A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components Page: 2 of 6
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Following this appmach, the US declares to the IAEA the number of interns , the mass of
plutonium summed over n items, and, for each item the vector Xj + Al. Depending on
classification licy in effect at the rime the declaration may or may not state that each item is
weapons grads plutonium from a dismantled weapon.
VERIFYING THE DECLARATION
Confirmation measurements would be performed by acombination of gamma-ray and neutron
coincidence (multiplicity) measmermts, or whatever is the best measurement method
The software used for the inspeeion will be under dual control and compiled for application
just before actual inspections so that both sides know that the measurement software is
authentic. The inspection software would differ from ordinary measurement softwwe to the
extent that Ai, as provided by the US just prior to the initial measurment, is added to the
measurement results. If the item identification belongs to the category "standards", Amj= is
added, thus allowing the instrument to show the tie characerisc.
Prior to the start of the inspection, bath sides would verify the i p on software source
code (stored under dual keys at the US site) before it is compilede US will provide the set
of Aj in a diskette and observes the IAEA inspector reading it into the computer. The US
continues to retain control of the disk afterward. The IAEA inspectors wil sample and
measure as many items as necessary and compare the measured Yj +Aj with the declared Xj
+ Aj. To test the functionality of the measurment system, the inspecon may insert some
known standards during the course of an inspection. In addition, ihe inspector may check to
assure himself that the sum of the AJ over a specified set of items is zero.
The verification approach described above enables inspectors to confirm that the declaration
for each item is correct and that the total content of the n items is as stated. When the
materials are eventually converted to a non-sensitive form, the declaration on total content can
be direcdy verified.
IAEA MONITORING ACTIVITIES
To assure traceability, declared items would be subject to IAEA monitoring which would rely
on tamper-indicating devices as well as on containmnt surveillance systems and verification
techniques such as those currently employed in spent fuel storage areas. Such monitoring
would continue until the sensitive items are reduced to a non-classified form when final
verification by the LAEA of the declared content could occur.
POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION CONCERNS
Since all of the fissile material from a single warhead would be placed in a separate container,
revealing the aggregate plutonium mass in n containers would also reveal the average
plutonium mass of n warheads. If all n warheads were of the same model, sensitive
formation would thus be revealed. If plutonium from several different weapon models were
included, there might be a concern that the over n items would also reveal sensitive
information on the amount of plutonium in a waread. Both of these problems might be
resolved by including among the n declared containers several which contain realistic masses
of non-fissile material doped with small quantities of material having the appropriate isotopics.
This resolution of the problem however would prevent a statement that each item contains
weapons grade plutonium from a dismantled weapon.
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Lu, M.S. & Allentuck, J. A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components, article, August 1, 1998; Upton, New York. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc690471/m1/2/: accessed December 14, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.