CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROGRAM

ELECTRIC POWER DISRUPTION
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILL
MARCH 5, 2002

SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED

Prepared by
Infrastructure Assurance Center
Argonne National Laboratory
SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED

Since January 2000, the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus, the Chicago Department of Environment, and the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection (now part of the Office of Energy Assurance) have been collaborating on the development and implementation of guidelines that municipal governments can use in preparing for electric power disruptions. On March 5, 2002 Commonwealth Edison (ComEd), the electric company serving the Chicago metropolitan area, held a drill to test its emergency preparedness procedures. ComEd invited three communities in the metropolitan area – Buffalo Grove, Oak Brook, Riverside – to participate in the drill as part of their own emergency planning efforts to respond to electric power disruptions. Although ComEd had held joint exercises with the City of Chicago, this was the first time that a cooperative exercise with the suburban communities was conducted. The Infrastructure Assurance Center of Argonne National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Assurance helped facilitate the drill in the communities.

A series of meetings involving ComEd, community controllers (who helped organize the drill but did not participate directly), and Argonne personnel was held to lay out the ground rules for the drill and determine how it would operate. Attachment 1 gives some of the guidance that was developed.

The drill scenario called for a hot summer day with high electricity demand. It contained a series of events including the following:

- In the early morning, a bomb was discovered at a natural gas pipeline serving several generating stations that provide electricity to ComEd.
- The gas company shut down the pipeline, thus requiring about 5,000 MW (about ¼ of the total generation) to be lost.
- ComEd was forced to implement controlled rotating interruptions (rolling blackouts) to maintain system integrity in the light of this significant loss of generation.
- Additional bomb threats and related events were experienced at ComEd transmission facilities.
- The rolling blackouts continued until late afternoon, when the situation was cleared.

There were a number of other events that were included in the ComEd internal drill but which did not involve the communities. A drill time line is included in Attachment 2.
The three communities received fax communications from ComEd in the same form that they would have during an actual emergency. In addition, Argonne staff injected a series of events to simulate situations that would have arisen during an actual outage (e.g., calls for help from people stranded in elevators, calls about traffic lights not functioning, calls for evacuation assistance from medical facilities). Attachment 3 contains examples of these messages.

All three of the participating communities felt that the drill was a valuable exercise. It confirmed some of the weaknesses in dealing with power outages that had been recognized but not yet corrected. It also identified a number of new issues that had not been previously considered. Among the most important lessons learned are the following:

(a) Communities were very capable of dealing with the events surrounding a power outage. Situations such as traffic light outages, people trapped in elevators, people using electrically-powered medical equipment and needing emergency assistance during an outage, and increased criminal activity during a power outage were all events that the communities had experience with and were able to cope with.

(b) Communities would like to have as much advance warning of a rolling blackout power outage as possible. It makes a significant difference in their ability to respond. The target of a two-hour advance notice of a rolling blackout was not achieved. Actual times varied from a maximum of 1-¼ hours to no advance warning (for the first operation).

(c) The Emergency Load Conservation Plan (ELCP) provided by ComEd to communities provides very useful information for dealing with rolling blackouts. However, its organization and presentation could be improved to make it more easily utilized under emergency conditions. It would be useful to review the format of this material to identify more efficient and effective ways of presenting it.

(d) The communications provided by ComEd during the drill enabled the communities to take appropriate response actions once they were interpreted correctly. However, it took some time for the communities to understand the terminology being used in the communications. The assistance provided by ComEd community liaisons was uneven in the accuracy and completeness of the information provided during the drill. In the best case, the community liaison provided very good support.

(e) There needs to be more interaction and coordination among neighboring communities and on a regional basis during this type of electric power disruption. Communities acting alone may not be able to effectively deal with situations. Among the issues that could be better addressed on a regional basis are:

- Emergency communication channels could become a bottleneck. With many communities sharing emergency frequencies, there is the potential for an overload with a resulting inability to communicate with emergency responders.
- Calls for mutual aid among communities could be complicated as rolling blackouts move from one area to another. Emergency responders could be
dispatched back and forth to different areas as the rolling blackout sequence progresses.

- Interdependencies between the electric power infrastructure and other infrastructures (e.g., water supply, telecommunications) could present municipalities with additional issues that needed to be managed during a disruption event. This needs to be addressed in a more thorough and coordinated manner.

A regional exercise was suggested as a very useful means of sorting out and resolving some of these issues.

(f) It appears that local law enforcement resources would be very limited in their ability to provide additional security to ComEd facilities during a threat situation. The available resources would be focused on other needs in the community and would not have additional capability to assist in securing electric power facilities.

(g) All the participating communities felt that the drill was a valuable exercise that allowed them to test their response procedures. This type of exercise should be done regularly. Other towns in the region would benefit from this type of cooperative activity, but this would yield the greatest benefit after they have completed an initial plan for dealing with power outages.

DETAILED RESULTS

The following sections tabulate some of the detailed results of the drill.

ROLLING BLACKOUT PROCEDURE

These comments apply to the implementation of the controlled rotating interruption (rolling blackout) procedure in general.

(a) There was a lack of understanding in the beginning of the drill of just how the overall approach to emergency load conservation, including the steps leading to rolling blackouts, would operate. It might be useful to provide some educational material to communities that describe the process in a readily understandable way.

(b) There was an observation that the scheduling of rolling blackout operations might not consider the impact on emergency response procedures. For example, an initial roll might have towns asking for mutual aid from other areas only to find out that the assisting towns would themselves be subjected to a blackout in the next roll. This would result in emergency crews having to rush back to their hometowns to deal with their own situations. It might be useful to look at the sequence of rolls in the light of how emergency responders would react in addition to looking at it from the power system requirements.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM COMED
The following comments apply to the notifications and communications received by the communities from ComEd during the drill.

(a) The initial fax announcement from ComEd about events affecting the system arrived at approximately 10:25 am. There was one sentence referring to planned interruptions that were to start at 11:00 am. It would have been helpful to include a little more information in this initial announcement such as an indication that notification of areas to be included in the interruption would be sent shortly.

(b) The initial notification of the first roll of interruptions arrived at about 11:05 am. This was after the expected start of the interruption and would have provided no advance warning.

(c) The information included in the notification did not use the same terminology as is used in the ELCP Book. For example, the notice referred to “North Region – Operations 1-8.” In the ELCP books the terminology is “N01, N02,…” In one community, it was initially thought that the “North Region” referred to the north part of town. In another, it was initially thought that the term “Operation” referred to the steps in the ELCP. Thus, attention was initially focused on ELCP steps 1-8 rather than on operations 1-8 of ELCP step 15. (This is discussed further in the section on the ELCP.) As another example, one community asked the ComEd external affairs if they were in the North Region and were told that they were in the “Central Region”, which did not correspond to any of the ELCP terminology.

(d) Subsequent announcements of interruptions did provide advance warning ranging from 45 minutes to 1-¼ hours. The target of a 2-hour advance notice was not reached. There was general agreement that the more advance notice that can be given, the better the communities can prepare their response.

(e) The interruption notifications did not indicate when a particular operation would terminate, only when it would begin. This created some confusion on what the impact of subsequent notifications would be – i.e., would the initially designated regions still be without power.

(f) The information received from ComEd community liaisons was uneven. In one case, the information was clear and accurate. In another case, the communication provided inaccurate or incomplete information and was not followed up with clarifications.

(g) The interruption notifications did not include any indication of the towns that would be impacted, particularly those nearby. The communities indicated that if such a list were included, they would be better positioned to prepare for mutual aid requests from surrounding towns as well as deal with their own situations.

(h) Once the communications from ComEd began to come in and were understood, they provided enough information for the towns to act.

(i) The ComEd messages were not time-stamped. The only indicator was the time stamp from the fax machine.
ELCP DOCUMENTS
Each of the communities in the ComEd service territory has received a book describing the Emergency Load Conservation Plan (ELCP) that is used to manage the load during times of peak demand and tight supply. The book identifies 15 steps in the plan beginning with bringing reserve generation on line and culminating with Step 15, rolling blackouts. The following comments apply to the ELCP material provided to the communities by ComEd.

(a) The information included in the ELCP books was not presented in a way that was quickly understandable by the communities. The terminology was different than what was sent in the interruption notification (see comment (c) in the section on Communications from ComEd). In several cases, the ELCP book identified a feeder associated with one of the operations, but there was no map included in the book for that feeder.

(b) The maps included in the ELCP book were difficult to use. Legibility was a constant problem. In some cases, street names were incorrect. In some cases, the north-south-east-west boundaries of an outage area that are listed on the table did not correspond with what was shown on the maps.

(c) It was not clear from the ELCP maps if the shaded areas were the only ones to be affected by the interruption or if the entire feeder was to be interrupted.

(d) It might be worthwhile to review the structure and format of the ELCP books to develop a formatting of the information that would be more easily used in an emergency.

COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS
The following comments apply to how the communities were able to respond to the various events included in the drill.

(a) All three communities felt that they were well prepared to deal with the events of the outage. The communities simulated the opening of their Emergency Operations Center to coordinate their activities.

(b) Some communities utilized a reverse 911 system (simulated) to alert residents of impending blackouts.

(c) Some communities had to spend some time early in the drill reviewing and re-familiarizing themselves with the ELCP material provided by ComEd as they had not looked at it in some time.

(d) Better information could be available in the communities on special needs individuals. While these lists are available in some databases, they are not always readily accessible for this type of emergency.

(e) Better information needs to be assembled by communities on critical facilities and on the backup generation available at these facilities, particularly those that are considered for use
as emergency shelters. Communities need to be able to prioritize critical facilities during emergencies.

(f) Communities need to be able to deal with situations where the facilities that lose power during a rolling blackout procedure are not the same as those that would be indicated on the ELCP maps. The maps need to be viewed as only approximate indicators of areas that will be blacked out.

(g) The larger critical facilities in a community should have their own emergency operations plan, which should be tested along with the community.

(h) At the start of the drill some additional scenario information that was not part of the ComEd procedure was provided to the communities by the Argonne controllers. One such piece of information was a request that towns provide additional security to ComEd facilities in the light of the bomb threats. The towns indicated that in a real emergency situation, they would probably be unable to do this, as their resources would be stretched thin dealing with their own situations. Further, they would not know which ComEd facilities would have highest priority. It appears that local law enforcement would be very limited in what help could be provided beyond just having police patrols pass by ComEd facilities and note any unusual situations.

CONDUCT OF THE DRILL
The following comments apply to the organization and conduct of the drill itself and offer some considerations for future drills of this type.

(a) The drill notification faxes contained a telephone number for ComEd external affairs but that number was not able to provide specific information to the communities on the drill events. It might be better not to include the number on the announcement.

(b) Before the drill it was agreed that the communities would not utilize the E-Outage system since special arrangements would be needed to avoid tying up the actual system. Nevertheless, some of the communities tried to call up the E-Outage system and found that their passwords did not work or that they were not able to get past the initial screens.

(c) Before the drill, it was agreed that each community would provide a special phone and fax number to which drill messages were sent. It was felt by some that this procedure detracted from the realism of the drill. Future drills might use actual contact numbers with clearly identified “This Is A Drill” markings.

(d) The drill operated on a real-time basis. That is, communications came in on a time line approximating real events. This meant that there were long periods during which nothing was happening. An alternative drill approach would have been to use a compressed time line during which participants could focus exclusively on drill events. While sacrificing realism, it would expedite participation in the drill. There was not universal agreement on whether the real-time drill schedule or the compressed-time drill schedule was preferable.
(e) One drill message indicating that railroad gates were locked in the “up” position during the power outage was considered unrealistic. The gates would lock in the “down” position. A more realistic issue is having to prevent drivers from going around the gates in this situation.

(f) Although it is not practical during a real emergency, it would be helpful in future drills to have a ComEd representative at the community to answer questions.
BEFORE THE DRILL

(1) Community Controllers should advise appropriate village personnel that an electric power disruption drill will take place beginning at approximately 7:00 am on March 5. Personnel to be advised should include:
   - Elected village officials
   - Village management
   - Fire department
   - Police department
   - Other relevant departments

   The details of the scenarios (timeline, events) should not be communicated to participants in the drill. The only specific information that should be conveyed is that the drill will simulate a hot, humid summer day (90º+ temperature, 90% humidity).

(2) Village personnel should be advised that all communications via phone, fax, or email related to the drill will be started and ended with the message “THIS IS A DRILL” to distinguish them from any real emergencies that might occur during the same time period. All drill communications will be sent to the special numbers shown on the first page. Regular emergency numbers (e.g., 911) will not be used for any drill communications.

(3) Community Controllers should make sure that all village emergency plans (e.g., village emergency operations plan, ComEd-provided Emergency Load Conservation Plan (ELCP)) are available and readily accessible.

(4) Without divulging any details of the drill, Community Controllers should discuss with appropriate village officials how extensive the drill response will be. Some options:

   a. Simple Table Top: During the drill, appropriate village department heads will be called to a command center and will react to the drill events in a tabletop mode. No communications to other village personnel (e.g., police, fire, public works) will be made.

   b. Extended Table Top: During the drill, appropriate village department heads assemble in the command center. As drill events unfold, response directions are communicated to other village personnel (e.g., police, fire, public works) who are asked to indicate how they would respond. No actions (e.g., dispatching vehicles or equipment) will actually be taken.

   c. Actual Response: During the drill, appropriate village department heads assemble in the command center. As drill events unfold, response directions are communicated to
other village personnel (e.g., police, fire, public works). They are directed to move into appropriate positions (e.g., vehicles are dispatched to a given location). Preliminary actions may be taken (e.g., test backup generators).

**DAY OF THE DRILL**

**Community Controllers**

1. Community Controllers should be at their designated locations at 7:00 am.
2. Drill communications (by phone and fax to the special drill numbers) should be relayed to the appropriate village personnel as they come in. This should be done in a manner that is as close as possible to what would be done in an actual emergency.
3. Community Controllers should be observers, but not participants, to the response actions. They should take notes on how things progress and on any problems, issues, deficiencies they observe. They should also note what works well.
4. During the drill, if things do not appear to be moving or there is some indecision, controllers may prompt Village staff to take certain actions. The following drill schedule includes some suggested prompts that can be offered to appropriate personnel.
5. During the drill, if things appear to be out of sync or if expected communications do not arrive at the expected point in the time line, Community Coordinators should contact the Argonne drill center (phone number on the first page) for information.

**Argonne Observers**

1. Observers should be at their designated locations at 7:00 am.
2. Observers should run a communications check (phone and fax) with the Argonne Drill Center.
3. Observers should call in to the Argonne Drill Center hourly to report on progress.
4. Observers should take notes on how things progress and on any problems, issues, deficiencies they observe. They should also note what works well.
5. Observers should offer any suggestions to Community Controllers if things are not moving or there are uncertainties.

**IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DRILL**

1. Community Controllers, Argonne Observers, and Village personnel who have participated in the drill should review the drill and identify strong points and deficiencies. The focus should include: communications between the Village and ComEd, response actions by Village personnel, and the structure of the drill itself.
2. Argonne observers will prepare a summary of the drill that gleans the lessons learned from all three communities.
ATTACHMENT 2

DRILL TIMELINE AND EVENTS
Tuesday, March 5, 2002

Note: This time line is coordinated with the ComEd drill time line. There are additional events included here that are not in the ComEd drill. See attached set of messages that will be transmitted during the drill.

Note: In the Actions column, some suggested Controller Prompts are included. These are to be used by the Controller in the event that there appears to be no action being taken or if there appears to be some confusion as to how to proceed. They do not have to be used if things are moving along on their own.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
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| 7:00 | • ComEd drill starts *(No contact yet from ComEd to communities)* | • Community Controllers on station  
• Argonne observers on station |
| 8:00 | • ComEd receives notification that bomb found on gas supply line. Gas supply company is shutting down gas supply to several power plants. *(No direct contact yet from ComEd to communities.)*  
• News report of bomb situation. *(Generated by Argonne. See Message #1)* | • Argonne plays video tape Message #1 for Community Controllers  
• Controllers pass news report to appropriate village personnel |
| 8:15 | • ComEd receives notification of bomb threats at substations *(No direct contact yet from ComEd to communities.)*  
• News report of bomb threats; news report relays request that all communities provide extra security at ComEd facilities *(Generated by Argonne. See Message #2)* | • Argonne plays video tape Message #2 for Community Controllers  
• Controllers pass news report to appropriate village personnel |
| 8:30 | • ComEd begins implementation of Emergency Load Conservation Plan including Step 15 and advises communities of planned rotating interruptions.  
• Specific steps of the ELCP to be implemented will be determined by the ComEd Distribution Center as part of the drill. Initial announcement may call for one or more steps.  
• Announcement is that first round of blackouts to begin at about 11:00. *(See Message #3)* | • ComEd sends Message #3 via fax notice (between 8:30 and 9:00) to communities advising that rolling blackouts to begin within next 2 hours.  
• Community Controller ensures that fax is received and delivered to appropriate village contact.  
• Communities begin to plan their response to impending rolling blackouts. |
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<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:45</td>
<td>• Additional communication from Argonne Drill Center regarding steps</td>
<td>• Depending on the steps in the ELCP that are announced by ComEd, Argonne may send a supplementary message to include additional steps. This is designed to ensure that some parts of the Village will be included in the outage area.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to be included in the first round of planned interruptions (Generated by Argonne. See Message #4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>• ComEd conducts news conference regarding bomb threats (See Message #5)</td>
<td>• Communities listen to press conference via conference call or Communities advised of results of press conference by ComEd Community Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>• ComEd issues announcement of second round of blackouts if it has been determined to be necessary by the Distribution Center (Note: there may not be a second round.) (See Message #6)</td>
<td>• ComEd sends Message #6 via fax notice (between 10:30 and 11:30) to communities advising that second round of rolling blackout to begin within next 2 hours. • Community Controller ensures that fax is received and delivered to appropriate village contact.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Second round of blackouts to begin at about 13:00</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>• Additional communication from Argonne Drill Center regarding steps</td>
<td>• Depending on the steps in the ELCP that are announced by ComEd, Argonne may send a supplementary message to include additional steps. This is designed to ensure that some parts of the Village will be included in the outage area.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to be included in the second round of planned interruptions (Generated by Argonne. See Message #7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>• First round rolling blackouts begin (No additional contact from ComEd to communities.)</td>
<td>• Argonne makes the set of blackout calls (Messages #8-17) identifying situations due to the power outage to the drill phone number</td>
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<td>• Calls from residents regarding loss of power (Blackout Calls generated by Argonne – See Messages #8-22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>• Second round rolling blackouts begin (No additional contact from ComEd to communities.)</td>
<td>• Argonne makes the set of blackout calls (Messages #18-22) identifying situations due to the power outage to the drill phone number</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Calls from residents regarding loss of power (Calls generated by Argonne – See Messages #18-22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>• Bomb threat cleared for ComEd.</td>
<td>• Argonne plays video tape Message #23 for Community Controllers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• News report that bomb threat have been found to be a hoax (Generated by Argonne – See Message #23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>• ComEd restoration from ELCP</td>
<td>• ComEd sends fax indicating end of ELCP. • Drill ends for ComEd</td>
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</table>
The following are examples of the messages sent to each town during the drill. Those marked “All Towns” were sent to all towns with the same wording. Others were individually tailored to each community (e.g., with street addresses in the community). An example of these messages is included here.
MESSAGE NO. 1 - All Towns INJECT MEANS: Video tape

PROJECTED TIME: 0800

INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller

INJECT TO: Community Controller

SUMMARY: News broadcast of gas pipeline bomb threat

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

ITVN Reporter: A “suspicious device” has been found on a gas pipeline just south of Chicago. The device was found less than a half hour after ITVN informed the FBI and State Police of a bomb threat phoned to our Chicago studios.

It all began this morning around 7:15. An unidentified man called ITVN’s switchboard claiming he had planted a bomb on the Midwest Gas Company pipeline in Will County, just south of Chicago. The caller said, and I quote, “It’ll blow up the pipeline and everything attached it!” ITVN promptly notified the FBI and State Police.

Shortly thereafter Midwest Gas Company officials located what they describe as a “suspicious device” on the pipeline. A Midwest spokesman said the company is “shutting down the gas supply to several power plants,” including two 500MW Chicago Power Company plants that sell electricity to Commonwealth Edison. Midwest is one of the major providers of gas to Chicago Power, which sells electricity to Commonwealth Edison.

It’s not clear what effect the Midwest shutdown may have on the ability of ComEd to meet electricity needs of its approximately 1.6 million customers in Chicago-land. However, ComEd earlier this week asked customers to conserve electricity because of high demand during the heat wave that began four days ago. And there’s no relief in sight. Today’s temperatures are again expected to be in the high 90s.

Again, the FBI and State Police are investigating a “suspicious device” found on a gas pipeline just south of Chicago. Discovery of the device came less than a half hour after a bomb threat to the pipeline was received at ITVN’s switchboard this morning.

Stay tuned to ITVN for more on the suspected bomb -- and on how the pipeline shutdown may affect ComEd’s ability to keep the lights and air conditioners on in this sweltering heat. I’m Willoughby Jones.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Ensure that appropriate Village personnel either view the video tape or are made aware of the contents of the news broadcast.

Prompts:

• Should any action be taken by the Village at this time?
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Electric Power Disruption Emergency Preparedness Drill
March 5, 2002

MESSAGE NO. 2- All Towns
INJECT MEANS: Video tape
PROJECTED TIME: 0815
INJECTED BY: Argonne controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: News broadcast of additional bomb threats to ComEd facilities

MESSAGE:
This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

ITVN Reporter: Tension mounts with new bomb threats – this time to ComEd facilities throughout Chicago-land. FBI, State Police and local law enforcement officials are scrambling to deal with bomb threats to gas and electric facilities throughout the metropolitan area. One “suspicious device” already has been found this morning on a gas pipeline just south of the city.

As the FBI and State Police try to determine whether a “suspicious device” found less than an hour ago on a gas pipeline in Will County is really a bomb, new threats to ComEd facilities came in to ComEd offices and a number of Chicago media outlets, including this station. The caller to ITVN’s switchboard said, “ComEd substations and transmission lines will be blown up within the next few hours.”

ComEd is asking area communities to provide “extra security” at all ComEd facilities within their jurisdictions. A Com Ed spokesman told ITVN the company is “taking these threats very seriously especially in light of the suspicious device found on Midwest’s pipeline.” ComEd provides electricity to about 1.6 million customers in the Chicago area.

Midwest Gas Company found a “suspicious device” on its pipeline in Will County within minutes after a bomb threat was phoned to ITVN’s studios at approximately 7:15 this morning. FBI and State Police are still at the scene of that “suspicious” device. At this point, we have no information that other “suspicious” devices have been found.

Governor George Ryan has been advised of the situation. A spokeswoman for the governor says Ryan has made no decision on whether he will call up the National Guard to assist with inspections and security at Com Ed facilities -- nor has he issued an emergency declaration to bring state resources to the aid of communities with pipeline and Com Ed facilities.

Com Ed still won’t say how the Midwest shutdown of gas to several power plants that sell electricity to ComEd may affect its ability to meet electricity demands as Chicago heads into the fifth straight day of temperatures in the 90s. However, Com Ed officials indicated earlier this week that electricity demands were pushing the limit.

Again, there are new bomb threats to Com Ed substations and transmission lines throughout the Chicago area as FBI and State Police investigate a “suspicious” device found less than an hour ago on a gas pipeline just south of the city. Stay tuned to ITVN for more as this and other news. I’m Willoughby Jones

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:
Ensure that appropriate Village personnel either view the video tape or are made aware of the contents of the news broadcast.

Prompts:
• Are there any ComEd facilities (e.g., substations or transmission lines) in the Village that need to be protected?
• Should police be dispatched now?
• Should the Emergency Operations Center be opened?
MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.
A message will be faxed from ComEd to all towns identifying the steps in the Emergency Load Conservation Plan (ELCP) that will be implemented. The message will identify the step numbers (e.g., N01, N02, etc) that will be implemented. All towns will receive the same message. Some of the steps may not affect every town.

The message will identify the expected start time and end time of the rolling blackouts. Expected start time of first round is approximately 1100.

Note: This message may also contain information on the second round of rolling blackouts. This decision on what to include will be made by ComEd as part of the drill. This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Ensure that this fax gets to the appropriate Village personnel. It should go first to the one who would have received the fax in a real situation.

Prompts:
- Where is the copy of the ComEd ELCP that was sent to the Village?
- What parts of the Village will be affected by the first blackout?
- What needs to be done to get ready for the first blackout?
- Who in the Village is notified?
- Should a public service announcement be made before the power goes out?
- Should the ComEd community representative be contacted for more information?
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MESSAGE NO.  4- All Towns
INJECT MEANS:  Fax

PROJECTED TIME:  0830
INJECTED BY:  Argonne Drill Center
INJECT TO:  Community Controller
SUMMARY:  Additional steps to be included in the first round of impending rolling blackouts. Note: This message may not be sent if the ComEd communication contains steps that impact the towns.

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

Add the following steps to those that have been conveyed by ComEd. The start and end times will be the same as those transmitted by ComEd. Treat this information as though it had come from ComEd.

N14
N15
N17
N20
N27
N32
S10

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Ensure that this information gets to the appropriate Village personnel. It should go to the same person who received the fax message from ComEd (Message #3)

Prompts:
***THIS IS A DRILL***

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MESSAGE NO. 5- All Towns
INJECT MEANS: Conference call or fax
PROJECTED TIME: 1000
INJECTED BY: ComEd
INJECT TO: Community Controllers
SUMMARY: ComEd news conference concerning the situation

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

There is no script for this message. The mock news conference will be held by ComEd staff as part of the drill.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Advise appropriate Village personnel of upcoming news conference. Ensure that appropriate Village personnel listen to the news conference or are given a copy of the fax summary of the news conference.

Prompts:
- Should the ComEd community representative be contacted for more information?
- Are there any additional steps that should be taken to get ready for the blackouts?
- Note: There may be a period, after the news conference and before the first blackout hits, where nothing is going on. Should Village staff return to their normal duties? If so, they should be advised to reconvene at the time of the expected blackouts – 1100.
MESSAGE NO. 6- All Towns
INJECT MEANS: Fax

PROJECTED TIME: 1100
INJECTED BY: ComEd
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: ComEd notice to communities of second round of impending rolling blackouts. Note: This may not be a separate message. The second round of rolling blackouts may be announced along with the first round (see All Towns – 3).

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

A message will be faxed from ComEd identifying the steps in the Emergency Load Conservation Plan (ELCP) that will be implemented. The message will identify the step numbers (e.g., N01, N02, etc) that will be implemented. All towns will receive the same message. Some of the steps may not affect the town.

The message will identify the expected start time and end time of the rolling blackouts.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Ensure that this fax gets to the appropriate Village personnel. It should go first to the one who would have received the fax in a real situation.

Prompts:
- What parts of the Village will be affected by the second blackout?
- What needs to be done to get ready for the second blackout?
- Who needs to be notified?
- Should the ComEd community representative be contacted for more information?
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROGRAM
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MESSAGE NO. 7 - All Towns  INJECT MEANS: Fax
PROJECTED TIME: 1100
INJECTED BY: Argonne Drill Center
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: Additional steps to be included in the second round of impending rolling blackouts. Note: This message may not be sent if the ComEd communication contains steps that impact the towns.

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

Add the following steps to those that have been conveyed by ComEd. The start and end times will be the same as those transmitted by ComEd. Treat this as though it had come from ComEd.

N29

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Ensure that this information gets to the appropriate Village personnel. It should go to the same person who received the fax message from ComEd (Message #6)

Prompts:
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MESSAGE NO.  8 – Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS:  Phone

PROJECTED TIME:  1105

INJECTED BY:  Argonne Controller

INJECT TO:  Community Controller

SUMMARY:  First Round Blackout Call: person on respirator.

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill.  This is a Drill.

The power is out in my house.  My husband is 78 and has been using a respirator.  He has emphysema.  He can’t breathe.  We need an ambulance right away!  We’re on ***street address***.

This is a Drill.  This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center.  Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.).  If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.
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MESSAGE NO. 9 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS: Phone

PROJECTED TIME: 1110

INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller

INJECT TO: Community Controller

SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: motorist reporting traffic lights out

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from my cell phone. The traffic lights are out all along ***street name***. The traffic is backing up pretty badly. A couple of pedestrians have almost been hit.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., police, traffic barricades, etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.
MESSAGE NO. 10 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS: Phone

PROJECTED TIME: 1115

INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller

INJECT TO: Community Controller

SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: motorist reporting traffic accident

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***street intersection***. The traffic lights are out and there has been an accident with three cars. I think some of the people are hurt. You better send an ambulance.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
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MESSAGE NO. 11 - Different for Each Town
INJECT MEANS: Phone

PROJECTED TIME: 1120
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: fearful resident

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I heard on the news something about bomb threats and my power just went out. Are we under attack? What should I do?

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Prompts:

• Is there a need for a Village announcement regarding the situation?
***THIS IS A DRILL***

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MESSAGE NO. 12 - Different for Each Town INJECT MEANS: Phone
PROJECTED TIME: 1125
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: School day care program

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***school and street address***. We have no power. We have about 150 children here for a summer day camp program. How long is the power going to be out? Do we need to start sending them home?

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
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MESSAGE NO. 13 - Different for Each Town
INJECT MEANS: Phone
PROJECTED TIME: 1130
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: Village employee reporting problem at pumping station

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

This is Joe White. I’m at ***water pumping station location***. The power is out but the backup generator hasn’t started. We can’t seem to find the problem.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to Public Works. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***railroad crossing point***. The railroad crossing gates are up and the warning lights aren’t working. A train just went through here with the gates up and just barely missed hitting a car. The traffic is still crossing the tracks with the gates up.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., public works personnel and vehicles etc.). If a person or piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
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MESSAGE NO. 15 - Different for Each Town
INJECT MEANS: Phone

PROJECTED TIME: 1140
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: angry resident

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

This is John Green. My power is out and I’m in the middle of an important project that I need to get done. I tried calling ComEd but got a recorded message. I’m tired of this happening. I want to talk to the mayor to find out what the town is doing to stop this.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the Village Hall. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Prompts:
• Has the Village issued a public service announcement?
• Who reviewed it?
***THIS IS A DRILL***

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MESSAGE NO. 16 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS: Phone
PROJECTED TIME: 1145
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: nursing home with no air conditioning

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***nursing home and street address***. The power has been out for a while and our air conditioning is out. The temperature inside the building is getting very high. We need to evacuate the residents. We have about 100 people that will need transportation.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
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MESSAGE NO. 17 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS: Phone
PROJECTED TIME: 1150
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: First Round Blackout Call: television news reporter calling

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ITVN television news. We would like to interview the mayor for a story on the blackout. We want to know how various towns are coping with the problem. We have a reporter and camera crew on the way. Can we meet with the mayor in about 20 minutes?

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
MESSAGE NO. 18 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS: Phone

PROJECTED TIME: 1300

INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller

INJECT TO: Community Controller

SUMMARY: Second Round Blackout Call: motorist reporting traffic lights out

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

The traffic lights are out at ***street name***. The traffic is getting bad.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
MESSAGE NO.  19 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS:  Phone
PROJECTED TIME:  1305
INJECTED BY:  Argonne Controller
INJECT TO:  Community Controller
SUMMARY:  Second Round Blackout Call: motorist reporting that traffic lights are on but drop down stop signs are still down

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

The traffic lights are operating ***street intersection*** but the STOP signs are still down. People don’t know what to do. Some car just got rear-ended when he stopped for the sign but the light was green.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
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MESSAGE NO. 20 - Different for Each Town  INJECT MEANS: Phone
PROJECTED TIME: 1310
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: Second Round Blackout Call: Assistance call from nearby community

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***adjacent community***. We have two nursing homes without power and we need to evacuate the residents. Can you send some ambulances to help?

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***store location***. The lights have gone out and we have some teenagers stealing merchandise from the store. We need the police right away.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
MESSAGE NO. 22 - Different for Each Town
INJECT MEANS: Phone
PROJECTED TIME: 1320
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: Second Round Blackout Call: School still without lights

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

I’m calling from ***school and street address***. We have about 150 children here for day camp. I called earlier and was told that the lights would be back on within an hour. That was several hours ago and they’re still not on. We need to get the children out of here. We need some help.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

This call would ordinarily have come to the 911 center. Ensure that the appropriate Village personnel are notified of this situation.

Ensure that there is a proper accounting of Village resources (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, police etc.). If a piece of equipment is to be dispatched to one location, it cannot be used elsewhere until that event has been cleared.

Prompts:
***THIS IS A DRILL***

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MESSAGE NO. 23 - All Towns
INJECT MEANS: Video tape
PROJECTED TIME: 1330
INJECTED BY: Argonne Controller
INJECT TO: Community Controller
SUMMARY: News report that bomb threat has been cleared.

MESSAGE:

This is a Drill. This is a Drill.

ITVN Reporter: The "suspicious device" found this morning on Midwest Gas Company’s pipeline in Will County is “a hoax.” That, according to State Police who have arrested a man believed to be responsible for both the hoax device and bomb threats phoned to ComEd and local media. The man in custody, police say, is a former Midwest Gas Co. employee.

Midwest Gas has begun procedures to reopen its pipeline that resulted in rolling power outages throughout the area. Chicago Power Company estimates that its two 500 MW electric power plants, shut down when Midwest stopped the gas flow, will be restarted and feeding electricity to ComEd within an hour.

That’s good news but it’s been a day many of us in Chicago-land won’t soon forget.

Power outages trapped people in elevators and terrified motorists at intersections and railroad crossings where lights and gates didn’t work. Police, already taxed by ComEd’s request for increased security at substations and transmission lines, had to deal with a myriad of traffic accidents, shoplifting at darkened malls and a lot of people who were just plain hot and mad about it.

Emergency and medical services personnel responded to numerous calls for help when power outages created problems for people on respirators. Some nursing homes and office buildings were evacuated when temperatures inside became too uncomfortable. Several facilities with backup generators, including at least one water pumping station, discovered that their backup equipment didn’t work.

And, if you came to work on less than a quarter tank of gas, you worried all day that you wouldn’t be able to fine a gas station with power at the pumps before the red light started flashing.

I’m Willoughby Jones, off to find a gas station.

This is a Drill. This is a Drill

CONTROLLER NOTES:

Ensure that appropriate Village personnel either view the tape or are made aware of the contents of the news broadcast.

Prompts: Can it be verified that the power is back on throughout the Village? Should the ComEd representative be contacted to verify the news report? Should all Village personnel be returned to normal status now or wait?