The following material is furnished as an experimental guide for the use of risk based classification for nuclear plant protection systems. As shown in Sections 2 and 3 of this report, safety classifications for the nuclear field are application based (using the function served as the primary criterion), whereas those in use by the process industry and the military are risk based. There are obvious obstacles to the use of risk based classifications (and the associated integrity levels) for nuclear power plants, yet there are also many potential benefits, including: it considers all capabilities provided for dealing with a specific …
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The following material is furnished as an experimental guide for the use of risk based classification for nuclear plant protection systems. As shown in Sections 2 and 3 of this report, safety classifications for the nuclear field are application based (using the function served as the primary criterion), whereas those in use by the process industry and the military are risk based. There are obvious obstacles to the use of risk based classifications (and the associated integrity levels) for nuclear power plants, yet there are also many potential benefits, including: it considers all capabilities provided for dealing with a specific hazard, thus assigning a lower risk where multiple protection is provided (either at the same or at lower layers); this permits the plant management to perform trade-offs between systems that meet the highest qualification levels or multiple diverse systems at lower qualification levels; it motivates the use (and therefore also the development) of protection systems with demonstrated low failure probability; and it may permit lower cost process industry equipment of an established integrity level to be used in nuclear applications (subject to verification of the integrity level and regulatory approval). The totality of these benefits may reduce the cost of digital protection systems significantly an motivate utilities to much more rapid upgrading of the capabilities than is currently the case. Therefore the outline of a risk based classification is presented here, to serve as a starting point for further investigation and possible trial application.
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Hecht, H,; Hecht, M.; Dinsmore, G.; Hecht, S. & Tang, D.Verification and validation guidelines for high integrity systems: Appendices A--D, Volume 2,
report,
March 1, 1995;
Washington D.C..
(https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc684441/:
accessed April 24, 2024),
University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu;
crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.