S

ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICE

Page 1 of 2

1. ECN 647505

Proj.
ECN

2. ECN Category (mark one)	3. Originator's Name, Organization, MSIN, and Telephone No.	4. USQ Required?	5. Date
Supplemental ☐	T.B. Powers, Nuclear Safety, R3-26, 372-2509	☐ Yes ☒ No	6-7-99
Direct Revision ☒	6. Project Title/No./Work Order No.	7. Bldg./Sys./Fac. No.	8. Approval Designator
Change ECN ☐	Spent Nuclear Fuel Project	W-441	E, S ^N , Q
Temporary ☐	9. Document Numbers Changed by this ECN (includes sheet no. and rev.)	10. Related ECN No(s).	11. Related PO No.
Standby ☐	HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-004, Rev. 2A	637191	N/A
Supersedeure ☐			
Cancel/Void ☐			

12a. Modification Work	12b. Work Package No.	12c. Modification Work Complete	12d. Restored to Original Condition (Temp. or Standby ECN only)
☐ Yes (fill out Blk. 12b)	N/A	N/A	N/A
☒ No (NA Blks. 12b, 12c, 12d)		Design Authority/Cog. Engineer Signature & Date	Design Authority/Cog. Engineer Signature & Date

13a. Description of Change 13b. Design Baseline Document? ☐ Yes ☒ No

used as input
 The changes to HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-004 are consistent with the changes to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report, HNF-3553 Annex B.

14a. Justification (mark one)			
Criteria Change ☐	Design Improvement ☒	Environmental ☐	Facility Deactivation ☐
As-Found ☐	Facilitate Const ☐	Const. Error/Omission ☐	Design Error/Omission ☐

14b. Justification Details

See block 13a.

15. Distribution (include name, MSIN, and no. of copies)

See attached distribution coversheet.

RELEASE STAMP

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1. ECN (use no. from pg. 1)

647505

16. Design Verification Required

☐ Yes
☒ No

17. Cost Impact

ENGINEERING
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Savings ☐

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18. Schedule Impact (days)

Improvement ☐ N/A
Delay ☐

19. Change Impact Review: Indicate the related documents (other than the engineering documents identified on Side 1) that will be affected by the change described in Block 13. Enter the affected document number in Block 20.

SDD/DD	☐	N/A	Seismic/Stress Analysis	☐	Tank Calibration Manual	☐
Functional Design Criteria	☐		Stress/Design Report	☐	Health Physics Procedure	☐
Operating Specification	☐		Interface Control Drawing	☐	Spares Multiple Unit Listing	☐
Criticality Specification	☐		Calibration Procedure	☐	Test Procedures/Specification	☐
Conceptual Design Report	☐		Installation Procedure	☐	Component Index	☐
Equipment Spec.	☐		Maintenance Procedure	☐	ASME Coded Item	☐
Const. Spec.	☐		Engineering Procedure	☐	Human Factor Consideration	☐
Procurement Spec.	☐		Operating Instruction	☐	Computer Software	☐
Vendor Information	☐		Operating Procedure	☐	Electric Circuit Schedule	☐
OM Manual	☐		Operational Safety Requirement	☐	ICRS Procedure	☐
FSAR/SAR	☐		IEFD Drawing	☐	Process Control Manual/Plan	☐
Safety Equipment List	☐		Cell Arrangement Drawing	☐	Process Flow Chart	☐
Radiation Work Permit	☐		Essential Material Specification	☐	Purchase Requisition	☐
Environmental Impact Statement	☐		Fac. Proc. Samp. Schedule	☐	Tickler File	☐
Environmental Report	☐		Inspection Plan	☐		☐
Environmental Permit	☐		Inventory Adjustment Request	☐		☐

20. Other Affected Documents: (NOTE: Documents listed below will not be revised by this ECN.) Signatures below indicate that the signing organization has been notified of other affected documents listed below.

Document Number/Revision

Document Number/Revision

Document Number Revision

N/A

21. Approvals

Signature	Date
Design Authority J. J. Irwin	6/7/99
Cog. Eng. T. B. Powers	6/4/99
Cog. Mgr. R. D. Crowe	6/7/99
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Environ. J. E. Turnbaugh	6/7/99

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Signature or a Control Number that tracks the Approval Signature

N/A

ADDITIONAL

Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Hazard Analysis Report

T. B. Powers, * P. R. Patterson

Fluor Daniel Northwest, Inc., Richland, WA 99352

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Abstract: This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) Hazard Analysis to support the CVDF Final Safety Analysis Report and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, "Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports," and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, "Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports."

* ARES Corp.

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(2) Title Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Hazard Analysis Report		

CHANGE CONTROL RECORD					
(3) Revision	(4) Description of Change - Replace, Add, and Delete Pages	Authorized for Release			
		(5) Cog. Engr.	Date	(6) Cog. Mgr.	Date
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1	<u>ECN: 630494</u> <i>This hazard analysis has been updated to reflect continuing design progress to date. Revision 1 of this document reflects design information as provided in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Safety Analysis Report, Phase II, HNF-SD-SNF-SAR-002, Revision 3.</i>				
2	<u>ECN: 637182</u> <i>This revision of the hazard analysis has been updated to reflect the elimination of the MCO relief valve during processing. This also reflects information as provided in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Safety Analysis Report, Phase II, HNF-SD-SNF-SAR-002, Revision 4.</i>				
2A	<u>ECN: 637191</u> <i>This revision reflects the changes in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Safety Analysis Report, Phase II, HNF-SD-SNF-SAR-002, Revision 4A.</i>				
3 RS	<u>ECN: 647505</u> <i>is used as input</i> <i>This revision reflects the changes in the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report, HNF-3553 Annex B, Revision 0.</i>	T. B. Powers <i>Tom B. Powers</i> <i>4/4/99</i>		R. D. Crowe <i>RDC</i> <i>6/7/99</i>	

**COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY
HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT**

**HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-004
Revision 3**

June 1999

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LIST OF TERMS

CVDF	Cold Vacuum Drying Facility
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
FSAR	final safety analysis report
MCO	multi-canister overpack

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COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) hazard analysis to support the CVDF final safety analysis report (FSAR) and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) standard, DOE-STD-3009-94, *Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports*, and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, *Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports*.

The hazard analysis process identified hazardous conditions and material at risk, determined causes for potential accidents, identified preventive and mitigative features, and qualitatively estimated the frequencies and consequences of specific occurrences. The hazard analysis was performed by a team of cognizant CVDF operations and design personnel, safety analysts familiar with the CVDF, and technical experts in specialty areas. Attachment A lists the members of the hazard analysis team and describes the background and experience of each.

The material included in this report documents the final state of a nearly two-year-long process involving formal facilitated group sessions and independent hazard and accident analysis work. The hazard analysis process led to the selection of candidate accidents for further quantitative analysis. New information relative to the hazards, discovered during the accident analysis, was incorporated into the hazard analysis data in order to compile a complete profile of facility hazards. Through this process, the results of the hazard and accident analyses led directly to the identification of safety structures, systems, and components; technical safety requirements; and other controls required to protect the public, workers, and environment.

2.0 SCOPE OF THE HAZARD ANALYSIS

The hazard analysis documented in this report, conducted to support the CVDF FSAR, covered normal, intended, CVDF operations to remove free water from the multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. The hazard analysis process, described in Chapter 3.0, examined:

- Routine activities to maintain the facility and to prepare for processing operations
- Receiving the trailer containing the cask-MCO, moving it into one of the facility's four process bays, positioning and securing the trailer, and finalizing bay preparations for processing (processing operations are not planned in the fifth bay)

- Operations involved with venting the cask-MCO, removing the cask lid, preparing the MCO for processing, installing process equipment, and establishing process connections to the MCO
 - Process hood/seal ring
 - MCO process port connectors
 - Tempered water system
- Verification and testing of equipment and connections prior to processing
- Monitoring and controlling process operations utilizing the monitoring and control system and the safety-class instrumentation and control system during the following processing modes
 - Heatup Mode
 - Drain Mode
 - Purge/Flush Mode
 - Drying Mode
 - Proof Mode
 - Pressure Test Mode
- Establishing MCO conditions for shipping, MCO port valve leak-testing, removing the process connections, reinstalling the process port covers, draining and drying the cask, and reinstalling the cask lid
- Preparing the trailer and bay for shipping, connecting the trailer to the transporter, and releasing the cask-MCO for shipment to the Canister Storage Building.

The following key sources of information were used to evaluate the hazards:

- HNF-3553, *Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report*, Annex B, “Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report”
 - Chapters B2.0 and B4.0 for facility design and operations information
 - Chapter B3.0 for the facility radioactive materials inventory
 - Chapter B6.0 for evaluating the potential for hazards from nuclear criticality
- HNF-SD-SNF-FHA-003, *Fire Hazards Analysis for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility*
- HNF-SD-TP-SARP-017, *Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Onsite, Multi-Canister Overpack Cask*, for coverage of accidents involving the transporter and transportation cask and for definition of assumptions inherent in defining the transportation window
- HNF-SD-SNF-SARR-005, *Multi-Canister Overpack Topical Report*, for criteria and assumptions related to the MCO design

- The latest available process information as presented in SNF-2356, *Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Operations Manual*
- Representatives from the design authority and from facility operations for details of design, operating modes, and procedures.

3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

This section presents the methodology used to perform the CVDF hazard analysis for normal operations. The hazard identification process systematically and comprehensively identified hazards that can contribute to the uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous materials or that can threaten the safety of facility workers. In addition to DOE Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94, guidance provided in HNF-PRO-704, *Hazard and Accident Analysis Process*, and *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures* (AIChE 1985), was used to develop the hazard analysis process. Specifically, the analysis followed the American Institute of Chemical Engineers preliminary hazard analysis method, and included elements of the process/systems checklists and “what-if” analysis methods.

3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The hazard analysis included identification of the hazards associated with CVDF design and operations based on descriptions provided in Chapters B2.0 and B4.0 of the CVDF FSAR (HNF-3553, Annex B) on an operational flow diagram, an operating sequence contained in the operations manual, and the other referenced material (see Section 4.0). The hazard analysis team included design authorities, operations personnel and hazard and accident analysts. The team met in facilitated sessions and communicated informally throughout the process. The team defined hazards as radioactive or hazardous materials (material at risk), system or process characteristics, or energy sources that represent a potential for an accident that could have an adverse effect on facility workers, the CVDF, the environment, or the public. Table 1 summarizes the material at risk for the CVDF in terms of type, form, and quantity.

A standardized checklist, Table 2, was used to identify potentially hazardous materials and energy sources present in each of the following six facility areas:

- Administrative area (AA)
- Transfer corridor and mechanical corridor (TC)
- Process bays 2-5 (PB)
- Process bay 1 – a spare bay (SB)
- Process water room (PW)
- Outside (OU).

Figure 1 provides a simplified drawing of the CVDF.

Tables 3 through 8 show the hazard identification results for each area. Each identified hazard was assigned a unique designator to allow for tracking. The hazard identification checklists were developed by a subgroup of the hazard analysis team and reviewed and accepted by the entire team.

3.2 HAZARD EVALUATION

The hazard evaluation was a structured and systematic examination of the CVDF and its operations using standard industry (American Institute of Chemical Engineers) hazard evaluation techniques. The first step in the hazard evaluation, once the hazards had been identified, was to screen the potentially hazardous materials and energy sources for those that presented only standard industrial hazards. These hazards are defined in DOE-STD-3009-94 as those that "are routinely encountered in general industry and construction, and for which national consensus codes and/or standards (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration, transportation safety) exist to guide safe design and operation without the need for special analysis to define safe design and/or operational parameters." Tables 9 through 14 list, by facility area, the standard industrial hazards that do not contribute to the uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous material. The standard industrial hazards listed are controlled through the implementation of institutional safety programs as described in the programmatic sections of the CVDF FSAR (HNF-3553, Annex B). The hazard analysis team agreed by consensus to the results of the screening for standard industrial hazard items.

Next, the team met in facilitated sessions to characterize each hazard. Hazard analysis worksheets were designed to capture the required information. Each hazard was assigned a unique identifier for tracking. Using the worksheets and the hazard summary as a guide, each hazardous condition was assessed to identify potential accidents, causes, frequencies, and consequences, and to determine a qualitative likelihood of occurrence of the initiating event and the resulting consequence. The assessment of likelihood and consequence for each hazardous condition was a collective, qualitative judgment made by the hazard analysis team. The assessment estimated the likelihoods and consequences of each hazardous condition scenario in two cases. The first case considered designed passive features only. The second case considered designed passive features as well as credited active features and administrative features.

The completed hazard analysis worksheets, included in this report in Attachment 2 as Table A2-1, show the results of the hazard evaluation as compiled by the hazard analysis team. The evaluation results are based on the hazard identification results, material-at-risk summaries, reviews of the systems designs and planned operations, existing safety documentation, and the experience of hazard analysis team members. Each column of the hazard analysis tables is explained below to aid in understanding the information contained therein.

Location/checklist entry. This column contains each hazard's unique identifier, which indicates the facility area, the hazard checklist category, and the specific hazard. For example, a designator of TV-F-01 would represent the truck vestibule (TV), a linear

kinetic hazard (F) from a car, truck, or bus (01). If a single hazard could result in more than one consequence, a lowercase letter is appended to the identifier (e.g., TV-F-01a, TV-F-01b).

Hazard energy source/material. This column further defines the specific hazard under consideration (e.g., a moving transporter).

Hazardous condition. This column describes the hazardous condition that the energy source or material represents (e.g., transporter collision).

Cause. This column identifies initiators of the potential accident (e.g., transporter collision with facility structure [the potential accident] could be caused by human error on the driver's part, by mechanical failure of the vehicle, or by misplaced equipment). Typical potential causes include equipment failures, operational errors, abnormal operating conditions, poor operating practices, and environmental conditions. The causes of a potential accident are identified to support a qualitative frequency evaluation.

Potential accident. This column identifies potential accidents that could result from the identified hazardous conditions (e.g., transporter collision with facility structures, systems, or components or with personnel).

Consequence. This column identifies the potential effects of the hazardous condition and potential accident in terms of radioactive or hazardous material releases and impact to personnel and facility systems, structures, and components.

Credited prevention. This column lists preventive safety features present within the facility that are credited with reducing the frequency of the hazard or accident. The credited features listed in this column (both engineered and administrative) include only the controls the accident analyst required to be implemented to support the actual accident analysis. These preventive controls (along with the mitigative controls) are those controls necessary to meet evaluation guidelines.

Frequency code. Two evaluations of the likelihood of occurrence of the hazardous condition and potential accident are listed in this column. The first frequency code subcolumn ranks the hazard and accident frequency by considering the impact of any passive features (e.g., structures, barriers) listed in the table but not the impact of active features or planned controls (e.g., valves, shipping restrictions). The second frequency code subcolumn ranks the hazardous condition and potential accident frequency considering preventive controls, including passive controls. The assessment of likelihood was a collective, qualitative judgment made by the hazard analysis team. The likelihood assessments resulted in frequency rankings based on the initiating event frequencies and subsequent failures on a per-year basis. The qualitative criteria for likelihood assessments are as follows.

- F3 The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is likely to occur during the facility lifetime.
- F2 The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is foreseeable, but unlikely.
- F1 The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is perhaps possible, but extremely unlikely.
- F0 The hazardous condition based on the causes postulated is considered too improbable to warrant further consideration.

Credited mitigation. This column lists mitigative safety features present within the facility that are credited with reducing the consequence of the hazard. The credited features listed in this column (both engineered and administrative) include only the controls the accident analyst required to be implemented to support the actual accident analysis. These mitigative controls (along with the preventive controls) are those controls necessary to meet evaluation guidelines. In some cases a control may reduce both the frequency and the consequence of a hazard.

Consequence code. Two evaluations of the potential effects of the hazardous condition on the health and safety of people and on the environment are listed in this column. The first consequence code subcolumn ranks the hazard and accident consequence by considering the impact of any passive features (e.g., structures, barriers) listed in the table but not the impact of active features or planned controls (e.g., valves, shipping restrictions). The second consequence code subcolumn ranks the hazardous condition and potential accident consequence with mitigative controls, including passive controls. The assessment of the consequence for each hazardous condition was a collective, qualitative judgment made by the hazard analysis team. The qualitative criteria for consequence assessments are as follows.

- S3 On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is sufficient material and release energy to affect a receptor at the nearest point of uncontrolled public access.
- S2 On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is sufficient material and energy to affect an onsite receptor (collocated worker) 100 m from the source of the release.
- S1 On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, the release is confined to the facility and affects facility workers.
- S0 On the basis of material at risk and causes postulated, there is insufficient material released to affect facility workers.

The more severe consequence categories encompass the less severe consequence categories. For example, a hazardous condition assessed as having onsite consequences (S2) is also considered to have facility worker consequences (S1).

Defense in depth for worker safety features. This column contains any additional controls that will reduce the likelihood or consequences even further, but no specific credit is taken for them in the quantitative analysis.

3.3 CANDIDATE ACCIDENT SELECTION

The hazardous conditions identified by the hazard evaluation have been used to select candidate accidents for a more detailed, quantitative analysis in the CVDF FSAR (HNF-3553, Annex B). The general selection criteria used were consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94: "The range of accident scenarios analyzed in a SAR should be such that a complete set of bounding conditions to define the envelope of accident conditions to which the operation could be subjected are evaluated and documented."

The team used the four-step process described below to identify specific hazardous conditions that, together, represented the "complete set of bounding conditions" requiring further analysis. In summary, the process involved creating representative sets (or "bins") of hazardous conditions having similar release characteristics, similar initiators, and/or similar controls, and identifying (using the Attachment A, Figure A3-1 ranking matrix) the hazardous condition that represented the most severe consequences and the highest risk in each bin. The highest ranking hazardous condition in each bin bounded the other hazardous conditions in the bin and, therefore, lead to candidate accidents needing further analysis. These hazardous conditions and candidate accidents represent the "complete set of bounding conditions" for the CVDF accident analysis.

The following four-step process was used by the evaluation team to select the CVDF bounding accidents:

1. Initial screening
2. Assignment of release attributes
3. Creation of hazardous material release bins
4. Selection of representative bounding hazardous conditions for each release attribute category.

To capture and record the relational nature of the data developed in the four steps, the results have been organized into two tables, Table A3-1 in Attachment A and Table A4-1 in Attachment B. The following sections describe each step, and identify where in Table A3-1 and Table A4-1 the related information is located.

Initial Screening. All hazardous conditions with a frequency of F1 (extremely unlikely) or greater and unmitigated consequences assessed as S3 (offsite consequences) or S2 (collocated worker consequences) were chosen for consideration as representative accidents. These hazardous conditions are listed in Table A3-1, with their frequency and consequence rankings listed under the column entitled "Frequency/consequence codes." There were no hazardous conditions assessed as S1 (facility worker consequences) involving radiological hazards requiring detailed accident analysis. The S1 hazardous conditions are addressed qualitatively in the CVDF FSAR (HNF-3553, Annex B). Hazard conditions having no consequences (S0) were dropped from consideration.

Assignment of Release Attributes. Each hazardous condition was evaluated and described in terms of certain release attributes related to uncontrolled release of the material at risk. This description was assembled to ensure that at least one candidate accident was selected to represent each unique set of release conditions. The following hazardous material release attributes were used:

- Hazardous source (Attachment A, Table A3-1)
- Hazardous conditions and initiators (Attachment A, Table A3-1).

Creation of Hazardous Material Release Bins. As the hazardous condition release attributes were identified, each hazardous condition was assigned to a bin category. Assignment to a bin category was based upon the potential accident release characteristics, initiators, and/or proposed mitigative or preventative controls. Table A4-1 in Attachment 4 lists the bin category assignment for each hazardous condition under the "Bin" column heading. The final step in creating the release attribute bins was to assemble hazardous conditions having the same bin category into a listing. This listing is the basis for Table A4-1, in which the hazardous conditions are grouped into their bin categories under the "Candidate accident" column.

Selection of Representative Bounding Hazardous Conditions for each Release

Attribute Category. Within each bin category, the most severe hazardous condition, considering consequences, and the highest risk accident were identified using the three-by-three likelihood and consequence ranking matrix described in DOE-STD-3009-94 (see Attachment A, Figure A3-1). In Table A4-1 of Attachment 4, the bin category hazardous conditions are listed in descending order with the highest ranking hazardous condition at the top. In each accident bin, more than one condition may have been required to provide the necessary bounding conditions for a bin. Table A4-1 identifies the bounding condition, or when necessary, bounding conditions for each bin.

Unique hazardous conditions were identified and selected as a part of the accident analysis process. However, the binning process described here provided the basis for identification and selection of those unique conditions. Briefly, at the completion of design basis accident analysis for each bin category, the results were compared with the other hazardous conditions in the original bin to ensure that no unique and unanalyzed conditions existed.

3.4 HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY

The final list of candidate accidents includes all hazardous conditions with a frequency of F1 (extremely unlikely) or greater and whose unmitigated consequences were assessed as S3 (offsite consequences) or S2 (collocated worker consequences). Attachment 4, Table A4-1 provides the final list of candidate accidents. The table also identifies the hazardous condition, or conditions, chosen as representative and bounding of all other conditions listed in the bin.

4.0 REFERENCES

- AICHe, 1985, *Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures*, American Institute of Chemical Engineers
- DOE Order 5480.23, *Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports*, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
- DOE-STD-3009-94, 1994, *Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports*, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
- HNF-3553, 1998, *Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report*, Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
- HNF-PRO-704, *Hazard and Accident Analysis Process*, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
- HNF-SD-SNF-FHA-003, 1997, *Preliminary Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Vacuum Drying System Facility*, Rev. 1, Draft, Fluor Daniel, Hanford, Incorporated, Richland Washington.
- HNF-SD-SNF-SARR-005, 1998, *Multi-Canister Overpack Topical Report*, Rev. 1, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
- HNF-SD-TP-SARP-017, 1998, *Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Onsite, Multi-Canister Overpack Cask*, Rev. 1, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
- SNF-2356, 1998, *Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Operations Manual*, Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.

Figure 1. Main Areas of the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility.

Table 1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Material at Risk (Type, Form, and Quantity).

Field name or location	MAR-subject	MAR-description	MAR-classification	Capacity	Material type	Physical form	Volume or activity	Transient	Quantity	Comments
Process bay	MCO in cask	SNF and particulate matter in MCO	SNF in MCO	1,000 L per MCO; five to six baskets	Spent fuel from N Reactor (upper bound)	Solid consisting of fuel and particulate corrosion products	6.40 MTU at 26,200 Ci/MTU	Yes, particulate is transient	Upper bound mass is 6.40 MTU per MCO	
				MCO estimated to contain 25 kg of particulate matter after cold vacuum drying and shipping to CSB (upper bound)						
Transfer corridor		Hydrogen gas	Combustible gas	-1 m ³ of hydrogen gas per MCO	Hydrogen gas	Gas	-1 m ³ of hydrogen gas per MCO	Yes	-1 m ³ of hydrogen gas per MCO	
	Truck fuel tank	Diesel fuel	Diesel fuel	40 gal	NA	Liquid	Up to 100 gal	Yes	One tank	
	Particulate on HVAC filters (central and local)	Finely divided radioactive particulate from MCOs	Radioactive particulate matter	Less than 20 g	NA	Solid	Unknown	Yes, particulate is transient	20 g	
Process water conditioning system components and piping	Process water conditioning system components and piping	SNF and particulate drained from MCO	Radioactive particulate matter	Less than 20 kg in filters, EXM, tanks, and piping	Spent fuel from N Reactor	Solid consisting of particulate corrosion products	0.02 MTU at 26,200 Ci/MTU	Yes, particulate is transient	Upper bound is 20 kg	
Outside area	Inert gas storage	Helium used to inert MCOs and overpack storage tubes	Helium	Storage tubes on trailer	NA	Gas	NA	Yes		

HVAC = heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (filter).

EXM = ion exchange module.

MCO = multicarrier overpack.

MTU = metric ton of uranium.

NA = not applicable.

SNF = spent nuclear fuel.

Table 2. Hazardous Material/Energy Source Checklist: Example.

NODE:

Y NA. Electrical	Y NE. Kinetic - Rotational	Y NF. Kinetic - Linear	Y NG. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y NH. Friction	Y NI. Corrosives
☐ 1. Battery banks	☐ 1. Centrifuges	☐ 1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐ 1. Human effort	☐ 1. Belts	☐ 1. Acids
☐ 2. Cable runs	☐ 2. Motors	☐ 2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐ 2. Shafts	☐ 2. Bearings	☐ 2. Caustics
☐ 3. Diesel generators	☐ 3. Pumps	☐ 3. Railroad	☐ 3. Lifts and cranes	☐ 3. Fans	☐ 3. Natural chemicals
☐ 4. Electrical equipment	☐ 4. Fans	☐ 4. Obstructions	☐ 4. Bucket and ladder	☐ 4. Surge tanks	☐ 4. Decontamination solution
☐ 5. HVAC heaters	☐ 5. Laundry equipment	☐ 5. Crane loads	☐ 5. Trucks	☐ 5. Autoclave	☐ 5. High temperature waste
☐ 6. High voltage	☐ 6. Shop equipment	☐ 6. Pressure vessel blowdown	☐ 6. Slings	☐ 6. Pumps	
☐ 7. Motors	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Hoists	☐ 7. Gas vessels	
☐ 8. Pumps			☐ 8. Elevators	☐ 8. Pressurized vessels	
☐ 9. Power tools			☐ 9. Jacks	☐ 9. Stressed members	
☐ 10. Switchgear			☐ 10. Scaffold and ladders	☐ 8. Gas receivers	
☐ 11. Service outlets, fittings			☐ 11. Pits and excavations	☐ 9. Vacuum	
☐ 12. Transmission lines			☐ 12. Elevated doors	☐ 10. Steam headers and lines	
☐ 13. Underground wires			☐ 13. Vessels	☐ 11. Other	
☐ 14. Wiring			☐ 14. Other		
☐ 16. Other					
Y NB. Thermal	Y NE. Kinetic - Rotational	Y NF. Kinetic - Linear	Y NG. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y NH. Pressure - Volume	Y NI. Corrosives
☐ 1. Bunsen burner/hot plates	☐ 1. Centrifuges	☐ 1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐ 1. Human effort	☐ 1. Boilers	☐ 1. Acids
☐ 2. Electrical equipment	☐ 2. Motors	☐ 2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐ 2. Shafts	☐ 2. Surge tanks	☐ 2. Caustics
☐ 3. Furnaces/boilers/heater	☐ 3. Pumps	☐ 3. Railroad	☐ 3. Lifts and cranes	☐ 3. Fans	☐ 3. Natural chemicals
☐ 4. Steam lines	☐ 4. Fans	☐ 4. Obstructions	☐ 4. Bucket and ladder	☐ 4. Autoclave	☐ 4. Decontamination solution
☐ 5. Welding torch/arc	☐ 5. Laundry equipment	☐ 5. Crane loads	☐ 5. Trucks	☐ 5. Motors	
☐ 6. Diesel units/fire box/exhaust line	☐ 6. Shop equipment	☐ 6. Pressure vessel blowdown	☐ 6. Slings	☐ 6. Pumps	
☐ 7. Radioactive decay heat	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Hoists	☐ 7. Gas vessels	
☐ 8. Exposed components			☐ 8. Elevators	☐ 8. Pressurized vessels	
☐ 9. Power tools			☐ 9. Jacks	☐ 9. Stressed members	
☐ 10. Convective			☐ 10. Scaffold and ladders	☐ 10. Steam headers and lines	
☐ 11. Solar			☐ 11. Pits and excavations	☐ 11. Other	
☐ 12. Cryogenic			☐ 12. Elevated doors		
☐ 13. Other			☐ 13. Vessels		
			☐ 14. Other		
Y NC. Friction	Y NE. Kinetic - Rotational	Y NF. Kinetic - Linear	Y NG. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y NH. Pressure - Volume	Y NI. Corrosives
☐ 1. Belts	☐ 1. Centrifuges	☐ 1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐ 1. Human effort	☐ 1. Boilers	☐ 1. Acids
☐ 2. Bearings	☐ 2. Motors	☐ 2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐ 2. Shafts	☐ 2. Surge tanks	☐ 2. Caustics
☐ 3. Fans	☐ 3. Pumps	☐ 3. Railroad	☐ 3. Lifts and cranes	☐ 3. Fans	☐ 3. Natural chemicals
☐ 4. Gears	☐ 4. Fans	☐ 4. Obstructions	☐ 4. Bucket and ladder	☐ 4. Autoclave	☐ 4. Decontamination solution
☐ 5. Motors	☐ 5. Laundry equipment	☐ 5. Crane loads	☐ 5. Trucks	☐ 5. Motors	
☐ 6. Power tools	☐ 6. Shop equipment	☐ 6. Pressure vessel blowdown	☐ 6. Slings	☐ 6. Pumps	
☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Hoists	☐ 7. Gas vessels	
			☐ 8. Elevators	☐ 8. Pressurized vessels	
			☐ 9. Jacks	☐ 9. Stressed members	
			☐ 10. Scaffold and ladders	☐ 10. Steam headers and lines	
			☐ 11. Pits and excavations	☐ 11. Other	
			☐ 12. Elevated doors		
			☐ 13. Vessels		
			☐ 14. Other		
Y ND. Corrosives	Y NE. Kinetic - Rotational	Y NF. Kinetic - Linear	Y NG. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y NH. Pressure - Volume	Y NI. Corrosives
☐ 1. Acids	☐ 1. Centrifuges	☐ 1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐ 1. Human effort	☐ 1. Boilers	☐ 1. Acids
☐ 2. Caustics	☐ 2. Motors	☐ 2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐ 2. Shafts	☐ 2. Surge tanks	☐ 2. Caustics
☐ 3. Natural chemicals	☐ 3. Pumps	☐ 3. Railroad	☐ 3. Lifts and cranes	☐ 3. Fans	☐ 3. Natural chemicals
☐ 4. Decontamination solution	☐ 4. Fans	☐ 4. Obstructions	☐ 4. Bucket and ladder	☐ 4. Autoclave	☐ 4. Decontamination solution
☐ 5. High temperature waste	☐ 5. Laundry equipment	☐ 5. Crane loads	☐ 5. Trucks	☐ 5. Motors	
	☐ 6. Shop equipment	☐ 6. Pressure vessel blowdown	☐ 6. Slings	☐ 6. Pumps	
	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Other	☐ 7. Hoists	☐ 7. Gas vessels	
			☐ 8. Elevators	☐ 8. Pressurized vessels	
			☐ 9. Jacks	☐ 9. Stressed members	
			☐ 10. Scaffold and ladders	☐ 10. Steam headers and lines	
			☐ 11. Pits and excavations	☐ 11. Other	
			☐ 12. Elevated doors		
			☐ 13. Vessels		
			☐ 14. Other		

Y NM. Hazardous Materials

- ☐ 1. Alkali metals
- ☐ 2. Asphyxiants
- ☐ 3. Biologicals
- ☐ 4. Carcinogens
- ☐ 5. Corrosives
- ☐ 6. Oxidizers
- ☐ 7. Toxics
- ☐ 8. Heavy metals
- ☐ 9. Other

Y NN. Ionizing Radiation Sources

- ☐ 1. Fissile material
- ☐ 2. Radiography equipment
- ☐ 3. Radioactive material
- ☐ 4. Radioactive sources
- ☐ 5. Other

Y NP. External Events

- ☐ 1. Explosion
- ☐ 2. Fire
- ☐ 3. Other sites

Y NQ. Vehicles in Motion (external to facility)

- ☐ 1. Airplane
- ☐ 2. Helicopter
- ☐ 3. Train
- ☐ 4. Truck/motorcar
- ☐ 5. Other

Y NR. Natural Phenomena

- ☐ 1. Earthquake
- ☐ 2. Flood
- ☐ 3. Lightning
- ☐ 4. Rain
- ☐ 5. Snow, freezing weather
- ☐ 6. Straight wind
- ☐ 7. Dust devil
- ☐ 8. Tornado
- ☐ 9. Ashfall
- ☐ 10. Range fire

Table 3. Hazardous Material/Energy Source Checklist: Administrative Area (AA).

Location: Administrative Area, Cold Vacuum Drying Facility

Y N	A. Electrical	Y N	E. Kinetic - Rotational	Y N	J. Explosives/Pyrophorics	Y N	M. Hazardous Materials
☐	1. Battery banks (UPS)	☐	1. Centrifuges	☐	1. Caps	☐	1. Aerial media
☐	2. Cable runs	☐	2. Motors	☐	2. Primer cord	☐	2. Acrylamides
☐	3. Diesel generators	☐	3. Pumps	☐	3. Dynamite	☐	3. Acrylonitrile
☐	4. Electrical equipment	☐	4. Fans	☐	4. Scrub chemicals	☐	4. Benzene
☐	5. HVAC heaters	☐	5. Laundry equipment	☐	5. Dusts	☐	5. Carbon tetrachloride
☐	6. High voltage	☐	6. Shop equipment	☐	6. Hydrogen (batteries)	☐	6. Corrosives
☐	7. Motors	☐	7. Other _____	☐	7. Gases, others	☐	7. Oxidizers
☐	8. Pumps	☐	F. Kinetic - Linear	☐	8. Nitrates	☐	8. Toxics
☐	9. Power tools	☐	1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐	9. Peroxides	☐	9. Heavy metals (mercury in relays)
☐	10. Switchgear	☐	2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐	10. Pu and U metal	☐	10. Other _____
☐	11. Service outlets, fittings	☐	3. Railroad	☐	11. Sodium	☐	
☐	12. Transformers	☐	4. Obstructions	☐	12. Other _____	☐	
☐	13. Transmission lines	☐	5. Crane loads	☐	K. Nuclear Criticality	☐	N. Ionizing Radiation Sources
☐	14. Underground wires	☐	6. Pressure vessel blowdown	☐	1. Vaults	☐	1. Fissile material
☐	15. Wiring	☐	7. Other (gas bottles)	☐	2. Shipping and receiving area	☐	2. Radiography equipment
☐	16. Other _____	☐		☐	3. Temporary storage areas	☐	3. Radioactive material
Y N	B. Thermal	Y N	G. Mass, Gravity, Height	☐	4. Filters	☐	4. Radioactive sources (sealed sources)
☐	1. Bunsen burner/hot plates	☐	1. Human effort	☐	5. Casks	☐	5. Other _____
☐	2. Electrical equipment	☐	2. Slips and trips	☐	6. Burial ground	☐	
☐	3. Furnaces/boilers/heater	☐	3. Lifts and cranes	☐	7. Storage racks	☐	P. External Events
☐	4. Steam lines	☐	4. Bucket and ladder	☐	8. Drums and basins	☐	1. Explosion
☐	5. Welding torch/larc	☐	5. Trucks	☐	9. Open flames	☐	2. Fire
☐	6. Diesel units/fire box/exhaust line	☐	6. Slings	☐	10. Truck forklifts, dollies	☐	3. Other sites
☐	7. Radioactive decay heat	☐	7. Hoists	☐	11. Hand carts	☐	
☐	8. Exposed components	☐	8. Elevators	☐	12. Cranes/lifts	☐	Q. Vehicles in Motion (external to facility)
☐	9. Power tools	☐	9. Jacks	☐	13. Hot cells, assembly, inspection	☐	1. Airplane
☐	10. Convector	☐	10. Scaffold and ladders	☐	14. Laboratories	☐	2. Helicopter
☐	11. Solar	☐	11. Pits and excavations	☐	15. Other _____	☐	3. Train
☐	12. Cryogenic	☐	12. Elevated doors	☐		☐	4. Truck/bus/car
☐	13. Other _____	☐	13. Vessels	☐		☐	5. Other _____
Y N	C. Friction	Y N	H. Pressure - Volume	☐	L. Flammable Materials	☐	R. Natural Phenomena
☐	1. Belts	☐	1. Boilers	☐	1. Packing materials	☐	1. Earthquake
☐	2. Bearings	☐	2. Surge tanks	☐	2. Rags	☐	2. Flood
☐	3. Fans	☐	3. Autoclave	☐	3. Gasoline	☐	3. Lightning
☐	4. Motors	☐	4. Test loops	☐	4. Lub oil	☐	4. Rain
☐	5. Power tools	☐	5. Gas bottles (portal monitor)	☐	5. Coolant oil	☐	5. Snow, freezing weather
☐	7. Other _____	☐	6. Pressure vessels	☐	6. Paint solvent	☐	6. Straight wind
Y N	D. Corrosives	☐	7. Stressed members	☐	7. Diesel fuel	☐	7. Dust devil
☐	1. Acids	☐	8. Gas receivers	☐	8. Buildings & contents	☐	8. Tornado
☐	2. Caustics	☐	9. Vacuum	☐	9. Trailers & contents	☐	9. Ashfall
☐	3. Natural chemicals	☐	10. Steam headers and lines	☐	10. Grease	☐	10. Range fire
☐	4. Decon solution	☐	11. Other _____	☐	11. Hydrogen (batteries)	☐	
☐	5. High temperature waste	☐		☐	12. Nitric acid	☐	
☐	6. Other _____	☐		☐	13. Organics	☐	
		☐		☐	14. Gases - others	☐	
		☐		☐	15. Liquids - others	☐	
		☐		☐	16. Other (aerosol propellant)	☐	

Table 4. Hazardous Material/Energy Source Checklist: Transfer Corridor and Mechanical Corridor (TC).

Location: *Transfer Corridor and Mechanical Corridor, Cold Vacuum Drying Facility*

[illegible]

A. Electrical	Y	N	1. Batteries	Y	N	1. Centrifuges	Y	N	J. Explosives/Pyrotechnics	Y	N	M. Hazardous Materials	Y	N
2. Batteries	□	□	2. Motors	□	□	2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	□	□	1. Caps	□	□	1. Alkali metals	□	□
3. Diesel generators	□	□	3. Pumps	□	□	3. Railroad	□	□	2. Primer cord	□	□	2. Asphyxiants	□	□
4. Electric equipment	□	□	4. Obstructions	□	□	5. Crane loads	□	□	3. Pyrotechnics	□	□	3. Biologicals	□	□
5. HVAC heaters	□	□	5. Crane loads	□	□	6. Pressure vessel blowdown	□	□	4. Solid chemicals	□	□	4. Corrosives	□	□
6. High voltage	□	□	6. Pressure vessel blowdown	□	□	7. Other (gas bottles)	□	□	5. Laundry equipment	□	□	5. Corrosives	□	□
7. Motors	□	□	7. Other (gas bottles)	□	□		□	□	6. Shop equipment	□	□	6. Oxidizers	□	□
8. Pumps	□	□		□	□		□	□	7. Other	□	□	7. Toxics	□	□
9. Power tools	□	□	F. Kinetic-Linear	Y	N	G. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y	N	8. Nitrides	□	□	8. Heavy metals	□	□
10. Switchgear	□	□	1. Cars, trucks, buses	□	□	1. Human effort	□	□	9. Peroxides	□	□	9. Other	□	□
11. Service outlets, fittings	□	□	2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	□	□	2. Stairs	□	□	10. Pu and U metal	□	□			
12. Transformers	□	□	3. Railroad	□	□	3. Lifts and cranes	□	□	11. Sodium	□	□	N. Ionizing Radiation Sources	Y	N
13. Transmission lines	□	□	4. Obstructions	□	□	4. Bucket and ladder	□	□	12. Other (uranium hydrides)	□	□	1. Fissile material	□	□
14. Underground wires	□	□	5. Crane loads	□	□	5. Trucks	□	□		□	□	2. Radioactivity equipment	□	□
15. Wiring	□	□	6. Pressure vessel blowdown	□	□	6. Rings	□	□	K. Nuclear/Criticality	Y	N	3. Radioactive material	□	□
16. Other	□	□	7. Other (gas bottles)	□	□	7. Hoists	□	□	1. Vaults	□	□	4. Radioactive sources	□	□
						8. Elevators	□	□	2. Temporary storage areas	□	□	5. Other	□	□
B. Thermal	Y	N	C. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y	N	9. Jacks	□	□	3. Shipping and receiving area	□	□			
1. Bunsen burner/hot plates	□	□	1. Human effort	□	□	10. Scaffold and ladders	□	□	4. Fillers	□	□	P. External Events	Y	N
2. Electrical equipment	□	□	2. Stairs	□	□	11. Pits and excavations	□	□	5. Casks	□	□	1. Explosion	□	□
3. Furnaces/boilers/heater	□	□	3. Lifts and cranes	□	□	12. Elevated doors	□	□	6. Burial ground	□	□	2. Fire	□	□
4. Steam lines	□	□	4. Bucket and ladder	□	□	13. Vessels	□	□	7. Storage racks	□	□	3. Other sites	□	□
5. Welding torch/larc	□	□	5. Trucks	□	□		□	□	8. Canals and basins	□	□			
6. Diesel units/life box/exhaust line	□	□	6. Rings	□	□	H. Pressure-Volume	Y	N	9. Decon solution	□	□	Q. Vehicles in Motion (external to facility)	Y	N
7. Radioactive decay heat	□	□	7. Hoists	□	□	1. Boilers	□	□	10. Trucks, forklifts, dollies	□	□	1. Airplane	□	□
8. Exposed components	□	□	8. Elevators	□	□	2. Storage tanks	□	□	11. Hand carry	□	□	2. Helicopter	□	□
9. Power tools	□	□	9. Jacks	□	□	3. Algaes	□	□	12. Cranes/lifts	□	□	3. Train	□	□
10. Connective	□	□	10. Scaffold and ladders	□	□	4. Test loads	□	□	13. Hot cells, assembly, inspection	□	□	4. Truck/bus/car	□	□
11. Solar	□	□	11. Pits and excavations	□	□	5. Gas bottles	□	□	14. Laboratories	□	□			
12. Cryogenic	□	□	12. Elevated doors	□	□	6. Pressure vessels	□	□	15. Other (MCOs, drain lines)	□	□			
13. Other (MCO contents)	□	□	13. Vessels	□	□	7. Stressed members	□	□				R. Natural Phenomena	Y	N
						8. Gas receivers	□	□	L. Flammable Materials	Y	N	1. Earthquake	□	□
C. Friction	Y	N	I. Pressure-Volume	Y	N	9. Vacuum	□	□	1. Packing materials	□	□	2. Flood	□	□
1. Belts	□	□	1. Belts	□	□	10. Steam headers and lines	□	□	2. Rugs	□	□	3. Lightning	□	□
2. Bearings	□	□	2. Storage tanks	□	□	11. Other (pressurized liquid/gas lines, truck tires, air ride suspension, air brakes)	□	□	3. Gasoline	□	□	4. Rain	□	□
3. Fans	□	□	3. Algaes	□	□		□	□	4. Lubric oil	□	□	5. Snow, freezing weather	□	□

Table 6. Hazardous Material/Energy Source Checklist: Process Bay 1 (Spare Bay) (SB).

Location: Process Bay 1 (Spare Bay), Cold Vacuum Drying Facility

Y	N	A. Electrical	Y	N	E. Kinetic - Rotational	Y	N	J. Explosives/Pyrophorics	Y	N	M. Hazardous Materials
☐	☐	1. Battery banks	☐	☐	1. Centrifuges	☐	☐	1. Caps	☐	☐	1. Alkali metals
☐	☐	2. Cable runs	☐	☐	2. Motors	☐	☐	2. Primer cord	☐	☐	2. Asphyxiants
☐	☐	3. Diesel generators	☐	☐	3. Pumps	☐	☐	3. Dynamite	☐	☐	3. Biologicals
☐	☐	4. Electrical equipment	☐	☐	4. Fans	☐	☐	4. Scrub chemicals	☐	☐	4. Carcinogens
☐	☐	5. HVAC heaters	☐	☐	5. Laundry equipment	☐	☐	5. Dusts	☐	☐	5. Corrosives
☐	☐	6. High voltage	☐	☐	6. Shop equipment	☐	☐	6. Hydrogen	☐	☐	6. Oxidizers
☐	☐	7. Motors	☐	☐	7. Other _____	☐	☐	7. Gases, others	☐	☐	7. Toxics
☐	☐	8. Pumps	☐	☐		☐	☐	8. Nitrates	☐	☐	8. Heavy metals
☐	☐	9. Power tools	☐	☐	F. Kinetic - Linear	☐	☐	9. Peroxides	☐	☐	9. Other _____
☐	☐	10. Switchgear	☐	☐	1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐	☐	10. Pu and U metal	☐	☐	
☐	☐	11. Service outlets, fittings	☐	☐	2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐	☐	11. Sodium	☐	☐	N. Ionizing Radiation Sources
☐	☐	12. Transformers	☐	☐	3. Railroad	☐	☐	12. Other _____	☐	☐	1. Fissile material
☐	☐	13. Transmission lines	☐	☐	4. Obstructions	☐	☐		☐	☐	2. Radiography equipment
☐	☐	14. Underground wires	☐	☐	5. Crane loads	☐	☐	K. Nuclear Criticality	☐	☐	2. Radioactive material
☐	☐	15. Wiring	☐	☐	6. Pressure vessel blowdown	☐	☐	1. Rods	☐	☐	3. Reproductive sources
☐	☐	16. Other _____	☐	☐	7. Other gas bottle storage	☐	☐	2. Temporary storage areas	☐	☐	4. Reproductive sources
								3. Shipping and receiving area	☐	☐	5. Other _____
Y	N	B. Thermal	Y	N	G. Mass, Gravity, Height	Y	N	L. Flammable Materials	Y	N	R. Natural Phenomena
☐	☐	1. Bunsen burner/hot plates	☐	☐	1. Human effort	☐	☐	1. Acetylene	☐	☐	1. Earthquake
☐	☐	2. Electrical equipment	☐	☐	2. Stairs	☐	☐	2. Packing materials	☐	☐	2. Flood
☐	☐	3. Furnaces/boilers/heater	☐	☐	3. Lifts and cranes	☐	☐	3. Gasoline	☐	☐	3. Lightning
☐	☐	4. Steam lines	☐	☐	4. Bucket and ladder	☐	☐	4. Lub oil	☐	☐	4. Rain
☐	☐	5. Welding torch/lac	☐	☐	5. Trucks	☐	☐	5. Coolant oil	☐	☐	5. Snow, freezing weather
☐	☐	6. Diesel units/fire box/exhaust line	☐	☐	6. Slings	☐	☐	6. Paint solvent	☐	☐	6. Straight wind
☐	☐	7. Radioactive decay heat	☐	☐	7. Hoists	☐	☐	7. Diesel fuel	☐	☐	7. Dust devil
☐	☐	8. Exposed components	☐	☐	8. Elevators	☐	☐	8. Buildings & contents	☐	☐	8. Tornado
☐	☐	9. Power tools	☐	☐	9. Jacks	☐	☐	9. Trailers & contents	☐	☐	9. Ashfall
☐	☐	10. Convective	☐	☐	10. Scaffold and ladders	☐	☐	10. Grease	☐	☐	10. Range fire
☐	☐	11. Solar	☐	☐	11. Pits and excavations	☐	☐	11. Hydrogen	☐	☐	
☐	☐	12. Cryogenic	☐	☐	12. Elevated doors	☐	☐	12. Nitric acid	☐	☐	
☐	☐	13. Other _____	☐	☐	13. Vessels	☐	☐	13. Organics	☐	☐	
					14. Other _____	☐	☐	14. Gases - others	☐	☐	
Y	N	C. Friction	Y	N	H. Pressure - Volume	Y	N	15. Liquids - others	☐	☐	
☐	☐	1. Belts	☐	☐	1. Boilers	☐	☐	16. Other (aerosol propellant)	☐	☐	
☐	☐	2. Bearings	☐	☐	2. Surge tanks	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	3. Fans	☐	☐	3. Autoclave	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	4. Gears	☐	☐	4. Test loops	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	5. Motors	☐	☐	5. Gas bottles	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	6. Power tools	☐	☐	6. Pressure vessels	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	7. Other (vehicle brakes)	☐	☐	7. Stressed members	☐	☐		☐	☐	
					8. Gas receivers	☐	☐		☐	☐	
Y	N	D. Corrosives	Y	N	9. Vacuum	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	1. Acids	☐	☐	10. Steam headers and lines	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	2. Caustics	☐	☐	11. Other (truck tires, air ride suspension, air brakes)	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	3. Natural chemicals	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	4. Decon solution	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	5. High temperature waste	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	6. Other _____	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	

Table 7. Hazardous Material/Energy Source Checklist: Process Water Room (PW).

Location: Process Water Room, Cold Vacuum Drying Facility

Y N A. Electrical ☐ 1. Battery banks ☐ 2. Cable runs ☐ 3. Diesel generators ☐ 4. Electrical equipment ☐ 5. HVAC heaters ☐ 6. High voltage ☐ 7. Motors ☐ 8. Pumps ☐ 9. Power tools ☐ 10. Service outlets, fittings ☐ 11. Transformers ☐ 12. Transmission lines ☐ 13. Underground wires ☐ 14. Wiring ☐ 15. Other _____ ☐ 16. Other _____	Y N E. Kinetic - Rotational ☐ 1. Centrifuges ☐ 2. Motors ☐ 3. Pumps ☐ 4. Fans ☐ 5. Laundry equipment ☐ 6. Shop equipment ☐ 7. Other _____ Y N F. Kinetic - Linear ☐ 1. Cars, trucks, buses ☐ 2. Forklifts, dollies, carts ☐ 3. Railroad cars ☐ 4. Overhead cranes ☐ 5. Crane loads ☐ 6. Pressure vessel blowdown ☐ 7. Other (gas bottles) _____ Y N G. Mass, Gravity, Height ☐ 1. Human effort ☐ 2. Stairs ☐ 3. Lifts and cranes ☐ 4. Bucket and ladder ☐ 5. Trucks ☐ 6. Slings ☐ 7. Hoists ☐ 8. Elevators ☐ 9. Jacks ☐ 10. Scaffold and ladders ☐ 11. Pits and excavations ☐ 12. Elevated doors ☐ 13. Vessels ☐ 14. Other (roof hatch) _____ Y N H. Pressure - Volume ☐ 1. Boilers ☐ 2. Surge tanks ☐ 3. Autoclave ☐ 4. Test loops ☐ 5. Gas bottles ☐ 6. Pressure vessels ☐ 7. Stressed members ☐ 8. Gas receivers ☐ 9. Vacuum ☐ 10. Steam headers and lines ☐ 11. Other _____ Y N I. Corrosives ☐ 1. Acids ☐ 2. Caustics ☐ 3. Natural chemicals ☐ 4. Decon solution ☐ 5. High temperature waste ☐ 6. Other _____	Y N J. Explosives/Pyrophorics ☐ 1. Caps ☐ 2. Primer cord ☐ 3. Dynamite ☐ 4. Scrub chemicals ☐ 5. Dusts ☐ 6. Hydrogen ☐ 7. Gases, others ☐ 8. Nitrates ☐ 9. Peroxides ☐ 10. PU and U metal ☐ 11. Sodium ☐ 12. Other (uranium hydride) Y N K. Nuclear/Criticality ☐ 1. Vents ☐ 2. Temporary storage areas ☐ 3. Shipping and receiving area ☐ 4. Filters ☐ 5. Casks ☐ 6. Burial ground ☐ 7. Storage racks ☐ 8. Canals and basins ☐ 9. Decon solution ☐ 10. Trucks, forklifts, dollies ☐ 11. Hand carry ☐ 12. Cranes/lifts ☐ 13. Hot cells, assembly, inspection ☐ 14. Laboratories ☐ 15. Other (tanks) _____ Y N L. Flammable Materials ☐ 1. Packing materials ☐ 2. Rags ☐ 3. Gasoline ☐ 4. Lub oil ☐ 5. Coolant oil ☐ 6. Paint solvent ☐ 7. Diesel fuel ☐ 8. Buildings & contents ☐ 9. Trailers & contents ☐ 10. Grease ☐ 11. Hydrogen ☐ 12. Nitric acid ☐ 13. Organics ☐ 14. Gases - others ☐ 15. Liquids - others ☐ 16. Other (gaseous propellant) _____	Y N M. Hazardous Materials ☐ 1. Alkali metals ☐ 2. Asphyxiants ☐ 3. Biologicals ☐ 4. Carcinogens ☐ 5. Corrosives ☐ 6. Oxidizers ☐ 7. Toxics ☐ 8. Heavy metals ☐ 9. Other _____ Y N N. Ionizing Radiation Sources ☐ 1. Fissile material ☐ 2. Radiography equipment ☐ 3. Radioactive material ☐ 4. Radioactive sources ☐ 5. Other _____ Y N P. External Events ☐ 1. Explosion ☐ 2. Fire ☐ 3. Other sites Y N Q. Vehicles in Motion (external to facility) ☐ 1. Airplane ☐ 2. Helicopter ☐ 3. Train ☐ 4. Truck/bus/car ☐ 5. Other _____ Y N R. Natural Phenomena ☐ 1. Earthquake ☐ 2. Flood ☐ 3. Lightning ☐ 4. Rain ☐ 5. Snow, freezing weather ☐ 6. Straight wind ☐ 7. Dust devil ☐ 8. Tornado ☐ 9. Ashfall ☐ 10. Range fire
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Table 8. Hazardous Material/Energy Source Checklist: Outside (OU).

Location: Outside, Cold Vacuum Drying Facility

Y	N	A. Electrical	Y	N	E. Kinetic - Rotational	Y	N	J. Explosives/Pyrophorics	Y	N	M. Hazardous Materials
☐	☐	1. Battery banks	☐	☐	1. Centrifuges	☐	☐	1. Caps	☐	☐	1. Alkali metals
☐	☐	2. Cable runs	☐	☐	2. Motors	☐	☐	2. Primer cord	☐	☐	2. Asphyxiants
☐	☐	3. Diesel generators	☐	☐	3. Pumps	☐	☐	3. Dynamite	☐	☐	3. Biologicals
☐	☐	4. Electrical equipment	☐	☐	4. Fans	☐	☐	4. Scrub chemicals	☐	☐	4. Carcinogens
☐	☐	5. HVAC heaters	☐	☐	5. Shop equipment	☐	☐	5. Dusts	☐	☐	5. Corrosives
☐	☐	6. High voltage	☐	☐	6. Other	☐	☐	6. Hydrogen	☐	☐	6. Oxidizers
☐	☐	7. Motors	☐	☐	7. Other	☐	☐	7. Gases, others	☐	☐	7. Toxics
☐	☐	8. Pumps	☐	☐	8. Nitrites	☐	☐	8. Peroxides	☐	☐	8. Heavy metals
☐	☐	9. Power tools	☐	☐	9. Carcasses and metal	☐	☐	10. Sodium	☐	☐	9. Other
☐	☐	10. Switchgear	☐	☐	11. Other	☐	☐	12. Other	☐	☐	
☐	☐	11. Service outlets, fittings	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	12. Transformers	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	13. Transmission lines	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	14. Underground wires	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	15. Wiring	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	16. Other	☐	☐		☐	☐		☐	☐	
Y	N	B. Thermal	Y	N	F. Kinetic - Linear	Y	N	K. Nuclear/Criticality	Y	N	N. Ionizing Radiation Sources
☐	☐	1. Bunsen burner/hot plates	☐	☐	1. Cars, trucks, buses	☐	☐	1. Vaults	☐	☐	1. Fissile material
☐	☐	2. Electrical equipment	☐	☐	2. Forklifts, dollies, carts	☐	☐	2. Temporary storage areas	☐	☐	2. Radiography equipment
☐	☐	3. Furnaces/boilers/heater	☐	☐	3. Railroad	☐	☐	3. Shipping and receiving area	☐	☐	3. Radioactive material
☐	☐	4. Steam lines	☐	☐	4. Obstructions	☐	☐	4. Filers	☐	☐	4. Radioactive sources
☐	☐	5. Welding torch/ac	☐	☐	5. Crane loads	☐	☐	5. Casks	☐	☐	5. Other
☐	☐	6. Diesel unit/fire box/exhaust line	☐	☐	6. Pressurized vessel blowdown	☐	☐	6. Burial ground	☐	☐	
☐	☐	7. Radioactive decay heat	☐	☐	7. Other (gas bottles)	☐	☐	7. Storage racks	☐	☐	
☐	☐	8. Exposed components	☐	☐		☐	☐	8. Canals and basins	☐	☐	
☐	☐	9. Power tools	☐	☐		☐	☐	9. Decon solution	☐	☐	
☐	☐	10. Conveyors	☐	☐		☐	☐	10. Trucks, forklifts, dollies	☐	☐	
☐	☐	11. Solar	☐	☐		☐	☐	11. Hand carry	☐	☐	
☐	☐	12. Cryogenic	☐	☐		☐	☐	12. Cranes/lifts	☐	☐	
☐	☐	13. Other	☐	☐		☐	☐	13. Hot cells, assembly, inspection	☐	☐	
Y	N	C. Friction	Y	N	G. Mass Gravity, Height	Y	N	L. Flammable Materials	Y	N	R. Natural Phenomena
☐	☐	1. Belts	☐	☐	1. Human effort	☐	☐	1. Packing materials	☐	☐	1. Earthquake
☐	☐	2. Bearings	☐	☐	2. Stairs	☐	☐	2. Rags	☐	☐	2. Flood
☐	☐	3. Fans	☐	☐	3. Lifts and cranes	☐	☐	3. Gasoline	☐	☐	3. Lightning
☐	☐	4. Gears	☐	☐	4. Bucket and ladder	☐	☐	4. Lub oil	☐	☐	4. Rain
☐	☐	5. Motors	☐	☐	5. Trucks	☐	☐	5. Paint solvent	☐	☐	5. Snow, freezing weather
☐	☐	6. Power tools	☐	☐	6. Slings	☐	☐	6. Diesel fuel	☐	☐	6. Straight wind
☐	☐	7. Other (vehicle brakes)	☐	☐	7. Holds	☐	☐	7. Dried fuel	☐	☐	7. Dust devil
☐	☐		☐	☐	8. Elevators	☐	☐	8. Buildings & contents	☐	☐	8. Tornado
☐	☐		☐	☐	9. Jacks	☐	☐	9. Trailers & contents	☐	☐	9. Ashfall
☐	☐		☐	☐	10. Scaffold and ladders	☐	☐	10. Grease	☐	☐	10. Range fire
☐	☐		☐	☐	11. Pits and excavations	☐	☐	11. Hydrogen	☐	☐	
☐	☐		☐	☐	12. Elevated doors	☐	☐	12. Nitric acid	☐	☐	
☐	☐		☐	☐	13. Vessels	☐	☐	13. Organics	☐	☐	
☐	☐		☐	☐	14. Other (roof)	☐	☐	14. Gases - others	☐	☐	
Y	N	D. Corrosives	Y	N	H. Pressure - Volume	Y	N	15. Liquids - others	Y	N	
☐	☐	1. Acids	☐	☐	1. Boilers	☐	☐	16. Other (aerosol propellant)	☐	☐	
☐	☐	2. Caustics	☐	☐	2. Surge tanks	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	3. Natural chemicals	☐	☐	3. Autoclave	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	4. Decon solution	☐	☐	4. Test loops	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	5. High temperature waste	☐	☐	5. Gas bottles	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐	6. Other	☐	☐	6. Pressure vessels	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐		☐	☐	7. Stressed members	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐		☐	☐	8. Gas receivers	☐	☐		☐	☐	
☐	☐		☐	☐	9. Steam headers and lines	☐	☐		☐	☐	
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Table 9. Standard Industrial Hazards: Administrative Area. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Electrical	Battery banks (uninterruptible power supply)	AA-A-01
	Cable runs	AA-A-02
	Electrical equipment	AA-A-04
	Motors	AA-A-07
	Power tools	AA-A-09
	Switchgear	AA-A-10
	Wiring	AA-A-15
Thermal	Bunsen burner/hot plates	AA-B-01
	Furnaces/boilers/heater	AA-B-03
	Power tools	AA-B-09
Friction	Fans	AA-C-03
	Power tools	AA-C-06
Corrosives	Acids	AA-D-01
	Caustics	AA-D-02
	Natural chemicals	AA-D-03
Kinetic - rotational	Motors	AA-E-02
	Shop equipment	AA-E-06
Kinetic - linear	Forklifts, dollies, carts	AA-F-02
Mass, gravity, height	Bucket and ladder	AA-G-04
	Jacks	AA-G-09
	Scaffold and ladders	AA-G-10
	Vessels	AA-G-13
Pressure - volume	Gas bottles (portal monitor)	AA-H-05
	Pressure vessels	AA-H-06
Explosives/pyrophorics	Scrub chemicals	AA-J-04
Hazardous materials	Alkali metals	AA-M-01
	Asphyxiants	AA-M-02
	Corrosives	AA-M-05
	Oxidizers	AA-M-06
	Toxics	AA-M-07
	Heavy metals (mercury in relays)	AA-M-08

Table 9. Standard Industrial Hazards: Administrative Area. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Ionizing radiation sources	Radioactive sources (sealed sources)	AA-N-04

*Hazard checklist identification numbers XX-Y-## represent a specific line item on a hazardous material/energy source checklist (see Table 2) where:

XX = facility area.

Y = hazard type.

= checklist designator.

Table 10. Standard Industrial Hazards: Transfer Corridor and Mechanical Corridor. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Electrical	Cable runs	TC-A-02
	Electrical equipment	TC-A-04
	HVAC heaters	TC-A-05
	High voltage	TC-A-06
	Motors	TC-A-07
	Power tools	TC-A-09
	Switchgear	TC-A-10
	Service outlets, fittings	TC-A-11
	Transformers	TC-A-12
Thermal	Wiring	TC-A-15
	Electrical equipment	TC-B-02
	Furnaces/boilers/heater	TC-B-03
Friction	Power tools	TC-B-09
	Belts	TC-C-01
	Bearings	TC-C-02
	Fans	TC-C-03
	Gears	TC-C-04
	Motors	TC-C-05
Corrosives	Power tools	TC-C-06
	Acids	TC-D-01
	Caustics	TC-D-02
Kinetic - rotational	Decon solution	TC-D-04
	Motors	TC-E-02
Mass, gravity, height	Shop equipment	TC-E-06
	Human effort	TC-G-01
	Stairs	TC-G-02
	Bucket and ladder	TC-G-04
	Slings	TC-G-06
	Hoists	TC-G-07
	Jacks	TC-G-09
	Scaffold and ladders	TC-G-10
	Elevated doors	TC-G-12
	Vessels (air compressor)	TC-G-13

Table 10. Standard Industrial Hazards: Transfer Corridor and Mechanical Corridor. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Pressure - volume	Gas bottles	TC-H-05
	Pressure vessels	TC-H-06
Explosives/pyrophorics	Scrub chemicals	TC-J-04
	Hydrogen	TC-J-06
	Gases, others	TC-J-07
Flammable Materials	Grease	TC-L-10
	Gasoline	TC-L-03
	Organics	TC-L-13
Hazardous materials	Biologicals	TC-M-03
	Carcinogens	TC-M-04
	Corrosives	TC-M-05
	Oxidizers	TC-M-06
	Toxics	TC-M-07
	Heavy metals	TC-M-08
Ionizing radiation sources	Radiography equipment	TC-N-02
	Radioactive sources	TC-N-04
Vehicles in motion (external to facility)	Train	TC-Q-03

*Hazard checklist identification numbers XX-Y-## represent a specific line item on a hazardous material/energy source checklist (see Table 2) where:

XX = facility area.

Y = hazard type.

= checklist designator.

Table 11. Standard Industrial Hazards: Process Bays 2 through 5. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Electrical	Cable runs	PB-A-02
	HVAC heaters	PB-A-05
	High voltage	PB-A-06
	Motors	PB-A-07
	Pumps	PB-A-08
	Power tools	PB-A-09
	Switchgear	PB-A-10
	Service outlets, fittings	PB-A-11
	Transformers	PB-A-12
	Wiring	PB-A-15
Thermal	Welding torch/arc	PB-B-05
	Radioactive decay heat	PB-B-07
	Exposed components	PB-B-08
	Power tools	PB-B-09
	Convective	PB-B-10
Friction	Belts	PB-C-01
	Bearings	PB-C-02
	Fans	PB-C-03
	Gears	PB-C-04
	Motors	PB-C-05
	Power tools	PB-C-06
	Other (vehicle brakes)	PB-C-07
Corrosives	Acids	PB-D-01
	Caustics	PB-D-02
	Decon solution	PB-D-04
Kinetic - rotational	Motors	PB-E-02
	Pumps	PB-E-03
	Fans	PB-E-04
	Shop equipment	PB-E-06
Kinetic - linear	Obstructions	PB-F-04
	Pressure Vessel Blowdown	PB-F-06

Table 11. Standard Industrial Hazards: Process Bays 2 through 5. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Mass, gravity, height	Human effort	PB-G-01
	Stairs	PB-G-02
	Bucket and ladder	PB-G-04
	Trucks	PB-G-05
	Slings	PB-G-06
	Hoists	PB-G-07
	Jacks	PB-G-09
	Scaffold and ladders	PB-G-10
	Elevated doors	PB-G-12
	Other (elevated platform)	PB-G-14
Pressure - volume	Surge tanks	PB-H-02
	Gas bottles	PB-H-05
	Gas receivers	PB-H-08
	Vacuum	PB-H-09
Explosives/pyrophorics	Scrub chemicals	PB-J-04
Nuclear criticality	Shipping and receiving area	PB-K-03
	Trucks, forklifts, dollies	PB-K-10
Hazardous materials	Asphyxiants	PB-M-02
	Biologicals	PB-M-03
	Carcinogens	PB-M-04
	Corrosives	PB-M-05
	Oxidizers	PB-M-06
	Toxics	PB-M-07
	Heavy metals	PB-M-08
Ionizing radiation sources	Radiography equipment	PB-N-02
	Radioactive sources	PB-N-04
External events	Fire	PB-P-02

*Hazard checklist identification numbers XX-Y-## represent a specific line item on a hazardous material/energy source checklist (see Table 2) where:

XX = facility area.

Y = hazard type.

= checklist designator.

Table 12. Standard Industrial Hazards: Process Bay 1 (Spare Bay). (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Electrical	Cable runs	SB-A-02
	Electrical equipment	SB-A-04
	Motors	SB-A-07
	Pumps	SB-A-08
	Power tools	SB-A-09
	Service outlets, fittings	SB-A-11
	Wiring	SB-A-15
Thermal	Electrical equipment	SB-B-02
	Welding torch/arc	SB-B-05
	Power tools	SB-B-09
Friction	Bearings	SB-C-02
	Gears	SB-C-04
	Motors	SB-C-05
	Power tools	SB-C-06
	Other (vehicle brakes)	SB-C-07
Corrosives	Acids	SB-D-01
	Caustics	SB-D-02
	Natural chemicals	SB-D-03
	Decon solution	SB-D-04
Kinetic - rotational	Motors	SB-E-02
	Pumps	SB-E-03
	Shop equipment	SB-E-06
Kinetic - linear	Obstruction	SB-F-04
	Crane loads	SB-F-05
Mass, gravity, height	Human effort	SB-G-01
	Lifts and cranes	SB-G-03
	Bucket and ladder	SB-G-04
	Trucks	SB-G-05
	Slings	SB-G-06
	Hoists	SB-G-07
	Jacks	SB-G-09
	Scaffold and ladders	SB-G-10
	Elevated doors	SB-G-12

Table 12. Standard Industrial Hazards: Process Bay 1 (Spare Bay). (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Pressure - volume	Gas bottles	SB-H-05
Explosives/pyrophorics	Scrub chemicals	SB-J-04
	Hydrogen	SB-J-06
Flammable materials	Grease	SB-L-10
	Organics	SB-L-13
Hazardous materials	Asphyxiants	SB-M-02
	Biologicals	SB-M-03
	Carcinogens	SB-M-04
	Corrosives	SB-M-05
	Oxidizers	SB-M-06
	Toxics	SB-M-07
	Heavy metals	SB-M-08
Ionizing radiation sources	Radiography equipment	SB-N-02
	Radioactive sources	SB-N-04
Vehicles in motion (external to facility)	Train	SB-Q-03

*Hazard checklist identification numbers XX-Y-## represent a specific line item on a hazardous material/energy source checklist (see Table 2) where:

XX = facility area.

Y = hazard type.

= checklist designator.

Table 13. Standard Industrial Hazards: Process Water Room. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Electrical	Cable runs	PW-A-02
	Electrical equipment	PW-A-04
	High voltage	PW-A-06
	Motors	PW-A-07
	Pumps	PW-A-08
	Power tools	PW-A-09
	Switchgear	PW-A-10
	Service outlets, fittings	PW-A-11
	Transformers	PW-A-12
	Wiring	PW-A-15
Thermal	Electrical equipment	PW-B-02
	Welding torch/arc	PW-B-05
	Radioactive decay heat	PW-B-07
	Power tools	PW-B-09
	Solar	PW-B-11
Friction	Bearings	PW-C-02
	Motors	PW-C-05
	Power tools	PW-C-06
Corrosives	Acids	PW-D-01
	Caustics	PW-D-02
	Decon solution	PW-D-04
Kinetic - rotational	Motors	PW-E-02
	Pumps	PW-E-03
	Shop equipment	PW-E-06
Kinetic - linear	Forklifts, dollies, carts	PW-F-02
	Crane loads	PW-F-05
	Pressure vessel blowdown	PW-F-06
Mass, gravity, height	Human effort	PW-G-01
	Stairs	PW-G-02
	Bucket and ladder	PW-G-04
	Slings	PW-G-06
	Hoists	PW-G-07
	Jacks	PW-G-09

Table 13. Standard Industrial Hazards: Process Water Room. (2 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number*
Mass, gravity, height (cont.)	Scaffold and ladders	PW-G-10
	Vessels	PW-G-13
	Other (roof hatch)	PW-G-14
Pressure - volume	Test loops	PW-H-04
	Gas bottles	PW-H-05
	Pressure vessels	PW-H-06
Explosives/pyrophorics	Scrub chemicals	PW-J-04
	Gases, other	PW-J-07
Flammable materials	Packing materials	PW-L-01
	Gasoline	PW-L-03
	Lube oil	PW-L-04
	Coolant oil	PW-L-05
	Paint solvent	PW-L-06
	Grease	PW-L-10
	Organics	PW-L-13
Hazardous materials	Asphyxiants	PW-M-02
	Biologicals	PW-M-03
	Carcinogens	PW-M-04
	Corrosives	PW-M-05
	Toxics	PW-M-07
	Heavy metals	PW-M-08
Ionizing radiation sources	Radiography equipment	PW-N-02
Vehicles in motion (external to facility)	Train	PW-Q-03
Natural phenomena	Earthquake	PW-R-01

*Hazard checklist identification numbers XX-Y-## represent a specific line item on a hazardous material/energy source checklist (see Table 2) where:

XX = facility area.

Y = hazard type.

= checklist designator.

Table 14. Standard Industrial Hazards: Outside. (3 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number
Electrical	Cable runs	OU-A-02
	Diesel generators	OU-A-03
	Electrical equipment	OU-A-04
	HVAC heaters	OU-A-05
	High voltage	OU-A-06
	Motors	OU-A-07
	Pumps	OU-A-08
	Power tools	OU-A-09
	Switchgear	OU-A-10
	Service outlets, fittings	OU-A-11
	Transformers	OU-A-12
	Transmission lines	OU-A-13
	Underground wires	OU-A-14
	Wiring	OU-A-15
Thermal	Bunsen burner/hot plates	OU-B-01
	Electrical equipment	OU-B-02
	Furnaces/boilers/heater	OU-B-03
	Welding torch/arc	OU-B-05
	Diesel units/fire box/exhaust line	OU-B-06
	Power tools	OU-B-09
	Solar	OU-B-11
Friction	Belts	OU-C-01
	Bearings	OU-C-02
	Fans	OU-C-03
	Gears	OU-C-04
	Motors	OU-C-05
	Power tools	OU-C-06
	Other (vehicle brakes)	OU-C-07
Corrosives	Acids	OU-D-01
	Caustics	OU-D-02
	Decon solution	OU-D-04

Table 14. Standard Industrial Hazards: Outside. (3 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number
Kinetic - rotational	Motors	OU-E-02
	Pumps	OU-E-03
	Shop equipment	OU-E-06
Kinetic - linear	Forklifts, dollies, carts	OU-F-02
	Railroad	OU-F-03
	Crane loads	OU-F-05
	Pressure vessel blowdown	OU-F-06
	Other (gas bottles)	OU-F-07
Mass, gravity, height	Human effort	OU-G-01
	Lifts and cranes	OU-G-03
	Bucket and ladder	OU-G-04
	Trucks	OU-G-05
	Slings	OU-G-06
	Hoists	OU-G-07
	Jacks	OU-G-09
	Scaffold and ladders	OU-G-10
	Pits and excavations	OU-G-11
	Elevated doors	OU-G-12
	Vessels	OU-G-13
	Other (roof)	OU-G-14
Pressure - volume	Gas bottles	OU-H-05
	Pressure vessels	OU-H-06
Explosives/pyrophorics	Gases, others	OU-J-07
Flammable materials	Buildings and contents	OU-L-08
	Hydrogen	OU-L-11
Hazardous materials	Asphyxiants	OU-M-02
	Biologicals	OU-M-03
	Carcinogens	OU-M-04
	Corrosives	OU-M-05
	Oxidizers	OU-M-06
	Toxics	OU-M-07
	Heavy metals	OU-M-08

Table 14. Standard Industrial Hazards: Outside. (3 sheets)

Hazard category	Hazard type	Hazard checklist identification number
Ionizing radiation sources	Radiography equipment	OU-N-02
	Radioactive sources	OU-N-04
Vehicles in motion (external to facility)	Train	OU-Q-03

*Hazard checklist identification numbers XX-Y-## represent a specific line item on a hazardous material/energy source checklist (see Table 2) where:

XX = facility area.

Y = hazard type.

= checklist designator.

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ATTACHMENT 1

**COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY HAZARD
ANALYSIS TEAM MEMBERS**

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ATTACHMENT 1

COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY HAZARD ANALYSIS TEAM MEMBERS

The key members of the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazards Analysis brought to the study the following experience.

Walter Alaconis

B.S., General Science. Nearly 27 years of diversified nuclear safety and operations experience in the military, commercial, and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environments. Obtained registration with the National Registry of Radiation Protection Technologists in 1982. Over 16 years at the Hanford Site supporting major facility modifications and new facility design projects. Co-author of the Process Facility Modification Project Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Managed the development of the Hanford Site Quality Training and Resource Center Root Cause Analysis Training Program and the Accident/Event Trending Program. Managed the Nuclear Engineering/Safety Data Management Unit for 4 years. Technical advisor to the Liquid Effluent Services Program at the Hanford Site and the Environmental Restoration Programs at the Hanford Site and DOE-Headquarters. Facilities supported at the Hanford Site include the tank farms (east), PUREX, B Plant, Plutonium Finishing Plant, Treated Effluent Disposal Facility, and Effluent Treatment Facility.

JoAnn Brehm

B.S., Biology, Mechanical Engineering. Twenty-two years experience in the nuclear industry, including sodium test reactor startup and operations, major DOE and international decontamination and decommissioning projects, and technology transfer. Six years direct experience in providing project management and preparing nuclear safety analysis documents for DOE facilities, including the Shippingport Station Decommissioning Project, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project, and the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility.

Ralph D. Crowe

M.S., Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Management. Over 20 years experience in the nuclear industry performing calculations using multidimensional time-dependent neutron kinetics and thermal hydraulic codes. Six years experience performing safety analysis within the DOE environment for a number of facilities, including high-level waste tanks, Plutonium Finishing Plant, and spent fuel storage.

John J. Irwin

B.S. Degree in Mechanical Engineering and in Aeronautical Engineering, Masters of Science Program in Mechanical Engineering. Principal Engineer at the Numatec Hanford Corporation, with 24 years experience. Formerly with Space Division of the Rockwell Corporation as a member of the technical staff. Worked as a mechanical engineer on the Space Shuttle Program, Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Reactor, Fusion Materials Irradiation Test Facility, SP100 Space Reactor Test Facility, and the K Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel Project.

Dwight E. Krahn

B.S., General Engineering, field of specialty in Operations Research. Eight years experience in engineering and safety analysis activities. Training includes safety analysis development, root cause analysis, and risk assessment. Most recent work has been in the area of Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility and the tank farms.

Curt Miska

B. S., Chemical Engineering. Seventeen years experience with Westinghouse Hanford Company/Rockwell Hanford Operations. Operations supervisor for PUREX Head End, PUREX Solvent Extraction, PUREX Plutonium Processing, and Uranium Conversion Facility (U03 Plant). Lead/cognizant process engineer for PUREX Solvent Extraction, PUREX Plutonium Processing, and B Plant cesium ion exchange systems. Currently an engineer for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project. Developed preconceptual design concepts for potential fuel stabilization facilities. Provided technical input to DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for N Reactor fuel stabilization, including developing bases for information such as construction and operating resources and personnel required, and routine and accidental radiological and nonradiological releases. Provided major input for and coordinated completion of Dry Storage Technical Evaluation, including development of preliminary processing scheme, material balance, cycle time, and life-cycle cost estimates.

Paul Patterson

Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), Hanford N-Reactor. Seventeen years experience in nuclear power plant and facility operations, training, safety and procedure development. As an SRO responsibilities included maintaining reactor safety during all modes of operation from the reactor control room. A certified DOE technical trainer and oral board examiner. Instructed reactor operator and senior reactor operator candidates and facility management in reactor process operations, heat transfer and fluid flow, reactor physics fundamentals, and accident analysis and safety basis. As a consultant, facilitator, and writer supporting various Hanford Site and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory projects over the past 10 years, led safety document and

requirements processes and hazard analyses sessions; participated in operational readiness reviews; designed and developed training and qualification programs; presented specialized training programs; facilitated specialized group processes; and supported process and facility operating procedure development during final stages of engineering and facility start-up.

Carole Pili-Vincens

Graduate Engineer, Environment, Health and Safety; Technological Hazards Management; Reliability and Maintainability Studies. Six years experience in the nuclear industry performing safety analyses, managing a safety group, and defining safety analysis methods for French nuclear facilities (including high-level waste treatment and storage). Specialist in pyrophoricity reaction risks and environmental analyses. Two years experience performing safety and environmental analyses and assessments as a consultant for industrial facilities (chemical and oil plants).

Richard Whitehurst

Over 27 years experience in nuclear-related instrumentation and controls, operations, and project management. Design/project lead engineer for computer-controlled processes, including the 300 Area Treated Effluent Disposal Facility and the K East Basin monitoring and control systems. Cognizant engineer at the FFTF with direct responsibilities for a number of process systems, including safety-class systems such as Seismic Monitoring, Safe Shutdown Monitoring, and Emergency Dump Heater Exchanger Control System. Experience in operations with both the FFTF and the U.S. Nuclear Navy. Performed duties as test director and test engineer at K Basins, 300 Area Treated Effluent Disposal Facility, and the FFTF. Involved in safety equipment and procedures since 1979 at FFTF.

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ATTACHMENT 2

COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY HAZARD ANALYSIS

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Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 1 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Administrative Area AA-5-06	Linear kinetic - other (gas bottles)	Shed gas bottles become missiles	Earthquake damage, delivery and hand cart impact	Bottle becomes missile and/or equipment	Personal injury, structure damage, loss of the administrative area only, no damage to SSCs	Gas bottle design includes protection against kinetic energy to limit velocity	F0			S1		
Administrative Area AA-1-06 and 12	Explosives / Pyrophorics - hydrogen (batteries)	Explosive gas mixtures	Batteries give off hydrogen gas	Explosion of explosive gases	Reduced capacity or loss of facility power, MCS control, and operations from control room	No credited prevention, safe process shutdown does not rely on input from the Administrative Area	F2	F2		S1	S1	
Administrative Area AAAL-01	Flammable material - packing materials, rags, paint solvent, building and equipment cleaning agents from batteries, other (aerosol propellant)	Fire due to ignition	Human error Electrical shorts	Fire, heat and/or heat in the administrative area with the potential to propagate to other areas	Reduced capacity or loss of Administrative Area affects facility power, MCS control, and operations from control room Fire spreads Personnel injury	Combustible loading requirements from the FHA ^a are imposed Safe process shutdown does not rely on input from the Administrative Area Walls between the administrative area and the process bays are fire rated for 2 hours Fire sprinkler system	F3	F0		S1		SCIC selects process upset initiating SCHE, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Cask-MCO and SCIC confinement design Facility evacuation to protect workers Fire alarm and fire department response
Administrative Area AA-01	Various external events affecting the Administrative Area AA-P-01 AA-P-02 AA-P-03 Sections OUP AA-Q-01 AA-Q-02 AA-Q-03 AA-Q-04 AA-R-01 - R-10											
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TC-B-05	Thermal - welding torch/warc	High temperature	Human error during welding operations Faulty sprinkler fusible links	Activation of fire protection sprinkler(s)	Water sprays on equipment	Equipment required for safe shutdown is designed to environmental qualifications	F2	F2		S0	S0	Site hot work procedures and training address precautionary measures for hot work
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TC-F-07	Linear kinetic - other (gas bottles)	Gas bottles used in portal become missiles	Earthquake damage Valve breaks off tube	Bottle becomes missile, damages equipment	Personal injury, structure and/or equipment damage	Sturdy walls (4- to 8-in. thick concrete) between the administrative area and the process bays Gas bottle design includes passive orifice that restricts pressure and kinetic energy to limit velocity	F0			S1		
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TC-12	Explosives/ radioactive gases - explosive gases	Explosive gas released from maintenance into ventilation system	Maintenance gases released from MCO into ventilation system	External explosion (e.g. gas release into ventilation system)	Dispersion of HEPA filter contents		F3	F2	Radioactive material released from HEPA filter is restricted	S2	S1	Emergency response procedures address personnel response procedure and training
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TC-N-4	Nuclear Criticality - Filters	Fissile material accumulated on HEPA filter's	Fissile material released from MCO during normal operation	Potential for criticality due to accumulation of material	High local doses to personnel nearby	No credible mechanism for transferring the required amount of material to the filters identified	F0					

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 2 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TCL-Q1 TCL-Q2 TCL-Q3 TCL-Q4 TCL-Q5 TCL-Q6 TCL-Q7 TCL-Q8 TCL-Q9 TCL-Q10 TCL-Q11 TCL-Q12 TCL-Q13 TCL-Q14 TCL-Q15 TCL-Q16	Flammable material - packing materials, rags, lubricating oil, solvent, paint, oil, grease, oil, paint, solvent, building and other gases and liquids, other (aerosol propellant)	Fire due to ignition	Human error (e.g. improper storage practices) Electrical shorts Propagation from other facility areas	Fire in the transfer corridor or mechanical room	Equipment and/or structural damage Personnel injury	Combustible loading not from the PMA are imposed Safe process shutdown does not rely on input from the transfer corridor or mechanical room Equipment in the transfer corridor required for safe shutdown designed to environmental qualifications Fire sprinkler system	F3	F0		S1	S1	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Gask-MCO and SCIC confinement design Facility evacuation to protect workers Fire alarm and fire department response
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TC-N-03	Ionizing radiation - radioactive material	HEPA filter loading of radioactive material	Indivertent contamination spread	HEPA filter failure and subsequent particulate release	Radioactive particulate release through stack	Multiple HEPA filter stages exist within the local and general exhaust system No credible mechanism for complete HEPA filter loading release identified	F1 - for failure releasing fraction of loading	F0 - for failure releasing entire filter loading		S1	S1	HEPA filters are monitored regularly and changed out according to established facility-specific procedures
Transfer corridor, mechanical room TC-P-01 TC-P-02 TC-P-03 TC-P-04 TC-P-05 TC-P-06 TC-P-07 TC-P-08 TC-P-09 TC-P-10 TC-P-11 TC-P-12 TC-P-13 TC-P-14 TC-P-15 TC-P-16 TC-P-17 TC-P-18 TC-P-19 TC-P-20 TC-P-21 TC-P-22 TC-P-23 TC-P-24 TC-P-25 TC-P-26 TC-P-27 TC-P-28 TC-P-29 TC-P-30 TC-P-31 TC-P-32 TC-P-33 TC-P-34 TC-P-35 TC-P-36 TC-P-37 TC-P-38 TC-P-39 TC-P-40 TC-P-41 TC-P-42 TC-P-43 TC-P-44 TC-P-45 TC-P-46 TC-P-47 TC-P-48 TC-P-49 TC-P-50 TC-P-51 TC-P-52 TC-P-53 TC-P-54 TC-P-55 TC-P-56 TC-P-57 TC-P-58 TC-P-59 TC-P-60 TC-P-61 TC-P-62 TC-P-63 TC-P-64 TC-P-65 TC-P-66 TC-P-67 TC-P-68 TC-P-69 TC-P-70 TC-P-71 TC-P-72 TC-P-73 TC-P-74 TC-P-75 TC-P-76 TC-P-77 TC-P-78 TC-P-79 TC-P-80 TC-P-81 TC-P-82 TC-P-83 TC-P-84 TC-P-85 TC-P-86 TC-P-87 TC-P-88 TC-P-89 TC-P-90 TC-P-91 TC-P-92 TC-P-93 TC-P-94 TC-P-95 TC-P-96 TC-P-97 TC-P-98 TC-P-99 TC-P-100 TC-P-101 TC-P-102 TC-P-103 TC-P-104 TC-P-105 TC-P-106 TC-P-107 TC-P-108 TC-P-109 TC-P-110 TC-P-111 TC-P-112 TC-P-113 TC-P-114 TC-P-115 TC-P-116 TC-P-117 TC-P-118 TC-P-119 TC-P-120 TC-P-121 TC-P-122 TC-P-123 TC-P-124 TC-P-125 TC-P-126 TC-P-127 TC-P-128 TC-P-129 TC-P-130 TC-P-131 TC-P-132 TC-P-133 TC-P-134 TC-P-135 TC-P-136 TC-P-137 TC-P-138 TC-P-139 TC-P-140 TC-P-141 TC-P-142 TC-P-143 TC-P-144 TC-P-145 TC-P-146 TC-P-147 TC-P-148 TC-P-149 TC-P-150 TC-P-151 TC-P-152 TC-P-153 TC-P-154 TC-P-155 TC-P-156 TC-P-157 TC-P-158 TC-P-159 TC-P-160 TC-P-161 TC-P-162 TC-P-163 TC-P-164 TC-P-165 TC-P-166 TC-P-167 TC-P-168 TC-P-169 TC-P-170 TC-P-171 TC-P-172 TC-P-173 TC-P-174 TC-P-175 TC-P-176 TC-P-177 TC-P-178 TC-P-179 TC-P-180 TC-P-181 TC-P-182 TC-P-183 TC-P-184 TC-P-185 TC-P-186 TC-P-187 TC-P-188 TC-P-189 TC-P-190 TC-P-191 TC-P-192 TC-P-193 TC-P-194 TC-P-195 TC-P-196 TC-P-197 TC-P-198 TC-P-199 TC-P-200 TC-P-201 TC-P-202 TC-P-203 TC-P-204 TC-P-205 TC-P-206 TC-P-207 TC-P-208 TC-P-209 TC-P-210 TC-P-211 TC-P-212 TC-P-213 TC-P-214 TC-P-215 TC-P-216 TC-P-217 TC-P-218 TC-P-219 TC-P-220 TC-P-221 TC-P-222 TC-P-223 TC-P-224 TC-P-225 TC-P-226 TC-P-227 TC-P-228 TC-P-229 TC-P-230 TC-P-231 TC-P-232 TC-P-233 TC-P-234 TC-P-235 TC-P-236 TC-P-237 TC-P-238 TC-P-239 TC-P-240 TC-P-241 TC-P-242 TC-P-243 TC-P-244 TC-P-245 TC-P-246 TC-P-247 TC-P-248 TC-P-249 TC-P-250 TC-P-251 TC-P-252 TC-P-253 TC-P-254 TC-P-255 TC-P-256 TC-P-257 TC-P-258 TC-P-259 TC-P-260 TC-P-261 TC-P-262 TC-P-263 TC-P-264 TC-P-265 TC-P-266 TC-P-267 TC-P-268 TC-P-269 TC-P-270 TC-P-271 TC-P-272 TC-P-273 TC-P-274 TC-P-275 TC-P-276 TC-P-277 TC-P-278 TC-P-279 TC-P-280 TC-P-281 TC-P-282 TC-P-283 TC-P-284 TC-P-285 TC-P-286 TC-P-287 TC-P-288 TC-P-289 TC-P-290 TC-P-291 TC-P-292 TC-P-293 TC-P-294 TC-P-295 TC-P-296 TC-P-297 TC-P-298 TC-P-299 TC-P-300 TC-P-301 TC-P-302 TC-P-303 TC-P-304 TC-P-305 TC-P-306 TC-P-307 TC-P-308 TC-P-309 TC-P-310 TC-P-311 TC-P-312 TC-P-313 TC-P-314 TC-P-315 TC-P-316 TC-P-317 TC-P-318 TC-P-319 TC-P-320 TC-P-321 TC-P-322 TC-P-323 TC-P-324 TC-P-325 TC-P-326 TC-P-327 TC-P-328 TC-P-329 TC-P-330 TC-P-331 TC-P-332 TC-P-333 TC-P-334 TC-P-335 TC-P-336 TC-P-337 TC-P-338 TC-P-339 TC-P-340 TC-P-341 TC-P-342 TC-P-343 TC-P-344 TC-P-345 TC-P-346 TC-P-347 TC-P-348 TC-P-349 TC-P-350 TC-P-351 TC-P-352 TC-P-353 TC-P-354 TC-P-355 TC-P-356 TC-P-357 TC-P-358 TC-P-359 TC-P-360 TC-P-361 TC-P-362 TC-P-363 TC-P-364 TC-P-365 TC-P-366 TC-P-367 TC-P-368 TC-P-369 TC-P-370 TC-P-371 TC-P-372 TC-P-373 TC-P-374 TC-P-375 TC-P-376 TC-P-377 TC-P-378 TC-P-379 TC-P-380 TC-P-381 TC-P-382 TC-P-383 TC-P-384 TC-P-385 TC-P-386 TC-P-387 TC-P-388 TC-P-389 TC-P-390 TC-P-391 TC-P-392 TC-P-393 TC-P-394 TC-P-395 TC-P-396 TC-P-397 TC-P-398 TC-P-399 TC-P-400 TC-P-401 TC-P-402 TC-P-403 TC-P-404 TC-P-405 TC-P-406 TC-P-407 TC-P-408 TC-P-409 TC-P-410 TC-P-411 TC-P-412 TC-P-413 TC-P-414 TC-P-415 TC-P-416 TC-P-417 TC-P-418 TC-P-419 TC-P-420 TC-P-421 TC-P-422 TC-P-423 TC-P-424 TC-P-425 TC-P-426 TC-P-427 TC-P-428 TC-P-429 TC-P-430 TC-P-431 TC-P-432 TC-P-433 TC-P-434 TC-P-435 TC-P-436 TC-P-437 TC-P-438 TC-P-439 TC-P-440 TC-P-441 TC-P-442 TC-P-443 TC-P-444 TC-P-445 TC-P-446 TC-P-447 TC-P-448 TC-P-449 TC-P-450 TC-P-451 TC-P-452 TC-P-453 TC-P-454 TC-P-455 TC-P-456 TC-P-457 TC-P-458 TC-P-459 TC-P-460 TC-P-461 TC-P-462 TC-P-463 TC-P-464 TC-P-465 TC-P-466 TC-P-467 TC-P-468 TC-P-469 TC-P-470 TC-P-471 TC-P-472 TC-P-473 TC-P-474 TC-P-475 TC-P-476 TC-P-477 TC-P-478 TC-P-479 TC-P-480 TC-P-481 TC-P-482 TC-P-483 TC-P-484 TC-P-485 TC-P-486 TC-P-487 TC-P-488 TC-P-489 TC-P-490 TC-P-491 TC-P-492 TC-P-493 TC-P-494 TC-P-495 TC-P-496 TC-P-497 TC-P-498 TC-P-499 TC-P-500 TC-P-501 TC-P-502 TC-P-503 TC-P-504 TC-P-505 TC-P-506 TC-P-507 TC-P-508 TC-P-509 TC-P-510 TC-P-511 TC-P-512 TC-P-513 TC-P-514 TC-P-515 TC-P-516 TC-P-517 TC-P-518 TC-P-519 TC-P-520 TC-P-521 TC-P-522 TC-P-523 TC-P-524 TC-P-525 TC-P-526 TC-P-527 TC-P-528 TC-P-529 TC-P-530 TC-P-531 TC-P-532 TC-P-533 TC-P-534 TC-P-535 TC-P-536 TC-P-537 TC-P-538 TC-P-539 TC-P-540 TC-P-541 TC-P-542 TC-P-543 TC-P-544 TC-P-545 TC-P-546 TC-P-547 TC-P-548 TC-P-549 TC-P-550 TC-P-551 TC-P-552 TC-P-553 TC-P-554 TC-P-555 TC-P-556 TC-P-557 TC-P-558 TC-P-559 TC-P-560 TC-P-561 TC-P-562 TC-P-563 TC-P-564 TC-P-565 TC-P-566 TC-P-567 TC-P-568 TC-P-569 TC-P-570 TC-P-571 TC-P-572 TC-P-573 TC-P-574 TC-P-575 TC-P-576 TC-P-577 TC-P-578 TC-P-579 TC-P-580 TC-P-581 TC-P-582 TC-P-583 TC-P-584 TC-P-585 TC-P-586 TC-P-587 TC-P-588 TC-P-589 TC-P-590 TC-P-591 TC-P-592 TC-P-593 TC-P-594 TC-P-595 TC-P-596 TC-P-597 TC-P-598 TC-P-599 TC-P-600 TC-P-601 TC-P-602 TC-P-603 TC-P-604 TC-P-605 TC-P-606 TC-P-607 TC-P-608 TC-P-609 TC-P-610 TC-P-611 TC-P-612 TC-P-613 TC-P-614 TC-P-615 TC-P-616 TC-P-617 TC-P-618 TC-P-619 TC-P-620 TC-P-621 TC-P-622 TC-P-623 TC-P-624 TC-P-625 TC-P-626 TC-P-627 TC-P-628 TC-P-629 TC-P-630 TC-P-631 TC-P-632 TC-P-633 TC-P-634 TC-P-635 TC-P-636 TC-P-637 TC-P-638 TC-P-639 TC-P-640 TC-P-641 TC-P-642 TC-P-643 TC-P-644 TC-P-645 TC-P-646 TC-P-647 TC-P-648 TC-P-649 TC-P-650 TC-P-651 TC-P-652 TC-P-653 TC-P-654 TC-P-655 TC-P-656 TC-P-657 TC-P-658 TC-P-659 TC-P-660 TC-P-661 TC-P-662 TC-P-663 TC-P-664 TC-P-665 TC-P-666 TC-P-667 TC-P-668 TC-P-669 TC-P-670 TC-P-671 TC-P-672 TC-P-673 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TC-P-1106 TC-P-1107 TC-P-1108 TC-P-1109 TC-P-1110 TC-P-1111 TC-P-1112 TC-P-1113 TC-P-1114 TC-P-1115 TC-P-1116 TC-P-1117 TC-P-1118 TC-P-1119 TC-P-1120 TC-P-1121 TC-P-1122 TC-P-1123 TC-P-1124 TC-P-1125 TC-P-1126 TC-P-1127 TC-P-1128 TC-P-1129 TC-P-1130 TC-P-1131 TC-P-1132 TC-P-1133 TC-P-1134 TC-P-1135 TC-P-1136 TC-P-1137 TC-P-1138 TC-P-1139 TC-P-1140 TC-P-1141 TC-P-1142 TC-P-1143 TC-P-1144 TC-P-1145 TC-P-1146 TC-P-1147 TC-P-1148 TC-P-1149 TC-P-1150 TC-P-1151 TC-P-1152 TC-P-1153 TC-P-1154 TC-P-1155 TC-P-1156 TC-P-1157 TC-P-1158 TC-P-1159 TC-P-1160 TC-P-1161 TC-P-1162 TC-P-1163 TC-P-1164 TC-P-1165 TC-P-1166 TC-P-1167 TC-P-1168 TC-P-1169 TC-P-1170 TC-P-1171 TC-P-1172 TC-P-1173 TC-P-1174 TC-P-1175 TC-P-1176 TC-P-1177 TC-P-1178 TC-P-1179 TC-P-1180 TC-P-1181 TC-P-1182 TC-P-1183 TC-P-1184 TC-P-1185 TC-P-1186 TC-P-1187 TC-P-1188 TC-P-1189 TC-P-1190 TC-P-1191 TC-P-1192 TC-P-1193 TC-P-1194 TC-P-1195 TC-P-1196 TC-P-1197 TC-P-1198 TC-P-1199 TC-P-1200 TC-P-1201 TC-P-1202 TC-P-1203 TC-P-1204 TC-P-1205 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TC-P-1306 TC-P-1307 TC-P-1308 TC-P-1309 TC-P-1310 TC-P-1311 TC-P-1312 TC-P-1313 TC-P-1314 TC-P-1315 TC-P-1316 TC-P-1317 TC-P-1318 TC-P-1319 TC-P-1320 TC-P-1321 TC-P-1322 TC-P-1323 TC-P-1324 TC-P-1325 TC-P-1326 TC-P-1327 TC-P-1328 TC-P-1329 TC-P-1330 TC-P-1331 TC-P-1332 TC-P-1333 TC-P-1334 TC-P-1335 TC-P-1336 TC-P-1337 TC-P-1338 TC-P-1339 TC-P-1340 TC-P-1341 TC-P-1342 TC-P-1343 TC-P-1344 TC-P-1345 TC-P-1346 TC-P-1347 TC-P-1348 TC-P-1349 TC-P-1350 TC-P-1351 TC-P-1352 TC-P-1353 TC-P-1354 TC-P-1355 TC-P-1356 TC-P-1357 TC-P-1358 TC-P-1359 TC-P-1360 TC-P-1361 TC-P-1362 TC-P-1363 TC-P-1364 TC-P-1365 TC-P-1366 TC-P-1367 TC-P-1368 TC-P-1369 TC-P-1370 TC-P-1371 TC-P-1372 TC-P-1373 TC-P-1374 TC-P-1375 TC-P-1376 TC-P-1377 TC-P-1378 TC-P-1379 TC-P-1380 TC-P-1381 TC-P-1382 TC-P-1383 TC-P-1384 TC-P-1385 TC-P-1386 TC												

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis: (sheet 3 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-B-02b	Thermal - electrical equipment	Bay temperatures in excess of electrical design limits no annulus water flow	HVAC failure Bay recirculation heaters continue to run (fail on)	Thermal runaway reaction (F 2)	High temperatures in the MCO bay could lead to a radioactive particle release	SCIC activates SCHe on high bay temperature SCIC activates SCHe on high TWS temperature SCHe establishes He flow through MCO directly to local exhaust MCO and SCHe confinement design TSR -- Crane movement restricted during MCO processing TSR -- Restore bay temperature to acceptable limits	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement	S3	S1 HVAC maintains operating temperatures in the bay	
Process bays 2-5 PB-B-03a	Thermal - heaters (tempered water heater)	Tempered water heated to temperatures above 50°C	Mechanical or software failure resulting in loss of control of water heat control	Internal hydrogen explosion (F 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4) Thermal runaway reaction (F 2) MCO Overpressurization (P 1)	Heating increases fuel reaction with water producing more heat and hydrogen gas, leading to a runaway reaction and/or radioactive particulate release, or thermal runaway reaction	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which initiates MCO process going and establishes helium supply to the MCO MCO and SCHe confinement design 30 lb/in ² rupture disk and vent path	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150 lb/in ² rupture disk MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	S3	S1 GShe safety-class flow limitation initiates 10 lb/in ² process relief valve	
Process bays 2-5 PB-B-03b	Thermal - heaters (tempered water heater)	Insufficient heating of tempered water	Software failure or human error in programming resulting in insufficient heater control leading to potential for inaccurate pressure rebound test and proof of dryness demonstration	External hydrogen explosion (E 3) Hydrogen generation and potential for runaway at the CSB	Excessive water remaining in MCO reacts with the fuel producing heat and hydrogen gas, leading to a runaway reaction and/or radioactive particulate release Over long term, potential for release at CSB	TSR -- Procedure to verify the results of the pressure rebound tests before continuing process steps (Note: Pressure rebound test utilizes different instrumentation than does the tempered water system)	F2	F1	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution	S2	S1 This consequence is a concern for the SARPs or the CSB FSAR: Initial pressure rebound test Final pressure rebound test	
Process bays 2-5 PB-B-13a	Thermal - MCO contents < 75°C for centrifuge of fuel	High fuel temperatures/air ingress	Process line failure or process upset causing significant air ingress into MCO, or HVAC failure	Internal hydrogen explosion (F 1, DBA) Gaseous release from MCO (G 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4)	Pressurization of the MCO leads to hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release, or explosion inside the MCO	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which initiates MCO process going and establishes helium supply to the MCO MCO and SCHe confinement design	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement, filtration, and dilution PWC drain line qualification Cask-MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	S2	S1 Tempered water system	
Process bays 2-5 PB-B-13b	Thermal - MCO contents < 75°C for centrifuge of fuel	High fuel temperatures/air ingress during drying mode or pressure rebound test	Leak back of deionized (DI) water during vacuum Bulk water added to hot MCO	Internal hydrogen explosion (F 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4)	Fuel reaction with water produces heat and hydrogen gas, leading to a runaway reaction and/or radioactive particulate release	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which initiates MCO process going and establishes helium supply to the MCO MCO and SCHe confinement design	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution Cask-MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	S2	S1 Tempered water system	

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 4 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PBB-13c	Thermal - MCO contents < 75°C for 25C for centerline of fuel	No tempered water line leak or break from connection or operator error	Tempered water line leak or break from connection or operator error	External hydrogen explosion (E 4) Thermal runaway reaction (T 1 DBA) MCO overpressurization (P 1 DBA)	Heating increases fuel reaction with water producing more potential hydrogen and/or thermal runaway reaction	TSR - Cause equipment restricted during processing to preclude common mode failure of tempered water line SCIC detects process upset isolating SCHe which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO MCO and SCHe confinement design	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150lb/in ² rupture disk TW System anticipation Manual cask annulus roll piping and vent port	S3	S1	GSHe safety-class flow instrumentation 10 lb/in ² process relief valve
Process bays 2-5 PBB-13d	Thermal - MCO contents < 75°C for 25C for 25C for proof of dryness	Excessive amount of water in the MCO	Human error - misread instrument and positioned SCC from Drying Mode to Proof Mode, or from Proof Mode to Pressure Test Mode, or from Proof Mode to adequate drying	External hydrogen explosion (E 3) Thermal runaway reaction (T 1) MCO Overpressurization (P 1)	Excessive water containing in MCO reacts with the fuel producing heat and hydrogen leading to potential hydrogen and/or thermal runaway reaction	TSR - Procedure to verify MCO seal integrity and pressure rebound tests before continuing process steps	F3	F1	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution	S3	S1	MCS will not allow out-of-sequence operation Initial pressure rebound test Final pressure rebound test
Process bays 2-5 PBB-13e	Thermal - MCO contents < 75°C for 25C for 25C for proof of dryness at CVDF	High fuel temperatures NOTE: Temperature at CVDF is 25°C for 25C for adding helium to MCO so don't need extra helium material added	MCO not adequately cooled (due to human error or software failure)	Higher than expected MCO temperatures Internal hydrogen explosion in the MCO at CSB	No release, with less than 200 grams of free water, pressure created is not in excess of cask/MCO design		F2			S0		This consequence is a concern for the SARPs or the CSB FSAR.
Process bays 2-5 PBB-13f	Thermal - MCO contents < 75°C for 25C for 25C for proof of dryness at CSB	High fuel temperatures	Inadequate cooling prior to shipping AND failure of MCO seals allowing hydrogen generation to leak out to the air filled cask annulus	Hydrogen explosion in cask at CSB	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release from cask	TSR - Procedure for cooling MCO and helium filling prior to shipment to CSB	F2	F1		S2	S1	This consequence is a concern for the SARPs or the CSB FSAR.
Process bays 2-5 PBB-13g	Thermal - MCO contents	High MCO temperatures on receipt	Shipping time exceeds window Improper fuel loading (insufficient water or improper fuel configurations) MCO water leakage	External hydrogen explosion (E 1)	Hydrogen formed in MCO when cask/MCO is vented	TSR - Receipt transportation window Cask/MCO confinement function Cask vent surface and interlock with HVAC for dilution	F3	F0	TSR - HVAC HEPA filter loading limit	S2	S1	No leak path below water line in MCO Cask vent line enters HVAC/CPV piping away from operator

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 5 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense in-depth or worker safety features
						Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-01a	Linear kinetic - transportation cask trailer	Human error Mechanical failure	Striking walls, personnel, outer bay doors	Personnel injury		F3	F3	Bollards and other structural steel devices near the process bays doors and within the process bay protect the outer doors and the back wall of the process bay The mezzanine supports protect the process bay side wall from damage	S1	S1	Painted lines on the bay floor are present to aid in guiding the trailer in correctly Vehicles are operated by qualified personnel and enter and exit the bays at a slow speed Operators direct the truck driver during entry and exit Breach of building confinement in other bays is not considered possible
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-01b	Linear kinetic - transportation cask trailer	Human error Mechanical failure	Striking the process bay doors and mezzanine supports	Damage to equipment on the process skid and subsequent material at levels below the process bay doors and administrative controls provided by the Radiation Protection and Access Control Program are not underway during event		F3	F3	Bollards and other structural steel devices near the process bay doors and within the process bay protect the outer doors and the back wall of the process bay	S1	S1	Continuous Air Monitors The mezzanine supports protect the process skid from damage Painted lines on the bay floor are present to aid in guiding the trailer in correctly Vehicles are operated by qualified personnel and enter and exit the bays at a slow speed
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-01c	Linear kinetic - transportation cask trailer	Human error Mechanical failure	Damage to cask	The cask is qualified for all anticipated transport accidents, which bound the low-velocity impact associated with this hazard Personnel injury	The cask is qualified for all anticipated transport accidents, which bound the low-velocity impact associated with this hazard	F0			S1		
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-01d	Linear kinetic - transportation cask trailer	Human error Mechanical failure	None -- this collision is not physically possible due to the elevation of the drain line	Personnel injury	None -- this collision is not physically possible due to the elevation of the drain line	F0					

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 6 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-02a	Linear kinetic - forklifts, dollies, carts	Forklift impacts within an empty process bay, striking instrument air lines or normal helium supply, electrical panel, demineralized water line, or adjacent bay wall, affecting processing operations in other bays.	Human error Mechanical failure	Fork lifts do not have room to operate in empty process bay. MCO trailer collisions in an empty bay potentially lead to accidents in empty process bay is underway. Internal hydrogen explosion (I 5) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 4) MCO overpressurization (P 2).	Process upset due to loss of support system, leads to potential hydrogen formation and/or radioactive particle release. Damage to equipment on the bay wall and subsequent release of contaminated material. Personnel injury Loss of power Breach confinement	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHE, which isolates MCO from process helium supply to the MCO and vent to local exhaust Cas-MCO AND SCHE confinement design 30 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk TSR Receipt transportation window	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk	S3	S1 Forklifts are operated by qualified personnel. 10 lb/in ² process relief valve	
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-02b	Linear kinetic - forklifts, dollies, carts	Forklift impacts within an empty process bay -- bay is empty	Human error Mechanical failure	None -- this collision is not physically possible due to the elevation of the drain line	None -- this collision is not physically possible due to the elevation of the drain line		F0					Fork lifts do not have room to operate in bays occupied by MCO trailer.
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-05 and PB-G-03a	Linear kinetic - crane loads and Load drops - Mass, gravity, height - lifts and cranes	Crane load impacts or drops striking instrument air helium supply, electrical panel, or demineralized water line, during processing operations	Human error Mechanical failure	Gaseous release (G 1) Internal hydrogen explosion (I 5) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 4) MCO overpressurization (P 2).	Process upset due to loss of support system, leads to potential hydrogen formation and release, and/or radioactive particle release. Damage to equipment on the process skid with subsequent release of contaminated material. Personnel injury Loss of power Breach confinement	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHE, which isolates MCO from process helium supply to the MCO and vent to local exhaust Cas-MCO AND SCHE confinement design 30 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk TSR -- crane movement is restricted during MCO processing	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk Cas-MCO withstands internal explosion energy	S3	S1 Restricted movement of crane by design. Crane maintenance conducted according to established procedures. Crane is operated by qualified personnel following established procedures. 10 lb/in ² process relief valve	
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-07	Linear kinetic - other (gas bottles)	Helium gas cylinders are damaged and become missiles	Earthquake, trailer impacts, forklift impacts	Bottle becomes missile, impacts structure and/or equipment	Personnel injury, structure and/or equipment damage Kinetic energy to limit	Gas bottle design includes internal rupture disks Kinetic energy to limit velocity	F0			S1		

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 7 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-G-03b	Miss, poorly height - elevated crane equipment	Crane trolley falling from overhead railing	Human error Mechanical failure	Crane hook is connected to a cask lid which has not been unbolted from the transportation cask. Crane attempts to lift. Lack of maintenance on overlift protection feature causes crane supports to fail.	Crane trolley falls onto cask or MCO Crane trolley falls onto process equipment resulting in contamination spread Personnel injury	Design feature - motor can't start if crane is not in correct position Cause potential accident	F0	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S1	S1	Process bay structure with HEPA filters provides secondary confinement Crane designed with overlift protection Personnel are trained in the proper use of the crane and the correct procedure for processing, and have established procedures for same Crane maintenance is conducted according to established procedures
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06a	Pressure, volume - process vessels (MCO and cask)	Pressurized release of hydrogen from MCO	Failure to vent the transportation cask Exceeding the shipping window Improper loading of fuel retrieval (e.g. insufficient water contents, improper MCO sealing)	Pressurized release of hydrogen from the MCO due to removal, or process line hook-up, with subsequent ignition	Personnel injury due to hydrogen ignition Worker exposure to radioactive particulate		F3	F3	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S1	S1	HEPA filter in MCO minimizes the amount of particulate released Personnel trained in the correct process steps prior to connecting process lines (including required venting and purging) Exceeded inter established transport window.
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06b	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Release of cask annulus water from the MCO and the transportation cask	Human error or mechanical failure Leak of process water Tempered water system quick disconnect leak Defeating while TW system is under pressure, or failure of the cask drain port The cask drain port (undiscovered until cover port is removed)	Spray or leak of water onto the process bay floor	Surface contamination Damage of basin water to the process bay floor Release of contaminated water The cask drain port is not underway during vent		F3	F3		S1	S1	Alarm occurs on seal ring pressure loss through the MCS. Procedural step to check tempered water system quick disconnect for leaks following installation. TW system connection to cask is double walled. The cask loading process uses a high pressure water system to clean the cask minimizing the expected contamination.
Process bay 2-5 PB-H-06c	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Pressurized relief from MCO	Prior to installing the process connectors and prior to hook-up with the port valves closed and the MCO closed and the water, the MCO is left for an extended period of time.	Hydrogen generation pressurizes the MCO to 150 lb/in ² gauge where rupture disk releases and H ₂ possibly ignites	Hydrogen deflagration in bay Personnel injury	MCO full of water limits the hydrogen/particulate release	F2	F2	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S1	S1	Procedures exist for pressurizing long process delay. MCO is not allowed to sit in this state indefinitely

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 8 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06d	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Pressurized MCO	Process upset processing delay or line failure, small leaks from the process, the procedure for a long time if there is no mitigation.	Gaseous release from MCO (G 1)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release due to pressurization	MCO design withstands MCO pressurization	F3	F3	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S2	S1	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06e	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Hydrogen formation in MCO during interruption prior to breakthrough	Loss of power Mechanical or moment failure in PVC system Operator error, (e.g., turning off PVC pump SCIC trip	Hydrogen forms and collects in PVC tanks	Hydrogen formed - MCO is drawn into the PVC drain and receiver tanks when MCO drain is restarted. Hydrogen explosion in PVC drain line or receiver tanks	TSR - drain time limit of 35 minutes TSR - shut off PVC pump (stop MCO drain) on loss of differential pressure in process water tank room	F2	F1	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution	S1	S1	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06f	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Pressurized hydrogen formation	Process line failure or operator causing significant leaks into MCO or HVAC failure	Gaseous release from MCO (G 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4)	Pressurization of the MCO leads to hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	Cask MCO design withstands pressurization TSR - Confinement function verified by testing process port connectors	F3	F2	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S2	S1	SCIC detects process upset isolating SCIC, which isolates process press piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Tempered water system
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06g	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Local and or partial exhaust PEPH filter fails	Random failure	Gaseous release from MCO (G 1)	Potential hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release		F3	F3	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S2	S1	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06h	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Loss of local exhaust fans (excluding loss of power)	Random failure Dampers close	Gaseous release from MCO (G 1)	Potential hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release within the process bay lead, potential hydrogen release into the local atmosphere while not turning		F3	F3	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S2	S1	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06i	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Delays in shipping of MCO from CVDF or MCO leakage or human error in closing port valves	Delays in shipping of MCO from CVDF or MCO leakage or human error in closing port valves	Gaseous release from MCO (G 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4)	Hydrogen and small amounts of fission gas may be released to the cask annulus, possibly leading to a hydrogen atmosphere in cask annulus with subsequent explosion with spread of contamination Release/explosion of hydrogen and fission gases when cask lid is vented or removed at CSB	TSR - Proof-of-dryness demonstration	F2	F2	HVAC systems provide confinement, dilution and filtration	S2	S1	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-06j	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Backflow (by diffusion) of vacuum pump oil as a result of leaking vacuum pump seal failure Condenser chilled water leak resulting in glycol contamination of the MCO by backflow	Backflow (by diffusion) of vacuum pump oil as a result of leaking vacuum pump seal failure Condenser chilled water leak resulting in glycol contamination of the MCO by backflow	Contamination (biological) introduced into the MCO and reacts with fuel	Fuel reacts with contamination leading to increased hydrogen formation, other gas formation Potential generation at CVDF or long term	The vacuum pump and the condenser are designed such that no single failure can result in contamination into the process system.	F0			S2		A second pressure rebound test is conducted in the last hour of the proof of dryness demonstration and all potential water sources are isolated.

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis (sheet 9 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-00k	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Fuel reacts with contaminants	Contaminated He purge gas Wrong gas hooked up. He gas received out of specification, no purge line not removed after maintenance	Internal hydrogen explosion (T 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 7) Thermal runaway reaction (T 5)	Hydrogen explosion of high temperatures in the MCO He gas explosion radioactive particulate release	TSR -- Shipment paperwork verified for gas bottle content during receipt TSR -- Vendor documentation of supplied gas tests	F2	F0		S2		
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-00l	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Uncontrolled release of water from MCO	Insert MCO port opened, tank leak, knockout at K Basin (e.g., long tube)	Spray or leak of MCO contents	Spread of contamination		F3	F3		S1	S1	K Basins personnel are trained in proper leak bailout procedures at K Basins
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-00m	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	MCO drain flow reversed due to ejector malfunction	Low flow in the ejector causes backflow of water into drain header	Water flows back to drain header and MCO	Process delay and possible increase exposure	None - No identified mechanism to provide backflow through ejector	F0					
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-00n	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels - MCO	Water reaction with fuel	Immediately following drain, while flushing drain lines, the MCO is refilled with water	None	No consequences other than delay (introduction of water just after draining does not cause any effects)		F2	F2		S0	S0	Duration of displaced water flush is limited by the MCS (15 min ± 80 gal)
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-00	Pressure, volume, vacuum	Degraded vacuum pump operations	Equipment malfunction	Thermal runaway reaction (T 4)	Heating occurs, increasing fuel/water reaction leading to potential thermal runaway	SCIC detects process upset isolating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and isolates helium supply to the MCO. (8/4/4)	F3	F0		S3	S1	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-11a	Pressure, volume - other	Helium pressure higher than expected	Cascading failure of regulators beginning with 3000 psi regulator failure.	MCO overpressurization (P 3)	Radioactive particulate release	Normal helium supply system safety valves SCHe supply pressure control valves and rupture disks MCO design withstands pressure	F2	F0		S2		Pressure relief valve on He trailer 30 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk and vent path 150 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk SCHe vent
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-11b	Pressure, volume - pressurized process lines)	Inaccurate instrumented, unavailability valves	Contaminated air with instrumented air supply under conditions that allow hydrogen to form and be released from the MCO	Isolation valves do not close	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	Fail-safe design for process valves isolating the MCO Redundant isolation valves	F1	F1	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution	S1		SCIC detects process upset isolating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and isolates helium supply to the MCO MCO and SCHe confinement design
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-11c	Pressure, volume - other (pressurized process lines)	Tempered water system lines leak	Hazard eliminated by design change -- double walled pipe									Air dryer on instrument air supply

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 10 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-1d	Pressure, volume, other (water addition to MCO)	Water addition during drying, pressure rebound test	Leak back of deionized (DI) water during vacuum Vacuum pump pressure Cooling water internal leak Bulk water added to hot MCO	Internal hydrogen explosion (E 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4)	Water addition causes hydrogen formation and release in explosive mixtures into local exhaust, or explosion inside the MCO Radioactive particulate release	SCC detects process upset initiating SCHE, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution Cask-MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	S2	S1	Tempered water system
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-1e	Pressure, volume, other (water addition to MCO)	Water addition during drying, pressure rebound test	Valves don't fully close due to particles, process upsets, operator error, vacuum conditions in MCO acts to draw water	Internal hydrogen explosion (E 1) External hydrogen explosion (E 4)	Water addition causes hydrogen formation and release in explosive mixtures into local exhaust, or explosion inside the MCO Radioactive particulate release	SCC detects process upset initiating SCHE, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution Cask-MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	S2	S1	Tempered water system
Process bays 2-5 PB-H-1f	Pressure, volume, other (water addition to MCO)	Water addition after final pressure rebound test from Process Water Room through MCO drain line	Valves don't fully close due to particles, process upsets, vacuum conditions in MCO acts to draw water	Fuel and water reactions in long term storage	Fuel and water reactions in long term storage	The final pressure rebound test closes all process valves and isolation valves. If first test fails, the final test helium supply is opened to pressurize the MCO, thus no water addition path exists	F0					
Process bays 2-5 PB-J06	Explosives/pyrophorics - hydrogen	Hydrogen is a product of the MCO contents	Expected conditions within the MCO Hydrogen forms and collects due to process upsets	Potential accidents are evaluated in PBL-11	See PBL-11a - L-11g							
Process bays 2-5 PB-K-10	Explosives - plutonium and uranium metal	Water reaction with fuel	Immediately following process upsets, the drain lines, the MCO is refilled with water	None	No consequences (introduction of water into the MCO does not cause any effects)		F2	F2		S0	S0	
Process bays 2-5 PB-K-12	Explosives - other pyrophorics, other (uranium hydrides)	Uranium hydride reactions	Oxygen infiltration into the MCO through line break in the helium normal supply	Internal hydrogen explosion	Hydrogen generation and sudden pressurization (a pulse) due to a hydride-oxygen reaction, with resulting particulate release to the process bay	Hydride reactions cannot create enough hydrogen to generate an explosion	F0					
Process bays 2-5 PB-K-04 PB-K-05 PB-K-15	Nuclear criticality - fibers, casks, other (MCOs and drain lines)	These hazards are addressed and analyzed in the CVDF FSAR, Chapter 6.0 ¹										

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 11 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PBL-01 PBL-02 PBL-03 PBL-04 PBL-05 PBL-06 PBL-07 PBL-08 PBL-09 PBL-10 PBL-11 PBL-12 PBL-13 PBL-14 PBL-15 PBL-16	Flammable / combustible materials - gasoline, lubricating oil, coolant oil, paint solvent, diesel fuel, coolants, hydraulic fluids, greases and contents, grease, propane, alcohol, aerosol propellant	Ignition of flammable atmosphere within the process bays	Human error Mechanical failure Fire within the process bay with possible spread of fire to adjacent processing MCOs	Internal hydrogen explosion (I 3) External hydrogen explosion (E 6) Thermal runaway reaction (T 3)	Fire within the process bay with possible spread of fire into adjacent processing MCOs Equipment damage leading to hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	TSR - limits on combustible loading in bay	F2	F0		S2	S1	SCG selects process upset and isolates the MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Cask-MCO AND SCHe confinement design Facility evacuation to protect workers Fire protection system present in each bay Fire suppression present in all adjacent areas Fire department alarm and response Tempered water system cask annulus manual refill piping
Process bays 2-5 PBL-11a	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere in local exhaust ventilation system	Expected normal condition for cask venting Shipping time exceeds window Improper fuel loading (insufficient water or configurations) MCO water leakage	External hydrogen explosion (E 11 DS/N)	Sufficient hydrogen to create a flammable atmosphere is present in the cask-MCO head spaces prior to venting, then released to local exhaust during cask vent The HEPA filters in the ventilation system may fail because of the event	TSR - Receipt transportation window Cask-MCO confinement function Cask vent orifice and interlock with HVAC for dilution	F3	F0	TSR - HVAC HEPA filter loading limit HVAC system provides dilution	S2	S1	No leak path below waigi line in MCO Cask vent line isolates HVAC/CCPV piping away from operator
Process bays 2-5 PBL-11b	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere in process bay	Failure to isolate auxiliary vacuum pump prior to cask venting Insufficient helium in process bay to create an explosion, gas release from MCO may also contribute to radioactive particulate	Hydrogen explosion in the process bay Personnel exposure to radioactive particulate	Hydrogen deflagration in the process bay, possible radioactive particulate release to the bay Personnel injury		F2	F2	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution	S1	S1	Procedure to verify isolation of auxiliary vacuum pump
Process bays 2-5 PBL-11c	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere in MCO	Failure to close the MCO port valve after receipt at CNDF Excessive time (>12 hr) with the MCO open Processing delays	Hydrogen explosion in the process bay Personnel exposure to radioactive particulate	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release to the bay Personnel injury	MCO full of water limits the hydrogen and particulate release	F2	F2	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution	S1	S1	Operators are trained in the proper MCO preparation for processing

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 12 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PBL-11d	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere in MCO during draining prior to breakthrough	Process line failure or process upset causing significant air ingress into MCO, or HVAC failure	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	Hydrogen formation leading to explosion inside the MCO, or vent system	Cask MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	F2	F1	HVAC systems provide containment, filtration and dilution	S2	S1	SCIC detects process upset and isolates process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO
Process bays 2-5 PBL-11e	Flammable materials - hydrogen forms during prep for shipment to CSB	Flammable atmosphere in or around MCO and cask	Failure to inert MCO Improper sealing of cask prior to shipment Failure to cool MCO sufficiently before shipment Inadequate vacuum drying Incomplete draining of cask annulus	External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release, or hydrogen explosion	With less than 200 grams of free water explosive mixtures of hydrogen are not formed	F2	F2		S0	S0	Flood-of-dryness demonstration
Process bays 2-5 PBL-11f	Hydrogen in MCO	Hydrogen enters location in explosive mixtures	Manual or automatic actuation of SCIC and local exhaust not running	External hydrogen explosion (E.2)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release, or hydrogen explosion		F2	F2	HVAC systems provide containment and dilution	S2	S1	SCIC actuates SCHe on process upset SCHe establishes He flow through MCO directly to local exhaust MCO and SCHe confinement design
PBL-11g	Hydrogen in MCO	SCHe activation with leaky PVC safety-class valves	Valve seal damage	Hydrogen in the PVC drain line	Hydrogen explosion in PVC drain line	Design includes redundant isolation valves	F2	F1	HVAC systems provide containment and dilution	S1	S1	
Process bays 2-5 PBM-08	Hazardous materials - heavy metals (TRU)	Radiological guidelines are more limiting than toxicological limits. see HNF-SD-SNF-TL-059'										
Process bays 2-5 PBN-01	Ionizing radiation sources - fissile material	Failure of the PVC drain line in a bay with an open door while draining an upstream bay	Random failure, corrosion	Gaseous release from MCO (G.1) Gaseous release due to purge flow from the drain line	Radioactive particulate release	PVC drain line in bay is closed and isolation effects such as corrosion and is located where it cannot be impacted	F2	F1		S2	S2	
Process bays 2-5 PBN-03a	Ionizing radiation sources - radioactive material	Failure to properly demineralized water rinses of PVC system and MCO port valve	Human error after MCS failure	Increased radiation in drain lines	Increased risk of exposure near the line		F2	F2		S1	S1	Routine radiation surveys are conducted
Process bays 2-5 PBN-03b	Ionizing radiation sources - radioactive material	No filtration during draining	Human error in manufacturing MCO	Increased radioactive particulate in drain line and process water room	Increased risk of exposure near the line and in PVC Room		F1	F1		S1	S1	CAMs in PVC Room Routine addition surveys are conducted

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 13 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-N-03 PB-N-04	Ionizing radiation contaminated radioactive material	Contamination in lines	Manual or spurious activation of SCIC causes contamination in lines. Contaminant may be blown into the process bay. The process bay doors are not attached to the MCO	Radioactive particulate release to process bay	Radioactive particulate release to process bay		F2	F2		S1	S1	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration Procedures Training
Process bays 2-5 PB-N-03d	Pressure, volume or other (building) pressure boundaries	Ventilation of the movement of hazardous materials across pressure boundaries	Failure to isolate bay ventilation before opening bay door (human error) Bay door opens accidentally, isolation ventilation exhausts not adequate (human failure) Failure to reestablish ventilation after closing bay door	Loss of confinement zones (ventilation not adequate to expected differential pressure inversions) Stagnant bay	Potential contamination spread if this occurs in conjunction with other accidents Potential for a differential pressure inversion with adjacent confinement zones		F3	F3	Differential pressure monitoring	S1	S1	Procedure for processing establishes and verifies proper HVAC conditions Operators trained to procedures
Process bays 2-5 PB-P-01 PB-P-03 PB-Q-01 -- Q-04 PB-R-01c PB-R-02 and OUP for discussion of these events	Various external events external to the process bay, see Outside Events Sections OUP, PB-R-01c and OUP for discussion of these events											
Process bays 2-5 PB-P-02	External events - fire	Fire external to facility ignites process heat and smoke or fire enters bay igniting combustible material within the process bays	Human error Mechanical failure Natural phenomena (range fire) Flammable materials ignite	External hydrogen explosion (E 6) Thermal runaway reaction (T 3)	Equipment damage leading to process upsets resulting in radioactive particulate release	The facility location is remote, reducing the likelihood of occurrence TSS -- limits on combustible loading in bay	F2	F0		S2	S1	SCIC detects process upset Initiating SCIC, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Cask-MCO AND SCIC confinement design Facility evacuation to protect workers Fire protection system present in each bay Fire suppression present in all adjacent areas Area surrounding building is controlled to limit combustible material and plants

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 14 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Process bays 2-5 PB-F-01a SB-F-01a SB-F-02a	Natural phenomena - earthquake (DBE)	Fuel reaction due to damage to piping, loss of ventilation and/or trailer movement	Earthquake causes process upset, loss of ventilation and/or trailer movement	Gaseous release (G 3) Internal hydrogen explosion (E 6) External hydrogen explosion (E 6) Thermal runaway reaction (T 6) MCO overpressurization (P 4)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	Seismic input into SCIC initiates SCHe SCHe isolates MCO from process equipment, establishes flow through MCO MCO and SCHe confinement design 30 lbm ³ gauge rupture disk and vent path TSR - Trailer placement in process seismic calculations	F2	F0	TSR - Process vent-HEPA filter loading 150 lbm ³ gauge rupture disk TV annulus system HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution Cask-MCO design withstands internal explosion energy	S3	S1	10 lbm ³ process relief valve
Process bay 1 (spare bay) SB-F-01b SB-F-02b	Linear kinetic - cars, trucks, buses, forklifts, dollies, carts	Vehicle impacts within the spare bay affecting spare bay only	Human error Mechanical failure	Sliding walls, doors, electrical panels, demineralized water line, or chilled water line	Personnel injury Loss of power to the spare bay Shear of demineralized water line, or chilled water line into its concrete vault pit		F3	F3	Vehicles are operated by personnel and may enter and exit the bays at a slow speed	S1	S1	Bollards and other structural steel in process bays doors protect the outer doors High-level alarms are present in drain tank Concrete vault pit has a large capacity
Process bay 1 (spare bay) SB-F-01b SB-F-02b	Linear kinetic - cars, trucks, buses, forklifts, dollies, carts	Vehicle or forklift impacts within the spare bay, striking instrument air lines, normal helium supply, or demineralized water panel affecting processing operations in other bays	Human error Mechanical failure	Internal hydrogen explosion (E 5) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 4) Helium supply, or demineralized water panel overpressurization (P 2)	Personnel injury (high pressure air, noise, flying debris) Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release Wall damage could result in a process upset in an adjacent bay (e.g., activating a seismic switch)	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Cask-MCO AND SCHe confinement design 30 lbm ³ gauge rupture disk TSR. Crane movement restricted during MCO processing	F3	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150 lbm ³ gauge rupture disk	S3	S1	Forklifts are operated by qualified personnel Asphyxiation would only be a concern if isolation were off and the leak continued for several shifts 10 lbm ³ process relief valve
Process bay 1 (spare bay) SB-F-01b SB-F-02b	Linear kinetic - cars, trucks, buses, forklifts, dollies, carts	Vehicle impacts within the spare bay	Human error Mechanical failure	Sliding process (MCO drain) lines	Damage to process lines (e.g., drain lines from MCO), which could result in radioactive particulate release into bay from MCO draining operations in other bays through the open path between floor drains	The common drain line is elevated and cannot be impacted by vehicles	F0					
Process bay 1 (spare bay) SB-F-01b SB-F-02b	Linear kinetic - other (gas bottles)	Stored gas bottles become missiles	Earthquake damage, forklift impact	Bottle may move but not enough to cause damage	Personnel injury, structure and/or equipment damage to the spare bay only, no damage to SSCs	Gas bottle design includes passive orifice that restricts kinetic energy to limit velocity	F0			S1		

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Table A2-I. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 16 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
IXM replacement is not anticipated during the lifetime of the facility. Therefore, IXM removal and replacement is not within the authorization basis of this safety analysis report												
Process water room PW-F-05	Linear kinetic - other (maintenance using crane through roof hatch)	Crane hooks malfunction during IXM replacement	Human error									
Process water room PW-F-07	Linear kinetic - other (maintenance gas bottles)	Gas bottles malfunction during maintenance become missiles	Earthquake damage	A gas bottle may move but will not move enough to cause any damage	Personnel injury, structure and/or equipment damage to SSCs	Gas bottle design includes safety devices to limit kinetic energy to limit velocity	F0			S1		
Process water room PW-G-03	Mass, gravity, height - lifts and cranes	IXM replacement requires a crane lift through a roof access panel	IXM dropped due to mechanical failure of the crane or human error									
Process water room PW-G-14	Mass, gravity, height - other (roof hatch requires a crane lift through a roof access panel)	IXM replacement requires a crane lift through a roof access panel	Roof hatch dropped due to mechanical failure of the crane or human error									
Process water room PW-H-06	Pressure in process water system pipes and tanks	Spray and/or release from pressurized PWC components	Process upset, processing delay or equipment failure (pipe leaks or breaks)	Liquid spray release (L1, DBA) Gaseous release (G1)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release		F3	F3	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration in process bays HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration in PWC room when PWC pump is operating	S2	S1	PWC room designed to contain spills Leak detection is present to detect spills to the floor CAMS are present in the room.
Process water room PW-H-11	Pressure, volume - other	Helium pressure higher than expected	Cascading failure of regulators beginning with 3000 psi regulator failure	Overpressurization of the drain line possibly causing water hammer and failure of the drain line in the process resulting in high-pressure helium blowdown	Particulate release	Safety relief valves installed on the helium supply	F2	F0		S1		HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration
Process water room PW-J-06	Explosives / pyrophorics - hydrogen	Hydrogen collects in receiver tanks	Process upset or delay during MCO draining Inadequate or loss of local exhaust ventilation flow	Hydrogen mixes with air in receiver tanks to create a flammable environment, then ignites		TSS - Pressure purge of MCO to dilute H2 prior to drain TSS - 35 min. Time limit on MCO drain	F1	F1	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S1		SCIC actuates SCHe on purge time limit SCHe establishes He flow through the MCO directly to local exhaust design MCO and SCHe confinement design The PWC drain line and receiver tank are purged with helium prior to MCO draining
Process water room PW-J-10 PW-J-12	Explosives / pyrophorics - plutonium and uranium metal	Air ingress into the IXM (normal operations)	Mechanical failure	IXM explosion due to air-hydroide or water-hydroide reactions			F0					Room provides confinement, including general exhaust ventilation with HEPA filtration

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 17 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
These hazards are addressed and analyzed in the CVDF FSAR, Chapter 6.0 and HNF-SD-SNF-CSER-006'												
Process water room PW-K-02 PW-K-04 PW-K-08 PW-K-15	Nuclear criticality											
Process water room PW-L-02 PW-L-08 PW-L-14 PW-L-16	Flammable materials - rags, buildings and contents, propane aerosol propellant	Ignition of flammable material within the process water room	Human error Mechanical failure	Liquid spray release as a result of fire equipment (L-2)	Spray release into PWC room (process water)	Combustible loading requirements from the FIA ^a are imposed	F2	F2	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S2	S1	Fire protection system is present (sprinklers).
Process water room PW-L-11	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Hydrogen collects in receiver tanks	Process upset or delay Hydrogen collects during MCO draining Inadequate or loss of local exhaust ventilation	External hydrogen explosion	Hydrogen mixes with air in receiver tanks to create a flammable environment, then ignites	TSR - Pressure purge of MCO to dilute H2 prior to drain TSR - 35 min. Time limit on MCO drain	F1	F1	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration	S1		SCIC activates SCHE on purge time limit SCHE establishes He flow through the MCO directly to local exhaust MCO and SCHE confinement design The PWC drain line and receiver tank are purged with helium prior to MCO draining
Process water room PW-M-08	Hazardous materials - heavy metals (HM)											
Radiological guidelines are more limiting than toxicological limits, see HNF-SD-SNF-T1059												
Process water room PW-H-01	Ionizing radiation sources - radioactive material	Radioactive liquid release from process piping and tanks	Processing upsets or delays, equipment failure, pipe break or leaks, pump leaks	Liquid spray release (L-1)	Radioactive particulate release		F3	F3	HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration in process bays HVAC systems provide confinement and filtration in PWC room when PWC pump is operating	S2	S1	PWC room designed to contain spills Leak detection is present to detect spills to the floor. CAMs are present in the room.
Process water room PW-N-03a	Ionizing radiation sources - radioactive material	Direct radiation	Collection of radioactive liquid within the process tanks or lines	Normal operations	Increased risk of exposure near the line		F3	F3		S1		Area radiation monitors are provided within the PWC room. A survey program to periodically survey the process lines will be in place. This is primarily an ALARA concern.
Process water room PW-P-01 PW-P-02 PW-P-03 PW-Q-01 PW-Q-02 PW-R-01 - R-10	Various external events affecting the process, see Outside Events Sections OUP, OUC and OUR for discussion of these events											

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 18 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/ material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Outside OUP-01	Linear kinetic - cars, trucks, buses (helium delivery truck)	Impact with the facility	Human error Mechanical failure	Truck strikes facility	Facility design precludes truck impact and is designed for safe shutdown from these events		F3	F3		S0	S0	Interior bay walls are 4- to 6-in. thick concrete Rear bay walls are 8-in. thick concrete Truck drivers are trained in the proper use of orbit vehicles
Outside OUL-02 OUL-03 OUL-15	Nuclear criticality - temporary storage areas other (drain tank)	These hazards are addressed and analyzed in the CVDF FSAR, Chapter 6.1										
Outside OUL-01 - L07 OUL-09 OUL-10 OUL-15 - L16	Flammable materials	Outside fires are analyzed in OUP-02a and OUP-02b										
Outside OUP-01	External events - explosion	External pressure on bay walls	Fuel truck accident/ explosion Helium tank overpressure Forcible propane tank explosion	Impact on process or shutdown systems Impact on personnel	Loss of MCS in the bay Loss of power in the bay Loss of support systems in the bay Personnel injury Spread of contamination	Pressure vessels and tanks are built to industry standards. The facility location is remote, reducing the likelihood of occurrence	F2	F2		S1	S1	HVAC systems provide containment and filtration SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCS from process and establishes helium supply to the MCC MCO and SCHe confinement design
Outside OUP-02a (related to process bays)	External events - fire	Fire external to facility introduces heat and smokes or igniting flammable material within bay process bays	Human error Mechanical failure Natural phenomena (range fire) Flammable materials ignite	External hydrogen explosion (E8) Thermal runaway reaction (T-3)	Equipment damage leading to process shutdown radioactive particulate release	The facility location is remote, reducing the likelihood of occurrence TSR - limits on combustible loading in bay	F2	F0		S2	S1	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCS from process and establishes helium supply to the MCC Cook-MCO AND SCHe confinement design Facility evacuation to protect workers Fire protection system present in each bay Fire suppression present in all adjacent areas Area surrounding building is controlled to limit combustible material and paints

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 19 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Outside OU-P-02a (related to all facility areas except process bays)	External events - fire Other sites	Fire external to facility introduces heat and smoke, fire spreads into process / mechanical room	Human error Mechanical failure Natural phenomena (large fire) Flammable materials Ignite	Fire spreads through the facility	Equipment damage leading to process upsets resulting in radioactive particulate release Personnel injury	SCC function for safe shutdown does not rely on input from the transfer corridor or mechanical room shutdown Equipment in the mechanical room required for safe shutdown is qualified for environmental qualifications The facility location is remote, reducing the likelihood of occurrence	F2	F2	Fire sprinklers, alarm and fire department response	S1	S1	SCC detects process upset, isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Cask-MCO AND SCC confinement design FHA* addresses combustible limits for stored materials Facility evaluation to protect workers Fire suppression present in all adjacent areas Area surrounding building is controlled to limit combustible material and plants
Outside OU-P-03	External events - fire Other sites	Accident at and/or facility	Various (identified in facility-specific FSAR)	None that impact facility operation - analysis concludes								
Outside OU-P-04	External events - Loss of power	Hydrogen forms	Loss of helium purge Process upsets MCO bottled up	Internal hydrogen explosion (I 5) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 1) MCO overpressurization (P 2)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	SCC detects process upset, isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO MCO and SCC confinement design SCC fail-safe design 30 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk	F3	F0	Standby electrical power for ventilation system HVAC systems provide confinement, dilution, and filtration 150 lb/in ² gauge rupture	S3	S1	10 lb/in ² process relief valve
Outside OU-C-01 OU-C-02	Vehicles in motion - airplane, helicopter	Aircraft impact	Human error Mechanical failure	Aircraft impacts facility structure and/or safety process systems	An assessment of aircraft impact frequency for the CVDG facility was performed. FSAR concluded that such an event is beyond extremely unlikely		F0					
Outside OU-C-04	Vehicles in motion - truck bus, car	Impact with the facility	Human error Mechanical failure	Truck strikes facility	Facility design precludes damage to equipment required for safe shutdown from these events		F3	F3		S0	S0	Interior bay walls are 4- to 6-in.-thick concrete Rear bay walls are 8-in.-thick concrete Truck drivers are trained in the proper use of on-site vehicles.

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis (sheet 20 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Outside OUR-01a	Natural phenomena - earthquake (DBE)	Fire/explosion due to damage caused by seismic event	Earthquake causes equipment damage, loss of ventilation and/or trailer movement	Gaseous release (G 3) Internal hydrogen explosion (I 6) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 6) MCO overpressurization (P 4)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO and vents to local exhaust Cask-MCO design isolates internal explosion energy TSR -- Trailer placement in dry to support seismic calculations	F2	F0	HVAC systems provide confinement, dilution and filtration TSR -- Process vent HEPA filter loading TMS annulus antisiphon valves and anti piping and parts	S3	S1	Workers are trained in emergency response and are applicable to seismic events to shut down facility in a safe-shutdown condition 10 lb/in ² process relief valve
Outside OUR-01b (related to process water room)	Natural phenomena - earthquake (DBE)	Acceleration forces exerted on the facility	Earthquake causes damage to process lines or tanks	Liquid spray release (L 3)	Blank in process lines or tanks causing liquid spray release in PWC Room		F2	F2	Seismic shutdown switch for PWC pump	S2	S1	HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution
Outside OUR-02 OUR-04	Natural phenomena - flood, rain	Water introduction into facility Water intrusion into process bays	Natural phenomena	Loss of power to key facility systems causing potential for internal hydrogen explosion (I 5) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 1) MCO overpressurization (P 1)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO and SCHe confinement design SCIC fail-safe design 30 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk	F3	F0	Standby electrical power for ventilation system HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk	S3	S1	
Outside OUR-03	Natural phenomena - lightning	Electrical surge	Natural phenomena	Loss of power to key facility systems causing potential for internal hydrogen explosion (I 5) External hydrogen explosion (E 5) Thermal runaway reaction (T 1) MCO overpressurization (P 2)	Hydrogen and/or radioactive particulate release	Facility designed to NFPA 780 for lightning protection SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO and SCHe confinement design SCIC fail-safe design 30 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk	F2	F0	Standby electrical power for ventilation system HVAC systems provide confinement and dilution 150 lb/in ² gauge rupture disk	S3	S1	
Outside OUR-05	Natural phenomena - freezing weather	Low temperatures	Extreme cold weather	Loss of power	Cask annulus and MCO freezing causes loss of primary containment leading to particulate release	Standby power	F2	F0	SCIC detects process upset initiating SCHe, which isolates MCO from process piping and establishes helium supply to the MCO Cask-MCO and SCIC confinement design	S2		HVAC systems provide confinement, dilution and filtration Facility emergency response procedures will address loss of power in cold weather

Table A2-1. Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis. (sheet 21 of 21)

Checklist entry	Hazard energy source/material	Hazardous condition	Cause	Potential accident	Consequence	Credited prevention	Frequency		Credited mitigation	Consequence		Defense-in-depth or worker safety features
							Without prevention	With prevention		Without mitigation	With mitigation	
Outside OU-R-05 OU-R-09	Natural phenomena - snow, ashfall	Excessive roof loading	Natural phenomena	Roof collapse	Personnel injury Loss of ventilation Loss of MCS control Loss of power Process upsets leading to fuel reactions with air and/or water	Building designed to withstand design basis snow loads and ashfall loads	F3	F0		S3	S3	
Outside OU-R-06 OU-R-07 OU-R-08	Natural phenomena - straight winds, dust devils, tornadoes	Pressure differentials and missile strikes	Wind and loose debris	Wall or roof collapse Missile impacts upon the facility	Loss of MCS control Loss of power Damage to process systems Process upsets leading to fuel reactions with air and/or water	Facility structure is designed to withstand design basis loads	F2	F0		S3		Process bay doors are closed prior to processing operations
Outside OU-R-10	Natural phenomena - range fire		Range fires, and other outside fires, are addressed in OUP-02a and OUP-02b									

*HNF-SD-SNF-FIA-003, 1998, *Primary Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility*, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
 *HNF-SD-TD-SARP-017, 1998, *Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Onsite, Multi-Container Overpack, Oak Creek, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.*
 *HNF-3553, 1999, *Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report*, Annex A, "Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report," Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
 *HNF-3553, 1999, *Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report*, Annex B, "Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Final Safety Analysis Report," Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
 *HNF-SD-SNF-FIA-003, 1998, *Primary Fire Hazard Analysis for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility*, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.
 *HNF-SD-SNF-CSSR-008, 1998, *Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report*, Rev. 0, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington.
 *NFA 780, 1995, *Lightning Protection Systems*, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts.

ALARA = as low as reasonably achievable
 CB = canister building
 CSB = Canister Storage Building
 CYDF = Cold Vacuum Drying Facility
 DBA = design basis accident
 DBS = design basis seismicity
 FIA = fire hazard analysis
 FSAR = final safety analysis report
 GShie = general-service helium
 GShie = general-service helium
 HVC = helium vent control and air conditioning
 IEM = ion exchange module
 MCO = multicarrier overpack
 MCO = monitoring and control system
 PNC = process nuclear control
 SARP = safety analysis report for packaging
 SCHe = safety-class helium
 SCC = safety-class instrumentation and control
 TRU = transuranic
 TW = tempered water

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ATTACHMENT 3

**RELEASE CHARACTERISTICS FOR HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH OFFSITE (SITE BOUNDARY) AND
ONSITE (COLLOCATED WORKER) RECEPTORS**

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Figure A3-1. Three-by-Three Likelihood and Consequence Ranking Matrix.

F3	4	7	9*
F2	2	5	8*
F1	1	3	6*
	S1	S2	S3

Combinations that identify situations of major concern

Combinations that identify situations of concern

*These situations are either prevented or mitigated by safety class features.

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors (sheet 1 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
TC-J-12	Explosive gases	Hydrogen deflagration inside the ventilation ducts due to collection of gases used during maintenance activity, deflagration disperses HEPA filter contents	External explosion (E.7)	F3/S2	7
TC-R-01	Natural phenomena - earthquake (equal to or less than the DBE)	Fuel reactions due to equipment damage caused by seismic event.	Gasous releases (G.3)	F2/S2	5
PB-B-02a	Thermal - electrical equipment	HVAC failure causes bay temperatures in excess of electrical equipment design limits, condition occurs with annulus water flow	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.2) External hydrogen explosion (E.2)	F3/S2	7
PB-B-02b	Thermal - electric equipment	HVAC failure causes bay temperatures in excess of electrical equipment design limits, condition occurs without annulus water flow	Thermal runaway reaction (T.2)	F3/S3	9
PB-B-03a	Thermal - heaters	Tempered water heated to temperatures above 50° C from mechanical or software failure resulting in loss of tempered water heat control.	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4) Thermal Runaway reaction (T.2) MCO overpressurization (P.1)	F3/S3	9
PB-B-03b	Thermal - tempered water heater	Insufficient heating of tempered water due to software failure or human error in programming resulting in inaccurate heater control leading to potential for inaccurate pressure rebound test and proof of dryness demonstration. Excessive water remains in MCO to react with fuel.	External hydrogen explosion (E.3) Hydrogen generation and potential for runaway at the CSB	F2/S2	5
PB-B-13a	Thermal - MCO contents	Process line failure, HVAC or process upset causing significant air ingress into MCO. Air ingress with high fuel temperatures present.	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) Gasous release (G.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F3/S2	7

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 2 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
PB-B-13b	Thermal - MCO contents	Leak back of water into MCO while fuel temperatures are high. Fuel reacts with water.	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F3/S2	7
PB-B-13c	Thermal - MCO contents	Low tempered water level, or loss of tempered water, from cask annulus raises fuel temperatures and accelerates fuel temperature and reaction with water.	External hydrogen explosion (E.4) Thermal runaway reaction (T.1) MCO overpressurization (P.1)	F3/S3	9
PB-B-13d	Thermal - MCO contents	Hydrogen release due to excessive free water in the MCO during (or after) the proof of dryness demonstration initiated by an inadequate pressure rebound test, inadequate drying, or human error	External hydrogen explosion (E3.) Thermal runaway reaction (T.1) MCO overpressurization (P.1)	F3/S3	9
PB-B-13g	Thermal - MCO contents	High fuel temperatures on receipt due to improper fuel loading at Basin or leakage, leads to increased water fuel reaction and increased hydrogen production, deflagration when cask is vented.	External hydrogen explosion (E.1)	F3/S2	7
PB-F-02a	Linear kinetic - forklifts, dollies, carts	Fork lift in empty bay strikes equipment causing process support system or utility system, causes process upset	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.5) External hydrogen explosion (E.5) Thermal runaway reaction (T.4) MCO overpressurization (P.2)	F3/S3	9

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 3 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
PB-F-05	Linear kinetic - crane loads	Crane load impacts or drops on instrument air line, normal helium supply line, electrical panel, or demin water line during processing	Gaseous release (G.1) Internal hydrogen explosion (I.5) External hydrogen explosion (E.5) Thermal runaway reaction (T.4) MCO overpressurization (P.2)	F3/S3	9
PB-H-06d	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Pressurized MCO/VPS develops small undiscovered, long term leak	Gaseous release (G.1)	F3/S2	7
PB-H-06f	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Pressurized releases from an MCO during vacuum drying, process line failure or HVAC failure allows air ingress	Gaseous release (G.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F3/S2	7
PB-H-06g	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Particulate releases from HEPA filters on the local and general exhaust ventilation systems through the exhaust stack initiated by excessive pressure differential	Gaseous release (G.1)	F3/S2	7
PB-H-06h	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Particulate releases within a process bay initiated by failure of ventilation ductwork or loss of ventilation fans	Gaseous release (G.1)	F3/S2	7
PB-H-06i	Pressure, volume - pressure vessels	Hydrogen generation within MCO due to excessive delays in shipping	Gaseous release (G.2) External hydrogen (E.4)	F2/S2	5
PB-H-06k	Pressurized MCO	Fuel reacts with contaminants in purge gas, or with air or other contaminants due to lack of proper purging of lines following maintenance	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.7) External hydrogen explosion (E.7) Thermal runaway reaction (T.5)	F2/S2	5

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 4 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
PB-H-08	Pressure, volume - vacuum	Degraded vacuum pump operation leads to increased fuel temperatures and reactions forming hydrogen	Thermal runaway reaction (T.1)	F3/S3	9
PB-H-11a	Pressure, volume - other (pressurized helium recirculation system)	Pressurized release of particulate from an MCO initiated by excessive pressure in the normal helium supply	MCO overpressurization (P.3)	F2/S2	5
PB-H-11d	Pressure, volume - other (water addition to the MCO)	Water addition into MCO while drying or testing from deionized water, vacuum pump cooling water, or bulk water addition, results water fuel reaction, heat and hydrogen	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F3/S2	7
PB-H-11e	Pressure, volume - other (water addition to the MCO)	Water addition into MCO while drying or testing due to isolation valves not closing fully, results in water fuel reaction, heat and hydrogen	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F3/S2	7
PB-L-01 PB-L-02 PB-L-03 PB-L-04 PB-L-05 PB-L-06 PB-L-07 PB-L-08 PB-L-09 PB-L-10 PB-L-13 PB-L-14 PB-L-15 PB-L-16	Flammable materials	Fire in the bay damages equipment	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.3) External hydrogen explosion (E.6) Thermal runaway reaction (T.3)	F2/S2	5
PB-L-11a	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere developing in local exhaust ventilation system due to hydrogen in tank upon receipt and venting	External hydrogen explosion (E.1)	F3/S2	7

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 5 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
PB-L-11d	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere developing within MCO during drain prior to breakthrough with air ingress	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.1) External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F1/S2	2
PB-L-11e	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere developing around the MCO or within cask-MCO during shipping prep due to improper valve plug seating, inadequate processing, or water introduction after the proof of dryness demonstration.	External hydrogen explosion (E.4)	F2/S0	0
PB-L-11f	Flammable materials - hydrogen	Flammable atmosphere developing within the local exhaust from SCIC actuation, local exhaust not running, during heat-up and drain modes	External hydrogen explosion (E.2)	F2/S2	5
PB-N-01	Ionizing radiation sources - fissile/radioactive material	Failure of drain line in process bay with the door open while draining an upstream bay. Gaseous release due to helium purge out of break.	Gaseous Release (G.1)	F2/S2	5
PB-P-02	External events - fire	Failure of key process systems within the process bays initiated by an external fire spreading to the facility	External hydrogen explosion (E.6) Thermal runaway reaction (T.3)	F2/S2	5
PB-R-01a	Natural phenomena - earthquake	Earthquake causes process upset, equipment damage, loss of ventilation and/or trailer movement	Gaseous release (G.3) Internal hydrogen explosion (I.6) External hydrogen explosion (E.8) Thermal runaway reaction (T.6) MCO overpressurization (P.4)	F2/S3	8

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 6 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
SB-F-01b SB-F-02b	Linear kinetic - cars, trucks, buses, forklifts, dollies, carts	Vehicle or forklift impacts equipment or structure in empty bay causing process upset or loss of utility system.	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.5) External hydrogen explosion (E.5) Thermal runaway reaction (T.4) MCO overpressurization (P.2)	F3/S3	9
SB-N-01	Ionizing radiation sources - radioactive material	Release of contaminated liquid into the spare bay to a PWC drain line failure. Gaseous release due to purge flow exiting the break.	Gaseous release (G.1)	F2/S2	5
PW-H-06	Pressure in PWC pipes and tanks	Equipment failure causes spray and/or gaseous release from PWC components	Gaseous release (G.1) Liquid spray release (L.1)	F3/S2	7
PW-L-02 PW-L-08 PW-L-14 PW-L-16	Flammable materials	Ignition of flammable materials within the PWC room results in equipment damage and leak.	Liquid spray release (L.2)	F2/S2	5
PW-N-01	Ionizing radiation sources - fissile/radioactive material	Radioactive liquid release from process PWC equipment.	Liquid spray release (L.1)	F3/S2	7
OU-P-02a	External events - fire	Fire causes equipment damage leading to process upsets	External hydrogen explosion (E.6) Thermal runaway reaction (T.3)	F2/S2	5
OU-P-04	External events - loss of power	Loss of power causes process upsets, hydrogen forms	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.5) External hydrogen explosion (E.5) Thermal runaway reaction (T.1) MCO overpressurization (P.2)	F3/S3	9

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 7 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
OU-R-01a	Natural phenomena - DBE	Fuel reacts with water or air due to damage from earthquake	Gaseous release (G.3) Internal hydrogen explosion (I.6) External hydrogen explosion (E.8) Thermal runaway reaction (T.6) MCO overpressurization (P.4)	F2/S3	8
OU-R-01b	Natural phenomena - DBE (related to the PWC room)	Earthquake causes damage to equipments, lines or tanks	Liquid spray release (L.3)	F2/S3	8
OU-R-02 OU-R-04	Natural phenomena - Flood, rain	Water is introduced into the facility, into process bays causing system upsets	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.5) External hydrogen explosion (E.5) Thermal runaway reaction (T.1) MCO overpressurization (P.1)	F2/S3	8
OU-R-03	Natural phenomena - lightning	Lightning strike on the facility causes power loss, process upsets with hydrogen forming	Internal hydrogen explosion (I.5) External hydrogen explosion (E.5) Thermal runaway reaction (T.1) MCO overpressurization (P.2)		
OU-R-02 OU-R-04	Natural phenomena - flood, rain	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs due to a loss of facility power initiated by water intrusion from floods or rain	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs	S3/F2	8
OU-R-03	Natural phenomena - lightning	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs due to a loss of facility power or process control initiated by electrical surges due to lightning	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs	S3/F2	8

Table A3-1. Release Characteristics for Hazardous Conditions Associated with Offsite (Site Boundary) and Onsite (Collocated Worker) Receptors. (sheet 8 of 8)

Checklist designators	Hazard energy source	Hazardous condition and initiator(s)	Bin	Frequency / consequence categories	Risk ranking
OU-R-05	Natural phenomena - freezing weather	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs due to a loss of facility power initiated by freezing weather	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs	S3/F3	9
OU-R-05 OU-R-09	Natural phenomena - snow, ashfall	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs due to a loss of process control and facility power initiated by snow or ashfall	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs	S3/F3	9
OU-R-06 OU-R-07 OU-R-08	Natural phenomena - straight winds, dust devils, tornados	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs due to a loss of facility power or process control initiated by straight winds or tornados (wind and/or missiles)	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs	S3/F2	8
OU-R-10	Natural phenomena - range fire	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs due to a loss of process control and facility power initiated by a range fire spreading to the facility	Runaway reactions in multiple MCOs	S3/F3	9

CSB = Canister Storage Building.

DBE = design basis earthquake.

HEPA = high-efficiency particulate air (filter).

HVAC = heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.

MCO = multi-canister overpack.

PWC = process water conditioning.

SCIC = safety-class instrumentation and control.

VPS = vacuum purge system.

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ATTACHMENT 4

**BINNED LISTING OF CANDIDATE ACCIDENTS
SORTED BY RISK RANKING**

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Table A4-1. Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents Sorted by Risk Ranking. (4 sheets)

Candidate accident		Initiator type ^a	Frequency/consequence categories ^a	Hazard analysis checklist designator ^c
Gaseous releases (Section B3.4.2.1)				
G.1	Gaseous release due to process line failure or HVAC failure ^d	O	F3/S2	PB-B-13a PB-F-05 PB-H-06d PB-H-06h PB-H-06f ^g PB-N-01 SB-N-01
G.2	Gaseous release due to delays in shipping from the CVDf	O	F2/S2	PB-H-06i
G.3	Gaseous release due to line break caused by a seismic event	NP	F2/S2	TC-R-01 OU-R-01a PB-R-01a
Liquid releases (Section B3.4.2.2)				
L.1	Spray release due to piping failures ^d	O, EI	F2/S2	PW-N-01 PW-H-06
L.2	Spray release due to fire		F3/S2	PW-L-02 PW-L-14 PW-L-08 PW-L-16
L.3	Spray release due to a seismic event	NP	F2/S2	OU-R-01b
MCO external hydrogen explosions (Section B3.4.2.3)				
E.1	Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to hydrogen generation within the cask ^d	O	F3/S2	PB-B-13g PB-L-11a
E.2	Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to instrumentation failure	O	F3/S2	PB-B-02a PB-L-11f
E.3	Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to excessive water in MCO	O	F3/S2	PB-B-03b PB-B-13d
E.4	Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to process upset of key parameters	O, NP, EI	F3/S2	PB-B-03a PB-B-13a PB-B-13b PB-B-13c PB-B-13d PB-B-13e PB-B-13f PB-B-13g PB-B-13h PB-B-13i PB-B-13j PB-B-13k PB-B-13l PB-B-13m PB-B-13n PB-B-13o PB-B-13p PB-B-13q PB-B-13r PB-B-13s PB-B-13t PB-B-13u PB-B-13v PB-B-13w PB-B-13x PB-B-13y PB-B-13z
E.5	Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO following MCO overpressurization	O	F3/S2	PB-B-03a PB-B-13c

Table A4-1. Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents Sorted by Risk Ranking. (4 sheets)

Candidate accident	Initiator type ^a	Frequency/consequence categories ^b	Hazard analysis checklist designator ^c
E.6 Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to loss of support utilities	O, NP, EI	F3/S2	PB-F-02a PB-F-05 OU-R-02 SB-F-01b OU-R-03 SB-F-02b OU-R-04
E.7 Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to facility fire	O	F2/S2	PB-L-01 PB-L-10 PB-L-13 PB-L-14 PB-L-15 PB-L-16 PB-L-05 PB-L-06 PB-L-07 TC-J-12 OU-P-02a PB-L-08 PB-L-09
E.8 Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to contamination of helium supply	O	F2/S2	PB-H-06k
E.9 Hydrogen explosion outside an MCO due to line break caused by a seismic event	NP	F2/S2	TC-R-01 PB-R-01a
MCO internal hydrogen explosions (Section B3.4.2.4)			
I.1 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to process upset of key parameters (significant air ingress into the MCO) ^d	O, NP, EI	F3/S2	PB-B-03a PB-B-13a PB-B-13b PB-L-11d
I.2 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to instrumentation failure (significant air ingress into the MCO)	O	F3/S2	PB-B-02a
I.3 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to loss of MCO control caused by facility fire (significant air ingress into the MCO)	O	F3/S2	PB-L-01 PB-L-02 PB-L-03 PB-L-10 PB-L-04 PB-L-05 PB-L-06 PB-L-07 PB-L-08 PB-L-09 PB-L-13 PB-L-14 PB-L-15 PB-L-16
I.4 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to hydride reaction	O	F0/S2	PB-L-12

Table A4-1. Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents Sorted by Risk Ranking (4 sheets)

Candidate accident	Initiator type ^a	Frequency/consequence categories ^b	Hazard analysis checklist designer ^c
I.5 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to loss of support utilities (significant air ingress into the MCO)	O, NP, EI	F3/S2	PB-F-02a PB-F-05 OU-R-02 SB-F-01b OU-R-03 SB-F-02b0 OU-R-04
I.6 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to line break caused by a seismic event	NP	F2/S2	PB-R-01a OU-R-01a
I.7 Hydrogen explosion within an MCO due to contamination of helium supply	O	F2/S2	PB-H-06k
MCO thermal runaway reactions (Section B3.4.2.5)			
T.1 Thermal runaway reaction due to internal process upset of key parameters ^d	O, NP, EI	F3/S3	PB-B-13c PB-B-13d OU-R-03 OU-R-04
T.2 Thermal runaway reaction in MCO due to instrumentation failure	O	F3/S3	PB-B-02b PN-B-03a
T.3 Thermal runaway reaction in MCO due to loss of MCO control caused by facility fire	O	F3/S3	PB-L-01 PB-L-02 PB-L-10 PB-L-03 PB-L-13 PB-L-14 PB-L-05 PB-L-15 PB-L-06 PB-L-16 PB-L-07 PB-P-02 PB-L-08 OU-P-02a
T.4 Thermal runaway reaction in MCO due to loss of support utilities	O, NP, EI	F3/S3	PB-F-02a PB-F-05 PB-H-08 PB-H-06k
T.5 Thermal runaway reaction in MCO due to contamination of helium supply	O	F2/S2	PB-H-06k
T.6 Thermal runaway reaction in MCO due to line break caused by a seismic event	NP	F2/S3	PB-R-01a OU-R-01a
MCO overpressurization (Section B3.4.2.6)			
P.1 Overpressurization due to internal process upset of key parameters ^d	O	F3/S3	PB-B-03a PB-B-13c PB-B-13d OU-R-02 OU-R-04

Table A4-1. Binned Listing of Candidate Accidents Sorted by Risk Ranking. (4 sheets)

Candidate accident	Initiator type ^a	Frequency/consequence categories ^b	Hazard analysis checklist designator ^c
P.2 Overpressurization due to loss of support utilities	O, NP, EI	F2/S3	PB-F-02a SB-F-02b PB-F-05 OU-P-04 SB-F-01b OU-R-03
P.3 Overpressurization due to excessive helium supply pressure	O	F2/S2	PB-H-11a
P.4 Overpressurization due to a line break caused by a seismic event	NP	F2/S3	PB-R-01a OU-R-01a

^aO = operational; NP = natural phenomena; EI = externally initiated

^bS2 = Sufficient material and release energy to affect an onsite receptor (collocated worker) 100 m from the source of the release.

S3 = Sufficient material and release energy to affect a receptor at the nearest point of uncontrolled public access (Site boundary).

F2 = Foreseeable, but unlikely.

F3 = Likely to occur during the lifetime of the facility.

^cHazard analysis checklist designators are from, HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-004, 1999, *Cold Vacuum Drying Facility Hazard Analysis Report*, Rev. 3, Fluor Daniel Hanford, Incorporated, Richland, Washington. The standardized hazardous material/energy source checklist (Chapter 3.0, Table 3-2) was used to group potentially hazardous materials and energy sources for each of the six major building areas:

- AA Administrative area
- TC Transfer corridor and mechanical corridor
- PB Process bays 2 through 5
- SB Process bay 1, an unused bay
- PW Process water tank room
- OU Outside.

An alpha-numeric designator from the standardized checklist is combined with the building identifier to provide a unique identifier for each hazard (e.g., AA-A-01 identifies an electrical source in the administrative area, specifically battery banks). If a hazard is evaluated in the hazard analysis tables (HNF-SD-SNF-HIE-004) using multiple rows, a lowercase letter following the designator is used to differentiate between rows (e.g., AA-A-01a, AA-A-01b).

^dChosen as a representative and bounding accident for further accident analysis development.

CVDF = Cold Vacuum Drying Facility.

HVAC = heating, ventilation, and air conditioning.

MCO = multi-canister overpack.

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