It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary ...
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Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States)
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It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form.
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Lu, M.S. & Allentuck, J.A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components,
article,
August 1, 1998;
Upton, New York.
(digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc690471/:
accessed April 26, 2018),
University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu;
crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.