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Accession #: D296005625

Document #: SD-WM-IP-009

Title/Desc:
B PLANT & WESF SUSPECT COUNTERFEIT PARTS IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM

Pages: 236
**ENGINEERING DATA TRANSMITTAL**

2. To: (Receiving Organization)  
B Plant/WESF Transition Project

3. From: (Originating Organization)  
B Plant Transition Engineering

5. Proj./Prog./Dept./Div.:  
B Plant Suspect Parts Identification Program/16020

6. Cog. Engr.:  
D. W. Mertz

8. Originator Remarks:  
This document describes a suspect/counterfeit parts inspection program required by DOE conducted in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan dated May 24, 1994.

11. Receiver Remarks:

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**Signature of EDT Originator**  
Date: 11/16/94

**Authorized Representative Date for Receiving Organization**  
Date: 11/16/94

**Cognizant Manager**  
Date: 11/16/94

21. DOE APPROVAL (if required)  
Etl. No.  
[] Approved  
[] Approved w/comments  
[] Disapproved w/comments
B Plant/WESF Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Identification Program

D.W. Mertz
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA 99352
U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC06-87RL10930

EDT/ECN: 611743 \hspace{1cm} UC: 2050
Org Code: 16D20 \hspace{1cm} Charge Code: E52165(B Plant)/E52166(WESF)
B&R Code: EW3135090 \hspace{1cm} Total Pages: 233

Key Words: Inspection Program, Suspect/Counterfeit Parts

Abstract: This document describes a suspect/counterfeit parts inspection program required by DOE conducted in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DMM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994. The program included: physical inspection of all spare parts inventories within the plant; screening of installed B Plant/WESF systems for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences; and a physical inspection based upon this screening.

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Release Approval Date

Approved for Public Release

A-6400-073 (10/95) GEF321
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS

INSPECTION PROGRAM
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The B Plant/Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) complex conducted a verification program to protect against critical system failures due to suspect/counterfeit parts. The program included risk evaluation, documentation reviews and physical inspections to identify any suspect or counterfeit parts which could potentially impact plant safety or operations.

An initial inspection of spare parts inventories, conducted in December 1994, identified suspect fasteners (graded stainless steel bolts). These fasteners were removed from the plant; the discovery of suspect parts was reported on Occurrence Report RL--WHC-BPLANT-1994-0042.

Installed plant systems were inspected in January 1996. This check revealed suspect items, including electrical circuit breakers, and fasteners (graded bolts) in some piping, ventilation systems and B Plant crane reel lights. These suspect items were listed on Nonconformance Reports (NCRs).

Based upon technical evaluations, many of the suspect bolts were replaced. The circuit breakers and the remainder of the bolts were determined to be acceptable. The NCRs were used to document the disposition of all suspect parts identified in the inspection. The Occurrence Report was updated to reflect the latter discovery of suspect fasteners.

BACKGROUND

Counterfeit and improperly marked items were recognized as a widespread problem during the 1980s. Various parties, particularly in Asia, found it easy to produce inferior look-alike copies of items such as high-strength fasteners and electrical devices. Lacking critical characteristics of the genuine parts, many of these inferior items failed, sometimes resulting in accidents and injury or death.

In response to a Department of Energy request, Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) developed an action plan to address potential impacts of counterfeit or suspect parts on the Hanford site. B Plant issued its own action plan (see Appendix 1) in May 1994.

APPROACH

The verification program provided a systematic approach to ensure that systems or equipment which could affect safety or operation within the plant would be checked. The inspection program included 4 major elements:

- Inspection of spare parts inventories
- Coordination of suspect parts verification programs
- Screening and inspection of installed plant systems
- Awareness training and procedure changes
RESULTS

The verification actions listed in the B Plant action plan were completed on January 12, 1996.

1. Inspection of spare parts inventories.
   a. Maintenance personnel conducted a 100% inspection of bulk fasteners in the tool crib. Suspect fasteners were identified, listed on a Nonconformance Report (NCR) and removed from the plant. Occurrence Report (OR) RL--WHC-BPLANT-1994-0042 was issued to report the discovery of suspect items at the facility.
   b. Materials which have already been staged in warehouses or material storage areas will be checked for potential suspect fasteners at the time of installation, as prescribed by WHC-CM-8-9, Workmanship Standards.

2. Coordination with supporting organizations to ensure that adequate suspect/counterfeit prevention programs are in place.
   a. Procurement quality assurance provides inspection for suspect/counterfeit items when new materials are brought on site.
   b. The ICF Kaiser Hanford (ICF KH) Hoisting and Rigging group, which performs inspections on portable hoisting and rigging equipment includes checks for suspect/counterfeit fasteners in their inspection program.
   c. The Heavy Equipment/Railroad Maintenance Garages have a program in place. Individual equipment which has been checked is marked with a "B" sticker. The B Plant maintenance manager verified the presence of "B" stickers on the material handling equipment used at the facility.

3. Screening and inspection of installed plant systems.
   a. System cognizant engineers performed screens of each system against the following criteria:
      - Maintenance work or item replacement since 1981
      - Equipment/components present of types listed in QA Bulletins
      - Significant safety/operational implications
   b. Inspection plans were developed for items which met the screening criteria. Verification was accomplished either by physical inspection or verification of Quality Assurance (QA) records. System screening results and inspection plans are attached as Appendix 2.
c. Physical inspections were performed, and results documented. Suspect fasteners (graded bolts) were found in several plant systems, including some piping, ventilation systems and B Plant crane reel lights. Suspect circuit breakers (based on model number) were found in various panels. These suspect items were listed on Nonconformance Reports (NCRs).

d. Based upon technical evaluations, many of the suspect bolts were replaced. The circuit breakers and the remainder of the bolts were determined to be acceptable. The NCRs were used to document the disposition of all suspect parts identified in the inspection. The Occurrence Report was updated to reflect the latter discovery of suspect fasteners.

4. Awareness Training. Plant engineering, craft and material procurement personnel were trained to recognize suspect parts, and on the importance of doing so. Everyone who performed the above inspections attended the training.

CONCLUSION

The actions completed as part of the B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Action Plan have provided a reasonable assurance against serious safety or operational impacts caused by suspect/counterfeit parts. Long term activities will continue, including employee awareness training, procurement quality control and verification of parts upon installation, in order to protect against future problems caused by suspect/counterfeit parts.

Appendices:

1. B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan
2. Screening and Inspection Results
APPENDIX A
Westinghouse Hanford Company

From: Facility Engineering
Phone: 372-0359 S6-81
Date: May 24, 1994
Subject: B PLANT SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS ACTION PLAN

To: J. N. Nansen

cc: D. K. Bailey S6-51
    D. M. Bogen S6-65
    C. L. Hoover L6-35
    J. C. Lo S6-25
    D. D. McAfee S4-69
    D. W. Mertz S6-81
    J. A. O'Brien S6-81
    DWM File/LB S6-81

References: (1) Letter, R. A. Holten, RL to President, WHC, "Suspect Parts", 91009748, dated February 14, 1992
(2) Quality Assurance Bulletin, QAB 92-01, dated February 14, 1992; QAB 92-02, August 21, 1992, and Revision September 17, 1992; QAB 93-002, April 28, 1993; and QAB 93-03, dated May 20, 1993
(3) Procurement and Operational Assessment of the Impact of Suspect Circuit Breakers on Facilities Operated by the Westinghouse Hanford Company SD-MP-TA-001, dated March 20, 1989

Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) has received direction/guidance from the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Field Office (RL) relative to suspect parts (Reference 1, Attachment 3). The B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan (Attachment 1) with a proposed schedule of completion (Attachment 2) is being issued to address the concerns. Quality Assurance Bulletins (Reference 2, Attachment 4) list the suspect fasteners, electrical components and mechanical components to be investigated.

If you have any questions on the plan, please contact D. W. Mertz at 372-0359.

J. A. O'Brien, Manager
Facility Engineering

gaa

Attachments A-1
B-PLANT

SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS ACTION PLAN

INTRODUCTION

In response to Internal Memo 38000-92-024 and DOE Letter 9200979B, this document provides the action plan requested for inspection/surveillance of "suspect parts" by B-Plant. Suspect electrical materials and suspect piping materials will also be examined in addition to the suspect bolts/fasteners addressed by the referenced correspondence. These categories are defined in QAB 92-01, 92-02, 93-002 and 93-03. This plan indicates a phased approach prioritized by the safety hazard classification which is reflected in the schedule for the systems that will be examined during subsequent walkdowns. The intent is to strive to replace suspect/counterfeit parts with qualified parts as required. Testing and evaluation of suspect/counterfeit parts are additional permitted methods of qualification which might be used.

SUSPECT PARTS INSPECTION

Suspect fasteners from foreign suppliers could have been introduced as early as 1981, therefore only system modifications, repairs and construction from 1981 on need to be evaluated. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) evaluated circuit breakers for suspect/counterfeit parts in 1989 (Reference 3). Circuit breakers installed prior to this date should be evaluated. The B-Plant Facility will be examined for suspect parts using a graded approach in each of the facility areas. Work packages, NCR's or similar documentation will be used to compile findings for each of the facility areas.

Suspect parts to be addressed:

- Fasteners: Listed in QAB 92-01, 92-02, and 93-002. Grade 5, Grade 8 and ASTM A325 high strength bolts, and cap screws.

- Electrical Components: Circuit breakers, transformers, fuses and relays per the listing in QAB 92-01.

- Piping Components: Fittings, flanges, valves, couplings, plugs, spacers and nozzles per the listing in QAB 92-01 and 93-03.
Inventories: 100% visual inspection. Inspect a sample chosen in accordance with military standard MIL-STD-105E if the size of the lot will not permit 100% visual inspection. A bolt shall be considered suspect if it bears a head mark matching one of those on the suspect headmark list attached to QAB 93-002. Electrical or piping components are identified in QAB 92-01, 92-02 and 93-03. An annual or other periodic inspection of inventory may be required.

Procurement: This is a company wide issue. B-Plant facility control has been implemented. All parts and materials with a suspect/counterfeit potential per attached QA Bulletins shall be procured to approval designator Q, and in accordance with procurement clauses E 33 and E 34.

The suspect parts shall be dispositioned in the following categories:

Non-Critical Applications: Suspect bolts, circuit breakers and other components as listed in the attached QA Bulletins which are judged to be used in an application in which a failure will not compromise personnel safety or result in equipment damage or system failure may be dispositioned as acceptable and require no further action.

Critical Applications: Suspect bolts, circuit breakers and other components as listed in the attached QA Bulletins which are judged to serve a pre-determined critical function in most cases will be replaced. The decision not to replace items in critical applications will be supported by engineering evaluation.

The following have been identified as minimum requirements to be inspected under critical applications and dispositioned as such.

General Plant Safety Equipment: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, manlifts, forklifts, elevators, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, storage/equipment racks, service platforms, rollup doors/installation, breathing air system and any additional items identified during the plant walkdown.

Process/Support Systems Safety: Radiation monitoring equipment, canyon supply and exhaust fans, HEPA Filter equipment and structures, stack monitoring, canyon doors, 480 VAC MCC’s, instrument air, stack exhaust fans and any additional items identified during plant walkdown.

Systems, equipment and components not accessible for visual examination may require an audit of design and procurement records. An evaluation should be made for accepting the system as-is provided the design requirements are met.
TRACKING AND WORK CONTROL

The work (initial evaluation) will be initiated by work plan/packages and tracked by the Job Control system (JCS) for the B Plant Facility. Packages will be issued for each type of suspect parts: bolts/fasteners, electrical materials, and piping materials. If other categories of suspect parts are later identified, they will also be inspected for and tracked by the JCS. Where possible, suspect parts will be segregated, identified with a hold tag, and documented on a Nonconformance Report (NCR) and an occurrence report (OR) written.

Proper disposal of suspect parts will be accomplished in accordance with QAB 93-02, including notification of cognizant buyers. The facility will track completion of the action plan and provide traceability and accountability of the completion of the actions identified.

DOCUMENTATION

The walkdown verification recorded in the field shall be included in a supporting document for permanent record keeping. Reporting and disposition of suspect/counterfeit items should be in accordance with QAB'S 92-01, 92-02, 93-002, 93-03, MRP 5.14, Occurrence Reporting, (DOE Order 5000.3b), NCR's, and corrective action per WHC-CM-4-2, QR 16.0 and QI 15.6. Upon receipt of a dispositioned Non-Conformance Report and a copy of the Occurrence Report, the WHC Suspect/Counterfeit Items Coordinator will file the appropriate reports.
## B-PLANT SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS ELIMINATION SCHEDULE

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**Author**: RA Holten/RL  
**Addressee**: President/WHC  
**Subject**: Suspect Parts

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FEB 14 902  
J. N. NANSEN

**DISTRIBUTION CORRECTIONS**: MARIAN CRAM - Ph. 6-4123 MSIN: A3-01  
or cc:Mail
President
Westinghouse Hanford Company
Richland, Washington

Dear Sir:

SUSPECT PARTS

This supplements the direction that was provided by letter dated May 24, 1991, on the same subject. At that time, specific direction for EM facilities had not been received from HQ. Since that time, direction from EM has been received and an alternative approach submitted to EM. That approach is shown in the attached flow chart diagram which is essentially the same approach that you were directed to take on OP and NE funded work.

Please advise C. K. Kasch when the inspections of EM facilities and/or activities have been completed in accordance with the attached process.

If you have any questions, please call C. K. Kasch of my staff at 6-5183.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

R. A. Holten, Director
Technical Support Division

Attachment
QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETINS
QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

QAB #92-01
Page 1 of 3
February 14, 1992

Control and Procurement of Suspect Parts

INTRODUCTION

Millions of bolts, improperly marked as high strength, high temperature Grade 5, Grade 8 and ASTM A 325 bolts, have been procured and installed in a broad variety of applications in the United States. These bolts are currently in stock of distributors and others who purchase and resell these parts; they have also been found in storage locations at a number of Management and Operations Contractors (M&O's), and installed in equipment, vehicles and systems. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) first identified that the problem existed in the commercial nuclear industry in 1985. Asian firms probably started manufacturing these substandard counterfeit fasteners during 1979-1980. The delay represents the time it took to permeate the U. S. Market. Only recently, at a March 1991, Department of Energy (DOE)-sponsored workshop, have listings (Attachment 1) of actual suspect bolts become available. The problem was originally thought to be limited to high-temperature applications (greater than 500 degrees F). However, this assumption is now being questioned, due to the poor controls on the heat treating process used by the Asian manufacturers.

The Industrial Fasteners Institute (IFI), a Cleveland-based trade association of bolt makers, warns us to be on the lookout for an increase in suspect fasteners during 1992 as a result of a Quality Fastener Act (H.R. 3000) enacted by Congress in late October of 1990. These bolts are being hastily dumped on the market by fastener distributors reacting to this Act. The law requires that Grade 5 and higher bolts with a diameter greater than 1/4-inch be tested by a certified laboratory before they're sold.

DISCUSSION

Westinghouse-Hanford Company (WHC) put in place a plan of action addressing measures to deal with the suspect parts issue in June of last year. To date, our inspections have uncovered over 20,000 suspect fasteners. Likewise, receiving inspection continues to find new orders coming in with suspect fasteners in them. This clearly falls in line with IFI's estimates that there will be a continued problem in this country. With this in mind, we are initiating controls up front in the engineering and procurement process to prevent re-infestation of our fastener stocks and engineered systems and components related to safety.
As a reminder of continued awareness and training, the U. S. Customs Suspect Fastener Headmark list is attached (Attachment 1) for your information and use. By now, these posters should not be news to you and should already have been posted in strategic locations on site. Also attached (Attachment 2) is another poster with fourteen common characteristics to help us in the identification of other misrepresented vendor products dealing with electrical and piping system components. Although this bulletin deals for the most part with fasteners, there continues to be a problem with certain electrical and piping components as well. Attachment 3 details the information known to date that has been extracted from Nuclear Regulatory Information Notices and Bulletins.

GUIDANCE

Fastener Headmark Identification

Interpretation of the headmark list has led to some confusion in some instances. Any fasteners which match any of those on the list are to be considered suspect. For example, if you find a bolt that has a manufacturer's mark that is not centered on the bolt head or does not line up with the radial grade identification lines but otherwise looks like those on the list, the bolt is still considered suspect. The grade identification marks, whether 3 or 6, must be equally spaced as shown.

WHC has just received an additional headmark listing (Attachment 4) from one of our fastener vendors that was published by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NTSA). This listing is consistent with the one published by the U. S. Customs and does not incorporate any new ones. The main difference between the two is that this list shows the manufacturer's name that is associated with the headmark. It also addresses the issue noted above about placement of the manufacturer's mark on the bolt head and shows some examples where they are not placed exactly in the center.

Reporting of Suspects

Suspect/counterfeit parts are a reportable item in accordance DOE Order 5000.3A, Occurrence Reporting (OR). It is expected that when found, they will be reported on an OR. Only one OR needs to be reported per facility. If additional suspects are found at a later date, the OR can be updated. When found, they should be segregated and identified with a hold tag and documented on a Nonconformance Report (NCR). These fasteners are not to be thrown away, buried or sent to excess. To reiterate previous messages, they should be sent to: 100 Area, 1723 Building; 200 Area, 2101M Building; and south of the Wye Barricade, 4732A Building. Storage arrangements can be made by calling 6-5604. The vendors should not be contacted directly but should be referred to the cognizant Buyer.
Procurement

1. All specification type fasteners and bolting materials (i.e. SAE Grade 5, 5.2, B, 8, 8.2, ASTM, ASME & ANSI) shall be procured to Impact Level 3 as a minimum. In addition to these requirements, these fasteners must be procured as controlled items requiring receipt inspection. Requisitioners and quality assurance personnel shall ensure that the receipt inspection block is marked "yes" on the purchase requisition. These fasteners are referred to as graded or specification fasteners.

2. All existing and new Store Stock Requisitions and Spare Parts orders should include these requirements. On an interim basis, existing store stocks and spares should be reviewed to ensure that there are no suspects.

3. Purchase requisitions and attachments or ordering data shall contain the following statement: Sellers will ensure that any fasteners with headmarks matching those shown on the attached U. S. Customs Fastener Headmark list are not utilized on this contract. These fasteners are not acceptable and will cause rejection of the fasteners or systems/components or spare parts that they are used in.

   Note: This constitutes a portion of a new QA Procurement Clause that has been proposed for incorporation into WHC-CM-4-2, Quality Assurance Manual.

4. Engineering and maintenance engineering organizations when specifying fasteners for engineered components, systems, equipment, and maintenance and modification work packages, shall ensure that proper controls are taken to control them. Likewise, radioactive and hazardous materials shipping containers and packaging and their methods of transport (such as rail tank cars and other prime movers) shall be reviewed for proper controls.

Awareness And Training

The awareness and training initially launched at WHC was aimed at ensuring that all inspection, crafts, and warehousing personnel were trained in the identification of suspect fasteners. The attached posters have been distributed widely on site. Phase two of this training should now focus on the engineering groups and those who specify and requisition fastener and bolting materials. Two video cassettes are available for this training and can be scheduled by calling 6-7021.

[Signature]
A. J. Fisher
Manager, Quality Assurance
**Help Stamp Out Suspects/Counterfeits**

### Suspect Fastener Headmark List

**No Manufacturer's Marking**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>UNY</td>
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All Grade 5 and Grade 8 with no Manufacturing I.D. are to be considered in this category, i.e., Suspect.

**Grade 5 Fasteners**

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**Grade 8 Fasteners**

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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
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Hollow Triangle (Greater than 1/2 inch dia.)

**Grade 8.2 Fasteners**

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**ASTM Grade A325 Fasteners**

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**Other Suspect Graded Fasteners**

(Not Made by U.S. Manufacturers)

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<th>U</th>
<th>LE</th>
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</table>

IFVACO or INFASCO

Universal Fasteners

Lawrence Engineering & Supply, Inc.

*If any of these fasteners are located, contact your QA representative or J. N. Nansen for instructions.*

A-12
Common Characteristics of Misrepresented Vendor Products Identified by NRC and Licensees

- Nonfactory-authorized distributor
- Price significantly less than that of competition
- Differences in appearance of items in the same shipment
- Unusual box and packing of component
- Wear marks or scratches on painted surfaces
- Pitting or corrosion of metallic components
- Exterior evidence of attempted repairs
- Missing name plate or new name plate on old component
- Unusual location or method of attachment of Identification (ID) tag
- Missing part number or irregular stamping on ID tag
- Improper dimensions
- Ground-off casting marks with other markings stamped in the area
- Photocopies of original manufacturer's and UL label
- Missing UL labels on products requiring such

If any of these components are located, contact your QA representative ___________ for instructions or J.N. Nansen
## ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

**Type of Equipment** | **Manufacturer** | **Part No.** | **Information Source**
--- | --- | --- | ---
Relays | Potter & Brumfield | MDR-138-8 | NRC 90-57
 |  | MDR-173-1 | "
 |  | MDR-134-1 | "
 |  | MDR-142-1 | "

Consider all MDR types relays from Potter & Brumfield to be suspect.

**VENDORS:**
- Spectronics, Inc.
  - Mobile, AL
- Stokely Enterprises
  - Norfolk, VA
- NUTHERM International
  - Mount Vernon, IL
- The Martin Co.
  - Chesapeake, VA

These relays may also be used in original electrical equipment

---

### Metal Clad Breakers

- **Manufacturer:** GE
- **Part No.:** AKF-2-25
- **Information Source:** NRC 89-45

*Used for low voltage applications (less than 600V)*

**VENDORS:**
- Satin America Corp.
- Circuit Breaker Systems

---

### Overcurrent trip Device*

- **Manufacturer:** GE
- **Part No.:** EC-1, EC-2A
- **Information Source:** NRC 89-45 Supp 1

* Is a component of the GE AKF-2-25 Metal Clad Breaker and was used during the 1983-1987 time period

**VENDORS:**
- Satin America Corp.
- Circuit Breaker Systems

---

### Low-voltage Switchgear

- **Manufacturer:** Westinghouse
- **Part No.:** DB-25
- **Information Source:** NRC89-45 Supp 2

**VENDOR:** Satin America Corp.

---

### Circuit Breakers

- **Various**
- **Information Source:** NRC88-46 Supp 2

**VENDOR:** Many*

* "See Attachment 1"
## ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

**Type of Equipment** | **Manufacturer** | **Part No.** | **Information Source** |
--- | --- | --- | --- |
Circuit Breakers | GE | THEF 136050 | NRC 88-46 Supp 3 06/08/89 |

**VENDOR:**
- Bob Ferguson's Industrial Control & Supply, Whittier, CA/Lake Forest, CA
- Lakeland Engineering-Equipment Company, Minneapolis, MN

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**VENDOR:**
- Molded Case Circuit Breakers Co. (MCCB), Temple City, CA
## Attachment 3

### ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

**NRC BULLETIN 88-046 SUPPLEMENT 02**

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### ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

**Page 5 of 7**

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Attachment 3

ELECTRICAL SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

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1. ATS - ATS Circuit Breakers, Inc.
   CAL BKR - California Breakers, Inc.
   ECD - Electro Components Distributors
   GEN BKR - General Circuit Breakers and Electrical Supply, Inc.
   GEM MAG - General Magnetics/Electrical Wholesale
   HLC - HLC Electric Supply Co.
   AC BKR - AC Circuit Breaker - Electrical Supply
   LUCKOW - Luckow Circuit Breakers
   MCCB - Molded Case Circuit Breakers
   MIDWEST - Midwest Co.
   ROSEN - Rosen Electric Equipment
   ROMAC - Romac Supply Co.
   NSSS - NSSS, Inc.
   PANELBD - Panel board Specialties
   VOYTEN - Voyten Electric Co.
## PIPING COMPONENT SUSPECT MATERIALS LIST

### Page 7 of 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>4&quot;, 1500 PSI Pressure Sealed Crane Valves</td>
<td>Southern California Valve Maintenance Company (SCV)</td>
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<td>NRC 91-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterfeit Valve Replacement Parts, Plug stem, stem to plug anti-rotation pin, seat ring, valve plugs, bushings, cages, and packing box components.</td>
<td>Sample-Webtrol Controls, Inc. (S-W) as secondary source such as Cor-Val or Control Valve Specialist, Inc. (CVS)</td>
<td>None, specific</td>
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NHTSA warns manufacturers of counterfeit bolts

By RICH CROSS
Senior Technical Editor

Washington, D.C.—The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) last December started an aggressive campaign to eliminate the use of counterfeit and substandard bolts by vehicle and component manufacturers.

NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation has compiled a list of suspect fasteners which charts the maker's mark of each bolt for easy identification (see chart on this page). That list was distributed to approximately 50 vehicle and component manufacturers whose names were obtained from customer lists seized by the U.S. Customs Service in shipments of counterfeit and/or substandard Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Grade 5 and Grade 8 bolts.

Counterfeit and substandard bolts have been implicated in a number of vehicle accidents and two recalls by heavy truck manufacturers Peterbilt and Freightliner of Canada. Substandard "KS" SAE Grade 8.2 bolts caused Peterbilt's 1988 recall of 556 tractors for steering assembly failures while Freightliner of Canada recalled 364 tractors last year. KS bolts have been blamed for the death of at least one truck driver.

CCJ has obtained a copy of a confidential letter of warning, written by NHTSA on December 18, 1989, that urges against the use of bolts identified in the list and cautions manufacturers never to purchase SAE Grade 5 or SAE Grade 8 bolts lacking a maker's mark. Included in the confidential mailing was a questionnaire to which manufacturers were required to respond within 30 days.

"Failure to respond promptly and fully to this letter may be construed as a violation," wrote Michael B. Brownlee, director of NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation—Enforcement Division.

Ten specific questions relating to bolt use and quality of inspection policies are summarized here:

- What precautions, if any, are taken to protect against installation of counterfeit and/or substandard bolts in vehicles and/or vehicular components?
- If you have used any listed bolt for vehicle or component assembly, which applications, makes, models and production dates are involved?
Control and Procurement of Suspect Parts

Introduction

Since the last Quality Assurance Bulletin (QAB), #92-01 was issued, relating to suspect parts, progress has been made in developing procurement clauses to protect against their purchase, and additional information has been obtained regarding interpretation of bolt headmarks. This bulletin is intended to provide you with additional information or clarification where it is needed. Additionally, recent Department of Energy, Richland Field Office (RL) surveillances have pointed out some areas that need additional attention. The issue of suspect parts continues to receive increased visibility within the DOE complex. Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) can expect a great deal of attention on this issue in the weeks and months to come.

This QAB is supplemental to, and should be read in parallel with, QAB #92-01. If you are not familiar with QAB #92-01, a copy can be obtained by calling 6-7021.

Procurement

On July 24, 1992, the WHC clause committee approved a fastener procurement clause (E34) for the general procurement of fasteners. A second clause (E33) is being revised, and will provide for more stringent control over the procurement of graded fasteners used in safety applications or those fasteners requiring traceability control. The E34 clause should now be used in lieu of the guidance that was provided in Item No. 3 under Procurement in QAB #92-01. This clause can be used immediately in your requisitions for fasteners. Until the E33 clause specifically for graded fasteners is finalized, continue to use the guidance under the Procurement section of QAB #92-01.

The verbatim text of the approved E34 clause is as follows:

Clause E34 - General Procurement of Fasteners

Instructions

This clause shall be applied to all general equipment, components, assemblies, and orders for other fasteners not covered in Clause E33. This clause will be included in all written purchase orders, but is also applicable to oral orders as well.
CLAUSE

In addition to, and without waiver of, any and all warranties, rights, or obligations set forth elsewhere in this Order, Seller warrants that all products, components, parts and assemblies (hereinafter referred to as "Materials") furnished under this Order are genuine and match the quality, test reports, markings and/or fitness for use represented or implied by the Materials themselves or their use by Seller as component parts.

WHC reserves the right to question Seller and require Seller to certify and/or furnish proof regarding the quality, authenticity, application or fitness for use of the Materials supplied by Seller under this Order. Any Materials furnished as part of this Order and which have been previously found by WHC, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, or the U. S. Customs Service to be counterfeit or which are listed by the Department of Commerce or U. S. Customs Service as suspect will be deemed, without more proof, to be subject to the above requirement of further proof or certification. WHC also reserves the right to question the circumstances and make available a report of any such review to the Government.

Further references about suspected or counterfeit parts and products should be obtained directly from the U. S. Customs Service or the Department of Commerce.

To ensure that vendors and suppliers are aware of WHC's concern about receiving suspect parts and to alert them to these clauses, Procurement on July 22, 1992, issued a letter (attachment 1) to all suppliers that have been actively used over the past year for acquisition of these types of parts. This general letter will also be sent to any new supplier that is proposing to do business with WHC. This also applies to oral orders as well.

Fastener Headmark Identification

Confusion relating to correct interpretation of the U. S. Customs headmark list still exists. In the last bulletin, guidance was given relating to placement of the manufacturer's mark on the bolt head. Attachment 2 reinforces that guidance and illustrates some examples of instances where the headmark is not centered on the bolt head. As before, these bolts should be considered suspect.

An additional clarification point is offered relating to the headmark list. There has been some very limited confusion on interpretation of the parenthetical statement for the Grade 8 Hollow Triangle bolt. Some have understood the statement, (Greater than 1/2 inch dia.) which appears to the right of the hollow triangle headmark, to be applicable for all grade 8 bolts shown on the list. THIS IS INCORRECT! This statement only applies to the bolt with the hollow triangle headmark (see Attachment 1, Page 3).
External Surveillances

A recent RL surveillance pointed out an instance where a Nonconformance Report (NCR) for suspect bolts was dispositioned accept-as-is because the bolt head did not look exactly like the picture on the Customs list (the headmark on the actual bolts was not centered on the bolt head). This specific problem was identified and corrected by WHC before the RL surveillance was performed — a second NCR was written, based on the information provided in QAB #92-01.

Although we did find and fix this particular instance, it is possible that there are other cases where either no NCR was written (because non-centered headmarks may not have been considered suspect), or an NCR was dispositioned accept-as-is (for the same reason).

In response to the RL surveillance, WHC will conduct a review of our previous actions regarding suspect fasteners. What follows is a summary of the actions being requested by separate correspondence. A review of the criteria utilized in the inspections that were made previously on Safety Class 1 and High Hazard applications should be made. Where the possibility exists to accept suspect fasteners due to misinterpretation of the headmark criteria or, where the more stringent criteria spelled out in QAB #92-01 were not used, a reinspection should be performed. An interview of people who conducted the inspection should also be performed and documented, to verify what criteria were used. These re-evaluations should be documented, with the aid of your counterpart QA organizations, utilizing the standard WHC Inspection Surveillance Report (ISR) form. Where there are conditions that are now found to be nonconforming, these should be documented using an NCR.

DOE Suspect Equipment Reporting Database

The DOE maintains a Safety Performance Measurement System, which includes a Suspect Equipment Reporting (SER) database. This database is intended to be a repository of information on suspect parts identified across the DOE complex. WHC has access to the SER database (both read and write capability) through ESQ/SAI. I recently sent a letter to WHC senior management, forwarding a copy of the then-current information in the SER, and summarizing its contents. The database contains a wide range of information: re-statements of NRC Information Notices, descriptions of what other sites have done to dispose of suspect parts, and ongoing investigations of specific instances of suspect parts. In some cases, suppliers are mentioned by name — for example, Platt Electric Supply Company is mentioned in two separate inputs from different DOE sites. This does not mean that the company has done anything wrong, and in fact such suppliers may now have better controls in place, having gone through their experience with suspect parts. While the SER may suggest a sensitivity to additional checks of parts and components provided by such companies, the information must be used very carefully.
Scope of Suspect Parts Control Program

The scope of the suspect parts problem is not limited to suspect fasteners, although because of the existence of the headmark list for bolts, it is easy to focus on fasteners. Following is a brief description of other existing controls that go beyond suspect fasteners:

1. The QA Manual, CM-4-2; QI 16.4, "Review and Processing of External Reports," is a primary mechanism for circulating relevant information within WHC (e.g., NRC Bulletins and Information Notices, vendor notices) which is not contained in other DOE databases. Some of this information has to do with suspect parts found in commercial nuclear and other applications. Your response to requests for applicability of the information in these documents to your areas of responsibility is an integral and essential part of our control program.

2. There are a number of characteristics common to substandard or falsified items. It is important to be aware of these characteristics, not only during receipt, but at other times. See Attachment 2 of the QAB #92-01 for a summary listing of examples.

   WHC-CM-4-B, QAI 7.1, "Receiving Inspection," contains a more complete listing of characteristics common to substandard or fraudulent items. This listing was also distributed to WHC senior staff in my recent letter summarizing the content of the SER database.

3. QAI 7.1 also contains a listing of parts found to have been falsified, taken primarily from NRC source references. In these cases, the items were typically genuine components from reputable suppliers, which had been altered or re-furbished and sold as new, by companies other than the original manufacturer (liquidators and other purchasers or excess items have been involved in some cases).

Training and Awareness

The DOE is sponsoring the development of QTRC-based training modules on the subject of suspect parts. It is expected that these modules will be ready next year.

A. J. Fisher
Manager, Quality Assurance
CORRESPONDENCE DISTRIBUTION COVERSHEET

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**Subject:** COUNTERFEIT FASTENERS AND COMPONENTS

**INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION**

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Dear Sir/Madam:

COUNTERFEIT FASTENERS AND COMPONENTS

Please be aware that we at Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) are most concerned about receiving counterfeit fasteners or components. Accordingly, the following clause will be incorporated into any future purchase orders for equipment, materials, fasteners, or components:

In addition to, and without waiver of, any and all warranties, rights, or obligations set forth elsewhere in this Order, Seller warrants that all products, components, parts and assemblies (hereinafter referred to as "Materials") furnished under this Order are genuine and match the quality, test reports, markings and/or fitness for use represented or implied by the Materials themselves or their use by Seller as component parts.

WHC reserves the right to question Seller and require Seller to certify and/or furnish proof regarding the quality, authenticity, application or fitness for use of the Materials supplied by Seller under this Order. Any Materials furnished as part of this Order and which have been previously found by WHC, the Department of Energy, or the Department of Commerce to be counterfeit or which are listed by the Department of Commerce as suspect will be deemed, without more proof, to be subject to the above requirement of further proof or certification. WHC also reserves the right to question the circumstances and make available a report of any such review to the Government.

Further references about suspected counterfeit products should be obtained directly from the Department of Commerce or U.S. Customs Service.

This Clause will be included in all future written purchase orders but is also applicable to oral orders for fasteners, components or equipment delivered to WHC.

Included herewith for your reference is a copy of the list we have been provided by the Department of Energy and are currently using to identify suspect fasteners.

Very truly yours,

R. J. Utley, Manager
Essential Materials/Spares Procurement

Enclosure: Suspect Fastener Headmark List
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SUSPECT FASTENER
HEADMARK LIST

NO MANUFACTURER'S MARKING

ALL GRADE 5 AND GRADE 8 WITH NO MANUFACTURING I.D. ARE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THIS CATEGORY; i.e., SUSPECT.

GRADE 5-FASTENERS

GRADE 8 FASTENERS

HOLLOW TRIANGLE (GREATER THAN 1/2 INCH DIA.)

GRADE 8.2 FASTENERS

ASTM GRADE A325 FASTENERS

OTHER SUSPECT GRADED FASTENERS
(NOT MADE BY U.S. MANUFACTURERS)

IVACO OR INFASCO
UNIVERSAL FASTENERS
LAWRENCE ENGINEERING & SUPPLY, INC.
QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

QAB 93-002
Page 1 of 4
April 28, 1993

Revised U.S. Department of Energy Guidance Relative to Identification of Suspect/Counterfeit Graded Fastener Headmarks

INTRODUCTION

Since the last Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) Quality Assurance Bulletin (QAB) 92-02 was issued, relative to suspect/counterfeit parts, revised guidance has been received from The U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL), which includes a revised Suspect/Counterfeit Headmark List. This list contains fewer headmarks than the one previously provided and issued by WHC in QAB 92-01.

GUIDANCE

The specific differences between the original list and the revised U.S. Department of Energy - Headquarters (DOE-HQ) list are as follows:

1. **Grade 5 Fasteners**—The revised DOE-HQ list only identifies three headmarks as being suspect/counterfeit: **"Y", "KS", and those that do not exhibit a manufacturer's headmark**. The original list identifies 12 separate manufacturer's headmarks. DOE-HQ has deleted the majority of the Grade 5 fasteners from the revised list.

2. **Grade 8 Fasteners**—All fastener headmarks listed on the original list, are also listed on the revised DOE-HQ list.

3. **Other Suspect Grade 8 Fasteners (Not produced by Manabusters within the United States)**—The revised list does not address "INFASCO/"INFASCOS," "Universal Fasteners," "Lawrence Engineering & Supply, Inc.," or their respective headmarks, although they were included on the original list.

What has happened is that DOE-HQ has not been able to substantiate the information on these fasteners that were on the original list. The list that WHC received from RL in 1991 was a composite list generated by the DOE Nevada Operations Office using several sources.

Only those fasteners that exhibit headmarks matching those listed on the revised Suspect Headmark List, published by RL Environment, Safety & Health Bulletin 92-4, (see attached) are to be considered suspect/counterfeit and processed in accordance with direction provided in QAB 92-02.
Based upon this guidance, line and support organizations can potentially expect to see graded fasteners, which exhibit headmarks matching those on the original list in loose lots and incorporated in equipment released by Procurement Quality Support and stores personnel.

PROCUREMENT

To establish WHC compliance with this new DOE-HQ guidance, the revised DOE-HQ Suspect Headmark List must be used as the attachment to procurement clauses E33 and E34, in place of the original list, and be referenced in all suspect fastener correspondence with WHC suppliers.

REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION

All suspect/counterfeit items will continue to be reportable items in accordance with DOE Order 5000.3B, "Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information," regardless of the reporting thresholds established therein, in accordance with DOE-HQ guidance.

Based upon a recent DOE-HQ sponsored suspect/counterfeit parts training workshop in Atlanta, Georgia, the RL is requesting that "suspect/counterfeit items" be the standard entry in Block 13 of the occurrence report (OR) form.

Open ORs and nonconformance reports (NCRs) that document headmarks not shown on the revised list may be closed out at the originator's discretion. New ORs/NCRs should not be initiated for headmarks other than those shown on the revised list.

It is recommended that existing posters, as well as badge-sized aids, previously distributed to WHC personnel, be removed and discarded to prevent confusion. New posters and badge-sized aids (see attached) will be provided which coincide with the revised list. For additional copies, contact J. N. Nansen (6-8393) or C. R. Hoover (2-3625).

DISPOSAL

Future disposal of suspect/counterfeit graded fasteners will require DOE-HQ concurrence, in accordance with the new DOE-HQ guidance. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to reaffirm the instructions for processing suspect/counterfeit fasteners previously addressed in QAB 92-01 with the additional requirement that fasteners must be maintained in their original packaging, if at all possible, to facilitate traceability to the vendor who supplied them.
TRAINING

The following courses have been developed and are being presented through the Quality Training and Resource Center to enhance personnel awareness of suspect/counterfeit items:

1. **Module 1--"Overview."** This class is designed as an overview of the suspect/counterfeit parts problem. Students will learn "how" to identify, "what" to do with, and "who" to report to when suspect/counterfeit items are found. Inspection techniques, equipment identification, and reporting methods are covered. Course materials are presented by lecture, video, and hands-on exercises.

2. **Module 2--"Design and Specification Prevention Tools."** This class is geared to those who design and write specifications and demonstrates the use of clear technical requirements in specification and material requisitions. The "tools" presented concentrate on establishing characteristics critical to product function, as well as critical functions. Students will learn how to reduce reliance on paper certification by understanding the necessary links between product specification and product acceptance methods.

3. **Module 3--"Procurement Prevention Tools."** This class is geared to those who procure products and administer contracts. This course will assist the purchaser in developing vendor relationships and help make the vendor the first line of defense against suspect/counterfeit items. This is done through a variety of "tools" a person can use to continually increase their knowledge and ability to prevent suspect/counterfeit items from being procured.

Module 1 is presented during the first half of the day. Module 2 and 3 are presented concurrently during the second half of the day, with a one hour discussion involving the participants of both modules at the end of the day.

As a reminder, the fastener video cassettes provided by ABC and NBC News and the Industrial Fastener Institute are still available by contacting K. C. Redfield on 6-7021.

PROCEDURE

The entire process of identifying, controlling, reporting, and disposing of suspect/counterfeit items is being consolidated into a new Quality Instruction that will be included in the Quality Assurance Manual, WHC-CM-4-2. This new procedure will be coming out for WHC review shortly.
In conclusion, the information presented in this bulletin must be disseminated to all line and support personnel as soon as possible to minimize confusion and avoid documentation of graded fasteners not identified as suspect/counterfeit by DOE-HQ.

For further information, contact J. N. Nansen (6-8393) or C. R. Hoover (2-3625) of my staff.

A. J. Fisher
Manager, Quality Assurance
DOE Quality Alert

Counterfeit Parts
This Bulletin provides a summary of information that has been disseminated by various organizations within the Department of Energy (DOE) to alert the DOE community that some vendors have sold substandard bolts and circuit breakers to its contractors. Such sales can be a crime. In certain cases, suppliers of these substandard parts may also be subject to the civil penalty enforcement provisions of the Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. DOE contractors have reported in excess of 1,000,000 suspect/counterfeit bolts and over 700 suspect/counterfeit circuit breakers to the Department.

Counterfeit/Substandard High-Strength Bolts
Counterfeit bolts have been found in military and commercial aircraft, surface ships, submarines, nuclear weapon production facilities, bridges, buildings, and the space shuttle. These bolts often do not possess the capabilities of the genuine bolts they counterfeit and can threaten the reliability of industrial and consumer products, National Security, or lives. At Congressional hearings in 1987, the Army testified that they had purchased bolts that bore the headmarks of Grade 8 high-strength bolts but that were actually inferior Grade 8.2 bolts. The International Fasteners Institute (IFI) reported finding substandard, mismarked, and/or counterfeit high-strength Grade 8 bolts in the United States commercial marketplace. In 1988, IFI reported that counterfeit medium-strength Grade 5 bolts had also been found.

Foreign bolts dominate the American marketplace due to their price advantage, and the majority of suspect/counterfeit bolts are imported. Identifying, testing, and replacing these bolts has proven expensive and difficult, both mechanically and technically. Not finding and replacing these bolts, however, has proven fatal in some instances.

Fatalities From Substandard Bolts
A Report of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives entitled The Threat from Substandard Fasteners: Is America Losing its Grip? dated July 1988 stated the following under the heading "Saturn Corporation, Tennessee:"

A death has occurred, in part, because a bolt...broke as an iron worker was tightening it. The iron worker lost his balance and fell, missing the safety net. The bolt, manufactured in Mexico or Spain, was substandard.

The Los Angeles Times printed a story under the headline "Counterfeits Now Nuts, Bolts Issue" in January 1989, which included the following:

Several people have died in crashes involving private planes that officials determined were caused by defective fasteners...the nuts, bolts and screws that hold together an aircraft. The National Transportation Safety Board's computer database indicated there were 61 aviation accidents between 1984 and 1987 caused by bad fasteners. How many of these fasteners were counterfeited is just now being investigated.

And just last summer, three different military planes at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma experienced engine failure as a result of defective bolts that may have been counterfeit...

The Houston Post ran a story with the headline, "Fatal Navy fire blamed on faulty bolt" on March 15, 1992, which stated the following:
A Feb. 22 fire aboard a Navy destroyer that killed two sailors and injured four was caused by a faulty bolt in the ship's engine room. The fire broke out aboard the steam-powered vessel after a stainless steel bolt connecting a high-pressure steam line sheared. A closer analysis of the bolt showed it hadn't been sold to the Navy by any known domestic company, and sources speculate that it might have been a foreign-made fastener.

Fastener Quality Act
Congress has passed legislation aimed at curbing future bolt counterfeiting. The Fastener Quality Act was passed by Congress in November 1990 to impose sanctions upon those who sell untraceable fasteners or bolts. However, the Act has not been implemented. When testing laboratories and regulations are established by the Department of Commerce, the Society Nuclear Managers Group (SNMG) will amend the guidance issued March 12, 1992.

DOE contractors have reported suspect/counterfeit bolts in several different ways. Some have weighed bolts and reported them in pounds, and others have counted the bolts and reported the actual numbers. As of June 1992, DOE contractors have reported finding in excess of 1,000,000 suspect/counterfeit bolts.

Indicators - Headmarks
There are several consensus organizations that have published standards for the properties of fasteners. One of these is the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). The SAE grade or alleged grade of a bolt is indicated by raised or indented radial lines on the bolt's head, as shown in Figure 1. These markings are called headmarks. DOE is currently concerned with two different grades of fasteners: one has three equally spaced radial lines on the head of a bolt which indicate that it should meet the specifications for a Grade 5 bolt; the other has six equally spaced radial lines which indicate a Grade 8 bolt. Letters or symbols on the head of a bolt indicate the manufacturer.

Figure 1 is a suspect/counterfeit Headmark List that was prepared by the United States Customs Service after extensive testing of many samples of bolts from around the nation. Any bolts anywhere in the DOE community that are currently in stock, in bins, or installed that are on the Customs Headmark List should be considered suspect/counterfeit. The headmarks on this list are those of manufacturers that have been found to have sold bolts that did not meet the indicated consensus standards. Sufficient testing has been done on the bolts on this list to presume them defective without further testing.

Posters and Headmarks
Figure 1 may be removed and photocopied as needed for use as a poster and handy reference to known suspect fastener headmarks. Bolts with the headmarkings shown have a significant likelihood of being found to be inferior to standards. Generally, the cost of replacement of these bolts is less than the cost of chemical hardness, and tensile strength testing. Note also that counterfeit bolts can be delivered with counterfeit certificates—documentation alone is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with standards.

The Fastener Quality Act of 1990 will require the registration of the headmarks of manufacturers, and it also will require everyone in the distribution chain to ensure bolt traceability.

Current Activities
SNMG took action in December 1990 to disseminate information for substandard material to field activities. Subsequently, the group developed a plan of action with two purposes, viz., (1) to determine the scope of the problem and to take immediate corrective actions as appropriate, and (2) to provide guidelines for strengthening the procurement process so as to preclude the acceptance of counterfeit parts in the future.

Consistent with SNMG guidance, each site should:
1. Continue inspection of inventories and systems for suspect/counterfeit parts.
2. Continue review and revise procurement and quality assurance procedures so that the problem does not recur, and
3. Continue to detect any new attempts by unscrupulous vendors to supply substandard parts.

Precautions
The following precautions should be recognized when addressing the issue of suspect/counterfeit parts:

Best Available Copy
1. **Selective Testing**—Some facilities perform selective testing of sample bolts rather than have an independent testing laboratory run all the tests required by consensus standards. In many cases, a new counterfeit bolt has roughly the same physical strength as the graded bolt it mimics, but does not have either the chemical composition or the heat treatment specified by the consensus standards. As a result, it will stretch, exhibit metal fatigue, or corrode under less harsh service than the genuine bolt. Simple tensile strength tests cannot be used to identify substandard high-strength fasteners and should not be solely relied upon in performing acceptance tests.

2. **Using Suspect/Counterfeit Grade 5 Bolts in Grade 2 Applications**—Some sites use suspect/counterfeit Grade 5 bolts in applications that only call for Grade 2 bolts. Eventually the suspect/counterfeit Grade 5 bolts will be used in an application that requires a genuine Grade 5 bolt and that application may fail. In some cases, cheap imported graded bolts have been purchased in place of ungraded bolts because the small price differential made the extra quality seem to be a bargain. Given the expense of removing suspect bolts from DOE facilities, the practice of using suspect bolts for any application should be stopped.

3. **Keep Bolts in Original Packages**—All bolts purchased should be kept in the original packages, not emplaced into bins. The packages should have labels or other markings that would permit them to be associated with a particular procurement action and a specific vendor. Approved vendor lists should be checked to assure that fastener vendors on that list have been audited for adequacy of their quality programs recently.

**Disposition**

Consistent with SNMG guidance:

1. **Segregate and retain** all suspect/counterfeit bolts including those found with headmarks that match those on the U.S. Customs Service Headmark List shown in Figure 1. The Office of Inspector General and the Office of Nuclear Safety should be notified when suspect/counterfeit bolts are being retained. These should be retained as potential evidence until specifically released by the Office of Inspector General and the Office of Nuclear Safety for Price Anderson Enforcement. Bolts on the Headmark List may only be disposed of when the above organizations no longer need them as evidence.

2. **Report all suspect/counterfeit bolts.** Regardless of use or test results, it is imperative that all suspect/counterfeit bolts be reported to ORPS in accordance with DOE 5000.3A, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information, Attachment I, "Categorization of Reportable Occurrences." The reports should include identification of the particular headmark, the number of bolts found with that headmark, and the supplier.

3. **Report to the Office of Inspector General cases where there are indications that suppliers knowingly supplied items and services of substandard quality.**

4. **Witness and document the melt down of all suspect/counterfeit bolts when approval is given for disposal as discussed in No. 1 above.**

As appropriate, DOE contractors should also report on the SPMS which provides more detailed information. To obtain a password for access to this system, contact Rick Edwards (208) 526-1099. Suspect Equipment Reports (SER) can be found in the Supplier Evaluation and Suspect Equipment (SESE) database on the ES&H News menu of the SPMS. Only SER representatives can enter data into SER. If there is no SER representative at your site, or if you wish to have data entry access, contact Janet Macen (201) 903-6096.

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**Refurbished Molded-Case Circuit Breakers**

Investigations thus far of electrical components at DOE facilities uncovered over 700 suspect/counterfeit molded-case circuit breakers that were previously used, refurbished and sold to DOE contractors.

The following factors should be recognized regarding suspect or refurbished circuit breakers.
1. The quality and safety of refurbished molded-case circuit breakers is questionable since they are not designed to be taken apart and serviced or refurbished. There are no electrical standards established by Underwriters Laboratory (UL) for the refurbishing of molded-case electrical circuit breakers, nor are there any “authorized” refurbishers of molded-case circuit breakers. Therefore, “refurbished” molded-case circuit breakers should not be accepted for use in any DOE facility.

2. One source of refurbished molded-case circuit breakers is from the demolition of old buildings. Some refurbishers are junk dealers who may change the amperage labels on the circuit breakers to conform to the amperage ordered and then merely clean and shine the breakers.

This situation was brought to DOE’s attention by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which, in turn, had been informed of the practice by the company that manufactures circuit breakers. In early 1988, a sales representative identified “refurbished” circuit breakers at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

A subsequent investigation confirmed that circuit breakers sold to the power plant as new equipment were actually refurbished. The managers of the two firms that refurbished and sold these breakers have been convicted of fraud and have paid a substantial fine.

3. NRC published Information Notice No. 88-46 dated July 8, 1988, on the investigation findings and circulated it to all applicable government agencies, including DOE. On July 20, 1988, DOE notified all field offices that refurbished circuit breakers may have been installed in critical systems. Shortly thereafter, DOE established the Suspect Equipment Notification System (SENS), a submodule of ES&H Events and News on the Safety Performance Measurement System (SPMS). SENS has since been replaced by the Supplier Evaluation and Suspect Equipment (SESE) submodule which includes Suspect Equipment Reports.

4. Some of DOE’s older sites have circuit breakers in use that are no longer manufactured. According to the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), examples of such breakers are Westinghouse breakers with frames E, EA, F and FA.

If a DOE contractor has an electrical box that requires a breaker with one of these frame sizes, that contractor would not have been able to purchase it from Westinghouse for several years. If the contractor were to order a replacement breaker from an authorized Westinghouse dealer, the dealer could not get a new replacement breaker from the manufacturer. To fill the order, the dealer had to turn to the secondary or refurbished market.

Dealing with an authorized distributor does not preclude ending up with refurbished circuit breakers. Westinghouse has announced that it is considering satisfying this market by manufacturing circuit breakers that will fit in these applications.

The solution, as recommended by NUMARC, is not to focus on the credentials of the distributor but on the traceability of the circuit breaker itself. A purchaser can be assured of having a new circuit breaker only if the breaker can be traced back to the original manufacturer.

Indicators of Refurbished Breakers

Typically, refurbished circuit breakers sold as new equipment have one or more of the following characteristics:

- The style of breaker is no longer manufactured.
- The breakers may have come in cheap, generic-type packaging instead of in the manufacturers’ original boxes.
- Refurbished circuit breakers are often bulk-packaged in plastic bags, brown paper bags, or cardboard boxes with handwritten labels. New circuit breakers are packed individually in boxes that are labeled with the manufacturer’s name, which is usually in two or more colors, and are often date stamped.

- The original manufacturer’s labels and/or the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM) labels may have been counterfeited or removed from the breaker. Refurbishing operations have been
Organizations no longer need to maintain equipment. May only be disposed of when the above equipment is no longer needed. The Office of Inspector General is responsible for the disposal of all equipment that may be relinquished. The procedures were followed by use with batteries.

**Disposition**

Products have not been returned to the manufacturer. No problem reported or detected. The products were received and readied according to procedures that were followed and recorded. The procedures were followed by use with batteries.

**Certification**

Model: Certification of all batteries used in the field has been completed and checked.

**Testing**

Testing was conducted and hand-painted the described appearance. The results of the testing were measured to the specifications of the model. The batteries were tested and tested to the specifications of the model. The results were recorded and recorded according to procedures that were followed and recorded. The procedures were followed by use with batteries.

**Recommendations**

Recommended that the tests be repeated. The procedures were followed and recorded. The results were recorded and recorded according to procedures that were followed and recorded. The procedures were followed by use with batteries.
2. Report suspect electrical components to ORPS and as appropriate to the Suspect Equipment Reports (SER) on SPMS. The ORPS categorization group should be identified as “Cross-Category Items, Potential Concerns or Issues.” The description of cause section in the ORPS report should include the text “suspect counterfeit parts.”

3. Witness and document the destruction of all suspect/counterfeit circuit breakers when approval is given for disposal as discussed in No. 1 above.

Additional Information

The Office of Nuclear Energy has the responsibility for resolving the suspect/counterfeit parts issue in the Department. Further guidance as it is developed will be disseminated to the Field Offices.
### Suspect Fastener Headmark Lists

#### Grade 5 and Grade 8 Fasteners of Foreign Origin Which Do Not Bear Any Manufacturers' Headmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>Jinn Han (TW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>Jinn Han (TW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Grade 5 Fasteners with the Following Manufacturers' Headmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Asahi Mgf (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>Nippon Fastener (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hinomoto Metal (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Minamida Sieyo (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Minato Kogyo (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Intasco (CA, TW, JP, YU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Dziel (JP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Grade 8 Fasteners with the Following Manufacturers' Headmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K5</td>
<td>Kosaka Kogyo (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>Tekal Ltd (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Fastener Co. of Japan (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>Kyoki Mfg (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Jinn Han (TW)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Grade 5.2 Fasteners with the Following Headmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K5</td>
<td>Kosaka Kogyo (JP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Grade A325 Fasteners (Bennett Denver Target Only) with the Following Headmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>A325 K5</th>
<th>Kosaka Kogyo (JP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes

- Any bolt on this list should be treated as defective without further testing.
- If any of these fasteners are located, contact your QA representative for instructions or J. N. Nansen or R. Hoover.

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**Key:**

- CA: Canada
- JP: Japan
- TW: Taiwan
- YU: Yugoslavia
QUALITY ASSURANCE BULLETIN

SUBSTANDARD CHINESE PIPE FLANGES

INTRODUCTION

In September 1992, the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) issued a "Special Bulletin" to alert the construction industry of a potential safety and plant operation hazard. A year-long investigation revealed that certain flanges and fittings are being fraudulently manufactured, in China, as meeting specific American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards. These products not only fail to meet the chemical or physical requirements of ASTM, but the manufacturing practices employed are potentially deadly to the end user.

The subject of substandard Chinese pipe flanges was previously discussed in a Lessons Learned distributed to Facility Management in December 1992.

Kaiser Engineers Hanford (KEH) discovered three (3) questionable 8" blind flanges, which were manufactured in China, at 100K Area in March 1993. Subsequent investigation has revealed these flanges were procured and accepted through the Westinghouse system in August 1992, prior to receipt of the NBBI Special Bulletin. Independent analysis of one of the flanges revealed that the process of manufacture was not forging, as required by the governing specification, but rolled plate.

GUIDANCE

In an effort to assure that no more of these products are currently in the possession of Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), all facilities where material is staged, stored, or used should be reviewed to assure that none of these products is present.

Furthermore, WHC Procurement and Materials Management personnel should be made aware that these products are unacceptable and that, if received from outside suppliers, they will be rejected.

If flanges with any of the following identification are found, they should be immediately segregated, identified, and documented in accordance with WHC-CM-4-2, QI 15.1 (Nonconformance Report) and MRP 5.14 (Occurrence Report).

WELD NECK FLANGES

- Size 4", Raised Face, 150lb.(est.)
- Markings: DSI 4-150 RF-A105M W/N STD 075 China
- Size Unknown, Rating & Configuration Unknown
  Markings: B-16.5 072 LEO STD TMI 454 China

- Size 4", Raised Face, 150 lb. (est.)
  Markings: LEO 4" 150 RFWN STD B-16 A-105 TB-511 China

- Size 4", Configuration Unknown, 150 lb. (est.)
  Markings: 4" 150 N B-16 A-105 DZ44 GJ China

- Size 4", Configuration Unknown, 300 lb. (est.)
  Markings: 4" 300 STD A105 57 China

- Size 6", Raised Face, 150 lb. (est.)
  Markings: A-105 LEO 6 150 RFWN STD B-16

- Size 4", Raised Face, 300 lb. (est.)
  Markings: 4 300 STD B-16 A105N W/N 58 China

- Size 4", Raised Face, 300 lb. (est.)
  Markings: 4-300 B-16 A105N W/N STD 4-1 China WW

SLIP-ON FLANGES

- Size 4", Raised face, 150 lb. (est.)
  Markings: LEO 4-150 RF50 B-16 A105N T MI-300 China

- 14", Raised face, 300 lb.
  Markings: 14 300 SO RF B16.5 A105 848 CHINA 02F

- Size Large, (est. min 12"), Flat face, Rating (unknown)
  Markings: B16.5 105N 8O 81D I-406 China USC

- Size Large, (est. min 12"), Raised Face, 150 lb.
  Markings: 18 2 150 RF50 B16 A105 109M1 292 China

- Size 14", Raised face, 150 lb.
  Markings: SXH A105 B16.5 ISO SO RF 14 B913725 China

BLIND FLANGES

- Size 8", 150 lb.
  Markings: QO China 150 A105 90-610 B16.5

- Size Large, (est. min 8", 8 bolt pattern)
  Markings: PF 105 B16.5 012 China BL
APPENDIX B
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

## 1. System Number: B12 Systems

## 2. System Title: Electrical Distribution Systems

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 1671094-DW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

### 4. Instructions:
- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- d. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6.
- e. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- f. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:
- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1081 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (06/21/92), 93-002 (04/29/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/26/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handcarts, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
- A. All 240V and 480V breakers - 240V and 480V breakers are listed in the QAB, and are a personnel safety concern.
- B. Other components (Aux Contacts, Heaters, Starters, and Trip Devices) in MCCs for the following critical applications:
  - 1. Ventilation Exhaust fans
  - 2. Cranes/Elevators/Trolleys/Hoisting Equipment/Doors
  - 3. Air Compressors
- C. Remote starting equipment for items in B above.
- D. Switchgear, Substations, Transformers and Gage glasses - They are listed on the QAB.

### 7. Other Components/Functions:
- A. Relays and motors will not be inspected because installed equipment is not the types listed on the QAB. This is based on knowledge of the Plant by Electricians and Engineers that those components do not exist at our facility.
- B. Other electrical components (Aux Contacts, Heaters, Starters, and Trip Devices) identified for non-critical applications will not be verified.
- C. System components of types other than identified on QABs will not be verified.
- D. Bolts will not be inspected - There are no requirements for high strength.

### 8. *Screen Prepared*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cog Engineer</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cog Manager</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Screen Prepared</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>[Date]</td>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>[Date]</td>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>[Date]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**B-1**
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Instructions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, &quot;100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts&quot;, or &quot;review of procurement records for vendor package&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. 480V Breakers.</td>
<td>A. 100% visual inspection of 480V breakers, complete make/model numbers and compare information to QAB 92-01.</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Record make/model number.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td>37 breakers identified see VSR 05/1/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td>Non Declared Suspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. 240V breakers.</td>
<td>B. Review drawings and identify any 240V breakers for ampcacies listed in QAB which need to be inspected.</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perform visual inspection for the identified breakers.</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Record make/model number.</td>
<td>Done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td>Non identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td>Non identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN</td>
<td>Page 2 of 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Component/function requiring verification:</td>
<td>5. Proposed inspection method:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other components in MCCs for critical applications.</td>
<td>C. - Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Remote starting equipment for items in critical applications.</td>
<td>- Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Switchgear and substations and gage glasses.</td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list with breaker and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. - Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. - Review drawing, CVI or perform visual inspection of switchgears, substations and gage glasses for components on QAB.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-3
## 5. Proposed inspection method:

- Review drawings and identify any transformers for KVA listed in QAB which need to be inspected.

- Perform visual inspection for the identified transformers.

- If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.

- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.

## 6. Action completed/comments:

- Done
- None identified
- None identified
- None identified
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 157/10-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

## 4. Instructions:
- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Hooge or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

## 5. Screening Criteria:
- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), V2-02 (06/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 96-01 (05/23/96) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

## 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

The Communications Systems, PAX, evacuation siren and radio contain no parts which have been identified as suspect in the QABs identified above.

The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

## 7. Other Components/Functions:

The bolts used in the assembly of the Communication Systems are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
<th>12.</th>
<th>13.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>9/15/96</em></td>
<td><em>10/15/96</em></td>
<td><em>11/15/96</em></td>
<td><em>12/15/96</em></td>
<td><em>1/5/96</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log Engineer | Log Manager | Screen Preparer | Date | Date | Date |

(01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B20</td>
<td>RAW WATER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Purpose.
This form provides a record that each B PLANT/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DMM-048, J. A. O' Brien to J. N. Hansen, B PLANT Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

#### 4. Instructions:
- **a.** Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- **b.** Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- **c.** List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- **d.** List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- **e.** Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- **f.** Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- **g.** If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rooge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- **h.** File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS Work package.

#### 5. Screening Criteria:
- **a.** Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **b.** General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **c.** Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **d.** Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

#### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

**NONE**

#### 7. Other Components/Functions:
**SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981 WITH NO ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS DONE EXCEPT FOR THOSE CONCERNING FIRE PROTECTION WHICH WILL BE INSPECTED PER FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION PLAN. (SYSTEM B208).**

### Signature Section

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<thead>
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<tr>
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<td>11/4/96</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

#### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

#### 4. Instructions:
- Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or G. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

#### 5. Screening Criteria:
- **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts**: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (09/29/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **General Plant Safety**: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **Process/Support Systems Safety**: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts**: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

#### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

**NONE**

#### 7. Other Components/Functions:

**SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981 AND DEACTIVATED EXCEPT FOR CELLS 25, 26, 27, AND 28 OF WHICH A WALKDOWN REVEALED NO NEW MODIFICATIONS AFTER 1981.**
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

## 1. System Number:
B20B

## 2. System Title:
RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR FIRE

## 3. Purpose:
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

## 4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

## 5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (12/21/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 Vac MCCs; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

## 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

**NONE**

## 7. Other Components/Functions:

**INSPECTION OF RAW WATER SYSTEM FOR FIRE WILL BE PERFORMED PER INSPECTION PLAN FOR FIRE PROTECTION.**

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*Signatures and dates are present but not legible in the image.*

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**B-8**
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Number: B20C, B20E, B20K</th>
<th>System Title: HIGH RISK COOLING WATER STREAM / LOW RISK COOLING WATER STREAM / COOLING WATER SUBHEADERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. J. O'Brien to J. H. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, crossover, lifting/moving devices, bulk door, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions: These underground effluent transport lines were installed prior to 1981, therefore inspection is not required of these systems.
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-04M-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeg or D. W. Herby immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more nonconformance reports (NCRs), and one occurrence report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in quality assurance bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailablility. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   Procedures are in place to provide backup coverage of system in the event of a system outage and until the system can be restored to normal operation. Therefore, inspection of this system is not required.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B PLANT/WESF</th>
<th>SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT</th>
<th>COMPONENTS</th>
<th>SCREENING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B20F</td>
<td>221BG LOW RISK MONITOR SYSTEM</td>
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</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. H. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/29/93), 94-001 (06/23/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   Procedures are in place to provide backup coverage of system in the event of a system outage and until the system can be restored to normal operation. Therefore, inspection of this system is not required.
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/MESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-DUM-DOE, J. A. O’Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Wartz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

Original 207B pond inlet electric valves were removed and replaced with manually operated butterfly valves before 1981. The outlet valves remain as original equipment and were also installed prior to 1981. Therefore, inspection of this system for suspect/counterfeit parts is not required.
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: B20H</th>
<th>2. System Title: 207BA CBC SAMPLER SYSTEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**3. Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 12710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

**4. Instructions:**

- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire utility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

**5. Screening Criteria:**

- **a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

- **b. General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

- **c. Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

- **d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

**6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:** NONE

The sampling pump base was inspected on January 12, 1996 and it was confirmed that two of the four bolts securing the pump to the base plate were identified as Grade 5/KS fasteners.

**7. Other Components/Functions:**

Procedures are in place to provide backup coverage of system in the event of a system outage and until the system can be restored to normal operation. Therefore, continued operation of this system with two suspect fasteners will not compromise the system function.
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WEES system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DM-018, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1983, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canopy doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC NCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   Manually operated valve stem sheared at/near connection to valve assembly. Repairs were initiated in late 1980's early 1990's. Failure of component could plant mission. Inspection requires entry into interior of non-permitted confined space. Inspect bolt securing valve extension to valve stem for suspect part.

7. Other Components/functions:

   Inside valve pit, inspection of flanges and fasteners securing flanges to valve is not required as this equipment was installed prior to 1981.
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. System Number: B20J  
2. System Title: 216-B-59 RETENTION BASIN

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:
   a) Inside the 216-B-59 manual valve diverter pit, inspect bolt securing valve extension pipe to valve stem.

5. Proposed inspection method:
   a. Perform a 100% visual inspection on the bolt securing the valve extension pipe to the valve stem for suspect part.

6. Action completed/comments:
   Inspected both bolts on extension. Neither are suspect.  
   Risk 1/1/96

Inspection plan by:  
[Signature/Date]

QA Concurrence:  
[Signature/Date]

Cognizant Engineer/Date:  
1/1/96

Cognizant Manager/Date:  
1/1/96

(B Plant/NEST 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B20K

2. System Title: COOLING WATER SUBHEADER

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/23/92), 93-001 (06/28/93), 93-03 (09/20/93), 94-01 (05/25/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:
   SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981 WITH NO ADDITIONAL MODIFICATIONS DONE AFTER 1981.
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/82), 92-02 (02/21/92), 92-002 (06/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (06/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If any modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 450 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   **NONE**

7. Other Components/Functions:

   SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981. IN ADDITION, FAILURE OF SYSTEM WILL NOT HAVE A PROGRAMMATIC AFFECT, AFFECT PROCESS/SUPPORT SYSTEM SAFETY, OR AFFECT GENERAL PLANT SAFETY.
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

| 1. System Number: | B21B |
| 2. System Title: | SANITARY SEWER SYSTEM |

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

### 4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

### 7. Other Components/Functions:
This system was screened for applications where the use of and subsequent failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. This system is not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of this system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>9/21/96</th>
<th>11/11/96</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cog Engineer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen Preparer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B21C
2. System Title: Deionized Water Supply System

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 10710-94-DMM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions:
   None

7. Noncritical Components/Functions:
   A+ TK-SD-III - Pump 2118-P50-1, piping, flanges, and valves.
   Deionization System (2718 3rd Floor AMV) - all components
   Failure of system components will not result in a safety hazard and would not impact plant mission. System does use hazardous chemicals or high pressures.

8. Mitch Bean
Log Engineer
9. 1/4/96
Date
10. Barry Ray
Log Manager
11. 1/4/96
Date
(12/29/95)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B21D</td>
<td>SAFETY SHOWERS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 167/10-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   - a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   - b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   - c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   - d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   - e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.
   - f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   - g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or O. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   - h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   - a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   - b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   - c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   - d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   
   **NONE**

7. Other Components/Functions:
   
   SYSTEM INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981 AND DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY COMPONENTS ON SUSPECT LIST PER WALKDOWN INSPECTION BY M J GUNDERSON

---

8. **[Signature]**
   - Cog Engineer
   - Date: [Signature]

9. **[Signature]**
   - Date: [Signature]

10. **[Signature]**
    - Cog Manager
    - Date: [Signature]

11. **[Signature]**
    - Date: [Signature]

12. **[Signature]**
    - Screen Preparer
    - Date: [Signature]

13. **[Signature]**
    - Date: [Signature] (01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B22/C22</td>
<td>B-PLANT/WESF STEAM SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

The following areas on the steam system shall be checked for suspect flanges and bolts:

- The exposed flanges on east pressure reducing station located at cell 15 in the pipe gallery. Some flanges have bolts and some have stud stock. Stud stock is not suspect. The exposed flanges with bolts requiring inspection are on valve 16P-710-10 and the strainer just before the southeast PRV. DO NOT REMOVE INSULATION.
- The two isolation valves in the electrical gallery (35E-700-6 and 35E-700-1).

The above areas need to be inspected because of the potential for personnel injury if equipment failed.
7. Other Components/Functions:
The west pressure reducing station does not need inspecting because the exposed areas are new and the flanges are fastened with stud stock. Other areas of the steam system, including the WESF pressure reducing station will not be checked because a majority of the connections are welded or threaded fittings or the system is covered with insulation. INSULATION WILL NOT REMOVED in order to keep possible burns and costs as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Other possible bolted connections are not considered to be a safety or programmatic issue. If a bolted connection that had counterfeit fasteners occurred, the chance that the failure would be catastrophic is considered to be low.
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B22/C22</td>
<td>B-PLANT/WESF STEAM SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly who inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of exposed bolts and flanges. DO NOT REMOVE INSULATION TO INSPECT BOLTS OR FLANGES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of exposed flanges and bolts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The following areas on the steam system shall be checked for suspect flanges and bolts:

- The exposed flanges on east pressure reducing station located at cell 15 in the pipe gallery. Some flanges have bolts and some have stud stock. Stud stock is not suspect. The exposed flanges with bolts requiring inspection are on valve 16P-710-10 and the strainer just before the southeast PRV. DO NOT REMOVE INSULATION.
- The two isolation valves in the electrical gallery (36E-700-6 and 35E-700-1).

The above areas need to be inspected because of the potential for personnel injury if equipment failed.

### 6. Action completed/comments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Inspector</th>
<th>Initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-96</td>
<td>E.G.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inspections**

- Located no suspect bolts or flanges.

**Inspection plan by:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature/Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**QA Concurrence:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature/Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-8-96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-3-96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
### 2. System Title:

**B PLANT STEAM CONDENSATE, 216-B-64 RETENTION BASIN, 216-B-55 CRIB, 221-BB MONITORS/SAMPLER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B22B, B22C, B22D, B22E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-OAM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Wender, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:

   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rope or D. W. Berz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 48V VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: **NONE**

7. Other Components/Functions:

These systems was screened for applications where the use of subsequent failure of the suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. These systems are inactive and not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of these systems.
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B23, B23A, AND B23B</td>
<td>COMpressed AIR, Instrument AIR, AND PROCESS AIR SYSTEMS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   **NONE**

7. Other Components/Functions: THE COMPRESSED AIR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (Piping) INSTALLED PRIOR TO 1981. ONLY THE INSTRUMENT COMPRESSOR AND THE TWO PROCESS COMPRESSORS INSTALLED LATER. HOWEVER, FAILURE OF ONE COMPRESSOR WILL NOT AFFECT GENERAL PLANT SAFETY, PROCESS/SUPPORT SYSTEMS SAFETY, OR HAVE ANY PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT. THREE COMPRESSORS ALONG WITH A STANDBY PORTABLE COMPRESSOR ARE ALL INTERTIED AND THUS SERVE AS BACKUPS AS NECESSARY IN EVENT OF ANY ONE COMPRESSOR FAILURE.
1. System Number: B23C
2. System Title: MOBILE COMPRESSOR

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain DA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
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   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:
   SYSTEM FAILURE WILL NOT AFFECT GENERAL PLANT SAFETY, PROCESS/SUPPORT SAFETY, OR PROGRAMMATIC IMPACTS IN THAT TWO OR MORE BACKUP AIR SOURCES EXIST

8. [Signature] [Date]
   CG Engineer

9. [Signature] [Date]
   CCG Manager

10. [Signature] [Date]
    Screen Preparer

11. [Signature] [Date]

12. [Signature] [Date]

13. [Signature] [Date]

(01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B23D
2. System Title: BREATHING AIR

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   **NONE**

7. Other Components/Functions:

   THE PORTABLE COMPRESSOR UNIT HAS NO SUSPECT COMPONENT (FASTENERS/VALVES) PER EXTERIOR INSPECTION BY M J GUNDERSON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Doe</td>
<td>01/02/86</td>
<td>Jane Smith</td>
<td>01/03/86</td>
<td>Mark Johnson</td>
<td>01/04/86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

2. System Title: Chemical Storage and Handling 21B, 271B AMV, Scale Tanks, 276B

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/25/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breaching air systems.
   c. Process/Surface Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions:
   Scale tanks 24A and 25A outlet piping cross connection piping flanges, and fasteners.
   Scale tanks contain hazardous chemicals—potential leak could cause personal injury.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: Components in 211B, 271B AMV, and 276B tanks, pumps, chemical transfer piping, instrumentation, and electrical have been upgraded (1991) but never have been or plan to be placed in service.

8. Mitch Barnor
   Cog Engineer
   9/5/95
   [Signature]
   Date

9. [Signature]
   Cog Manager
   11/4/95
   Date

(12/29/95)
**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B24G</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
<th>Chemical Storage and Handling - Operating Gallery Scale Tanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Instructions:
   
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale Tank 24A and 25A outlet cross connection piping, flanges, and fasteners</td>
<td><strong>100% visual Inspection of pipe, flanges, and fasteners.</strong></td>
<td>All items inspected, no suspects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inspection plan by:**

**QA Concurrence:**

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

(B Plant/UESF 01/02/96)
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

| 1. System Number: B24C | 2. System Title: B PLANT CHEMICAL SEWER STREAM |

3. **Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWS-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/10/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1989, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impact.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:** NONE

7. **Other Components/Functions:**
   This system consists of the underground piping, exterior to the facility. B Plant portions of this piping network was replaced with RTRP resin pipe (non-metallic). Applications where use of the suspect/counterfeit parts could have been used are not applicable. Therefore, inspection is not required of this system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/5/96</td>
<td>John Doe</td>
<td>Log Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/26/96</td>
<td>Jane Smith</td>
<td>Log Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/14/96</td>
<td>John Doe</td>
<td>Log Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1/96</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Screen Preparer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(01/02/96)
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nisenson, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCB; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

This system was screened for applications where the use of and subsequent failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The electrical gallery headers associated with this system were either installed prior to 1981, or the materials are non-metallic (PVC). In addition, failure of one sump pump and/or its alarm system to activate would not go undetected for a duration sufficiently long enough to constitute a programmatic issue or an unrecognized plant safety issue as additional sump pumps are adjacent to each other and procedures are in place to provide routine surveillance of the electrical gallery. Therefore an inspection is not required on this system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B PLANT/WESF</th>
<th>SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS</th>
<th>SCREENING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B24E, B24F</td>
<td>2904EA MONITOR SYSTEM, 216-B-63 SAMPLING SYSTEM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1983 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

These systems are inactive. Applications where use of suspect/counterfeit parts could be used are not applicable. Therefore, inspection of these systems are not required.


Cog Engineer Date Cog Manager Date Screen Preparer Date

B-32
### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/NESE system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

### 4. Instructions:
- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
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- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Wertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:
- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-06 (10/6/93), 94-01 (06/23/94) and 94-03 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipement damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

### 7. Other Components/Functions:
These pits are concrete structures installed prior to 1981. This includes the covers and supports for the pit covers. Applications where the use of suspect/counterfeit parts could be used in critical applications are not applicable. Therefore, inspection of these systems are not critical.

### B PLANT/NESE SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>System Number: B24H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>System Title: UTILITY PITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/NESE system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Instructions: a. Complete one screening form for each plant system. b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5. c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences. d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria. e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence. f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record. g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Wertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility. h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Screening Criteria: a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-06 (10/6/93), 94-01 (06/23/94) and 94-03 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required. b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems. c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air. d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Other Components/Functions: These pits are concrete structures installed prior to 1981. This includes the covers and supports for the pit covers. Applications where the use of suspect/counterfeit parts could be used in critical applications are not applicable. Therefore, inspection of these systems are not critical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Screening Preparer Date: 6/30/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Cognizant Engineer Date: 6/30/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Cognizant Manager Date: 6/30/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Screen Preparer Date: 6/30/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Date: 6/30/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Date: 6/30/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-33
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B24J
2. System Title: TK-900

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DMM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/26/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   Tank B and associated piping flanges, valves and beta/gamma monitoring system was installed by ICF KH in 1994 under design provided by project W-007H. The project QA documentation provides the necessary traceability. Tank A was installed in 1988 by JA Jones. Tank and discharge piping was non-metallic. Inlet piping to Tank A was modified under project W-007H. Therefore, inspection of this system is not required.

8. [Sign]
   Cog Engineer

9. [Sign]
   Date

10. [Sign]
   Log Manager

11. [Sign]
   Date

12. [Sign]
   Screen Preparer

13. Date

(01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF  SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT  COMPONENTS  SCREENING

| 1. System Number: B24K | 2. System Title: 221-271B FLOOR DRAINS/PIPING |

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 10710-94-CDM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS Work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/11/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 92-02 (04/28/93), 90-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/28/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

   Floor drains and piping were installed prior to 1981. Applications where the use of suspect/counterfeit parts could be used in critical applications are not applicable. Therefore, inspection of this system is not required.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B24L
2. System Title: 21BA Chemical Sewer Neutralization Facility

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DAM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roze or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions:
   Electrical - MCC and controls are screened separately
   Fasteners - facility, equipment, mios, nm
      Building structural

Failure of structure during seismic event could result in injury.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions:
   Neutralization Tanks
   15% pumps
   System piping
   Chemical storage tanks
   This system does not have components that meet criteria of
   (continued)

   [Date] [Date] [Date]

B-36

(12/29/95)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title: 211BA Chemical Sewer Neutralization Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 3. Instructions:

- **a.** Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
- **b.** List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
- **c.** Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
- **d.** Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

#### 4. Component/Function requiring verification:

- **211BA Structural fasteners**

#### 5. Proposed inspection method:

- **100% visual inspection of building frame fasteners.**

#### 6. Action completed/comments:

- **OK SLD 1/5/96**

---

**Note:** Misc. other fasteners also inspected - no suspects. MB 11/5/96

---

**Inspection plan by:**

- **Mitch Baro**

**QA Concurrence:**

- **Signature/Date:**
  - **1/5/96**

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

- **Signature/Date:**
  - **1/10/96**

---

B-37
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

2. System Title: HVAC 221B/271B and Outbuildings, 291B stack exhaust fans, and steam turbine

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-03 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   Exhaust duct connection between the 291B filters and the exhaust fans.
     All visible bolt connections, non visible areas were installed prior to 1980

   Exhaust duct connection between the exhaust fans and the main stack.
     All visible bolt connections, non visible areas were installed prior to 1980

   291B electric canyon exhaust fans.
     Fan motor starters
     Over load trips
     Relays for stopping the fans and closing the block dampers
     All Bolt connections

   291B Steam turbine
     Relays for starting the steam turbine
     All bolt connections
7. Other Components/Functions:

Exhaust duct connection between 221B and the 291B filters - Installed prior to 1980.

271B air distributions ductwork

The Heating and ventilation system for the following outbuildings, note equipment in each building will be screened for the system it is associated with this screening only applies to the heating and ventilation system for each building.

- 207B Change trailer
- 207BA CBC sampling building
- 211B Chemical tank farms
- 217B Demineralizer building
- 218B Emergency equipment storage building
- 219B Emergency equipment storage building
- 221BA 15 inch sewer monitor facility
- 221BB Condensate building for LLW concentrator
- 221BC SWP change house
- 221BD Laundry storage
- 221BE Fork lift storage
- 221BG 24 inch sewer monitoring facility
- 272B Electrical shop
- 272BA Maintenance material storage building
- 291BB A/B filter instrumentation building
- 291BC C filter building (manipulator storage building)
- 291BD C filter instrumentation building
- 291BF D filter instrumentation building
- 291BG E filter instrumentation building
- 291BJ F filter instrumentation building
- 291BK E/F filter Process Control Unit (PCU) building
- 271B Breathing air compressor house
- 2715B Paint and oil storage building
- 2716B RR cut laundry storage building

Any failure of these ventilation systems or the 271B air distribution ductwork due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN


3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:
   - Above ground portion of exhaust duct connections between the 291B filter and the exhaust fans.
   - Above ground portion of exhaust duct connections between the exhaust fans and the 291B stack.
   - 291B electric canyon exhaust fans
     - Fan motor starter
     - Over load trips
     - Relays
     - All bolt connections
   - 291B Steam turbine
     - Relays
     - All bolt connections

5. Proposed inspection method:
   - 100% visual inspect all bolts in areas identified on attached drawings for the electric exhaust fans, steam turbine and duct connections to include:
     - Above ground portion of duct and connection
     - Fan housing
     - Fan housing anchors
     - Fan motor
     - Actuator mounting
   - Steam turbine - Inspect all valves and flanges from where steam enters the building to supply the steam turbine, the turbine, through where the steam exhaust stack exits the building.
   - Electrical panel and miscellaneous supports
     - Instrument air panel supports
     - Electrical control panel supports
     - Transmitter supports

The circuit breakers, motor starters and overload relays were inspected as part of the electrical system. See section on B12, Electrical distribution. The motors used or not identified as suspect part in the OABs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Action completed/comments:
   - ALL BOLTS OR EXCEPT FOR MOUNTING BOLTS FOR INSTRUMENT AIR PANEL. BOLTS WIL BE ACCEPTED PER NCR 05-124

[Signatures and Dates]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B25A
2. System Title: Canyon Supply Fans

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 18710-94-DAM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system component whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-001 (08/23/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: None.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   Inlet Filters
   Fans

Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.

Block dampers - Installed after 1994 on project W-007, all of the material was inspected to prevent the installation of suspect/counterfeit bolts

8. [Signature]
   Cog Engineer

9. [Signature]
   Date

10. [Signature]
    Cog Manager

11. [Signature]
    Date

(01/02/94)

B-41
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. **System Number:** B25D, B25E, B25F, B25G  
2. **System Title:** A, B, C, and D filter.

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-04-00M-046, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Haasen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. M. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 02-01 (02/14/81), 02-02 (08/21/82), 03-002 (04/28/83), 03-03 (05/20/83), 04-01 (08/29/84), and 04-02 (09/18/84). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:** None

7. **Other Components/Functions:**
   - **A Filter - Not in service (retired)**
     - Filter housing located in 291B area
     - Instrumentation located in 291BB
   - **B Filter - Not in service (retired)**
     - Filter housing located in 291B area
     - Instrumentation located in 291BB
   - **C Filter - Not in service (retired)**
     - Filter housing located in 291B area
     - Instrumentation located in 291BC
   - **D Filter - Active**
     - Filter housing located in 291B area
     - Instrumentation located in 291BF

These filters and instrumentation were all installed prior to 1980, the only modifications completed after 1980 were to instrumentation. Any failure of this instrumentation due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>9/1/96</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>11/1/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-42 (01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 167-10-94-DWM-046, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 V AC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: None

7. Other Components/Functions:

   E Filter - Filter currently active, but off line
   Filter housing located in 291B area - The filter and filter housing were procured and installed as safety class 1 equipment.

   Instrumentation located in 291BG

   F Filter - Filter inactive/Filter isolated from airstream by plugs and filters not loaded into filter frames
   Filter housing located in 291B area
   Instrumentation located in 291BJ

Any failure of the instrumentation due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B25K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Sand Filter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DOH-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow-up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-001 (03/23/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   None.

7. Other Components/Functions:
The sand filter building - Installed prior to 1980.

   Exhaust duct between the wind tunnel and the sand filter inlet.
   Exhaust duct between the sand filter outlet and the wind tunnel.
   This items were installed on project B-625 as safety class I equipment.

(01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

**1. System Number:** B25L, and B25M  
**2. System Title:** Gallery Supply Fans and Gallery Exhaust Fans

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/11/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-045 (05/20/93), 94-01 (06/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: None.

7. Other Components/Functions:

   **Gallery Supply fans:**  
   - Inlet Filters  
   - Duct work  
   - The Fan  
   - Fan motor and electrical controls  
   - Steam heating coils  
   - Evaporative cooler

   **Gallery Exhaust Fans:**  
   - Filters and filter frames  
   - Duct work  
   - The Fan  
   - Fan Motor and electrical controls

These fans do not service an airborne contamination area. Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B25N, and B25P
2. System Title: 221BB and 221BF Exhaust fans

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 167/10-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:
   221BB Exhaust Fans
   221BF Exhaust Fans

The inventory has been removed from this buildings, any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.

[Signatures and dates]

(01/02/96)

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7. Other Components/Functions:

Exhaust duct connection between 221B and the 291B filters - Installed prior to 1980.

271B air distributions ductwork

The Heating and ventilation system for the following outbuildings, note equipment in each building will be screened for the system it is associated with this screening only applies to the heating and ventilation system for each building.

207B Change trailer
207BA CBC sampling building
211B Chemical tank farms
217B Demineralizer building
218B Emergency equipment storage building
219B Emergency equipment storage building
221BA 15 inch sewer monitor facility
221BB Condensate building for LLW concentrator
221BC SWP change house
221BD Laundry storage
221BE Fork lift storage
221BG 24 inch sewer monitoring facility
272B Electrical shop
272BA Maintenance material storage building
291BB A/B filter instrumentation building
291BC C filter building (manipulator storage building)
291BD C filter instrumentation building
291BF D filter instrumentation building
291BG E filter instrumentation building
291BJ F filter instrumentation building
291BK E/F filter Process Control Unit (PCU) building
2711B Breathing air compressor house
2715B Paint and oil storage building
2716B RR cut laundry storage building

Any failure of these ventilation systems or the 271B air distribution ductwork due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

### 1. System Number: B25T, and B25U

### 2. System Title: 271B Supply Fan and 271B Exhaust Fans

### 3. Purpose:

This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 10710-94-06M 04B, J. A. D'obrien to J. H. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:

- **a.** Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- **b.** Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- **c.** List in Block 5 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- **d.** List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- **e.** Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- **f.** Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- **g.** If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- **h.** File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:

- **a.** Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-02 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **b.** General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **c.** Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **d.** Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

None.

### 7. Other Components/Functions:

**271B Supply Fan**
- Steam heating coils
- Evaporative cooler
- Fan
- Fan motor and motor controls

**271B exhaust fans**

These fans do not service a contamination area, any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired.
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

| 1. System Number: | B26 |
| 2. System Title: | Fire Protection |

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WM-04B, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 5 those components identified in Step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roehe or J. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The notification will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/28/92), 92-02 (02/12/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/92), 94-01 (08/21/94), and 94-02 (07/28/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, fallout doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canary doors; canyons supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 Vac MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   - System B26 will include the wet pipe sprinkler system in Building 2218 and the deluge system in Building 2768 and the wet pipe sprinkler system in Building 2128 including the sway (earthquake) bracing. Pipe hangers used directly for sprinkler systems will be inspected. Sprinkler system hangers contain no components that are considered suspect. They are installed with all-thread rod, nuts and/or UL listed hangers. None of these parts are considered suspect. In addition failure of a pipe hanger will not severely impact system performance.

   The building 2218 wet pipe sprinkler system was installed prior to 1981. No documentation can be found to indicate that modifications to this system involving bolts or any items that may be counterfeit have taken place since 1981, however a limited inspection should take place. The only components that are considered critical and could potentially contain suspect/counterfeit components would be the riser components and the sway (earthquake) bracing. These require verification that no suspect fasteners were used. There are no other critical components in this system.

   Building 2128 contains a small wet pipe sprinkler system. This system was installed after 1981. The only component in the system which could potentially contain suspect components is valve 82-15. There are no other critical components in this system.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   - Building 2768 contains a deluge system. This system was installed prior to 1981. Building 2768 was an organic material makeup facility. The deluge system was installed to suppress an organic fire. Organic material has been removed from the facility and preparations are underway to deactivate the deluge system. There is currently no equipment in Building 2768 that is critical to the operation and support of B Plant, therefore an inspection for suspect/counterfeit parts is not warranted.

8. [Signature]
   9. [Signature]
   10. [Signature]
   11. [Signature]

(01/02/96)

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# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. System Number: 826</td>
<td>2. System Title: Fire Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Instructions:**
   - Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   - List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   - Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   - Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. **Component/function requiring verification:**
   - All riser valves and other riser components.
   - All sway (earthquake) bracing

5. **Proposed inspection method:**
   - Perform 100% visual inspection of all riser valves and other riser components located in building 221B. These items are shown on drawing H-2-366P04. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" with results.
   - Perform 100% visual inspection of all the 221B wet pipe sprinkler system sway (earthquake) bracing. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" with results.

6. **Action completed/comments:**
   - Inspection complete
   - No suspect components identified
   - [Signature] [Date] 1/5/96

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**Inspection plan by:** [Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:** [Signature/Date] 1/5/96

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:** [Signature/Date] 1/5/96

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(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)

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**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: 826</th>
<th>2. System Title: Fire Protection (Building 2128)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Instructions:
   
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   
b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   
c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   
d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/function requiring verification:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wet pipe sprinkler system riser valve 83-S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valve</td>
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<td>1/4/96</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perform 100% visual inspection for suspect fasteners on the building 2128 wet pipe sprinkler system riser valve 83-S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4/96</td>
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<tr>
<th>6. Action completed/comments:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INSPECTION COMPLETE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO SUSPECT COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMM 1/5/96</td>
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<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
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<td>Signature/Date</td>
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<th>Cognizant Engineer/Date</th>
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<th>Cognizant Manager/Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>WMM 1/5/96</td>
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</table>

(B Plant/UESF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B26A, B20B*
2. System Title: Fire Foam System, Raw Water Supply for Fire

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roose or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/22/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

The inspection of the foam fire system for suspect fasteners will also include inspection of the Raw Water Supply for Fire (System B20B).

Inspect the following in the foam fire system for suspect components:

a. Inspect all piping components located at or near cell 26 in pipe gallery.

b. Inspect the piping and component modifications depicted on ECNs 613491 and 613494.

c. Inspect flanges and bolts on the foam system supply valves to their respective cells (10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30).

d. Inspect all sway (earthquake) bracing.

e. The tie-in to the raw water system is depicted in ECN 613491. Inspection of this tie-in satisfies the requirement for inspection of system B20B (Raw Water Supply for Fire, for the foam fire system supply only).

7. Other Components/Functions:

All fire alarm and relay panels including those associated with the foam system have been verified to not contain any components that are considered suspect, (see screening for system B260) therefore no inspection is warranted.
**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

1. System Number: B25A, B208
2. System Title: Fire Foam System, Raw Water Supply For Fire

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:

   Inspect the following on the foam fire system:
   a. All piping components located at or near cell 21 in pipe gallery.
   b. All piping and component modifications depicted on ECN's 613491 and 613494.
   c. All fasteners on the foam system supply valves to their respective cells (cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30).
   d. All sway (earthquake) bracing.
   e. Isolation valve 260-FIRE-1 for the raw water supply to the foam fire system foam as depicted on ECN 613491.

5. Proposed inspection method:

   a. Perform 100% visual inspection of all piping components at or near Cell 21 in the pipe gallery, list those inspected items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" with results.
   b. Perform 100% visual inspection of those components depicted in ECN's 613491 and 613494. List those inspected items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" with results.
   c. Perform 100% visual inspection of all foam fire system supply valves to their respective cells (cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30). List those valves by number on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" with results.
   d. Perform 100% visual inspection of all sway (earthquake) for suspect parts. Identify all braces inspected on "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" with results.
   e. Perform 100% visual inspection of the raw water supply isolation valve 260-FIRE-1 from the raw water system to the foam fire system located in the Operating Gallery. Record results on "Counterfeit/Suspect Parts Inspection Record". (This satisfies the requirement for inspection of system B208, Raw Water Supply For Fire, for the foam fire system supply only.)

6. Action completed/comments:

   **INJECTION COMPLETE**
   8 SUSPECT BOLTS FOUND ON VALVE 260-FIRE-13 (VALVE OPERATOR)
   BOLTS DISPOSED ON SUSPECT PART IDENTIFICATION & DISPOSITION REPORT.
   DOCUMENTED FINDINGS ON NCR 05112A.
   AS INSTRUCTED.
   11/12/96

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**Inspection plan by:**

[Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**

[Signature/Date]

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[Comment]

[Signature/Date]

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[Comment]

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[Signature/Date]

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[Signature/Date]

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8 Plant/ESF 01/02/96

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B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: 8268, 8208

2. System Title: 271B Automatic Sprinklers, Raw Water Supply for Fire

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-04-PM-043, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roega or D. W. Hertz immediately. The cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs). and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1980 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (10/22/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/27/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these Bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   The 271B sprinkler system inspection will include the Raw Water Supply for Fire (System 8208). The 271B sprinkler system is supplied from the 10th raw water header located in the building 221B Operating Gallery.

   The 271B sprinkler system was installed prior to 1981. No documentation can be found to indicate that modifications to this system have occurred since that date. However, an inspection will be performed to ensure that no suspect parts are present. Sprinkler system pipe hangers do not require inspection since they do not contain any potential suspect parts. Sprinkler system hangers are installed using all-thread rod and U. Listed hangers. No potential suspect fasteners are used in sprinkler system hangers. The 271B sprinkler system inspection shall include the following components:
   a. All sprinkler system riser valves and other components.
   b. The sprinkler system tie-in to the 10th raw water header. This inspection shall include valves, and any flanged connections where suspect fasteners could potentially be used.
   c. All sway (earthquake) bracing.

7. Other Components/Functions:

8. [Signature]
   Date
   [Position]

9. [Signature]
   Date

10. [Signature]
    Date
    [Position]

11. [Signature]
    Date
    (01/02/96)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component/Function Requiring Verification</th>
<th>Proposed Inspection Method</th>
<th>Action Completed/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Sprinkler system riser valves and other components.</td>
<td>a. Perform a 100% visual inspection on the 271B sprinkler system riser valves and other components for suspect components as shown on drawing K-2-36893, Detail 1. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the &quot;Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record&quot; with results.</td>
<td>Inspection Complete No Suspect Components Identified 1/5/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Sprinkler system tie-in bolted connection to the 10&quot; main raw water header, the 8&quot; fire water or isolation valve bolted connections and other components downstream of the isolation valve that contain bolted connections.</td>
<td>b. Perform a 100% visual inspection on the bolted tie-in connection for the 271B sprinkler system water to the main 10&quot; inch raw water header. Inspect the 8&quot; isolation valve connection and the downstream bolted components for suspect parts. All these items are shown on K-2-36893 and are located in the operating gallery of building 221B. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the &quot;Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record&quot; with results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. All sprinkler system sway bracing bolted connections.</td>
<td>c. Perform a 100% visual inspection of all sway bracing and associated fasteners for the 271B sprinkler system. List the sway bracing on the &quot;Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record&quot; with results.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inspection Plan by: [Signature/Date]  
GA Concurrence: [Signature/Date]  
Cognizant Engineer/Date: [Signature/Date]  
Cognizant/Manager/Date: [Signature/Date]

(B Plant/USFS 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: 826C
2. System Title: In Cell Heat Detection

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 10710-94-DMM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   The dual cell heat detectors for cells 10, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 are critical equipment, however they do not contain any components that are considered suspect. All single element heat detectors located in the many of the non-organic cells are not critical equipment. Preparations are underway at this time to deactivation these detectors. These detectors also do not contain any components that are considered suspect. It has also been determined (see screening for system 826C) that no panels associated with fire protection at B Plant contain any components considered suspect. Therefore inspection of the in cell heat detection is warranted. The fire alarm panels which supply power to these detectors are equipped with a minimum of 24 hours of backup battery power should the normal power supply to them be lost.

8. 

9. [Signature]  
   Date: [Date]

10. [Signature]  
   Date: [Date]

11. [Signature]  
   Date: [Date]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-BMM-068, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1992. J. A. O'Brien 1/2/96.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify R. E. Rooge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-03 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   
   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   The fire detection system at B Plant consists of the fire detectors and all the circuitry from the detectors back to and including the fire panels. All fire panels in B Plant (i.e. 2718, 2218 and 2918) are considered critical equipment necessary for the proper operation of the detectors as well as the associated suppression systems. Investigation has revealed that the detectors themselves and the fire panels do not contain any components considered suspect. This was verified by drawing searches and personnel knowledgeable about the internals of the fire panels in question. Therefore, no inspection of the fire panels and detection system is warranted.

8. 

9. 1/4/96
   
10. 

11. Date (01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B27.
   B27A/B27B/B27C

2. System Title: Solid Waste Handling

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-D48, J. A. O’Brien to J. W. Hansen, A Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 92-08 (04/28/93), 92-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

NONE

7. Other Components/Functions: System B27 covers the activity of waste handling: physical facilities are included in subsystems:
   
   B27A. Canyon Railroad - The railroad was constructed prior to 1981, and would not contain any suspect items listed on the above QABs. The railroad tunnel roll-up door was covered under system B99K, Canyon Doors.
   
   B27B. Cell 4 - The 221B process cells were built prior to 1981. Further, there is nothing in the cell whose failure would have a serious safety or operational impact.
   
   B27C. Hazardous Waste Pad - This concrete does not contain any fasteners, valves or other items of a type listed in the QABs.

__________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________  ____________________________
Doc Engineer       Date       Doc Manager       Date       Screen Preparer       Date

(01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: B28A</th>
<th>2. System Title: Cell Drain Header</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmable Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item e. does not apply

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item e. does not apply

8. Date
   Cog Engineer
   (12/20/95)

9. Date
   Cog Manager
   (12/20/95)
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: B28B</th>
<th>2. System Title: Cell 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 167710-84-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:

- **a.** Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- **b.** Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- **c.** List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- **d.** List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- **e.** Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- **f.** Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- **g.** If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeg or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- **h.** File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:

- **a.** Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **b.** General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rolup doors, breathing air systems.
- **c.** Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **d.** Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Critical Components/Functions:
None, Box 5 Screening Criteria item a. does not apply.

### 7. Noncritical Components/Functions:
Cell 10 contains a single waste collection tank that is fed by gravity drains. This cell and equipment does not contain critical components as defined in box 5, but are supported by other systems that contain these components. These other systems will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.

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**Signatures:**
- **Cog Engineer:**
  
- **Cog Manager:**
  
- **Date:** 1-5-96

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# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: B28C</th>
<th>2. System Title: Hot Pipe Trench</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**3. Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 18710-94-DWM-O48, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nessen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

**4. Instructions:**

- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

**6. Screening Criteria:**

- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (09/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (09/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

**6. Critical Components/Functions:** None. Box 5 Screening Criteria, Item a. does not apply because the piping system and support racks were constructed or modified before 1981.

**7. Noncritical Components/Functions:** None.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B290  
2. System Title: In Cell Leak Detection

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-O48, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roque or D. W. Martz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/10/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or noneavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria does not apply. The in cell leak detection system is inactivated.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None

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8. [Signature]  
Cogn Engineer  
9. [Date]  
10. [Signature]  
Cogn Manager  
11. [Date]  
(12/29/95)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. System Number:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31 Low Level Waste Handling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31A Cell 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31D Cell 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31E Cell 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31P Cell 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. System Title:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Level Waste handling, Cell 9, Cell 24, Cell 25, and Cell 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Purpose:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Instructions:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegs or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Screening Criteria:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Critical Components/Functions:</strong> None. Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a, does not apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Noncritical Components/Functions:</strong> The Low Level Waste handling system including cells 9, 24 and 39 do not contain critical components as defined in box 5, but are supported by other systems that contain these components. These other systems will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **8.** D. S. Katzler  |
| **9.** 1-5-96  |
| **10.** J. A. O'Brien  |
| **11.** 12-17-96  |

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### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-001 (08/23/94) and 94-012 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Cavity doors; cavity supply/exhaust fans; EPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   These systems are not active process systems. Applications where the use of suspect/counterfeit parts could be used in critical applications are not applicable. Therefore, inspection of these systems are not required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
<th>12.</th>
<th>13.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cog Engineer</td>
<td>J.L.</td>
<td>J.L.</td>
<td>1/26</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-65
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B31M
2. System Title: WESF Transfer

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/13/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None. This system represents a procedure or activity and not directly responsible for equipment so the screening criteria in box 5 does not apply. The equipment used in this procedure/activity will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.

8. [Signature]
   Cog Engineer
   1-5-96
   Date

9. [Signature]
   Cog Manager
   10- [Date]
   Date
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. System Number: B31N
2. System Title: Canyon Samplers

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rooge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/82), 92-02 (08/21/82), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item e. does not apply.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: Canyon samplers do not contain critical components as defined in box 5, but are supported by other systems that contain these components. These other systems will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B31P

2. System Title: Canyon Samplers

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1985.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Merz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmable Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None,

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: The canyon samplers may have the potential for the presence of counterfeit parts but failure will not impact box 5 items b, c, or d.

8. [Signature]
Engineer

9. [Signature]
Date: 1-5-96

10. [Signature]
Manager

11. [Signature]
Date: 12/29/96

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. System Number: E32G (B32)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DAM-D48, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertzi immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (05/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact. Equipment whose failure could cause a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: **Air Dilution Systems Consist of Tubing, Rotameters and Valves Smaller Than Two Inches. These Components Do Not Meet Criterion 5.a.**

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: **None.**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engineering</strong></td>
<td><strong>9/18/96</strong></td>
<td><strong>Manager</strong></td>
<td><strong>11/6/96</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B-69</strong></td>
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<td><strong>(12/29/95)</strong></td>
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</table>
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B32 H (B32)  2. System Title: CELL 26

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. H. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/21/92), 93-002 (02/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.


7. Noncritical Components/Functions: NONE.

8. Signature: [Signature]
   Date: 1/2/95

9. Signature: [Signature]
   Date: 1/4/95

10. Signature: [Signature]
   Date: 12/29/95

B-70
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B 32 J (B32)  
2. System Title: Cell 27

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 169712-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/25/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1981, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: **NO COMPONENTS MEET CRITERION S.C.**

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: **NONE**

8. [Signatures]
   [Log Engineer]
   [Log Manager]
   [Date: 1/3/96]
   [Date: 11/24/96]

9. [Date: 12/29/95]
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. **System Number:** B32K (B32)  
2. **System Title:** CELL 28

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Document No. 20/94-DO-044, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. H. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the inspection plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts:** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1985 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1985, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety:** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, walkways, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canary doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Critical Components/Functions:**
   - **No Components Meet Criterion 5.a.**

7. **Noncritical Components/Functions:**
   - **None**

8. **Log Engineer**
   - **Date:** 10/96
   - **Manager**
   - **Date:** 6/92

9. **Date:** 12/95
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

## 1. System Number: B32L (B32)  2. System Title: Cell 30

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 12710-94-DM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   - a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   - b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   - c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   - d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   - e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   - f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   - g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Kertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   - h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   - a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1981, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   - b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   - c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   - d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Critical Components/Functions:**
   - No Components Meet Criterion 5.a.

7. **Noncritical Components/Functions:**
   - None

8. **Date:** 1/3/96  9. **Date:** 1/3/96  10. **Date:** 11/11/96
   - **Engineer:**  
   - **Manager:**  

(12/29/95)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. **System Number:** B36A (B36)  
2. **System Title:** VV & 1 SYSTEM

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   - a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   - b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   - c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   - d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   - e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   - f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection record.
   - g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. M. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   - h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   - a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/25/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no specification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   - b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   - c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   - d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Critical Components/Functions:**

   VALVES, FLANGES AND ASSOCIATED FASTENERS. THESE PROVIDE AIR TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM.

   **NOTE:** THE PROCESS AIR SYSTEM (B328) IS ALSO REQUIRED TO OPERATE THIS SYSTEM.

   **SEE ATTACHED DRAWING.**

   OUTLINED COMPONENTS ON ATTACHED PAGE WERE INSPECTED - NO SUSPECT PARTS FOUND.

7. **Noncritical Components/Functions:**

   NONE.

8. **Summary:**

   - **Cog Engineer:** [Signature]  
   - **Date:** 9/1/96  
   - **Cog Manager:** [Signature]  
   - **Date:** 11/15/96

(12/29/95)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

#### 1. System Number: B36A

#### 2. System Title: VV #1 System

#### 3. Instructions:

- **a.** Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
- **b.** List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
- **c.** Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
- **d.** Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

#### 4. Component/function requiring verification:

- **Vessel Vent, Air Supply & Isolation**
  - **Valve #**
    - **220-800-1** visual
    - **220-800-2** visual
    - **220-800-3** visual
    - **220-800-4** visual (Insulation prevents inspecting flanges and fasteners on this valve)
    - **220-710-10** visual
    - **220-800-17** visual
    - **N/A** visual
    - **N/A** visual

- **Flanges**
- **Fasteners** visual

#### 5. Proposed inspection method:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valve #</td>
<td>Visual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Visual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6. Action completed/comments:

- **Crane, 2" Gate**
- **Crane, 2" Gate**
- **MASS EQUIL. 2", DOV**
- **Crane, 2" Gate**
- **Crane, 2" Gate**
- **Crane, 2" Gate**
- **Crane, 2" Check**
- **Check, @ Win 22-6-96**

---

**Inspection plan by:**

- **Signature/Date:**
  - Employee: 1/3/96
  - Labeled: 1/3/96

**QA Concurrence:**

- **Signature/Date:**
  -_Maple: 1/3/96
  -_Employee: 1/3/96

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

- **Signature/Date:**
  - Employee: 1/3/96

---

**B-75**

(P Plant/65F 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: 1330 B (330)  
2. System Title: UU # 2 System

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. V. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 and later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletin (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: NONE

7. Noncritical Components/Functions:
   SYSTEM IS INACTIVE. FURTHERMORE, SYSTEM HAS NO IDENTIFIED FUTURE USES.

8. [Signature]  
Crisp Engineer  
9/12/95  
9. [Signature]  
Date  
10. [Signature]  
Date  
11. [Signature]  
Date  
(12/29/95)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. **System Number:** B36C  (B36) 
2. **System Title:** Cell 22

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   - a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   - b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   - c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   - d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   - e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   - f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   - g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   - h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   - a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   - b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   - c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   - d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Critical Components/Functions:**

   **NO COMPONENTS MEET CRITERION 5.a.**

7. **Noncritical Components/Functions:**

   **NONE**

8. **Signatures:**
   - **Cog Engineer:**
   - **Date:** 1/3/95

9. **Date:** 1/3/95
10. **Cog Manager:**
11. **Date:** 1/4/96

(12/20/95)
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title: Inactive process cells</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- B38 Mac. Cells</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- B38D Cell 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- B38J Cell 18</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- B38N Cell 31</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- B38S Cell 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- B31G Cell 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- B32D Cell 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that every B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 15710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Blen to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:
- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the inspection plan, inspection records, and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:
- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems, which protect equipment.

### 6. Critical Components/Functions: None

### 7. Noncritical Components/Functions:
Inactive process cells containing vessels and other chemical processing equipment that has been shutdown with no future plans for restart. These cells and equipment are supported by piping and electrical systems that have the potential for containing suspect/counterfeit parts. Since the systems have been inactivated, they are no longer considered critical systems.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cog Engineer</td>
<td>Cog Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date: 1-5-96
Date: 12/29/95
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B38T</td>
<td>2128 Cask Station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, 8 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. List system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

d. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

e. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

f. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. M. Hartz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:

a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1980 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (06/23/94) and 94-02 (10/16/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Critical Components/Functions:

- **Truck port roll-up door fasteners**
- **Handrails**
- **PPE, CS-1 and CPA cells**

Potential safety hazard during seismic event or during operation if fasteners fail. Truck port used for waste segregation.

### 7. Noncritical Components/Functions:

- **Electrical - Power dist. and Controls**
- **Piping Systems - Fire/water detection**
- **Facility structure**
- **Handrails - In need of structural inspection**

### 8. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/14/96</td>
<td>4/14/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signed:**
- **Engineer:**
- **Manager:**

(12/29/95)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. **System Number:** B387  
2. **System Title:** 212B Cask Station

3. **Instructions:**
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. **Component/function requiring verification:**
   - Truck port
   - Roll-up door
   - Fasteners

5. **Proposed inspection method:**
   - 100% Visual inspection of anchor bolts and load bearing fasteners.

6. **Action completed/comments:**
   - O.K. 3/4/96

---

**Inspection plan by:**

[Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

Mitch Baker 5/96

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

[Signature/Date]

(8 Plant/WSF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B41A, B41B, and B41D
2. System Title: 221B Canyon Crane, Crane Optics, and Crane Camera System

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DYM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1980 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (10/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   Auxiliary monorail trollies - The auxiliary monorail trollies were replaced as an entire unit during the 1980s these are the only items on the crane that might require the use of high grade bolts.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   Original Canyon Crane - The Vendor Information (VI) for the crane was reviewed and no high grade bolts by any standard were identified. The B Plant canyon crane was installed in the early 1940s. The original ASME A325 bolt standard was published in 1964, however other standards may have been used prior to this date. Because no additional specifications are given on the VI and considering the time period the crane was designed it will be assumed that the crane was designed for assembly and use with industrial grade bolts.

   Crane Optics
   Crane camera system

   Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.

8. [Signature]
   CoG Engineer
   Date 1/4/96

9. [Signature]
   CoG Manager
   Date 1/5/96
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. **System Number**: B41A, B41Z
2. **System Title**: Canyon Crane Aux. Trolley

3. **Instructions**: B41D, B41A
   
a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   
b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   
c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   
d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of GC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aux. Trolleys on B Plant canyon Crane</td>
<td>100% visual inspect for all bolts on the aux. monorail trolleys &amp; monorail connections to main frame.</td>
<td>All bolts ok except for 4 bolts located on each cable reel supplying power to the impact wrench. Bolts were grade 5. Stamped with K5. These bolts will be accepted see NCR 05-1124.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Inspection plan by:**

[Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**

[Signature/Date]

**Manager/Date**

[Signature/Date]

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

| 1. System Number: | B41C |
| 2. System Title: | Elevators |

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 15710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Bogie or D. R. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, roll-up doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spray. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 460 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

All load bearing parts on elevator at east end of 2718.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   Non load bearing parts.
   Non person carrying elevators.

Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.

8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 

Date: (01/32/96)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B41C</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
<th>B Plant Elevator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 3. Instructions:
- Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
- List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
- Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
- Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B Plant elevator at east end of 2718</td>
<td>100% visual inspection for all load bearing bolts for suspect head markings on the B Plant elevator. This inspection will include the following: the hoist motor cable attachments and sheaves located in the penthouse, the cable attachment to the elevator, the accessible areas of the frame and floor.</td>
<td>None found</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inspection plan by:**

Signature/Date

**QA Concurrence:**

Signature/Date

**Cognizant Engineer/Date**

**Cognizant Manager/Date**

(B Plant/NESF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B41H/C41H
2. System Title: Chain Hoists and Rigging Equipment

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DNM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1983 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have altered items listed in these Bulletins since 1983, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or non-availability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   None.

7. Other Components/Functions:

   All miscellaneous chain hoists and rigging are inspect for suspect/counterfeit bolt by site crane and rigging.

   [Signatures]

   [Dates]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B93 (A,B)  2. System Title: Process Instrumentation and Control

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DAN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 92-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Failure of the controllers, gauges, relays and similar equipment used in the Process Instrumentation and Control System can produce critical consequences to the facility. The equipment used in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs.

The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

7. Other Components/Functions:

The bolts used in the assembly of the Process Instrumentation and Control System are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B93D
2. System Title: Jet Gang Valves

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Naasen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1993.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Merz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: Jet gang valves deliver air and steam to liquid transfer jets in the process cells. The critical components are the flanges and bolts where the steam and air enter and exit the valves. The only active jet gang valves are as follows.

   | JGV 9-9B-1 | JGV 9-9B-2 | JGV 9-9C-1 |
   | JGV 9-9C-2 | JGV 9-9C-3 | JGV 10-10A-1 |
   | JGV 10-10A-2 | JGV 10-10A-3 | JGV 10-10B-1 |
   | JGV 10-10B-2 | JGV 10-10B-3 | JGV 10-10C-1 |

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: All other jet gang valves are considered noncritical because they are inactive.
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. System Number: 883D
2. System Title: Jet Gang Valves

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe flanges and bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:
   Jet Gang valve assemblies are made up of 4 globe valves mounted to a common manifold. See drawing HW-73123. Inspect the bolts and flanges of the air and steam globe valves for the following list of jet gang valve assemblies, reference drawing W-73676. The air and steam globe valves are the outer 2 valves, or the 2 farthest away from the panel board.
   JGV 9-9B-1
   JGV 9-9B-2
   JGV 9-9C-1
   JGV 9-9C-2
   JGV 9-9C-3
   JGV 10-10A-1
   JGV 10-10A-2
   JGV 10-10A-3
   JGV 10-10B-1
   JGV 10-10B-2
   JGV 10-10B-3
   JGV 10-10C-1

5. Proposed inspection method:
   100% visual inspection of pipe flanges and bolts.

6. Action completed/comments:
   Inspector initials indicates bolts and flanges mating with the indicated globe valve are not suspect/counterfeit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gang Valve</th>
<th>Globe Valve</th>
<th>Inspector Initial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JGV 9-9B-1</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 9-9B-2</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 9-9C-1</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 9-9C-2</td>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>Initial 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 9-9C-3</td>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>Initial 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10A-1</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10A-2</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10A-3</td>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>Initial 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10B-1</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10B-2</td>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>Initial 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10B-3</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Initial 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGV 10-10C-1</td>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>Initial 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inspection plan by: [Signature/Date]
QA Concurrence: [Signature/Date]
Cognizant Engineer/Date
Cognizant Manager/Date

B-88
**B PLAN/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. **System Number:** B96 (A-E)  
   2. **System Title:** Radiation Monitoring

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Wensel, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or C. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts:** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety:** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lift/moving devices, rollup doors, breaching air systems
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCD; instrument air
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

   The equipment (detectors, monitors, indicators and interconnecting wire) associated with the Radiation Monitoring System is critical to the safety of personnel within the facility. The equipment used in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above QABs.

   The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

   The bolts used in the assembly of the Radiation Monitoring System are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.

8. **Names:**
   - [Name]
   - [Name]
   - [Name]
   - [Name]

9. **Dates:**
   - [Date]
   - [Date]
   - [Date]
   - [Date]

10. **Signatures:**
    - [Signature]
    - [Signature]
    - [Signature]
    - [Signature]
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. **System Number:** B97  
2. **System Title:** Stack Monitors

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of this screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-SHM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. **Instructions:**  
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.  
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.  
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.  
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.  
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.  
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.  
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roone or D. U. Wertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.  
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**  
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.  
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.  
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.  
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.  

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**  
   The equipment used in the Stack Monitors are critical to the facility operation. The equipment in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above identified QAPs. The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**  
   The bolts used in the assembly of the Stack Monitors are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.

---

**Table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B Plant Engineer</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cog Manager</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Screen Preparer</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>(01/02/96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/5/96</td>
<td></td>
<td>10/96</td>
<td></td>
<td>11/96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-90
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B97A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>291-B-1 Stack Monitors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3. Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

**4. Instructions:**

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 5 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

**5. Screening Criteria:**

a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). Items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, walkways, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.

c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

**6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:** NO.

**7. Other Components/Functions:**

291-B-1 Stack monitoring

Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log Engineer</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Log</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(01/02/94)
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B97B, B97C, and B97D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>296-B-5 Stack Monitors, 296-B-13 Stack Monitors, and 296-B-14 Stack Monitors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roego or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1988 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 95-02 (10/18/95). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1988, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: **NONE**

7. Other Components/Functions:
   - 296-B-5 Stack monitoring
   - 296-B-13 Stack monitoring
   - 296-B-14 Stack monitoring - Not in service

Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner.

[Signatures and dates]

(01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number:
   - B99
   - B99A
   - B99B
   - B99C
   - B99D
   - B99E
   - B99F

2. System Title:
   - General Plant Support
   - Sign Painter General Plant Support
   - Painter General Plant Support
   - Millwright General Plant Support
   - Pipefitter General Plant Support
   - Carpenter General Plant Support
   - Lauger General Plant Support

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P.E. Rooge or D.W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None. This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions: None.

8. Cog Engineer
   Signature: [Signature]
   Date: 1/22/96

9. Date
   [Signature]
   1/22/96

10. Cog Manager
    [Signature]
    Date: 1/22/96

(12/23/95)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B99G
2. System Titles: Sample Truck

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DNM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. 

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyons; doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCC; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: 

   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   The Sample truck is not considered critical equipment and is no longer located at B Plant. Therefore an inspection is not warranted.

8. [Signature]
   [Date: 01/02/96]

   Cog Engineer

9. [Signature]
   [Date: 01/02/96]

   Cog Manager

10. [Signature]
    [Date: 01/02/96]

   (01/02/96)

B-94
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B99J

2. System Title: Canyon Cover Blocks

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1990.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/15/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors, canyon supply/exhaust fans, HEPA filters and instrumentation, air and radiation monitoring equipment, 480 VAC MCCs, instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

7. Other Components/Functions:
The Canyon cover blocks contain no components that are considered suspect.
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: B99K</th>
<th>2. System Title: Canyon Doors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. **Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. **Instructions:**

- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**

- a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
- d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

- a. *Included in the inspection will be all canyon and overhead doors at B Plant, WESF and 2128.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

- System B99K also includes personnel access doors. These doors will not be inspected because they do not contain any components that are considered suspect. The bifold doors at building 2128 were also not inspected. These doors are rarely used and a visual inspection by the cognizant engineer indicates that the original hardware on these doors has not been changed. The doors were installed prior to 1981.

---

8. [Signature]

Log Engineer

9. [Date] 10. [Signature] 11. [Date]

(01/02/96)
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. System Number: B99K
2. System Title: Canyon Doors

## 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of GC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

## 4. Component/function requiring verification:

*Included in the inspection will be all canyon and overhead doors at B Plant, WESF and 212B.

Inspect all of the following doors and associated mechanical hardware for suspect components,

1. 2718 tool crib overhead door at B Plant
2. 2718 railroad tunnel overhead door at B Plant
3. North overhead door at WESF
4. West overhead truckport door at WESF (225B)
5. 212B overhead door
6. Bifold truckport door at WESF (225B)
7. WESF (225B) upper elevator bifold doors
8. WESF (225B) lower bifold doors

## 5. Proposed inspection method:

Perform 100% visual examination of the canyon doors and the associated hardware. List each door on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Report". If suspect parts are identified provide information on the parts as specified on the "B Plant/WESF Suspect Part Identification & Disposition Report".

## 6. Action completed/comments:

INSPCTION COMPLETE
NO SUSPECT PARTS IDENTIFIED

Jul 17, 96

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Inspection plan by: [Signature/Date]

QA Concurrence: [Signature/Date]

Cognizant Engineer/Date: [Signature/Date]

Management Manager/Date: [Signature/Date]

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: B99L, C99K
2. System Title: B Plant Structural, WESF Structural

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rooge or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/29/93), 93-03 (02/20/93), 94-01 (07/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canary doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
Components requiring inspection under the subject of "structural" are permanently installed handrails and ladders. These items are personnel safety related and will require an inspection for suspect fasteners. The ladders and handrails that have been selected for inspection are listed on the "Suspect/Counterfeit Components Inspection Plan." The remaining structural items will not require inspection. This is addressed in Block 7 below.
Both B Plant and WESF ladders and handrails will be inspected under the same inspection plan. Not all handrails and ladders will be inspected. The majority of the handrails and ladders selected for inspection have been selected based on two criteria. The criteria are the amount of use, and the risk to personnel safety if the subject ladder or handrail is compromised due to the presence of suspect parts. The remaining handrails and ladders to be inspected have been randomly selected. If suspect fasteners are found during the inspection of any of the selected ladders or handrails, inspection of the remaining ladders and handrails will become necessary.

7. Other Components/Functions:
The roofs, walls and floors of the B Plant and WESF facilities do not require an inspection. These structures were constructed prior to 1981. No documentation can be found (work packages, EVMs) to indicate that modifications or design changes made to these structures after 1981 involve suspect fasteners. No structural deficiencies have been previously identified. There is currently a roof inspection program for Hanford facilities. Documentation is available to verify that the safety inspections for the roofs (inspection plan WHC-SD-GM-ER-30012) of all major buildings at B Plant and WESF are current.

8. [Signature]
   Big Engineer

9. [Signature]
   Date: 01/26/96

10. [Signature]
    Log Manager
    Date: 01/26/96

11. [Signature]
    Date: 01/26/96
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Number: B99L, C99K</th>
<th>System Title: B Plant Structural, WESF Structural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

## 4. Component/function requiring verification:

- The following permanently installed ladders and handrails shall be inspected. (System B99L is B Plant ladders of handrails, System C99K is WESF ladders or handrails).
- **1. B Plant 2718 roof ladder**
- **2. B Plant railroad tunnel access**
- **3. WESF East lower roof access**
- **4. WESF South lower roof access**
- **5. WESF West upper roof access**
- **6. East Crane Access**
- **7. West Crane Access**
- **8. B Plant R-13 Roof access ladder**
- **9. B Plant building 2128 upper roof access**
- **10. B Plant building 2128 lower roof access**
- **11. WESF transmitter room #2 access**
- **12. WESF transmitter room #1 access**
- **13. WESF pool cell Handrail**
- **14. WESF pool cell catwalk handrail**
- **15. B Plant #11 inside stairwell handrails**
- **16. B Plant #11 outside stairwell at entrance**
- **17. B Plant #13 inside stairwell handrails**
- **18. B Plant #13 outside stairwell at entrance**

## 5. Proposed inspection method:

Perform a 100% visual inspection of the fasteners that anchor the permanently installed ladders and handrails listed. List each ladder and handrail and the location of each on the "Counterfeit/Suspect Part Inspection Record" and record results of inspection.

## 6. Action completed/comments:

**INSPECTION COMPLETE, NO SUSPECT COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED**

Sign: [Signature]

Date: 1/9/96

QA Concurrence:

Sign: [Signature]

Date: 1/6/96

Cognizant Engineer/Date:

Sign: [Signature]

Date: 1/7/96

Cognizant Manager/Date:

Sign: [Signature]

Date: 1/7/96

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B-99

(WHC-SD-WM-IP-009, Rev. 0)
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-001 (02/14/92), 92-002 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-001 (08/23/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   Expansion joints contain no components that are considered suspect. Therefore an inspection is not warranted.

8. [Signature]
   Cog Engineer

9. [Date]
   Date

10. [Signature]
    Log Manager

11. [Date]
    Date

(01/02/94)
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>B99P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Compressed Gas Storage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3. Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1999.

**4. Instructions:**

- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- D. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

**5. Screening Criteria:**

- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

**6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

None

**7. Other Components/Functions:**

The compressed gas storage racks are not considered critical equipment for plant operation. Failure of a fastener in the application in which they are used is extremely unlikely.

---

**8. Signatures:**

- **9. Date:**
  - [Date]
- **10. Signatures:**
  - [Signature]
  - [Signature]
- **11. Date:**
  - [Date]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C12,C12B,C12D,C12F thru P</td>
<td>Electrical Distribution Systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-OM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rohe or D. W. Hetz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1981, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breaching air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   A. All 240V and 480V breakers - 240V and 480V breakers are listed in the QAB, and are a personnel safety concern.
   B. Other Components (Aux Contacts, Heaters, Starters, and Trip Devices) in MCCs for the following critical applications:
      1. Ventilation Exhaust fans
      2. Cranes/Elevators/Trolleys/Hoisting Equipment/Doors
      3. Air Compressors
      4. Pool Cell Pumps
   C. Remote starting equipment for items in B above.
   D. Switchgear, Substations, Transformers and Gage glasses - They are listed on the QAB.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   A. Relays and motors will not be inspected because installed equipment is not the types listed on the QAB. This is based on knowledge of the Plant by Electricians and Engineers that those components do not exist at our facility.
   B. Other electrical components (Aux Contacts, Heaters, Starters, and Trip Devices) identified for non critical applications will not be verified.
   C. System components of types other than identified on QABs will not be verified.
   D. Bolts will not be inspected - There are no requirements for high strength
**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

1. **System Number:** 812 System  
2. **System Title:** Electrical Distribution Systems

3. **Instructions:**  
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.  
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.  
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".  
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. **Component/function requiring verification:**  
   A. **480V Breakers.**

5. **Proposed inspection methods:**  
   A.  
      - 100% visual inspection of 480V breakers, complete make/model numbers and compare information to QAB 92-01.  
      - Record make/model number.  
      - If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.  
      - If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.

   B.  
      - Review drawings and identify any 240V breakers for ampacities listed in QAB which need to be inspected.  
      - Perform visual inspection for the identified breakers.  
      - Record make/model number.  
      - If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.  
      - If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.

6. **Action completed/comments:**  
   - Done  
   - 32 breakers identified. see NCR 05/24  
   - 1 breaker identified. see NCR 05/25  
   - Done  
   - Done  
   - None identified  
   - None identified
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN</strong></th>
<th><strong>Page 2 of 3</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Component/function requiring verification:</strong></td>
<td><strong>5. Proposed inspection method:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other components in MCCs for critical applications.</td>
<td>C. - Review drawings and identify any components associated with critical applications (see block 6b of screening form).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perform visual inspection of auxiliary contacts, heaters, starters and trip devices identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list with breaker and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Remote starting equipment for items in critical applications.</strong></td>
<td><strong>E. Switchgear and substations and gage glasses.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Review drawing, CVI or perform visual inspection of switchgears, substations and gage glasses for components on QAB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list, then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify on attached list and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6. Action completed/comments:**

- Done
- Done
- None identified
- None identified
- None identified
- None identified
- Done
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Component/Function Requiring Verification</th>
<th>Proposed Inspection Method</th>
<th>Action Completed/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Transformers</td>
<td>- Review drawings and identify any transformers for KVA listed in QAB which need to be inspected.</td>
<td>Done, None identified, None identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Perform visual inspection for the identified transformers.</td>
<td>None identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- If data matches an item on the suspect list then perform inspection per attached inspection criteria list (from QAB 93-002) and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td>None identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- If any item is suspect after inspection is performed then declare component suspect and identify as such on inspection form.</td>
<td>None identified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inspection Plan by:**

R. Kearnedy 1/2/96

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

W. Washell 1/2/96

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

B. May 1/2/96

**QA Concurrence:**

W. Washell 1/2/96

**Signature/Date:**

W. Washell 1/2/96
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C12E</th>
<th>2. System Title: EMERGENCY 480 VAC DIESEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DHM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roche or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/29/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (06/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPAC filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmable Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

The equipment mentioned below is located in the diesel generator building. The diesel generator and related components are safety class 2 according to WSH-DM-46, Safety Analysis Manual. The diesel generator is required by the Operational Safety Requirement, 11.4.2, WESF Ventilation Systems, in the Waste Encapsulation & Storage Facility (WESF) Safety Analysis Report (SAR), SD-WH-SAR-005. The diesel generator functions as a backup electrical power source to critical systems in the event of loss of normal power to those systems. The bolts which secure the following shall be visually inspected for suspect/components according to the QABs mentioned above:

1) the engine to the generator and both units to the floor,
2) the diesel engine cooling system electric fan motor to the mounting device and this device to the floor,
3) the battery charger to the wall,
4) the Automatic Transfer Switches (ATSs) and their cabinets to the wall or floor,
5) the electrical distribution panel to the wall,
6) the unit heater to the top of the ATS cabinet,
7) the electric loads sequencer panel to the wall.

The 120 volt electrical relays and 480 volt circuit breakers in the diesel generator control cabinet, the electric load sequencer panel, and the automatic transfer switches cabinets shall be visually inspected to verify they are not counterfeit per the QABs mentioned above.

The engine cooling system 480 volt motor and its thermal trip heaters are of a type not specified on the QABs above.

7. Other Components/Functions:

The 120 volt circuit breakers in the diesel generator lighting panel distribute power to the lighting, the engine water and oil heaters, the battery charger, and the fuel line heat trace. These circuit breakers were not inspected, since there are no 120 volt circuit breakers specified as suspect/counterfeit components on the QABs identified above.

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-106

(01/02/96)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C12E</th>
<th>2. System Title: EMERGENCY 480 VAC DIESEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

#### 4. Component/Function requiring verification:

The bolts which secure the following shall be inspected for head markings:

1. The engine to the generator and both units to the floor,
2. The diesel engine cooling system electric fan motor to the mounting device and this device to the floor,
3. The battery charger to the wall,
4. The Automatic Transfer Switches (ATS) and their cabinets to the wall or floor,
5. The electrical distribution panel to the wall,
6. The unit heater to the top of the ATS cabinet,
7. The electric loads sequencer panel to the wall,

The 120 volt electrical relays in the diesel generator control cabinet, the electric load sequencer panel, and the automatic transfer switches cabinets shall be visually inspected.

The 480 volt circuit breakers in the diesel generator control cabinet and the automatic transfer switches cabinets shall be visually inspected.

The cooling fan motor shall be inspected.

#### 5. Proposed inspection methods:

- **5. The bolts shall be visually inspected.** The actual bolt head markings will be compared with the illustrations on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.
- **6. The relays shall be visually inspected.** The manufacturer and model will be compared with the types identified on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.
- **7. The circuit breakers shall be visually inspected.** The manufacturer and model will be compared with the types identified on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.
- **8. The motor shall be visually inspected.** Compare the make and model of the motor to the vendor information and the types identified on the QABs to determine if they are suspect.

#### 6. Action completed/comments:

- **Inspection of bolts completed. No suspect bolts found.**
- **Inspection of relays completed. No suspect relays found.**
- **Inspection of circuit breakers completed. No suspect circuit breakers found.** Since visual inspection did not provide desired results, the vendor information was relied upon for verification.
- **Inspection of motor completed. The motor is not suspect/counterfeit.**
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C15 /A/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. H. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

## 4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.

b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.

c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.

d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.

e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.

f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.

g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or C. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.

h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

## 5. Screening Criteria:

a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.

b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollover doors, breathing air systems.

c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCCs; instrument air.

d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

## 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

The Communications Systems, PAX, evacuation siren and radio contain no parts which have been identified as suspect in the QABs identified above.

The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

## 7. Other Components/Functions:

The bolts used in the assembly of the Communication Systems are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C20</td>
<td>RAW WATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20A</td>
<td>RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR PROCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20B</td>
<td>RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR FIRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B20L</td>
<td>EMERGENCY BACKUP WELLS (282B AND 282BA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-04M-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, 'B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Martin immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (05/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1986, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Plant/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which must protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   System use: pool cell cooling, process fire sprays (OSR)

Components requiring verification:
   Bolts (including piping supports), flanges, valves

7. Other Components/Functions:

8. [Signature]
    Cog Engineer
8. [Signature]
    Cog Manager

9. 11/4/94
    Date

10. 11/4/96
    Date

(01/02/96)
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C20</td>
<td>RAW WATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20A</td>
<td>RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR PROCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C20B</td>
<td>RAW WATER SUPPLY FOR FIRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

## 4. Component/function requiring verification:

- **Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators)**
- **Flanges**
- **Valves**

## 5. Proposed inspection method:

Walk down and visually inspect all items listed in column 4 for the raw water line in all areas of WESF which are not buried or in high radiation areas or air borne areas:

- pool cell area
- operating gallery
- cold manipulator shop
- AMU
- Manipulator repair shop
- East transmitter room
- West transmitter room
- 225BC
- Service gallery/truck port
- outside south wall of 225B
- HVAC room
- 2B2B
- 2B2BA

Decision to inspect canyon, A cell air lock and process cells A - G will be made after results of above inspections (ALARA).

**NOTE:** Check bolts used to assemble valves

---

**6. Action completed/comments:**

- Bolts found on TIPLINE/REPORTED UNDER C2Y
  - OK
- RSS VALUE ON MATTE. REPORTED UNDER C2Y
  - OK
- N/A, FNG 6/45 OK
  - OK
- 

---

**Inspection plan by:**  
[Signature/Date]

**OA Concurrence:**  
[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**  
[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**  
[Signature/Date]
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C21</td>
<td>SANITARY WATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C21A</td>
<td>SANITARY WATER SUPPLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C21B</td>
<td>SAFETY SHOWERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C21C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DNW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Instructions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.</td>
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<tr>
<th>5. Screening Criteria:</th>
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<td>c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air</td>
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<td>d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment</td>
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<tr>
<th>6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USE: fire sprays (OSR), safety showers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Components requiring verification:
Bolts (including piping supports), flanges, valves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Other Components/Functions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dog Engineer</td>
<td>1-4-96</td>
<td>Dog Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(01/02/96)
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. System Number: C21/C21A/C21C
2. System Title: Sanitary Water

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:
   - Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports)
   - Flanges
   - Valves

5. Proposed inspection method:
   - line in all areas of WESF which are not buried or in high radiation areas or air borne areas.
     - pool cell area
     - operating gallery
     - cold manipulator shop
     - AMU
     - Manipulator repair shop
     - East transmitter room
     - West transmitter room
     - 225BC
     - Service gallery/truck port
     - outside south wall of 225B
     - HVAC room
     - 282B
     - 282BA

Decision to inspect canyon, A cell air lock and process cells A - G will be made after results of above inspections (ALARA).

NOTE: Check bolts used to assemble valves

6. Action completed/comments:
   - pool cell area: OK
   - operating gallery: OK
   - cold manipulator shop: OK
   - AMU: N/A
   - Manipulator repair shop: OK
   - East transmitter room: N/A
   - West transmitter room: OK
   - 225BC: OK
   - Service gallery/truck port: OK
   - outside south wall of 225B: N/A
   - HVAC room: OK
   - 282B: N/A
   - 282BA: N/A

Inspection plan by: [Signature/Date]
QA Concurrence: [Signature/Date]
Consultant Manager/Date: [Signature/Date]

B-112
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C21B
2. System Title: Sanitary sewer

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DNM-048, J. A. O’Brian to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   None

7. Other Components/Functions:
   No inspection required.

This system drains the change rooms and water from none contaminated areas. The majority of this system is imbedded in concrete or buried.

(C) 1996

B-113
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number:
   - C23
   - C23A
   - C23B
   - C23C

2. System Title:
   - COMPRESSED AIR
   - INSTRUMENT AIR
   - PROCESS AIR
   - BREATHING AIR

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-048, J. A. imrench to J. R. Hansen, Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in Step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the inspection record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or J. J. Hertz immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one occurrence report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (05/21/92), 93-02 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, roll-up doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 460 VAC MCBs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavilability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Components requiring verification: Bolts (including piping supports), flanges, valves

7. Other Components/Functions:

8. Signature: [Signatures and dates]

9. Date: [Date]

10. [Signature]

11. Date: [Date]

B-114
## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

### 1. System Number:
- C23
- C23A
- C23B
- C23C

### 2. System Title:
- COMPRESSED AIR
- INSTRUMENT AIR
- PROCESS AIR
- BREATHING AIR

### 3. Instructions:
- a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
- b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
- c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
- d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

### 4. Component/function requiring verification:
- Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports)
- Flanges
- Valves

### 5. Proposed inspection method:
- Follow lines in all WESF areas listed which are not burned or in high radiation areas or air borne areas.
  - 22SB
  - 22SF
  - HVAC ROOM
  - OPERATING GALLERY
  - AMU
  - MANIPULATOR REPAIR SHOP
  - EAST TRANSMITTER ROOM
  - WEST TRANSMITTER ROOM
  - SERVICE GALLERY/TRUCK PORT
  - POOL CELL AREA

Decision to inspect conyam. A cell air lock and process cells A - G will be made after result of above inspections (ALARA).

NOTE: Check bolts used to assemble valves

### 6. Action completed/comments:
- OK
- OK
- OK
- OK
- OK

---

**Signature/Date**
- Cognizant Engineer/Date: [Signature/Date]
- Cognizant Manager/Date: [Signature/Date]

---

**B-115**
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C24</td>
<td>COLD CHEMICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C24A</td>
<td>WESF AMU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:
- **a.** Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- **b.** Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- **c.** List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- **d.** List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- **e.** Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- **f.** Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- **g.** If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- **h.** File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:
- **a.** Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **b.** General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **c.** Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **d.** Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or unavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
This system (C24) includes the chemical and deionized distribution lines in WESF. System C24A is for the AMU area in general.

Components requiring verification: Bolts for all uses and valves.

### 7. Other Components/Functions:
No flanges exist in these systems/area which are currently on the suspect list.

### 8. Signature and Date:
**Signature:** [Signature]
**Date:** 9/4/94
**Signature:** [Signature]
**Date:** 10/24/94
**Signature:** [Signature]
**Date:** 11/8/94

---

(01/02/96)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C24</td>
<td>C24A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COLD CHEMICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WESF AMU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

#### 4. Component/function requiring verification:

- **Bolts** (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators)
- **Valves** (only location of valves with sizes matching those on suspect list is in AMU by TK-210)

#### 5. Proposed inspection method:

100% visual inspection of all bolts in areas not requiring "whites" nor can not be inspected without a lift device or scaffolding.

AMU

Pool Cell

Operating gallery

The results of the above inspections will determine if other areas will be inspected.

#### 6. Action completed/comments:

- **Pool Cell - Initial inspecting did not include all bolt types. Review results of attached inspector's record.**
- 28 bolts

---

**Inspection plan by:**

[Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

[Signature/Date]

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25

2. System Title: HVAC 225B AND OUT BUILDINGS

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify D. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/16/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or mitigate operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

This system is a general catch all for the C25* systems. All necessary inspections will be covered in each of the other systems with this base number.

ALL "OUT BUILDINGS" WILL BE CHECKED AS PART OF OTHER SYSTEMS.

7. Other Components/Functions:

---

8. **Tom Ceoney**
   Cog Engineer

9. 11/5/96
   Date

10. **J. O'Brien**
    Cog Manager

11. 11/5/96
    Date

(01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25A

2. System Title: KI SUPPLY SYSTEM

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16/10-94-ONX-008, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Merz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more NCRs, and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1991 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/25/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these Bulletins since 1990, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   None

7. Other Components/Functions:
   All components. The KI supply system provides fresh air to WESF areas with a potential for radiological contamination. Failure of this system would not have a critical impact on facility.

   Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the KI ventilation zones, but this would not significantly increase the risk of contamination spread.

   Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.

8. [signature]

9. 11/5/96

10. [signature]

11. 11/5/96
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25B
2. System Title: K2 SUPPLY SYSTEM

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-0048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1996.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, Inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (05/28/93), 93-03 (05/25/93), 94-01 (08/25/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these Bulletins since 1988, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   All components. The K2 supply system provides fresh air to uncontaminated areas within WESF. Failure of this system would not have a critical impact on facility.

   Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the K2 ventilation zones, but this would not significantly increase the risk of contamination spread.

   Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.

8. [Signature: Tom Creamer]
   Date: 11/15/96
   Cog Engineer

9. [Signature: ]
   Date: 11/15/96

10. [Signature: ]
    Date: 11/15/96
    Cog Manager

11. [Signature: ]
    Date: 01/02/96

B-120
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

| 1. System Number: | C25C |
| 2. System Title:  | K3 SUPPLY SYSTEM |

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/16/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting devices, rollup doors, breaching air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 400 VAC Mics; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

All components. The K3 supply system provides fresh air to contaminated areas within WESF. Failure of this system would not have a critical impact on facility.

Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the K3 ventilation zones, but this would actually tend to decrease the risk of contamination spread by increasing a favorable pressure differential (increasing the vacuum in the canyon and process cells).

Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tom Casey</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>William</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(01/02/96)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(01/02/96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-121
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25D

2. System Title: K4 SUPPLY SYSTEM

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or O. U. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, walkways, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, Breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

   All components. The K4 supply system provides fresh air to the capsule storage area (Pool Cells), an uncontaminated area within WESF. Failure of this system would not have a critical impact on facility.

   Sudden loss of airflow would result in a short-term reduction in the ambient pressure within the capsule storage area, but this would not significantly increase the risk of contamination spread.

   Other functions include heating and cooling, whose failure would not have a critical safety or operational impact.

8. [Signature]
   Date: 1/5/96
   [Name]
   [Title]

9. [Signature]
   Date: 11/5/96
   [Name]
   [Title]

10. [Signature]
    Date: 01/02/96
    [Name]
    [Title]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 15710-94-DWE-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (OABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 02-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (06/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air
   d. Equipment with Prognostic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   The important function of the K1 exhaust system is to prevent hydrogen buildup in the capsule storage area. In order to ensure continued exhaust function, the duct must remain intact from the capsule storage area to the fans. The duct downstream of the capsule storage area is underground, and therefore, would not fail due to substandard fasteners.

Components requiring inspection: Exhaust fans and exhaust duct immediately upstream of the fans. Specific potential suspect items include: Bolts located in duct connections and fan housing. In the supporting structure.

The pool cell air dilution line will be inspected as required as part of System C31C.

7. Other Components/Functions:

Ductwork inside the building. Because K1 services only potentially contaminated areas, a failure of one or more bolts could cause in-leakage to the duct, but would not result in any spread of contamination. (See additional discussion in Block 6).
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C25E</td>
<td>K1 exhaust system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component/function requiring verification:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K1 Exhaust fans and exhaust duct, immediately upstream of the fans (between K1 filters and fans). Specific potential suspect items include: Bolts located in duct connections and fan housing, and in the supporting structure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Proposed inspection method:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of hex head bolts in duct connections, fan housing, fan mounting, and supporting structure for duct and dampers. If any head markings correspond to those listed in QA Bulletins #93-02 and 94-01, then mark the bolts for later disposition and identify their locations on an attached sheet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Action completed/comments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action completed/comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV: FINDINGS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Inspection plan by:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature/Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/8/96</td>
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</table>

**QA Concurrence:**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>1/5/96</td>
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</table>

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Signature/Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/8/96</td>
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</table>

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Signature/Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1/8/96</td>
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</tbody>
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B-124
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C25F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>K2 EXHAUST SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 10710-94-OAM-045, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1991 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1990, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   **NONE.**

7. Other Components/Functions:

Failure of this system will not have a critical impact on facility. The K2 system services only uncontaminated areas of the facility, therefore, loss of the K2 exhaust system will not cause a loss of contamination control.

---

8. **Tom Galvin**
   Cog Engineer

9. **11/5/94**
   Date

10. **L. Heister**
    Cog Manager

11. **1/3/95**
    Date

(01/02/95)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25G

2. System Title: K3 EXHAUST SYSTEM (INCLUDES PROCESS CELL)

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, 3 Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for item listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. V. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

The K3 exhaust system provides for contamination control by maintaining a differential pressure between contaminated and uncontaminated areas of WESF.

Components/functions requiring verification include:

a. Exhaust airflow - K3 fan function (power and control) and integrity of the ductwork between the canyon and process cells and the fans. Also, function of the K3 exhaust steam jet.

b. Confinement - Integrity of ductwork upstream of the K3 filters where it passes through uncontaminated areas (truck port).

Potential uses of counterfeit parts include:

a. Bolts in ductwork connections, duct supports and fan housing.

b. Valves, bolts and flanges installed in the steam and air piping of the steam jet.

c. Electrical components and bolts installed in the power and control panels which support exhaust fan operation.
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C35G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>K3 Exhaust system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

### 4. Component/function requiring verification:

- The K3 duct in the truck port which is exposed.
- K3 exhaust fan area, including ductwork from the K3 filter building to the fan inlets, fan housings, supports for duct and dampers.
- K3 steam jet, including steam line from ground level to the jet, air duct from ground level to the jet, and the steam jet itself.

### 5. Proposed Inspection method:

1. **100% visual inspection of bolted K3 duct flanges.** If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-02 or 94-01, mark the bolts for later disposition and identify their locations on an attached sheet.

2. **100% visual inspection of bolted duct connections, fan housing, and duct and damper supports.** If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-02 or 94-01, mark the bolts for later disposition and identify their locations on an attached sheet.

3. **100% visual inspection of bolted duct and piping connections and valves.** If suspect components listed in the referenced bulletins are found, mark them for later disposition and identify their locations on an attached sheet.

### 6. Action completed/comments:

- Found component marked as `80/20`.
- Completed as Req.
- Outper in NCR 02/11/96 to be replaced.

---

**Inspection plan by:**

- Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**

- Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

---

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

- [Cognizant Engineer/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

- [Cognizant Manager/Date]
Notes:

1. Function of the fan controls and canyon differential pressure control (HVAC control panels) are covered by system C93: instruments. Power for exhaust fans is covered by system C12: electrical distribution.

2. The K3 filters are system C25K

7. Other Components/Functions:

The HEPA filters in the process cells and the canyon act as prefilter to the K3 exhaust filter; they are not critical to the prevention of contamination spread.

Ductwork in the canyon only serves to control the airflow pattern within the canyon. It does not affect the differential pressure required to prevent contamination spread.

Underground duct between Bldg 2258 and the K3 filters is encased in concrete: its integrity does not rely on bolts.

Ductwork downstream of the fans is not critical to the function of the fans (maintaining differential pressures); nor to containment.
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25H
2. System Title: K5/K6 SYSTEM

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with internal Memo 16710-94-OWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in block 5.
   c. List in block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeg and D. W. Kertz immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94), and 94-02 (10/19/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1981, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination releases/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 485 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

This system includes the chilled water system and cooling tower. The chilled water system provides for space cooling within areas served by X1, X2, and X3 ventilation systems. The cooling tower provides cooling water for the chillers. A loss of space cooling would not have a critical safety or operational impact.

The only failure which would cause a serious operational consequence would be a leak in the chilled water piping in the pool cell area. A leak of propylene glycol-water mixture into the pool cells would contaminate the deionized water and require a time-consuming and costly cleanup. However, this section of the line is insulated with asbestos; it is unlikely that is has been repaired since original construction (prior to 1981).

No inspection will be performed at this time.

8. [Signature]
   Cog Engineer

9. 11/3/96
   Date

10. [Signature]
    Cog Manager

11. 1/25/96
    Date

B-129

(01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C25J
2. System Title: K1 FILTERS

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify R. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records, and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (09/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors, canyon supply/exhaust fans, HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

NONE

7. Other Components/Functions:

The K1 filter system provides protection against the release of radiological contamination in the event of a contamination spread to normally clean areas. A filter system failure would be detected either by surveillance of the filter system operation (differential pressures) or annual filter efficiency testing. A contamination spread coincident with a filter failure would constitute two independent detectable failures of low probability. Even then, the consequences would be minor, since the contaminated air would be released through the stack.

The physical filter building is concrete; therefore, no potentially suspect parts are relied upon to provide that outer confinement boundary.
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C25K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>K3 FILTERS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 10710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 26, 1995.

#### 4. Instructions:

- **a.** Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- **b.** Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- **c.** List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- **d.** List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- **e.** Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- **f.** Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- **g.** If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- **h.** File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

#### 5. Screening Criteria:

- **a.** Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **b.** General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **c.** Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **d.** Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

#### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

NONE

#### 7. Other Components/Functions:

The K3 filters were built to Safety Class I. NQA-1 standards. Quality assurance records are located in Project B-455 files. This traceability of the construction materials precludes the potential for suspect parts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>11/5/96</td>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>11/5/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog Engineer</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Cog Manager</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-131
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C26, C26B, C26C</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
<th>FIRE PROTECTION, DETECTION AND AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DEN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/13/94) and 94-02 (10/18/96). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   System use: WESF Fire detection and suppression OSR SYSTEM

Components requiring verification:
   All sanitary water piping, flanges and supports

7. Other Components/Functions:
   Components not requiring inspection include: FACP, and detection devices. The bolts used in the assembly of the fire detection system are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.

8. By [Signature] [Date]
9. By [Signature] [Date]
10. By [Signature] [Date]

(01/02/96)
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

**1. System Number:** C26, C26B, C26C  
**2. System Title:** FIRE PROTECTION, DETECTION AND AUTOMATIC SPRINKLERS

**3. Instructions:**

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of GC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

**4. Component/function requiring verification:**

A. Sprinkler system riser, valves components.

B. Sprinkler system tie in to the sanitary header, and all bolted connections downstream of the isolation valve.

C. All sprinkler system sway bracing bolted connections

**5. Proposed inspection method:**

Perform a 100% visual test of the 225B fire sprinkler system including the riser valves and fire dept connection, located in the 225B fan room north wall. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "counterfeit/Suspect part inspection record.

100% Visual inspection of bolted connections for mounting instruments and panel mounting. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "counterfeit/Suspect part inspection record.

100% Visual inspection of bolted connections for mounting instruments and panel mounting. List those items that potentially contain suspect parts on the "counterfeit/Suspect part inspection record.

All discrepancies shall be noted on the attached suspect/counterfeit part inspection record and identified on the attached identification and disposition report.

**6. Action Completed/comments**

Documented  
C21, C21A, C21C

**Inspection plan by:**  
Signature/Date:  
QA Concurrence:  
Signature/Date:  
Cognizant Engineer/Date:  
Cognizant Manager/Date:  

(B Plant/NESF 01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C26A
2. System Title: 225B PROCESS CELL DETECTION AND FIRE FOG

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
g. If any suspect counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The cognizant engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
c. Process/Surface Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
System use: WESF process cell fire suppression system (OSR).
Components requiring verification:
Bolts (including piping supports), flanges, valves, switches, relays.

7. Other Components/Functions: None

8. [Signature]
Cog Engineer
9. [Date]
10. [Signature]
Cog Manager
11. [Date]
(C01/02)

B-134
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. **System Number:** C26A  
   **System Title:** 225B PROCESS CELL DETECTOR AND FIRE FOG

2. **Instructions:**
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

3. **Component/function requiring verification:**
   - Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports)
   - Valves
   - Flanges
   - Relays
   - Switches

4. **Proposed inspection method:**
   - Walk down and visually inspect 100% of items listed in column 4 for the raw water supply line which supplies the fire fog system for all process cells except F cell.
   - The visual inspection will include the areas of WESF listed below:
     - Operating Gallery
     - G Cell Air Lock
     - Service Gallery
   - Walk down and visually inspect 100% of items listed in column 4 for the deionized water supply line which supplies the fire fog system for F cell.
     - Service Gallery
   - All discrepancies shall be noted on the attached suspect/counterfeit part inspection record and attached identification and disposition report.

5. **Action completed/comments:**
   - No items found during craft inspection 4B 11/1/96

6. **Inspection plan by:**
   - Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]
   - QA Concurrence:
     - Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

7. **Cognizant Engineer/Date:**
   - Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

8. **Cognizant Manager/Date:**
   - Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

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B-135
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C27 and C27A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Solid Waste Handling and Transfer Cask</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. M. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:

- **a.** Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- **b.** Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- **c.** List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- **d.** List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- **e.** Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- **f.** Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- **g.** If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roes or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- **h.** File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:

- **a.** Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **b.** General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **c.** Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
- **d.** Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Solid waste handling is performed in WESF through the use of the transfer cask, routinely referred to as the waste cask. The cask functions by using a chain hoist to lift waste drum into the cask cavity. Cask in service prior to 1981 and structurally has no components meeting this criteria. The chain hoist was replaced in 1994. Failure of the chain during operation does not meet any of the above criteria.

### 7. Other Components/Functions:

Cask chain hoist failure would have no impact on facility safety or programs. Chain hoist is a direct replacement through off the shelf procurement.

### 8. Cog Engineer

### 9. Date

### 10. Cog Manager

### 11. Date
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>VARIOUS TITLES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-D4M-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

## 4. Instructions:
- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- f. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. M. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- g. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

## 5. Screening Criteria:
- a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (05/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-001 (05/23/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

## 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
System use: pool cell, hot cell, and ventilation instrumentation (OSR)

Components requiring verification:
Instrumentation, instrumentation supports including panel mountings hardware.

## 7. Other Components/Functions:

*none*

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. Date</th>
<th>1-10-96</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Date</td>
<td>11/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Date</td>
<td>01/02/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B-137**
## SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-140
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C30J
2. System Title: Closed Loop Cooling System

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-046, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/31/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC NCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   System shut down after the completion of cesium and strontium encapsulation.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   System removed from service.

8. [Signatures]
   9/14/96
   10. [Signatures]
   1/10/96
   Date

9. 10.
   Date
   (01/02/96)
3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-0MM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (09/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94), and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   System has no parts or components as described by QA bulletin 92-2 or 94-1.

7. Other Components/Functions:

   N/A

8. [Signature]  
   Cog Engineer  
   [Date]  

9. [Signature]  
   Cog Manager  
   [Date]  

(01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C30MC 334</th>
<th>2. System Title: Manipulators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. **Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   - a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   - b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   - c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   - d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   - e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   - f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   - g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or O. U. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   - h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   - a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in quality assurance bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   - b. **Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.**
   - c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   - d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**
   - **Screening Criteria for Manipulators B. General Plant Safety, D. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.**

   WESF Manipulators support all remote functions in hot cells. Replacement parts used on the manipulators which would be subject to this criteria are verified by facility Quality Control at the time of installation that they are lock tight but there is no inspection for suspect or counterfeit parts. Monorails used to support transfer of manipulators are routinely inspected as part of preventive maintenance. Fasteners used to cinch the monorail to the ceiling are not inspected for suspect or counterfeit status. The monorail system installed early 1970's. Modification to the system performed 1981.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**
   - None.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cog Engineer</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cog Manager</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B-143**

---

(01/02/96)
**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C30M C33A</td>
<td>Manipulators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Instructions:**

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/function requiring verification:</th>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manipulator structural integrity</td>
<td>Representative sampling for visual inspection of fasteners on manipulators. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their location on attached inspection record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monorail system (225B Operating Gallery/Cold Shop) structural integrity</td>
<td>Monorail system (225B Hot Shop) structural integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monorail system (225B Manipulator Repair Shop) structural integrity</td>
<td>Representative sampling for visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the monorail. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monorail system (225B Manipulator Repair Shop) structural integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Action completed/comments:

- No suspect bolts identified during inspection.
- No suspect bolts identified during inspection.
- No suspect bolts identified during inspection.

Cognizant Engineer/Date

Cognizant Manager/Date

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C31</td>
<td>225B POOL CELLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-04-SXH-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts:** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-001 (08/23/94) and 94-002 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety:** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**
   This system will be used to screen general items in the pool cell area.

Components requiring verification: Check hand rails and grating supports for suspect bolts.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**
   All other systems (items) will be inspected as part of each of the other systems in the area as required by each of those systems.

![Signatures](image)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Instructions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, &quot;100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts&quot;, or &quot;review of procurement records for vendor package&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/function requiring verification:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pool cell railings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pool cell grating supports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of handrails for suspect bolts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of grating supports for suspect bolts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Action completed/comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Suspect Parts/Beams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found LB 1/4/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Suspect Bolts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found LB 1/4/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature/Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Hill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QA Concurrency:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature/Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Hill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant Engineer/Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8 Plant/WEIS 01/02/96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant Manager/Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8 Plant/WEIS 01/02/96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. System Number:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C31A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 167/10-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/21/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added the items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification: System operates by measuring the differential pressure between a reference leg and leg in the pool cell water. The transmitter measures the pressure difference and transmits the signal. Components requiring verification: bolts (holding supports, transmitter assembly).

The air system and location where signal is transmitted will be covered under any inspections for air(C32*) and M panels(C93-).

The electrical supply to this system is inspected per system C12.

7. Other Components/Functions:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. System Number: C31A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title: pool cell weight factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Instructions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, &quot;100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts&quot;, or &quot;review of procurement records for vendor package&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Component/Function requiring verification:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight factor transmitters and tubing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Proposed inspection method:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection for suspect bolts on anchors, supports, transmitter assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Action completed/comments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ITEMS FOUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERTY 1/5/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inspection plan by:**

[Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrency:**

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

[Signature/Date]

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. **System Number:** C31B
2. **System Title:** POOL CELL TEMPERATURE

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16770-94-CUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-05 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/21/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety:** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**
   Components requiring verification: Bolts used for mounting or support of equipment.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**
   This system does not contain any electrical parts currently identified as suspect. The panel where the signal is displayed will be inspected per the requirements of system C93-.

---

**Signatures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log Engineer</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Log Manager</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>11/16/96</td>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>11/18/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B-150)
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

1. **System Number:** C31B  
   2. **System Title:** Pool cell temperature

3. **Instructions:**  
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.  
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.  
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".  
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. **Component/function requiring verification:**  
   Inspect any bolts used to assemble or mount the temperature measurement system.

5. **Proposed inspection method:**  
   100% visual inspection of any bolts used to mount or anchor this equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
<td>[Signature/Date]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. **Action completed/comments:**

---

B-151
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C31C
2. System Title: POOL CELL LEAK DETECTION

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048 J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. V. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the CDS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1980 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (01/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), and 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), and 92-03 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1990, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting-moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

No inspection required.

7. Other Components/Functions:
The leak detector probe assembly flange rests on the riser flange. If the bolts used to hold the leak detector flange in place were to fail the problem would likely not be noticed until the probes were to be removed. From recent work on this system it is known that studs are used to hold this flange in place.

8. [Signature]
   [Date: 9/14/96]
   COS Engineer

9. [Signature]
   [Date: 10/13/96]
   COS Manager

11. [Signature]
    [Date: 1/29/96]

B-152
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C310
2. System Title: Pool cell air dilution

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-33w-058, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeg or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (CR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (02/21/92), 92-002 (04/28/92), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/13/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

This system consists of fabricated duct connecting each of the pool cells on the west side, a valve and a flow meter instrumentation.

Components requiring inspection: Bolts holding duct flanges together, the valve by pool cell 1 and for instrumentation supports.

7. Other Components/Functions:

[Signature] Cog Engineer
[Date] 01/02/96
[Signature] Cog Manager
[Date] 01/02/96
[Signature] Screen Preparer
[Date] 01/02/96

B-153
**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

1. **System Number:**
   C31D

2. **System Title:**
   Pool cell air dilution

3. **Instructions:**
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/function requiring verification:</th>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolts</td>
<td>Walk down and perform 100% visual inspection of items in column 4 for suspect items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanges</td>
<td>Note: This is from where the air dilution duct begins at the north end of the pump trench and ends at the south wall.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. **Action completed/comments:**
   - No Suspect Parts (Bolts or Flanges) Found.
   - All Flanges, Joints on Duct are made from Duct Metal and Bolted Together.

**Inspection plan by:**
- Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**
- Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

**CoPzintzT Engineer/Date:**
- Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]

**CoPzintzT Manager/Date:**
- Signature/Date: [Signature/Date]
Any required inspection of the controls on the M panels will be inspected per system C93.

Failure of this system could impact emergency water addition and removal.

Compliance with Section 7.2.2.1 of the Code, which states: "Systems that do not meet the requirements of this section shall be provided with a means of isolation from the rest of the system."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C3IE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>POOL CELL WATER ADD./CONTAMIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/Function requiring verification:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walk down and perform 100% visual inspection of all items listed in column 4 for items listed as suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This inspection will be in the pool cell area and will include the deionized water line and the waste water removal lines (used when the pool cell pumps are jetted after testing of the leak detectors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note: a pre inspection walk down found suspect bolts holding the two halves of the diaphragm operator together. Check and document the extent of these bolts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Action completed/comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached list for suspect bolts found. Accepted as is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB 1/5/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LB 1/6/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR #051124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature/Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.Carroll 1/5/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3A Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature/Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 1/8/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant Engineer/Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/8/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant Manager/Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/9/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b Plant/WESF 01/32/96)
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C31F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>POOL CELL ION EXCHANGE SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-WM-005, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hanes, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeg or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records, and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (06/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1986, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Safety Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Components requiring inspection: flanges, valves and bolts.

7. Other Components/Functions:

Any required inspection of the controls on the M panels will be inspected per system C93-.
### SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C31F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Pool cell ion exchange system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/function requiring verification:</th>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators)</td>
<td>Walk down and perform 100% visual inspection of all items listed in column 4 for items listed as suspect. Items in PC11 will be inspected during preparation for or during resin change. This space required fall protection and confined space permit for entry. This inspection will be in the pool cell area and will include the deionized water line and the waste water removal lines (used when the pool cell sumps are jetted after testing of the leak detectors).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. Action completed/comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO ITEMS FOUND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature/Date: 1/4/96]</td>
<td>[Signature/Date: M.A. Hill]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant Engineer/Date</th>
<th>Cognizant Manager/Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature/Date: 1/8/96]</td>
<td>[Signature/Date: 1/6/96]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B Plant/VESF 01/02/96)
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

1. **System Number:** C31G
2. **System Title:** POOL CELL COVER BLOCKS

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. M. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts:** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety:** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon in preventing or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

   No screening required.

The cover blocks contain none of the items currently listed on the suspect lists (they contain rebar, angle iron, bail and concrete).

---

**Signatures:**

- **Signer:**
  - **Date:** 14/01/96
- **Signer:**
  - **Date:** 16/01/96
- **Signer:**
  - **Date:** 16/01/96
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C31H  
2. System Title: POOL CELL VACUUM

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DUM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

7. Other Components/Functions:

   *o inspection required.

This system is not critical to facility operation. This vacuum is a commercial swimming pool vacuum parts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/5/95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(01/02/96)

B-160
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. **System Number:** C31J  
2. **System Title:** POOL CELL CLOSED LOOP COOLING

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roese or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts:** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have altered items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety:** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems, etc.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors, canyon supply/exhaust fans, HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC NCCS; instrument air, etc.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**
   This system is misnamed in the JCS system at this time. This system is used for the cooling system for the pool cells (pool cell water recirculation and raw water).

Components requiring verification: Bolts, flanges and valves on loop of pool cell water thru pump, heat exchanger and back into the pools (see inspection plan for items under water in the pool cells).

7. **Other Components/Functions:**
The raw water portion of this system will be verified using the raw water systems (C20 and C20A).

Procurement of the items for the new closed loop cooling system project W-252 will be done under a qualified QA program (construction is to start 1995).
1. **System Number:** C31J  
2. **System Title:** Pool cell closed loop cooling

3. **Instructions:**
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. **Component/function requiring verification:**
   - Bolts (including those holding structural piping supports, and to assemble valves and valve operators)
   - Flanges
   - Valves

5. **Proposed inspection method:**
   - Walk down and visually inspect all items listed in column 4. This inspection will only cover the pool cell water which is recirculated thru the heat exchangers. Perform for pool cells 1 thru 7 and 12.
   - Note: Pool cell 2 does not have a heat exchanger or pump installed. Pool cell 1 has a cover block in place above the heat exchanger and will not be inspected.
   - Note: if the flanges on the heat exchangers cannot be verified and if any bolts cannot be verified. The flanges and bolts on the dispersion headers at the bottom of the pool cells will not be inspected at this time (please note if these flanges are can be confirmed to be held together by studs)

6. **Action completed/comments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Signature]</td>
<td>[Signature]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: If the flanges on the heat exchangers cannot be verified and if any bolts cannot be verified. The flanges and bolts on the dispersion headers at the bottom of the pool cells will not be inspected at this time. (please note if these flanges are can be confirmed to be held together by studs)
**B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C32</th>
<th>2. System Title: WESF TK-100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roesig or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) QA-01 (02/14/92), QA-02 (09/21/92), QA-03 (04/28/93), QA-04 (05/20/93), QA-05 (08/23/94), QA-06 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions: None, Box 5 Screening Criteria, item a. does not apply.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions:
   WESF TK-100 does not contain critical components as defined in box 5, but are supported by other systems that may contain these components. These other systems will be evaluated on the screening form that applies to that system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DB</td>
<td>1-5-96</td>
<td>DB</td>
<td>12/29/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cog Engineer</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Cog Manager Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C33 & C99K
2. System Title: Miscellaneous WESF Areas and Structural

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 167/10-96-DWM-048, J A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination. Release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

Miscellaneous WESF areas includes stairwells, airlocks, roof and loading dock and other general areas not specifically covered under other systems. There have been no structural modifications to the WESF facility since construction.

A CORK COVERED UNDER B PLANT STRUCTURAL (SYSTEM B99L)

7. Other Components/Functions: None.

8. Cog Engineer
9. Date
10. Cog Manager
11. Date

(01/02/96)

B-164
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C33B
2. System Title: Compressed Gas Storage

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 19712-94-0WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (06/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Progammable Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   Gas storage cabinets installed at the west end of the WESF facility in the late 1980's. Potential for impact to personnel safety due to counterfeit or suspect bolts.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   None.

8. Cog Engineer
9. Date 11/14/92
10. Cog Manager
11. Date 1-5-94

(01/02/96)
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C33B</th>
<th>2. System Title: Compressed Gas Storage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**3. Instructions:**

- a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
- b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
- c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
- d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

**4. Component/function requiring verification:**

- WESF Gas Bottle Storage

**5. Proposed inspection method:**

"100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used to connect gas bottle storage structure. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record."

**6. Action completed/comments:**

"Susp Bulid Ident on Assy to Gas Bottle
Accept 8621
Justification
MLT 05/124"

---

**Inspection plan by:**

[Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:**

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:**

[Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:**

[Signature/Date]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C33D
2. System Title: Truck Port

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counteit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWH-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roegge or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impact: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   Bi-fold doors were installed to increase ventilation and radiological control of the truck port area in the late 1980's. Failure of the doors has the potential to impact both personnel safety and programs.

7. Other Components/Functions:

(01/02/96)
**SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN**

1. System Number: C33D  
2. System Title: Truck Port.

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:
   Bi-Fold Door.

5. Proposed inspection method:
   100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation of Bi-Fold door. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.

6. Action completed/comments:
   Inspect, document on 8/96.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection plan by:</th>
<th>QA Concurrence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z. Brown 11/69</td>
<td>J. Miller 8/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognizant Engineer/Date</th>
<th>Cognizant Manager/Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/96</td>
<td>6/96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
## B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C41, C41B, and C41D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>Cranes, 10 ton Pool Cell Crane, and 15 ton Canyon Crane</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Purpose
This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-046, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

### 4. Instructions:
- Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

### 5. Screening Criteria:
- **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts**: The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- **General Plant Safety**: Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- **Process/Support Systems Safety**: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors, canyon supply/exhaust fans, HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts**: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

### 6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
NONE

### 7. Other Components/Functions:
Important functions include structural integrity of the crane and load bearing capability of the hoist system.

The 10 ton pool cell and the 15 ton canyon crane were installed in the early 1970's as part of WESF construction. None of the fasteners in the structural connection have been replaced since the installation, except for several bolts in the bridge girder end connections (original bolts were identified in the PM as being too short). The replacement bolts received adequate procurement quality control to ensure traceability. None of the hoist components have been replaced except for the load brake and wire rope. The wire rope is not on the list of potential suspect parts. Failure of the load brake would not have critical consequences because there are redundant braking systems (eddy current and load brakes).

### Note:
The cranes routinely undergo monthly, quarterly, annual and tri-annual inspections.
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C41A
2. System Title: Bi-Products Crane

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect-counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16719-94-059-045, J. A. O’Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain OA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roeger or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   - Gantry was procured from Washington Public Power and Supply System as excess material in 1984. Crane pad and structure erected in 1985.
   - Bolts - structural assembly
   - Bolts - Gantry
   - Bolts - handrails and ladders.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Other Components/Functions: None.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Cog Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1/5/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Cog Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 1-5-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(01/02/96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS INSPECTION PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C41A</th>
<th>2. System Title: Bi-Products Crane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## 3. Instructions:

a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.

b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.

c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".

d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

## 4. Component/function requiring verification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Component/function requiring verification:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crane Structural integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gantry integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handrails and ladders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 5. Proposed inspection method:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Proposed inspection method:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the crane. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their location on attached inspection record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting gantry (bridge) components. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting gantry handrail and west and east end ladder assemblies. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their location on attached inspection record.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 6. Action completed/comments:

- **No suspect bolts identified during inspection:** 1/5/94
- **No suspect bolts identified during inspection:** 1/5/94
- **No suspect bolts identified during inspection:** 1/5/94

### Inspection plan by: [Signature/Date]

### QA Concurrence: [Signature/Date]

### Cognizant Engineer/Date: [Date]

### Cognizant Manager/Date: [Date]
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C41C
2. System Title: WESF Elevator

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWN-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1981, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   WESF elevator installed as part of construction during early 1970's. No upgrades or replacement of components has been performed since installation.

7. Other Components/Functions:

   No safety or programmatic issues are impacted by elevator availability. This is a freight elevator.

8. [Signatures]
   9. 11/5/96
   10. [Signatures]
   11. 1-6-96

(01/02/96)

B-172
### B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. **System Number:** C41E  
2. **System Title:** In Cell Hoist.

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-04W-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the inspection plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety:** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; Instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts:** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

   The In Cell Hoist system in G Cell was installed in 1983 to support the handling of the BUSS cask for cesium shipments to commercial irradiations facilities. The hoist system, which was an upgrade to the previous hoist, included installation of rail bed, bridge and 2 ton hoist. Loss of In-Cell Hoist has potential impact to programatic issues.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

---

**8.**  
**Log Engineer**  
**Date:** 01/02/96  
**Log Manager**  
**Date:** 01/02/96

---

**B-173**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number: C41E</th>
<th>2. System Title: In Cell Hoist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Instructions:
   a. Use the Suspect/Counterfeit Components Screening form to identify items requiring verification.
   b. List the items and functions requiring verification from Block 6 of the screening form in Block 4 below.
   c. Identify the inspection/verification method to be used in Block 5. For example, "100% visual inspection of pipe hanger bolts", or "review of procurement records for vendor package".
   d. Perform and document the verification as specified in Block 5. Documentation should indicate clearly what was inspected, who performed the verification and date. Records may include marked up drawings, inspection checklists, copies of QC records, etc. It must be possible to tell whether a particular item in the plant has been inspected.

4. Component/function requiring verification:
   - Rail Bed Integrity
   - Bridge Integrity
   - 2 Ton Hoist

5. Proposed inspection method:
   - **Rail Bed Integrity**: 100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts used in installation rail bed for in cell hoist. If any head markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletin #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.
   - **Bridge Integrity**: 100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting structural members of the bridge assembly. If any markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.
   - **2 Ton Hoist**: 100% visual inspection of head markings on bolts connecting hoist assembly. If any markings correspond to those identified in QA Bulletins #93-2 or 94-1, mark the bolts for later disposition, document as required, and identify their locations on attached inspection record.

6. Action completed/comments:
   - No suspect bolts identified during inspection.
   - No suspect bolts identified during inspection.
   - No suspect bolts identified during inspection.

**Inspection plan by:** [Signature/Date]

**QA Concurrence:** [Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Engineer/Date:** [Signature/Date]

**Cognizant Manager/Date:** [Signature/Date]

(B Plant/WESF 01/02/96)
3. **Purpose.** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-OIW-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**

The equipment (detectors, monitors, indicators and interconnecting wire) associated with the Radiation Monitoring System is critical to the safety of personnel within the facility. The equipment used in this system are not identified as suspect parts on the above QABs.

The electrical supply components were covered with the Electrical System (B12). No suspect components were identified. See the section on Electrical Distribution for details.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

The bolts used in the assembly of the Radiation Monitoring System are not required to be hardened or otherwise treated.
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

**1. System Number:** C97/C97A  
**2. System Title:** 296-B-10 STACK MONITOR (WESF)

3. **Purpose:** This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-91-BLM-G01, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. **Instructions:**
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. **Screening Criteria:**
   a. **Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts.** The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (03/21/92), 93-002 (04/23/93), 93-003 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. **General Plant Safety.** Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. **Process/Support Systems Safety.** Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480V MCCs; instrument air.
   d. **Equipment with Programmatic Impacts.** Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. **Components/Functions Requiring Verification:**  
**System use:** WESF SAFETY SYSTEM  
Components requiring verification: None.

7. **Other Components/Functions:**

The monitor system is in service at WESF. Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner. These systems are not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of for this system.

8. **Cog Engineer:**
   
9. **Date:** 7-10-96
   
10. **Cog Manager:**
   
11. **Date:** 14/1/96

(01/02/96)
# B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C97B
2. System Title: K-1 AIR SAMPLERS (WESF)

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DW-M-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. W. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the inspection plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   System use: WESF ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM

Components requiring verification: None.

7. Other Components/Functions:

The monitor system is in service at WESF. Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner. There are no air sampler system applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. These systems are not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of for this system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cog Engineer</td>
<td>1-11-94</td>
<td>Cog Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>1-4-94</td>
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</tbody>
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(01/02/95)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>C97C</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. System Title:</td>
<td>K-3 AIR SAMPLERS (WESF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Interim Memo 16710-94-WM-048, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roega or O. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/14/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/13/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air system.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:
   System use: WESF ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM

Components requiring verification: None.

7. Other Components/Functions:
   The monitor system not in service at WESF. Any failure of these items due to a failure of a suspect part will not compromise personnel or process safety, or have a programmatic impact before it can be repaired in a timely manner. There are no air sampler system applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. These systems are not considered critical, therefore inspection is not required of for this system.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>1. System Number:</th>
<th>2. System Title:</th>
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<tr>
<td>C99</td>
<td>General plant support</td>
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<tr>
<td>C99A</td>
<td>SIGN PAINTER GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C99B</td>
<td>PAINTER GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C99C</td>
<td>MILLWRIGHT GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>C99D</td>
<td>PIPE FITTER GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT</td>
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<td>C99E</td>
<td>CARPENTER GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT</td>
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<td>C99F</td>
<td>LAGGERS GENERAL PLANT SUPPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>C99G &lt;B.11/96</td>
<td>GENERAL ELECTRICAL SUPPORT</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. Purpose: This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with internal Memo 16/10-94-DWM-048, J.A. O'Brien to J. W. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:

- a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
- b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
- c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
- d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
- e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
- f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
- g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Roege or D. W. Mertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
- h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:

- a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 02-01 (02/14/92), 02-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
- b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/stowing devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
- c. Process/Support Systems Safety: Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 480 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
- d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts: Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protections systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

No inspection required.

This system is for general minor work. This work will be inspected as required as part of the areas/systems in which it is contained.

7. Other Components/Functions: **NONE**

8. **Larry Boo**
   Cog Engineer

9. 11/96
10. **Walter**
    Cog Manager

11. 1-4-96
    (01/02/96)

B-179
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. System Number: C99H
2. System Title: COVER BLOCKS

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-004-042, J. A. O'Brien to J. M. Hansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect/counterfeit items are found, notify P. E. Rooge or D. W. Hertz immediately. The Cognizant Engineer will follow up with a list of deficiencies and proposed disposition. The information will be consolidated on one or more Nonconformance Reports (NCRs), and one Occurrence Report (OR) will be submitted for the entire facility.
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, inspection records and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect/counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (02/15/92), 92-02 (08/21/92), 93-002 (04/28/93), 93-03 (05/20/93), 94-01 (08/23/94) and 94-02 (10/18/94). If no modification or repair has been performed which would have added items listed in these bulletins since 1980, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollup doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors; canyon supply/exhaust fans; HEPA filters and instrumentation; air and radiation monitoring equipment; 460 VAC MCCs; instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Components/Functions Requiring Verification:

   No inspection required.

   The cover blocks do not contain any items identified as being suspect.

7. Other Components/Functions:

   **NONE**

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8. 
   
9. 9/14/96
   
10. 
   
11. 1/7/96

B-180

(01/02/96)
B PLANT/WESF SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT COMPONENTS SCREENING

1. SYSTEM NUMBER: C999 Buss Cask; 2. SYSTEM TITLE: Beneficial Uses Shipping System (BUSS) Cask.

3. Purpose. This form provides a record that each B Plant/WESF system has been screened for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect counterfeit parts could have critical consequences. The purpose of the screening is to facilitate the performance of physical inspections in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-95-024, J. A. O'Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, Dated May 24, 1995.

4. Instructions:
   a. Complete one screening form for each plant system.
   b. Identify system components whose failure could have critical consequences by applying the screening criteria in Block 5.
   c. List in Block 6 those components identified in step b, along with the functions whose failure would have critical consequences.
   d. List or describe in Block 7 those components or items which were evaluated but do not meet the screening criteria.
   e. Prepare an Inspection Plan for items listed in Block 6. Obtain QA concurrence.
   f. Perform the inspection per the approved plan and record results on the Inspection Record.
   g. If any suspect counterfeit items are found: (1) Complete an Nonconformance Report (NCR) and determine the appropriate disposition; and (2) Notify management immediately to submit or update an Occurrence Report (OR).
   h. File copies of this form, along with the Inspection Plan, Inspection Record and any resulting NCRs in the JCS work package.

5. Screening Criteria:
   a. Potential for Presence of Counterfeit Parts. The concern for suspect counterfeit parts applies only to items procured in 1981 or later which are listed in Quality Assurance Bulletins (QABs) 92-01 (Feb 14, 1992), 92-01 (Aug 21, 1992), 93-002 (Aug 28, 1993) and 93-03 (May 20, 1993). If no modifications have been made to these lists, no detailed inspection of the component is required.
   b. General Plant Safety. Protective equipment and items whose failure could directly result in serious injury. Examples: Cranes, hoists, handrails, ladders, catwalks, lifting/moving devices, rollover doors, breathing air systems.
   c. Process/Support Systems Safety. Equipment relied upon to prevent or monitor operational accidents or contamination release/spread. Examples: Canyon doors, canyon supply/exhaust fans, HEPA filters and instrumentation, air and radiation monitoring equipment, 480 VAC MCCs, instrument air.
   d. Equipment with Programmatic Impacts. Equipment whose failure could have a serious impact on the plant mission due to resulting equipment damage or nonavailability. Examples: Cranes, fire protection systems which protect equipment.

6. Critical Components/Functions:

   A review of the (BUSS) Cask Safety Analysis Report for Packaging identified the (Lid Bolts) as the only BUSS Cask fastener that meets the above screening criteria. The lid bolts are a high quality fastener made of A-286 corrosion resistant steel and traceable by (heat code # AZK) to quality assurance records. The primary function of the bolts is to secure the cask lid to the cask body, which provides shielding and containment as well as impact, puncture, and thermal protection for its certified special form contents during transport under both normal and accident conditions.

   Note: The Quality Assurance records for the lid bolts, (i.e., Certificate of Conformance and CMTR) are located in the BUSS Cask files located in MO-410 room F. Attached for your information is a copy of bolt material certification.

7. Noncritical Components/Functions:

   N/A

8. Sig/Custodian: [Signature]
9. Date: [Date]
10. Sig/Manager: [Signature] [Date]