A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components Page: 1 of 6
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A Suggested Approach to Applying [AEA Safeguar s to
Plutonium in Weapons Components* COAF -qV 73 -
Ming-Shih Lu and Jack Allentck. Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Building 197C, P.O. Box 5000, Upton. New York, USA 516-344-24552412
It is the announced policy of the United Stares to make fissile material removed from its
nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of
this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of LAEA safeguards
would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and
international reaes. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium
mo the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is
foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to lying IAEA safeguards while porvig
the necessary degree of confldendaliry is required is paper identifies such an approach. It
ptsents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are net:
inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA coulA xch
concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would
reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers
presented to the JAA for verification while proecing dara of the isotopic composition and
plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability
from the time the contaimers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive
It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile numerial removed frnm its
nuclear w ons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of
this materi is plutonium in the form of pits. (HEU will also be parent. Thus, wherever in
this p the ward plutoniumm" is used, read "nuclear material of interest.") The application
of r IAEA safeguards would reveal sensitive information to unauthorized persons
which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. PuNor to the availability of a facility
for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term
solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA
safeguards while preserving the required degree of confidendalily is described in the
paragraphs which follow. We believe that this approach succeeds in protecting sensitive
information although it might require sone dication to current classification policy.
POSSIBLE MODE OF DECLARATION OF SENSITIVE ITEMS
it is assumed that the US. in the course of a nuclear weapons dismantling campaign disposes
of fissile components in a set of containers; one warhead to a container. In this paper we
shall refer to these containcrs as items. Individual items are designated, iternj. Assume the
existence of a instrnment known to the US and the IAEA which is capable of determining the
true characteristic of Item j, Xj; e.g., Xj is the isotopics and weight of Item j. Because the US
does not wish the nue values of Xi revealed to IAEA inspectors, it will declare that the
characteristic is the sum of Xj and an arbitrary factor Aj. Aj will not be known to the IAEA
and is held completely under US control. The sum of Aj summed over all items is zero.
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Degy
under the Contract No. DE-AC02-98CH!0886.
M OF THUS DGWAENT I 17 MASTER
SS T I
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Lu, M.S. & Allentuck, J. A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components, article, August 1, 1998; Upton, New York. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc690471/m1/1/: accessed December 9, 2018), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.