IMPLICATIONS OF DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM
FOR EDUCATION

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IMPLICATIONS OF DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Problem

This thesis is a study of Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism and the implications for education.

Method of Collecting Data

The material for this thesis has been gathered through extensive reading of books and magazines and study of research data in the field of education and philosophy.

Purpose of the Study

It is the purpose of this thesis to define and explain the educational philosophy of instrumentalism as developed by John Dewey. This will be done in the second chapter.

In the third chapter, explanation will be carried somewhat further, and an attempt will be made to give implications and trends as observed today for knowledge, truth, curriculum, and educational values.

In the fourth chapter, which will be the conclusion, the writer will show from readings and material gathered, from explanation and definitions of instrumentalism, that
have been given in this study, what meanings and implications are being revealed in our educational fields today.
CHAPTER II

DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF INSTRUMENTALISM

DEFINED AND EXPLAINED

John Dewey is the most dominant figure in American philosophy today. A host of disciples look upon him as the great intellectual liberator of our times, for they believe that initiation into the methods and principles which he has introduced dispels most of the plaguing problems which philosophers have heretofore felt themselves obliged to face.

A study of Dewey's writings will convince one that a number of quite distinct preconceptions influence his argumentations upon philosophical questions.

Some of these questions are metaphysical, some are logical, and some are extra-philosophical in origin. Nor are they all coordinate; some are derivable either by logical inference or by association from others.¹

Very few people are familiar with Dewey's philosophy of education and morals, with his view on social and political affairs. This is largely due to the fact that to gain a unified knowledge of Dewey's thoughts, it is necessary

to read a great many of his writings, because in his separate volumes he deals for the most part with only one phase of his thought.

Dewey looks at the world primarily from the perspective of the moralists, the educator, and the ordinary man; and only secondarily and hence instrumentally from the perspective of the theoretical scientist and metaphysician. 2

This chapter is to define and explain instrumentalism in philosophy and to give some explanation as to its place in the general field of education.

Instrumentalism in philosophy is a system akin to pragmatism, a philosophy introduced by William James. James defines pragmatism as

... the doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences in the shape of conduct to be recommended or in that of experience to be expected. We may understand at once the meaning and spirit of pragmatism if we keep in mind that it always puts the emphasis upon what is practical, efficient, useful, fruitful, or satisfying. ... It is distinctly a philosophy of life. 3

Since instrumentalism resembles and is closely akin to pragmatism, a better understanding of the term will be needed. The term "pragmatism" as employed in philosophy at the present time denotes the general tendency to


3 G. W. T. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 363.
subordinate logical thinking to the ends of practical life and to find the test of the truth of ideas in their practical consequences. There are thus two distinct sides to the doctrine, which we find differently emphasized by different writers.

On the one hand this view points out that thought owes its origin to the needs and demands of practical life. Thought is thus a tool or instrument that is always invoked to meet a particular crisis or problem resulting from a concrete situation. Thought therefore does not aim at truth in general. Its business is to discover in concrete circumstances the best means to the realization of some practical end that life demands.

This side of doctrine has chiefly been elaborated by John Dewey and those associated with him at Columbia University as colleagues or students. These writers have connected their theory with the doctrine of evolution and support it mainly by arguments and analogies drawn from this source.

On the other hand, in order to decide regarding the truth or falsity of any theory or conception, we must appeal to the consequences that result from it.

A theory is demonstrated in the only possible way when it is shown that it will "work"; that is, that the results
we wish to obtain in a given situation follow from it. 4

Pragmatism has many meanings and implications. It is indeed a philosophy with a modern outlook, and although it was born on American soil, its followers are legion and found in many lands. Dewey's support of pragmatism has been definitely established, but in an article, "How Pragmatism Looks Today," he says that he finds that the chief value of pragmatism lies in the fact that it pleads for the emancipation of philosophy from the intimate and exclusive attachment to the traditional forms and refuses to be satisfied with systems of thought which do not in some way help us to a knowledge that will give us control over the world. He goes on to say that since pragmatism is based on actual experience, it has a definite connection with an attempt to control the future.

Instrumentalism in philosophy is a system akin to pragmatism. If a thing is found to be practical, if it works in a given situation, if it has a use, it is accepted by pragmatists. Instrumentalism is akin to pragmatism, according to which thought is considered an organic function, the object of which is to maintain the even tenor of experience, restoring the latter when it is interrupted or confronted by a special situation. 5

It seems unfortunate that the pragmatists should have insisted that all reality is experience. It has led to much misunderstanding. They want to show by analysis of

5Ibid., XV, 175.
pure experience what knowledge does and does not imply. But one might be interested in fields of reality quite outside these provinces and be wholly unwilling to admit that all reality is experience in any sense of the term.

A further glance at instrumentalism will help us to understand why there is so much emphasis upon experience:

The Instrumentalist is a biologist and an evolutionist. He is interested in showing how knowledge has arisen in the evolutionary movement, and in pointing out the function of intelligence. He therefore assumes outright the presence of the organism with its vital interests -- its will to live -- and he assumes the presence of a real environment consisting of natural energies. Experience then is the intercourse of living organism with its physical and social environment.6

The instrumentalist, then, taking for granted the organism and its needs, goes on to show by the analysis of experience how such things as thought, reflection, intelligence, ideas, and concepts may be explained. He shows that the environmental energies are sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile to the good of the individual.

The individual, therefore, is confronted with the task of controlling and moulding the environment in such a way as to foster his own welfare; he must achieve the good and avert the evil.7

A liberal reading and survey of James' philosophy shows that he regarded conceptions and theories purely as

6 Patrick, op. cit., p. 371. 7 Ibid., p. 37.
instruments which can serve to constitute future facts in a specific manner. 8

Instrumentalism is an attempt to establish a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and influences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences. That is to say, it attempts to establish universally recognized distinctions and rules of logic by deriving them from the reconstructive or mediative function ascribed to reason. It aims to constitute a theory of the general forms of conception and reasoning, and not of this or that particular judgment or concept related to its own content, or to its particular implications. 9

As far as the historical antecedents of instrumentalism are concerned, two factors are particularly important over and above this matter of experimental verification, which we have already mentioned. The first of these two factors is psychological; the second is a critique of the theory of knowledge and of logic which has resulted from the theory proposed by such writers as Lotze, Bosanquet, and F. H. Bradley. The psychological tendencies which have exerted an influence on instrumentalism are of a biological rather than a physiological nature. They are more or less closely related to the important movement whose promoter in psychology has been John Watson and to which he has given the name of Behaviorism. 10

It is particularly interesting to note that in the Studies of Logical Theory (1903), which was their first

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 27.
declaration, the instrumentalists recognized how much they owed to William James for having forged the instruments which they used, while at the same time, in the course of the studies, the authors constantly declared their belief in a close union of the "normative" principles of logic and the real process of thought in so far as these are determined by an objective or biological psychology of states of consciousness. But it is curious to note that the "instruments" to which allusion is made are not the considerations which were of the greatest service to James.\textsuperscript{11}

Instrumentalism assigns a positive function to thought, that of reconstituting the present stage of things instead of merely knowing it. As a consequence, there cannot be intrinsic degrees, or a hierarchy of forms of judgment. Such type has its own end, and its validity is entirely determined by its efficacy in the pursuit of its end. A limited perceptual judgment, adapted to the situation which has given it birth, is as true in its place as is the most complete and philosophic or scientific judgment. Logic, therefore, leads to a realistic metaphysics in so far as it accepts things and events for what they are independently of thought, and to an idealistic metaphysics in so far as it contends that thought gives birth to distinctive acts which modify future facts and events in such a way as to

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 29.
render them reasonable; that is to say, more adequate to the ends which we propose for ourselves. This ideal element is more and more accentuated by the inclusion progressively of social factors; so that the needs which are fulfilled and the ends which are attained are no longer merely of a biological or particular character, but include also the ends and activities of other members of society. 12

Instrumentalism has been called a modern development of pragmatism, but the instrumentalist puts distinctive stress upon the use of intelligence as an instrument. According to the philosophy of instrumentalism, mind, ideas, and intelligence are "instruments for attaining certain ends, or removing difficulties and perplexities." 13 To quote Dewey: "The essence of instrumentalism is to conceive of both knowledge and practice as means of making goods . . . excellencies of all kinds . . . secure in inexperienced existence." 14 Dewey formulates his method in terms of instrumentalism, which implies experimental uses assignable to the intellect, in logic, in education, in the general conduct of life, in the reformulation of philosophy, and in the possibility that America may some time contribute other types of philosophy. Knowledge is here shown to be secondary, as a functional activity within experience. Emphasis

12 Ibid., p. 32. 13 Patrick, op. cit., p. 363.

falls on social philosophy and progress, with the hope that through progressive formulations the end or purpose of existence will become more clear.\textsuperscript{15}

The rapid increase of scientific knowledge has made the constructive enterprise more difficult. Scientific formulations are often taken as tentative, as signs or "shorthand" accounts of realities and relativities surpassing present knowledge. Relativity, as essentially objective, has come to occupy a place once assigned to absolutes of various types. Reason, which in the age of Des Cartes seemed able to generate principle out of its own nature, has come to be regarded as an instrument; thus the instrumentalism of Dewey and his followers has come into vogue and pragmatism as a method of testing conceptions has made its modest contribution.\textsuperscript{16}

Foremost among the achievements of instrumentalism must be placed the desire of educators to make education nothing less than the coordination of all human activities. Education has been taken out of its isolation as a specialized technique. We can ans should aim at "the education of the whole man." Our goal today is an education that has steadily in view the creation of a better and happier society.

To impart "the kind of knowledge that gives power in a

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 424. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 418.
coordinated democracy" is our avowed aim. Instrumental philosophy should train the child to meet with a scientific spirit the problems of life in the world as soon as he has left the miniature democracy of his school.

According to the Instrumental philosophy of education, a school should be a miniature democracy. Only by according scientific subjects and scientific methods first rank, leaving the humorist in a lesser place, with the classics wherever possible dropped out of the curriculum altogether and regarded as obsolete witnesses of a dead world long since faded out of usefulness, can a school hope to perform this important function of training for actual life and the dangerous process of living. The subject matter taught in our school should be a means toward a greater end, an instrument merely, through the use of which the pupil learns to fit himself for the wider tasks of life, the successful life in this society to which he belongs.17

The instrumentalist believes that education should concern itself with immediate problems and the needs of the child, with a view of developing an individual who can adjust himself to the environment and develop a sense of security in the world. This implication is one that will have a tendency to create a growing respect for the newer educational aims and objectives.

CHAPTER III

IMPLICATIONS OF INSTRUMENTALISM FOR KNOWLEDGE,
TRUTH, CURRICULUM, AND VALUES

The most elaborate philosophies are founded on a few simple ideas. For the generation in which the philosophy is developed, these fundamental ideas are most often obscured by the obtruse and technical aspects of the system; but in the course of time they rarely ever fail to disengage themselves from the superstructure they support and to become part of the common intellectual coin which circulates in the realm of the mind. Instrumentalism has been unusually superior in this respect to the law of time; its basic ideas have been rapidly appropriated if not completely assimilated by contemporary thought.

This easy "naturalization" is partially due to Dewey's own criterion to the effect that instrumentalism is grounded in the pervasive interests of life and is concerned with the values that all men cherish; but it is also in significant measure due to the fact that Dewey has constantly used his philosophy as a basis for analyzing and interpreting current social and educational implications of instrumentalism.
He has had to divest philosophic principles of their technical garments and dress them in a fashion of common speech and circumstances; and as a result, large audiences have had through these essays ready access to the essentials of his teachings. It is hardly just a sheer accident of Dewey's interest or versatility that made him apply instrumentalism to the criticism of current events.

Such application is a natural consequence of his cultural doctrine concerning the nature of reason or intelligence. According to instrumentalism, reason or intelligence does not reside in some transcendental sphere where it concerns itself primarily with observing its own precious state, and from where, when it is so inclined, it views as a pale spectator what goes on below; the proper home of intelligence is the world, and its function is to act as critique and regulator of the forces operative within it.¹

An explanation of Instrumentalism will be necessary each time the term is used in regard to any phase of Dewey's philosophy.

Instrumentalism in recent metaphysics is called a theory of knowledge forming a part of Pragmatism. . . . In essence it is that ideas or intellectual concepts are neither pure intuitions nor translations of realities into phenomenal forms but mental modes of adaptation to reality (W. James); to wit, instruments for grouping sensations (experiences) into an intelligent fabric. In this view, knowledge is not a state, but a process. Experience by itself -- the aggregate of mere sense impressions -- can teach nothing; it can do only by comparing an inference -- that is, thought, which relates impressions -- to a conceptual system partly sensory, partly involved intuitionally.²

Knowledge

It is characteristic of the inevitable moral prepossession of philosophy, together with the subjective

¹John Dewey, Character and Events, introduction, pp. v-vi.

²Nelson's Perpetual Loose-Leaf Encyclopedia, VI, 453.
turn of modern thought, that many critics take an instrumental theory of knowledge to signify that the value of knowing is instrumental to the knower. 3

Perhaps this theory is not acceptable to many in particular cases; but certainly in many cases the pursuit of science is a sport, carried on like other sports for its satisfaction. But instrumentalism is a theory not about personal disposition and satisfaction in knowing, but about the proper objects of science, what is proper in that case being defined in terms of physics. 4

If scientific knowledge and discourse are instrumental, the implication is decidedly plain that it is also capable of becoming an enjoyed object to those concerned in it. Dewey is not unaware of the wide divergence between his use of the term "knowledge" and its traditional and current usage. He relates the two concepts in the following manner:

Knowledge, in the sense of information, means the working capital, the indispensable resources, of further inquiry; of finding out, or learning, more things. 5

What is already known, what is accepted as truth, is of immense importance; inquiry should not proceed a step without it. But it is held subject to use, and is at the mercy of the discoveries which make it possible. 6

Dewey puts this question to his readers: "Is logic primarily an account of getting knowledge, with a concept of achieved knowledge serving only as a limiting term, or is it a theory of knowledge achieved?" 7

3 Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 151. 4 Ibid., p. 152.
5 Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 185-186.
7 Quoted in Journal of Philosophy, VII, 557.
As Dewey states elsewhere,

The decisive consideration as between instrumentalism and analytic realism is whether the operation of experimentation is or is not necessary to knowledge. The instrumental theory holds that it is.8

Following a bit further in Dewey's reasoning, we find "knowing" is now identified with learning, and "knowledge" means that information which is acquired as a result of reflected inquiry.

"Knowledge is an affair of making sure, not of grasping antecedently given sureties."9

The static, cold-storage ideal of knowledge is inimical to educational development; it swamps thinking.10

Taking what is already known or pointing to it is no more a case of knowledge than taking a chisel out of a tool box is the making of the tool.11

Since knowledge is the stock and trade of education, it is easy to understand that a philosophy of education must be based upon adequate consideration of epistemology or knowledge theory. There is an opinion which maintains that epistemology is too abstract and speculative to affect the practical issues of learning.

"As a matter of fact, knowledge is such a familiar, every-day occurrence that few unsophisticated people ever stop to demand inspection of its credentials. . . ."12

8Feldman, op. cit., p. 105. 9Dewey, How We Think, p. 198.
10Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 166.
11Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 188.
12Brubacher, op. cit., p.53.
"Even sophisticated people like scientists and teachers, who are constantly accumulating and dispensing it, seldom propound such fundamental questions."13 Rather is knowledge assumed.

Man has always sought the complete, the perfect, the orderly universe. The old philosophy in reaching for that security has taken for granted the superiority of purely theoretical knowledge to knowledge that comes from practice from doing. Experimental science accepted the inferior role, but in its development, especially in the new physics of recent years, it has posed questions which traditional philosophy has found hard to answer.

Dewey, sweeping away the cobwebs of tradition, contends for a philosophy that accepts a changing world, that unites science and human well-being. In this new form of scientific humanism, practices takes its place with theory, and action paves the way to understanding.

Water as an object of science, as \( H_2O \) with all the other scientific propositions which can be made about it, is not a rival for a position in real being with the water we see and use. It is, because of experimental operations, an added instrumentality of multiple controls and uses of the real things of every-day science.

The sum and substance of this illustration is that if we frame our conceptions of knowledge on the experimental model, we find that our way of operating upon and with the things of ordinary experience so that we can frame our ideas of them in terms of their interactions with one another instead of in terms of

13Ibid.
the qualities they directly present, and that thereby our control of them, our ability to change them and direct their changes as we desire, is indefinitely increased.\textsuperscript{14}

Knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the way of interaction by which other natural interactions become subject to direction. Such is the implication of an experimental method, and is found in the realm of instrumentalism.

A doctor draws upon a general store of principles of physiology, etc., to help in diagnosing a case. Without this knowledge he would be helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities.\textsuperscript{15}

It is in this sense that all reflected knowledge as such is instrumental. But apart from knowledge, the things of our ordinary experiences are fragmentary, casual, unregulated by purpose, full of frustration and barriers.\textsuperscript{16}

Reflective knowledge is the only means of regulation. Its instrumental value is unique.

But apart from the exercise of intelligence, which yields knowledge, the realities of our emotional and practical life have fragmentary and inconsistent meanings and are at the mercy of forces beyond our control.

\textsuperscript{14}Dewey, \textit{Quest for Certainty}, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 219.
Knowledge, instead of revealing a world in which preference is an illusion and does not count or make a difference, puts in our possession the instrumentality by means of which preference may be an intelligent or intentional factor in constructing a future by wary and prepared action. Knowledge of special conditions and relations is instrumental to the action which is in turn an instrument of production of situations having qualities of added significance and order. To be capable of such action is to be free.\textsuperscript{17}

We are socially in a division and confusion because our best authenticated knowledge is obtained by directed practice, while this method is still limited to things aloof from man or concerning him.

Knowledge is instrumental. All kinds can be used as tools, means and instrumentalities, putting them on a level equal in value to ends and consequences, since without them the latter are merely accidental, sporadic, and unstable. To call known objects, in their capacity of being objects of knowledge, means to appreciate them, not to depreciate them.\textsuperscript{18}

The implication is encouraging, and from the general acceptance and acknowledgment of Dewey's teaching, there is no wonder that we all realize there is going to be a changed program.

Scientific study leads to and enlarges experience, but this experience is educative only to the degree that it rests upon a continuity of significant knowledge and to the

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 250.  \textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 299.
degree that this knowledge modifies and "modulates" the learner's outlook, attitude, and skill. The true learning, then, has longitudinal and lateral dimensions. It is both historical and social. It is orderly and dynamic.\textsuperscript{19}

Rugg sums up the basic concepts of instrumentalism as follows:

First, human experience is unified and continuous. . . .

Second, knowledge comes only through active response. . . .

Third, knowledge arises through testing consequences. This is Dewey's concept of "the experimental method of knowing" and the contemporary physicist's "operational" definition of thinking.

Fourth, experience consists primarily in the adjustments and interaction of individuals. . . .

Fifth, society is concerned as a democracy built on the foregoing principles; that is, on the experimental method of knowing, the unity and continuity of experience, numerous and varied points of shared common interest.

Sixth, an educational system, also based on the foregoing concepts, which would give individuals a personal interest in social relationship and control and habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.\textsuperscript{20}

Truth

The nature of truth given by the experimental and functional type of logic is completely a corollary from the nature of thinking and ideas. If the view held as to the latter is understood, the conception of truth follows as a matter of course. If it be not understood, any attempt to

\textsuperscript{19}Dewey, \textit{Experience and Education}, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{20}Harold Rugg, \textit{Culture and Education in America}, pp. 123-124.
present the theory of truth is bound to be confusing, and
the theory itself to seem arbitrary and absurd.

If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of
the given environment, to a removal of some specific
trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity
and values lies in accomplishing this work. If they
succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound,
valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up con-
fusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase con-
fusion, uncertainty, and evil when they are acted upon,
then they are false.21

Again we find that the prospective use of accepted
truths, the satisfaction that we anticipate in their employ,
the assurance of control that we feel in their possession
become relatively much more important than the circum-
stances under which they were first made true. In becoming
permanent resources, such tested ideas get a generalized
energy of position. They are truths in general, truths in
themselves or in the abstract, truths to which positive
value is assigned on their own account. Such truths are
"eternal truths" of current discussion. They naturally
and properly add to their intellectual and to their prac-
tical worth a certain esthetic quality. They are interest-
ing to contemplate, and their contemplation arouses emo-
tions of admiration and reverence. Esthetically such truths
are more than instrumentalities. But to ignore both the
instrumental and esthetic character of some interior and

21Joseph Ratnor, editor, The Philosophy of John Dewey,
p. 216.
a priori constitution of truth is to make a fetish of them. We may not exaggerate the permanence and stability of such truths with respect to their recurring and prospective use. Moral truths that are not re-created in application to the urgencies of the passing hour, no matter how true to the place and time of their origin, are pernicious and misleading; that is, false.²²

The implications of this statement are easily understood. A thing that was true years ago may not find any fulfillment in the present time. Truitt says: "Truth is purely a matter of consequences; that is true which works in any particular circumstances."²³ Erubacher says that "truth is never complete or perfect, but is always in the making."²⁴

The instrumentalists, according to this statement, would make a thing true if it could be used or applied as a tool or a device.

Riding now on the front of the wave of scientific logic, Schiller and Dewey appear with their account of what truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere these teachers say that truth in our ideas and beliefs means the same things that it means in science. It means, they say, nothing but this, that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about

²²Ibid., p. 240.
²³Isaac Deoughton, Modern Public Education, p. 79.
²⁴Erubacher, op. cit., p. 57.
among them by conceptual short cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak, any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experiences to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying and saving labor; is true for just so much, true so far, true instrumentally. This is the instrumental view of truth taught so successfully at Chicago, the view that truth in our ideas means their power to work promulgated so brilliantly at Oxford. Dewey, Schiller, and their allies in reaching this general conception of all truth have only followed the example of geologists, biologists, and philologists. In the establishment of these other sciences, the successful stroke was always to take some simple process actually observable in operation, and then to generalize it, making it apply at all times, and produce great results by summatirng its effects through the ages.25

The implications of this newer insight are far-reaching. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, after twenty-five centuries of Western philosophy, there were only two significant theories of truth: the correspondence theory of Aristotle and the Scholastics, and the coherence theory of Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. The first is a theory of common sense. The second is essentially a deductive theory, a mathematical deduction in Spinoza, a grotesque deduction in Hegel, and a phenomenal consistency presided over by a priori categories in Kant.

Modern science from the first has been both mathematical and experimental, but it was the experimental method which most impressed the imagination of the philosopher and gave

25William James, Pragmatism, pp. 197-207.
rise to the coherence theory. The inductive and experimental methods, although constantly used, were imperfectly formulated, and they remained without influence on theories of truth.

It is, however, a curious thing that it was in unphilosophical America that an induction theory of truth came into being. The inventors of this theory escaped from the European tradition. It is attributed to three men. There appeared in America the sporadic genius of three great pioneers in art, Whitman, Isadora Duncan, and Frank Loyd Wright, but each had a successor in his own field. But the three in philosophy were concatenated. Pierce led to James and James to Dewey, and the result was an inductive and experimental theory of truth. It is now the famous theory of instrumentalism.26

In whatever manner the readers and students of Dewey's philosophy are prepared to receive his viewpoint on knowledge or truth, it would certainly be a great mistake to conclude that it is in any way outmoded and that contemporary thought might do well to discard it. The truth has rather been, as we have seen, that there is not one Deweyan standpoint, but several; and among these are many that are both original and valuable.

Most fruitful has been his conviction that reflective experience is a factor in shaping human life and action and therefore is actually altering in some degree the world we live in; and that philosophy would do well, consequently, to look into the exact character of its role. The liberation

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thus effected in social thinking has been immeasurable, for if thought can modify the natural growth of institutions, the task of the social philosophy is not limited to a description of how society has developed in the past and a forecast of its probable future development, but also implies a measure of responsibility for its evolution toward desired goals.\textsuperscript{27}

We know that the pragmatist asks his usual question:

Grant an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the beliefs were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash value in experimental terms? ... The answer comes like this: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have two ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as.\textsuperscript{28}

Curriculum

One of the phenomena of the educational cosmos during the past five years has been a hasty and headlong movement known as curriculum revision.

One may ask why are we doing it? Why revise the curriculum? The superficial reply seems to be because it is fashionable or because everyone else is doing it. It seems to be a fact that in certain school systems curriculum

\textsuperscript{27}Feldman, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{28}James, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 205.
revision is going on more or less blindly because it is thought to be the thing to do. More basically, however, there is a very real stimulus to curriculum revision in the needs of gradually changing school practice. Recent studies have given support to what the sagacious observer of American school life cannot fail to realize, namely, that the older the organization of school life is, the more likely it is to be conventional. In the main, however, the older type of school life in terms of textbooks, recitations, and subject matter is passing. Many a school principal who would draw back from being called "progressive" is, nevertheless, sanctioning and even encouraging the more active forms of learning in his school.29

Properly understood, curriculum building applies not merely to the determination of objectives but it also has to do with deciding upon the means and activities of education and the relation in which personnel must stand in the attainment of the objectives decided upon. It is concerned with these activities and processes, through which education as a result takes place. The curriculum from this point of view must be looked upon as a general plan covering a period of years intended for the guidance of teachers and supervisors in providing, selecting, grading, and

presenting the means of education which are considered desirable and essential to the reliable realization of the objectives decided upon. From this point of view the curriculum lists the activities in which children engage, points out the source of available material, and describes for the teachers the means and methods to be used in stimulating and encouraging these activities.30

Dewey's philosophy concerning the child is decidedly that of a humanist. He says:

The school shall center about the child, with subject matter merely as a means of better child development; industry shall be a way of life for the worker as well as a livelihood; government shall serve men and enrich their lives; homes shall be places where life is unified and made joyous and rich.31

The efficient education of tomorrow, whether conceived as stabilizing and perpetuating valuably functional parts of the social inheritance, or equipping men and women to adapt themselves to changing needs and conditions in their societies, must more and more find and define their guiding purposes in terms of social values, tangible things of worth in the large and small societies now or prospectively functional. For our purpose we find it helpful to assume that the aim of education is to help the person to do well those


things he most likely will need to do. A logical conclusion from this statement is that in a new curriculum nothing will be included which is not useful in life; that which is included is done so with some assurance of its common occurrence in life, with anticipation of improvement in the ways of living, and with the intention that it will be useful not only in the present but also in the future. The curriculum consists of all the experiences that all of the children are likely to have. 32

The child is concerned not with subject matter as such, but with the subject matter as a related factor in a total and growing experience. ... It is the failure to keep in mind the double aspect of subject matter which causes the curriculum and the child to be set over against each other. 33

William H. Kilpatrick has been first among those who have been pioneers in sensing the educational implications of the new situation that has been brought about by a changed and changing economic, social, and educational life. As author, lecturer, and professor of the philosophy of education, Kilpatrick is our foremost interpreter of the pedagogy of activity and interest. In his book entitled *Remaking the Curriculum* he begins with the following paragraphs:

Already in many places a better curriculum outlook has been achieved, and the general prospects for advance were perhaps never brighter. But much remains to be done. Our aims need to be clarified. Appropriate


content needs to be conceived, and the compelling reason more firmly grasped; while all of us, including many who still hesitate, need to be surer of the road to take.

The chief reason for new curriculum and educational procedure lies in the fact that our modern social and thought world has brought significant new developments which in turn make demands on the school that intelligent and conscientious educators can no longer disregard.34

The following excerpt is taken from the first chapter of Democracy and the Curriculum, the Life and Program of the American School, edited by Harold Rugg:

We conceive the school to be an enterprise in living; hence what was narrowly and forbiddingly called in the old education "the curriculum" has become in the new education "the life of the school." Every aspect of a truly vital education partakes of life itself; the school becomes a school of living... learning is seen as living through novel situations... the curriculum becomes the very stream of dynamic activities that constitute the life of the young people and their elders. Thus the new school is a social enterprise in living.35

In the second chapter of the same book edited by Harold Rugg, the following statements are found under the heading, "The Special Nature of Our Times":

It is of utmost importance that the curriculum designer understand that his work must be done in an America which is caught in a period of bewildering transitions. Forty years have passed since John Dewey opened the Laboratory School and Francis W. Parker organized the School of Education of the University of Chicago. Those four decades have witnessed the most spectacular cultural change in the

34 William H. Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, p. 13.

35 Harold Rugg, editor, Democracy and the Curriculum, the Life and Program of the American School, p. 3.
eight hundred years during which our new industrial democratic society has been forming. 36

America has witnessed in the last decade more activity in curriculum making and courses of study construction than in all previous history. Literally thousands of teachers, supervisors, and administrators all over the country, many of whom are people of splendid training working in next-to-the-child situations, are seeking materials and methods for improving the various curricula and constructing and revising courses of study that will more nearly meet the needs of the child today. They are attempting a program directed toward the twentieth-century demands for better adapted, more effective, and more functional types of education. 37

Organized public education in the United States, much more than ever before, is now compelled, if it is to fulfill its social obligations, to adjust its objectives, its curriculum, its methods of instruction, and its administrative procedures to the requirements of the emerging integration ordered. The extremely rapid tempo of social change and movement, arising out of the drive of technology and the restless energy of the American people, requires adjustment and readjustment of the school to new conditions.

36 Ibid., p. 15. 37 Ibid., p. 12.
The curriculum as defined by Rugg is "really the entire program of the school's work. It is everything that the students and their teachers do." It includes both activities and materials which are used in these enterprises.

The concept of growth is basic to the new and modern school curriculum. John Dewey expressed it thus:

Since growth is characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. . . . Growing is not something which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous growth leading into the future. 39

If the entire program of the school includes not only the activities but also the materials used and needed, the child should have experience so related and guided as to utilize some important aspects of thinking.

Materials used in the school must, of course, be in themselves worthwhile, but their main function is to furnish the means for practice in thinking. In seeking the desired material, pupils learn to consider it critically and to find what is pertinent. 40

Summary of Guiding Principles

The following summary of guiding principles for the development of a curriculum are broad and usable. The curriculum

38American Historical Association, Commission on the Social Studies, Conclusion and Recommendations, pp. 35-100.
39Rugg, op. cit., p. 228.
is considered to be the actual experiences of each pupil which are affected by the school. Experiences should be so selected and guided as:

1. To result in socialized human beings.

2. To give consideration to the health and physical development of children.

3. To make provision for the individual differences in children.

4. To be suitable to the maturation level of the child.

5. To meet the needs, purposes, and interests of children.

6. To be educative rather than mis-educative.

7. To enlarge the child's understanding of important concepts.

8. To aid in the development of new meanings through adaptations to the needs of the local community, utilization of available local resources, compensation where possible for environmental lacks, and participation in a wide variety of environmental situations.

9. To utilize some important aspect of thinking.

10. To make possible successful achievement by the child.41

If the criteria are to be met, it is inherent that the teacher know the children, know the subject matter, know the local environment, and so carefully plan that the optimum

41Ibid., pp. 172-173.
values are derived from the combination. Planning is essential. Planning does not mean, however, that everything is predetermined.

The traditional program cannot meet these criteria. In departing from the traditional, many schools fell into the pitfall of negative approach; that is, the newer education should not be what the older education was. In the earlier days of any new departure it was easy to succumb to the fallacy of completely discarding the old and bringing in the new and the untried. Instead, the procedure should be to build constructively by carefully considering the implications of the new philosophy.

Educational Values

The educational process by examination will result in the creation of certain educational values, according to Dewey. In order to carry on a discussion, the definition of the term "value" is given by Dewey. To value means really two things, to prize and to apprise. The former involves the emotions, the latter the intellect. We prize a thing when we love it or derive pleasure from it; we apprise or evaluate it when we form a critical judgment concerning its relative worth. It follows that values are of two kinds, absolute and relative; or, as Dewey expresses it, intrinsic and instrumental.44

44Gustav G. Schoenchen, The Activity School, p. 262.
We can see immediately why Dewey prefers the words "intrinsic and instrumental" rather than the simpler words "absolute and relative," when we follow his discussion of values to its application in education.

The intrinsic value of any study or activity is the value it has for satisfying a present need; but it also has an instrumental value in that it enables the process of education to go on in a subsequent future activity which would be impossible unless the learner were equipped with powers, abilities, appreciations, and skills previously gained as intrinsic values.

While every subject admittedly has an intrinsic value from Dewey's point of view of education as growth, the relative or the instrumental is of greater importance.

It follows, therefore, that the subjects of the curriculum cannot be arranged in a scale of relative values, nor can specific human values be assigned as the special province of individual curricular subjects.

To achieve the educational values which he claims the school should contribute, Dewey finds it necessary that education throw off the shackles of a whole series of mistaken dualisms or antitheses.

The first of the dualisms, that between the appreciation studies versus the knowledges and skills, Dewey has attacked in his discussion of value by showing that all subjects have both kinds of values, intrinsic and instrumental. 45

In this opinion Dewey is supported by school activity practice.

The instrumentalist in educational philosophy would probably join the absolutist in criticizing the attempt of science to set up aims and values of the educational process. But he would have to part company with him in the endeavor to set up a hierarchy of value based on the acceptance of certain educational values as absolute. He would disagree with any general standard of value which elevates a single value to the apex of a pyramid of educational values. While the absolutist criticizes the instrumentalist for the absence of "set" educational values, the omission should not be interpreted to mean that the instrumentalist altogether excludes any classification of educational values. The nearest the instrumentalist has allowed himself the luxury of an absolute is in his use of the term "growth" as a criterion for educational procedure.

The chief indictment of the growth theory of value, then, is that it seems to fail in providing any indication of what is a desirable or right direction for growth. It appears to have the fatal weakness of instrumentalism.46

However, a properly formulated psychology will inevitably work hand in hand with the instrumental idea of education. True psychology is itself "a conception of democracy," for it believes in the efficacy of training, of

46 Brubacher, op. cit., p. 98.
communication, of participation, and of action as ways of changing human conduct. It does not deal with absolutes. Rather, it proceeds step by step, asking what the organism is going to do next. And it marches hand in hand with the ethics of instrumentalism, asking what is better to do next.  

It is reasonable to expect the school progressively to orient the student in the life of which he is a part. For the child, education may become genuinely creative. In his school world he is living and forming his democratic way of life. Democratic education must, therefore, be progressive, progressive in the sense of being genuinely creative. For the pupil to understand and appreciate democracy, there must be something more than the docile acceptance of a point of view. He must achieve a quality of mind and heart which makes him actively and eagerly disposed to the continuous reorganization of his life values.

The writer has attempted to weave into the facts shown in the foregoing pages of the present chapter certain of the educational implications for knowledge, truth, curriculum, and values for the purpose of consideration from the instrumentalist's point of view. But for the purpose of providing additional and further emphasis, the following material

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48 Trubacher, op. cit., p. 159.
is presented for the purpose of more clearly elucidating the writer's problem.

Knowledge. -- In regard to knowledge, the instrumentalist would imply that experimentation and active participation in the process of living and learning are necessary. Knowledge is an instrument and is gained through actual experience. In this connection, it is the aim of education to train and develop true experiences possessing worthwhile educational values.

The educational implication for knowledge is that knowledge as an instrument is the controlling factor in the working out of life problems.

The writer Demiashkevich has this to say about knowledge: "Knowledge or experience is functional as to its origin, its purpose, and the process of its growth."49

An appreciation of knowledge and its value lends itself to an encouraging implication to be caught from the general acceptance and acknowledgment of Dewey's teachings. When knowledge is used as a tool or device, it is one of the chief instruments for adaptation to environment. Understanding of pupils and their needs and a knowledge of facts and skills are involved in child growth and development. Instrumentalism is a theory of knowledge, and the implication and significance of its value is that knowledge

49 Demiashkevich, op. cit., p. 112.
really consists in acts of knowing in response to the environment. Learning comes from experimentation; it grows out of experiences and knowledge gained and thereby is meaningful and of value. This knowledge can be used as an instrument and will not need to be shelved or left to clutter up the mind of the child.

The implication here is very simple: knowledge as an instrument for child development and growth has a significant value and is the means whereby the child can see backward and forward in order to plan and to organize, and to make secure his place in the world about him.

Truth. -- Reflecting upon the problem of the test of truth, one becomes convinced that it seems useless to endeavor definitely to designate one theory as the one and only one concerning truth.

Following an examination of the theory of knowledge and truth, such as has been brought out in the instrumental philosophy, our findings imply that knowledge is an instrument for adaptation to our environment, that truth is not fixed or eternal. Again it becomes apparent that truth is an instrument. To know a thing to be true implies that the knowledge can be used as a means or tool in the learning process. In the process of learning, verification is literally the activity of truth making.

The instrumentalist uses truth as a tool. If a thing
that was true years ago is not true today, it has no use. Truth must have a place. To know a thing to be true implies the ability to use that truth. Truth in reference to our educational program and the implications of its meanings are found in the following from Brubacher:

. . . The test of the truth of an educational program by whether it works means to translate the program into a series of activities to institute a chain of specific physical changes in the educational situation. Only by the consequences of such operations can one tell the truth about the initial program. . . . What is true of truth is true of knowing. Learning is true verification, truth making.50

Curriculum. -- Dewey's philosophy has had an important influence upon the aims of teaching and upon the curriculum. Under the newly accepted ideas of education we realize that the curriculum has become the most vital part of the school. New practices have been inaugurated and developed and responsibility for child growth has been taken over by educational leaders.

The curriculum is but an instrument to mold the child's life into a useful and desirable whole, thereby enabling him to find a place -- his proper place -- in the democracy to which he belongs. This is the aim of education today, and the practical implications found in this new philosophy and the acceptance of its precepts really denote a dawn of a great day.

In a recent book entitled The Child and His Curriculum, the following is most interesting and pertinent:
A free and active curriculum, involving ideas and materials interesting to the child and within his comprehension, helps to develop a happy, secure, and useful type of person, whereas the formal, rigid procedure dependent upon memorization of facts is apt to kill interest and initiative; and because much of it is beyond his comprehension, it leads to insecurity. 51 Here the curriculum itself, taken as a whole, is thought of as an instrument contributing to the development of well-rounded personalities.

In its implication for the curriculum, instrumentalism places emphasis on practical, worthwhile studies. It has also objectives that give a wide range of interests, and produce abilities that can be used to determine what the child wants to know and to enable him to control and use instruments and tools for bringing about his desires.

The implication here for the child is one of vast dimensions. It promises a program of useful and pleasant endeavor, to be able to live as a contributing member with the ability to attain success in his environment and the possibility of taking his place as a harmonizing individual in society.

Value. -- From the instrumentalist's point of view, values are instrumental. "They implement a person to gain ends. Progress occurs if these ends are achieved." 52 The instrumentalist has no fixed values except the use of values


as instruments that have been judged against other values and found to prove their worth and are thereby accepted. The ability to judge and to prove what is of value is developed from learning and experimentation. The value of a thing will depend upon its use; but, as Dewey has pointed out, the use determines the value. The old conception of value was that a thing was useful because it was valuable, but the instrumentalist would find a thing to be valuable if useful.

When a child is confronted with new problems, values shift and the implication here will show that values are not fixed or absolute. Often one has to make a choice. In this connection Dewey says:

... let one thing go in order to take another. This establishes an order of preference, a greater and less, better and worse. Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in relation to some third thing, some further end, with respect to which they are means or instrumental values.53

From this the instrumentalist implies a very careful but significant deduction. When the evidence is all in and the weight of each problem is considered, the only course to pursue is the one that will be instrumental, that will solve the problem and that can be used in reaching an end.

Quoting again from Brubacher, we find:

... Other things being equal, it would seem that those learnings are of most value which apply to the

53Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 28.
largest number of life situations. ... But other things are not always equal. Emergencies sometimes arise. For the children must be prepared even though they rarely or never occur.\textsuperscript{54}

The educational implication here is that the test of the instrumental philosophy and its significance is plainly discernible.

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Brubacher, op. cit.,} p. 99.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

John Dewey is easily the most eminent personality in contemporary education. There may be a division of opinion regarding the extent and the worth of his contribution to general philosophy.

When he has touched on politics, his teachings have not been strikingly original or effective. He missed by a mile the bull's-eye when he undertook to interpret religion. But in a very peculiar way Dewey has long been hailed by school people as education's special saint. He more than any other American educator was instrumental in breaking the shackles of harsh school discipline and inflexible teaching routine. He blazed the way for a really human attitude toward the millions of children whom homes and compulsory attendance laws put under the school's authority. When Progressive Education dared to swing from the creed of rule by an iron hand to unwarranted freedom, and from rigidly prescribed programmes to no programme at all, it was not Dewey who set the course but rather certain overzealous disciples who had taken the bit in their own mouth and had run away with the wagon much to the chagrin of the master. The reaction that promises soon or late to bring the Progressives back to common sense, will land them close to the place that Dewey originally had conceived as a proper goal.¹

In the second chapter the philosophy of John Dewey known as instrumentalism was defined and explained and also

¹John Buckholz, "Dewey Mocked by N. E. A.," Educational Administration and Supervision, XVIII (September, 1932), 416.
certain implications for education were shown in terms of knowledge, truth, curriculum, and educational values.

We have seen that instrumentalism is closely identified with and is very much akin to pragmatism, the philosophy of William James that has also been taken into the minds and hearts of American educators.

The meanings and implications of the practices have been developed and spread, and the influence of instrumentalism is encouraging to the disciples who have accepted it and found it workable.

Dewey as a dominant force in the fields of education and philosophy has done the pragmatic theory an unbounded and desired service by the acceptance and use of its teachings. The meaning of pragmatism, to be exact, is practical -- if a thing is found to "work" in a given situation, it is accepted by pragmatists. Instrumentalism is akin to pragmatism -- in fact, one may say that pragmatism had its place in the development of instrumentalism.

John Dewey, who is possibly the greatest philosopher of education, says:

Only that which has been organized into our dispositions so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live, is really knowledge. ²

Reaching out and trying to find the educational

²Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 400.
implications for knowledge as developed through the reasoning of the instrumental philosophy, Brubacher sums it up very acceptably:

Many have slipped into the worship of knowledge for its sake. This risks the severance of intelligence from action or volition. Moreover, the content of a course of study becomes verbal, to say nothing of being stated largely into other men's words. . . . Children become preoccupied with facts and mere words. Man is taken captive by his own spoils. . . . Knowledge really consists in acts of knowing in responses to the environment. It grows out of the defeat of purpose and redeems the continuity of practice which has been temporarily interrupted. The old idea that knowledge is power now can be brought down from the attic and dusted off. Yet until knowledge is put to work, it does not achieve the status of knowledge.\(^3\)

Knowledge is instrumental. As a tool we use it to clear the way for understanding. Scientific study leads us to an enlarged experience, but this experience is educative only to the degree that it rests upon a continuity of significant knowledge and to the degree that this knowledge modifies and "modulates" the learner's outlook, attitude, and skill.

Many critics take an instrumental theory of knowledge to signify that the value of knowing is instrumental to the learner or the knower. Instrumentalism teaches a school should be a small democracy. It makes the brain a behaviorist organ instead of an organ for knowing the world. Instrumentalism is grounded on the pervasive interests of the

\(^3\)Brubacher, op. cit., p. 73.
life of the child. The training of the child and the development of his ability to make a better adjustment to his environment is the place for a better social process.4

Our schools are in the grip of a great transitional movement. Dewey more than any other educational leader has made a lasting effect upon the schools of our time. Dewey's educational theories have been broadly scattered and assimilated not only by the schools of his own land but also in other countries as well.

Dewey says that learning is active. The child is the starting point, the center, and the end. His development, his growth, is the ideal. It alone furnishes the standard. To the growth of the child all studies are subservient; they are instruments valued as they serve the need of growth. Personality and character are more than subject matter.5

The fundamental opposition of child and curriculum set up by two modes of doctrine can be duplicated in a series of other terms. "Discipline is the watchword of those who magnify the course of study; interest that of those who blazen 'The Child' upon their banner."6

If we abandon the notion of subject matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside of the children's experiences; if we cease thinking of the child's experiences

4Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 57.
as also something hard and fast; if we see subject matter as something fluent, embryonic, and vital, we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the truths of studies define instruction.\footnote{Ibid., p. 15.}

The schools of the past either did not see its function as one of developing people's potentialities in becoming worthy selves or it failed to recognize that education is primarily a social process, one coming through interaction with people. The only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social life. The school is a democracy, then, and it should be one phase of a total program for living.

Cubberly has spoken of Dewey as the foremost American interpreter, in terms of the school, of the vast social and economic changes that have taken place. The following quotation illustrates his point of view:

\begin{quote}
The school, then, is a place where children are working rather than listening, learning life by living life, and becoming acquainted with social institutions and industrial processes by studying them. The virtues of the modern school, as Dewey points out, are learning by doing; the use of muscles, sight, feeling, as well as hearing; and the employment of energy, originality, and wit.\footnote{Dewey, Moral Principles of Education, p. 14.}
\end{quote}
The movement back of this trend of thought is not new, but it is an improvement to meet the ever-changing needs and problems of time.

The history of modern educational thought shows not an aimless wandering amid catchy slogans and sensational by-play, but instead there has been a definite development with noticeable trends that tend to unify public thought and ideas toward a hope and a promise for a better social structure. The increasing adaptation to child nature has its illuminating history. It took the new biological outlook of the second half of the nineteenth century to launch an effective attack upon the old foundations. What we now call the activity movement is the effort to bring together the democratic regard for personality, the biological psychology of both James and Dewey, and the experimentalistic outlook in general, to form the basis for a new educational procedure and outlook.

It begins with life or experience, analyzes life into continual interaction of organism and environment, sees life as active and goal-seeking, with purpose as its conscious manifestation, and counts that the universe and the world of affairs are in the process of continual novel development with the precariousness therefore fundamental.

Learning is an essential phase of life wherein experience as it is had is built into the organism
so as to capitalize that experience by remaking the behaving structure. Through meanings mind is built and conscious direction of life made possible.  

The influence of Dewey, as everyone knows, is vast. In a large measure this is due, the writer believes, to the way in which his philosophical teachings cater to the national pragmatism. Thus he emphasizes the practical. The test of his philosophy is its workability. Horne asserts:

It is an educational philosophy that is improving the schoolroom practice, making learning a more purposeful process, giving children the sense of reality in the school, making the schools into workshops and laboratories, thereby inspiring educational experimentation. Recent educational philosophy teaches us to put less emphasis on the value of factual information and more on the development of the personality and proper habits and attitudes.  

Because instrumentalism builds its philosophy upon participation, it above all other philosophies should be of service in our present-day confusion.

Specifically, then, the school must launch a positive program for dealing with the present confusion both within and without the school by pointing up its reorganization at least in the following ways:

1. It is reasonable to expect the school progressively to orient the student in the life of which he is a part.

2. It is reasonable to expect the school to provide

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situations for the purpose of leading the student progressively to direct his actions by an integrated and unified attitude to which he increasingly gives his allegiance.

3. It is reasonable to expect the school to encourage the development of independent interests, intellectual, esthetic, or practical, on the part of the students.

4. It is reasonable to expect the school to set up an environment in which all its members, through active participation in its organization and control, may move more progressively to a more complete appreciation of the deeper significance of the democratic way of life.

5. It is reasonable to expect the school to face frankly the fact that it will not contribute significantly to the reconstruction of the social process until it launches a positive program of its experimentation, directed toward the reconstruction of its own procedures.\[11\]

It is our conviction, accordingly, that any educational philosophy which is to be significant for American education at the present time must be the expression of a social philosophy and that the social and educational theories and conceptions must be developed with definite reference to the needs and issues which mark and divide our domestic, economic, and educational life in the generation of which we are a part.

One reason certainly for the great influence of Dewey's educational theory in this country is that it has made a serious attempt to clarify the meaning of the democratic movement.12

The activity program has beyond question revolutionized practice in public schools. It has set a high value on child interest and experience; it has stressed the importance of meanings and understandings; it has taken the school out into real life. Children have gained tremendously in initiative, poise, self-control, and group responsibility, as well as in growth in knowledge and in the development of habits, skills, and appreciations.

Our schools are reflecting in a large measure the influence of the creative thinker, Dewey, who, more than any other educational philosopher, has affected schools in his time.

Kilpatrick says of Dewey:

But after all is said, school life everywhere in our country and in many distant parts of the world is finer and sweeter and more fruitful because of what he has taught. And the body of thought and practice still moves, even if slowly, more and more toward his teachings. A like effect the world has seldom, if ever, seen within the lifetime of the man himself.13

In a consideration of changes in practice, too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the influence of educational

12 Ibid., pp. 35-36.
13 William H. Kilpatrick, John Dewey: the Man and His Philosophy, p. 3.
thought. In this period educational thought has undergone nothing short of a revolution. There is an increasing demand for a school more realistic in its processes and more sensitive to individual and social needs.

The scientific movement and other influences have contributed to this changed attitude, but the most powerful influence has been that of the new philosophy of education.

Dewey found the American school strongly entrenched in custom and tradition, still in the grip of a treadmill pedagogy that at best frustrated the child's normal impulses at almost every point—a formal, static, and unimaginative institution.\textsuperscript{14}

It is hardly necessary to point out that John Dewey's philosophy, with its insistence upon the statement of the end in terms of the means, is the developed method of that implicit intelligence in the minds of the American community. And there is no other test of intelligence, of moral and intellectual hypotheses, except that they work. In the profoundest sense, John Dewey is the philosopher of America.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14}John Dewey, the \textit{Men and His philosophy}, addresses delivered in New York in celebration of his birthday (1930), p. 62.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 105.
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