Incentives for Cheating Given Imperfect Detection

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Description

The incentives for cheating given imperfect detection can be discussed within the context of first strike stability. The cost reduction due to is balanced against the sanctions that would be imposed if cheating was detected. For small political sanctions, the optimum level is at high levels of cheating. For large sanctions, the optimum is at quite low levels, which discourages cheating.

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Creation Information

Canavan, G. H. October 1, 1998.

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Description

The incentives for cheating given imperfect detection can be discussed within the context of first strike stability. The cost reduction due to is balanced against the sanctions that would be imposed if cheating was detected. For small political sanctions, the optimum level is at high levels of cheating. For large sanctions, the optimum is at quite low levels, which discourages cheating.

Physical Description

Medium: P; Size: vp.

Notes

OSTI as DE00763173

Source

  • Other Information: PBD: 1 Oct 1998

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  • Report No.: LA-UR-98-4476
  • Grant Number: W-7405-ENG-36
  • DOI: 10.2172/763173 | External Link
  • Office of Scientific & Technical Information Report Number: 763173
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metadc720648

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Office of Scientific & Technical Information Technical Reports

Reports, articles and other documents harvested from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information.

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Creation Date

  • October 1, 1998

Added to The UNT Digital Library

  • Sept. 29, 2015, 5:31 a.m.

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  • Nov. 7, 2017, 6:24 p.m.

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Citations, Rights, Re-Use

Canavan, G. H. Incentives for Cheating Given Imperfect Detection, report, October 1, 1998; New Mexico. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc720648/: accessed November 24, 2017), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.