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This report includes the issuances received during the specified period from the Commission (CLI), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (LBP), the Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), the Directors' Decisions (DD), and the Decisions on Petitions for Rulemaking (DPRM).

The summaries and headnotes preceding the opinions reported herein are not to be deemed a part of those opinions or have any independent legal significance.
COMMISSIONERS

Shirley A. Jackson, Chairman
Kenneth C. Rogers
Greta J. Dicus
Nils J. Diaz
Edward McGaffigan, Jr.

B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
CONTENTS

Issuances of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards

EMERICK S. MCDANIEL
(Proposed Suspension of License)
Docket 55-21849-OT (ASLBP No. 96-716-01-OT)
(Re: License Amendment) (Transfer to Southern Nuclear)
INITIAL DECISION, LBP-96-17, September 3, 1996 ............... 79

YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY
(Yankee Nuclear Power Station)
Docket 50-029-DCOM (ASLBP No. 96-718-01-R)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, LBP-96-18, September 27, 1996 ... 86
Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards Issuances

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL

B. Paul Cotter, Jr., *Chief Administrative Judge
James P. Gleason, *Deputy Chief Administrative Judge (Executive)
Frederick J. Shon, *Deputy Chief Administrative Judge (Technical)

Members

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<th>Permanent Panel Members</th>
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<td>Dr. George C. Anderson</td>
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<td>Elizabeth B. Johnson</td>
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<td>Dr. Jerry R. Kline*</td>
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*Permanent panel members
After reviewing in detail each of the claims made in this informal proceeding, conducted under 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart L, the Presiding Officer sustained the Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its determination that the applicant did not pass the written portion of his examination to become a licensed operator of a nuclear power plant.

INITIAL DECISION

Emerick McDaniel, a reactor operator license applicant at Plant Vogtle, requested an informal hearing to substantiate his claim that he passed the written examination for a reactor operator.\textsuperscript{1} The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

\textsuperscript{1}This is an informal hearing under 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart L. See 10 C.F.R. §2.1201(b)(2). Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §2.1231, the NRC Staff (Staff) submitted the Hearing File on July 3, 1996.
has jurisdiction of this appeal. The NRC helps to ensure the health and safety of the public by requiring reactor operators to successfully demonstrate their knowledge of nuclear power plant operation before they are licensed. See Alfred J. Morabito (Senior Operator License for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-10, 27 NRC 417 (1988) and LBP-88-16, 27 NRC 583 (1988); Roger W. Ellingwood (Senior Operator License for Catawba Nuclear Station), LBP-89-21, 30 NRC 68 (1989). Part 55 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains the NRC regulations implementing section 107 of the Atomic Energy Act; these regulations require that applicants for reactor operator licenses pass both a written examination and an operating test.

On the written examination, Mr. McDaniel was scored by the examiner as correctly answering 77 of 100 multiple choice questions, for a score of 77%, which does not meet the 80% minimum score required to pass. See NUREG-1021, “Operator Licensing Examiner Standards,” section ES-402, page 5 of 6. In response to Mr. McDaniel’s request, the Staff completed an informal review that sustained his failing grade. Hearing File item 21, attach. at 2-7.

Initially, Mr. McDaniel challenged the grading of Questions 7, 8, and 16 on his examination. Subsequently, he also challenged Question 19. The Staff concedes the validity of the challenge concerning Question 19 but contests the other challenges. Mr. McDaniel must be sustained in two of three remaining challenges to pass the examination. Below, the challenges are considered one at a time.

I. QUESTION 7

A. The Question and Answer

1. The Question

7. Given the following conditions:
   • You are performing a whole body frisk using a portable frisker.
   • Background radiation is at the MAXIMUM allowed level for performing a whole body frisk.

Which ONE of the following is the count rate at which you are considered to be “Contaminated”?
   a. 100 counts per minute
   b. 200 counts per minute
   c. 300 counts per minute
   d. 400 counts per minute

---

2 Letter from Emerick S. McDaniel, July 30, 1996 (McDaniel Presentation).
3 Written Presentation of NRC Staff, August 27, 1996 (Staff Presentation), at 6.
2. The Answer

The correct answer was (c), 300 counts per minute. Mr. McDaniel’s answer was (b), 200 counts per minute.

B. Legitimacy of Question

Mr. McDaniel argues that the source for the answer to this material is the GET badge retraining handbook. He submitted for consideration, with his Presentation, the Georgia Power, “Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Training Lesson Plan,” August 17, 1993, and he argues that he was trained in the materials listed on page 4 of that Plan. He concludes that mastery of the GET badge retraining handbook was outside the scope of his licensing course and should have been outside the scope of the exam. Presentation at 1.

Whether the question is proper is governed by NRC regulations and published guidance, including 10 C.F.R. § 55.41(b)(11)-(12) and NUREG/BR-0122 (which references a companion volume, a handbook on knowledge and abilities [K/A] of operators of pressurized water reactors, NUREG-1122). The K/A handbook, at KA 194001 K1.03, specifies knowledge that the test may cover, including “knowledge of 10 C.F.R. 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.”

Hence, I conclude that a test item on radiation control requirements is a permitted subject. Absence of this subject from the training course is not relevant to the appropriateness of the question.4

C. Ambiguity

Mr. McDaniel also argues that Question 7 is ambiguous as to whether it is referring to a “net count rate above background” or to a “gross count rate.” However, I do not see any ambiguity. First, the applicant was told he was to assume he was using a portable frisker. Second, the question emphasizes that background radiation is the MAXIMUM allowed level for performing a frisk. At this point, if he had the required knowledge of radiation procedures, Mr. McDaniel would know that the MAXIMUM count rate for background is 200 (the maximum is the rate at which a person is required to go to another frisker and to report the high level to health physics personnel). GET Handbook, Hearing File item 22, attach. 2 at 68. He also should know, from the handbook, that when the metered count rate increases by 100 cpm above background, to 300 c.p.m. (the correct answer), he should report that event to health physics immediately.

4 Since it is the NRC regulatory materials that determine the scope of the examination, Mr. McDaniel’s further argument that Question #7 is “not procedurally driven . . . .” also is irrelevant.
Mr. McDaniel argues that the question does not specify whether the count rate to be reported in the answer should be 300 c.p.m. (gross rate) or 100 c.p.m (net rate or difference). I am not impressed by this possible ambiguity. Problems of that kind may be raised with the examiner. Staff Presentation, Exh. 1 at 5 of 6, ¶9. If, indeed, the question were ambiguous, Mr. McDaniel’s argument would avail him only if he gave one of the two permissible answers. Since his answer is different from either of the answers that he considers permissible, it is wrong.

The use of a frisker is an important requirement for plant personnel, who must check themselves “at every frisking station posted.” Hearing Record, #17 of attach. 2. Georgia Power provides annual training in these procedures and Mr. Emerick McDaniel was trained in January 1995. Staff Presentation, Exh. 2 (Affidavit of John Munro) at 2, ¶5.

II. QUESTION 8

A. The Question and Answer

1. The Question

   8. Given the following:
      • An operating procedure is being performed to restore a system to service following system maintenance during an outage.
      • An error is discovered in the sequence of steps in the procedure which, if performed, would result in starting a pump without the required seal water.

      Which ONE of the following actions should be taken?
      a. Obtain the Unit Shift Supervisor’s permission to perform the steps out of sequence.
      b. Stop the performance of the procedure at the incorrect step, and request a procedure change.
      c. Continue with the procedure, performing the steps in the correct sequence, since the errors are obviously typographical.
      d. Continue with the procedure performing the steps in the correct sequence, and request a procedure change to correct the order of the steps after completion.

2. The Answer

   Mr. McDaniel’s answer was (a), obtaining the Unit Shift Supervisor’s permission to perform the steps out of sequence. The “correct” answer, according to the Staff, is (b).

B. Analysis

   Mr. McDaniel claims that his answer is a reasonable interpretation of the plant procedures. If his interpretation is reasonable, then there may be an ambiguity
in the procedures. This would be a problem for Georgia Power but not for the applicant. A reasonable interpretation of ambiguous plant operating procedures should be graded as “correct” on the operator’s test.

I have read Mr. McDaniel’s answer and have traced his thinking through the procedures. In one instance, I relied on a procedural definition not relied on by Mr. McDaniel. That definition explained the meaning of the “intent” of a procedure.

Mr. McDaniel relies on Procedure 0054-C, Rev. 9, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Rules for Performing Procedures. On page 4 of 10, ¶4.1.4, the following text appears:

FOLLOW STEPS IN SEQUENCE, UNLESS SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT OR DEVIATIONS ARE ALLOWED by the procedure. See step 4.2.7.

NOTE

Operation’s Unit Operating Procedures (UOPs) have many tasks which may be performed concurrently. The Unit Shift Supervisor may allow procedural steps to be performed out of sequence if it does not: result in omission of required work, violate the intent of the procedure, or create an unsafe plant condition.

Step 5.2.7, referenced in ¶4.1.4, provides the following definitions for application in this context:

The phrases “UNDERSTAND THE SAFETY AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS,” AND “UNLESS SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT” are clarified as follows. In certain situations, it may be acceptable to use a procedure to perform an evolution not specifically described in the procedure, for example, using an equipment operating procedure to troubleshoot a piece of equipment. Care must be taken to ensure that the actions will not produce negative consequences as a result of the evolution. The personnel must know what effect the actions will have, and ensure that the actions will not violate plant commitments.

On page 10 of 10 of Procedure 54-C, there is a reference to Procedure 52-C, “Temporary Change to Procedures.” The intent of the reference is not clear. However, I have noticed that the term “intent of the procedure,” used in the note on page 4 of 10, is not defined in Procedure 54-C but it is defined in Procedure 52-C at page 2 of 10, ¶2.2 CHANGE OF INTENT, which states:

The intent of a procedure is considered to be changed if steps are added or deleted which cause:

A change in the purpose or scope of the procedure.

A change to VEGP administrative procedures or a change reducing administrative control established in VEGP administrative procedures.

A change which deviates from the FSAR or Technical Specifications.
A change in acceptance criteria less conservative than previously established.

I conclude that the intent of the procedure being implemented in Question 8 of the examination is to start a pump with the required seal water. No steps are added or deleted, so rearranging the steps does not meet the premise for "CHANGE OF INTENT." Furthermore, for Mr. McDaniel to ask for a supervisory waiver, pursuant to the NOTE, he would have to stop what he is doing and wait for supervisory action. Then there apparently would be no change in the administrative procedures for the plant, so none of the criteria are met for determining that there has been a CHANGE OF INTENT.

I agree with the Staff that the procedure should NOT work this way. A matter like this ought to be handled as a temporary change in procedures, with appropriate engineering review and coordination. However, I find that Mr. McDaniel is appropriately relying on plant procedures. The remedy here is to change the procedures. Under current procedures, Mr. McDaniel's answer is permissible and therefore right.

III. QUESTION 16

A. Question and Answer

1. Question

16. Which ONE of the following statements is correct regarding the DESIGN of the RCP shaft seals [sic] ability to withstand full RCS pressure?
   a. Only the #1 seal is capable of withstanding full RCS pressure.
   b. Seals #1 and #2 are independently capable of withstanding full pressure but only for 30 minutes.
   c. Seals #1 and #2 are independently capable of withstanding full pressure indefinitely.
   d. Seal #1 is capable of withstanding full pressure indefinitely but seal #2 is only capable of withstanding full pressure for only 30 minutes.

2. Answer

   The correct answer provided by the NRC is (d). Mr. McDaniel answered (c).

B. Analysis and Conclusion

   Mr. McDaniel argues that the 30-minute limit before seal #2 would fail is not supported either in the Reactor Coolant Pump Instruction Manual, 2X6AB09-119 or in Plant Procedure 13003 RCP. However, Mr. McDaniel was taught the #2 seal is "good for 30 minutes." Lesson Outline (LI-LP-16401), Attach. 2
to Record #18. Furthermore, the Reactor Coolant Pump Instruction Manual, cited by Mr. McDaniel (Presentation at 2), states that when the No. 1 seal is inoperative, “The pump may be operated for a period not to exceed an additional 30 minutes.” While Mr. McDaniel is technically correct that this “allows a total of 35 minutes,” this does not excuse Mr. McDaniel’s answer that, “Seals #1 and #2 are independently capable of withstanding full pressure indefinitely.” That answer is wrong and it could result in inappropriate operator action.

IV. OVERALL CONCLUSION

The only matter before me is whether Mr. McDaniel passed his examination. I conclude that he did not. I have ruled that his answers to questions 7 and 16 are wrong. While I was prepared to rule that his answer to Question #8 was correct, that discussion is not essential to my decision and should be treated as a nonbinding opinion.

V. ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is, this 3rd day of September 1996, ORDERED that:

1. Mr. Emerick S. McDaniel’s appeal of the denial of his application for a reactor operator’s license is denied.
2. Within 15 days, Mr. McDaniel may appeal this Order pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.786 and 2.763. Judicial review may not be sought unless a timely petition for review is filed. The petition should comply with all the provisions of the cited sections, including those related to length and content and that describe the considerations based on which the Commission may grant the petition.

Peter B. Bloch, Presiding Officer
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

Rockville, Maryland
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

Before Administrative Judges:

G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Chairman
Dr. Jerry R. Kline
Dr. Thomas S. Elleman

In the Matter of Docket No. 50-029-DCOM
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC (ASLBP No. 96-718-01-R)
COMPANY
(Yankee Nuclear Power Station) September 27, 1996

In this proceeding concerning citizen group challenges to the decommissioning plan for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the Licensing Board grants Licensee Yankee Atomic Electric Company’s (YAEC) motion for summary disposition. The Board concludes the Intervenors failed to establish any genuine disputed material factual issues regarding YAEC’s showing that the differential between the total occupational doses associated with facility decommissioning under its chosen DECON decommissioning option and the alternative SAFSTOR option would not fall outside of the generic DECON/SAFSTOR differential “envelope” previously recognized by the Commission as significant in assessing whether a licensee’s choice of the DECON decommissioning option would transgress either the principle that radiation doses should be kept “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) or the dictates of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
RULES OF PRACTICE: SUMMARY DISPOSITION (BURDEN OF PROOF)

The party filing a summary disposition motion has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993). In this regard, 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(a) requires that the moving party include a statement of material facts about which there is no genuine issue to be heard. In contrast, the opposing party must append to its response a statement of material facts about which there exists a genuine issue to be heard. If the responding party does not adequately controvert material facts set forth in the motion, the party faces the possibility that those facts may be deemed admitted. If, however, the evidence before the Board does not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then the motion must be denied even if there is no opposing evidence. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977). Nevertheless, a party opposing a motion cannot rely on a simple denial of the movant's material facts, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(b).

RULES OF PRACTICE: SUMMARY DISPOSITION (MATERIALITY OF FACTUAL DISPUTE)

A presiding officer need consider only those purported factual disputes that are "material" to the resolution of the issues raised in a summary disposition motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (factual disputes that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" will not preclude summary judgment).

RULES OF PRACTICE: SUMMARY DISPOSITION (GENUINE DISPUTED MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT)

In opposing summary disposition by seeking to establish the existence of a genuine dispute regarding a material factual issue, a party must present sufficiently probative evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (evidence that is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly probative" will not preclude summary judgment).

RULES OF PRACTICE: SUMMARY DISPOSITION (DISCOVERY; GENUINE DISPUTED MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT)

In opposing summary disposition by seeking to establish the existence of a genuine dispute regarding a material factual issue, a party that had discovery
following the filing of the dispositive motion generally cannot interpose claims based on a lack of information as the valid basis for a genuine material factual dispute.

RULES OF PRACTICE: SUMMARY DISPOSITION (EXPERT OPINION; GENUINE DISPUTED MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT)

In opposing summary disposition by seeking to establish the existence of a genuine dispute regarding a material factual issue, a party’s bald assertion, even when supported by an expert, will not establish a genuine material factual dispute. See United States v. Various Slot Machines on Guam, 658 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1981) (in the context of a summary judgment motion, an expert must back up his opinion with specific facts); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1988) (expert’s study based on “unsupported assumptions and unsound extrapolation” cannot be used to support summary judgment motion).

TECHNICAL ISSUE DISCUSSED:

Proportionality between occupational exposure rate for completed decommissioning activities and exposure rate for additional radioactive inventory.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
(Granting Motion for Summary Disposition)

This proceeding was convened to consider the challenges of Intervenors Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. (CAN), and the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) to various aspects of the decommissioning plan put forth by Licensee Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) for its Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe). In LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8 (1996), we admitted a single Intervenor contention contesting the efficacy of YAEC’s decision to use a modified DECON decommissioning option (under which decommissioning is to be completed relatively promptly after facility operation is completed) rather than the SAFSTOR option (which provides for decommissioning only after the facility has been maintained in a “stored” condition for an extended period following operation). According to the Intervenors, the Licensee’s choice runs afoul of both the regulatory principle that occupational doses should be maintained “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) and the dictates of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
Now pending before the Board is a YAEC motion for summary disposition relative to the Intervenors’ contention. In its motion, YAEC requests the Board find, as a matter of law, its modified DECON decommissioning alternative does not entail occupational radiation doses that fall outside the previously analyzed generic parameters within which the Commission has found a licensee’s choice of either the DECON or SAFSTOR option will be deemed acceptable for ALARA or NEPA purposes. The NRC Staff supports that motion; the Intervenors vigorously oppose it.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude YAEC has established there are no genuine disputed material facts and it is entitled, as a matter of law, to a decision in its favor regarding the CAN/NECNP contention.

I. BACKGROUND

The procedural story of this proceeding up to this juncture has been described elsewhere. See CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 225, 241-46 (1996); CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 5 (1996); CLI-95-14, 42 NRC 130, 131-33 (1995); LBP-96-15, 44 NRC at 12-21; LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, 65-68 (1996). Now before the Board is a lone Intervenor contention regarding the YAEC plan for decommissioning the Yankee Rowe facility that we admitted in a July 31, 1996 memorandum and order.1 It provides:

For Yankee Rowe facility decommissioning, YAEC and the NRC Staff have incorrectly assumed that the dose differential between the DECON and SAFSTOR alternatives is less than the 900 person-rem differential deemed acceptable in the 1988 [final generic environmental impact statement (GEIS) supporting the agency’s 1988 decommissioning rule]. In fact, the dose differential would be significantly higher than 900 person-rem. Therefore, the ALARA and NEPA cost-benefit balances must be re-evaluated, taking into account the significant radiological dose savings afforded by the SAFSTOR alternative.

LBP-96-15, 44 NRC at 22. In our July ruling, we concluded that a "proportionality" argument proffered by the Intervenors provided a sufficient basis for accepting this contention. Based on the information then presented by the Intervenors, we found that because the projected dose figures for certain near-term decommissioning activities entailed doses that could not be considered de

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1 Initially, the Board dismissed the Intervenors’ hearing petition for want of any litigable contentions. See LBP-96-2, 43 NRC at 91-92. Although the Commission subsequently affirmed this ruling on appeal, it sent back for consideration under the “late-filing” standards of 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a)(1) information filed by the Intervenors after our ruling dismissing the hearing petition. See CLI-96-7, 43 NRC at 277. In LBP-96-15, 44 NRC at 21-37, we determined the Intervenors’ so-called “new dose argument” constituted a new contention, the terms of which are set forth in the text below; found the contention met the standards for late-filing; and concluded that contention was supported by an adequate basis, i.e., the “proportionality” theory discussed below. None of the parties filed an appeal from or sought reconsideration of these determinations.
minimis when compared with YAEC figures on total doses for all completed activities and because the remaining facility radioactivity level was not insignificant, there was a reasonable possibility the Intervenors could establish a total DECON dose for completed and future activities that fell outside the 900 person-rem differential reflected in the 1988 GEIS. This, the Board decided, presented the requisite material factual dispute warranting further inquiry so as to permit admission of the Intervenors' contention. See id. at 36.

In accepting this contention, the Board also noted that resolving its merits involved two distinct litigation stages: an “envelope” phase and a “relief” phase. As we described it:

The “envelope” phase involves a determination of whether the YAEC DECON decommissioning process will result in occupational doses that exceed the 900 person-rem GEIS “envelope” such that additional ALARA and/or NEPA analysis is necessary. If we should decide that, in fact, the GEIS parameters have been exceeded to a degree that warrants further ALARA and/or NEPA analysis, only then do we need to consider the question of “relief” regarding the appropriate manner for providing that analysis and litigating its sufficiency.

Id. at 37. Because the Board then had pending before it a YAEC “conditional” request for summary disposition, with supporting affidavit, that generally addressed the “envelope” phase of Intervenors’ challenge to the Licensee’s DECON option choice, in accord with earlier Commission guidance the Board established an expedited litigation schedule for considering that motion and, if necessary, holding an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 37-45.

Initially, Intervenors CAN and NECNP had a chance to obtain both informal and formal discovery from YAEC and the Staff on the “envelope” phase of their challenge. Discovery closed on August 30, 1996, without the parties bringing any discovery disputes to the Board for resolution. Thereafter, the Licensee had an opportunity to supplement its summary disposition request, which it did in a September 3, 1996 filing that included a statement of uncontested

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2 Regarding the 900 person-rem differential that the Commission previously has indicated is significant relative to the validity of a licensee’s choice between the DECON and SAFSTOR options, see CLI-96-7, 43 NRC at 251-53, in LBP-96-15, 44 NRC at 13 n.2, we noted:

This 900 person-rem figure reflects the approximate difference between the GEIS estimated total reference pressurized water reactor (PWR) DECON decommissioning occupational dose of 1,215 person-rem and the GEIS estimated SAFSTOR occupational dose of 333 person-rem that would be accrued using a 30-year storage period at the reference PWR. See Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC, NUREG-0868, “Final Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities” (Aug. 1988) at 4-8 (Table 4.3-2). The GEIS was prepared in support of the 1988 rule that is the basis of pertinent NRC decommissioning requirements. See 53 Fed. Reg. 24,018 (1988).

3 See Conditional Motion for Summary Disposition (“New Dose Argument”) (July 10, 1996); Memorandum of YAEC in Opposition to Late Filed “New Dose Information” and in Support of Conditional Motion for Summary Disposition (July 10, 1996) [hereinafter YAEC Summary Disposition Memorandum]; Affidavit of Russell A. Mellor (July 10, 1996) [hereinafter Mellor Summary Disposition Affidavit].
facts and supporting affidavits. Under the Board’s schedule, the Staff had the chance to seek summary disposition as well; instead, the Staff chose to file a response in support of YAEC’s motion, with supporting affidavits. At nearly the same time, acting under the Board’s schedule, the Intervenors filed a response in opposition to YAEC’s motion, with a statement of disputed material facts and a supporting affidavit. The Licensee then filed a reply to the Intervenors’ opposition, with a supporting affidavit, while the Intervenors sought leave to file a reply to the Staff’s supporting response, with an accompanying reply pleading and supporting affidavit.

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Subsequently, after reviewing the parties’ pleadings, we issued a memorandum advising them we did not intend to hold an oral argument prior to deciding the Licensee’s motion. See Board Memorandum (Summary Disposition Oral Argument and Location for Evidentiary Hearing) (Sept. 16, 1996) at 1 (unpublished).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standards Governing Summary Disposition

Section 2.749 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Commission’s administrative analog to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes a party to request, and a presiding officer to render, a decision in the moving party’s favor on any part of the matters in controversy in the proceeding. According to section 2.749(d):

The presiding officer shall render the decision sought if the filings in the proceeding, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the statement of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.

See also Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993).

The party filing the summary disposition motion has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See id. In this regard, section 2.749(a) requires that the moving party include a statement of material facts about which there is no genuine issue to be heard. In contrast, the opposing party must append to its response a statement of material facts about which there exists a genuine issue to be heard. If the responding party does not adequately controvert material facts set forth in the motion, the party faces the possibility that those facts may be deemed admitted. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(a). If, however, the evidence before the Board does not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then the motion must be denied even if there is no opposing evidence. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977). Nevertheless, a party opposing a motion cannot rely on a simple denial of the movant’s...

In doing so, however, we note that, even if we were to accept the Intervenors’ filing, nothing in it would change the result we reach here. In fact, as it might be pertinent to our decision here, it appears to reflect no more than a rephrasing of earlier arguments without the addition of relevant new information or perspective.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also has participated in the proceeding as an interested governmental entity pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.715(c). The Commonwealth did not make any substantive submissions in connection with the Licensee’s summary disposition motion.

92
material facts, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
of material fact. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(b).

B. The Parties' Arguments

As the discussion above suggests, the cardinal focus of our inquiry here
is whether there are material factual issues in genuine dispute relative to the
size of the modified DECON option dose as it is used in computing the Yan-
kee Rowe DECON/SAFSTOR differential for comparison with the GEIS DE-
CON/SAFSTOR differential "envelope." In support of its dispositive motion,
YAEC asserts that the appropriate inquiry concerns two matters: (1) the rel-
vant occupational exposures incurred to date for decommissioning; and (2)
the "correct" estimate of the occupational exposure that will be incurred com-
pleting Yankee Rowe decommissioning. Regarding the "to date" occupational
exposures, YAEC declares that the figure through mid-June 1996 is 440 person-
rem. For the "to go" occupational dose estimate, YAEC maintains the appro-
priate figure is a total exposure of 140 person-rem, the correctness of which
can be accepted with a high degree of confidence based on YAEC's experi-
ence with providing estimates. See YAEC Summary Disposition Memorandum
at 19; YAEC Supplemental Memorandum at 3-7; see also YAEC Uncontested
Facts at 11-12. As support for these assertions, YAEC provides affidavits from
Russell A. Mellor, the decommissioning manager for the Yankee Rowe facility,
that describe the current status of decommissioning, the history of occupational
exposure estimates for Yankee Rowe decommissioning, the methodology used
in accumulating actual exposures and estimating future exposures, and reasons
why YAEC's estimates are reasonably accurate and conservative. See Mellor
Summary Disposition Affidavit at 2-6; Mellor Supplemental Affidavit at 2-15;
see also YAEC Uncontested Facts at 2-8.

In addition, YAEC asserts that the "proportionality" theory that was the basis
for the Intervenors' admitted contention is neither a valid nor reliable way to
estimate future exposures because it fails to account for a variety of factors
affecting exposure rates, including the nature of the task to be performed, the
number of people engaged in the work and their experience level, and the
radiation shielding employed. As support for this proposition, YAEC relies
upon both the discussion in one of Mr. Mellor's affidavits and a separate
affidavit from Dr. Dade W. Moeller. See Mellor Supplemental Affidavit at
15-18; Moeller Affidavit at 3-10; see also YAEC Uncontested Facts at 9. In
particular, Dr. Moeller gives a detailed analysis of the specific factors that
affect occupational radiation doses and provides examples of Yankee Rowe
decommissioning activities that run contrary to the Intervenors' "proportionality"
theory, including steam generator and irradiated hardware liner removal.
Based on this information, about which YAEC asserts there is no genuine issue to be heard, YAEC declares that even if the SAFSTOR exposure for Yankee Rowe is assumed to be zero (rather than the GEIS SAFSTOR estimated exposure of 333 person-rem) the differential between total Yankee Rowe DECON exposures of 580 person-rem and SAFSTOR would fall well within the GEIS 900 person-rem differential that is the “envelope” for this proceeding. As a consequence, YAEC asserts that it is entitled to summary disposition in its favor relative to the CAN/NECNP contention. See YAEC Supplemental Memorandum at 11-12.

In its September 9 response supporting YAEC’s dispositive motion, the Staff declares its essential agreement with the main points made by YAEC. The Staff states that, in comparison with the occupational exposure figure of 457 person-rem for all facility activities set forth in NRC inspection reports through April 1996, the YAEC “to date” figure of 440 person-rem occupational exposure for decommissioning activities is reasonable. The Staff also asserts that the methodology described by YAEC for reaching its “to go” figure of 140 person-rem is acceptable because it comports with industry practice; previously projected doses for now-completed dismantlement activities were consistent with doses actually accrued; remaining work is similar to work already completed; and Licensee personnel can be expected to avoid unexpected doses because they know the facility. See Staff Response at 5-9. In support of these assertions, the Staff provides the affidavits of NRC senior health physicist Charles A. Willis and Morton B. Fairtile, the senior project manager in charge of Staff review of Yankee Rowe decommissioning. See Willis Affidavit at 2-3; Fairtile Affidavit at 2-4.

Moreover, on the issue of the Intervenors’ “proportionality” theory, agreeing with the criticisms leveled by YAEC affiant Moeller, the Staff (relying on its affiant Willis) likewise finds this concept invalid. Although recognizing that some direct relationship between the level of radioactivity (curies) and the absorbed dose (person-rem) could exist, the Staff rejects Intervenors’ theory because ultimately it fails to account for the various job-specific factors that will affect occupational dose, including worker time in the radiation field, distance from the source, and shielding. See Staff Response at 9-11; Willis Affidavit at 3-4. The Staff concludes that because the Licensee’s factual showing clearly establishes its DECON option falls within the 900 person-rem GEIS “envelope,” the Licensee is entitled to a decision in its favor on the Intervenors’ contention.

In their September 10, 1996 response to YAEC’s dispositive motion, Intervenors CAN and NECNP oppose the Licensee’s summary disposition request, asserting that they estimate the expected DECON dose should be at least 1184 person-rem, making the differential between YAEC’s modified DECON option and the SAFSTOR option at least 1000 person-rem, a figure well outside the GEIS 900 person-rem “envelope.” See CAN/NECNP Opposition at 2;
I. CAN/NECNP Disputed Facts at 1-2. In reaching this conclusion, they describe a series of flaws in the YAEC analysis by which the Licensee has incorrectly measured, underestimated, or failed to support its dose estimates. These items of Intervenor criticism, which are drawn from a supporting affidavit of Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, can be summarized as follows:

1. In assessing thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) readings, YAEC failed to make appropriate corrections for background radiation in determining which workers incurred “no measurable exposures,” thereby underestimating doses by at least 25 person-rem.

2. YAEC ignores a full year of decommissioning work that took place in 1992, which included unloading irradiated fuel and control rods from the reactor, cutting and shipping the control rods to the Barnwell, South Carolina radioactive waste disposal site, and conducting a detailed reactor radiation survey, thereby underreporting doses by 94 person-rem.

3. YAEC did not count exposures incurred during “operation and maintenance” (O&M) activities as decommissioning doses, as was done under the “continuing care” category in the GEIS for the SAFSTOR option, thereby underreporting occupational exposures by some 34 person-rem.

4. YAEC has not provided enough information regarding the “to go” activities described in its pleadings — in particular those in the categories of “Etc.” and “Miscellaneous” — to determine whether the dose it estimates for those activities is appropriate.

5. YAEC’s reliance on a 1993 dose estimate as a harbinger of the accuracy and conservatism of its recent “to go” estimate is unsupported because (a) most of the activities involved are incomplete or not started or were already well under way when the estimate was made; (b) YAEC has not supported its statement that the level of uncertainty is reduced by experience, given its failure outlined in paragraph 4 above to provide sufficient information; (c) YAEC’s reliance on cobalt-60 decay as a measure of its conservatism is misplaced in that it fails to account for other radioactive contaminants with longer half-lives; and (d) the accuracy of its predictions for upcoming projects is suspect given the long-term or otherwise unanalyzed nature of those projects, such as concrete decontamination.

6. Rather than YAEC’s figure of 140 person-rem “to go,” it is reasonable to assume a “to go” figure of 400 person-rem over the next 2 1/2 years needed to complete “to go” decommissioning, given (a) decommissioning occupational exposures over the past several years have been on the order of 160 person-rem per year; and (b) the nature of the remaining projects, such as concrete decontamination.

7. YAEC has not adequately considered inhalation doses in that (a) all radionuclides were not included in its calculations; (b) radionuclide decay and biological half-lives were not calculated correctly; and (c) “hot particle” dose inhalation was not accounted for, resulting in a dose underestimation of at least 7 person-rem.

8. YAEC has entirely failed to account for doses incurred in the offsite processing of contaminated waste, which can reasonably be estimated to add 41 person-rem to occupational doses.
9. YAEC erred by using the outdated WASH-1238 model to arrive at an original estimated transportation dose of 41 person-rem (34 person-rem to truckers/rail workers, 7 person-rem to the public) rather than using the modern RADTRAN model that would result in an estimated dose of 103 person-rem (9 person-rem to truckers/rail workers and 94 person-rem to the public).

10. YAEC has underestimated total public exposures due to airborne effluent emissions, although by how much is unclear because YAEC failed to provide sufficient information for calculations.

11. YAEC has not made any decommissioning dose estimate for facility site soil cleanup, which would entail unspecified additional exposures.

12. The SAFSTOR dose estimate should be based on a 186 person-rem figure given in a 1979 decommissioning study that included Yankee Rowe (NUREG-0130, Addendum (Aug. 1979)) rather than the 333 person-rem that was set forth in the 1988 GEIS, which has the effect of increasing the total DECON/SAFSTOR dose differential for Yankee Rowe by 147 person-rem.

See CAN/NECNP Opposition at 3-13; CAN/NECNP Disputed Facts at 2-11; Resnikoff Opposition Affidavit at 5-17.

Thereafter, in their September 17, 1996 reply to the Staff’s response in support of that motion, the Intervenors take issue with the Staff’s assertion that YAEC’s estimation methods comport with industry standards, asserting that this does not guarantee they are reliable. Among other things, the Intervenors again declare, as they did in items 4 and 5 above, that the information provided by YAEC is not sufficient to evaluate the reliability of its dose projections and that the projections involved were based on actual measurements or near-term projects. They also dispute the Staff’s assertions regarding the routine nature of future work and its similarity to already completed tasks, asserting that the concrete decontamination and demolition work, which constitutes a significant portion of the remaining tasks, as well as work involving soil/groundwater contamination and reactor vessel removal are neither like completed work nor routine. See CAN/NECNP Reply Disputed Facts at 1-7; Resnikoff Reply Affidavit at 1-3.

In its reply to the Intervenors’ response, YAEC asserts initially that because the Intervenors’ 1184 person-rem estimate is below the GEIS DECON estimate of 1215, the Board need inquire no further. The Licensee also notes that if each of the exposures for which the Intervenors specify a dose is accepted — other than items 3, 7, 8, and 9 that YAEC asserts are not applicable because they are not within the scope of the GEIS — along with their value of 186 person-rem for SAFSTOR, the resulting differential value is still well within the 900 person-rem “envelope.” YAEC further declares that, given their failure to mention it, the Intervenors clearly have abandoned their “proportionality” theory to focus on the specific components that make up the “to date” and “to go” DECON doses. See YAEC Reply at 1-3.
Looking then to the Intervenors' specific challenges to the Licensee's "to date" and "to go" doses, YAEC first asserts that Dr. Resnikoff's affidavit analyzing those matters should be stricken because his credentials make it clear he is not qualified to act as an expert witness on dosimetry, health physics, and construction engineering, the subjects that are at issue relative to those doses. See id. at 3-4. Further, regarding the particular items of intervenor concern described above, YAEC declares:

1. Regarding item 9, (a) the Intervenors' attempt to introduce public exposure relative to transportation doses is improper because the GEIS and the 900 person-rem differential relate only to occupational exposures; and (b) contrary to the Intervenors' assertion, YAEC did not arrive at its present estimate of 7 person-rem for transportation workers (which is in line with the Intervenors' RADTRAN estimate of 9 person-rem) by "scaling down" transportation doses to account for the smaller size of Yankee Rowe relative to the GEIS reference reactor, but rather to account for its estimate that fewer shipments would be required for that facility.

2. Regarding item 1, (a) the Intervenors' discussion of background dose corrections is confused about the distinction between correcting for such doses by removing them from incurred dose measurements and correcting for exposures incurred for TLDs while those devices are in storage and not being worn; and (b) although permitted to do so, YAEC does not subtract background from dosimeters while in use, thereby adding to the conservatism of its exposure figures.

3. Regarding item 4, the Intervenors' claim that they were provided with insufficient information to make a disciplined analysis of YAEC's "to go" analysis is incorrect because during discovery they were given documents that gave a detailed breakdown of all the "to go" activities, including estimated worker hours and exposure rates and their expert was provided an opportunity to ask any questions he wanted about these matters.

4. Regarding item 6, (a) the Intervenors' use of extrapolations regarding the yearly exposure rate and the amount of time remaining to complete decommissioning to reach the figure of 400 person-rem is entirely without basis, particularly because, as Dr. Moeller's affidavit establishes, a "proportionality"-based argument regarding exposures is entirely speculative; and (b) besides failing to attach any particular person-rem value to concrete decommissioning, the Intervenors' suggestion that concrete structure decommissioning will involve high occupational exposures because of the use of explosives on the contaminated concrete and the lack of any full accounting of the amount of concrete contamination at the facility does not account for the fact that the Yankee Rowe decommissioning plan provides for concrete structures to be decontaminated to background before being demolished and that the decommissioning plan contains data on concrete contamination.

5. Regarding item 11, the Intervenors' assertions that there is no site characterization plan and that soil contamination will result in additional exposures does not account for the site characterization data submitted with the decommissioning plan and YAEC's conclusion, based on that data, that exposure for such activities will be low because the radioactivity level is low.
6. Regarding item 7, besides the fact that the report that is the basis for the GEIS (NUREG/CR-0130 (June 1978)), did not include inhalation dose figures, YAEC asserts that inhalation doses do not matter because YAEC has counted them during the decommissioning period, taking into account all significant radionuclides, and found them to be an insignificant contributor to dose (0.5 person-rem).

7. Regarding item 3, the applicable GEIS table (Table 4.3-2) (a) specifically acknowledges that "custodial care," which is long-term care unique to the SAFSTOR, is not applicable to DECON; and (b) does not include DECON-period routine O&M, such as spent fuel pool operation or license-required routine maintenance, surveillance, and inspection.

See YAEC Reply at 4-10; Errata to Reply Memorandum of [YAEC] (Motion for Summary Disposition) (Sept. 16, 1996) at 1; Mellor Reply Affidavit at 1-11.

In addition, YAEC asserts that in bifurcating this proceeding into an "envelope" phase and a "relief" phase, the Board has applied an incorrect legal standard concerning the question whether the YAEC DECON option will exceed the 900 person-rem occupational exposure DECON/SAFSTOR differential that the Commission has indicated is the general benchmark for judging the validity of a licensee decommissioning option choice. According to YAEC, because a significant portion of the decommissioning work has been done relative to this facility, any judgment now about whether it is appropriate to shift from DECON to SAFSTOR should be based solely on an analysis of whether the exposures necessary to remove the existing facility radioactivity would exceed the 900 person-rem differential. See YAEC Reply at 10-13.

C. Discussion

YAEC's declaration that it is entitled to a decision in its favor on the Intervenors' admitted contention rests on its assertion that there are no genuine material factual disputes concerning two decommissioning dose figures: (1) "to date" occupational exposures for its modified DECON process have amounted to 440 person-rem; and (2) occupational exposures "to go" are estimated at 140 person-rem. According to the Licensee, this amounts to a total DECON decommissioning occupational exposure of 580 person-rem that, when compared with the GEIS figure of 333 person-rem for the SAFSTOR option, results in a differential of approximately 250 person-rem that is well within the relevant 900 person-rem "envelope" identified by the Commission. The Intervenors, in contrast, seek to establish that a genuine material factual dispute exists regarding one or more of these numbers. As we have outlined above, they assert additional dose amounts are applicable to the "to date" 440 person-rem figure (items 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 10) and the "to go" 140 person-rem figure (items 4, 5, 6, 9, and 11). They also maintain that the GEIS SAFSTOR dose figure of 333 person-rem should not be used for determining whether the "envelope" has been exceeded;
rather, the Intervenors declare the appropriate number is 186 person-rem, based on a 1979 decommissioning study that included Yankee Rowe as one of its reference reactors.

YAEC, the Staff, and the Intervenors have presented affidavits of "expert" witnesses in support of their contrary assertions regarding the existence of genuine material factual disputes relative to the various additional/revised exposure figures introduced by the Intervenors. In at least one instance, the Intervenors' point may be well taken. Their assertion regarding the failure of the Licensee to include exposures (41 person-rem) relating to the offsite processing of contaminated wastes (item 8) likely has merit. In other instances, their claims apparently have no validity. For example, the additional dose (94 person-rem) they attribute to the public in connection with waste transportation (item 9) seemingly has no relevance here because the 900 person-rem envelope with which we are concerned under the admitted contention is one that involves occupational — not public — doses.

Ultimately, however, we need not consider each of the Intervenors' claims regarding these purported factual disputes because, under our analysis, they do not fulfill the requirement that they be "material" to our resolution of the Licensee's summary disposition motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (factual disputes that are "irrelevant or unnecessary" will not preclude summary judgment). This is so because, even if (1) those items for which the Intervenors have ascribed a dose figure are attributed to either the Licensee's "to date" or "to go" figures as the Intervenors' assert they should be, and (2) we utilize the intervenor-proffered 186 person-rem SAFSTOR occupational dose figure, the DECON/SAFSTOR differential that would result

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9 As was noted above, YAEC has challenged the credentials of the Intervenors' expert witness, Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, to testify in a number of areas including dosimetry, health physics, and construction engineering. See supra p. 97. For present purposes we need not resolve that matter because, even assuming Dr. Resnikoff has the required expertise, we find that those intervenor concerns for which his affidavits are cited as support do not create a genuine disputed material factual issue.

10 Although the Intervenors' original ALARA contention (Contention A) made reference to public exposures, see LBP-96-15, 44 NRC at 18, as recast by the Board to reflect the substance of the Intervenors' "new dose argument," the admitted contentions clearly relate only to occupational doses because they are the basis for the 900 person-rem "envelope" now at issue. See supra note 2.

11 The Intervenors have raised several concerns about YAEC dose calculations or estimates without indicating what additional exposure can be attributed to their concern. These include their assertions about the vagueness of the Licensee's "to go" miscellaneous category (item 4); uncertainty over the validity of past YAEC estimates (item 5); uncertainty over concrete contamination (items 5 and 6); failure to account for "hot particles" (item 7(c)); underestimation of total public airborne effluent emission exposures (item 10); and uncertainty over soil cleanup (item 11). In the context of the admitted contention, in which we are called upon to consider whether the total Yankee Rowe DECON exposure falls within a specified envelope, this failure to provide any estimate of the exposures involved essentially renders these concerns immaterial.

Given this flaw, which in many instances seems rooted in the adequacy of Intervenors' discovery efforts, see infra p. 101, these matters could be rejected out of hand. We nonetheless do deal with the first three of these

(Continued)
with the inclusion of those exposure figures would not exceed the 900 person-
rem envelope.\footnote{Although YAEC gives a “to go” estimate of 140 person-rem, in referring to this estimate the Intervenors use a figure of 91 person-rem. See, e.g., Resnikoff Opposition Affidavit at 19. This apparently is taken from a subtotal figure given on a table supplied by Mr. Mellor to explain the nature of the Licensee’s “to go” estimate. See Mellor Supplemental Affidavit, exh. 2. We are unable to discern the Intervenors’ basis for using the lower figure, and thus utilize the higher, 140 person-rem figure supported by the Licensee.}

The one factual matter that we do consider because it is potentially “material” is the Intervenors’ assertion that the Licensee’s “to go” figure should be 400 person-rem rather than the 140 person-rem projected by YAEC, a difference of 260 person-rem. In contesting the 140 person-rem figure,\footnote{The following Board-constructed table illusbates this point:}

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rem envelope.\footnote{Although YAEC gives a “to go” estimate of 140 person-rem, in referring to this estimate the Intervenors use a figure of 91 person-rem. See, e.g., Resnikoff Opposition Affidavit at 19. This apparently is taken from a subtotal figure given on a table supplied by Mr. Mellor to explain the nature of the Licensee’s “to go” estimate. See Mellor Supplemental Affidavit, exh. 2. We are unable to discern the Intervenors’ basis for using the lower figure, and thus utilize the higher, 140 person-rem figure supported by the Licensee.}

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\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
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The agency’s rules of practice in 10 C.F.R. § 2.749(c) provide:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the presiding 

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Yankee Rowe “To Date” Exposures & 440 person-rem \\
Yankee Rowe “To Go” Estimated Exposures & 140 person-rem \\
Background Underestimation (item 1) & 25 person-rem \\
1992 “DECON” Exposures (item 2) & 94 person-rem \\
Operation and Maintenance (item 3) & 34 person-rem \\
Inhalation Doses (item 7) & 7 person-rem \\
Offsite Waste Processing (item 8) & 41 person-rem \\
Transportation Exposures (item 9) & 96 person-rem \\
Yankee Rowe DECON Total Exposures & 877 person-rem \\
Yankee Rowe SAFSTOR Estimate & 186 person-rem \\
Yankee Rowe DECON/SAFSTOR Differential & 691 person-rem \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
In this instance, the Intervenors' assertions about a lack of information regarding activity descriptions and a “miscellaneous” activities category generally would be the type of argument made to support obtaining discovery. The problem is that, consistent with their previous concerns about their need for information to respond to the YAEC summary disposition motion, see LBP-96-15, 44 NRC at 38-39, they already have been given the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding their contention.

The Intervenors complain about a lack of detail in the description in Mr. Mellor's July 10, 1996 affidavit, which indicated that the 140 person-rem “to go” figure was a “[p]rojection to compile all remaining decommissioning activities (e.g., reactor vessel removal, lower neutron shield tank removal, activated concrete removal, decontamination of buildings, etc.).” Mellor Summary Disposition Affidavit at 11 n.1. They, however, had an opportunity to take discovery to find out the exact nature of those items. They did not submit a motion to compel or any other complaint about the discovery information provided by YAEC. Consequently, we have no cause to believe the Intervenors were denied any information they requested regarding the nature of the remaining “to go” activities. Having apparently failed fully to utilize the discovery afforded them, they cannot now interpose that shortcoming as the basis for a genuine material factual dispute.14

Regarding the question of the YAEC estimation method as it reflects on the viability of its “to go” estimate, as we noted above, the Licensee has provided an extensive narrative discussion of the history of its decommissioning dose estimation efforts, including the first estimate made by TLG Engineering, Inc., in 1992, a 1993 estimate prepared by YAEC itself, and the 1996 estimate that is the basis for the current “to go” estimate of 140 person-rem. See Mellor Summary Disposition Affidavit at 3-5; Mellor Supplemental Affidavit at 4-8. Additionally, YAEC sets forth a detailed explanation of the methodology, i.e., engineering analysis, used in arriving at those estimates, which the Staff finds acceptable. See Mellor Summary Disposition Affidavit at 2-3; Mellor Supplemental Affidavit at 13-15; Willis Affidavit at 2-3; Fairtile Affidavit at 2-3. In this regard, the Licensee describes a number of phenomena that provide confidence in its exposure estimates. These include (a) radioactive isotope decay from cobalt-60 that results in a 13% dose field reduction per year; (b) radioactive source term removal procedure, which results in dose rates diminishing because

14The particular “miscellaneous” category that is the subject of this Intervenor concern, see Mellor Supplemental Affidavit, exh. 2, accounts for only 14 person-rem, an amount that, even if doubled or tripled, would make no material contribution to the occupational dose differential at issue here.
more contaminated components are removed first; and (c) integration of "lessons learned."

Finally, YAEC has provided supporting documentation (which it declares was provided to the Intervenors during discovery) that outlines in detail the various activities that make up its "to go" estimate. This documentation includes figures showing the estimate of exposure hours to perform each activity, the effective dose rate in the work area, and the estimated person-rem dose for the activity, the components needed to arrive at an estimate of worker exposure for the various activities. See Mellor Supplemental Affidavit, exh. 6, attach. 2 (Memorandum RP-96-19); see also id., exh. 4 (Memorandum YSM-96-20).15

In the face of this information, the Intervenors declare that there are several disputed material factual issues regarding the validity of the YAEC estimates. See CANNECNP Disputed Facts at 4-8; CAN/NECNP Reply Disputed Facts at 2-7. Based on our review of the parties' filings, however, the only one of these that apparently would have any real significance relative to the validity of the YAEC estimates is the Intervenors' concern about concrete contamination. See CAN/NECNP Reply Disputed Facts at 3-4 ("significant portion of the remaining work" involves demolition and other activities associated with contaminated concrete).

According to the Intervenors, the "reasonableness" of the YAEC estimate is suspect because concrete decommissioning will be "dirty" and the extent of concrete contamination is unknown, meaning that, notwithstanding the general decline in the facility's radioactive inventory, this activity could cause unaccounted-for exposures. See CAN/NECNP Disputed Facts at 7; CAN/NECNP Reply Disputed Facts at 4; Resnikoff Opposition Affidavit at 9; Resnikoff Reply Affidavit at 2. In fact, as is reflected in the Yankee Rowe decommissioning plan, the Licensee has made efforts to survey and account for the extent of concrete contamination. See Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Yankee Nuclear Power Station Decommissioning Plan at 3.1-7 to -8, Tables 3.1-5 to -7 (rev. 0.0 Dec. 1993) [hereinafter Decommissioning Plan]; see also Mellor Supplemental Affidavit, exh. 6, attach. 2 (exposure estimates for activities including "concrete/steel decon," "[vapor container (vc)] concrete/steel decon" below and above charging floor, and "vc activated concrete removal"). Further, although the Intervenors postulate a "dirty" concrete decommissioning process based, at least in part, on the use of "explosives," the plan indicates that (1) explosives are not to be used in decommissioning; (2) structures generally are to be decontaminated before they are taken down; and (3) if coatings and hand wiping will not stabilize surface contamination, then airborne contamination control and waste processing systems will be used to control contamination releases.

15 So there is no confusion regarding our citations to the record, we note that the Mellor Supplemental Affidavit contains six exhibits, some of which, in turn, include attachments labeled as "exhibit."
See Decommissioning Plan at 1.2-4, 2.3-10, 2.3-12 to -13; see also 1 Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Final Safety Analysis Report, Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Rowe, Massachusetts at 10, 200-7, 200-9 to -10 (rev. June 1995). In the latter instance, any water from surface washing methods will be collected and processed in the plant liquid waste processing system, while contaminates from methods that will result in airborne particulate matter will be controlled using vacuum removal with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration systems. See id. In this light, the intervenors’ bald assertion that concrete decontamination will provide an unspecified level of exposure is simply conjecture that, even when supported by an expert, will not establish a genuine material factual dispute. See United States v. Various Slot Machines on Guam, 658 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1981) (in the context of a summary judgment motion, an expert must back up his opinion with specific facts); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1988) (expert’s study based on “unsupported assumptions and unsound extrapolation” cannot be used to support summary judgment motion).

Finally, wholly inadequate to establish a material factual dispute is the intervenors’ assertion that it is “reasonable to assume” a 400 person-rem “to go” figure based on an “average” yearly 160 person-rem exposure rate over the purported 2½-year duration of the project. Resnikoff Opposition Affidavit at 9. Initially, this assertion suffers from the problem that it is based on a “rough estimate” that once resumed, “it is reasonable to expect” completion of “to go” decommissioning will take more than twice as long as the 1 year the Licensee has estimated. Id. In support of its 1-year estimate, YAEC cites its decommissioning plan schedule (Table 2.3-5) indicating that approximately 1 ½ years are required for dismantlement period activities, in conjunction with a decommissioning completion percentage of 60%. See Mellor Reply Affidavit at 7. The intervenors proffer their completion schedule based on the assertion that decommissioning activities can be expected to proceed at the same pace as has been achieved since 1993, without offering any reason this is so (other than it is “reasonable”) or why the Licensee’s proposed schedule is deficient. In this context, the intervenors again have provided nothing more than speculation, which is not sufficient to establish a genuine material factual dispute.

Even more troubling, however, is the fact that at its core their 400 person-rem “to go” dose argument is merely a variant of their “proportionality” theory that the recently filed Licensee and Staff analyses have thoroughly discredited and the intervenors have made no attempt to defend. As YAEC and the Staff made clear in their summary disposition submissions, a reasonably accurate collective dose assessment cannot be done by simply assuming that there is a proportionality between the occupational exposure rate resulting from facility cleanup activities for a particular level of radioactivity and the exposure rate likely to accrue in decommissioning any additional radioactive
inventory. Instead, a reasonably accurate dose assessment requires consideration of a number of factors, including component characteristics (e.g., location, size and shape, shielding, and complexity); exposure conditions (e.g., internal or external); chemical and physical nature of the radionuclide and its quantity; radionuclide decay mode and emission energy; and decommissioning operation phase. See Mellor Supplemental Affidavit at 16-18; Moeller Affidavit at 3-10; Willis Affidavit at 3-4.

The Intervenors now would have us ignore all these factors and make the simplistic assumption that the “to date” decommissioning activities are essentially identical to the remaining decommissioning activities so as to provide the same yearly 160 person-rem exposure rate during the time needed to complete “to go” decommissioning. In the face of the uncontroverted evidence now before us demonstrating that because the “proportionality” theory fails to account for these factors, it lacks any reasonable scientific basis for establishing a “to go” figure, we are unwilling to do so. We thus conclude that the Intervenors’ “average annual dose” variation on this theme, which incorporates the same analytical shortcomings as their proportionality “theory,” does not create a genuine material factual dispute about the validity of the Licensee’s “to go” estimate.

As we noted above, in light of the Licensee’s showing regarding the validity of its “to date” and “to go” DECON dose figures, even accepting the other occupational dose estimate revisions proffered by the Intervenors, see supra note 12, unless the Intervenors can establish a genuine material factual issue relative to their assertion that the “to go” dose estimate for Yankee Rowe decommissioning should be in the neighborhood of 400 person-rem, the Licensee would be entitled to summary disposition in its favor on the substance of their contention. Because the Intervenors have not done so, we grant YAEC’s dispositive motion.

III. CONCLUSION

In connection with their challenges to the Licensee’s “to go” decommissioning dose estimate for Yankee Rowe as described in items 3, 4, and 5 above, the Intervenors have failed to show a genuine issue as to any material fact that

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16 Although we need not resolve the matter, YAEC asserts that the average annual dose between 1993 and 1996 (apparently without counting doses for the year 1992 the Intervenors otherwise maintain should be included in the total dose figures) is, in fact, 130 person-rem rather than the Intervenor-proffered 160 person-rem average dose figure, an amount that approximates the highest annual dose during that period. See Mellor Reply Affidavit at 7.

17 Putting aside the question of the propriety of waiting until a reply pleading to challenge the Board’s ruling on the applicable legal framework for this proceeding, because we find in the Licensee’s favor on the “envelope” phase of this proceeding as it was outlined in our July 31, 1996 memorandum and order, we need not consider YAEC’s arguments regarding the validity of that Board determination.
would require an evidentiary hearing regarding the Licensee’s factual demonstration that occupational exposures from its modified DECON plan fall within the applicable 900 person-rem “envelope.” Because those items present the only disputed factual matters that potentially are material to the Intervenors’ contention at issue in this proceeding, we conclude that, as a matter of law, Licensee YAEC is entitled to a decision in its favor regarding the merits of that contention.

For the foregoing reasons, it is, this twenty-seventh day of September 1996, ORDERED that

1. The September 13, 1996 request of CAN/NECNP for leave to file a reply to the Staff’s September 9, 1996 response in support of YAEC’s summary disposition motion is granted.

2. The September 17, 1996 request of CAN/NECNP for leave to file a reply to YAEC’s September 13, 1996 reply is denied; provided, however, that the September 17, 1996 pleading entitled “[CAN/NECNP] Reply to YAEC’s Reply Memorandum (Summary Disposition)” and the accompanying “Second Reply Affidavit of Marvin Resnikoff, Ph.D.” shall remain lodged in the docket of this proceeding.

3. The July 10, 1996 “conditional” summary disposition motion of YAEC, as renewed in its supplemental filing of September 3, 1996, is granted and, for the reasons given in this memorandum and order, a decision regarding the merits of the Intervenors’ admitted contention is rendered in favor of YAEC.

4. As the determination rendered herein terminates this proceeding before the Board, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.786, within 15 days after service of this Memorandum and Order a party may file a petition for review with the Commission on the grounds specified in section 2.786(b)(4).

5. In accord with the Commission’s ruling regarding a stay pending appeal from the Board’s determination in LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61 (1996), see CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 59-60 (1996), any effectiveness of this Memorandum and Order is stayed up through and including Wednesday, October 9, 1996, to provide the
parties with an opportunity to seek from the Commission any appropriate stay pending review.\textsuperscript{19}

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Chairman
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

Jerry R. Kline
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

Thomas S. Elleman
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

Rockville, Maryland
September 27, 1996

\textsuperscript{19} Copies of this Memorandum and Order have been sent this date to counsel for YAEC by Internet E-mail transmission, to counsel for CAN/NECNP and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by facsimile transmission, and to Staff counsel by E-mail transmission through the agency's wide area network.