the European powers. No important instance can be cited where the United States had taken action with the intention of weakening the
Far East or keeping it down. The American Government found it profitable to seek the good will of the Far East.

There was a vast difference between the Far East policy of 1904-1905 and that of 1842 or 1858. The American Government would not join the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In 1904-1905, the President gave to Japan every support which was constitutionally within his power. Some of his acts may have been unconstitutional, but they were of the most honorable declarations in the history of American foreign relations. So long as Japan was fighting the battle of America in Manchuria, President Roosevelt was prepared to help her.

This was the big contribution of President Roosevelt to Far Eastern policy. It was not a permanent contribution, for it was not the American policy -- it was merely the policy of Roosevelt. The next Administration lapsed into the old policy of expecting something for nothing, of standing off until some other power made the effort, and then demanding a share in the victory. President Roosevelt set the precedent in American history that the United States should pay for its privileges on the mainland of Asia.

The President was not blind to the new danger that might arise. Roosevelt believed it was better to take a chance on Japan than a chance on Russia and Europe. It was his policy to reduce to a minimum the chances of failure
arising out of the support of Japan. He believed Russia ought to be left in eastern Asia to face Japan and moderate her action. As a protection to American interests, he would place the American navy in such a position that the United States would be in a condition of dependence upon no power for favors. To the Anglo-Japanese Alliance he would offer no verbal support, nor would he draw aloof from the struggle in Europe in case the balance of power were upset. When Japan began to display that arrogance which he feared, he would send the American fleet around the world to show that the withdrawal of American approval would prove a substantial loss to any nation incurring it.

In reality, Roosevelt was the Government. Congress had no part; the Senators were rarely consulted; and President Roosevelt's Cabinet made few contributions. The President attained this position less from choice than from the fact that no one else had any contributions to make. President Roosevelt was not in the position of having to choose between plans offered by his advisers, for nothing of any importance was proposed. It fell to his lot both to blaze the trail and to make it.

When Roosevelt asked the belligerent powers to peace negotiations, he had been invited by Japan in the most formal way; he had the assurance of Germany, France, and England that his good offices would be acceptable; and he had
the word of the German Emperor that Russia likewise would prefer his services to those of France. His diplomatic technique was perfect. He tried to fix the place of meeting, being careful not to suggest Washington at first, but recommending Manchuria and then The Hague, two places as far as possible removed from his direct influence. Not until it was clear that Russia and Japan at Portsmouth were unable to make peace without mediation, did he come forward as the peacemaker. At the end of the treaty, although he had been charged with selfish motives, he refrained from public utterances in his own defense. He knew human nature thoroughly; and from long experience he had learned to be humorously philosophical about such manifestations of man's ingratitude. 8

8 Howland, op. cit., p. 175.
CHAPTER VII

CUBA AND THE PLATT AMENDMENT

As has been noted in the foregoing chapter, President Roosevelt took part in the balance of powers in Europe and in settling the Far East dispute between Russia and Japan. Now in this chapter we see him assuming control over Cuba until the island was capable of managing its own affairs.

Cuba is inhabited by people of Spanish ancestry with a considerable intermixture of Negro blood. Until 1898 these people were under the Spanish colonial rule. Its two evil spirits were autocracy and exploitation. The Spanish colonial government in practice never got very far from the idea that the colony existed for the benefit of the mother country. Rulers were sent over to govern Cuba with such an object in view.

These facts show the political tradition with which the Cuban people were familiar and in which they were educated. The government was looked upon as an oppression and those in charge were expected to be its chief beneficiaries.

When the United States demanded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba, it was with the declaration:
The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to the people.¹

A nation has never made a pledge and so faithfully carried it out as the United States has this one.

Spanish rule was ended by the armed forces of the United States in the year of 1898, and an American military government was set up. For the first time, the Cubans had a government whose purpose was to serve them. There was no graft, and there was no oppression. The administration of Cuba during the period of American military occupation was a model of its kind. Major-General Leonard Wood, the military governor, and his associates established order, relieved distress, and started extensive public work.

[In the organization of a government for the Cubans, the first step was to take a census of the people, to determine the proper basis for suffrage, and to hold municipal elections for the purpose of organization of local governments. The electoral law was proclaimed on April 18, 1900, and municipal elections were held on June 16, 1900, at which time municipal officials were selected by the populace.]

[Sonn afterward the military governor issued an order

¹Latane, pp. cit., p. 511.
in the form of a proclamation calling for the election on September 3, 1900, of delegates to a convention

... to frame and adopt a constitution for the people of Cuba, and, as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba, and to provide for the election of the people of such officers under such constitution and the transfer of government to the officers so elected. 2

The convention met November 5, 1900. The military governor informed the delegates that they should first frame a constitution adequate to secure an orderly and free government, and that it should subsequently state in definite terms what they thought should be the relation between Cuba and the United States.

By February 21, 1901, the convention had agreed upon a constitution modeled in general after that of the United States. The constitution provided for the recognition of the public debts made by the insurgent government, but was silent on the subject of future relations with the United States. This subject had been brought to the attention of the convention by the military governor, General Wood, who had submitted for incorporation into the constitution certain provisions which had been drafted in Washington. The convention objected to such proposals on the ground that they impaired the independence and sovereignty of the island, and that it was their duty to make Cuba independent

2 Munro, op. cit., p. 8.
of every nation, the great American nation included.

The United States had no intention of withdrawing from the island until the matter was satisfactorily settled. A provision, known as the Platt Amendment, was therefore inserted in the army appropriation bill of March 2, 1901. This provision directed the President to leave the control of the island to the Cubans as soon as the government should be established under a constitution which defined the future relations with the United States as follows:

1. That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

2. That said Government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of Government shall be inadequate.

3. That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

4. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

5. That the Government of Cuba shall execute, and as far as necessary, extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious disease may be
prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as the commerce of the Southern parts of the United States and the people residing therein.

6. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

7. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States land necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

8. That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.\(^3\)

The Cubans' opposition to the Platt Amendment was centered almost wholly on Article 3. In order to calm doubts expressed by members of the convention in regard to the third article, General Wood was authorized to state officially that the intervention described in this article did not mean intermeddling in the affairs of the Cuban Government, but formal action on the part of the United States, based upon just grounds. With this assurance the convention adopted the Platt Amendment on June 12, 1901, and added it as an appendix to their constitution.

There was hardly a reference to Article 2, dealing with finances, which in later years became as much as Article 3 the object for intervention by the United States. The remaining articles have caused little, if any, trouble

\(^3\)Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 2954.
in the relations between the United States and Cuba.

On May 20, 1902, General Wood presented a letter from the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt, to the President and Congress of the Republic of Cuba, declaring that occupation of Cuba by the United States was at an end. Tomas Estrada Palma was inaugurated as the first president of the Republic of Cuba. This ended the obligations which the United States had undertaken to respect in Cuba in the Treaty of Paris. At last the long-anticipated day had come when the Cubans had their government in their own hands.

President Roosevelt summed up the results of the first occupation and administration of Cuba in the following words:

For three years our representatives, civil and military, have toiled unceasingly, facing disease of a peculiarly sinister and fatal type, with patient and uncomplaining fortitude, to teach her how to use aright her new freedom. Never in history has any alien country been thus administered, with such high integrity of purpose, such wise judgment, and such single-minded devotion to the country's interests.  

Although the Platt Amendment had laid down the general principles which were to govern the relations between the United States and Cuba, several questions vitally affecting these relations were necessarily left to be dealt with after an independent Cuban Government had been established. The

4Hill, op. cit., p. 30.
most important of these was the establishment of commercial relations which would assure the Republic of Cuba economic stability.

In Cuba a campaign was initiated to procure favorable trade relations with the United States. President Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress clearly stated his views of the duty and interest of the United States on the question. President Roosevelt said:

Elsewhere I have discussed the question of reciprocity. In the case of Cuba, however, there are weighty reasons of morality and of national interest why the policy should be held to have a peculiar application, and I must earnestly ask your attention to the wisdom, indeed to the vital need of providing for a substantial reduction in the tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States. Cuba has in her constitution affirmed what we desired, that she should stand in international matters, in closer and more friendly relations with us than with any other power; and we are bound by every consideration of honor and expediency to pass commercial measures in the interest of her material well being. 

President Roosevelt had hoped to settle this question before the withdrawal of American troops, and he had urged upon Congress the expediency of providing for a substantial reduction in tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States, but an opposition composed of the beet-sugar growers of the North and West and of the cane-sugar planters of Louisiana succeeded in thwarting for two years the efforts of the Administration to do justice to Cuba. All attempts

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5Harry F. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, p. 104.
to get a bill through Congress failed.

In the meanwhile Cuba was suffering greatly from lack of trade, a depleted treasury, and burdensome taxation to pay the bills of its administration. With Congress adjourned, President Roosevelt under his constitutional authority immediately started negotiations for a Reciprocity Treaty with Cuba and coincidentally he made an appeal to the people of the United States over the heads of Congress in a speech in 1902, when he said:

Cuba must always be peculiarly related to us in international politics. She must in international affairs be to a degree a part of our political system. In return she must have peculiar relations with us economically. She must be in a sense part of our economic system. We expect her to accept a political attitude toward us which we think wisest both for her and us. In return we must be prepared to put her in an economic position as regards our tariff system which will give her some measure of the prosperity which we enjoy.⁶

A reciprocity convention was agreed upon in the ordinary diplomatic way December 11, 1902, which is still in force, provided in general for a twenty per cent reduction in customs duties upon all importations from Cuba into the United States, and for reductions ranging from twenty to forty per cent upon importations from the United States to Cuba. It was stipulated that the preference thus granted to Cuba by the United States should continue during the life of the convention as against all like imports from

⁶Ibid., p. 108.
other countries, and that the duty on sugar imported into the United States should never be less than that imposed by the Tariff of 1897. The convention was to remain in force for five years, and from year to year thereafter until renounced by one of the contracting parties. The advantages assured to Cuban sugar by the reciprocity provision made possible the rapid growth of the industry.

The first Cuban president, Tomas Estrada Palma, had been duly elected under the new constitution. He tried during the first three years of his term of office to conduct his administration without connecting himself with any one political party. Toward the end of his last year, however, he definitely affiliated himself with the Moderate Party.

At the end of the first presidential term of four years there was a more or less formal election held in which there was obviously much fraud at the polls. President Palma was re-elected, but the partisans of General Jose Miguel Gomez, the Liberal candidate, claimed that Gomez was legally elected, but was illegally deprived of his office.

This was obviously a state of affairs which might cause the United States, in accordance with the terms of the Platt Amendment, to intervene in order to maintain a government adequate to protect life and property in Cuba. President Roosevelt wished to avoid intervention if he could possibly
do so; but President Palma preferred intervention to the
triumph of his political enemies. President Roosevelt ad-
dressed a letter to Mr. Quesada, the Cuban minister at Wash-
ington, begging him to urge upon his government the neces-
sity of its maintaining law and order; but regardless of
protests from the United States Government, President
Palma resigned his office, thus leaving Cuba without a
government. The first effort of Cuban self-government had
failed.

In the crisis President Roosevelt decided to send Wil-
liam Howard Taft, Secretary of War, to Havana to do what
was possible to end hostilities and to re-establish order
in the island. President Roosevelt told Taft that if the
need arose, as he hoped it would not, he intended to inter-
vene; that the Platt Amendment was the law of the land and
he intended to execute it.

The American representatives in accordance with Presi-
dent Roosevelt's orders, tried in every way consistent with
the re-establishment of peace and order to avoid interven-
tion and to bring about amicable solutions to the contro-
versy.

President Roosevelt, while urging a compromise among
the Cubans, neglected no step toward military and naval
readiness in case armed intervention proved inevitable; he
did not propose to have a repetition of the unpreparedness
and mismanagement of 1898.
Mr. Taft's efforts proved unsuccessful. Under these circumstances Secretary Taft assumed control of affairs by issuing a proclamation establishing an American Provisional Government, under his own direction. Such a provision was to last only long enough to restore order and peace, and then to hold such elections as may be necessary to determine those persons upon whom the permanent government of the Republic should be involved. A body of United States troops under command of General Bell was sent to Cuba to preserve order and to uphold the provisional government.

On October 13, 1906, Secretary Taft was relieved of his duties of provisional governor in order that he might resume his duties in Washington, and Charles E. Magoon was appointed to take his place at Havana. President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress December 3, 1906, declared that while the United States had no desire to annex Cuba, it was absolutely out of the question that the island should continue independent if the insurrectionary habit should become confirmed. The second period of American occupation lasted a little over two years, when the control of the government was again restored to the Cuban people and the American troops were withdrawn.

President Roosevelt summed up his policy in Cuba by saying:
The United States simply found itself the dominant power in a region occupied by a number of backward governments controlling immature peoples. It happened also that this region was one in which the United States is vitally interested from the point of view of its own safety. It was and is... inevitable that the United States should participate both politically and economically in the development of the Caribbean.7

The main purpose of American policy has been helpful. Cuba has been converted from a land of tragedy and misery into a comparatively prosperous country with a system of government on the road to political maturity.

([The chapter to follow deals with President Roosevelt and the temporary protectorate over the five republics of Central America.])

7C. L. Jones, The United States and the Caribbean, p. 130.
CHAPTER VIII

MEDIATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Central America, politically and historically, includes the five republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Despite their common origin and the historical ties which have made Central America a distinct international community, there are decided differences, both in the racial composition of the population and in the economic and political conditions of the various states.

While some of the Central American states have made more progress than others, all have suffered to some extent from internal political disorders. The maintenance of a stable government in each state was made difficult not only by the factors which have worked to the same end in most of the other Latin-American countries, but also by conditions peculiar to Central America.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century the Central American states began to have more contact with the outside world and to attract investments of foreign
capital. The inability of the local governments to afford adequate protection to these interests in time of civil war inevitably brought on complications with foreign powers. The United States was affected, not only because American citizens and their interests had to be protected, but also because injuries to citizens of other countries inevitably raised questions connected with the Monroe Doctrine.

With the construction of the Panama Canal the United States had utilitarian as well as unselfish reasons for wanting political stability in the region. Such facts furnish the explanation of Roosevelt's policy in the Central American republics.

The attitude of Central Americans toward the United States has usually been one of fear, hatred, and distrust. In common with most Latin-Americans, the aversion of the Central Americans to the United States was caused in part by a different attitude toward life.

From the beginning to the end, President Roosevelt's policy in this region was that of the peacemaker. Viewed as a whole, he was highly successful.

President Roosevelt's first attempt at mediation occurred in 1906 as the result of war between Guatemala and Salvador in which Honduras finally joined as the ally of Salvador. The American representatives in the region tried to prevent a clash between the two countries, but their efforts resulted in failure.
The President of Mexico said he would join in anything that President Roosevelt might desire to do to preserve peace. In agreement with the Mexican President, Roosevelt on July 13, 1906, sent the following dispatch to the presidents of Salvador and Guatemala:

I earnestly appeal to Salvador to take immediate steps toward settling questions pending with Guatemala, either by agreement to arbitrate or by direct negotiation for a definite agreement between the two countries. Disturbance of the peace of Central America inflicts grievous injury upon the affected States and causes the gravest concern to the United States, whose sole desire is to see its neighbors at peace. The recent deplorable renewal of hostilities should not be allowed to be the precursor of a protracted and disastrous struggle, perhaps involving other States and leading to results of which the scope can not be foreseen. In the interest of humanity and the indispensable peace of Central America, it becomes my duty to urge a settlement before it may be too late. I offer the deck of the "Marblehead," now on the way to the coast of Salvador, as a neutral place where representatives of Guatemala and Salvador may meet to consider terms of agreement.1

President Roosevelt's proposal was immediately accepted by both Guatemala and Salvador. The American and Mexican representatives were to be present purely in an advisory and friendly manner and that the negotiations were to be conducted directly between the representatives of the belligerents.

Peace negotiations began on the "Marblehead" on July 18, 1906. Negotiations were conducted and controlled throughout by the representatives of the belligerents. The representa-

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1Hill, op. cit., p. 178.
tives from Mexico and the United States confined their activities strictly to friendly suggestions.

The conference on the "Marblehead" was a complete success, for a truce was established within two days after the negotiations began. The fact that the convention was signed on the high seas in rough weather was declared by some of President Roosevelt's critics to be proof that the representatives had been deliberately carried to sea in order to force them to sign an agreement that they would not have signed on land. By the convention, Guatemala, Salvador, and Honduras agreed to submit their recent difficulties and all disputes that might arise to the joint arbitration of the President of the United States and the President of Mexico.

Theodore Roosevelt was greatly pleased over the outcome of his mediatory efforts. His course in securing the cooperation of Mexico, the first instance in which the United States had solicited the assistance of another American state in the settlement of international difficulties, was apparently justified by the results. At the same time his policy had promoted friendly relations with Mexico.

The conference provided for in the "Marblehead" convention met at San Jose, Costa Rica. The President of Nicaragua, Zelaya, refused to attend as he said Nicaragua

\[2\text{Ibid.}\]
had no connection with the proposed treaty. At this time Zelaya was interfering in the internal affairs of the other Central American states, and exercised such complete control over the government of Honduras that Guatemala and Salvador were endeavoring to stir up revolutions against him in that state and in Nicaragua. His refusal was probably due to his unwillingness to recognize the right of the United States to have a hand in Central American affairs.

The San Jose Conference lasted ten days. The most notable provisions in the general treaty were, first, that differences among Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras should be submitted to arbitration by the Presidents of the United States and of Mexico; and, second, that difficulties among Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras should be arbitrated by Central American tribunals established in accordance with the Corinto Convention of 1902. Although the agreements of the San Jose Conference were short-lived, they are significant as endorsing the idea of arbitration by outsiders rather than by members of the Central American countries.

Two methods of arbitration were in existence in Central America in the year of 1907. By the Corinto Treaty of 1902 Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador had agreed to submit their differences to arbitration by Central American tribunals. By the San Jose Treaty of 1906 Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras had agreed to submit
their difficulties to the arbitration of the Presidents of the United States and of Mexico. The first method was arbitration by members of the family. The second method was arbitration by outsiders.

The question came to a crisis in the year of 1907, when a revolution broke out in Honduras against the government of its President. The rebels seemed to have received aid from the President of Nicaragua, Jose Zelaya, whose ambition was to make himself head of a united Central American state. The insurrectionists operated close to the Nicaraguan border and in an effort to put down their forces the Honduran soldiers crossed the frontier.

The government of Nicaragua immediately demanded an explanation of the invasion and soon afterward claimed an indemnity for the violation of Nicaraguan soil. Later in the same year the governments of both countries in accordance with the Corinto Treaty, agreed to submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal. This tribunal was composed of one member from each of the republics of Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Costa Rica. The refusal of Honduras and Nicaragua to disband their armies pending arbitration, as directed by the arbitrators, resulted in the dissolution of the tribunal. The Corinto plan, when put to a test, proved a failure.

Energetic diplomats from the United States and Mexico
persuaded all the Central American governments to send representatives to a conference at Washington to consider measures which would place the relations between the five republics on a permanently stable basis.

On September 17, 1907, the ministers of the five republics in Washington agreed upon a series of treaties which became the basis of the relations of the Central American states with one another. The most important of these was the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, which provided for the maintenance of peace and the compulsory judicial settlement of all disputes. Another treaty provided for the establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, which should decide all cases of every kind that arose between the contracting governments. There was another treaty that provided for a Central American Bureau somewhat similar in purpose to the Pan-American Union.

The establishment of the Central American Court of Justice aroused more general interest than any other act of the Washington Conference. The Court was capable of determining its own jurisdiction.

Peaceful relations at all events did not immediately develop in Central America. Six weeks had hardly passed since the origin of the Court of Justice before need arose. The disputes were brought before the Court. At the same time the Court ordered Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Salvador to reduce their military forces to a peace basis. The
order of the Court was obeyed, and the Court rendered a decision in which by a vote of three judges it absolved Salvador from all responsibility for the insurrection in Honduras, and by the vote of four judges it exonerated Guatemala. Neither side was required to pay the cost. ³

The case was important because it prevented a general war, because it constituted the first action of the Court, and because it was probably the first instance of states not parties to a difficulty holding the actual parties before a court for a trial of their case.

The exact extent of President Roosevelt's responsibility for the origin of the Court and for the major features of American policy in Central American affairs during his administration is to a degree a matter of conjecture. In his public addresses he gave very little attention to Central American affairs. In comparison with the other problems that engaged his attention, conditions in the five republics of Central America may have seemed of small consequence.

President Roosevelt's energy, his intimate contact with the State Department, his dominant interest in all that affected American foreign relations, makes it certain that he was concerned in the affairs of the five republics of Central America. His messages to Congress, his dispatches

³Ibid., p. 195.
to President Diaz of Mexico and to the five Presidents of the Central American republics, as well as the comment in his correspondence, furnish enough evidence of his interest in the "Marblehead" Convention, the San Jose Treaties, and the Washington Conference.

President Roosevelt's passion for law and order, as well as his desire to promote the social and economic stability and progress of the countries in the Caribbean furnish corroboratory evidence of his controlling influence in determining the policy of the American Government toward the five republics of Central America. In view of such facts it is not open to question that back of the Department of State in promoting mediation in Central America there was, as usual, the guiding hand of President Theodore Roosevelt.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study on President Theodore Roosevelt is to give such aid as it can to the understanding of his relations with European countries; his dealings with the Far East question; his contacts in the New World, especially in the Caribbean region; his idea of preparedness; his policy of imperialism; his interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine; and his foreign achievements.

President Theodore Roosevelt's fights have been fought out before the entire public, and he refused to be drawn into mere factional quarrels. He was direct in his dealings with individuals, as he was in his dealings with the country at large. He would tell them what he wanted and why he wanted it. He tried to carry on the public business in such a way that decent citizens would believe that he had shown wisdom, integrity, and courage. It was known by all that he stood in no awe of wealth and that he believed law and justice the only sound basis of national well-being.

Theodore Roosevelt was an apostle of preparedness from the time that he began to think at all about public affairs,
and that time came to him earlier in life than it does to most men. His prime interest, from the beginning, lay in the navy. His sense of proportion told him that the navy was the nation's first line of defense. He realized that without an efficient navy a nation situated as the United States was would be helpless before an aggressive enemy; therefore he went to work in building one. When he was through, the United States had a navy that ranked with the best in the world.

His policy did not seem to have been influenced to any marked degree by a desire to stimulate the economic activity in the Caribbean by American business men and American corporations. He frequently pointed out the commercial advantages that would come to the United States from the measures he commended. But for all the actions and relationships mentioned, political rather than economic considerations seemed to have determined Roosevelt's course. Nor must it be overlooked that the policy he favored was often opposed by corporation heads and by influential financiers.

It may be said that President Roosevelt's policy in the Caribbean represents a high type of opportunism. Unaware apparently of the goal toward which his course tended, he took Panama, interceded for Venezuela, preserved order in Cuba, mediated in Central America, and intervened in
Santo Domingo. In his course of action President Roosevelt ever held in the foreground the needs of national defense. In his relations with the backward people, with the exception of Colombia, his attitude was paternalistic, his policy that of benevolent imperialism.

President Roosevelt had no ambition to annex territory in the Caribbean. He often stated that the United States had not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighboring countries. As soon as the arrangements for turning over the government to the inhabitants could be completed, he withdrew the American troops and terminated the American occupation.

President Roosevelt strongly shared the sympathies of the American people for the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War. He also thought that Russia was scheming to shut the Open Door against American commercial enterprise in Manchuria. He realized if the Nipponese could stop them, the United States would be benefited. Japan might have won all the advantages she did without the friendly mediation of Roosevelt. Although Roosevelt's reputation as a world leader was tremendously increased both at home and in Europe by his efforts at peacemaking, there can be no doubt that the results of the Portsmouth Conference did much to cloud friendly relationships between America and Japan.

It is evident that by the close of his administration
Roosevelt had retreated substantially from his earlier championship of the Open Door policy. Even as a believer in military might as the right hand of diplomacy, he was enough of a realist to conclude that there was no advantage in fighting to stop what one could not prevent. Rather, it was wise statesmanship to exchange the inevitable for concessions.

To President Roosevelt the conduct of foreign affairs was essentially simple. The phrase first conceived to describe his attitude in dealing with the governments of Europe and others was, "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far." The Monroe Doctrine was the cornerstone of American diplomacy or belligerency; and before President Roosevelt had concluded his interpretation, it had been changed almost beyond recognition. The divergent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine in the highest official circles have led to confusion in the country as well as abroad. Apparently the Monroe Doctrine can be given almost any character.

Roosevelt was not fully aware of all the forces behind the tangled diplomacy of Europe and the Far East. At times the President undoubtedly jeopardized the safety of his own country. The extraordinary thing was he did so well not to have anyone in particular to inform him on the various questions that caused the difficulties. He thought
of the United States no longer as isolated but as a member of the family of nations.

President Roosevelt stood for fair play; for an even chance to all who could use it for their own and for their country's good. He would fight in the ranks to the end of life for the things worth fighting for. It was even more important to him to be right, and to do right, than to be logical and consistent. "The way to do a thing is to do it" might be his slogan; it certainly was his way. No one ever estimated his own powers and his own capacities more moderately than he.

Consistency was one of the main keys to Roosevelt's principles, and yet in his lifetime the public generally regarded him as an inconsistent, impulsive man who could not be calculated upon because he was likely to do anything.

It is impossible not to admire President Roosevelt's courage, honesty, and energy. He was nobody's man. He thought, as he frankly explained, that one who leaves his faction for every slight occasion loses his influence and his power for good. He realized it was better to compromise, to swallow some differences, and to stick to the crowd, which, upon the whole and in the long run, embodies one's convictions.

Throughout the seven and one half years as President of the United States, he used every ounce of power that was
in the office, and he did not care about the criticisms of those who spoke of his illegal seizure of sovereign power. He believed that the efficiency of the government depended upon a strong central executive. He believed in having power and that responsibility should go with power. He felt that he represented a democracy not in any demagogic way but with a sincere effort to stand for a government by the people and for the people.

Theodore Roosevelt was the most commanding, the most original, the most interesting, and the most brilliant personality in American public life. He had many qualities, which included courage, perseverance, capacity for leadership, and a high moral purpose. His mistakes were few, and his accomplishments many.

His blustering manners and looks lent themselves to caricatures, and his directness could be irritating with his honest catchwords, "the square deal," and that rather tiresome "big stick." He became so big in the sight of all that neither the spirit within nor the real deeds done were duly noted in his day. He had made the United States safer and stronger, and had involved it in no foreign entanglements. He had built up the respect in which the United States was held and he had labored truly for the cause which he defined as the peace of righteousness.

In summarizing the foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt,
one could say that he blazed his own trail. He had no outstanding forerunners to follow and very seldom sought advice from any of his foreign ministers or his Secretary of State. He followed no set rules or formalities once he had determined to do something. He was very direct and forceful in carrying out his ideas; sometimes he was even blunt and gruesome in obtaining what he desired.

He had his own personal ideas which often caused trouble within his own political party and among his own co-workers. The public often thought him almost crude and unorthodox at times. Yet with his boldness and vigorous determination he succeeded in accomplishing what he set out to do.

Never had the United States found itself so closely allied with foreign nations as in the time of Theodore Roosevelt's administration. Never had it left its proud western position to fight or to mingle with foreign nations for a common world good. Once having done so, however, the door had swung wide. So wide, in fact, it never could or would quite close again. Theodore Roosevelt had the vision and used the power to open that door.
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