ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND RIVALRY RELATIONS

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Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

December 2014

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McCallister Jr., Gerald L. *Ethnic Similarity and Rivalry Relations.* Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), December 2014, 192 pp., 15 tables, 6 figures, references, 241 titles.

Research on ethnicity and conflict treats the concept of ethnicity as defining the actors in these conflicts, whereas research on the construction and maintenance of ethnic identity explores why ethnicity unifies individuals into a single social group. What happens when this unifying concept is divided between two enemy countries? How does this situation influence peace settlements over territorial issues, armed conflict, and economic relations between these countries? To answer these questions, I create a continuous measure of ethnic similarity between rivals. I find that ethnic similarity can facilitate cooperation and exacerbate conflictual interactions between rivals, but governments will seek to limit interactions with their rival when the cross border ethnic groups are minorities. In addition, I create categorical predictors of ethnic similarity, which reveal nuances in these relationships. Specifically, rivalries sharing a pan-ethnic identity are more likely to engage in conflict regardless of actual ethnic similarity, and dyads with a majority in one country sharing ethnicity with a minority in another country are less likely to fight once in a state of rivalry. This is because a quid pro quo exists between these rivals where one rival can reduce oppression of the minority in exchange for the other rival not supporting secessions by their co-ethnics. These pairs of rivals also are more likely to attempt peace settlements. Contested nations, which are rivalry-dyads with similar ethnic majorities, are both the most likely of the ethnically similar rival categories to engage in militarized interstate disputes, but also engage in larger amounts of interstate trade.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Literature on ethnicity and conflict approaches the concept of ethnicity as a possible source of conflict, or as defining the actors in a conflict (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gagnon 1994; Saideman 2002; Sambanis 2001). Another strand of literature on ethnic identity, though, seeks to explain the concept of ethnicity as one that unifies individuals as part of a common community and identity (e.g. Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006; Chandra 2006; Connor 1993; Nagel 1994). An unanswered, yet interesting question is, “What happens when this unifying concept of ethnic identity, is split between enemy countries?” How is it associated with the issues that arise between the two countries? How does shared identity impact conflict between them? How does it influence economic relations between those countries? This research seeks an answer to these questions. The answers should then give us further insight into the most conflictual relationships in international relations.

The Research Task

Thompson (2001) says that domestic constituencies maintain interstate rivalries as citizens view the rival country as a threat, which results in the construction of cognitive biases that maintain and justify that rivalry. In addition, common themes in psychological literature explaining identity formation are that identity association results in individuals’ construction of cognitive biases to selectively process information and seeking to validate their membership in an identity group (Monroe, Hankin, and Bukovchik Van Vechten 2002). Therefore ethnic similarity between rival nations creates conflicting cognitive biases promoting both rivalry and unity. Why individuals would seek to validate membership in the same politically relevant ethnic identity as their enemy isn’t too difficult to understand if we accept they do not have a
choice concerning their ethnic similarity with their rival due to exogenous factors. These exogenous factors may include history or imposition of ethnic identifiers by an ethnically different majority. Regardless, the creation of such cases results in unique situations important to research on international relations, the psychology of rivalry and ethnicity, and the extent or limits of ethnic identity’s influence on people’s behavior.

Gartzke and Simon (1999) argued that theories of rivalry relations were in fact subordinate to theories already available to international relations research. However, consider the unique situation of ethnic similarity between rivals. To be ethnically similar translates into fewer obstacles to interacting with others due to similar language, religion, history, and culture. Our expectations of ethnic similarity might lead us to expect more frequent interactions between two ethnically similar countries. However, this ease of interaction leads to an interesting situation when it exists across the border of two enemy countries that may not be fully explained by existing explanations of international relations or ethnic politics.

Ethnic similarity increases ease of interaction, so greater ethnic similarity should increase interactions between two non-rivals. Should we expect the same for rivals? For example, ease of interaction would increase trade between non-rivals. However, in the context of rivalry would the government tolerate such ease of interaction? Furthermore, trade may strengthen their enemy (Gowa and Mansfield 1993). Ethnic similarity at lower levels may also be due to a subversive minority that threatens the security of the state. Therefore, if rivalry controls trade flows, we would expect no positive influence from ethnic similarity.

Longstanding rivals would seem to have little or nothing in common that would justify a deep economic relationship, but in some cases substantial trade flows between rivals exist. Consider the Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan, and South Korea-China dyads. South Korea-
China trade was limited by the fact that South Korea had maintained ties with Taiwan, and China had maintained ties with North Korea after the Korean War. However, the two countries normalized relations in 1992, with South Korea ceasing diplomatic relations with its ally Taiwan. Once their political differences were set aside, South Korea and China’s economic relationship grew steadily. Yet during the 1990s China traded extensively with its rival Taiwan, and South Korea was willing to engage in a trade relationship with North Korea (Kahler and Kastner 2006).

Why did economic relations require the settling of basic political issues between South Korea and China, but not between China and Taiwan, or South and North Korea?

One may argue that Taiwan’s proximity to the large economy of China would make trade necessary for the island. However, South Korea is a similarly sized country that is also in proximity to China. Although the idiosyncrasies that explain how each of these rivalries engaged in economic relationships may differ, or may even have generalizable application to other cases, it is difficult to ignore the sense that these relationships between China and Taiwan, and North and South Korea, are between similar peoples, and that this similarity factors into the decisions, passions, and political pressures in these rival countries.

Conversely, small levels of ethnic similarity between rivals often seem to be met with oppression. The Soviet Union forcefully relocated ethnic groups sharing ethnicity with groups in Turkey. Turkey also sought to develop its own national identity so the development was favorable for that endeavor. Though for 50 years these cross border ethnic groups were estranged, once relations thawed, these groups were utilized to promote trade relationships between the two rivals (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; Wilson and Donnan 1998), which speaks to the strength of common identity overcoming borders.

Yet, studies of ethnicity and conflict have mostly focused on intrastate conflict within
borders (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Saideman 2002; Sambanis 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002). More than being just assets for rivals to use to promote cooperation when relations become better, minorities with strong cross border ties can act as independent agents influencing states’ foreign policies even against the will of the majority in these countries (Moore 2002). However, in the international relations literature, there have been few efforts to systemically study the influence ethnicity has on the relations between countries (Woodwell 2004). Furthermore, ethnic similarity allows us to go beyond generalized view of rivalries as one group of conflict prone dyads, and instead view the variation across different rivalries’ behaviors.

Organization

Here, I provide a very brief summary of how this research is organized. Chapter two covers the academic literature on territorial disputes, conflict, and trade. Chapter three, informed by this literature, articulates a theory on ethnic similarity between rivals. Chapter four discusses the concept of ethnic similarity and my categorical and continuous measurements of it. I take this theory and these ethnic similarity variables and test them on territorial disputes between rivals in chapter five, militarized disputes between rivals in chapter six, and bilateral trade flows between rivals in chapter seven. Chapter eight then synthesizes these findings into a more complete understanding of ethnically similar rivals. I include suggestions on how policy makers could address these contexts, followed by suggestions for future research.

The Benefit of this Research

To add to the effort to address this gap in the literature, I develop a theoretical explanation for how ethnic similarity influences rivalry relationships. Ethnic similarity between rivals can be viewed in different ways based on the size of the similarity. However, a continuous
measure of this concept presents problems, which is probably why few scholars have attempted to develop such a measure, and research on ethnicity and conflict has been limited mostly to studies of intrastate conflict. An ethnic group making up the entire population of one country and only 4% of the rival country would represent 52% of the population of the rivalry dyad. However, if the group made up a slight majority at 52% of each country’s population, the percentage of the population of the rivalry would be the same, yet these cases obviously appear different. As a result, the few studies considering ethnic similarity between countries use categorical measures for the presence of a similar ethnic group (e.g. Saideman 2002; Woodwell 2004).

I develop a continuous measure of ethnic similarity between rival countries that takes the percentage of each population and asymmetry into account. In addition, I include categorical measures of ethnic similarity for comparison. The continuous measure provides more information over a more detailed range of ethnic similarity. However, the categorical measures provide a more theoretically rich grouping informed by different political realities of ethnic similarity that allow us to address special relationships such as when a minority in one rival shares ethnicity with a majority in the rival country.

With these measures, I answer the questions that I proposed at the beginning of this chapter. I explore the association ethnically similar rivals have with territorial disputes, conflict, and trade. Territorial disputes provide something to fight over. Economic interdependence provides a reason not to fight. The association of ethnic similarity with militarized disputes, trade flows, and territory creates an intertwined story of relationships that is pertinent to conflict-ridden interstate relationships and of interest to international relations scholars. This research seeks to explain this story.
There is not necessarily a direct, cause-and-effect relationship between ethnic similarity and territorial disputes. However, there is an association as a result of history and geographic proximity. Telhami and Barnett (2002) write that identity has a constitutive standing. Understanding the way the identity is constituted allows us to explain how it makes certain state actions possible and plausible. That people are often associated with land, and these associations are not always fulfilled by the status quo, makes territorial disputes part of the constitutive standing of ethnicity. The constitutive characteristics of ethnicity, as it relates to territorial issues between rivalry relations, thus provide some of the context associated with ethnic similarity between rivals.

Patterns that exist between ethnic similarity and territorial disputes are then important for peaceful settlements of issues. If ethnic similarity creates biases against peaceful settlement, or facilitates unity in the face of rivalry, then perhaps this has implications for the likelihood of success of negotiated peace settlements, or the likelihood that they will be engaged in at all. This in turn should influence the persistence of rivalry, and possibly the likelihood of militarized disputes between rivals. Ethnic similarity may add salience to territorial disputes by having an ethnically similar group inhabit disputed lands, or that the rivalry coincides with complete ethnic similarity because the point of contention is over who should rule both countries. However, ethnic similarity may also ease interactions by reducing linguistic and cultural barriers to peaceful negotiations.

Fearon (2002) conceptualized cultural distance as dissimilarity between two ethnic groups. He said that one might be interested in this measure if they were interested in a theory about how it was difficult for dissimilar groups to communicate and cooperate with each other. However, what I am interested in is the similarity of groups where the only difference is national.
And if we assume that dissimilarity makes communication and cooperation harder, the opposite is that similarity makes it easier to interact. In the case of rivals, this easier interaction takes place between enemies. So what are the implications of this situation?

An interesting place to study an implication of this ease of interaction is economic relations between rivals. According to international relations research, increased economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict (see Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke 2007; Hegre 2000, 2002; Mousseau 2000; Oneal and Russet 1999). Yet, these cases are unusually conflictual ones in the international system. Does ethnic similarity influence trade flows? If so, does this influence conflict through interdependence? Or is it that ethnically similar rivals both trade often and fight frequently?

Ethnic similarity becomes an extension of one’s self perception. Others’ experiences become your own and their successes become yours as well. Attacks on them become attacks on you. Research on more intuitive aspects of international relations such as power, institutions, alliances, and economic interests have guided our understanding of international relations outcomes and why states act; however, the psychology of unity between individuals due to identity or other shared ideas influences why states will act too. That borders between states do not fully capture ethnicity is why ethnic similarity exists. That it exists between some rivals means, depending on the level of ethnic similarity, that this extension of one’s self extends to your enemy, or it extends onto your enemy’s territory. Because of this ethnic similarity, actions are taken both militarily and diplomatically. Such risks and effort are probably not as likely on behalf of a minority group that does not share ethnic similarity.

Ethnic similarity between countries is a relatively static variable, but it is fluid in terms of how much it resonates with groups, and the biases that it produces are contingent on the
politically relevant context. In addition, as the temporal distance between some relevant context and the present increases, the impact of some interaction becomes less significant in how it informs the present. Therefore, even if a situation of rivalry persists, because the politically relevant issues persist, the relative static nature of ethnic similarity also persists. That ethnic similarity induces cooperative behavior should mean that ethnic similarity across borders should create pressure for cooperative behavior across borders. Thus an interesting dynamic between cooperative pressure and enduring rivalry should exist.

Furthermore, when a state’s majority ethnic group shares ethnic similarity with a minority being oppressed in another country this increases the likelihood of risky behavior. Perhaps, under rivalry with asymmetric ethnic similarity, as the memory of military interactions fade, national differences between them and their co-ethnics are illuminated. Thus, these states may be able to view themselves more as a third party to otherwise intrastate conflicts, rather than simply an extension of those who they view as being oppressed. Enduring rivalry lasts for years so perhaps such situations eventually provide opportunities for negotiated settlements after the initial failure of peace when the rivalry began.

As someone of mixed ethnic background, over time and with some difficulty, I eventually found it interesting that I could be one or the other, neither and both. I found it interesting that others’ views on this were so strongly felt yet fickle in the face of changing contexts. After some learning, I found it interesting that our politically salient ethnic distinctions differ by national system and are only as important as their political context that keeps them in place. In addition, I find it interesting that these types of thinking would have such a significant impact on world politics. Ethnic identity is a fascinating topic. This research provides an opportunity to observe ethnicity’s influence on the world and the most volatile of relationships – interstate rivalries.
What emerges in this study is a complex and interesting relationship between ethnic similarity and rivalry.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

International relations research has not provided many large N quantitative analyses of rivalry relations using ethnic variables. In addition, research on ethnicity and conflict has mostly focused on intrastate conflict such as civil wars or rebellions rather than interstate conflict. However, there is much literature on cases of interest and on the international phenomenon I seek to investigate. In this chapter, I explore relevant literature on territorial disputes, conflict, and trade, and consider what this literature can tell us about these topics of interest and their relationship with ethnicity.

This review is separated into literature on topics of interest to this study. Territorial disputes, militarized disputes, and bilateral trade flows are all topics of interest to international relations scholars and are relevant to ethnically similar rivals. Identity has been observed as a basis of legitimacy and a source of salience concerning territorial disputes (Alee and Huth 2002; Davis, Jaggers, and Moore 1997; Moore and Davis 1998; Dreyer 2010; Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008; Saideman 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Vasquez 1983). Ethnic variables have been included in research looking at conflict, and support for ethnically similar groups has been studied in the context of intra-state conflict (Cetinyan 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Moravcsik 1997; Saideman 2002; Vasquez 1983; Woodwell 2004). In addition, bilateral trade has been studied from the perspective of international relations and conflict between countries (Barbieri and Levy 1999; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Liberman 1996), how cross border ethnic groups facilitate it (Aker, Klien, Connel, and Yang 2010), and with case studies when ethnicity influences trade between rivals (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; Chan 2009; Kahler and Kastner 2006; Wilson and Donnan 1998).
Ethnicity and Territory

Ethnic similarity with inhabitants on a rival’s territory, especially disputed territory, can produce an extended sense of sovereignty and/or responsibility over these co-ethnics by the group that is ethnically similar to them. Likewise, a state of rivalry between two countries can facilitate an enemy image of people that are ethnically associated with a country’s rival (Alee and Huth 2002; Davis, Jaggers, and Moore 1997; Moore and Davis 1998; Dreyer 2010; Saideman 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Vasquez 1983; Woodwell 2004). According to international relations research, territorial issues are the most conflictual of issue types (Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Tir 2007), and the more issues are linked, the more conflictual they will become (Dreyer 2010; Vasquez 1983).

Gibler (2007) asserts that once these territorial disputes are removed, international relations between the claim disputants become more conducive to peace and democratization is more likely to occur. However, a norm has developed in interstate politics where territorial redistribution following an interstate territorial war is less likely to happen (Zacher 2001). Zacher finds that in the three centuries preceding 1946, 80% of interstate territorial wars led to territorial redistribution, whereas only 30% of such wars have led to territorial redistribution since then. If territorial redistribution is less likely to occur due to international pressure to resolve these issues peacefully, this may cause territorial issues to persist longer than they would otherwise, resulting in enduring rivalry.

Goertz and Diehl (1995) say that the beginning and end of enduring rivalries are associated with large international political shocks such as world wars. Since the international norm has been to preserve the territorial integrity of existing countries, this may have in turn preserved the status quo in the rivalries that contend over these territorial disputes. Gibler (2007)
says that cases where ethnic groups are divided by international boundaries based on the borders created by former colonial powers have lower joint democracy on average because this ethnic similarity creates alternative justification for territorial dispute claims. If borders created by colonial powers divided ethnic communities and ethnic similarity is associated with territorial disputes that are more likely to result in a rivalry situation and the international norm after 1946 is to prevent changes of territory, and then these developments and associations have culminated in the context of ethnic similarity between rivals with persistent territorial claim disputes.

When a territorial issue involves a salient ethnic cleavage, this becomes a source for further issue linkage. The territorial dispute provides a tangible objective for the challenger state to contend over. When a country has both the resources and a target that can be obtained, the likelihood of militarized disputes over this territory increases (Vasquez 1983). Moreover, beyond the tangible characteristic of land as well as other tangible bases for the dispute such as resource presence, strategic location, and population presence; identity issues and the associated sense of extended sovereignty provide added intangible bases that provide an extra issue linkage over territorial disputes between states with a cross border ethnic group that will increase the saliency of such disputes and thus, the likelihood of militarized disputes (Dreyer 2010; Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008; Vasquez 1983).

Saliency of territorial issues increases the likelihood that governments will take action on territorial claim disputes, and this action is not only limited to militarized disputes. Research on peaceful settlements has suggested that the saliency of territorial issues is also related to an increase in peaceful settlement attempts (Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers II, and Thyne 2008). Greig (2001) advises that attempts at mediation be conducted early in a rivalry before either side develops significant levels of hostility toward one another. However, despite
more frequent pushes for dispute resolution, territorial disputes remain especially inhibitive of conflict management (Andersen, Bumgardner, Greig, and Diehl 2001). Territorial salience thus increases attempts at peace, but also increases difficulty in achieving peace.

Hensel (1996) says that added territorial salience causes rivalry over territorial issues to evolve differently than other cases. The added salience increases domestic pressure on political leaders to engage in further action and militarized disputes. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) find that salience also increases settlement attempts as well as militarized disputes, with intangible salience being a source of greater success in attempted, negotiated settlements. An identity basis to territorial disputes increases intangible salience. In addition, Tir (2007) finds that territorial disputes between rump and secessionist states with an ethnic basis to the dispute are especially conflictual. Combining these findings leads to the conclusion that identity based disputes are both more conflictual and more likely to peacefully resolve territorial disputes.

On the relationship between the conflictual and peaceful attempt aspect of territorial disputes, following an overwhelming military defeat involving a disputed territory that causes a people to conclude that victory is not obtainable, Hensel (1996) says public support for peaceful resolution would increase. Andersen et al. (2001) argue that war weariness contributes to an increase in countries looking for peaceful negotiations over territorial disputes. Greig (2001) also says that chances for successful mediation occur after two rivals realize they cannot resolve their differences militarily. However, this pressure for further negotiations does not last indefinitely. If overwhelming defeat and war weariness increase pressure for peaceful resolution, and ethnically based territorial disputes result in more frequent conflict as Tir (2007) says, perhaps ethnic similarity pressures leaders into engaging in conflict where they eventually experience overwhelming defeat. If this is the case, this may explain why intangible salience is
associated with more peaceful settlements. However, the cases that don’t result in peaceful settlement of the territorial dispute may become locked into rivalries with a generally higher territorial dispute salience due to the identity basis.

Ethnicity and Conflict

The presence of ethnicity, heterogeneity, and minorities does not itself lead to conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Gagnon 1994; Mueller 2000), but the identities that people emphasize may serve some instrumental or political objective (Riker 1962). Political leaders may articulate these objectives for ethnic groups and use ethnic identity as a target of the relatively less costly tactic of persuasion to achieve their political goals (Gagnon 1994). These goals may include competition over resources, which can exacerbate ethnic tensions and the struggle for resources can strengthen ethnic identification (Fearon and Laitin 2004; Mueller 2000). Governments are less likely to accommodate any demands by ethnic groups over land when these demands are more likely to lead to further claims by other challengers, which is more likely in more heterogeneous societies (Walter 2006). When political efforts by ethnic groups are accompanied with a lack of democratic institutions, and have non-democratic neighbors, identity related civil wars are more likely to occur (Sambanis 2001).

Reynal-Querol (2002) finds that religious and especially animist differences are especially conflictual among these identity related civil wars. The first reason for this is the exclusivity of religion. Interethnic mixing can occur when ethnic identity is on the basis of race, and individuals can learn to speak different languages to help bridge the difference between two ethnic groups. However, an individual can only have one religion. Second, Reynal-Querol explains that religion provides the bases for different understandings of the world and relationships in society. Much of the research on ethnicity and conflict focuses on differences
between actors and seeks to explain how these differences lead to violence.

However, as Fearon and Laitin (2000) point out, much of the interethnic violence that occurs is promoted by elites as a strategy to obtain or keep power and this can also be aimed at the moderate factions of the elite ethnic group. For example, Rwandan Hutu extremists murdered 10,000 to 30,000 Hutu moderates in addition to the Tutsis that were targeted. Serbian extremists executed moderate Serbs in Croatia to silence voices for reconciliation during the Serbian-Croatian War, and both loyalists and Catholics in Ireland’s civil conflict were involved in intragroup killing of informers with 22% of Loyalist killings being against fellow Protestants (Fearon and Laitin 2000).

These studies tend to focus on intrastate conflict though. Naturally, ethnically related violence would be analyzed at the intrastate level because ethnic identification categorizes people relative to others within their country. However, sometimes people are an oppressed minority in hierarchical societies (Horowitz 1985), which leads to a greater likelihood of civil war (Sambanis 2001); yet, have a source of power outside their own borders (Cetinyan 2002; Woodwell 2004), which makes ethnicity relevant to interstate relationships. Ethnic differences between countries may not be as useful of a separate topic because then they simply become national differences. Cultural, linguistic, racial, and religious differences between countries could be labeled as either ethnic differences or national differences.

However, cross-border ethnic communities can be viewed as a threat to security when these communities are viewed as a means of subversion by a rival. A case in point, in the late 1970s, Vietnamese leaders viewed the small Chinese community in Vietnam as a threat that would act in the interests of Vietnam’s rival, China (Dreyer 2010; Khahn 1993). Chinese in Vietnam did not reside on disputed territory between the two countries. In addition, China had a
policy of not treating overseas Chinese as territorial extensions of the nation to allay concerns of its neighbors that it would use overseas Chinese for colonial ambitions (Barabantseva 2011; Thunø 2003). Yet, ethnic Chinese were forced out of the country by the Vietnamese government, thus exacerbating tensions, because they were a distinctive ethnic group within Vietnam that could easily be identified as well as associated with the enemy.

This paranoia by a government directed at their own countrymen because they share ethnic similarity with that government's international rival, is not completely unreasonable considering empirically supported evidence on the actions of some minority groups. For example, Saideman (2002) analyzes external support to separatist groups and finds that separatist groups in stronger states are more likely to receive support when these groups are in stronger states that may be threatening to adversaries. Leaders will attempt to manipulate ethnic kin abroad to achieve their own policy goals and so similar ethnicity between these adversaries and the subversive group will correlate with higher external assistance. Otherwise separatist groups usually do not receive any external assistance due to the fact that they may threaten regional stability (Moravcsik 1997; Saideman 2002).

Since China's foreign policy goals included territorial disputes and competition of regional hegemony with Vietnam, the Vietnamese had reason to suspect China's co-ethnics on Vietnamese soil. When a state can lay claim to populations on the territory of their rival, they are laying claim to greater power and reducing any threat that comes from the country that is the target of their claim (Woodwell 2004). Woodwell finds that cases such as the Sino-Vietnamese rivalry are more likely to become involved in militarized disputes. This author takes a rare look at the size of ethnic similarity between two countries and their relationship to conflict.

Woodwell (2004) groups ethnically similar countries into several categories. His study
uses several dummy variables to measure various sizes of ethnic similarity including dyads
where a similar ethnicity in two countries are minorities in each country in the dyad, are a
majority in both countries, or cases where there is a majority in one country and a minority in a
bordering country. He finds support for the relationships that if contiguous dyads are home to
similar ethnic majorities, or have an ethnic majority in one country and the same ethnic group is
a minority in the other state, they are more likely to become involved in militarized disputes than
other dyads. In addition, he finds that ethnic-based rebellion exacerbates the likelihood of
interstate conflict even further when the rebellious group is a diaspora. Since rivalry dyads that
are contiguous are more likely to go to war (Vasquez 1996), the finding that there is variation
among contiguous dyads with ethnic similarity may mean that ethnic similarity between rivals
may have implications for conflict between them.

Woodwell (2004) says that dyads with a majority in both countries will more likely be
involved in competitive nationalism over national supremacy. Dyads with a minority in one
country sharing ethnicity with a majority in another country will more likely be involved in
diaspora based nationalism. Woodwell reasons that these minorities often will not have the
ability to influence state policy and will therefore look outside of the country for support. When
their ethnic kin are a majority in a neighboring country, this will likely become the source of
foreign support. Militarized disputes are theorized to occur because minorities become involved
in armed rebellions against the state leading to external support from countries where this group
is a majority.

However, if these states become involved in militarized disputes due to intervention by
the side where the ethnic group is a majority, or through an act of deterrence because of the
perceived threat of the minority by the government this minority resides in, then what does this
mean for these dyads when they become locked into a rivalry? According to Cetinyan (2002), the likelihood of negotiations between ethnic minorities is not determined by the resources they have, but rather the resources they have determine how much they can get in negotiations. In addition, the most conflictual dyads are generally characterized by power-parity, and geographic proximity (Bremer 1992). If the country where this cross-border ethnic group is a majority truly cares for the well-being of their co-ethnics and lacks the military means to achieve a successful irredentist goal, would they continue arming rebels to the point of provoking further suppression? This may reduce the minority’s resource base. Likewise, if “involuntary dismemberment or dissolution represents the ultimate nightmare for any leader,” (Woodwell 2004, 201) then why continue to provoke the country where the potentially subversive ethnic group is a majority with an intolerable amount of oppression aimed at their co-ethnics? Such intervention may lead to dismemberment of the state, but continued support for armed rebellions may in turn result in suppression of the co-ethnics. Thus, beyond initial rebellions, militarized interstate disputes, and wars each side should have some leverage in a bargaining process, which may increase settlement attempts and dampen the likelihood of a militarized dispute once these countries are locked into a rivalry relationship.

Rivalry Trade

That rivals would defy the predictions of the gravity model of trade seems intuitive. That is the gravity model’s output expects greater trade flows between proximate and larger economies; whereas, it is expected that rivals would engage in much less trade. Why would enemies want to trade with each other? However, previous research on trade between enemies has focused on cases where countries did not cease trading once becoming enemies (Barbieri and Levy 1999; Liberman 1996). There are few if any large N empirical studies of trade patterns
between rivals not in state of war.

Chan (2009) provides a possible explanation of why rivals would trade by analyzing trade relations between Taiwan and China. According to Chan, neither realism nor liberalism explains trade between Taiwan and China, because security concerns and a lack of facilitative institutions would both predict less trade between these two countries. Chan suggests that trade between Taiwan and China is the result of a confluence of factors such as political liberalization in Taiwan, incentives to Taiwanese businesses by the Chinese government, cheaper labor in China and its increasing openness to trade and investment, and cultural and family ties. But how generalizable are these factors to other cases of intra-rivalry trade, and what would a more general approach to applying these insights to a broad number of rivalry cases look like?

Generally, the difference between rivalry trade and normal bilateral trade is that rivalry trade is more susceptible to security concerns, which should reduce the size of the trade relationship. According to Gowa and Mansfield (1993), higher trade flows should take place within rather than across military alliances. This is because free trade may enhance the real power of those who engage in it, and those who are not allies will therefore have less incentive to facilitate the growth of potential adversaries in an anarchic international environment. Conversely, rivals that do relax trade restrictions should experience a more rapid rate of increase in bilateral trade until they reach their natural state of economic integration if they were not rivals. Therefore, to obtain a proper understanding of ethnicity's influence on trade between rivals, the conflictual and cooperative tendencies of a rivalry must be taken into consideration.

According to Crescenzi and Enterline (2001) the level of cooperation and conflict between two countries includes four concepts they say are necessary to understand this characteristic of international relations: accumulation, temporal distance, degree, and the rate of
change. Accumulation means that states with frequent interactions will have a well-defined relationship and those with infrequent interactions will have a more volatile relationship. Temporal distance is the amount of time that separates interactions. The more proximate these interactions are to the present, the more likely that they will influence the current relationship. Degree means that the influence that interactions have on a bilateral relationship are not the same. For instance, the 1950-53 Korean War and the 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel are both incidents that negatively influence North and South Korean relations, but the former should have a longer lasting impact due to the larger loss of life. Finally, the rate of change refers to how quickly the relationship decays toward neutrality over time when there is an absence of interactions.

Considering Chan's (2009) argument that thick international business ties between rivals are hard for future politicians to overturn in the context of Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) dynamic approach, these interstate business interests should have a higher likelihood of being advocated by the business community when relations between the two countries become more cooperative. The difficulty of reversing such ties once initiated may give politicians pause otherwise. The two rival states will have a history of interactions that have accumulated between them, which both businesses and political leaders will use to inform their expectations. As the negative impact of hostile interactions with the rival decays, as described by the dynamic approach, businesses will eventually be more open to advocate bilateral trade and political leaders more likely to accept them, whereas more frequent and more intense hostile interactions will delay this process.

In addition, cooperation should not be confused with a lack of conflict (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001; 2008). This is because the effect of further interactions between the rivals on
their level of conflict/cooperation should be reduced as the number of interactions increases, and
conversely, greater temporal distance between the present and previous interactions should cause
the relationship to decay towards neutrality. So even though issues between rivals are still a
source of antagonism, the lack of recent interactions causes the relationship between the rivals to
become more susceptible to further interactions. As a result, in the absence of recent
interactions, even though there may be no recent conflict, businesses still have little assurance
that a conflict will not occur that in turn begets more conflict, thus, reducing the opportunity to
make a profit. Businesses may still be willing to push their leaders to engage in economic
relationships, but cooperative interactions should increase trade relations by assuring the
business community of cooperative stability in the future. A more cooperative relationship
requires cooperative interactions that reduce security concerns, facilitate economic incentives for
business interests, which then translate into greater political incentives for a leader to initiate
trade with a rival.

Therefore, a lack of interactions, whether cooperative or conflictual, does little to remedy
security concerns. These security concerns can make a robust economic relationship undoable
by increasing uncertainty, thus reducing the likelihood of a robust trade relationship. South
Korean policy makers understood this when attempting conditional trade relations with North
Korea. North Korea would simply accept trade for the economic benefits but instigate a
militarized dispute before having to accept any agreement for political reform. South Korean
president Kim Jae-dung therefore made trade unconditional in 1998, hoping that increased
interdependence would eventually change the North’s behavior. Despite uncertainty and the
ultimate failure to change the North’s behavior, by detaching trade from conflictual interactions,
volatility was removed and trade ties developed quite rapidly with South Korea quickly
becoming North Korea’s second largest trade partner behind China by 2002 (Kahler and Kastner 2006). After North Korea sank a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, in 2010 trade was again suspended on the peninsula (Sang-Hun 2010). Yet by 2012, trade on the Korean Peninsula was reported to have hit an all-time high (Yonhap News Agency 2013).

The decision to initiate or continue cross border trade relationships by rivals is based on political, economic, and security reasoning. Countries will allow a trade relationship with a rival to develop if such a relationship serves either a political or economic goal of the regime and the relationship does not threaten the security of the country. This of course must apply to both rivals. A case in point is Taiwan and China. The Chinese were ostracized by the international community following the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, and thus would take trade partners where they could find them to avoid complete isolation. In addition, China’s failure to reclaim Taiwan militarily led it to seek out an economic strategy of eventual reintegration. Thus China had a political incentive to initiate trade relations.

Taiwan on the other hand had economic incentives due to its small size and therefore the necessity of trade to make up for a lack of domestic resources for its own survival. The relationship does not threaten China’s security as it is not threatened by Taiwan, and Chan (2009) argues that trade with China helps Taiwan increase security because business interests from Taiwan signal to China how seriously rhetoric from Taiwanese leaders that make statements about Taiwanese independence should be taken. If such rhetoric would be taken seriously, it would most likely lead to war between the two rivals, and businesses would limit economic relations to avoid losses. Therefore, as Morrow (1999) argues, stable economic ties signal stability to both sides.
Ethnicity and Trade

Although the interests of the state are dominant, cross border ethnic ties can facilitate the growth of economic relationships. Although shared ethnicity could help grow trade within any dyad, the implication for rivals is that these cross border ethnic communities facilitate ties, which just like business interests, they are more challenging for leaders that are against trade to reverse. Political, economic, and security concerns continue to play a role in whether or not to continue the trade relationship, but if ethnic ties between the two rivals are large, these trade ties should grow more rapidly thus enhancing the economic costs and thus the political costs to politicians of eliminating these trade relationships. To illustrate, Taiwan familial ties between China and Taiwan helped solidify business connections more rapidly. When the Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-2008) sought to limit economic relations with China, the reaction of Taiwanese businesses was to continue cross strait trade through intermediaries (Chan 2009).

Another example of how ethnic communities facilitate trade between countries is provided by Aker, Klien, Connel, and Yang (2010), who observe trade of millet and cowpea between Niger and Nigeria. Through survey research of traders and farmers they find that similar ethnicity across borders dramatically reduces price dispersion. In addition, intra-national ethnic diversity creates de facto borders within these countries, resulting in higher prices for those who are not of the same ethnic group. Although the authors did not have data on trade volumes, they found that far fewer traders did business across these de facto borders between ethnic groups within Nigeria than with their own ethnic group in Niger. If we assume that fewer traders translates to less volume of trade, then a case can be made that similar ethnicity can boost trade. Generalizing this to other cases, we can expect greater ethnic similarity between states to help facilitate trade relations.
Ethnic similarity’s impact on trade can also be observed between Turkey and the Soviet Union, that had a border and rivalry that divided a number of cross border ethnic communities that had migrated from one country to the other, were forcefully relocated at some point, or whose communities had been divided by the border (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; Wilson and Donnan 1998). The 50 year barrier to cross border relations was a favorable development for both countries as each sought to develop its own national identity without such cross border identities undermining them. According to Wilson and Donnan (1998; 14-15) the religious differences between those on the Soviet side provided a more salient cleavage that strengthened Turks identifying with the Turkish state. That is Islam was strongly identified with the Turkish identity, but although tolerated at times in the Soviet Union, the state had a strong atheistic agenda to eventually eliminate religious practices. However, once the trade barriers were lifted in 1988, even if individuals’ association with their national identities remained robust, these cross border ethnic communities still facilitated Soviet-Turkey economic relations despite the religious differences.

Summary

There is an association between ethnic similarity between countries and territorial disputes. An ethnically similar group can lead to an added basis of intangible salience when they reside on the disputed territory, or territorial disputes may be divided between ethnically similar majorities in two countries. Added intangible salience is associated with an increase in peaceful settlements, though. This provides a possibility that ethnic similarity is associated with more salient territorial disputes and more attempts at peace.

Yet, ethnicity is also a source of legitimacy and a target of political leader’s efforts at persuasion. Ethnic similarity between rivals may extend the beneficiaries of this source of
persuasion. Thus, ethnically similar rivals are more complex when it comes to rivalry and conflict. This ethnic similarity can be security vulnerability as well as a tool for political leader’s international ambitions. It provides an extended sense of self and of legitimacy over territory not belonging to one’s own country.

Besides exacerbating negative tensions between rivals, ethnic similarity can facilitate economic interdependence, thus being a source of further cooperation. The reduction of linguistic and cultural obstacles to enriching oneself will certainly entice thoughts of trade and investment. Security vulnerability prevents trade between rivals, but this may be overcome. Following an acceptable reduction in security vulnerability, a higher level of ethnic similarity will allow rivals to more quickly pursue political and economic goals related to trade.

The next chapter combines these topics in a theory of ethnically similar rivalry relations. These topics are interrelated in the context of rivalry. Salient territorial disputes provide a reason for militarized disputes. Economic interdependence should reduce militarized disputes. Ethnic similarity is associated with territorial disputes and their salience, exacerbates conflict, and facilitates trade. This unifying concept of ethnicity therefore unites enemies in shared conflict, shared issues, and shared economic relations whereas rivalry divides them in contending sides on these interstate outcomes.
CHAPTER 3

A THEORY ON ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND RIVALRY RELATIONS

My theoretical explanation of ethnic similarity between rivals begins with a few basic assumptions. First, that ethnic similarity provides an identity that pulls individuals closer together, by reducing linguistic and culture barriers. This ethnic identity creates shared symbols and myths of similar ancestry, which creates an extended sense of self. Individuals with ethnic similarity will feel an attachment and concern for those with whom they share identity. Second, majority identities will be more associated with the national identity; however, minority groups that share ethnicity with a majority of citizens in the rival country may be viewed by the majority as associated with the other rival’s national identity. Third, minorities sharing ethnic identity with another identity may be utilized by political leaders on either side of the rivalry; thus, they provide both security vulnerability and opportunity.

Ethnic similarity with inhabitants on a rival’s territory, especially disputed territory, can produce an extended sense of sovereignty and/or responsibility over these co-ethnics by the group that is ethnically similar to them. Likewise, a state of rivalry between two countries can facilitate an enemy image of people that are ethnically associated with a country’s rival (Allee and Huth 2002; Davis, Jaggers, and Moore 1997; Moore and Davis 1998; Dreyer 2010; Saideman 2002; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Vasquez 1983; Woodwell 2004). Therefore, ethnic similarity combined with rivalry may cause an incongruous relationship between the states that are rivals and the peoples that are rivals. This mismatch between the territory of rival states and land inhabited by politically salient ethnic groups perceived to be, whether justifiably or not, associated with these rivals has consequences for cross border trade relations between the rivals, conflict, between the rivals, and the issues that arise between them.
In this chapter, I discuss my expectations of ethnic similarity’s impact on rivalry relations. First, I discuss within ethnic group relations, between rivalry relations, and how these two overlap. I then apply this theoretical understanding to territorial issues, militarized disputes between rivals, and bilateral trade between rivals. After a theoretical discussion of ethnic similarity between rivals and its effect on each of these international relations phenomenon, I provide a series of hypotheses derived from this theory.

A Theory on Ethnic Similarity and Rivalry

Simply stated, greater ethnic similarity should increase cooperation and interactions within the ethnically similar group. Rivalry should increase the conflictual propensities of the interactions between the two countries. When an ethnic group overlaps the borders between two rivals this results in some degree of ethnic similarity between the two countries. Increased interactions, whether conflictual or cooperative, within the ethnic group thus create more interactions, whether conflictual, cooperative or both, across the borders of the rivals. However, if this ethnic group is not associated with the dominant national identity in both countries, it creates security vulnerability for the governments in those countries because the increased interactions may promote cooperation within the ethnic group and across the border that may not necessarily be in favor of one or both of the rivals.

Big Brother

Three agents at work in rivalries with ethnic similarity are the two rival governments and the ethnically similar group(s). In rivals where a government and the ethnically similar group are not the same, the government will perceive security vulnerability due to the fact that a group on their territory may be cooperating with others on a rival's territory. This security vulnerability
should increase as this group is larger. If they share ethnicity with the dominant ethnic group in their rival's territory, this will create an even stronger enemy image of this group. In addition, the rival where this cross border ethnic group is a majority will also have a stronger feeling of attachment to this group, an extended sense of sovereignty because of their nation-state status, and a sense of concern over their co-ethnics. Yet, a minority group’s decision to rebel may not be influenced by the ethnically similar rival where this group is a majority.

International relations research has found contiguous majority-minority dyads are more conflictual (e.g. Saideman 2002; Tir 2007; Woodwell 2004). However, previous studies are not theorizing about the role of ethnic similarity in the case of rivalry. Dyads with a majority ethnic group in one country sharing ethnicity with a minority in another may often be associated with more issues and a greater likelihood of conflict relative to the average dyad. However, once these countries are rivals, the establishment of a rivalry where the two states view each other as enemies becomes ingrained in their psyche, and may result in a relative detente where conflict is reduced relative to other rivalries.

I call these cases “big brother rivals.” The country where the ethnic similarity is limited to their minority groups should want to prohibit within-group cooperation because this gives their rival greater leverage on their territory. This would reduce bilateral cooperative interactions. Conversely, the big brother with the greater sense of attachment to their co-ethnics will fear retaliation against these co-ethnics, and thus be hesitant to take military action out of fear that their co-ethnics would be targeted. These same pairs of countries, when they are not rivals, have overlapping populations divided by borders that may increase interstate conflict (Saideman 2002; Tir 2007; Woodwell 2004).

However, once rivalry is established, there should be lessons learned from these initial
conflicts that did not resolve the issues. One such lesson should be that minority groups are vulnerable to repression if they engage in subversive activities, but the big brother rival will act on their behalf in the face of oppression. If continued intrastate conflict with the secessionist minority continues, the big brother may soon seek to resolve their status. Therefore the likelihood of interstate conflict would become lower. This theoretical description should not be confused with peaceful relations, but big brother rivals should be less conflictual relative to other types of rivals.

Minority

This is not the case when there is a cross border ethnic group that is a minority in both countries. I call these cases “minority rivals.” If the cross border ethnic group is a relatively large minority, it could pose significant challenges to the state of either rival. If they have separatist ambitions, leaders in either rival could exploit this. Without an extended sense of sovereignty or national attachment to the cross border ethnic group, nothing about the ethnic similarity would preclude leaders from using these minority groups to advance their own agenda. Thus the ethnic similarity is a source of increased interaction, but not a deterrent.

Contested Nation

Once ethnic similarity becomes so high that it is the largest group in each country, it becomes less likely to provide a salient cleavage that can be exploited against the governments of either state. I call these rivalries “contested nations.” Rivals may keep tabs on nationals from their rival country when they are contested nations, but this is different than Azerbaijan leaders viewing ethnic Armenians born in the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh with
suspicion. Ethnic Similarity should thus facilitate a greater number of interactions between contested nation rivals.

The persistence of rivalry when the ethnic group is the same should require even stronger disagreements than other interstate rivalry situations. Even though similar ethnicity should promote some type of cultural unity between populations, something instead caused deep division. To be part of one ethnic group suggests similarity in certain ideas and myths of common ancestry with others in that group. In these cases, there is generally one nation, but two governments. The issues that beset contested nations are less likely to be as peripheral to the hearts and minds of the populations in these countries relative to less ethnically similar rivals. If two sides desire to become one people with one government, then the rivalry that prevents this becomes more salient. As a result, a greater number of interactions, facilitated by the similar ethnicity, between the two countries provide more opportunities for this issue to arise.

Ethnic similarity facilitates interactions, but states' interests and their security concerns will decide when interactions are allowed or pursued. However, similar cultures, languages, symbols, and myths of common ancestry reduce obstacles to interactions once allowed by the respective governments. Greater ethnic similarity can facilitate cooperation, but it can also exacerbate conflict. The assertion that highly ethnically similar rivalries will consist of more deeply felt, competing convictions should cause conflicts between these rivals to be less amenable to peaceful resolutions and compromise (Woodwell 2004). Economic cooperation is more difficult to reverse for political leaders due to speed that it will increase once allowed. The unity created by ethnic similarity will work to maintain economic cooperation even when political leaders say the national identity wants it to stop.

As a result, contested nations should be associated with both higher levels of cooperation,
including trade flows, and higher likelihoods of conflict. According to much international relations literature, economic interdependence is supposed to correlate with fewer militarized disputes (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke 2007; Hegre 2000, 2002; Mousseau 2000; Oneal and Russet 1999). Therefore, a counterintuitive relationship may exist where contested nations should be associated with both relatively high levels of increased economic interdependence and higher likelihood of conflict. Although conflict would probably be associated with a dramatic drop in bilateral trade, the ties between co-ethnics should resume more rapidly in contested nations relative to other dyads, and despite higher levels of economic interdependence, conflict will still be very likely due to the salience of the issues, and the degree to which these differences resonate with the populations in these rivals.

Pan-Ethnic

There are ethnic identities and national identities, but there are also pan-ethnic identities. There is much research on pan-ethnic identity that suggests leaders in these countries use these identities to advance territorial claims across the entire relevant region, and that regions with a pan-ethnic identity have a trans-national characteristic to them (Banac 1984; Mufti 1996; Pintak 2009; Podeh 2005; Rubin 1991; Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson 1994; Sluglett 2002; Telhami and Barnett 2002). Yet, pan-ethnic identity has not played a big part of studies on identity, conflict, and territorial disputes. I cover this literature more in the next chapter on my dataset addressing ethnic similarity.

Rivalries sharing a pan-ethnic group are a non-exclusive group of cases I call “pan-ethnic rivals.” The same assumptions apply to rivalries with pan-ethnic identities as with ethnically similar rivals. However, pan-ethnic identities provide another politically relevant layer of
identity that competes both with ethnic identity as well as the national identities involved in the rivalry. Although pan-ethnic ideas sought to merge states into a single nation, like contested nations, the competition between identities would make pan-ethnic identities resonate less with populations compared to ethnicity in contested nations. Pan-ethnicity represents an idea of some politically relevant ethnicity across a region that co-exists and competes with the conception of these politically relevant ethnicities as a group within their countries. Therefore, the unity that ethnic similarity creates between individuals is not as consistent between those who are of the same pan-ethnicity yet still contain salient ethnic and national distinctions.

The pan-ethnicity will be more like ethnically similar rivals when the ideology is advanced by political leaders. This is because these rivals may be minority or big brother rivals, but pan-ethnic ideas grant an extra source of legitimacy that can often extend to all of a political leader’s international ambitions across a region. Leaders in pan-ethnic rivals will use this pan-ethnic idea to gain support in advancing their ambitions against their rival just like minority rivals, but the difference is that pan-ethnic passions can also generate more international support from many different countries. In addition, because the pan-ethnic idea may apply to different politically salient ethnic groups, pan-ethnicity increases the ethnic similarity between countries, but this increase is ephemeral and contingent on the effectiveness of political leader’s rhetoric and actions framed in pan-ethnic terms.

Due to weaker adherence to pan-ethnic ideas and opposition by those advocating a national identity, pan-ethnicity will only be advocated by leaders when it is to advance their own agenda, and thus when this is not the case, people will identify more with the politically salient groups within their own country to advance their preferences domestically. The implication for pan-ethnic rivals is that this will be done at the expense of the rival, and thus may have all the
conflictual associations with ethnic similarity, but fewer of the cooperative tendencies. Therefore, pan-ethnicity turns non-ethnically similar rivals, minority rivals, or big brother rivals into a type of quasi-contested nation when it comes to these cases’ conflictual propensities.

Hypotheses on Territorial Disputes

There is not necessarily a direct cause-and-effect relationship between territorial issues and ethnically similarity. However, there is an association between these variables caused by proximity and history that forms the constitutive nature of ethnically similar rivals, which has implications for conflict and cooperation. Identity is often strongly associated with territory. When territory is disputed, having it inhabited by co-ethnics increases saliency between the two countries. In addition, since contested nations will include claims to the entire territory of their rival, they should be the most salient. A couple of related hypotheses exist concerning territorial claim disputes:

$H_1$: The higher the level of ethnic similarity between two rivals, the more salient their territorial claims will be.

$H_2$: Contested nation rivalries are associated with higher salience than any other group of rivals.

Hypotheses on Peaceful Settlements

According to the theory, big brother rivalries are special cases. Even though these types of dyads may be more conflictual in general, once establishing a rivalry, a potential quid pro quo should evolve between them. The rival with the minority group on it will realize this group has a big brother capable of challenging that country with the resolve and capabilities to act militarily on their behalf. Likewise, a big brother rival that supports secessionist activities in a neighboring country will soon realize that this incites repression against their co-ethnics. Both sides have
leverage, which can then be traded off in negotiations over a range of issues. As a result, big brother rivals should see a higher likelihood of peaceful settlement attempts and success. This creates two more hypotheses:

**H3:** Big brother rivals are more likely to attempt peaceful settlements than other rivalries.

**H4:** Big brother rivalries are more likely to have successful peaceful settlements over territorial issues.

Since pan-ethnic rivalries will tend to lack this same leverage due to the pan-ethnicity’s relatively weak, but still significant source of legitimacy for instrumental purposes of advancing claims, and the competition for hearts and minds from national identity, and domestic politically salient distinctions, the issues between pan-ethnic rivalries will be tougher to resolve. Thus pan-ethnic rivals should have fewer successful negotiated settlements resulting in another testable hypothesis:

**H5:** Pan-ethnic rivals are less likely to have successful peaceful settlements over territorial issues.

Due to the costs to the loser and devastation suffered by resolving the issues militarily, contested nation rivalries may choose not to resolve their rivalries through force very often. However, the same should be true for successful peaceful attempts. Perhaps other issues may be negotiated, but attempts at addressing reunification or any territorial exchange are likely to encounter failure. Therefore I have another hypothesis on the relationship between contested nation rivalries and the likelihood of successful settlement over territorial issues:

**H6:** Contested nation rivalries are less likely to have successful peaceful settlements over territorial issues.

**Hypotheses on Conflict**

According to the theory, increases in ethnic similarity at higher levels increase
interactions between rivals. This helps facilitate trade flows since there are fewer obstacles to this cooperation. In the case of conflict, the rivals will seek to exploit higher levels of ethnic similarity as a means to influence their opponent. This will in turn increase the likelihood of conflict. However, there are a couple of exceptions to this trend. The theory also predicts a relative détente associated with cases that are big brother rivals. The bordering country where these cross border ethnic groups are a majority may feel an extended sense of sovereignty over these minority groups, or the ethnic similarity may coincide with previous interactions and disagreements between the two countries. Among contiguous non-rivals this correlates with a higher likelihood of conflict (Woodwell 2004). However, although cases with a majority ethnic group in one country sharing ethnicity with a minority on a rival's territory may be more likely to fight, once they are in a state a rivalry and the context of ethnic similarity becomes a salient aspect of this rivalry, perhaps even through initial conflict, we should observe a dampening effect on the likelihood of a militarized dispute associated with these cases.

Another exception to the general trend between ethnic similarity and rivalry are pan-ethnic rivals. Regardless of how low the ethnic similarity between domestic groups is, if the rivalry contains a pan-ethnic group, these dyads will be associated with a higher likelihood of a militarized dispute. Pan-ethnic ideas grant political leaders a source of legitimacy relevant to most if not all their territorial claims and regional ambitions. Since this source of legitimacy often competes with politically relevant ethnic identities within the rival countries as well as the national identities, it is weaker than other sources of identity and is used as a tool by political leaders when pursuing international objectives at the expense of their rival. In addition, this source of legitimacy is likely to resonate across a region, and be tied to the majorities of many countries in that region since it ignores some domestic cleavages (e.g. Sunni-Shia cleavage
between Arabs). Thus, pan-ethnicity creates the same foothold a big brother rival will have with their co-ethnics in their rival’s territory without the same repercussions against their co-ethnics for militarized disputes.

Summarizing the theoretical expectations of the relationship between ethnically similar rivals on the likelihood of conflict, greater ethnic similarity should correlate with a higher likelihood of militarized disputes. Big brother rivals where an ethnic group is a majority in one country shares ethnic similarity with a minority on their rival's territory, should see less conflict relative to other ethnically similar rivals. In addition, pan-ethnic rivals should be associated with a higher likelihood of a militarized dispute regardless of their ethnic similarity. So there are three hypothesized relationships on ethnic similarity and conflict:

H7: Higher levels of ethnic similarity between rivals will be associated with increases in the likelihood of a militarized dispute between rivals.

H8: Big brother rivals will be associated with a lower likelihood of a militarized dispute.

H9: Pan-ethnic rivals will be associated with a higher likelihood of a militarized dispute.

Hypotheses on Trade

Cooperation can take place in different forms including political, militarily, or economic. If we use bilateral trade as an indicator of cooperation, then higher levels of ethnic similarity are generally associated with facilitating greater trade between rivals. If cooperation begets cooperation, and ethnic similarity facilitates this cooperation, then greater ethnic similarity may interact with greater political or other types of cooperation to even further increase bilateral trade. Conversely, greater ethnic similarity should also be associated with a larger negative effect on trade when relations between rivals are more conflictual. During a more conflictual relationship, the security vulnerability associated with lower levels of ethnic similarity further
reduce trade, but this trend continues for higher levels of ethnic similarity for different reasons.

Simply, if higher levels of ethnic similarity are associated with greater levels of trade between rivals, the opposite of this is that we should see a greater drop in bilateral trade when a relationship is more conflictual between rivals that are ethnically similar. Additionally, if the issues that persist between highly ethnically similar rivals are more salient, this would also cause a greater decrease in trade between highly ethnically similar rivals when these rivals are more conflictual. However, a more conflictual relationship between rivals is not the same as the lack of a cooperative relationship, but is instead a separate concept. It is possible for rivals to have some level of conflict while maintaining some level of cooperation.

Summarizing the theoretical expectations above, increases in ethnic similarity at lower levels should increase security vulnerability between rivals as the countries with a minority sharing ethnicity with their enemy will view this cross border ethnic community as potentially subversive, which should in turn cause this government to seek to limit interactions between this group and their co-ethnics on the rival's territory thus reducing trade. Higher levels of ethnic similarity should facilitate more economic ties between rivals by reducing cultural barriers and obstacles created by associated one's ethnic identity with the enemy. When relations between rivals are more cooperative, trade is more likely, and higher levels of ethnic similarity should increase trade between the rivals. Conversely, when relations between rivals are more conflictual, ethnic similarity between the rivals magnifies the negative effect a conflictual relationship has on trade because the issues are more salient the higher the level of ethnic similarity. Four testable hypotheses result from these theoretical expectations.

H₁₀: Small increases in low levels of ethnic similarity between rivals will be associated with less trade between rivals.

H₁₁: Increases in high levels of ethnic similarity will be associated with more trade
between rivals.

H_{12}: As the relationship between ethnically similar rivals becomes more conflictual, higher levels of ethnic similarity further reduce trade.

H_{13}: As relations between ethnically similar rivals become more cooperative, higher levels of ethnic similarity will further increase trade growth between the rivals.

Testing the Hypotheses

To test these hypothesized relationships, I first construct variables on ethnic similarity between rivals in the next chapter. I provide categorical variables for when cases are minority rivals, big brother rivals, and contested nations. In addition, I include a non-exclusive variable pan-ethnic, which indicates the presence of a pan-ethnicity between rivals. I also develop a continuous measure for ethnic similarity. These variables are discussed in the next chapter and provide my independent variables for the statistical tests in the following chapters.

The hypotheses on territorial disputes and peaceful settlements, H_1 through H_6, are tested in chapter 5 using the Issue Correlates of War project’s data on territorial disputes and peaceful settlements (Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008). After setting the context of territorial claims and tendencies to peacefully negotiate or not, I then proceed to test the hypotheses on conflict, H_7 through H_9, in chapter 6. Conflict is tested using the Correlates of War project’s militarized interstate dispute data (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2003; Ghosn and Bennett 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). Finally, in chapter 7 I test the remaining hypotheses on bilateral trade between ethnically similar rivals, H_{10} through H_{13}, using Gleditsch’s (2002) trade data due to his effort to address coverage issues, especially in former socialist countries, which include many of my ethnically similar rivals. I synthesize these findings in chapter 8.
CHAPTER 4
A DATASET ON ETHNIC SIMILARITY BETWEEN RIVALS

Ethnicity is a component of identity, which gives individuals a shared sense of community. Yet, often these communities are divided by political borders. In the case of rivalries, these communities are divided by two countries that are in conflict with one another. However, it is likely that under certain contexts, these communities provide opportunities for an increased number of interactions between the two rivals. Since rivalries involve highly conflictualized relationships, it is important to understand how common ethnicity between rivals influences these interactions.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the coding of my common ethnicity data. First, I explore and explain how I approach the issue of common ethnicity conceptually and practically for an international relations perspective. I then explain my categorical measures of ethnic similarity as well as my continuous ethnic similarity variable and compare these two different approaches to measuring ethnic similarity. I conclude with a discussion of how I use these variables in this project as well as other potential applications for future research.

The Concept of Ethnic Similarity

International relations scholars may generally understand the meaning of ethnic similarity between countries. However, since ethnic identity and relations between ethnic groups are usually defined by, and are relevant to, the societies the ethnic group resides in, deeper explorations of the concept of ethnicity in a political context are usually researched by comparativist scholars. Social scientists who study ethnicity generally believe that ethnicity is a socially constructed concept, and that a failure to grasp this will prevent researchers from understanding ethnically related violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Therefore, my task is to
extend this deeper understanding of politically relevant ethnic groups to dyads so researchers can apply this concept to international relations by employing a dataset that can be used in large N studies with many dyads.

Research into the understanding of ethnicity and politics is generally something pursued more by comparativists rather than international relations researchers. However, if ethnic similarity between countries is a measure worth considering in international relations research, I believe a dataset for this variable would benefit from the work of comparativists measuring and identifying ethnicity. Therefore, to approach the creation of an ethnic similarity dataset, I simplify the detailed research on ethnic identity, and what it has to say about ethnic similarity between countries, into a conceptualization that can be used as a basis to guide me in producing consistent and valid measurement of this concept.

To accomplish this task, I provide a brief review of some relevant literature on ethnic identity that I believe will help in developing a conceptually understanding of the variable that is being created and why it would be useful. In this section I use Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott’s (2006) framework for analyzing identity as I believe it is a useful approach for examining identity. Then I apply Chandra’s (2006) definition of ethnicity which is a subgroup of identities which the framework of Abdelal et al. addresses. Then I explore why ethnicity is related to politics and how this relates to ethnic similarity between countries.

Abdelal et al. (2006) say that identity consists of two components: Content and Contestation. Content describes the meaning of the identity, whereas contestation describes the level of agreement over the content between members of the identity group. There are four types of content: constitutive norms, social purpose, relational comparisons with other social categories, and cognitive models. Constitutive norms are informal rules that define group and
membership. This normative content is derived from multiple sources of authority in society. Social purposes refer to the shared goals by members of the ethnic group. Relational comparisons refer to defining the ethnic group by what it is not, or how it differs from those who are not part of the identity group. Cognitive models describe the worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interest that are shaped by a particular identity. The application of these categories of content will become more apparent as I use them to address the concept of ethnic similarity. I believe their versatility allows for most literature on ethnic identity and politics to be framed in these terms.

Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott’s (2006) framework can be applied to many identities, and Chandra (2006) defines ethnic identity as a subset of identity based on the constitutive norm of descent. Again, constitutive norms are rules of membership, and if ethnicity revolves around descent based attributes, this is a rule that excludes others. Descent can be divided into different dimensions which include, but are not limited to, race, language, religion, tribe, caste, clan, or place of origin. However, Chandra relaxes the descent rule somewhat by allowing for identity dimensions where shared identity can exist outside of descent (e.g. religion and language). However, in cases where we think of these dimensions as distinguishing different ethnic groups the different groups generally consist of individuals who are the same religion or speak the same language as their parents.

I believe the ubiquity of ethnic cleavages across many countries is due to the interaction of two reasons. First, because individuals compare themselves to others in society and second, because the term ‘ethnic group’ actually subsumes many of the dimensions people will cleave and compare on for the sake of finding others like them. If we restrict our observations to any single dimension of ethnic identity, I believe we will find that a cleavage on any one of these
dimensions that Chandra (2006) lists, are not as ubiquitous. What is ubiquitous is that people cleave and compare and can find communities with shared purpose, norms, and relations to other groups on some dimension which provides people with a minimum winning coalition.

Furthermore, this minimum winning coalition becomes static due to the decent based attributes associated with ethnic identity.

To understand how these groups may influence international relations I believe it is a useful to understand how and why they influence the political process in general. According to Nagel (1994) ethnic groups sometimes organize on the basis of their identity to compete for resources and political access. Political access fulfills the type of content that Abdelal et al. (2006) describe as social purposes. This shared purpose provides a unifying aspect of ethnicity and why they influence the political process. However, although ethnicity is a unifying force among individuals, it also creates ubiquitous cleavages in many societies.

Multiple identities exist within individuals who will only emphasize one if forced to do so (Hobsbawm 1996; Latin 1998). Some authors believe that choices between identities are instrumental (Cohen 1969, 1974; Patterson 1975; Young 1976; Kasfir 1979; Bates 1983; Brass 1991), which emphasizes the social purpose of an identity. Laitin (1998) provides an illustration by studying identity formation in the Russian diaspora community. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians who had previously self-identified as Soviets had to decide how they were going to identify in relation to the newly independent states they reside in. According to Laitin’s findings, Russians assimilated into their new environments when occupational mobility required it. This was true in Estonia and Latvia but less so in the Ukraine where Russians faced discrimination and in Kazakhstan where Russians did not need to assimilate to obtain opportunities. The findings suggest individuals are more willing to associate themselves with an
identity if that identity provides economic benefits.

A unifying desire for political access is also a reason to be a part of community and may determine whether these groups become politically salient ethnicities in the first place. Yet every dimension of identity where relational comparisons to other groups expose differences does not necessarily become instrumental for individuals in their choice of who to associate with. Fearon and Laitin (2000) say that members of different groups need not think of themselves as members of those groups. Riker (1962) theorizes that that the identity individuals will emphasize is the one that is available to them that puts them in the ‘minimum winning coalition’. That is the group with the fewest members that can win political access that is then divided by the number of members within the group.

Posner (2004, 2005) uses this theory to explain identity cleavages and competition in Malawi and Zambia. The Chewa and Tumbuka ethnic groups are political enemies in Malawi yet they have friendly relations in Zambia. The reason Posner finds for this difference is that in Malawi, the Chewa and Tumbuka are large relative to the population and therefore are able to individually mount a successful campaign for power. In Zambia, they are allies because they are small, are of the same linguistic group, and have to compete against three other linguistic groups within Zambia to win political power. Posner (2005) explains that in Zambia this linguistic division became salient once multiparty rule was instituted with democratic competition. However, the salient cleavages under the previous one party rule were between the many different tribes that competed for positions in the bureaucracy. The change in which cleavages were significant was therefore strategic.

It therefore seems that the content of identity is constructed from societal and historical developments in a country where this development is not uniform across individuals, and
economic access strengthens a desired association with an ethnic identity. However, this strategy of identity choice might also favor a permanent majority in some cases, whatever dimension of identity this group chooses may be imposed on others in society leaving them locked in what Horowitz (1985) calls a ranked or hierarchical society. This leads to variation in the content of identity which is explained by shared experiences between individuals on the dimensions of race, language, religion, tribe, caste, clan, or place of origin within a country. Therefore different content forms different ethnic groups and also informs members’ sense of community with their co-ethnics. However, this content is not always perfectly captured by political boundaries.

Wilson and Donnan (1998) identify three types of border populations in terms of individuals’ ethnic identity. The first type includes those who share an identity with those across the border as well as with those residing within their own state’s geographic core; the second type consists of those who share an identity with those across the border but not with those in their own state’s geographic core; and the third type includes those who share an identity with those in their geographic core but not with those across the border. The first two types should cause increased interactions between the two countries if we assume that shared identity increases interactions.

Ease of interactions should increase economic and political opportunities. Gellner (1983) says that opportunities for upward mobility are made possible by national institutions if one is educated. In addition, for a national system to work, the public needs to speak a similar language (Gellner 1983). Anderson (1983) says that national identity was an accidental result of the spreading of print capitalism seeking a wider market to sell their printed material. The ability to mass print books first developed an appreciation and standardizing of Latin. Then the Reformation was facilitated by print capitalism. After the market for Latin was saturated,
publishers sought a larger market and thus printed books for the masses in their local languages. Anderson’s (1983) explanation of the origins of nations is about Western Europe. He points out that the collapse of the Western Roman Empire had left no nation powerful enough to establish a large multiethnic nation based on Latin as a spoken language. In contrast, Imperial China was able to assert control over larger areas due to the combined reach of both Mandarin and associated political analogue. Fearon and Laitin 2000 say that these states have been better able to maintain territorial borders in the modern era relative to their ethnic groups. Thus cross border ethnic communities are the results of societal and historical developments informing the content of these identities somehow developing outside the establishment of these states. In many cases, they may have preceded the establishment of the state – often the result of colonialism. In other cases the groups form a distinct ethnic group in a country as a result of more recent immigration. Either way, there is a sense of community, called ethnicity, which exists between individuals in different countries. For rivals, this forms an interesting dynamic.

If these groups cause greater interactions, it is important to understand when these interactions occur (if at all), and to understand what the outcomes of these interactions are. To influence the international relationship between two countries, these groups must be recognized ethnic groups and be politically salient. An ethnic group is recognizable if observers of ethnic politics recognize them by name, and politically salient means that they have an observable relationship with the politics of their host country. This political relationship could range from the group dominating politics in a country to simply being that the group is generally ignored by political leaders, but even in this case they are ignored as a recognizable group.
Constructing the Data

I mention at the end of the previous section that identifying these groups requires that they are politically salient and are recognizable ethnic groups. Since datasets for ethnic groups already exist from ethnic politics researchers, I can use one that is most thorough in meeting these requirements as a starting point. I first identify rivals using Thompson’s (2001) rivalry list. Second, I search for matching politically salient ethnic groups using the Ethnic Power Relations data because this dataset provides information on all politically salient ethnic groups from 1946 to 2005 (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2009). However, I go further to research ambiguous cases since this data was intended for national politics or comparative research rather than dyadic interactions.

When I encounter ambiguity, I research the cases further to determine whether or not these politically salient groups are similar or not. I say similar rather than the same because there are almost always national differences in identity that could prevent agreement in coding groups from different countries as being the same group. Since I must ignore national differences between similar groups to create measures of ethnic similarity, when national labels become ethnic group names I ignore the national dimension. A case in point, the EPR data codes Arabs as a politically salient group in Jordan, and Israeli Arabs is the label placed on Arabs in Israel. I drop the Israeli dimension and code the groups as similar.

Dimensions of ethnicity include but are not limited to race, language, religion, tribe, caste, clan, and place of origin (Chandra 2006). To illustrate, Egypt has Arab Muslims as a salient identity according to EPR and Syria has Sunni Arabs (Cederman et al. 2009). In this case, these two groups contain two dimensions of identity, an ethnic one and a religious one. The two groups are similar on the ethnic dimension. However, on the religious dimension, these two
ethnic groups are not explicitly the same. In the case of Syria, the religious dimension of Sunni Arab is more narrowly confined to a denomination of Islam, whereas in the Egyptian case of Arab Muslims, the religious dimension is more broadly defined as applying to all Muslims. Whereas, I believe Egypt is more Sunni, this has not been coded as a salient distinction by the EPR data; thus, I do not assume that these two groups are similar enough to code as a joint ethnicity.

In some cases, I cannot drop the national dimension of an identity, because it is the only dimension mentioned, and it is not derived from the country the group resides in, but rather from the rival country in the dyad that I am investigating for ethnic similarity. Since the groups in the EPR data are meant to be national variables their names often do not match their ethnic counterparts in the rival country when the difference is on a national dimension of identity. Namely, China is divided into many different ethnic groups whereas Chinese living abroad are simply coded as Chinese by the Ethnic Power relations data (2009). Politically salient nationalities such as this require a bit of interpretation and research. In the case of the Vietnam-China rivalry, Chinese are an ethnic category in Vietnam but who are their co-ethnics in China? Traders from port areas in China had intermarried with local Vietnamese over a few centuries time (Heng 2009, 132-134). In addition, although some politically salient ethnic distinctions in Chinese society therefore might have little meaning to Chinese in Vietnam, many politically salient ethnicities in China have historical and ethnic attachments to Vietnam (Edmondson and Gregerson 2001; Matisoff 2006; Olson 1998; Yueh-hua 1961). I explore Chinese identities in more depth when I discuss how I code my continuous measure of ethnic similarity.

When coding my categorical variables on ethnic similarity, I pool the similar ethnic groups to keep the contested nation, big brother, and minority rivals mutually exclusive. So a
rivalry dyad may share a minority group in both countries but are still coded as a big brother rivalry if the majority of the population in one country shares ethnic similarity with another minority group in another country. The rationale behind this is that the dynamics of ethnic similarity between countries is driven more by the biggest ethnic group in a country. Larger ethnic groups tend to set the policy of the country, or even in cases where they are not part of the ruling elite, they will still have an influence on the national identity.

The purpose of the continuous measure of ethnic similarity is to measure the unifying influence of ethnic similarity, but the purpose of the categorical measures of ethnic similarity is to capture the presence of certain ethnically based contexts resulting from minority and majority status of ethnic groups or the presence of pan-ethnic ideology. Therefore, the groups must be similar and mutually inclusive on the same dimensions of ethnicity as the rival country for the categorical variables. Since identity is complex and similarity is a real but fuzzy concept, this avoids biasing the ethnic similarity categorical measures by including too ambiguous of cases.

After using Thompson’s (2001) rivalry list, determining which dyads are ethnic rivals using the EPR data (Cederman et al. 2009), and doing further research on ambiguous cases, I finally determine scores for each of these variables. In this section I discuss the operationalization of my measures of the ethnic similarity of rivals. My continuous measure of \textit{ethnic similarity} is operationalized and I address the obstacles in creating such a measure including the complex case of Chinese ethnic identities. I then list my categorical measures of ethnic similarity, \textit{minority, big brother, pan-ethnic,} and \textit{contested nation}. Following this, a cross-tabulation of the categorical and continuous measures of ethnic similarity is displayed for comparison.
Ethnic Similarity Variable

To develop a continuous measure of ethnic similarity for rivals several obstacles must be addressed. Among those obstacles are when to consider a group an ethnic community, how to treat asymmetric sizes of an ethnic group between two countries, and how to address multiple cross border ethnic groups in a single case. In addition, because the EPR data (Cederman et al. 2009) codes various ethnic groups within a nation, an extra obstacle exists when groups are defined by their national origin.

Before deciding on how to code my ethnic similarity variable, I must decide on what set of rivals to include. I use Thompson’s (2001) list of rivals because he does not rely on militarized dispute densities for the coding of his rivalry cases. This is important for my purposes since it is possible that ethnic similarity may reduce the likelihood of conflict between some rivals. Thompson identifies cases where two countries consider each other competitors over some issue, where they consider the other side a possible military threat, and the other rival has explicitly been identified as an enemy.

The EPR data identifies politically salient ethnic groups and their percent of the population by country. Since the data made use of experts on each country in the data, I use these coders’ judgment as to when to consider an ethnic group as politically salient (Cederman et al. 2009). I convert these into dyadic values by finding similar groups within both states in the rivalry dyads and taking the average of these similar groups’ percentages of their respective populations, then multiplying this value by one minus the absolute difference of their percentages of their respective populations. In other words, I multiply the average size of the ethnic similarity by its asymmetry. I demonstrate this in the formula below. If the EPR dataset coded these dimensions as political salient then these particular dimensions of identity mean
something to individuals in both countries. However, in some cases these dimensions are not explicitly the same and require further research. I discuss several of the more difficult cases latter in this section.

\[
\text{Ethnic Similarity}_{it} = \\
100 \times \left\{ \sum_{i} \left[ \frac{\text{ethnic group }_{i\alpha} + \text{ethnic group }_{i\beta}}{2} \times (1 - |\text{ethnic group }_{i\alpha} - \text{ethnic group }_{i\beta}|) \right] \right\}
\]

The letter \(i\) represents the ethnic group, \(t\) is for the year, and \(N\) stands for the number of similar ethnic groups in the dyad for that year. The label \(\text{ethnic group}_i\) stands for a generic ethnic group that both states in the rivalry share whereas \(\text{ethnic group}_{i\alpha}\) and \(\text{ethnic group}_{i\beta}\) stand for that ethnic group in rival ‘\(a\)’ and rival ‘\(b\)’ respectively. The second half of the equation takes the absolute value of the difference of the ethnic group’s size in each country and subtracts it from one. This operationalization reduces the measure’s value for more asymmetric pairings. Since statistical tests would estimate coefficients based on a change of one in the independent variable this would be the entire range of ethnic similarity if the scale were left as 0-1 and thus might result in very large coefficients. Therefore, for better presentation, the measure is then multiplied by 100 giving us a 0-100 scale.

By reducing the score on asymmetric pairings in this operationalization, it is possible for the total proportion of the population of the dyad to be of the same ethnic group(s) to be larger relative to another dyad, but its ethnic similarity score to be smaller. This is necessary to measure similarity. By considering asymmetry in the equation we can avoid valuing a rivalry as very similar ethnically when in fact the dominant ethnic group in each rival is really a very small minority in the other. To illustrate this, Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks are nearly all of the population in both Croatia and Serbia, yet Croats take up nearly 90% of the population in Croatia, but only 1% in Serbia. Considering this, these rivals should not be coded as having
nearly identical ethnic makeups, which would happen if the asymmetry of ethnic groups were not considered.

I use another asymmetric pair of ethnic similarity, the case of the long standing Turkish-Bulgarian rivalry (1908-1950) in Thompson’s rivalry data set), to demonstrate my ethnic similarity formula. Using the EPR data, Turks and Roma are identified as the two politically salient ethnicities that live in both rivals. Turks make up 10 and 82% of Bulgaria and Turkey respectively. Roma are 0.5 and 0.66% of Bulgaria and Turkey respectively. Thus the equation would be: \{.1 + .82/2 \times [1 - |.82-.1|]\} = .1288 for Turks and \{(0.005 + 0.0066)/2*[1 - |.005-.0066|]\} = .0058 for Roma. I then add these two numbers and come up with a value of 0.135. I multiply this by 100 and end up with 13.5 for the ethnic similarity variable. Note that these numbers are rounded and in practice I used the precise values.

Ascertaining the ethnic similarity of Iraq and Kuwait presents a unique challenge. The EPR data codes Iraq as having Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs; whereas, Kuwait has Kuwaiti Sunni and Kuwaiti Shia, and the EPR data mentions that they are also an “(Arab)” group. However, unlike the rivalry case of Iraq and Saudi Arabia where every group in Saudi Arabia mentions the “(Arab)” alternative to the Wahhabi and Shafii/Sofi difference among Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Muslims and the Ja’afari and Ismaili differences among Shia Muslims, I provide an ethnic similarity score for Iraq and Kuwait. Moreover, although I code both rivalries as pan-ethnic, I code neither dyad as being minority, big brother, or contested nation rivals. For the Iraq and Saudi Arabia rivalry, the reason is simply that the politically salient divisions between denominations of Islam are not mirrored in each society; though, both have Arabs.

The Sunni/Shia divide among Arabs in Kuwait coded in the EPR data also misses the politically salient divisions based on migration and citizenship. Although Kuwait is 99%
urbanized and no longer contains any Bedouin practicing a nomadic or pastoral lifestyle, the term *badū* remains a commonly used term in Kuwait to designate a distinction between a group of people and *hadar*, or settled urbanites (Al Nakib 2014). The 1959 Nationality Law differentiates between Kuwaitis whose families were in Kuwait before 1920 and those who arrived afterward. The *badu* collectively arrived in the 1960s and 1970s. This was encouraged to build a pro al-Sabah support base in opposition to the merchants after limited democratic elections were permitted in 1962 (Longva 2006).

The *badu* tend to be mostly Sunni Arabs from Saudi Arabia, whereas the *hadar* include Shia Arabs, mostly from Iran, but also Southern Iraq. However, there are also Sunni Arab and Christian Arabs from Southern Iraq and Palestine that are *hadar* too. One difference between these two groups is that *badu* have surnames that indicate what tribe they are from, whereas *hadar* last names indicate an occupation despite some having originally descended from the same tribes. Longva (2006, 181) says that the growing *badu* community and the tribal affiliations is more a case of nationalization of tribes as opposed to the tribalization of the nation. Al Nakib (2014, 24) provides the story that in 1989, every Monday for seven weeks public gatherings were held about the constitution by a member of the parliament dissolved in 1986. The government allowed these meetings when they were held in *hadar* areas, but used the National Guard against thousands of people when the meeting was held in *badu* areas to prevent such ideas from infiltrating the pro-government areas. Although the *hadar* that Longva (2006) spoke to complained about *badus’* blind loyalty to the government, Al Nakib (2014) points out that the exclusion and segregation of the *badu* have led them to become the main opposition to the Al Sabah family that rules the country.

According to the information above, the political distinctions between Kuwaitis are based
on when they lived there, rather than the sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia that are present in Iraq. However, these two groups are mostly Sunni Arab and Shia Arab as in Iraq. Considering that they are the two largest politically salient groups, the Iraq and Kuwait rivalry could be similar to the contested nation category. Indeed, Iraq did lay claim to the entire country of Kuwait (Sluglett 2002). However, although these two political groupings are a majority in Iraq, foreign workers have been coming to Kuwait in large numbers to work since the 1940s, making Kuwaiti citizens are a minority in their own country (Cederman et al. 2009; Longya 2006; Al Nakib 2014).

Considering that both groups are a minority of Kuwait’s population according to the EPR data, Iraq and Kuwait could be considered a big brother rival. However, that the true ethnic makeup of these groups are not strictly Sunni Arab or Shia Arab and that some Sunnis and Shia are excluded from either category, a big brother rivalry does not correctly label the case either. There are mostly Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs in these groups even if they do not actually provide the most politically salient societal cleavage as coded in the EPR data. Therefore, I can code the ethnic similarity score for these two rivals, since it only requires that I combine these groups, thus solving the issue. However, for my categorical measure, I only code this rivalry as a pan-ethnic due to that variable’s requisite only being that they are Arab and the ambiguity caused by overlapping identities.

Chinese Ethnicities

Coding ethnic similarity between China and its rivals presented the greatest challenge to my operationalization procedure. The Ethnic Power Relations data (Cederman et al. 2009) codes 48 politically salient ethnic groups for China; whereas, Vietnam has one category called Chinese,
and Taiwan is divided between Mainlanders and Taiwanese based on when they emigrated from China to Taiwan. This makes my coding procedure less straightforward because Chinese in Vietnam obviously shares ethnic similarity with people in China, but not all people. Likewise, any casual observer of Taiwan knows that it is very ethnically similar to China, but again it is not clear who makes up their co-ethnics in China.

In addition, Central Asian ethnic groups are recognized as distinct politically salient groups in both the Soviet Union and China by the EPR data. This means that coding ethnic similarity between these rivals was not as problematic as the other rivalry cases involving China. These similar groups include Russians, Uyghurs, Koreans, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. Since these groups are small in China, the ethnic similarity measure scores this rivalry at 4.9.

Problems addressing ethnic similarity between China and Vietnam or China and Taiwan may be associated with the previous lack of focus on Chinese overseas minority groups. Barabantseva (2011) characterizes China’s view of cross border Chinese as having been overly Han-centric. However, more recent efforts by Chinese scholars have attempted to extend China’s multi-ethnic domestic society to its view of cross-border ethnic groups as well as all Chinese residing abroad. This has required some effort because the domestic policies of highlighting these ethnic differences, especially after the decentralization of Deng Xiao-ping’s reforms in 1979, have often served to illuminate minority groups’ inferior political, economic, and social statuses in China (Kaup 2000). These efforts by the Chinese government aimed at minority groups abroad seek to strengthen these minority groups’ ties to China, as well as remittances to their co-ethnics back home by emphasizing China’s multi-ethnic society and these groups’ parts of it. By addressing these cross border ethnic communities and their distinct ethnic differences, China has sought to extend its national identity (Barabantseva 2011; Thunø 2001).
This extension of China’s national identity does not extend to territory. Both scholars and officials in China refer to overseas Chinese as being a bridge between China and its neighbors, but that they also help to secure China’s borders. So China has encouraged Chinese in other countries to become citizens in those countries (Barabantseva 2011). These attachments do have economic benefits for China, and since the 1980s, China has sought to strengthen its ties to minority groups outside of China. Because it has risen in both economic and military power, Thunø (2001) says that Asian countries in the region have become more accepting of this as a legitimate responsibility of China rather than a threat to their sovereignty. Table 4.1 lists the ethnic similarities for China and its rivals.

One of the relevant border regions is with Vietnam, and it has been noted that there is a great similarity between ethnic groups in China and Vietnam (Edmondson and Gregerson 2001). Minority groups in the Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces of China share ethnic similarity with many groups in North Vietnam. Edmondson and Gregerson (2001) say that in 1978, it was found that out of 36 languages in the northern-most part Vietnam, 23 of them were also in China. These ethnic groups are relatively small and not politically salient groups in China according to the EPR data though (Cederman et al. 2009).

However, even when limiting what groups are politically salient to the EPR data, another obstacle is the disagreement between China and Vietnam as to who are considered overseas Chinese ethnic minorities. For example, the Zhuang are the largest minority group in China and thus would affect the ethnic similarity score if similar people in Vietnam were also considered Zhuang or Chinese. However, Chinese and Vietnamese scholars and officials disagree on this (Barabantseva 2011). According to Kaup (2000), the Zhuang is an invention by the Chinese Communist Party meant to suppress dissent. Before the CCP started providing generous
subsidies to those of Zhaung dissent, the Zhaung had consisted of several groups speaking mutually unintelligible languages that had often fought against each other on the basis of their different identities. Kaup says that by creating a larger group that could be controlled at a regional level, the state could break the attachments these people had with their localities.

Table 4.1. Chinese Ethnicities and Their Similarity with Rivals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group (China)</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyghur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That the Zhaung’s autonomous area borders Vietnam means this is of strategic concern to China. The Zhaung’s attachments to their co-ethnics in Vietnam might provide a means of subversion on Chinese territory, except that there is no Zhaung group in Vietnam. Rather the Vietnamese have a problem with the Chinese conceptualization of Zhaung and instead split Zhaung into at least five minority groups, which China refuses to accept as distinct groups, but rather branches of the Zhaung family (Barabantseva 2011; Kaup 2000). Unresolved issues between China and Vietnam have perhaps prevented this issue from being settled. In addition, the EPR data refers to the Hoa as the politically salient Chinese group in Vietnam. However, the Hoa in Vietnam consist of various ethnic groups that are not politically salient groups in China.
but are all Han groups (e.g. Cantonese) (Khahn 1993). Though the ethnic similarity between China and Vietnam may actually be higher, because of the politics of labeling identity and its effect on who is considered part of politically salient groups – as opposed, possibly, to who actually are a part of these groups - coding this similarity is limited to Han Chinese in China with the Chinese in Vietnam (Khahn 1993; Matisoff 2006; Olson 1998; Yueh-hua 1961).

Ethnic similarity between Taiwan and China is not clear either. The EPR data set codes Taiwan’s politically relevant ethnic groups as being Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese, and Aboriginal Taiwanese with Mainland Chinese only being 14% of the population (Cederman et al. 2009). The difference between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese or “waishengren” and “benshengren” as it is referred to in academic literature to avoid confusing Taiwanese and aboriginal Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese with Chinese from China, is when they immigrated to Taiwan from China. Waishengren translates to “foreign provincial person” whereas benshengren translates to "Native Taiwanese Person".

However, if I were to code only the waishengren as ethnically similar, this would grossly underestimate the level of actual ethnic similarity. Though benshengren have some Japanese cultural influences from Japan’s control of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, they are essentially Han Chinese too (Corcuff 2002; Wang and Liu 2004; Lynch 2004). Being originally from China, many Taiwanese may also be more ethnically similar to other groups in China so the ethnic similarity should not be limited to the Han in China if that is the case.

Taiwanese would not be similar to all groups in China though. To find out who they are ethnically similar to I searched for information on communities within Taiwan. Unlike coding other ethnically similar rivals where the national contexts cause differences, the politically salient distinctions in Taiwan are coded as such in the EPR data (Cederman et al. 2009) because they
migrated from China. The salient distinctions coded for Taiwan imply they are originally from China. I believe this justifies a more lenient approach to coding ethnic similarity for Taiwan and China than simply requiring the politically salient groups to have similar names in the EPR data. I first explored literature on each distinct ethnic group in China and found out if there were any significant communities in Taiwan. I then excluded any that would obviously not be part of *waishengren* or *benshengren*, (e.g. such as Korean).

Hui people are similar to Han except they are Muslim and their ancestors may have intermarried with Arabs. An estimated 90% of Muslims in Taiwan are Hui (Caltonhill 2014). The Manchu are another politically salient group in China. The Qing Empire, which originally annexed Taiwan, was Manchu, and since they had long settled in Taiwan would have been *benshengren*, and many Manchu had also arrived with the Kuomintang after Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists lost the Chinese Civil War against Mao Ze-dong and the Communist, which makes some Manchu *waishengren* (Stary 1995; Weng 2014). The She people, a group in the EPR data, are also mixed with Hakka, with the latter not considered a politically salient distinction in the EPR data in either Taiwan or China, but treated as part of the Taiwanese people (Committee of Fujian Province 2014). My decisions on these can be found in table 4.1.

Contested Nation Rivals

Using the EPR data, I find rivals where the countries are more ethnically similar than not and code contested nation as ‘1’ if this is the case and ‘0’ if it is not. I used the continuous measure, which ranges from 0-100, to determine thresholds between contested nations versus minority and big brother rivalries. Cases must be over a score of 50 on the ethnic similarity scale to be considered a contested nation. This helps me decipher between multi-ethnic societies that
are very similar and ones that are not so similar. I discuss the categorical measures first, since it provides an explanation of how I identify cases of ethnically similar rivals.

Generally, these cases contain the same majority ethnic group(s) with the exception being Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia rivalry. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a plurality of Bosniaks, with large numbers of Serbs and Croats. In this case, the similarity is still relatively high in these dyads using my continuous measure, which I will discuss in detail later. The contested nation rivalries consist of partitioned nation-states. These dyads include East and West Germany, the Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan, North and South Vietnam, Rwanda-Burundi, Croatia-Bosnia, and Serbia-Bosnia. If it were not for extreme and violent political differences these dyads may have remained one country.

In most cases the division of these countries was due to either civil wars or the partition of the nation by victorious countries following World War II. The exception to this was Rwanda and Burundi. In this unique case, instead of one common ethnicity in these countries, Rwanda and Burundi are both made up of Hutus and Tutsis. Yet these two countries are very ethnically similar in both the proportion of the population of similar ethnic groups and the ratio between these two groups.

The United Nations trust Territory administered by Belgium, Ruanda-Urundi, was dissolved upon the request of Burundi’s Mwami also known as King Mwambutsa IV. This decision was, in part, influenced by Burundi’s reaction to the massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda. As a result, these Tutsis fled to Rwanda and elsewhere. However, despite coming to Burundi for refuge, the ethnic cleansing that had taken place against Tutsis in Rwanda, repeated itself in Burundi (Weinstein 1976). Although it was not a major war that resulted in the breakup and rivalry between Rwanda and Burundi, the breakup of Ruanda-Urundi was still preceded by
extreme violence in the form of genocide.

Likewise, the breakup of Yugoslavia was associated with genocide and ethnic cleansing and resulted in the rivalries of Croatia-Serbia, Croatia-Bosnia, and Bosnia-Serbia. Researchers should note that these developments changed the values of these cases ethnic similarity scores several times during the 90s for both for the categorical and continuous measures. This volatility in an otherwise static variable can create issues that researchers may want to control for ethnic cleansing, intrastate conflict, or even consider ignoring these cases since a drop in ethnic similarity in one rivalry increases it in another and the reasons may effect one rivalry differently than others creating difficulties in accounting for the changes in all three rivalries.

The rest of these dyads have several similarities. They are very if not completely ethnically similar, they each split as the result of a large scale war, they were each divided with one side being communist and the other side allied with the United States, and they all experienced attempts to reunite the two sides. In the case of East and West Germany and the Vietnams, these reunification attempts were eventually successful with the former done peacefully, and the later accomplished by North Vietnam’s victory in war over South Vietnam.

Pan-Ethnic Rivals

Pan-Ethnic rivalry dyads contain the same pan-ethnic identity, specifically the Yugoslavian and Arab pan-ethnic identities. I code pan-ethnic rivals as ‘1’ if they have politically salient groups that share an Arab or Slavic identity regardless of the size of this identity and ‘0’ if they do not. These dyads include Iraq-Syria, Iraq-Kuwait, Egypt-Syria, Croatia-Serbia, Croatia-Bosnia, and Serbia-Bosnia. Each of these rivalry cases consists of some effort to unify each of these dyads into a single nation and identity. The rivalry dyads of Iran-
Iraq and Sudan-Chad, Egypt-Israel, and Jordan-Israel also have Arabs in both rivals.

The pan-ethnic identity identified foreign forces as part of their justification to exist. In addition, all were ultimately unsuccessful. Whereas the pan-Slavic identity was able to form a country called Yugoslavia for a while, the attempt at forming a pan-Arab nation state was especially unsuccessful (Banac 1984; Podeh 2005; Rubin 1991; Sluglett 2002). Yet, these pan-ethnic ideas provided a source of legitimacy over many countries that could be applied to all their regional ambitions. For this reason, it is important to code this category to differentiate these rivals from the other ethnic similarity types. The uniqueness of these cases relative to other ethnic similarity types is the trans-national nature of this level of ethnic similarity, which provides a trans-national source of legitimacy that extends beyond the ideas of the pan-ethnic idea itself, but also to the context it creates. Based on literature review, the pan-Arab and pan-Slavic identities are relevant to rivalry dyads. I provide examples of each below, and explore these relationships further in the next chapter.

Pan-Arabism is the belief that countries in the Middle East are parts of the same nation that should be united into one state. Pan-Arabs believed their societies were worse off than the West due to foreign manipulation and their accomplices in the region (Rubin 1991). According to Sluglett (2002) only three major realignments of frontiers have occurred in the Arab world since the First World War: the transfer of Asir from Yemeni control to Saudi Arabia in 1932; Syria’s loss of Alexandretta to Turkey in June 1939 as the result of a dubious plebiscite; and the union between North and South Yemen in May 1990. Other attempts at uniting states in the Arab world were unsuccessful and include the short lived United Arab Republic, which joined Egypt, Syria, and North Yemen between 1958 and 1961; and efforts to unite Libya with Tunisia, Egypt with Sudan, Libya with Sudan, and Iraq with Jordan.
To illustrate the instrumental nature of pan-ethnic ideology, consider Iraq’s claim to Kuwait. The case of Kuwait and Iraq had little association with pan-Arab identity. The Iraqi argument generally contends that since Iraq was the successor to the Ottoman Empire in the provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, and Kuwait was a sub-district of the district of Basra, Kuwait has always been, *ipso facto*, part of Iraq (Sluglett 2002). However, even though identity is not as much a part of the territorial claim, pan-Arab identity still had an influence in this rivalry case. On June 25, 1961, Abd al-Qarim, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral part of Iraq threatening a takeover, which led to a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and all the Arab states, pan-Arab identity became salient (Sluglett 2002; Podeh 2005).

Podeh (2005) writes that the dialogue between the Arab rulers throughout this crisis was couched in pan-Arab terminology with Nasser, the president of the United Arab Republic considered the leader in the Arab world. However, he was vulnerable in the Arab world during this crisis as he was trying to maintain the cohesion of the United Arab Republic, while the Arab world was so divided that they also feared being undermined by Nasser’s influence on their Arab populations. Podeh concludes that although the Arab world did work as a single system, the legitimacy of the territorial state was strengthened by each player enhancing their own interests during the crisis.

The pan-Slavic identity achieved greater success following World War I and the collapse of the Hapsburg Austria-Hungary Empire when the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, and the Kingdom of Serbia merged into Yugoslavia. The country’s name means Southern Slavs, and the idea of a united Slavic nation was advocated by Southern Slavic intellectuals and politicians. The pan-Slavic identity includes several ethnic groups that speak southern Slavic languages such
as the Bosniaks, Bulgarians, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes (Banac 1984).

Political leaders who took power after The War of National Liberation in Yugoslavia during WWII had an ideological commitment to national unity. Foreign forces had partitioned Yugoslavia leading to intense internecine conflict during WWII at the cost hundreds of thousands of lives. The Yugoslav identity was therefore created to overcome these past divisions and was used by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to advance modernization and unity. However, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia actually ended up enforcing distinctions as different regions’ economies developed at different paces and party leaders representing the different nationalities fought for greater influence to enhance their own political agendas and organized their constituencies based on the different nationalist oral traditions not subject to critical review. A Yugoslav identity had begun to take hold among few, but not enough to thwart the disintegration of the country into the warring nationalities (Posen 1993; Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson 1994). The result of the genocides and ethnic cleansing during the 90s changed the Croatia-Bosnia rivalry from being coded as contested nation, with high ethnic similarity, to a big brother rivalry with a majority in Croatia sharing ethnicity with a smaller minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina and far fewer Serbs in both countries.

In both sets of cases of pan-ethnic identities there was an identified foreign threat, real or imagined, that the pan-ethnic identity sought to counter. The decisions by leaders to adhere to the pan-ethnic identity rested on the resulting benefits. For example, Mufti (1996) finds an inverse relationship between Arab nationalist rhetoric and the strength of state structures and regimes. Since pan-ethnic rhetoric resonated with many, the ideology would be used by political leaders to legitimize their rule and also as a tool to enhance their influence to delegitimize their
neighbors. It thus served as a means of enhancing a state’s power in the realm of foreign relations, but also as a vulnerability that could be used by a leader’s domestic and foreign adversaries.

Both of the pan-ethnic ideas are no longer as relevant due to the strength of the state. However, Pintak (2009) writes that Arab journalists have begun to espouse and shape a new type of Arab identity. The new Arabism transcends national borders just as the old pan-Arab identity did. These journalists are more secular and identify themselves as “Arab” more strongly than the region at large. The Arab Spring and revolutions across the Middle East has weakened institutions giving a new pan-ethnic identity a chance to resonate with more people once again. It is still uncertain what the outcome of this might be, but Telhami and Barnett (2002) say that the Arab world still has a sort of trans-national character due the similarity in religion, language, and Arabic identity.

The pan-Slavic identity was able to establish one nation state for some time, but this was not the case in the pan-Arab world. I can think of several possible reasons for the difference in success of the two. The aftermath of World War I and relative weakness of the independent actors by themselves was sufficient enough to counter doubt of others’ intentions in those seeking to establish a pan-ethnic nation state in the case of the pan-Slavic identity. Although Arab countries were suspicious of foreign interference, leaders perhaps realized that foreign forces were less of a threat to regional rulers than other Arab leaders were. Another factor would also be the relatively compact size of Yugoslavia as compared to the geographic stretches of the Arab world. In the case of the latter, controlling such a vast territory was not possible without a more capable military effort or greater unity among a greater number of regional political and ethnic leaders.
Big Brother Rivals

Big Brother rivals are coded as ‘1’ when a majority in one country is similar to a minority in the other, and ‘0’ otherwise. The country where the common ethnic group is a minority will view this group with suspicion and may abuse this minority. Then the other rival, where this group is a majority will step in like a big brother protecting its smaller sibling. Excluding pan-ethnic cases, these cases include Chinese minorities in Vietnam, Hungarians in Yugoslavia, Greeks in Albania, Turks in Bulgaria, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Somali in Kenya with Somalia as a rival, Thai in Vietnam, and Khmer in Vietnam with majority Khmer in Cambodia as a rival.

I code these cases, as all my cases, by population rather than political status. I also code them as big brother rivals if a majority in each country shared ethnicity with a minority of the ethnicities in the other country. For example, although Croatia-Serbia is a pan-ethnic rival, it is also a big brother rival. Even though each side is made up of Serbians and Croatians together as a majority, Croats are a minority in Serbia, and Serbs are a minority in Croatia. The sizes of these minorities are low enough to increase the asymmetry between among similar groups and keep the level of ethnic similarity below the threshold of 50, which I set using my continuous measure.

Often the minority group resides on disputed territory giving the big brother rival an extended sense of sovereignty over this territory. In addition, the minority group sometimes has its own separatist or irredentist ambitions. A case in point, in 1991, Karabakh Armenians had voted to secede from Azerbaijan, reviving the issue of whether Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Armenia or Azerbaijan, which the two sides had fought over before being subsumed by the Soviet Union in the early 1920s. Karabakh-Armenians had previously demonstrated for unification with Armenia, which was prevented by Moscow. Armenia invaded Azerbaijan,
responding to Azerbaijan’s war on ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh by intervening on behalf of their co-ethnics (Nichol 2010).

After the Nagorno-Karabakh War, the two sides have been engaged in a series of negotiations. The Organization of Security Co-operation in Europe’s Minsk Group helped to initiate these talks in 1992, and by 1994 a Russian sponsored cease fire was established. However, a peace deal remained elusive as populations in both countries refused to accept any negotiated settlement. This was made apparent when both sides made progress in the peace talks in late 1997, but in early 1998 Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan was forced to resign by the military and other pressure groups (Nichol 2010).

Many of these cases result in autonomy for the minority on the rival’s territory, whether recognized or de facto. In other cases, the minority is met with oppression because they are associated with the enemy state. These rivalries should experience more intrastate conflicts as a result. The big brother rival seeks to limit oppression, whereas the other rival will seek to limit subversive activities as well as dismemberment. The ultimate political status of the territory is disputed, thus the rivalry persists. However, a few cases will result in rivalry because of other issues and the minority might not inhabit disputed territory. This was the case with the Chinese minority in Vietnam. However, even in these cases, treatment of minority ethnic groups that are ethnically similar to the rival becomes a linked issue as the rivals develop enemy images of each other resulting in the same situation with the big brother concerned about treatment of their co-ethnics (Dreyer 2010; Khahn 1993).
Minority Rivals

A majority of ethnically similar rivals share the same minority groups. I code minority as ‘1’ if the two rivals share a minority ethnic group that, together with other ethnically similar minorities, do not form a majority in either rival, and ‘0’ if they do not. In many cases, this group may be irrelevant to rivalry relations, though they may provide a cross border link to communities on the rival’s territory if the two reinitiate peaceful relations. In some cases, the cross border ethnic group may be large and rebellious; thus, it would provide a means for political leaders to undermine their rival. However, if the state can incorporate the minority as part of the national identity, then the cross border ethnic group provides political leaders and extended source of legitimacy over their rival’s territory. However, unlike big brother rivalries, this would be true for both rivals in the dyad.

A case in point, the Ewes of Togo and Ghana are a minority in each country, but they do make up a plurality in the latter. However, according to the EPR data they remained powerless in Togo until 1990. Thompson (2001) codes this rivalry as ending in 1995. Nugent (2003) suggests that the ties between the tribes that facilitated the construction of the idea of the Ewe people as a single group had their impetus in the resistance against the Asante invasion and occupation during the 19th century. It was then that Nugent says that the hint of an idea that these tribes had mutual interests began.

The German protectorate of Togo was established in 1884 initiating a treaty signing competition with the Germans and English over who could obtain the most treaties with local chiefs. However, the chiefs were agreeing to overlapping claims with the Europeans. After realizing this, England and Germany agreed to a partition with the border being settled in the Heligoland Treaty of 1890. This treaty divided Eweland into the British protectorate of the Gold
Coast, which became Ghana in 1956, and the German protectorate of Togo, thus establishing the imperial context for national successors with ethnic similarity (Nugent 2003).

However, the construction of the modern Ewe identity was still being formed when after World War I German Togo was split in 1919 between British Togoland and French Togoland. Most Ewes still identified more with their local tribes rather than seeing themselves as a nation. Another group, the Agotime were mostly placed in the latter, but administered under Ewe chiefs. By 1930 they were still marrying and trading across the border as before, but the Agotime identity had disappeared as they became a sort of proxy Ewe. By the 1940s, some Ewe began an independence movement, but gained little support beyond the capital of Lome in Togo (Nugent 2003).

The states of Ghana and Togo established independence in 1957 and 1960 respectively. The main issue arising between these two countries is the reunification of the Ewe into a single homeland. However, the two countries have different solutions to achieve this. Lome argues that the former British Togoland should be merged with Togo thus uniting most of the Ewe. Ghana believes that the two countries should unify into one Greater Ghana (Austin 1963). Though they are not a majority in either country, the Ewe provided both sides an added legitimacy over the territory of the other, even though they often lacked political power over the tenure of the rivalry.

Many minority rivals consist of cases where the country formations developed and divided preexisting ethnic communities, as with the Ewes. In other minority rivalries, the communities came after the establishment of the political territories. Afro-Latinos are in multiple South American states as a result of former slaves being brought to the new world and are thus present in the Colombia-Venezuela rivalry, and Ecuador-Peru rivalry. In such cases, they may
have little influence in the rivalry situation. Although these groups may not have been large and influential at the time of the creation of the rival countries, they are still politically relevant though; thus, they may impact the relationship between the rivals that they exist in. This may include acting as agents for one of the states in the rivalry or perhaps facilitating greater cooperation between the two rivals. These minority groups may act independently, causing greater tensions between the two countries.

Another significant minority case is the Fulb people, who are also called Peul, Fulani, or Pulaar. They are in a number of African countries due to migration and their former nomadic ways. It is generally agreed upon by historians that sometime around the 10th century, they began migrating eastward from the east and north of Senegal eventually reaching as far east as Sudan and Ethiopia. Along with migrating east they began to adopt Islam, which became a defining characteristic of the Fulb (Azarya 1993, 42).

In the 18th and 19th centuries, a series of jihads were carried out in West Africa that mobilized many Fulani pastoralists in support and spread the jihads to areas yet untouched by Islam, such as Adamawa in present day Nigeria and Cameroon. The settlement of the Fulani into a sedentary lifestyle from a position of strength led other groups in their area to also identify as Fulani that saw in it a status symbol. Furthermore, Fulbization of people in these different areas was synonymous with Islamization, such that the salient distinction of Fulani as opposed to non-Fulani is its cultural-religious basis that incorporates much diversity on other dimensions such as ethnic, tribal, and even linguistic (Azarya 1993; Schultz 1984).

To Fulb, race and ancestry once mattered when slavery was allowed since they were phenotypically distinct from other native Africans whom they often conquered and enslaved. However, with the abolition of slavery by the colonial administrations, racial differences were no
longer salient (Schultz 1984). Because of the cultural-religious basis of the Fulb identity and the different names resulting different languages, I allow a little more leniency in coding the similarity of rivals with Fulani peoples.

Table 4.2. Rivals’ Shared Ethnic Groups and Joint Ethnicity Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rival 1</th>
<th>Rival 2</th>
<th>Ethnic Group(s)</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Ethnic Similarity Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Miskitos</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1948-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1948-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1948-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>Contested Nation</td>
<td>1955-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1948-1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1948-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks</td>
<td>Pan-Ethnic and Big Brother</td>
<td>1992 - 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1955-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Turks, Roma</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1948-1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Peul</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1989-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Fulani, Muslims</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1975-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1964-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1963-1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Hutu, Tutsi</td>
<td>Contested Nation</td>
<td>1962-1966</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1958-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Sunni Arabs</td>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td>1948 - 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1961 – 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Sunni Arabs,</td>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td>1948-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shia Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1967 – 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Sunni Shafii</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pashtuns, Baloch</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1948-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1972 - 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Various Groups</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1948-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Various Chinese</td>
<td>Contested Nation</td>
<td>1949-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Various Chinese</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1973-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>Contested Nation</td>
<td>1949-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1948-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Thai, Chinese</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1954-1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Khmer, Chinese</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1975 - 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979 – 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>1956 - 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1956 - 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1956 – 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†: Measures are Rounded

This leniency affects the ethnic similarity between Cameroon and Nigeria and the rivalry between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. In the former, the EPR data codes Nigeria as Hausa-Fulani whereas in Cameroon it is just Fulani. However, in both cases, the EPR data notes that other Muslim groups are associated with the Fulani in both of these countries (Cederman et al. 2009).

The Hausa are no different in this respect, except that when the Fulani conquered the area, they inherited relatively strong institutional structures and Hausa culture had a larger impact on
Nigerian Fulani than other Fulani-incorporated groups elsewhere (Azarya 1993). Table 4.2 lists my data for these cases.

Comparing Measures of Ethnic Similarity

Table 4.3 includes three ranges of ethnic similarity and four categorical variables. Minority, Big Brother, and Contested Nation are mutually exclusive groups, whereas Pan-ethnic rivalry dyads are not mutually exclusive. Whereas Minority, Big Brother, and Contested Nations categorize different combinations of cross border ethnic groups being a minority or majority in both countries in a rivalry, pan-ethnic rivals are those that share a pan-ethnic group regardless of the size of this group. I believe the implied challenge to a state's sovereignty by a pan-ethnic idea, which believes several existing states should be united into a single nation state combined with the political salience of these groups on the state's territory, may present an extra vulnerability to stability not captured by ethnic similarity alone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3. Ethnic Similarity Variables Cross Tabulation of Frequencies (1,028 Rivalry-Dyad-Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity (1-25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity (26-50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity (51-100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Brother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is some overlap between how ethnically similar the categorical variables are when cross tabulated with the continuous measure. The exception is contested nation, which naturally coincides with a high level of ethnic similarity so that every dyad with an ethnic similarity value more than 50 is counted under the contested nation variable. More than 63% of ethnic similarity values from 1-25 consist of minority dyads. Many of the rest are big brother dyads, and over 18% contain a pan-ethnic dyad.

There is some overlap because even though big brother dyads have a majority in one of the countries in a dyad, the asymmetry may be so large as to diminish the similarity with ethnicities in the other rival. Likewise, some cross border ethnic groups that are a minority in each dyad may still be a large minority. Ethnic Similarity values from 25-50 are only 13% big brother rivals, whereas Minority rivals make up 36%. However, the more interesting finding here is that all rivalry dyads with levels of ethnic similarity from 25-50 contain the same pan ethnic group as their rival! Although it is reasonable to expect this range of ethnic similarity for most if not all dyads containing the same pan-ethnic group as their rival, it was not expected that every rivalry dyad between any of the ranges of ethnic similarity would be a pan ethnic rival. Perhaps pan-ethnic ideas arise in contexts where countries are almost at the point of being more similar than not in terms of politically salient ethnic groups, but not quite. Moreover, some pan-ethnic rivalries are not included in the ethnic similarity range due to the fact that politically salient ethnicities within countries are not similar to their pan-ethnic neighbors. Pan-ethnic ideas may be a realization of these facts. Political leader may then believe that if they could only subsume cleavages within a large area into a single identity, they could consolidate the relevant states into a stronger, more ethnically similar political unit.
Summary

In this chapter I have created variables that measure ethnic similarity between rivals. These include dummy variables for different categories of ethnic similarity such as when the rivals share majority ethnic groups, which I call contested nation rivals. I code big brother rivals for cases where a majority in one rival is ethnically similar to a minority group in the other rival. Minority rivals are rivalries that share a minority group. In addition, I have a pan-ethnic dummy variable for when rivals have the same pan-ethnic group. Moreover, I have also created a continuous measure of ethnic similarity between rivals. I cross tabulated the categorical variables with different ranges of ethnic similarity on my continuous measure and found that both approaches are similar but that there is some overlap between different categories and which ranges of similarity they fall in. This is especially true of those rivals with ethnic similarity below 50 using my continuous measure.

The continuous measure provides more information on how similar rivals are. However, the categorical variables provide information on specific dyadic contexts not captured in the continuous measure. In the following chapters, I use these variables to test ethnic similarity’s influence on various international relations phenomenon including territorial claim disputes, peaceful settlements, militarized interstate disputes, civil wars, and bilateral trade flows.
CHAPTER 5
ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

Ethnic similarity between rivals is the result of specific geographic, historical, and political developments. Geography influences how societies spread out and thrive (Diamond 1999; Shenefelt and White 2013), and members of an ethnic group will generally be geographically proximate as well. Although these groups may have come to eventually form nation states with their co-ethnics, some of an ethnic group may end up on disputed land with a rival since disputed territory is rarely distributed according to the wishes of those that populate it (Berdichevsky 1999). Since the governments with claims to the territory are generally contiguous and the ethnic group residing on the disputed territory will be in proximity to most if not all of their ethnic group, it makes sense that in many cases there will be cross border ethnic groups in the countries contending over territory. Furthermore, since countries engaged in a rivalry will often contain competing territorial claims, there would naturally be many rivals with these cross border ethnic groups on the territories they claim to.

In the first half of this chapter I explore the associations between ethnic similarity and territorial claim salience and its implications with a descriptive approach because there is not necessarily a causal relationship between ethnically similar rivals and territorial disputes, but rather a significant association between these two variables that can potentially influence our understanding of rivalry relations and territorial disputes. This first half of the chapter addresses H1 and H2, which deal with ethnic similarity’s associations with salience. To do this I cross reference my categorical measures of ethnic similarity between rivals with data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project’s data on territorial issues and their related saliency and peaceful settlement attempts (Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008).
follow the tests of these hypotheses with a more detailed look at the bases of these territorial disputes and how they differ by ethnically similar rivalry types.

In the second half of this chapter I test the hypotheses H3 through H6 on peaceful settlements between ethnically similar rivals. The categorical measures of ethnic similarity between rivals are minority rivals, which are ones where the cross border ethnic group is a minority in both states, big brother rivals, in which the cross border ethnic group is a majority in one country and a minority in the other, contested nations, in which the cross border ethnic group is a majority in both states, and pan-ethnic, which is a non-mutually exclusive group where the cross border ethnic group is a pan-ethnic identity. I also perform statistical tests using my continuous ethnic similarity variable.

Ethnically Similar Rival Types and Issue Saliency

Contested nations should generally be concerned over nationalist competitions over who will rule a united nation. Since contested nations are ethnically identical they should have the highest salience if more ethnic similarity is associated with more salient territorial disputes. Therefore, my two hypotheses are:

H1: The higher the level of ethnic similarity between two rivals, the more salient their territorial claims will be.

H2: Contested nation rivalries are associated with higher salience than any other group of rivals.

By separating these two hypotheses I can demonstrate that more ethnic similarity increases salience, but also that there is a significant jump in the average salience of territorial dispute claims for contested nations. For the descriptive statistics on these hypotheses, I increase the observations for several relevant cases of my categorical variables, which cover the years 1948-2000, to cover values for years previous to this time when the ICOW data begins coding
territorial disputes for these same dyads. Cases that I code as minority rivals previous to 1948 include Honduras-Nicaragua beginning in 1926 where historical records indicate the Miskito ethnic group has existed for centuries (Helms 1986). In addition, the Colombia-Venezuela dyad is extended back to 1913 and the Ecuador-Peru dyad measures back to 1890. Both of these rivalries have long had African Latinos as a similar politically salient ethnic group since they were introduced through the slave trade during colonialism (Romero 1944). Iraq and Iran are extended back to 1932. Finally, the minority dyad of Greece-Turkey is extended back in time to 1871 where Roma have resided for centuries (Petrova 2003).

A few big brother rivalries were also extended to the pre-1948 beginning of the ethnic similarity data to correspond to their territorial disputes. Hungary and Yugoslavia has been extended back to 1921 with ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia. Albania and Greece is also extended back to 1921 after Greece’s defeat in the Greco-Turkish war with the status of Northern Epirus and the Greek population reverting back to Albanian control (Blitz 2006; Ruches 1965). Although large numbers of Turks had emigrated from the newly established country of Bulgaria following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), a significant number remained since (Eminov 2000), thus the Bulgaria-Turkish dyad is coded back to 1912 when it enters the ICOW data for its first year to have a territorial dispute. The Russia-China dyad is extended back to 1870.

The pan-Arab movement has been a characteristic of the Arab World since World War I (Nafaa 1983). The ICOW data has territorial disputes between two pan-ethnic dyads pre-1948. These dyads include Iraq and Iran, which I code as a pan-ethnic dyad back to 1932 since there is an Arab minority in Iran, and Iraq-Saudi Arabia, which I extend the coding back to 1934. There are no contested nation dyads before 1948. The ability to add these specific pre-1948 observations are available and allow a fuller analysis of the territorial disputes that have arisen
between ethnically similar rivals. However, the continuous measure of ethnic similarity will not be extended pre-1948 due to a lack of demographic data. The demographic data is necessary to calculate the average and asymmetry of the relative populations necessary for that measure.

Addressing these two hypotheses is rather straightforward and will be done descriptively followed by further detail on cases associated with the different categories of ethnic similarity. The ICOW data measures the salience or value of the claimed territory for each of the claimant states, including three indicators of tangible salience and three of intangible salience. Tangible salience’s indicators includes whether the territory is believed to possess valuable resources, is considered to be militarily or economically strategic, and whether or not the territory has a permanent population residing on it. Intangible salience includes whether the territory is claimed as homeland territory, if the country has an explicit ethnic, religious, or other identity connection with the residents of the territory, and whether the state exercised sovereignty over this territory within the past two centuries. Each of these indicators are coded for each side of the dispute resulting in six points for tangible salience, six for intangible, and then these are added together to obtain a 0-12 scale for salience (Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008).

Out of 3,975 rivalry years from Thompson’s (2001) data on strategic rivals, 1,204 are ethnic-rivalry-years, and 2,771 are non-ethnic rivals. Using the ICOW data for territorial disputes, 99.4% (1,197) of the ethnic rivalry-years have land based territorial disputes compared to only 53.1% (1,471) for the non-ethnic rivals. Table 5.1 cross tabulates my categorical ethnic similarity indicators with an average of ICOW’s saliency indexes for each category for these 1,204 observations. I provided a row for the 1,471 rivalry-years that have territorial disputes but are not ethnically similar for comparison, and the rows for ethnically similar rivals also have a value for the difference between their salience scores and that of the non-ethnically similar rivals.
Table 5.1. Average Salience of Dyadic Territorial Claims By Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Rivals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Salience (0-12)</th>
<th>Tangible Saliency (0-6)</th>
<th>Intangible Saliency (0-6)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ethnic Rivals</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>1,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1.16</td>
<td>+0.31</td>
<td>+0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+0.18</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>+0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1.63</td>
<td>+0.68</td>
<td>+0.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested Nation</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+2.82</td>
<td>+1.42</td>
<td>+1.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnically similar rivals have higher tangible, intangible, and total salience in all but one cell in table 5.1 providing support for H1, which says that salience will be higher for ethnically similar rivals. Claiming an identity connection to the disputed territory should increase intangible salience of a claim since identity is one of the elements of the salience index. However, the tangible salience is also higher indicating that identity is not the only source of the extra territorial salience. The exception is big brother rivals’ average value for tangible salience, which is -0.78 points lower on average. The rivalries with the biggest differences with non-ethnically similar rivals are contested nations, which supports H2. These rivalries have the highest average tangible salience, intangible salience, and thus the highest salience scores out of any category in the table. Their average tangible and intangible salience is at the maximum value of 6. Contested nation’s average salience score is 11.36, which is 2.82 points above the average for non-ethnically similar rivals.
Pan-ethnic rivalries have the second highest salience score with a 10.17, which is 1.63 points above the average non-ethnically similar rivals. Whereas big brother rivalries have much higher intangible salience scores relative to tangible, pan-ethnic rivals derive a similar percentage of their bases for their territorial claims from both intangible and tangible bases. Minority rivals’ territorial claim bases draw relatively equally from both tangible and intangible bases. However, all ethnically similar rivalry categories have a higher proportion of cases containing an intangible salience basis when compared to the non-ethnically similar rivals.

Table 5.1 shows that, on average, ethnic similar rivals are different than non-ethnically similar rivals when it comes to the salience of the territorial disputes. Using my continuous measure for ethnic similarity I plotted the relationship between ethnic similarity and the salience score, which is shown in Figure 5.1. The ethnic similarity variable is significant at the p<.001 level. The trend shows that on average increasing ethnic similarity between rivals with territorial

![Figure 5.1: Ethnic Similarity and Claim Salience (1948-2001)](image)

Least Squares Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Similarity</th>
<th>.064 p&lt;.001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
disputes is associated with more salient territorial disputes providing further support for H1.

Considering the overlap in ethnic similarity between minority, big brother, and pan-ethnic rivals, and the difference that arise in tangible versus intangible types of saliency it is interesting to also find a general increase in overall saliency predicted by ethnic similarity. Big brother rivals obtain claim saliency more from intangible sources, whereas pan-ethnic rivals obtain more saliency from tangible sources. Yet, the more ethnically similar the rivals, the more overall saliency are attributed to the territorial claim.

Territorial Claim Bases

Figure 5.2 breaks down the ICOW salience measure into each claim basis so we can observe the sources of these groups’ differences in territorial dispute salience. I included the three indicators of tangible salience being whether there is a resource basis, strategic basis, and whether the disputed territory is populated. Intangible indicators for whether there is an identity basis for the territorial dispute, or whether one rival in the dyad claims the territory as their homeland or has had historical sovereignty over the disputed territory sometime in the past two centuries are also included. In addition, I provided ICOW’s indicator as to whether at least one state in the dyad claims the other’s entire territory. I cross tabulate these with the percentage of each of my ethnically similar rival categories, and I include a category indicating non-ethnically similar rivals for comparison. I count the presence for each salience indicator as true if it applies to either country in the rivalry-dyad.
Minority Rivals’ Territorial Claim Bases

Minority rivalry dyads are generally similar to non-ethnically similar rivals in each indicator. Virtually all rivals, whether or not they have ethnic similarity, claim disputed territory as a homeland or have had sovereignty over the disputed territory with in the last two centuries. A noticeable difference minority rivals have from the others is the percentage of observations that are populated. Although most territorial disputes between rivals are over populated territories, minority rivals contain a few that are not. The territorial disputes over unpopulated lands are the long lasting rivalries between the countries of former Gran Colombia.

The dispute over the Peninsula of la Guajira between Venezuela and Colombia and the border disagreement between Peru and Ecuador originated in colonial times resulting in a state of rivalry after the breakup of Gran Colombia (La Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango del Banco de la República 2014; Wayman 1993). Though South America is mostly inhabited by Latinos, this is
not a salient distinction in these societies. Thus the similarity between political salient ethnic
groups in these countries is derived from Afro-Latinos in each of these societies. Slaves had
been introduced from Panama into Peru, and western parts of Ecuador, and Colombia. From
Colombia, they were transported to Venezuela (Romero 1944).

Although 100% of minority rival observations with land based territorial disputes are
between contiguous countries, only 74.8% of the non-ethnic rivalry years with territorial claims
share a land or river border. Minority rivals have more resource (81.1 to 68.8) and strategic
(86.2 to 77.4) bases for their territorial claims compared to non-ethnic rivals, but it is likely that
contiguity may have more to do with this and small amounts of ethnic similarity may be the
result of contiguity. Previous researchers have noted that territorial disputes are more likely to
arise from contiguous countries (e.g. Bremer 1992; Goertz and Diehl 1992).

However, the ethnic similarity between countries in a minority rivalry can become an
issue, especially as the size of the similarity is larger. This may occur when the minority
becomes associated with the national identity. Such is the case with the Ewes in Ghana and
Togo, and the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Though the Ewes are a minority in both
Ghana and Togo, they are plurality. Despite not having political power in both rivals for much of
the rivalry, the territorial issue between these countries is how to reunify the Ewe into a single
homeland. Togo believes that the British Togoland should be returned to Togo thus unifying the
territory that Ewes mostly reside on, whereas Ghana believes that Togo should be incorporated
into a single Greater Ghana thus reunifying the entire Ewe community (Austin 1963).

Likewise, “Afghan” is a Persian word for Pashtun so that the multi-ethnic country of
“Afghanistan” means “land of the Pashtuns” (Schetter 2013, 53) where Pashtuns are 41% of the
population (Cederman et al. 2009). In the late 19th century, the struggle known as the “Great
Game,” resulted in the emergence of the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The struggle for power and influence saw Russia pushing toward warmer waters and trying to prevent British expansion beyond the Hindu Kush Mountains. Likewise, among Great Britain’s various goals was the prevention of Russian expansion. In between these two great powers was the “Kingdom of Carbool,” which maintained its independence until the second Anglo-Afghan War when British India turned the province into a protectorate with limited autonomy (Schetter 2013).

The borders for modern day Afghanistan were set between 1887 and 1895 by British India and Russia by merging several ethnic groups. In 1893, Abdur Rahman, known as the “Iron Amir,” officially recognized the borders, which had been previously negotiated by Rahman’s predecessor, Muhammad Yaqub in 1879. However, the Amir continued demanding taxation from vassals in areas officially under British sovereignty (Schetter 2013). The demands for taxes and statements of loyalty then as well as various statements from Afghan leaders since, demonstrates the different ideas the Afghans had on the border arrangement.

Besides the lack of recognition for the border, Pashtun merchants that had dominated the Afghan government also had an economic interest in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They long wished to have an outlet to the sea to facilitate their trade. This then prompted their claim to defend the self-determination of Pashtuns and Baluchis that lived in Pakistan (Emadi 1990). The Pakistani government feels that the Afghan government’s proclaimed support of Pashtun and Baluchi self-determination is hypocritical in light of its own subordination of its own minorities. In addition, as Montagno (1963) points out, the Afghan government had not expressed any desire for any of its territory to become part of an independent Pashtunistan.

Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973, Mohammad Daoud became president
of Afghanistan and openly supported Baluch resistance leaders. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan again normalized following pressure on Daoud by the Shah of Iran, who felt that Daoud’s anti-monarchy propaganda and support for Baluchi resistance, was a threat to Iranian security because Iran also contained a Baluchi minority. However, unlike ethnically similar groups in big brother rivalries where the ethnic group is a majority in the other country, cross border ethnic minority groups are more likely to be exploited in both directions. Money could be used to foment trouble as well as peace from both sides of the Durand Line (Montagno 1963).

Daoud was overthrown in 1978 leading once again to support for irredentism among Afghan Pashtuns and Baluchis. The Pakistani response to this was to support Islamist parties, which considered the Pashtunistan issue to be fabricated by social forces hostile to Islam (Emadi 1990). This support culminated in Pakistani support for the Taliban, which they believed would allow them to suppress the Pashtunistan issue (Schetter 2013). However, the issue has become more salient following the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on the United States, and the subsequent US led War on Terror. The porous borders and tribal solidarity on both sides of the Durand line allowed Taliban and Al Qaeda elements a means to evade US attacks.

Big Brother Rivals’ Territorial Claim Bases

Big brother rivals, which are dyads with a minority ethnic group sharing ethnic similarity with a majority in a rival country, contain a number of differences relative to the minority rivals. Only one observation exists with no population on the disputed territory. That observation would be China-Vietnam in the year 2000. On December 31, 1999, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam signed the Treaty of Land Border between China and Vietnam in Hanoi. By agreeing on the border between Vietnam and
China, the two sides had removed many of the territorial disputes in populated areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2000).

The noticeably larger percentage of big brother rivalries with an identity basis to their territorial dispute in figure 5.1 reveals the source of the higher average for the big brother category’s intangible salience score in table 5.1. Likewise, the sources of the big brother category’s lower tangible salience score in table 5.1 are also revealed. Fewer big brother rivalries have a resource or strategic basis for their territorial claims. A case in point, the dispute between Albania and Greece is not about the strategic location of North Epirus or resources there and is more about Greeks living there. Albania believes that Greece supported secessionist movements despite its acceptance of the Protocol of Florence in which Greece abandoned its claims to North Epirus. Greece protested perceived mistreatment of Epirotes by Albania in contradiction to its agreements in the Protocol of Corfu (Blitz 2006; Ruches 1965). Therefore, the issue between the relationship between Albania and the Greek residents of the autonomous area of North Epirus in Albania’s southern border with Greece has an identity basis in addition to the intangible bases of historical significance and that of sovereignty.

Since big brother territorial disputes will have historical and homeland bases for the dispute, an attachment to the people on these territories, and most likely be on the border between the rivals, the territory with the minority cross border ethnic group would have an incentive to reduce interactions between their rival. An illustration of this is the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, which had historically been part of the Jubaland region in Somalia. In addition, the population there is Somali. Despite having declared that all Somali lands would be united, once the British granted independence to Kenya 1963, they realized that Kenya would not give the NFD up and thus relented into giving them the territory despite
overwhelming support to join Somalia. These facts and the treatment of Somali by the Kenyan government is the basis of Somalia’s claim to the territory (Baker 2003; Laitin 1977). When Somalis in the NFD pursued closer relations and union with Somalia, the Kenyan government responded with repressive measures with the aim of reducing these cross border interactions and maintaining the territorial integrity of Kenya thus beginning the Shifta War that would last from 1963-1967 (Howard 1986; Laitin 1977).

Pan-Ethnic Rivals’ Territorial Claim Bases

Despite often being either big brother rivalries, which have higher intangible bases for their territorial disputes, or minority rivalries, which have similar bases of territorial claim salience as non-ethnic rivalries; those rivals sharing a pan-ethnicity have more cases associated with a tangible issue basis. In big brother dyads, ethnic similarity and history will more likely provide the context for at least part of the basis of the territorial dispute. In contrast, territorial disputes between rivals with pan-ethnic identities also have a higher percentage of observations with a strategic or resource basis, though identity bases are similar to big brother rivalries.

The two pan-ethnicities relevant to rivalry relations are the pan-Arab and pan-Slavic identities. These pan-ethnic ideas provided another means for state leaders to pursue their foreign policy objectives (Mufti 1996; Podeh 2005). Rivalry territorial disputes that arose in the pan-Arab regional system, or following the collapse of Yugoslavia differ from other rivalry types in that the pan-ethnic identity can be used as a tool to pursue these goals by tapping into regional passions in one’s favor or influencing the population within the rival state.

A case in point, after the Baath Party had taken power in 1968, Iraqi leaders desired a leadership role in the Arab world. Nasser had been viewed as the leader of the Arab world, but
his death in 1970 and the British withdrawal from the Middle East in 1971 led Iraq to view itself as more of a dominant regional player (Podeh 2005; Rajaee 1993). The 1979 Revolution in Iran provided Iraq the opportunity to achieve these regional aims of Arab leadership and capture the disputed territory of Khuzestan from Iran, which is a southwestern province of Iran that borders the Shatt al Arab River that provides the only water way access Iraq has to the Persian Gulf. Efforts were made to encourage Arab separatist groups in Khuzestan and claims to the territory were espoused in pan-Arab terminology with Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, using the historical reference “Arabistan” to refer to the province. However, during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1987), the wishes of these secessionists were soon forgotten as Hussein undertook his military ambitions in earnest (O’Toole 2000; Rajaee 1993).

In 1991-1992, the Croatia-Serbian rivalry began with the breakup of Yugoslavia, ending the pan-Slavic idea and beginning the Croatia-Serbia War. The pan-Slavic idea was not just a failure because of the territorial breakup of Yugoslavia, but also because the idea had not overcome the distinctions between the various Yugoslav peoples’ sense of identity (Posen 1993; Sekulic et al. 1994). Propaganda emanating from Belgrade comparing the new Croatian government to the Ustashas (Fascists), was used to generate support from Serbs in Croatia for Serbia’s goals of creating a Greater Serbia, which encompassed the contemporary borders of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbian populations and areas of historical significance in all the newly independent former Yugoslav republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (Cohen and Riesman 1996; Gagnon 1994; Klemenčić and Schofield 2001).

Although pan-Slavic identity was not itself used as a tool to pursue other tangible aims as the pan-Arab ideology was used, it did provide the opportunity and contemporary historical context for Serbia to pursue its aims. Gagnon (1994) says that one effective means to achieve
persuasion is to successfully appeal to politically relevant actors’ interests as members of a group, and that ethnic ideas provide one source of legitimacy and authority. Pan-ethnic rivals differ from big brother rivals because this source of ethnic legitimacy and authority is only applied to the minority in rival country in big brother rivals, whereas pan-ethnic ideas give political leaders a source of legitimacy and authority that is most likely applicable to all their regional ambitions. Pan-Arab terminology was used as a tool by different Arab leaders to advance their legitimacy within their states and against their regional opponents because it resonated with at least some members of the populations of all their regional rivals (Podeh 2005: Rubin 1991; Sluglett 2002).

In the case of the breakup of Yugoslavia, this source of legitimacy quickly dissipated as identification with the pan-Slavic identity was never high in the first place (Posen 1993; Sekulic et al. 1994). Rather, the new political reality that would cause Serbs to become minorities in Croatia and elsewhere when compared to their former majority status under the erstwhile Yugoslavia was fresh on Serbs minds. Therefore, the context created by the pan-Slavic idea made this idea politically relevant as a source of legitimacy over a broad area of territorial claims that were part of the Greater Serbia ambition, and had been part of the former Yugoslavia.

The Croatia-Serbia rivalry remains a pan-ethnic rivalry despite the ultimate failure of the pan-Slavic identity because its legacy had provided a source of legitimacy to maintain the rivalry. This pan-ethnic context enabled for the Greater Serb ideas that were later espoused by Milosevic when he used the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science of Arts as a basis, which in 1986 had made conspiratorial claims that the other Yugoslav ethnicities had abused and committed genocide against Serbs (Ramet 2006). Unlike the pan-Arab ideology, where Arab leaders advanced pan-ethnic ideas to gain legitimacy over a broad area, Milosevic used the idea
of Greater Serbia in the context of Yugoslavia, created by the pan-Slavic idea, in favor of one ethnic group to gain legitimacy over a broad area. However, this justification would seem to only apply to the former Yugoslav republics and not as much to the surrounding Balkan countries, which also include territory considered to be part of Greater Serbia (Anzulovic 1999; Guzina 2003).

Contested Nations’ Territorial Claim Bases

Contested nations include four rivalry cases with highly salient territorial disputes. These cases would be the Germanys, the Vietnams, China-Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. All contested nations with territorial disputes have every basis for their territorial claims. The most notable differences from the other rivalry types are whether the territorial dispute has an identity basis and that each rivalry claims the entire territory of the other state. There is also a noticeable difference with other rivalry types when it comes to territorial claims with a resource basis as well.

The association between high ethnic similarity and the territorial dispute being the entire territory of the other rival is due to these nations having all previously been a single country. Strong disagreements exist between the governments of these rivals preventing reunification. With the removal of these strong disagreements, reunification was achieved by East and West Germany. Otherwise, such reunification must be achieved militarily, as with North and South Vietnam. Strong nationalist sentiments and the general belief that the two nations should be a single unified country and people provide an identity basis to each of these cases. An exception to this general attitude among the citizens of contested nations with territorial claims is Taiwan, leaving the China-Taiwan desire for reunification more one-sided.
Unlike the rivalries between other contested nations, Taiwan and China have basically been estranged more than a century. Taiwan had been ceded to Japan following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Although it was returned after World War II, in 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) lost the Chinese Civil War against Mao Zedong and the Communists, they retreated to Taiwan. Taipei became the temporary war time capital, but the nationalists never returned to power on the mainland.

Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, Lee Teng-hui repatriated Taiwanese citizens who had formerly been exiled under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule. These repatriated Taiwanese espoused a new Taiwanese identity, which emphasized Taiwan’s long separation from China and Japanese influence distinguishing it from China. Although the KMT had once claimed to be the true government of the mainland exiled to the island of Taiwan, most Taiwanese have come to reject this desire and believe themselves to be a separate Taiwanese identity with many citizens advocating Taiwan be an independent state (Corcuff 2002; Chu 2004; Lynch 2004; Dittmer 2004; Wang and Liu 2004; Wu 2004). Therefore, many of the citizens of Taiwan reject reunification, even if the government has not officially renounced so as not to antagonize its much larger rival.

The identical or nearly identical ethnic makeup between contested nations would make interactions between the two rivals in these cases easier since there are fewer linguistic and cultural barriers to interaction. Competing ideas on how the reunified nation should be run and by whom, leads to nationalistic statements that would resonate with larger portions of the populations and inflame passions on the other side. Actions and statements advancing one rival’s claim to the other’s territory or enforcing the rivalry concern the future of the reunified nation that is pertinent to that nationalist identity that citizens in the other rival feel. This makes these
actions and statements more personal. Nationalist identity, the higher salience of territorial disputes, and the costs to the loser if the other side succeeds in their territorial ambitions make contested nations especially dangerous dyads.

Peaceful Settlements Between Ethnic Rivals

To think of why different ethnically similar rivals will have varying relationships for both the likelihood that they will engage in a peaceful settlement and that they would have varying levels of success in these negotiations, consider the different goals and leverage in each rivalry type. Since I am observing rivals, the history of the relationship between these cases will always be relatively antagonistic. For ethnically similar rivals there is an added sense of sovereignty and a psychological dimension that extends to some or all of a nation’s ethnic identities.

For minority rivals, the territorial disputes are not much different than non-ethnic rivals. A cross border ethnic group may be significant to the extent that it is associated with the national identity of a country. Such is the case with the Ewes, but they provide a source of legitimacy for both Ghana’s claim to the entire country of Togo and Togo’s claim to the Ghana controlled area of British Togoland (Austin 1963; Nugent 2003). The cross border ethnic group could be an obstacle to peaceful relations between the two countries so it is possible that there exists a lower likelihood of a peaceful settlement between the two countries, but it is also possible that the cross border ethnic group is a source of mutual antagonism giving both sides a reason for common ground. Therefore, on average, the presence of cross border minority ethnic groups has little to say about the goals or leverage minority rivals will have on negotiated settlements.

Big brother rivalries provide a unique situation when it comes to goals and leverage. The big brother rival’s goal may be to advocate irredentism or autonomy among their co-ethnics, but another goal will most likely be the treatment of their co-ethnics. For the rival with the cross
border minority on its territory, the goal will be to prevent a challenge to its authority, and more importantly preventing dismemberment of the state. In this case, both sides have leverage to trade. Though the territorial status of the disputed territory is still disputed, the big brother rival can avoid promoting irredentism thus lessening oppression against their co-ethnics. Likewise, the rival with the cross border minority group can agree not to oppress the minority and perhaps even grant a degree of autonomy in exchange for the big brother rival not promoting or supporting rebellion on behalf of their co-ethnics.

A case in point, in 1993 and 1994, Albania and Greece exchanged diplomatic demands and oppressive actions towards their respective minority populations. Along with the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and dissidence in other communist bloc countries; Albania saw a reemergence of proclamations of Greek political allegiance on the part of ethnic Greek Albanians, which heightened tensions between the countries. The Albanian government responded with repressive measures, and there were claims that ethnic Greeks were fired from government jobs. The tensions escalated when Greek border police shot illegal Albanian immigrants near the frontier, and began deporting thousands of Albanians. However, following negotiations, tensions were defused by Greece confiscating weapons and arresting ultranationalists associated with the Liberation Front of Northern Epirus (including some from Albania). The Greek Prime Minister Papandreou condemned the extremists. In turn, the Albanians reduced oppressive measures against their ethnic Greek community and allowed bilingual education (Budina and Hart 1995).

In cases where the ethnic group is not associated with disputed territory, such as the Chinese community of Vietnam, the similar ethnic group would not be directly tied to the disputed territory, but may become associated with it anyway. Oppression of the minority may
give the big brother justification for solving the territorial dispute militarily. However, if the big brother cares for the well-being of their co-ethnics, the presence of the cross border ethnic group results in the same negotiating dynamic as big brother rivals where the minority group resides on the disputed territory. The big brother rivalry can agree to not use the minority group subversively, and also not engage in military actions concerning the disputed territory. Likewise, the rival with the minority group must agree to not resort to outright oppression or the big brother rival will intervene militarily.

If a big brother rival delays peaceful settlements, this may prolong the suffering of their co-ethnics. Likewise, if the rival with the minority on it delays settlement, the risk of rebellion would linger. This increases pressure for peaceful settlements. Although the territorial dispute may not be resolved, the big brother rival can reduce support for rebellion in exchange for the relative well-being of their co-ethnics. Since both sides have leverage, each can gain something valuable from this quid pro quo. Thus I have two testable hypothesis concerning big brother rivalries and peaceful settlements:

H₃: Big brother rivals are more likely to attempt peaceful settlements than other rivalries.

H₄: Big brother rivalries are more likely to have successful peaceful settlements over territorial issues.

The extra layer of identity present in the context of pan-ethnic rivalries creates an added obstacle that would complicate peaceful settlement attempts. Consider if the pan-ethnic rivalry, which simply includes an Arab or Slavic identity, is also a big brother rivalry. Though big brother rivals feel an extended sense of sovereignty over their co-ethnics, this source of power is countered by the fact that the other rival has political sovereignty over these same individuals. Each side knows or learns what it can and cannot do. However, the pan-ethnic idea, or its legacy, grants an extended sense of sovereignty or legitimacy applying to an even wider range of
associated ethnic groups, but this ethnic attachment is weaker than other politically salient identities. Nafaa (1983) writes that pan-Arabism is “confined to a latent emotional force” under the lack of democratic institutions. However, inspirational leaders can stoke this emotional force for their own means. Therefore, even though big brother rivalries should be more likely to peacefully resolve issues, if they are a pan-ethnic rivalry these political leaders will be more likely to miscalculate or attempt to increase their influence during negotiations.

Persuasive rhetoric or imagery can potentially increase a political leader’s influence to a larger number of residents in their rival’s territory. In addition, the same rhetoric can generate support from other countries where the pan-ethnic ideas also resonate. However, it is less certain how much leverage a leader would successfully generate from this compared to ethnically related speeches and symbolism. The reach of the pan-ethnic idea or its legacy and the opposition to it provides both sides in a pan-ethnic rivalry an indeterminate amount of people their rhetoric will resonate with. That is not to say that the influence of any speech or propaganda is predictable, but rather that the target audience of ethnically related rhetoric is narrow relative to pan-ethnic associated rhetoric.

Pan-ethnic contexts may cause political leaders to believe they have alternatives to negotiated settlements since they have more of an ability to increase pressure on their opponents, but it may also lead negotiators to use “peace talks” as venues to express their pan-ethnic related ideas as well. In addition, political leaders could sincerely search for peaceful resolutions to territorial disputes, but the pan-ethnic idea or context grants a source to relevant legitimacy to a wider range of political actors within the region.

For example, Iraq and Iran successfully negotiated the Algiers Treaty in 1975, which settled disagreement over the navigation of the Shatt-al-Arab River and over the land border.
Saudi Arabia welcomed the news, but Syria and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen accused Iraq of “selling out” on the status of Arab land. During this period of reduced tensions between Iraq and Iran, some Arab states, including Libya and Syria, continued to support Arab secessionist areas in Iranian Khuzistan whereas Iraq remained muted on the issue. However, after abrogating the treaty in 1979, Iraq also supported the Arabs in Khuzistan referring to the land as “Arabistan” to rally Arab unity.

Although there is no expectation that pan-ethnic rivals would be more or less likely to engage in peaceful negotiations relative to other rivals, there is an expectation of fewer successful peaceful settlements overall due to interference from regional rivals both before and during any efforts to negotiate. In minority, big brother, or contested nation rivalries, the opposing rivals would generally have sovereignty over most or all of the ethnically similar actors. However, in pan-ethnic rivalries, this is not the case. Pan-ethnic unity could help promote agreement on territorial issues, but considering the number of relevant actors associated with a pan-ethnicity with various interests in the rivalry, negotiations are more likely to be undermined. Each relevant pan-ethnic actor could utilize rhetoric that could potentially create discord between participants in negotiations or within a participant’s territory. Thus there is a hypothetical relationship between pan-ethnic rivalries and peaceful settlements:

\( H_5: \) Pan-ethnic rivals are less likely to have successful peaceful settlements over territorial issues.

Like pan-ethnic rivals, contested nations would have an extended sense of sovereignty over a greater portion of each other’s population relative to minority and big brother rivalries. However, the goals of contested nations’ territorial claims are the acquisition of the entire target’s territory. This goal makes both sides in the rivalry unable to reach peaceful settlement on territory. Reasons for diplomacy may still exist to avoid conflict, but settlements over the status
of territory are less likely. Neither side has leverage in a negotiated settlement derived from the similar identity. The only alternative is to resolve the territorial dispute militarily.

Table 5.2. Hypotheses on Peaceful Settlement Success by Ethnic Rivalry Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>At Least One Attempt</th>
<th>Successful Substantive Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>H3 +positive</td>
<td>H4 +positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-ethnic</td>
<td></td>
<td>H5 –negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested Nation/</td>
<td></td>
<td>H6 –negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ethnic Similarity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the costs of war for contested nations are high. Since rivals are characterized by power parity over an issue, it is less likely that one side could overwhelm the other. The costs of such military accidents may increase the pressure for the diplomacy to prevent escalation of militarized interactions. However, the expectation that no permanent deal could be reached may also reduce the pressure for diplomacy. So there is no expectation on the likelihood of engaging in a peaceful attempt as settlement, but there is an expectation of failed settlements.

H6: Contested nation rivalries are less likely to have successful peaceful settlements over territorial issues.

I use table 5.2 to clarify the relationships I have hypothesized in this section. The only hypothesis on attempts to peacefully settle territorial disputes is H3. Big brother rivalries are expected to have a higher likelihood of a successfully negotiated peace according to H4 as well. According to H5, pan-ethnic is expected to have a negative relationship with successful attempts. And then, contested nations H6 are also expected to have a lower likelihood of successful attempts at peace. Because of data limitations I substitute the ethnic similarity variable for contested nations. It is not a perfect substitute as it covers a broader range of cases, but contested nations are the most ethnically similar of rivals.
### Table 5.3. Settlement Data on ETHNICALLY SIMILAR Rivals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Claims</th>
<th>Dyads</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Years with at least one Attempted Peaceful Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ethnic</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>286 (31.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>120 (29.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18 (45.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>47 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested Nations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6 (16.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Claim Data**

Currently, the ICOW data is limited to peaceful settlements on claims in Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. When I limit the observations even further to claims by ethnically similar rivals there are only a few dyads with some claims and a handful of negotiation attempts left. These associations should be retested once the data is available on more cases.

Table 5.3 lists ICOW’s data on land territory, river, and maritime claims, cross tabulated with my ethnic rivalry types. Rather than limit the time the claims are observed to when the associated dyad is coded as a rivalry by Thompson (2001), I include the timeframe of all claims from 1948-2001, that these rivalry dyads are in competition over. So I observe claim years beginning when the claim starts or 1948 since that is the earliest my ethnic similarity variables begin.

Unfortunately, I cannot test the relationships on settlement attempt success because there is a selection effect that limits the amount of available data relative to attempts. That is, instead of dyad-claim-years, which are the observations for the tests on attempted settlements, settlement success would be limited to years in which an attempt was made. Since attempts are rare in
these dyads, the data limitations are too severe for the necessary variation to test H4, H5, and H6.

The observations are claim years, and attempted settlements are the number of claim years where at least one attempt was made for a peaceful settlement. Non-ethnic rivals have 31 claims between 13 rivalries. Minority rivals contain 24 territorial claims between six rivalries. There are four big brother rivalries with five claims. The six rivalries containing a pan-ethnic group, consists of 28 claims, which means they have more per rivalry than other types. Two contested nation rivalries in the cross tabulation are East and West Germany with two territorial claim disputes and Croatia-Bosnia with one territorial claim dispute.

Pan-ethnic rivalries have the most claims per dyad. There are 412 minority rival claim years with territorial disputes in the data, whereas the other types have far fewer. Big brother rivals make up 40 claim years, pan-ethnic consists of 181 claim years, and the contested nations contain 36 claim years. Big brother rivals have a higher percentage of claim-years with an attempt at settling the claim though. At 45%, it is much higher than the next highest, which is the non-ethnic rivalries with 31.9% of the claim years containing an attempt to settle. Minority rivals are the next highest ethnically similar rivalry category with 29.1% of the claim years containing an attempt to settle. Pan-ethnic rivals attempted a peaceful settlement to their territorial claims 26% of the claim years. The contested nation rivalry has the lowest percentage of years with attempted settlements at 16.7%.

I use this data in logit regressions to test the likelihood that a peaceful settlement was attempted either bilaterally or by a third party in any given year. In a separate test not shown here, none of the ethnically similar rivalry types had a significant relationship when only looking at attempts initiated only by the rivals themselves. Non-ethnic rivals are included for comparison. Contested was dropped from the analysis due to collinearity. Robust standard
errors are reported, but there is basically no significant difference in p-value levels or standard errors using robust and regular standard errors.

For a guide on what controls to use on models estimating negotiated settlements on issues, I consult Hensel and Mitchell (2005). These authors tested territorial dispute saliency on dispute settlement success and included capability ratio between the two countries and joint democracy as important control variables. I use these variables and their operationalization though the dependent variables are slightly different. These authors observe the success or failure of only attempted settlements’ success or failure, whereas I analyze the likelihood of a settlement attempt. This may likely produce different values, significance, and directions for the coefficients even though the dependent variables are similar, because Hensel and Mitchell (2005) are explaining settlement attempt success, whereas I am estimating differences in settlement attempt behavior between my ethnically similar rival categories relative to other dyads with territorial disputes.

**Capability ratio** uses the Correlates of War’s National Military Capabilities data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987) and is constructed by taking the ratio of the stronger nation’s capabilities to the total capabilities of both states resulting in range of 0.5-1 range. **Joint democracy** will use the Polity IV data on regime characteristics (Marshall, Jaggers, Gurr 2011), and will be coded as ‘1’ if the lower of the two states’ democracy score is 6, and it will be ‘0’ if it is lower than 6. I use ICOW data (Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008) for salience of territorial claim disputes, which provides a 1-12 scale with ‘1’ being low salience, and ‘12’ being the highest salience.
Table 5.4. Peaceful Settlement Attempt by Ethnic Rivalry Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Settlement Attempt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity</td>
<td>0.053* (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ethnic</td>
<td>1.089*** (0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>0.366* (0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>2.074*** (0.511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td>0.490 (0.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience</td>
<td>0.134*** (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Ratio</td>
<td>-2.553*** (0.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>0.816*** (0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-0.841** (0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2955 2953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<.001*** p<.01** p<.05*

Analysis

The controls in table 5.4 are all significant. Both salience and joint democracy increase the likelihood of an attempt at peaceful settlement. As territorial issues become more important, action is more likely to be taken concerning these disputes (Hensel et al. 2008). Democratic countries are more likely to resolve their disputes by peaceful means due to norms of cooperation (Maoz and Russett 1993). Capability Ratio significantly reduces the likelihood to attempt a settlement. This is most likely because stronger states have less incentive to negotiate peaceful
deals with states if the same can be accomplished with a less costly show of force, and the weaker country will have less leverage in negotiations.

Ethnic similarity has a significant relationship with a lower likelihood of a settlement attempt ($p<.05$). Since there is limited data on contested nation rivals, I used ethnic similarity as a proxy for this until more data is available on these cases. The data in table 5.3 shows that the two contested nation rivalries in the data engaged in a much lower number of peace settlements, which makes associations with this category and the continuous measure questionable.

Pan-ethnic has no significant relationship with the likelihood of an attempted peaceful settlement. Minority, big brother, and non-ethnic rivals experience a higher likelihood of engaging in peaceful attempts. However, big brother and non-ethnic rivals have a higher likelihood of experiencing a peaceful attempt unlike minority rivals’ insignificant relationship. Big brother rivals are different than the other categories with significant positive coefficients in that they have a much larger likelihood of an attempt. The big brother coefficient (2.074) in the peaceful settlement attempt is nearly twice as high as non-ethnic rivals (1.089). Big brother rivals also have a higher likelihood of a peaceful settlement attempt at the $p<.001$ level supporting $H_3$.

The higher likelihood of attempts at negotiation between big brother rivals may be because these cases involve disputes where the minority group either resides on disputed territory, or is at least a politically relevant and potentially subversive group in one rival. This establishes a foothold in that country by the big brother rival. However, this foothold also presents a vulnerability to the big brother rival if they care for the well-being of their co-ethnics. This gives both sides leverage in negotiations over other issues, which would increase the likelihood of an attempt at negotiation.
Admittedly, the geographic limitations of the ICOW data, the temporal limits of my ethnic similarity data, and that I am only analyzing a subset of rivals may bring into question the inferences made from results of the tests on ethnically similar rivals and peace settlements. Specifically, there are relatively few big brother rivals and contested nations represented in the peace settlement data. With more data, the hypotheses H4, H5, and H6 may be tested. Specifically, as ICOW data is updated to include the outcomes of agreement attempts worldwide, I should be able to test these hypotheses.

Summary

Although there is not necessarily a direct-cause-and-effect relationship between ethnic similarity and territorial disputes, there is an association with the bases of these territorial disputes and the level of ethnic similarity between rival countries that have arisen as the result of geographic proximity and historical developments. To understand the level of the ethnic similarity and its association with territorial disputes provides scholars and policy makers alike a previously neglected perspective on these disputes that may provide a better understanding of the context concerning these volatile situations. This chapter demonstrates that ethnically similar rivals are different than non-ethnically similar rivals, and that understanding these differences provides us an opportunity to gain some insight into some of the more dangerous rivalries in the world.

This descriptive insight and research on peaceful resolutions provides a basis to combine research into ethnicity with analyses on rivalry and territorial disputes. Regardless of being rivals or not, dyads with territorial disputes are more likely to attempt a settlement when salience increases. Ethnically similar rivals generally have higher salience scores using ICOW’s measure so a higher likelihood of attempting negotiations would be expected among these dyads.
However, the results of this chapter show that rivals with high ethnic similarity are even more likely to engage in peaceful attempts at settling territorial disputes.

Rivals sharing a minority ethnic group are not too different than non-ethnic rivals when it comes to their salience, the bases for their territorial disputes, and the likelihood of whether they will attempt settlements. Combining this with the findings on ethnic similarity, it is likely that rivals sharing larger minority groups may be even more likely to engage in settlement attempts. Assuming size means power, perhaps larger minority groups may be able to prevent negotiated settlements. It is also likely that more politically active cross border ethnic groups may undermine negotiated settlements too. This will have to be explored further with more data and case studies.

Rivals with a cross border ethnic group as a majority in one country and a minority in the other tend to dispute territory where this minority resides. The issues in these cases are often associated with the treatment of this minority by the rival where this minority group resides, and that rival’s fear of subversive or secessionist activities by this minority group. Since fewer of these cases have resource or strategic based claims to the disputed territory, they generally have higher intangible salience associated to their territorial disputes, rather than tangible bases. The oppression of these groups is often associated with fear of subversive activities. If the big brother rival cares for the well-being of their co-ethnics, a quid pro quo may exist between the two rivals, even if not explicitly stated – less oppression for reduced support for secession. Each side has leverage in negotiations that could be applied over a wider range of disputes and thus we see more attempts at settlement between big brother rivals.

The pan-ethnic rivals have higher salience than other big brother or minority rivals due to more territorial disputes with a strategic or resource basis. In addition, relative to minority or big
brother rivals, pan-ethnic rivals see a higher percentage of cases where one country lays claim to the entire territory of their rival. Pan-ethnic ideas grant a source of legitimacy that allows political leaders an added justification to territorial disputes across more territorial disputes. However, these pan-ethnic ideas have been ultimately unsuccessful. Yet, it is possible that their legacies live on and still shape the history and perceptions of the people in the area these ideas laid claims to. If reactions to these pan-ethnic ideas’ legacies are similar across these areas, political leaders may still be able to use this to their advantage. The higher salience attached to the territorial disputes and an extra source of legitimacy obtained by leaders in rivals with a pan-ethnic group reduces the likelihood of peaceful settlement attempts.

Contested nations arise when a single country is divided into two rivals with a strong disagreement over who should rule the entire nation. These cases are associated with a rival making a claim to the other’s entire territory. These disputes are the most salient and are also the most ethnically similar. Inferring from the results of the relationship between ethnic similarity and attempts at peaceful settlement, these dyads should be most resistant to peaceful settlement success. This similarity should make interactions between the two sides more easily undertaken, but the differences are often too great to be overcome with dialogue alone. However, reunification was accomplished in the case of East and West Germany with the end of the Cold War giving hope for peaceful reunification. It may be that major international and political changes are necessary to resolve the other rivalries of Taiwan-China and the Korean Peninsula. So international leaders must maintain vigilance to avoid these cases from being resolved with a major war like North and South Vietnam was, and they must remain prepared to take advantage of some major international development so reunification is achieved peacefully as in the case of East and West Germany, if that is what the people in each rival truly want.
In this chapter I have established the context that ethnically similar rivals exist in. The findings in this chapter support the assertion that ethnically similar rivals are different than other rivals. From these differences we find unique possibilities for peace and greater resistance to peace than the average rivalry. In the following chapters, the possibilities are pursued further answering the questions this study began with concerning what ethnic similarity between rivals mean for militarized disputes and for trade.
CHAPTER 6

ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND ARMED CONFLICT

In this chapter, I explore the impact that ethnic similarity has on the likelihood that rivals engage in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), using both continuous and categorical measures of ethnic similarity. In chapter three, I theorized that ethnic similarity between rivals should increase the frequency of interactions between rivals. This increase in interactions will increase the likelihood that highly salient issues between the rivals will be raised, which in turn raises the likelihood of a militarized dispute. In addition, ethnic similarity increases the associated passions with rivalry. This is because ethnic similarity is an extension of one’s self. This unifying concept of ethnicity is extended to one’s enemy, or to some of the population on the enemy’s territory.

The categorical predictors also add nuance to the relationship between ethnic similarity between rivals and militarized disputes. Rivalry-dyads where the cross border ethnic group is a minority in one rival and a majority in another should be associated with a lower likelihood of a MID relative to other rivals. First, since the point of contention is between an ethnic minority and the government some conflicts would be intrastate conflicts, with the big brother rival aiding the minority co-ethnics with arms. This may draw the big brother rival into an interstate conflict, just as Azerbaijan’s intrastate conflict with ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh turned into an interstate conflict involving Armenia. However, after initial militarized disputes, the presence of rivalry means these issues were not resolved militarily.

Unlike other rivals, this gives both sides leverage in negotiations. The big brother will not want their co-ethnics oppressed, and the other rival will not want their country to be dismembered. Support for secession leads to repression. Likewise, oppression will raise the
likelihood of big brother involvement. Thus a quid pro quo exists that may not even be explicitly stated in any negotiated settlement. However, the reality still exists and is observable using statistical approaches.

Pan-ethnic rivals are expected to be more conflictual because despite their actual level of ethnic similarity using the national ethnic groups, the pan-ethnicity turns all the relevant countries into a quasi-contested nation. Contested nation rivalries are expected to be the most conflictual rivalry group, but pan-ethnic rivals provide another layer of politically relevant identity to the already politically relevant national and ethnic identities. Pan-ethnic identity is thus a weaker form of ethnic similarity, but it is still salient and not captured in continuous measures of ethnic similarity. It complicates peaceful resolutions and even after its failure, the transnational application of this idea and the context it creates makes even reactions to this context possibly resonate with relevant societies.

For example, the pan-Slavic idea led to the creation of Yugoslavia. This context allowed Milosevic to claim that other Yugoslav ethnicities had abused and committed genocide against Serbs (Ramet 2006). Such a claim may resonate with Serbs in countries of the former Yugoslavia, but was not as pertinent to the Serbs in other Balkan countries, which were also on territories associated with the Greater Serbia that Milosevic wanted to create.

In the previous chapter, territorial issues between contested nation rivals were demonstrated to be the most salient. The ethnic attachment to people in the rival country makes the issues between the two countries more personal. The inability to resolve the outstanding disagreement over who should rule the unified nation leaves the issue unresolvable with nothing short of regime change. This makes the stakes as well as the salience of the rivalry high. Ethnic similarity creates pressure for further interaction as citizens want to see family members from the
rival, and business leaders see a market they could tap into without having to hire speakers of a foreign language or translate their products’ labels.

For leaders on the autocratic side of mixed dyads, diffusion of democratic ideas into their society can be used to subvert their rule. Likewise, the relative prosperity of democratic countries will allow democratic leaders to use this as leverage to gain concessions over some issues. The similarity in ethnicity and desire for eventual unification or peaceful relations with co-ethnics will increase the pressure for regime change for one of the rivals when an opportunity allows. The opportunity that allowed for reunification of Vietnam was a weakened South Vietnam. The opportunity that allowed for the reunification between Germany was the end of the Cold War. Contested nation rivals that have yet to find such an opportunity maintain a very militarized relationship that requires battle readiness leading to a higher likelihood of a militarized dispute.

In this chapter, I test my hypotheses on the relationship between ethnic similarity and militarized interstate disputes. After finding support for my hypotheses I provide an extension to explore the relationship between ethnic similarity and casualty levels. Moreover, I analyze a possible challenge to my theory that big brother rivals are relatively more peaceful rivals by observing their inclination toward escalation of militarized disputes as well as whether they experience more intrastate conflicts. These explorations provide a more complete story of these ethnically similar rivals’ conflictual propensities.

Research Design

Dependent Variable: MID

*Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID)* measures the presence of militarized conflict between two countries whether lethal or not. For the MID variable I use the Correlates of War
data for these militarized interstate disputes (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2003; Ghosn and Bennett 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). The thorough coverage of conflict between countries and the rivals I am observing make it a good choice. I use a binary indicator for conflict with '1' indicating the presence of a militarized dispute, and '0' for the lack of a reported dispute in the dataset.

Independent Variables

I use my *ethnic similarity* measure from chapter three for my main independent variable. I have also included categorical indicators of ethnic similarity for comparison. This will allow me see whether my continuous measure is better than categorical measures of the same concept. The categorical predictors of ethnic similarity include *contested nations*, which are rivals with identical ethnic makeups that have once been one nation-state. *Minority* rivalry dyads are those where the ethnically similar groups are a minority in both rivals in the dyad. *Big Brother* dyads are those where the cross border ethnic group is a majority in one rival and a minority in the other. *Pan-Ethnic* dyads are those rivals that share a pan-ethnicity. Although H7 hypothesizes directly about a continuous predictor, H8 and H9 hypothesize about categorical measures of ethnic similarity. Yet these relationships may be observable by both categorical and continuous measures so I test them both ways. For simplification, I provide table 6.1, which shows the variables and directions that their coefficients should be if my expectations are supported.

The contested nation variable provides a good categorical substitute for the continuous measure that H7 theorizes since it represents the most ethnically similar rivals. If H7 is supported, contested nation and the continuous measure of ethnic similarity should both be positively associated with the likelihood of a militarized dispute. When the quadratic term ethnic
similarity$^2$ is included, then the quadratic should be significant and positive. Thus three
measures should support H$_7$.

| Table 6.1. Hypotheses on Relationship Between Ethnically Similar Rivals and Likelihood of Militarized Interstate Dispute |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Ethnic Similarity | Ethnic Similarity$^2$ | Big Brother | Contested Nation | Pan-Ethnic |
| H$_7$ | + positive | -negative/+positive | +positive | |
| H$_8$ | -negative/+positive | -negative | | |
| H$_9$ | | | +positive | |

H$_7$: Higher levels of ethnic similarity between rivals will be associated with increases in the likelihood of a militarized dispute between rivals.

H$_8$: Big brother rivals will be associated with a lower likelihood of a militarized dispute.

H$_9$: Pan-ethnic rivals will be associated with a higher likelihood of a militarized dispute.

It is not as clear that the big brother variable is perfectly captured in the ethnic similarity measure though. Big brother dyads should generally be more ethnically similar than the least similar of the minority dyads since the cross border ethnic group(s) make up a majority of one of the rivals in the former. However, they should also generally be less similar than the most similar minority rivals due to the fact that asymmetry reduces the ethnic similarity between rivals and big brother rivalries are the most asymmetric.

If this is generally the case, then the relationship between ethnic similarity and rivalry should be curvilinear. The rival with the minority on its territory will fear provoking their rival because the ethnic group represents a foothold on their territory whereas the other rival where this ethnic group is a majority will fear provoking their rival because of retaliation against its co-ethnics. I include a model with a quadratic to test the possibility of curvilinear relationship between MIDs and ethnic similarity. The hypothesis H$_8$ is supported if big brother is associated
with a lower likelihood of a MID. When the quadratic term ethnic similarity\(^2\) is included, ethnic similarity should be negatively associated with the likelihood of a MID indicating the impact of the relationship in H\(_8\) on the continuous measure.

*Pan-ethnic* should be positively associated with the likelihood of conflict supporting H\(_9\). Although it is expected that lower ethnic similarity should be associated with less conflict, and dyads with pan-ethnic groups generally have enough ethnic differences to make them much lower on the ethnic similarity measure than contested nations, these dyads are still associated with more militarized disputes.

Controls

A dummy variable for *land contiguity* is included, which indicates whether the two rivals share a land or river border with a value of ’1’ and ’0’ otherwise. *Water Contiguity* is valued at ’1’ if the states are separated by a body of water up to 400 miles and ’0’ if they are not. Data on whether two states are contiguous is obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contiguity data set (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002). These variables should have a positive relationship with conflict. However it is possible that water contiguity is different since we are only looking at rivals, which are conflictual on average. The added water barrier may provide an extra buffer against conflict.

Units of distance between two countries also allows for extra meaningful variation over the dichotomized contiguous variable so I also include another measure, *distance*. Data for the Distance variable is from Gleditsch and Ward’s (2001) values for the distance between state’s capitals and will be measured using the miles as the unit of measurement. The authors provide values for dyads less than 950 kilometers (589 miles). The log of this distance is used and this
variable should have a negative relationship with conflict.

Research results have demonstrated that shared, strong democratic institutions reduce the likelihood of conflict (Bremer 1992; Doyle 1986; Kinsella 2005; Maoz and Russet 1993; Russet 1993), whereas greater differences in regime types generate more conflict (Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002; Bennett 2006). To code regime types I use the Polity IV data for my government values (Marshall, Jaggers, Gurr 2011). For joint democracy I use Polity IV’s democracy scores. Polity IV codes countries’ democratic dimensions from 0-10 with ‘0’ being less democratic and ‘10’ being fully democratic. I code the joint democracy variable as the value of the less democratic country in the dyad. The dissimilarity variable is constructed by taking the difference between the two rivals' democracy scores and adding that to the difference between each state's autocracy score using the Polity IV data.

Capability Ratio is an important factor to consider as a control. Singer et al. (1972; Singer 1987) provides us a Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) indexed from measuring total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure. Using this index, military asymmetry is calculated by taking the log of the absolute value of subtracting country A’s CINC score by country B’s CINC score:

$$\text{Capability Ratio} = \log(|\text{CINC}_A - \text{CINC}_B|)$$

Trade was measured using the trade data by Gleditsch (2002). Trade interdependence has been demonstrated to correlate with a lower likelihood of conflict between rivals (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Hegre 2000, 2004; Mousseau 2000; Oneal and Russet 1999). I take the log of trade and this variable is expected to have a negative correlation with conflict.

Salience measures how salient territorial disputes are between countries and uses the
Issue Correlates of War’s data. The importance countries attach to territory in dispute has a positive association with militarized disputes (Hensel 2001; Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Hensel et al. 2008). The previous chapter used ICOW data to demonstrate that big brother rivals’ territorial disputes are more likely to be associated with an identity basis and less likely to be associated with strategic and resource bases. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) finds that territorial disputes with intangible bases are less likely to engage in militarized disputes and much more likely to agree on peaceful settlements over these disputes. This provides an alternative explanation for H5, since big brother rivals are expected to be associated with a lower likelihood of a militarized dispute. In addition, the last chapter also found that contested nation had the maximum value for salience as well, which provides another explanation for H7. The salience measure has a relatively high correlation with my ethnic similarity ($r = 28.6$) and contested nation ($r = 27.6$) variables. Inclusion of this variable therefore provides an additional robustness check for my ethnic variables.

Methodology: Logit and Heteroskedastic Probit

The data consists of 1,935 rivalry-years covering the time span 1948 to 2000. One issue in estimating the relationship between ethnic similarity and militarized disputes is heteroskedasticity theorized to be present because of the divergence of big brother rivals being more pacified and pan-ethnic rivals being more conflictual, despite potentially having the same ethnic similarity scores. Therefore, the method I use is a heteroskedastic probit, which allows me to model the heteroskedastic variance of the continuous ethnic similarity variable into my equations. The use of a regular logit or probit regression when heteroskedasticity is present can lead to biased estimators. Many researchers have approached this with the use of Huber (1967),
Eicker (1967), and White (1980) robust standard errors to get heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. However, although the errors may be robust and consistent, the estimates are not (Davidson and MacKinnon 1984; Green 2012). Heteroskedastic probit provides a way to specifically specify the error variance for my ethnic similarity variable in the models.

The dependent variable is militarized interstate disputes and includes variables for ethnic similarity for my independent variables. I run six models on militarized disputes. The first two models will use categorical predictors of ethnic similarity, and I use logit since the issues with heteroskedasticity are not present in those. Models 3-6 use my continuous measure. The categorical predictors resemble Woodwell's (2004) approach to ethnic similarity and conflict.

Two major differences between my model 1 and Woodwell's tests are that I am looking at only rivalry dyads, whereas Woodwell observes militarized disputes between contiguous dyads, and I also include a predictor for pan-ethnic rivals. I believe the cases I am looking at, and the inclusion of more detailed ethnic variables will provide some interesting results.

In the case of logit regressions, Wald statistic tests have been demonstrated to have wider applicability when it comes to comparisons of social groups such as nations (Liao 2004) so I provide Wald statistics to evaluate the added value of my independent variables. If these variables are significant, heteroskedasticity is present.

Analysis

The control variables’ coefficients in table 6.2 differ in both the direction and significance relative to what international relations scholars are accustomed to. The reason for this difference is because these tests are on the most highly conflictual dyads and such dyads tend to share similar conditions including geographic proximity, power parity, and a lack of democratic institutions (Bremer 1992). Therefore the data lacks the variation on these variables that we
would find among all dyads. As a result, the variables of land contiguity, distance, and capability ratio are not significant. I include them anyway because they are important conflict variables.

| Table 6.2. Effect of Ethnic Similarity on Militarized Interstate Disputes Between Rivals (1,935 Rivalry-Years 1948-2000) |
|--------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Variables | Logit | Heteroskedastic Probit | | | | |
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
| Ethnic Similarity | --- | --- | 0.006*** | -0.049* | -0.007* | 0.010** |
| | | | (.001) | (.019) | (.002) | (.004) |
| Ethnic Similarity² | --- | --- | --- | 0.001* | --- | --- |
| | | | | (<.001) | | |
| Minority | 0.288* | 0.173 | 0.092 | 0.426** | 0.190* | --- |
| | (.142) | (.147) | (.078) | (.148) | (.083) | |
| Big Brother | -0.465* | -0.542* | --- | --- | -0.384* | --- |
| | (.218) | (.217) | | | (.159) | |
| Contested Nation | 1.550*** | 1.589*** | --- | --- | 1.290*** | --- |
| | (.227) | (.224) | | | (.288) | |
| Pan Ethnic | --- | 0.584*** | 0.254** | 0.421*** | 0.552*** | --- |
| | | (.145) | (.075) | (.113) | (.084) | |
| Land Contiguity | 0.228 | 0.141 | 0.126 | -0.025 | -0.074 | 0.085 |
| | (.507) | (.515) | (.263) | (.296) | (.280) | (.282) |
| Water Contiguity | -0.368 | -0.431 | 0.046 | -0.268 | -0.307 | -0.132 |
| | (.290) | (.291) | (.160) | (.181) | (.168) | (.188) |
| Distance † | 0.024 | 0.028 | 0.044 | -0.006 | -0.002 | 0.008 |
| | (.092) | (.093) | (.045) | (.051) | (.048) | (.051) |
| Joint Democracy | 0.064* | 0.082** | 0.037* | 0.042* | 0.039* | 0.044** |
| | (.028) | (.029) | (.016) | (.019) | (.016) | (.017) |
| Dissimilarity | 0.034*** | 0.032*** | 0.012* | 0.024*** | 0.013** | 0.020* |
| | (.008) | (.009) | (.005) | (.006) | (.004) | (.008) |
| Capability Ratio † | 0.059 | 0.161 | 0.112 | 0.217 | 0.152 | -0.045 |
| | (.436) | (.440) | (.237) | (.284) | (.244) | (.257) |
| Trade † | -0.226*** | -0.219*** | -0.102*** | -0.122*** | -0.108*** | -0.129*** |
| | (.029) | (.029) | (.016) | (.019) | (.016) | (.017) |
| Saliency | 0.068*** | 0.069*** | 0.047*** | 0.42*** | 0.041*** | 0.043*** |
| | (.013) | (.014) | (.007) | (.009) | (.007) | (.009) |
| Intercept | -1.325* | -1.401* | -0.974** | -0.900* | -0.735* | -0.780 |
| | (.601) | (.613) | (.305) | (.354) | (.323) | (.314) |
| Wald test ‡ | 6.96** | 14.94*** | 10.45** | | | 0.01 |

£ Robust standard errors reported. p-value—***0.001, **0.01, *0.05. † I use the log of these variables. ‡ Wald Test on ethnic similarity for heteroskedasticity.
The joint democracy variable significantly increases conflict in each model. This is because none of the rivalry dyads are between two strong democracies. In these models joint democracy indicates the presence of weak democratic institutions among populations with a deeply felt animosity towards each other. If these countries were to each become more democratic, they may likely settle their issues and cease to be rivals. Increased trade flows and territorial dispute salience are both in the expected direction, with trade interdependence significantly reducing conflict between rivals, and more salient territorial claim disputes increasing the likelihood of a militarized dispute.

I test my hypotheses with categorical measures of ethnic similarity as well as my continuous measure. Both models one and two test the categorical variables on the likelihood of conflict with model one testing only the mutually exclusive ethnic variables. In model 1, the minority variable significantly increases the likelihood of conflict between rivals whereas the big brother variables decrease conflict, supporting H8. Once the non-mutually exclusive pan-ethnic variable is included in model 2, minority is no longer significant, and the pacifying influence of big brother is larger.

Pan-ethnic significantly increases the likelihood of conflict and appears to account for some of the more conflictual dyads at lower half of the 0-100 range of the ethnic similarity measure, which supports H9. In both models with the categorical predictors the contested nation variable significantly increases conflict providing support for H7, which says greater levels of ethnic similarity between rivals should be associated with higher likelihoods of a militarized dispute and contested nations consist of dyads that are the most ethnically similar.

Models 3-6 test my continuous measure of ethnic similarity on militarized disputes. Model 3 shows that by itself, ethnic similarity is associated with a higher likelihood of
militarized interstate disputes, which supports H7. The cross-tabulation in table 4.3 in chapter 4 shows overlap in the amount of ethnic similarity between the big brother and minority variables. It may be that the relationship is more continuous than is captured by the big brother variable and that the theorized relationship that these cross border ethnic groups act as a buffer between rivals would seem to be less true for big brother dyads with higher levels of ethnic similarity if we just used this model.

However, models 4-6 reveal more complexity in this relationship. Model 4 includes the quadratic term, ethnic similarity$^2$, so ethnic similarity represents increases in similarity at low levels, which include the big brother dyads. Ethnic similarity is significant and becomes negative, whereas the quadratic is significant and negative making the relationship between the continuous measure and ethnic similarity curvilinear. Since big brother rivalries have more ethnically similar observations than minority dyads on average, we should expect this negative relationship with MIDs when a quadratic is included since big brother rivals have a lower likelihood of conflict. So this finding agrees with the relationship between big brother rivalries and MIDs. However, this now brings into question the hypothesized relationship in H7. If higher ethnic similarity at lower levels reduces the likelihood of conflict, then this is different than the theorized relationship that increased ethnic similarity between rivals increases interactions and thus militarized disputes. Model 6 gives further support for the hypothesized relationships that more ethnic similarity increases the likelihood of a MID, and big brother cases are a specific exception though.

In Model 5 the contested nation variable is substituted for the quadratic, and the pacifying effect for the ethnic similarity variable becomes stronger. Since the contested nation variable is now accounting for much of the increase in the likelihood of a MID due to ethnic similarity at
higher levels, and both minority and pan-ethnic account for the increases in the likelihood of a MID associated with categories of ethnic similarity at lower levels, the ethnic similarity variable now accounts for the variation in the likelihood of militarized disputes attributed specifically to the big brother variable and therefore is significant in the negative direction. Once contested nation is dropped and big brother included in Model 6, ethnic similarity is once again associated with a positive relationship with MIDs and big brother has a significant pacifying effect, which supports both hypotheses.

Although my continuous measure provides more information on the level of ethnic similarity between rivals and its relationship with the likelihood of militarized disputes, it lacks information on other dyadic characteristics of ethnic similarity between rivals. Specifically, it does not give information as to whether the ethnic group is a majority or minority in one of the states. In addition, it has nothing to say about whether the dyad contains a pan-ethnic group. The categorical predictor, big brother, is more suited to testing H8 since the hypothesis is about a specific case where the cross border ethnic group is a majority only in one country. The same is true for pan-ethnic and H9.

For H7, the continuous measure is more appropriate. The models tested in table 6.2 suggest that these relationships coexist – that greater levels of ethnic similarity between rivals increase the likelihood of a MID, whereas big brother rivals and pan-ethnic rivals create exceptions to this relationship. In addition, the Wald statistic scores identify the fix to the heteroskedasticity of ethnic similarity’s effect on the likelihood of a militarized dispute. According to the Wald statistic, in models 3-5 heteroskedasticity is present, whereas in model 6 it is not present. The big brother variable’s negative correlation with the likelihood of a militarized dispute accounts for that part of ethnic similarity’s relationship to militarized dispute likelihoods.
in model 6, thus removing the source of the heteroskedasticity.

Figure 6.1 uses the results from model 4, which includes the quadratic term, to graph the relationship between ethnic similarity and the probability of a militarized dispute between rivals. The 95% confidence intervals are included in the figure and are relatively close to the fitted line. By visually displaying the relationship we can see that increases in ethnic similarity are continuously associated with an increase in the likelihood of a militarized dispute, but the curve becomes slightly steeper as the similarity increases at higher levels. The predicted probabilities are dispersed more as the level of ethnic similarity gets smaller, and the most conflictual dyads are the relatively fewer cases at the high end of the ethnic similarity range. According to the graph results, as ethnic similarity between rivals goes from zero similarity to completely similar, the probability of a militarized dispute more than doubles from .3 to more than .6!
Ethnic Similarity and Casualty Levels

According to the results reported in table 6.2, big brother rivals fight less frequently than non-ethnically similar rivals, minority rivals had mixed results being significant in some models but not in others, and contested nation rivals and pan-ethnic rivals fight more frequently. Here I extend the analysis to ascertain if these conflictual propensities translate into similar relationships with the intensity of conflict (i.e. number of fatalities). I use COW’s data on fatality levels (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2003; Ghosn and Bennett 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) and display this data and my ethnic similarity categories in figure 6.2.

Though there are seven levels of fatalities ranked 0-7 in the COW data, I organize these into 5
levels for display in figure 6.2. Fatality level six covers anything at 1,000 casualties or more, which meets the threshold set by COW to code the militarized dispute as a war. I combine level three (101-250 casualties), level 4 (251-500 casualties), and level 5 (501-999) casualties into one group since some categories do not have any observations falling within some of these ranges.

For example, the big brother category only has one observation for the level 5 casualties, and no other group of rivals has any observations for this level. Big brother rivals have no MIDs with 101-250 casualties, and non-ethnic rivals have no MIDs experiencing 251-500 casualties. So these categories are combined into one category ranging from 101-999 battle deaths to avoid zero values, which would make the 100% stacked pyramid figure confusing. A tabular version of casualty rates along with the N for each percentage is included in Appendix A.

All of the ethnic similarity categories have higher percentages of militarized disputes involving fatalities than non-ethnic rivals. This is likely because virtually all ethnically similar rivals will be contiguous, whereas some non-ethnic rivals will not. Iran-Israel is the only non-contiguous minority rivalry, Thailand-Vietnam is the only non-contiguous big brother rivalry, and Taiwan-China is the only contested nation rivalry in the data. However, there are 40 non-ethnic rivalries that are non-contiguous making up around a third of the observations for non-ethnic rivals.

Though contested nation rivalries were the most likely to experience a militarized dispute, they have the lowest percentage of their militarized disputes escalating to war. However, the two wars, represented as 2.04% of the MIDs for contested nations in figure 6.2, had very high casualties. The Vietnam War and the Korean War were both attempts at forcefully unifying Vietnam and the Korean Peninsula respectively. The costs to the loser and winner as well as the costs of achieving their territorial aims militarily are factors that give more reason to
avoid this level of escalation. Thus, due to the deep divisions that keep these rivals from unifying into a single country, militarized disputes are more likely, but the costs of achieving their territorial claims against the other diminishes the percentage of these incidents escalating to war.

In general, the percentages of minority, big brother, and pan-ethnic rivals escalating to war are not much different than non-ethnic rivals. Out of the six wars fought between non-ethnic rivals, three involved Iraq’s participation in wars against Israel. This rivalry is not a pan-ethnic rivalry due to my conservative coding approach of ethnically similar rivals. I required that the Arab identity be part of the politically relevant group’s label – as well as that the pan-ethnic rivals be contiguous due to the pan-Arabism’s wide geographic reach. However, Iraq was participating in wars alongside Israel’s neighbors, which include pan-ethnic rivalries with Israel and its Arab minority. Considering this, militarized disputes between non-ethnic rivalries do not escalate to war very frequently.

Minority rivals had a higher percentage (5.44%) of militarized disputes escalating to the level of war compared to non-ethnic rivals (4.69%), and pan-ethnic rivals experienced an even higher percentage (6.88%). Despite being less likely to fight, big brother rivals pacifying relationship with the likelihood of a militarized dispute does not appear to apply to conflict escalation. According to figure 6.2, big brother rivals have the highest percentage (7.29%) of their militarized disputes escalating to war. However, five of these wars involved Vietnam and its neighbors. The other two war dyads were Syria’s involvement in the Gulf War against Iraq, and the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I will use the latter case to illustrate another alternative explanation to my assertion that these rivals are relatively less likely to engage in militarized disputes compared to other rivalry types.
The Nagorno-Karabakh War first began with ethnic Armenians in the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh petitioning to join Armenia. Armed conflict broke out between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which soon involved the countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Since conflict first began within the territory of Azerbaijan, this would have remained an intrastate war if Armenia did not become a direct participant in the fighting. If conflicts between other big brother rivals begin this way, then it is possible that these rivals often compete in intrastate armed conflicts that may not escalate to interstate conflicts causing big brother rivals to appear to fight less in the MID models when in reality the big brother rival is supporting secessionist rebellions. This would explain both the lower likelihood of conflict, and the higher percentage of conflicts escalating to war. Moreover, this would challenge my theoretical assertions that big brother rivals are relatively more peaceful than other rivalry types.

Ethnic Similarity and Intrastate Conflict

To test the possibility that big brother rivalries engage in militarized disputes in intrastate rather than interstate conflict I run models on intrastate conflict using my ethnic similarity variables. I am not seeking to explain intrastate conflict, which is best done using states as the unit of analysis, but rather determine if big brother rivals have a significant association with intrastate conflict. If big brother rivals are associated with a higher likelihood of an intrastate dispute, this does not necessarily challenge H8, which says that big brother rivals should be associated with a lower likelihood of a militarized dispute, but it would challenge my theory that big brother rivals are a relatively less conflictual rivalry type.

I run two models on rivalry dyads with my continuous and categorical ethnic similarity variables. For the dependent variable, *intrastate war*, I use COW’s intrastate war data (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). I code intra as ‘1’ if either country in the rivalry dyad experiences civil war
or internal militarized conflict for that year, or ‘0’ otherwise.

I used the log of each state’s *population* for control variables, which are available in COW’s National Material Capabilities data (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972; Singer 1987).

States that lack freedom should be associated with more grievances so I use the lowest of Polity

Table 6.3. Ethnic Similarity and Intrastate War (2,104 Rivalry Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Intrastate War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity</td>
<td>0.030*</td>
<td>0.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity^2</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>-0.144 (.218)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Brother</td>
<td>-0.124 (.303)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>-1.092* (.506)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Ethnic</td>
<td>0.885*** (.234)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population(a^\dagger)</td>
<td>0.139* (.071)</td>
<td>0.101 (.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population(b^\dagger)</td>
<td>0.105 (.074)</td>
<td>0.098 (.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Autocracy</td>
<td>0.393* (.189)</td>
<td>0.436* (.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP(p_c)(a^\dagger)</td>
<td>0.206 (.103)</td>
<td>0.223* (.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP(p_c)(b^\dagger)</td>
<td>0.222* (.089)</td>
<td>-0.164 (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>0.542** (.176)</td>
<td>0.593** (.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.051*** (.865)</td>
<td>-5.156*** (.785)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(p<.001***; p<.01**; p<.05^*\)

^\dagger-I use the log of these variables.
IV’s (Marshall, Jaggers, Gurr 2011) autocratic values in a dyad, which range from 0-10, for my joint autocracy value. I use Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten’s (2011) Penn World Table to include the log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for each state. Higher personal income should be related to fewer grievances among the population. I include my MID variable from table 6.2 in case interstate wars spill over into intrastate wars. The results are reported in table 6.3.

Most of the controls are significant. The exception is the size of the population in the states where only one of the two variables is significant in the first model. The more autocratic the states in a dyad are the more one of them will be associated with an intrastate conflict. One GDP per capita variable is significant in each model. The two significant GDP per capita variables are associated with a higher likelihood of an intrastate conflict. When rivals experience an interstate conflict, the likelihood of intrastate conflict is higher at the p<.001 significance level. Subversive groups would likely take advantage of instability caused by interstate conflicts. However, this may also be a case of reverse causality. Intrastate wars between states may result in interstate conflicts too.

The big brother variable is not significant in the model 2 meaning there is no evidence that big brother rivals are only peaceful in the MID models because they are instead both participating in an intrastate war where one rival is supporting their co-ethnics on the other’s territory. This finding does not disagree with my theoretical story on big brother rivals. However, it does not provide an extension of the peaceful rival theory either since it also lacks a significant negative relationship. The big brother rival becomes concerned for the well-being of their co-ethnics by acting as an advocate in negotiations, but is reluctant to initiate militarized disputes for the same reason and perhaps following some failed attempt at promoting secession,
which may have been associated with the rivalry in the first place.

Likewise, the other rival with the cross border ethnic group will fear having its territory
dismembered and will thus be willing to reduce any oppressive measures against this group,
which may also have been the source of the initial rivalry and related military actions. The
resulting détente between the two countries thus may prevent an increase in intrastate conflict.
However, the fact that the cross border ethnic group may act on its own may prevent the big
brother variable from being significant and negatively associated with intrastate conflict.

Pan-ethnic rivals are positively associated with intrastate war. The breakup of the former
Yugoslavia was accompanied with intrastate conflicts including the moves by Kosovo and
Croatia for independence, with the latter becoming a rival of Serbia. Several of the intrastate
conflicts associated with pan-Arab rivals involved Kurdish rebellions in Iraq. The Kurds have
their own territorial ambitions aside from the relations across the borders where they live. The
area inhabited by Kurds is in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran where many Kurds have long wished
for the establishment of Kurdistan. Although Kurds now enjoy autonomy in Iraq, they have
played a role in several interstate relationships. The Syrians had agreed to allow the People’s
Party of Kurdistan to base their operations against Turkey there in exchange for not pursuing
subversive activities on Syrian territory. Turkey had also bombed targets in Iraq linked to the
PKK. In addition, Iran and Iraq had also supported Kurdish militias to undermine each other
(Arsu 2011; Ferhadi, Hassanpour, and Elturan 1992; Gunter 2004; O’Toole 2000; Rajaee 1993).

Though the Kurds may act on their own, the Kurdish desire for autonomy was also
exploited by states to undermine their rivals while simultaneously suppressing attempts at
Kurdish autonomy in their own countries (Ferhadi, Hassanpour, and Elturan 1992). Since Kurds
are a minority in these countries and involved in several intrastate conflicts, this would support a
story of cross border minority groups being more independent thus causing more intrastate conflict. However, the minority variable is insignificant. Even so, the theoretical story for minority rivals seems to explain the cases involving Kurdish rebellions more than the pan-ethnic story of leaders using another layer of identity to influence the people among their rival states.

The influence of pan-ethnic ideas as an instrument for political leaders can be observed in other intrastate conflicts though. For example, the pan-Arab idea helped Saddam instigate rebellion from Arabs in the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which he referred to as “Arabistan” (Rajaee 1993), or influenced Nasser’s decision to introduce Egyptian troops in Yemen in 1962, which was still part of the United Arab Republic along with Egypt and Syria. Syria had seceded a year earlier so Nasser felt that he needed to reinforce his and Egypt’s leadership of the Arab world (Ferris 2008). Though Palestinians have similar ambitions as Kurds, they are more ethnically similar to Arabs, and it is this similarity that has generated support among different Arab communities for the idea of a Palestinian state and as a part of Arab identity (Al-Haj, Katz, and Shye 1993; Frisch 1997) despite there being ethnic differences.

Contested nations are significant and negatively associated with intrastate conflict. It may be because these countries will be more ethnically homogenous and therefore are less likely to have a discriminated identifiable group that can organize along ethnic lines to rebel. However, it seems that these rivals would see the most benefit from exploiting and supporting dissidents in their rival’s territory since these rivals seek to eliminate their rivals and ultimately reunite their countries. Such was the case with North Vietnam’s support for the Viet Cong. However, this does not often seem to be the case for other contested nation rivalries.
The continuous measure of ethnic similarity and its quadratic used in model two are both significant and reveal a curvilinear relationship between ethnic similarity and intrastate conflict. This relationship is plotted onto Figure 6.3, which shows that intrastate conflict is higher in the middle values for ethnic similarity. Larger minority groups with more outside support may be more capable of engaging in an interstate war against the government. The contested nations, which have scores of 50-100 ethnic similarity are less likely to be involved in intrastate conflicts. This is the opposite of the relationship between rivals with high ethnic similarity and intrastate conflict.

Summary

Ethnic similarity will increase the ease of interaction between people by reducing linguistic and cultural barriers. When these people are hostile to one another, this ease of interaction will increase the ease of hostile interactions. One exception to this general trend is
when the cross border ethnic group is a minority in one country and a majority in the other. It is possible that these dyads are more likely to become rivals, a higher percentage of their militarized disputes do escalate to war when militarized disputes break out. In addition, previous research has found that these types of dyads are more likely to have a higher likelihood of militarized disputes (e.g. Woodwell 2004), and the minority is more likely to gain support for rebellion from the country where their co-ethnics are a majority (e.g. Saideman 2002). However, once rivals, the likelihood of a militarized dispute is significantly diminished though.

The rival where the cross border ethnic group is a minority would fear antagonizing the rival, which will lead to calls for secession, or at least subversive activity instigated by the big brother rival. The rival where this group is a majority would fear retribution against their co-ethnics and thus try not to antagonize the rival where this group is a minority. Unless a country crosses some line of intolerable oppression against the minority, the big brother rival would likely respond to oppression that does not cross this line with economic sanctions and statements by political leaders. This situation would likely continue until one side gains a large enough military advantage to alter this state of affairs. A slightly higher percentage of the militarized disputes experienced by these rivals escalate to war though.

Another exception to the general trend is the case of pan-ethnic rivals. Pan-ethnic ideas have been applied to areas covering many states. That these ideas have resonated with people across many countries in an area makes them a tool that leaders can use regardless of the level of ethnic similarity among the other politically salient ethnicities in the region. This is even the case after the failure and rejection of such ideas because political leaders can use general, widespread reaction to the legacy of pan-ethnic ideas in much the same way as when the pan-ethnic ideas were more generally accepted. In this sense, the political leader can use the pan-
ethnic idea itself or its legacy to gain more legitimacy over their claims, even when their co-ethnics are not being oppressed, as in the case of many big brother rivals, and the ethnic attachments are otherwise not very significant, as in the case of minority rivals.

Pan-ethnic rivals also experience a higher likelihood of intrastate conflicts as well, though it is not clear as whether or not a generalizable explanation exists for this. Pan-ethnic ideas or contexts have helped to facilitate rebellions, which in turn give rise to interstate conflicts, whether it is Iraq instigating Arab rebellion in Iran before the Iran-Iraq war, or Croatia fighting for independence from Yugoslavia culminating in war and rivalry between Serbia and independent Croatia. However, the region associated with pan-Arab ideas and the Middle East acting as a single system in general are related to many insurgencies with a myriad of explanations. The continuous measure of ethnic similarity shows that intrastate conflicts are associated with rivals in the middle range of ethnic similarity though, and many of pan-ethnic rivals also are in this middle range providing another way of viewing this relationship.

The most ethnically similar rivals are the most conflictual when it comes to militarized interstate disputes as demonstrated by both a linear measure of ethnic similarity as well as the categorical predictors. However, they are less likely to experience intrastate conflicts. These contested nations would be one country if were not for some deep divide between the two sides on who should rule and what kind of government the country should have. Contested nations amount to an institutionalized civil war, where two governments are established with the goal of ruling the territory of both countries. Contested nation rivalries involve nationalist identities and therefore any actions or statements by one of the sides concerning the rivalry will personally resonate with citizens in both countries.

In general, the more ethnically similar rivals are, the more they will fight. My continuous
measure of ethnic similarity supports this. However, although my continuous measure provides more information across a more detailed range of ethnic similarity, the categorical measures of ethnic similarity provide exceptions to this trend. Specifically, pan-ethnic ideas act as an added similarity between otherwise less ethnically similar rivals. Conversely, big brother rivals reduce the likelihood of conflict even though they are often more ethnically similar than rivals sharing only a minority ethnic group.
CHAPTER 7
ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND TRADE

The relationship between trade and rivalry is important in the study of conflict because it contains two concepts that have each been researched extensively in international relations literature but have divergent expectations for the likelihood of conflict: rivalry, which IR research has identified as atypically conflictual pairs of countries with persistent unsettled issues between them (Bennett 1997; Goertz and Diehl 1995; Hensel 1999; Thompson 2001), and bilateral trade, which has been demonstrated to reduce the likelihood of conflict between pairs of states (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Hegre 2000, 2002; Mousseau 2000; Oneal and Russet 1999). Rivals differ from other dyads in that they tend to trade less frequently and also have lower volumes of trade. If we can understand why rivals begin trading, we can better understand how the most war-prone pairs of states may develop more cooperative relationships.

In this chapter I explore one potential influence on trade between rivals, ethnic similarity. By analyzing the impact of ethnic similarity on trade relations between rivals, this research addresses a neglected possibility in previous literature on ethnicity, that common ethnicity may provide a unifying force that can facilitate peaceful relations between rivals. As I discuss my trade variable I demonstrate the difference between rival and non-rival trade. Second, I discuss trade between ethnically similar rivals and how it can emerge and grow when presenting my ethnic similarity variable. Then I take the theoretical expectations on trade from chapter 3 and explain my conflictual and cooperative relationship measures. I also discuss the methodological issues in measuring variables' trade flows. I then provide an analysis of my data and estimation results, and finally a summary of my results.
Table 7.1. Rivalry and Trade in Contiguous Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#TRADE&gt;0</td>
<td>1355</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>7738</td>
<td>2204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#NO TRADE</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Trading</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADING PARTNERS’ MEAN INTERDEPENDENCE</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>9444</td>
<td>2585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Research Design

Dependent Variable: Bilateral Trade

For trade I use trade data by Gleditsch (2002) because of his effort to address the coverage issues of other trade data sets. Gleditsch’s trade data covers the years 1948-2000, and includes observations for many socialist states. This more thorough coverage is important since bilateral trade flows between rivals are likely to contain missing data, and these countries also tend to be involved in many rivalries. I also ran robustness checks using the Correlates of War project’s trade data (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008), with similar results. To demonstrate that rivalry trade differs from trade between non rival dyads, I provide a summary of trade between rivals according to this data in table 7.1 by cross referencing Gleditsch’s (2002) trade data, which begins in 1948, with Thompson’s (2001) list of rivals.

Since most rivals are contiguous to one another, and typically we expect closer countries to trade more frequently, I use contiguous rivals and contiguous non-rivals for the purpose of comparison. One might expect there to be little to no trade between longstanding rivals, but there appears to be a substantial amount. However, when compared to contiguous non-rivals,
there is still a noticeable difference in that a lower percentage of contiguous rivals trade (72.7 to 81.9%). This difference becomes more pronounced after the end of the Cold War (62.2 to 85.3%). A more interesting difference appears when we calculate the average interdependence score. By dividing bilateral trade by the combined GDP of the two countries for contiguous dyads, average non-rival interdependence is more than two and half times as high relative to interdependence between rivals (.54 to .20)!

Independent Variables

To measure the influence of cross border ethnic communities, which I call ethnic similarity on a growing trade relationship I use my measure of ethnic similarity discussed in the previous chapter. This variable ranges 0 being no ethnic similarity between the two countries, to 100 indicating that the two countries are ethnically homogenous. The descriptive statistics on trade patterns between ethnically similar rivals are shown in table 7.2 and display differences between groups of rivals based on their ethnic similarity. Included in the table are the numbers of rivalry-dyad-years that trade grows from the previous year, trade declines from the previous year, and years of zero trade after being zero in the previous year.

The categories of ethnic similarity are divided into those that are contested nations or more than an ethnic similarity score of 50; those that range from 25-50 ethnic similarity, those that are less than 25, but non-zero on the ethnic similarity measure, and non-ethnically similar rivals, which have a zero ethnic similarity score. There are no cases of rivalries with scores of exactly 25 or 50 so there is no need to decide which category to put such cases in for this table.
Table 7.2. Ethnic Similarity and Years of Trade between Rivals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Similarity</th>
<th>Trade Growth</th>
<th>Trade Decline</th>
<th>Consecutive Zero Trade</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt;50</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(74.0%)</td>
<td>(3.9%)</td>
<td>(22.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;25-50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27.8%)</td>
<td>(21.5%)</td>
<td>(50.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 25</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46.2%)</td>
<td>(29.5%)</td>
<td>(24.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>1,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42.5%)</td>
<td>(29.3%)</td>
<td>(23.5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trade Data from Gleditsch (2002); Rivalry List from Thompson (2001)

The most dramatic differences in trade patterns exist for those rivalry dyads with over a 50 ethnic similarity score, which are contested nations that used to be one country before deep divisions over who should rule led to rivalry. Unlike other rivalry dyads, these dyads are generally characterized by continual growth in trade, 74% of the rivalry-years for this group, once a trade relationship is initiated. In addition, no trade relationship between such dyads had ended once began in the data. Among these dyads North and South Vietnam and the Rwanda-Burundi rivalry never conducted trade during their state of rivalry according to Gleditsch’s (2002) data.

However, Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollin’s (2008) trade data has Rwanda and Burundi trading very small amounts 1964-1966. The previous two years Barbieri et al. have missing data whereas Gleditsch codes zero trade flows. Either way, Rwanda and Burundi had begun trading by 1967 once their rivalry had ended (Gleditsch 2002; Thompson 2001; Barbieri et al. 2008). Despite those two cases, rivalries with the highest ethnic similarity are associated with fewer zero trade years.
Gleditsch’s (2002) trade data goes up to the year 2000, so some may question whether
such trade growth has continued to be the case following the 2010 sinking of a South Korean
naval vessel, and President Lee Myung-bak declaring that South Korea would cut all trade ties
with North Korea. However, Yonhap News Agency (2013) reports that despite increasing
tensions on the peninsula, the Korean Customs Service data showed bilateral trade between the
two Koreas hitting an all-time high in 2012. In fact, the table shows that only 3.9% of the rivalry
years for the most ethnically similar rivals saw declines in trade flows.

Rivalries with ethnic similarity scores ranging from 25-50 have fewer years of trade
growth (27.8%) than other groups. Whereas this category of ethnically similar rivals experience
higher percentage of rivalry-years with declining trade than those with more than a 50 ethnic
similarity score, those with 25 or less ethnic similarity experience an even higher percentage of
rivalry years with declining trade (21.5% and 29.5%). However, both ethnically similar rivalries
below 25 and non-ethnically similar rivals have a much lower percentage of consecutive years of
zero trade, 24.3% and 23.5% respectively, compared with the high percentage of 50.6% for those
rivals between 25-50 similarity.

Compared to non-ethnically similar rivals, rivals with non-zero ethnic similarity scores
below 25 are relatively similar. Such rivals have a slightly lower percentage of cases with zero
trade flows, and a slightly higher percentage of years of trade decline. Non-ethnically similar
rivals have fewer years of trade growth with compared to rivals with ethnic similarity from 1- 25
(42.5% and 46.2%). Thus it appears that more ethnic similarity is associated with increases in
the percentage of rivalry years of trade growth with the exception of rivalries between 25-50
ethnic similarity. As we go from less ethnically similar categories to more ethnically similar,
those rivalries with ethnic similarity from 25-50 see an increase in the years with zero trade
along with a noticeably lower percentage of rivalry years of increasing trade.

According to the theory, rivals that have a minority in at least one of the countries that share ethnicity with the other country will seek to limit interactions between this minority and their co-ethnics when these groups are a larger presence on their territory. At this point of ethnic similarity, instead of facilitating trade relationships, the ethnic similarity instead is a source of security vulnerability. That this range of ethnic similarity shows only a slight increase in the percentage of years of declining trade, yet the same percentage of zero trade years as non-ethnically similar rivals and a larger decrease in years of trade growth, reversing the otherwise positive relationship seen in increasing percentages of years of trade growth moving from lower to higher groups of ethnic similarity. These patterns indicate an added reluctance to grow trade between these rivals relative to rivals with different levels of ethnic similarity.

More sophisticated analyses must be conducted to determine the effects ethnic similarity has on volume, but these descriptive statistics suggest that there are differences between the different subsets of rivals based on their ethnically similarity. It seems that very high levels of ethnic similarity facilitate trade growth and are also associated with maintaining these relationships even in the presence of hostile relations. Below the score of 50 ethnic similarity this is not the case. However, although those beneath the threshold of 50 ethnic similarity do not maintain strong trade relations, those above 25 ethnic similarity tend to have even fewer years of trade growth and as many zero trade counts as non-ethnically similar rivals. Perhaps this is because ethnic similarity is a source of tension when it can be associated with an enemy image of the enemy, or is used as a means to undermine legitimacy of a rival.

The independent variable ethnic similarity will test $H_{10}$ previously presented in chapter three and listed again below:
H₁₀: Small increases in low levels of ethnic similarity between rivals will be associated with less trade between rivals.

This first hypothesis predicts that initially, greater ethnic similarity will correlate with less trade because it will only serve as a source of antagonism between rivals. However, H₁₁, listed below, predicts that at some point, greater levels of ethnic similarity should increase the amount of trade as the size of the ethnic similarity is no longer a source of antagonism, but rather provides a source of sameness with fewer cultural obstacles to cooperation between the rivals that can facilitate greater trade between the two. A quadratic term for the ethnic similarity variable will also be included to test this second hypothesis:

H₁₁: Increases in high levels of ethnic similarity will be associated with more trade between rivals.

Conflictual Relationship

To test H₁₁ that ethnic similarity between rivals can exacerbate an already conflictual relationship, I must first have a variable to measure how conflictual the relationship between rivals is. The conflictual variable is developed using Crescenzi and Enterline’s (2001) interstate interaction score for conflictual relationships given below:

\[ \text{conflictual relationship}_t = \left( e^{-1 \left( \frac{\text{PeaceYears}_t}{\text{ConflictHistory} + 1} \right)} \right) \text{conflictual relationship}_{t-1} - \left( \frac{\text{Degree of Conflict}_t}{\text{PeaceYears}_t} \right) \]

Conflictual _t-1_ is the previous year’s conflict relationship score, peace years are the number of years since the dyad had a previous conflict, conflict history is the number of past conflictual interactions between the rivals, which is added to a constant to prevent a zero denominator and degree of conflict is the highest intensity level of conflict for that year. The exponential decay formula operates on conflictual relationship_t so that the value decays towards neutrality. A higher value for the peace years component therefore increases the trend towards
neutrality whereas a higher value for the conflict history component decreases the trend towards neutrality (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001; 417).

The information on conflict is from the Correlates of War’s militarized interstate dispute data (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2003; Ghosn and Bennett 2004; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). I provide my own way to measure the degree of conflict in Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) formula. Any militarized dispute is coded as a conflictual interaction but fatalities cause conflicts to be more severe. To accomplish this I count the presence of a hostile interaction as one and then add COW’s fatality level value which ranges from zero to six. The result is a 0-7 range where a hostile interaction such as a threat or use of force with no fatalities equals ‘1’, 1-25 deaths is coded as ‘2’, 26-100 deaths is ‘3’, 101-250 deaths is ‘4’, 251-500 deaths equals ‘5’ 501-999 deaths results in a value of ‘6’ and cases with a thousand or more deaths are coded as ‘7’. As a result the degree of conflict will equal zero when no conflictual interactions occur and the possibility that a devastating war, a deadly skirmish, and a display of force will have meaningful variation in terms of its influence on the relationship between states.

I must also consider how I deal with multiple militarized disputes within a single year. Ideally I could add the fatalities from different militarized disputes within a single observation together since a higher cumulative death toll should have a greater negative influence on the relationship. However, given that each fatality level provides a range of possible fatalities any consistent operationalization that sums multiple disputes within a year is questionable. I therefore rely on the highest fatality level given within a single observation as a way to gauge the level of hostility.

The degree of conflict component of the variable includes the severity of conflictual interactions, and the numbers of peace years considers how temporally proximate these
conflictual interactions are thus enabling a test of the hypothesis. From this setup I follow Crescenzi and Enterline's construction of a more intuitive range using the following equation.

This provides a range of from zero to one for a dyad’s conflictual relationship:

\[ I_{i,t} < 0, \text{then } I_t = \frac{-i_t}{-i_t + \gamma} \]

As the value increases, the rate of change for \( I_t \) decreases (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001; 2008). I set my \( \gamma \) at ‘8’ because the conflictual degree has a range from zero to seven depending on casualty levels. By giving the rate of change at least the same variation as conflict degree each value of the conflict degree part of the equation will increase the time until the conflictual score decays to neutrality, which can also be described as decreasing the rate of change. In reality, the score cannot reach one as the denominator will always be larger than the numerator. The highest score reached is actually 0.5.

To test H12 that ethnic similarity exacerbates a conflictual relationship’s negative impact on trade between rivals, an interaction term between ethnic similarity and the conflictual relationship variable is also constructed. Therefore, H11 is supported if the added interaction term between *ethnic similarity* and *conflictual* reduces trade.

\[ H_{12}: \text{As the relationship between ethnically similar rivals becomes more conflictual, higher levels of ethnic similarity further reduce trade.} \]

*Affinity*

To test H12, which says that ethnic similarity between rivals can facilitate a more cooperative relationship’s positive relationship with bilateral trade flows between rivals, I use Streshnev and Voeten’s (2012) *affinity* variable constructed from their United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. I use their agree3un variable as the affinity measure. The variable ranges from 0-1 with zero being no similarity in UN voting patterns and one meaning the two countries
voted the same. The agree3un affinity measure is computed using three outcomes of vote data for a yes vote, no vote or abstention. Abstaining from a vote is treated as half agreement on that vote with a value of .5.

Like the conflictual relationship variable, Crescenzi, Enterline and Long’s (2008) provide a cooperative interstate relationship score that operationalizes the concepts of accumulation, temporal distance, degree, and the rate of change. The data they employ to operationalize this variable is Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke’s (2004) Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) data, and they code two countries joining an IGO in the same year as a cooperative interaction. The authors explain that they rely on the IGO data to illustrate their operationalization. However, the fact that there are an increasing number of IGOs makes the measure problematic for this study. For example, since most rivals are in proximity to each other, an increasing number of regional IGOs will result in more joint memberships between these rivals. The number of joint memberships will increase over time rather than due to a greater desire to cooperate. Furthermore, it is likely that many IGOs would induce cooperation, but this would make it a cause of cooperation, rather than necessarily a measure of it.

The Streshnev and Voeten’s (2012) affinity variable is a better measure, I believe, because it shows agreement between two countries on matters of international relations. In relation to the conceptual components of an interstate relationship considered by Crescenzi et al. (2008), the affinity variable is a simpler approach that provides a value that is already the product of these concepts. To the extent that similar voting patterns indicate cooperative behavior, the resulting impact of accumulated past interactions, their temporal distance from the present and the degree of these past interactions should have a direct impact on affinity's value.
Table 7.3. Hypotheses on Ethnically Similar Rivals and Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>$H_{10}$</th>
<th>$H_{11}$</th>
<th>$H_{12}$</th>
<th>$H_{13}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity</td>
<td>-negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity$^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>+positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is intuitive that greater levels of cooperation would allow trade to grow, but I also want to consider the additive effect that greater ethnic similarity during these cooperative contexts would facilitate this trade growth. To test $H_{12}$, an interaction term between the affinity variable and ethnic similarity will be used. The hypothesis is supported if the interaction variable is significant and increases bilateral trade flows.

$H_{13}$: As relations between ethnically similar rivals become more cooperative, higher levels of ethnic similarity will further increase trade growth between the rivals.

Table 7.3 provides a quick reference to the hypotheses, related independent variables, and expected directions of their coefficients. Controls are included that likely have an impact on the likelihood that two rivals will trade with one another. These include dyadic geographical variables, cultural variables, country level economic variables that facilitate trade relationships between each country, and dyadic political variables that may influence a relationship between rivals.

Geographic Control Variables

*Contiguous*

Data on whether two states are contiguous is obtained from the Correlates of War (COW)
Direct Contiguity data set (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002). Contiguity is coded as ‘1’ if the countries share a land border or river border and ‘0’ if they do not. Contiguous states are among the first to be considered as trade partners for a country. However, for rivals they may also provide an opportunity for more frequent negative interactions not captured by the conflictual variable thus resulting in a negative correlation with trade between rivals.

**Distance**

Considering units of distance between two countries also allows for extra meaningful variation over the dichotomized contiguous variable. Data for the distance variable is from Gleditsch and Ward’s (2001) values for the distance between state’s capitals and will be measured using miles as the unit of measurement. The authors provide values for dyads less than 950 kilometers (589 miles). I take the log of distance and this variable should have a negative relationship with trade flows.

**Landlocked**

I constructed a variable for landlocked countries. Landlocked countries lack access to sea lanes and must negotiate this access to water so they can benefit from shipping trade. This limits their access to world markets and should often result in a reduced trade flows overall. Dyadic trade may also be affected because the lack of access to larger markets may result in less economic development. When both rivals are landlocked, this situation would exist for both countries thus magnifying the negative influence on trade. However, in cases where the rival is blocking one way to sea access, this may also have a greater negative impact on bilateral trade as
the country with sea access may attempt to leverage this advantage over its landlocked rival. So I include a discreet variable coded as '1' if either country is landlocked or '0' if neither are.

Cultural Control Variable: Common Language and Colonial Ties

Official first and second languages are coded using both the list provided by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), and the CIA’s *World Factbook* (2009). The *World Factbook* (2009) was used for rivalry dyads that Silva and Tenreyro (2006) did not cover. Colonial ties have a significant impact on trade according to the traditional gravity model (Silva and Tenreyo 2006). However, Silva and Tenreyo (2006) demonstrate that Poisson Maximum Likelihood method causes the colonial variable to be insignificant when common language is included. However, Silva and Tenreyo only look at a cross sectional selection of dyads in 1990, a time when the Cold War was winding down. The tests on this variable will see if it is still an insignificant predictor of trade using Poisson Maximum Likelihood against the Common Language variable over a longer timeframe.

Economic Control Variable: Gross Domestic Product and GDP Per Capita

Variables for each country’s GDP and GDP per capita have long been included in gravity models of trade. As countries grow economically their trade will also grow. The growth of trade relationships will likely pressure political leaders to trade with their rivals. Gross domestic product per capita of each country may also represent citizen’s desire for more imports or be the result of greater exports between rivals. These variables will be measured with data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten’s (2011) Penn World Table. The log of the lower of the two countries GDP and GDP per capita will be used in the models.
Governmental Control Variable: Joint Democracy and Joint Autocracy

Research results have demonstrated that a pair of regimes that are either both democratic or both autocratic will generally have more peaceful relations (Bennett 2006; Peceny et al. 2002). They are not traditional controls in gravity models of trade, but I believe that the politicized nature of rivalry trade relationships may be influenced by regime type. Since less conflict is in part what I am theorizing facilitates trade between rival states I use joint regime types as controls in the model. To code regime types I use the Polity IV data for my government values (Marshall, Jaggers, Gurr 2011).

These joint democracy and joint Autocracy variables use Polity IV’s democracy and autocracy scores respectively. Polity IV codes countries’ democratic and autocratic dimensions from 0-10 with ‘0’ being less democratic or autocratic and ‘10’ being fully democratic or autocratic respectively. I code the joint democracy variable as ‘1’ if both democracy scores of the dyads are 10 and the joint autocracy variable as ‘1’ if both autocracy scores in the dyad are codes as `10 by Polity IV. Positive scores of these variables should correlate with a higher value of the dependent variable.

Methodology and Coding Decisions

The traditional log-linear gravity model of trade has several issues, mostly because of zero counts in the trade data. We cannot take the log of zero, so an issue arises in how to deal with this. Adding a ‘1’ to the trade data would solve this, but then there is added heteroskedasticity and bias introduced in the model. Variables that are correlated with more or less zero trade flows, such as contiguity or distance, also have their monotonic relationship with trade flows. In addition, that trade models take the log of causal variables leads to Jensen’s
inequality, which says that the expected value of the logarithm of a variable is different than the logarithm of its expected values, which makes the output of such models potentially misleading (Silva and Tenreyo 2006).

Several alternative methods have been proposed, but they either do not resolve all the issues or introduce some of their own. Heckman two-step and Zero-Inflated Poisson provide an intuitive way to deal with zero trade flows by estimating the model after first estimating the likelihood of zero trade flows. This brings up an issue of trying to explain zero trade flows, and in the case of the Heckman two-step, deciding on an exclusionary variable. Weighted Generalized Least Squares deals with zero trade flows and heteroskedasticity, but requires us to know the distribution of the errors, which we do not (Burger, Oort, and Linders 2009; Martin and Pham 2008; Silva and Tenreyo 2006).

Burger et al. (2009) provide some comparative statistics between different methodological approaches to the gravity model of trade. According to a Vuong statistic test, trade data do contain excess zeroes, and the authors advised using a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP). The ZIP approach considers two groups within the data. One group has only zero counts, and the other group has a non-zero probability of having counts other than zero. A ZIP approach combines a logit regression for the likelihood of zero trade with a Poisson for the probability of actual trade. The results of Burger et al. show that both PML and ZIP fit with the data well. However, the Bayesian Information Criterion, which is used to compare models for the best fit with the data, favors the Poisson Maximum Likelihood.

Another issue is dealing with unit effects. Panel Fixed Effects controls for unobserved heterogeneity, but constant terms are dropped and it eliminates zero trade flows. In addition, the unbalanced panel contains dramatically different amounts of observations per rivalry with some
rivalries and associated trade values only having a few observations. Because I have four
different variables specifying how ethnic similarity influences trade, I want to make sure that the
outcome being modeled is precise and unaffected by high variance as well. Considering all this I
decide to go with Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006; 2011) suggestion of a Poisson Maximum
Likelihood Estimator for its better fit, but I use a random effects approach since I am working
with panel data on rivals, which may enter and exit the dataset during unknown times of their
trade relationship. The random effects approach allows me to incorporate unit effect
heterogeneity while creating a more stable model and limiting variance. However, issues with
over dispersion may increase the significance of the estimates with Poisson. So I also run robust
checks on the models using the traditional log-linear model, which is in Appendix B, Heckman
2-step in Appendix C, and I include a model without zero trade values. I briefly discuss the
results of these other methods at the end of the analysis section.

The ethnic cleansing that occurred in the Slavic countries effects the ethnic similarity
values between the Croatia-Bosnia, Croatia-Serbia, and Serbia-Bosnia rivalries leading to issues
in the statistical outputs. Croats became a smaller percentage of Serbia thus increasing the
percentage of Bosniaks in Serbia. This then raises the similarity between Serbia and Bosnia, but
without the corresponding trade that would be associated with greater ethnic similarity due to the
instability associated with this. Moreover, the aftermath saw higher trade flows between Bosnia
and Croatia after ethnic similarity had seen a dramatic reduction (67.3 to 40.4) because of fewer
Serbs on Croatian territory.

This would be easier to control for if each ethnic cleansing did not raise ethnic similarity
in one rivalry while decreasing it in another with similar effects on trade. The conflictual/affinity
dimension of these rivalry relationships would be the proper place to control for these situations.
However, my conflictual and affinity variables do not capture ethnic cleansings and whether or not they are aimed at a major ethnic group associated with the rival. As a result, and due to the sensitivity of the trade models, some variables would not have reasonable coefficients.

Moreover, although my main independent variables are still significant in models with these cases, the confidence intervals become wider and the results are less robust. Since I cannot control for this I omit these three cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Similarity</th>
<th>Contiguous Distance</th>
<th>Common Language</th>
<th>Colonial</th>
<th>Conflictual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous Distance</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Language</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis

Since I have constructed several variables for my analysis that deal with similar concepts, I thought it best if I run a cross correlation to identify potential issues of collinearity and demonstrate the uniqueness of my constructed variables. Specifically, I want to demonstrate that main independent variable, ethnic similarity, differs from the common language variable since some ethnic groups distinguish themselves by language. According to table 7.5, the correlation between ethnic similarity and common language is only 0.06.

In addition, I want to demonstrate that my conflictual relationship variable is not just the inverse of affinity, which is a measure of a cooperative relationship. The correlation between conflictual and affinity is in the expected direction at only -0.21. Some notably high correlations
do exist between the logged distance variable and the dummy variable for contiguity ($r = -0.89$), and also between the colonial and common language variable ($r = .55$). These relationships are intuitive since a contiguous score of one equals zero for the distance variable and those countries belonging to a former colonial empire would also share the same language of that empire.

Table 7.5. Ethnicity and Trade Incident Rate Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Non-Rival Dyads</th>
<th>Bilateral Trade</th>
<th>Rivalry Dyads</th>
<th>Model 6 (trade&gt;0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Model 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity</td>
<td>0.723** (.079)</td>
<td>1.734*** (.125)</td>
<td>0.222*** (.045)</td>
<td>0.225*** (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity$^2$</td>
<td>0.707*** (.020)</td>
<td>0.629*** (.073)</td>
<td>0.334 (.081)</td>
<td>0.616*** (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity*Confictual</td>
<td>0.819*** (.045)</td>
<td>0.572*** (.011)</td>
<td>0.224*** (.089)</td>
<td>0.097*** (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity*Affinity</td>
<td>1.791* (.473)</td>
<td>2.541*** (.348)</td>
<td>0.277*** (.175)</td>
<td>0.209 (.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous</td>
<td>3.521*** (.1037)</td>
<td>1.614*** (.248)</td>
<td>8.304** (.520)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance$^t$</td>
<td>1.101** (.010)</td>
<td>1.334*** (.011)</td>
<td>0.620*** (.032)</td>
<td>1.162* (.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlocked</td>
<td>1.702*** (.005)</td>
<td>1.517*** (.003)</td>
<td>0.300*** (.019)</td>
<td>0.126*** (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Language</td>
<td>1.978*** (.010)</td>
<td>1.367*** (.003)</td>
<td>4.439*** (.135)</td>
<td>4.421*** (.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial$^t$</td>
<td>1.418*** (.006)</td>
<td>1.218*** (.003)</td>
<td>1.056* (.028)</td>
<td>1.005 (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confictual</td>
<td>2.995*** (.011)</td>
<td>1.440*** (.002)</td>
<td>1.840*** (.068)</td>
<td>1.378*** (.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>1.978*** (.010)</td>
<td>1.376*** (.003)</td>
<td>4.439*** (.135)</td>
<td>4.421*** (.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP1$^t$</td>
<td>0.458*** (.002)</td>
<td>1.633*** (.003)</td>
<td>0.510*** (.023)</td>
<td>0.783*** (.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP2$^t$</td>
<td>1.418*** (.004)</td>
<td>1.118*** (.002)</td>
<td>0.790*** (.011)</td>
<td>0.773*** (.011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150
Table 7.5 has six models on bilateral trade flows. Models 1 and 2 are on non-rivals for comparison with the rivalry models. Models 3-6 are on rivals and test the impact of the ethnic similarity variables. The sixth model tests the independent variables only on dyads with trade values exceeding zero. I report incident rate ratios, which takes the ratio of the trade value of the observation to the value of trade if all variables were held at their averages. A value greater than one means that the variable increases the trade between two countries by that rate and values smaller than one reduce trade.

In models 4-6 the independent variable ethnic similarity significantly decreases trade at the p<.001 level. Conversely, the quadratic term for ethnic similarity increases trade at the p<.001 level. These results provide support for the theoretical story tested in H10 and H11. Ethnic similarity reduces trade when it is ethnic similarity of a minority group with a rival. As this cross border ethnic group becomes a majority on each country, it begins to have a more positive impact. However, this would only take place during more peaceful relations.

According to H12 ethnic similarities exacerbate the negative impact of a conflictual relationship on trade. The interaction term ethnic similarity*conflictual supports H12 significantly reducing trade between rivals at the p<.001 level in models 4 and 5, but is not significant in model 6. The lack of support in model 6 is most likely because model 6 omits zero counts, which may often be the result of a more conflictual relationship between ethnically similar rivals. The conflictual variable by itself increases trade in the non-rival models, which
would be counterintuitive. However, in the models on rivalry dyads, conflictual significantly reduces trade in models three and five. It is insignificant in the other models on rivalry trade.

The conflictual variable's positive correlations with trade in the non-rival models is probably because great powers both engage in more conflict and trade more. Reviewing the data on rivals there are 330 rivalry dyad-years that trade with a conflictual score above .2, and there are only a dozen rivalry-year dyads that trade despite having a conflictual score above .4. Out of these dozen, seven have ethnic similarity scores above zero. Examples of high ethnic similarity and conflict are the North-South Korea dyad in 1953 following the Korean War and in 1969 following militarized incidents that resulted in the deaths of South Koreans and Americans, and the Thailand-Vietnam dyad in 1987 where the two rivals fought a series of border clashes resulting in casualties. These dyads all traded less frequently relative to when their relationships were less conflictual, yet traded more than similar conflictual dyads without the same level of ethnic similarity.

When the ethnic similarity variables are included in model 4, the conflictual variable becomes less significant from the p<.001 level to the p<.05 level. Conversely, when ethnic similarity is omitted in model 3, a higher conflictual score reduces trade. The reason that conflictual loses significance may be because half of the rivalry dyad years that have a conflictual score above .4 and non-zero trade values, also have some level of ethnic similarity. Specifically, the interaction variable between ethnic similarity and conflictual captures too much of the conflictual variable’s negative impact on trade. However, this is not the case when the distance variable is omitted in model 5. Since including the distance variable limits observations to those rivals that are 600 kilometers apart or less, omitting that variable includes rivals that are further apart. Once these more distant and less ethnically similar rivals are included, the
conflictual variable significantly reduces trade at the $p<.001$ level again.

Affinity correlates with less trade between rivals, but again we must consider the effect it has with its interaction. The interaction term affinity*ethnic similarity does have a positive effect on trade as predicted by H13, which states that ethnic similarity will increase trade when the two rivals’ relationship is more cooperative. However, affinity by itself reduces trade. This is the opposite of its impact on non-rivals. It may be that similar voting patterns at the UN, which is used as a measure of two rivals’ cooperative relationship, might not necessarily be a good measure of a cooperative relationship. However, both of these variables using the affinity measure are significant at the $p<.001$ level. That suggests that similar voting patterns at the UN correlates significantly with less trade between rivals, but greater ethnic similarity helps facilitate a positive relationship affinity has on trade.

Perhaps the affinity measure is associated with more proximate countries that tend to vote in blocs when it comes to their involvement in global politics. For example, Podeh (2005) says that although individual countries work to enhance their national interests, the Middle East still acts as a single system in that these countries’ foreign policies, relations, and interests are centered within this region. In addition, Middle Eastern countries involved in a rivalry are rivals with other countries in the Middle Eastern region, which may share similar voting pattern at the UN, such as those votes concerning the Palestinians, which may be salient to Arab populations. In this sense, affinity may not be the best indicator of a more cooperative relationship between rivals if similar regional based interests are already causing this variable's coefficient to be higher.

The colonial variable is significant and in the expected direction for models 1-3. However, the models with the ethnic similarity variables would not converge with the colonial
variable included so I had to drop it from those models. The colonial and common language variables are highly correlated and in a few scaled down models, which are not reported here, that included these two variables and the ethnic similarity variables, the results were not realistic due to the sensitivity of Poisson models on trade (Silva and Tenreyo 2006; 2011). The common language variable would approach zero and the colonial variable would be extremely large. This relationship can be observed in model three where the ratio of colonial’s impact on trade is 8.23 and common language reduces trade with rivals by a factor of .285.

Although common language is found to increase trade between non-rivals, it is insignificant in models 4 and 5, which study rival trade relations. It results in an increase in trade according to model six, but that model only considers rivals with trade above zero. So it appears that when a country speaks the same language as its rival this is not significantly related to the existence of a growing trade relationship between the two or perhaps is even related to a reduction in trade according to model three, but if a trade relationship does exist, a common language can facilitate trade growth.

When non-rivals are stronger democracies, trade increases, but when they are rivals democratic institutions are weaker and thus this variable correlates with less trade. The Joint Autocracy variable however is positive and robust. The results show that two strongly autocratic rivals are more likely to engage in a trade relationship, but if they begin to develop weak democratic institutions, their populations seek to limit these trade relationships. The relationship ethnic similarity has with trade between rivals is curvilinear as shown in figure 7.1, which plots out this variable and its quadratic from model 5. However, the results show this is also contingent on a cooperative relationship, and greater ethnic similarity can also exacerbate the negative influences rivalry has on trade. Ethnic similarity at lower levels are correlated with
a reduction in trade, because this creates a security vulnerability that can be exploited by a rival, which vulnerable rivals will react to by limiting cross border interactions. These tensions are not directly captured by my measure of a conflictual relationship, which focuses more on militarized disputes. However, even these ethnically similar groups should be able to facilitate trade relationships under a more cooperative relationship.

The traditional log-linear model in Appendix B also supports these relationships with the exception of the interaction term ethnic similarity*conflictual. However, this is because zero trade flows are omitted using the traditional approach and conflict increases the likelihood of zero trade. However, the Heckman 2-step, shown in Appendix C, agrees with the results from the Poisson for the main independent variables. For the ethnic similarity*conflictual variable, the probit half of the equation shows that it is negatively associated trade, whereas the log-linear half of the model supports the other variables.
Summary

More ethnic similarity at lower levels is associated with less bilateral trade between rival countries. Low levels of ethnic similarity are a source of further tension between rivals because it creates security vulnerability and thus become a source of identity issues to occur and states will seek to limit cross border trade flows when minorities share ethnic similarity with the population on rivalry territory. Conversely, greater ethnic similarity at higher levels is associated with higher amounts of trade between rivals. This is because the two rival countries are so ethnically similar, that an enemy image is no longer attributed to the ethnic groups from the other rival. Using figure 7.2, the predicted outcomes put the threshold between where ethnic similarity lowers trade and where it increases trade around 40-50 ethnic similarity.

Though the ethnic similarity of rivals is generally a static variable between any one rivalry, the relationship between ethnic similarity and trade in a rivalry varies more frequently. Ethnic similarity regardless of whether it is at low or high levels can exacerbate the negative relationship of a conflictual relationship with bilateral trade flows. Conversely, greater ethnic similarity, even at low levels, which are generally associated with less trade, can still help increase trade when interacted with more cooperative interactions. The implication is that rivals with ethnic similarity can expect an added economic bonus in trade relations if they choose a more cooperative relationship. In addition, leaders and businesses should also realize that it may be fruitful to tap into these cross border ethnic communities when trade ties between rivals are initiated. Doing so may more quickly grow interdependence thus making the reversal of such trade relationships by political leaders more difficult.

According to research on the relationship between interdependence and conflict, greater trade interdependence should reduce the likelihood of conflict (Bliss and Russett 1998; Oneal
and Ray 1997; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett 1996; Oneal and Russett 1999; Polachek 1997). However, it is possible high ethnic similarity works against peace in the long run too. If trade relations can be grown rapidly by ethnically similar rivals once cooperative interactions are pursued, the costs of conflictual interactions may actually be smaller than if the rivals were not ethnically similar. If this is the case, then policy makers considering initiating an economic relationship between highly ethnically similar rivals may want to take this into consideration and figure out a way to raise the economic costs of defection, yet also not slow down the economic integration so much that the benefits of pursuing a cooperative relationship are absent.

Another possibility is that the high levels of trade between ethnically similar rivals may allow these rivals to send more costly signals. This is useful for contested nations, which are essentially identical ethnically. Rivalry dyads with high ethnic similarity such as those on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait are involved in disputes with higher costs for the loser. The objective of at least one side in these rivalries is unification, but strong differences exist over who will rule. Thus ethnic similarity between rivals may potentially facilitate greater cooperation and a reduction to armed conflict between the most highly conflictual rivals.
CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS

Part of the premise I start from is simply that more ethnic similarity makes interacting easier. However, is easier interaction between enemies a good or a bad thing? The findings in this research are, that in general, it is both. High levels of ethnic similarity between rivals are associated with more salient territorial issues, more militarized disputes, and greater interdependence. Higher levels of ethnic similarity can both exacerbate conflictual relationships and facilitate cooperative ones. All of these conclusions mean greater ethnic similarity raises the stakes of the rivalry, increases the opportunities to fight over these stakes, and increases the chances for cooperative interactions despite the high stakes.

One of the more interesting findings concerns the case of big brother rivals and their lower likelihood of conflict. This is the opposite of what previous research has found on contiguous states with a minority in one country and a majority in the other, especially when ethnicity is associated with territory (Tir 2007; Woodwell 2004). If we combine my findings with this previous research, we get a more complete story of these types of cases. This story begins with the understanding that the ease of interaction between culturally similar people precedes the establishment of the borders between two states. A border is established, which separates part of this ethnic group with a minority in one country sharing ethnicity with the majority in the other state. Woodwell (2004) finds these cases to be more conflictual. Territorial claims arise concerning the territory these minorities are on, or the minority is mistreated leading the state where this ethnic group is a majority to act as a big brother and retaliate. However, once these cases evolve into a rivalry my research finds that the likelihood of conflict is significantly reduced.
The territory disputed between big brother rivals is more likely to be associated with an intangible identity basis. A case in point, Northern Epirus in Albania and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya are disputed by Greece and Somalia, respectfully, due to the historical associations with the territory and the treatment of their co-ethnics residing there rather than any strategic basis or resource value of the territory (Baker 2003; Blitz 2006; Howard 1986; Laitin 1977; Ruches 1965). Once the cases are rivals with big brother indicating resolve, and an enemy image is established towards the rival and associated ethnic background(s), certain vulnerabilities become evident. The rival with the minority on its territory will perceive a potential fifth column as their enemy’s co-ethnics represent a foothold on their territory. For example, even though they did not populate the disputed territory between Vietnam and China, the Vietnamese government persecuted ethnic Chinese for this reason (Dreyer 2010). Likewise, the big brother rival will realize that their co-ethnics are susceptible to retaliation if they were to initiate a militarized dispute.

Although big brother rivals are associated with fewer militarized disputes relative to other rivals, the larger cross border minority groups are, the lower the amount of bilateral trade between the two rivals. This is not peculiar to big brother rivals, but this relationship exists for any pair of rivals with a cross border ethnic group that makes up a minority on either rival. So big brother rivals with more ethnic similarity are involved in fewer interactions whether militarized or economic. The implication for policy makers is that these rivals may have more neutral relationships relative to other rivals, and perhaps are more susceptible to negotiated settlements. Fewer militarized disputes may mean that third parties may feel less pressure to quickly resolve these rivalries even though these cases tend to be associated with more peaceful resolution attempts and successes though. However, they are also associated with more attempt
failures.

Despite also being either minority rivals or big brother rivals, the former not associated with an increase in militarized disputes, and the latter being generally associated with lower likelihoods of militarized disputes relative to non-ethnic rivals, pan-ethnic rivals are associated with increases in militarized disputes. In the same way that ethnic similarity between two rivals reduces cultural, religious, and linguistic obstacles to communication and perhaps claims to legitimacy in governing the similar people, pan-ethnic ideas provide an alternative and extra layer of legitimacy based on identity covering all the territories that such an idea applies to.

Even after their failure, the legacy of these pan-ethnic ideas and reaction by the people affected by them still provided a source of legitimacy for leaders to advance their ambitions. Territorial disputes by pan-ethnic rivals tend to have more of a tangible basis despite the intangibility of pan-ethnic ideas, or reactions to them, and who should lead those efforts. Saddam Hussein’s encouraging of Arab uprisings on disputed territory, or Milosevic’s use of alleged conspiracy against Serbs under the former Yugoslavia both made use of the pan-ethnic or its legacy that would resonate across the territories of many countries. Legitimacy tapped into by political leaders using pan-ethnic rhetoric were used not just to build support in the territory that was a target of these leaders’ actions, but also gain support from relevant groups across several countries that were part of these leaders’ future political ambitions.

As a source of legitimacy able to destabilize their relevant regions, these pan-ethnic identities no longer provide useful tools for political leaders. One reason for this has been the increasing strength of state institutions in these countries, which do not resonate with the public any longer (Mufti 1996; Telhami and Barnett 2002). However, the Middle East has a transnational character to it linked together by language, religion, and Arab identity. Through the
use of modern media, a new Arabism has begun to arise, though it is not certain which direction it will take (Pintak 2009; Telhami and Barnett 2002). The Arab Spring has provided a new opportunity for new leaders to arise as state institutions have been weakened, and if these ideas develop symbolism and influential beliefs then political leaders may once again use them as a source of legitimacy. Policy makers should be mindful of these developments, and what they may mean for the future of the Middle East and its relationship to the rest of the world.

Although pan-ethnic and big brother rivals provide exceptions to the general trend in the relationship between ethnic similarity and more conflict, the more specific political realities behind these two types of ethnically similar rivals provide a better explanation for the relationship with militarized disputes. However, the trend with ethnically similarity and trade maintains a more consistently followed pattern regardless of what category these types of rivals fall in. As levels of ethnic similarity increase at low levels, trade is reduced, whereas higher levels of ethnic similarity between rivals at relatively high levels are associated with more bilateral trade flows.

A more intuitive way to view the relationship between ethnic similarity and bilateral trade flows between rivals is that the larger a cross border ethnic group that is a minority in at least one of the rivals, the lower the flow of trade will be. This is because rivals will view these minority groups with suspicion regardless of whether it shares ethnicity with a majority or another minority on their rival’s territory. A minority group in both rivals could still be exploited by one of the rivals for a shared goal aimed at the other rival. The larger the minority group is on either territory, the larger the potential threat and the greater the effort to reduce cross border relations.

As the ethnic similarity grows to the point that the ethnic group is a majority in both countries, this similarity will cease being considered security vulnerability by itself. These
rivals have the counterintuitive association of having the most salient territorial disputes usually involving the entire territory of the other state, the highest likelihoods of militarized disputes, and the highest levels of bilateral trade flows. However, they are not likely to be associated with peaceful resolutions to their territorial disputes. Most of these contested nations are very if not completely ethnically similar and would be a single nation, but were split as the result of a large scale war. Often, after division one side fell into the Soviet sphere of influence and the other side allied with the United States making them Cold War rivals. Attempts at reunification have been made both violently and peacefully. East and West Germany eventually were unified peacefully whereas the Vietnams were unified by the victory of North Vietnam over the south.

Perhaps more research is needed on the high levels of trade between contested nations. If high levels of economic interdependence provide a means to send more costly signals by cutting such economic relationships, then it is possible that the added cost is useful in the context of the high stakes and more frequent interactions between these rivals. The costs to the loser in a war over the disputed territory in contested nations are generally higher than other rivalries. Greater economic interdependence thus provides a useful alternative to air strong disagreements and demonstrate one side’s resolve. However, if economic interdependence can grow more quickly between highly ethnically similar rivals, then perhaps the costs of cutting such trade or even engaging in militarized disputes are not as high as they would be for other pairs of countries despite their higher value.

Today, the remaining contested nation rivalries are between Taiwan and China and on the Korean Peninsula. North and South Korea have continued to engage in both high levels of trade as well as militarized disputes. In reaction to South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, which made economic relations unconditional hoping to induce liberalization in North
Korea over time, North Korea would separate this interdependence from its citizens thus extracting economic benefits without changing (Kahler and Kastner 2006). Yet, once initiated, trade relations between ethnically similar countries are more difficult to reverse. Even with the end of the Sunshine Policy, and the tougher stance by Lee Myung-bak administration, and suspension of trade following the sinking of the Cheonan with blame placed on North Korea (Sang-Hun 2010) trade quickly resumed and grew (Yonhap News Agency 2013).

Cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan have been relatively peaceful since the Third Cross-Strait Crisis, and trade has steadily increased. However, the results of this paper suggest that contested nations are still associated with a high likelihood of conflict despite also being associated with a high level of trade. Chinese President Xi Jinping has already suggested a more active push to address the political issue of reunification (Ramzy 2014). Although efforts will likely be diplomatic, this is an area Taiwan is probably not willing to negotiate on. If the current talks between Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jiu and Xi Jin-ping don’t provide any institutionalized means to address this issue in the future, and if a less Beijing friendly president is elected in Taiwan in 2016, then the current economic and diplomatic efforts to reunite the two countries by Beijing may give way to more aggressive efforts. That contested nations are associated with both high trade and conflict suggests that policy makers should not become complacent just because economic interdependence is high between such rivals. Until both sides agree on some resolution, the ultimate objectives in these territorial claims leave little room for compromise except an acceptance of and the means to preserve the status quo in the face of attempts to alter it.
Policy Recommendations

The results in this study are applicable not only to dyads that are recognized as rivalries by scholars, but also any pair of countries at odds with one another with a potentially militarized relationship with similar ethnicity. Ethnic similarity between rivals should be viewed as an opportunity for facilitating peaceful interactions. In addition, it is an added difficulty in resolving conflict. Resolving issues peacefully requires just as much effort in understanding the similarity as it does the differences. Understanding the similarity may be most helpful in cases of contested nations where similar symbols and culture may resonate with both sides. The highly conflictualized nature of these types of rivals means third parties are required to maintain the peace and help to reduce tensions. Currently, this is being done in part with a US troop presence in South Korea, and US naval presence and agreement to intervene if Taiwan is attacked by China.

There are fewer big brother and pan-ethnic rivalries now than before. Likewise, the fading legacy of pan-ethnic rivalries, such as those Arab countries’ relations with Israel and involvement in the status of Palestinians, may mean that these dyads begin behaving more like big brother, minority, or even non-ethnic rivalries, which should make resolution of disputes easier than before. Third party intervention could facilitate resolution of at least some of the disputes of these rivalries. Focusing on the treatment of minorities and preventing support for secessionist or insurgent activities provides a means for both sides to gain something from a negotiated resolution. In addition, these outcomes could be linked to other outstanding issues between these countries.

Although these peaceful patterns have existed for some big brother rivalries, the same potential for removing issues should exist between some minority rivals. Better treatment of
minority groups would not necessarily pacify the other rival, but it may pacify minorities that are otherwise willing to sometimes ally themselves with one rival to conduct subversive activities on the other rival’s territory. Even though the relationships found in this study have smaller impacts in minority rivals, since minority rivals make up a majority of the ethnically similar rivalry cases, the findings might find broader application for minority rivals. Better economic conditions and equal opportunities for economic benefit would reduce support for insurgencies. In addition, just as Turkey used small cross border ethnicities to initiate trade relations with the Soviet Union following thawed relations, other rivalries with small cross border ethnicities could implement the same strategy. Assuring that these groups are not oppressed and thus are in a position to facilitate the beginning of an economic relationship is therefore important for advancing international peace.

Whereas big brother rivalries provide opportunities for peaceful resolution, the pan-ethnic worlds deserve attention to how these trans-national systems and related ideas develop. It may be that pan-ethnic ideas and even the reaction to them have little traction in public opinion now. However, all future political leaders need to resurrect ideas of identity centered on a shared history are grievances and opportunities. The Arab Spring, associated regime changes, Islamist involvement, and a more secularized media focus in the Middle East may all have further implications on the ideas of a pan-ethnic trans-national society. If the trans-national character of the regions enables a new layer of identity to become influential again, will these new ideas inform and influence rivalries in the future, or will democratic reforms enable these ideas to become more like the European identity and its influence in the democracies of Europe?
Where to Go From Here

This study leaves several avenues of research open. The data developed here is for ethnic similarity between rivals. However, there may be uses for my ethnic similarity variable outside of rivalry. This would especially be true of bilateral trade. Whereas ethnic similarity between rivals and trade flows have a curvilinear relationship, trade should increase monotonically when associated with higher levels of ethnic similarity between non-rivals.

Ethnic similarity between non-rivals may also be associated with more conflict outside of rivalry. The negative relationship between big brother rivals and militarized disputes creates an exception to the general trend that dampens ethnic similarity’s generally positive relationship with militarized disputes. It may be that such cases are generally associated with more conflict outside of rivalry though. Ethnic similarity data on at least contiguous dyads may help to explore this possibility. Since ethnic similarity is associated with more salient territorial disputes and more conflict, perhaps ethnically similar dyads are associated with higher likelihoods of rivalry too. This may especially be the case with big brother rivals. Since ethnic similarity encourages closer relationships between countries, this may have implications for making the issues that exist between them to be broached more frequently. Increased interaction then may work to highlight differences as promote unity between different populations.

The theoretical expectations between pan-ethnic rivals may also apply to dyads throughout regions associated with pan-ethnic identities. Extensions on the data can observe this relationship in more detail as well. I theorize that leaders pursue regional ambitions by using the pan-ethnic ideas or the trans-national contexts they exist in. This has implications for rivalries, but do they have similar implications for non-rivals? Are territorial disputes more likely to be fought over militarily by all pan-ethnic dyads making these regions more conflictual? Such
findings would make observance of recent developments concerning the Middle East more important for how and if they will influence the opportunities for leaders to espouse ideas of a new pan-Arabism.

In addition to extensions to my ethnic similarity data, more data on territorial disputes and peaceful resolutions will allow for retests of the relationships I have found on territorial disputes and perhaps extend the analysis to contested nations, which I could not test this time due to limits in the data. Each territorial claim also provides an opportunity to further explore the relationships that have been discovered between ethnically similar rivalry types and the bases for the territorial disputes that arise between them.

Confirming and outlier case studies provide an opportunity for further extensions for this research too. We should be able to find instances where minority groups are used as subversive groups against a country’s rival. However, comparative cases should be able to identify differences between minority and big brother rivalries in this respect. The big brother rival should be more amenable to negotiated settlement and indicate concern for the well-being of the minority group in the rival’s territory, whereas the minority case should see no such leverage.

The findings on trade between ethnically similar rivals should be extended to the implications of foreign direct investment from one rival to another. Does it follow the same trends as trade? For services, investment should precede trade, because the talent needs to be in place to facilitate the transfer of more materials and goods. For manufactured goods, trade should precede investment since goods are sold and traded before manufacturing plants are setup in the foreign market. What implications does this have for ethnically similar rivals? It may be that investment between ethnically similar rivals produce somewhat different patterns than trade.

Ethnic similarity should facilitate both investment and trade. However, although initial
trade deals are initially communicated between businesses, services may result in more interactions with the public. This sometimes creates a new security vulnerability associated with migration from one rival to the other, which may create more public pressure from domestic constituencies. For example, Taiwanese students, supported by other protesters, occupied the parliament in reaction to a trade deal they felt was not properly reviewed and allowed more Chinese investment on the island (Sanchez and Li 2014).

The intangibility of identity association does not negate the real life applications of these attachments. Although ethnic attachments are relatively static, the content of the identity, which is influenced by the context that makes them resonate with people and informs these people on their opinions do vary. The case of rivalry is associated with the development of an enemy image of the other state, and different levels of ethnic similarity can cause this enemy image of a national identity to translate to an enemy image of an ethnic identity, or make the rivalry more personal.

In this research, I laid out the implications of these conflicting cognitive biases of rivalry and the unity associated with ethnic similarity, and I have mentioned a few policy suggestions on managing these situations. Beyond the political differences, which may not have immediate or peaceful solutions, how to resolve the biases associated with the combination of identity with emerging rivalry before they result in enduring rivalry, or ameliorate their prolonging and inflaming rivalry are questions worth pursuing. The answers may require us to delve deeper into the political psychological foundations of identity’s association with rivalry and the enemy image. That may bring to light new questions. If content, influenced by context, informs these biases, can we indirectly influence the content of people’s identity and associated biases by addressing the relevant context? If so, should we?
APPENDIX A

MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTE CASUALTY LEVELS BY ETHNIC RIVAL TYPE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivalry Type</th>
<th>Non-Ethnic</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Big Brother</th>
<th>Pan-Ethnic</th>
<th>Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No fatalities (fatality level=0)</td>
<td>116 (90.63%)</td>
<td>167 (69.87%)</td>
<td>73 (76.04%)</td>
<td>202 (73.19%)</td>
<td>78 (79.59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-25 deaths (fatality level=1)</td>
<td>4 (3.13%)</td>
<td>31 (12.97%)</td>
<td>6 (6.25%)</td>
<td>35 (12.68%)</td>
<td>12 (12.24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-100 deaths (fatality level=2)</td>
<td>1 (0.78%)</td>
<td>17 (7.11%)</td>
<td>7 (7.29%)</td>
<td>12 (4.35%)</td>
<td>4 (4.08%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-250 deaths (fatality level=3)</td>
<td>1 (0.78%)</td>
<td>9 (3.77%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (2.54%)</td>
<td>1 (1.02%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251-500 deaths (fatality level=4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (0.84%)</td>
<td>2 (2.08%)</td>
<td>1 (0.36%)</td>
<td>1 (1.02%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-999 deaths (fatality level=5)</td>
<td>0 (0.78)</td>
<td>0 (4.51)</td>
<td>1 (1.04%)</td>
<td>0 (2.90)</td>
<td>0 (2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000+ deaths (fatality level=6)</td>
<td>6 (4.69%)</td>
<td>13 (5.44%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19 (6.88%)</td>
<td>2 (2.04%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = MIDS</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND TRADE: TRADITIONAL GRAVITY MODEL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Log Trade&gt;0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity</td>
<td>-0.278***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.066)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity²</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity*Conflictual</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity*Affinity</td>
<td>0.262***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous</td>
<td>3.151***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.537)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Distance</td>
<td>0.361**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlocked</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Language</td>
<td>0.368**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>-0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>1.231**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP1</td>
<td>0.251***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP2</td>
<td>0.284***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDPpc1</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDPpc2</td>
<td>0.605***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.137)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Autocracy</td>
<td>0.215*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-10.060***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad-Years (N)</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p<.001***; p<.01**; p<.10*
†Robust Standard Errors
APPENDIX C

ETHNIC SIMILARITY AND TRADE: HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Probit Probability of Trade(&gt;0)</th>
<th>Ordinary Least Squares Logged Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity</td>
<td>-0.264** (.081)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity(^2)</td>
<td>0.002* (.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity*Conflictual</td>
<td>-0.139* (.057)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Similarity*Affinity</td>
<td>0.251** (.088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous</td>
<td>1.058*** (.302)</td>
<td>1.428*** (.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlocked</td>
<td>-0.001 (.112)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflictual</td>
<td>-3.498*** (.437)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>1.823*** (.253)</td>
<td>0.693* (.0328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP1</td>
<td>0.025 (.033)</td>
<td>0.212*** (.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP2</td>
<td>0.074 (.040)</td>
<td>0.274*** (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDPpc1</td>
<td>0.292*** (.082)</td>
<td>-0.081 (.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDPpc2</td>
<td>-0.428*** (.074)</td>
<td>0.592*** (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Autocracy</td>
<td>0.145 (.094)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.575*** (.503)</td>
<td>-6.757*** (.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad-Years (N)</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^p<.001***; ~p<.01**; ~p<.05^*

†Robust Standard Errors
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