WAR BY OTHER MEANS – THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMY
MILITARY GOVERNMENT DOCTRINE IN THE WORLD WARS

David C. Musick, B.A.

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APPROVED:

Robert Citino, Major Professor
Richard B. McCaslin, Committee Member and
Chair of the Department of History
Michael V. Leggiere, Committee Member
Geoffrey Wawro, Committee Member
James D. Meernik, Acting Dean of the
Toulouse Graduate School
Occupation operations are some of the most resource and planning intensive military undertakings in modern combat. The United States Army has a long tradition of conducting military government operations, stretching back to the Revolutionary War. Yet the emergence of military government operational doctrine was a relatively new development for the United States Army. During the World Wars, the Army reluctantly embraced civil administration responsibilities as a pragmatic reaction to the realities of total war. In the face of opposition from the Roosevelt administration, the United States Army established an enduring doctrine for military government in the crucible of the European Theater of Operations.
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by

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Two Views, 81 Years

As civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.

– Frances Lieber, (1863)

We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.

– Franklin Delano Roosevelt, (1944)
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The attack brought a surreal surprise that could only come with the disorder of combat. Children, chased by their teachers, nuns or guardians, dashed to the German lines and began climbing on the enemy weapons. Patton had earlier been asked, via a radio message from Washington, how many military government officers he wanted; he responded “not a God damn one of those civilian sissies!” Now he regretted his move and radioed a request to immediately send twenty-five military policemen and twenty-five military government officers competent in handling children.¹

This episode from OPERATION HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily in 1943, highlights many of the common perceptions held not only by the military, but also civilian leaders, historians, and the public in general. Many, like Patton, view military government as an altogether separate event from combat. Others overlook military government completely.

Military government operations get little notice from military historians. Military government operations lack the high drama of open combat. There is little physical risk and no opportunities for daring exploits, thus there is no chance for a heroic reward. Military government is bereft of dynamism. Combat efforts are organized into operations like HUSKY, SLEDGEHAMMER, and OVERLORD – terms evocative of power and movement – that are descriptive of efforts to kill and destroy in the national interest. Military government operations are staid affairs – bereft of exciting cover terms – that are intended to rebuild and pacify in the wake of military cataclysm. The typical view of military government is as a clean up effort – an unwanted but necessary chore. In many respects, military government operations are an anticlimactic encore to the act of war, much more the domain of social and political scholars than military historians.

¹ As related via email conversation with the publisher, Malcolm S. MacLean, Adventures in Occupied Areas (unpublished memoir: Army War College, 1975) no pages.
Yet military government is very much a critical part of twentieth century military operations. It is conducted in closer quarters with the enemy, and in some aspects has greater risks, than traditional combat. Military government frames the transition between war and peace. Failures in these operations can prolong or prematurely end a national commitment to restoration and reconciliation. Most importantly, mistakes in occupation can lay the foundations for future conflict.

In spite of their importance, military government operations are underappreciated. Combat-fatigued soldiers and war weary citizens on the home front – having already sacrificed significantly – are reticent to continue efforts that have an uncertain benefit. In the dénouement of tactical, operational, and national conflict, these operations rarely receive the level of national commitment and resources that are given to kinetic operations. There are no military government analogues to Rosie the Riveter, the Higgins boat, or the Manhattan Project. Working largely with the shattered remains of a society, military government seeks to harmonize the vanquished foe with the victorious conqueror.

It is a common misconception that military government operations begin with the capitulation of an enemy at the end of a war. Contemporary civil affairs and military government begin after the first battle and continue well after the final peace documents are signed. In the Second World War, United States military government began operations with TORCH in North Africa. These efforts expanded to concurrently include Sicily, Italy, France, the Netherlands, the Balkans, Germany, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. Unlike combat operations, government actions are continuous, resulting in an effort that expands geographically behind military conquests. Likewise, the duration of military government operations far outstrips kinetic operations. Again using the Second World War as an example, American combat operations in
Europe ran for 31 months from November 1942 until May 1945. American military government operations in Europe also began in November 1942, yet continue, in a greatly limited capacity, today.

Military government operations are an ancillary, unintended development of total war. In the era before mass armies and mobilized national economies, armies would ‘meet on the field of battle’. Villages and crops may have been destroyed incidentally, but the main focus of war was largely on the enemy force alone, usually outside of major population centers. With the development of mass armies, the agricultural and industrial capacity to supply those armies became a target. A good example is the scorched earth policy that destroyed Portuguese crops before the lines of Torres Vedras, a tactic that eventually forced Marshal Massena to withdraw. Social systems expanded in parallel with industrial and military technology, creating populations and economies that were much more integrated with and dependent on government. By the end of the First World War, the objectives of war expanded beyond immediate logistical and tactical resources to include the dismantling of infrastructure, population centers, and enemy government systems, necessitating the occupation of enemy territory.

By the Second World War, the Allies had made the complete dismantling of German, Italian, and Japanese government systems a grand strategic objective. Drawing on lessons learned from their occupation of Germany after World War One, the American military began planning for occupation and governance of enemy countries. It is worth noting that the military recognized the need and began planning for military government before the need arose – “a true innovation in the conduct of military affairs.”

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Occupation and military government are military operations that require extensive planning and preparation. It is ironic that the forces most often tasked to carry out the rehabilitative operations of military government are often those that most recently participated in the carnage. As early as 1939, veterans of the Great War recognized that supplanting enemy social and economic systems required extensive training and preparations. The War Department’s answer was the creation of the School of Military Government to train and prepare soldiers to administrate, and the Civil Affairs Division to plan at the operational and strategic level. However, the plan to replace civilian government with military ran contrary to American sensibilities. The controversy led to the initial adoption of a system of divided military and civilian command.

As military government operations commenced, the divided system was abandoned. Plans for rapid civilian assumption of government affairs were likewise scrapped as civilian agencies realized that they were inadequate to the task. The Army embraced the mission of military government and incorporated the lessons learned from early experiences into its doctrine expressed in the 1943 edition of Field Manual 27-5.

As World War II concluded, military government operations expanded. The Germans and Japanese had ravaged the countries they had conquered. In this environment, military government operations necessarily expanded to include the administration of liberated countries. During the enemy’s withdrawal, they often systematically dismantled or destroyed equipment and industry. An example comes from newly liberated French bankers, who related the account of German officers demanding the printing plates for Banque de France notes. Bankers
substituted the real plates and handed over old ones that had been hammered and rendered useless.\(^3\)

As military government operations expanded geographically, they also increased in scope. Soldiers were confronted with all the problems of modern government and found their training insufficient. Monetary policy, taxation, public health, transportation, housing, displaced persons, manufacturing and distribution all fell under the purview of military government officers. Reconstruction in many liberated areas was rapid as governments in exile resumed control. However, in some areas, Axis occupation had been extensive or extended, resulting in a dearth of capable native governors. In places like the Philippines and Korea, United States armies of liberation turned quickly into armies of occupation as the native pool of talent was inadequate to the task. Missteps in the administration of both these countries would have lingering consequences over the rest of the twentieth century.

Military government in enemy occupied territory was not without unexpected challenges. The sheer volume of displaced persons in Germany quickly overwhelmed the capacity of planned systems for resolving the problem. Recently liberated Jews likewise formed another challenge as they resisted being placed in refugee camps while Germans remained in their own homes.\(^4\) Military government officers, civil affairs soldiers, United Nations workers and civilian relief agencies all worked together to resolve these issues and rebuild truly war torn countries. Throughout these operations, lessons noted were evaluated and incorporated into doctrine, and in 1947 the War Department released an updated version of Field Manual 27-5.

\(^3\) Related in SHAEF memorandum to Civil Affairs Division, War Department and Secretary of Treasury, dated 15 September 1944, CAD Messages, Box 17, Record Group 165, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

Military government and occupation is the last phase of modern war because it defines the true purposes of the war. A nation’s values are expressed in the nature of occupation – the actions of military government and civil affair operations. Rebuilding, replacing and restoring take the place of targeting, killing and capturing. Military government may lack high drama and heroic rewards, but it can provide meaningful opportunities for personal reward. Brigadier General Franklin M. Davis, on occupation duty in Germany said that military government “may be a poor encore to the last act of victory, but let government fail and the victory becomes a meaningless pageant.”

Though soldiers and officers eagerly published memoirs of their experiences in occupation, there are comparatively few scholarly studies of the subject. The historiography of military government operational doctrine is somewhat understandably sparse. The first scholarly narrative of military government was Harold Zink’s *American Military Government in Germany*, published in 1947. Zink’s account is a memoir of his participation in the development of military government policy and planning for Germany. As a first-hand account, it is necessarily limited in scope, but Zink’s training and experience as a professor of political science are evident in the scholarly level of the writing and analysis.

In 1948, Carl J. Friedrich edited and contributed to a collection of monographs titled *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*. Imminently qualified by his academic credentials alone, Friedrich also served as Constitutional and Governmental Affairs Adviser to the Military Governor of Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, from 1946 to 1948. The book is the first academic analysis of American military government doctrine, policies, and

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procedures. Zink and Friedrich remained the sole foundational works of academic thought on military government for almost twenty years.

In 1964, the most prominent work on military government was published: Harry L. Coles’ and Albert K. Weinberg’s official history of the subject in the Army ‘green book’ series, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*. The book is a largely documentary collection of official messages, memoranda, and military communications that are organized chronologically and collated into topical groups. Coles and Weinberg deserve high praise for cataloging the massive volumes of information into a single volume. However, that is all they provide. There is very limited analysis of the subject in general, and it is not correlated to any other actions. Readers are required to have a solid background in the events of World War II to understand the context of many of the messages. The work also focuses exclusively on Italy and the liberated nations in the European theater, with no mention of Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Germany. The book’s strongest point is in highlighting the debates, discussions and deliberations among the senior leadership – including Franklin D. Roosevelt, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower – regarding the initial planning for and conduct of military government.

Franklin M. Davis, who published *Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany 1945 – 1949*, augmented the historical narrative in 1967. His book is an engaging picture of the problems encountered daily during occupation. Davis is long on anecdotes and examples of the major issues like displaced persons, fraternization between German women and American soldiers, and Jewish antagonism. The author is very good at explaining the various forces at work in Germany other than the United States Army. His shortcoming comes in his myopic view of events, which he depicts only through the viewpoint of the Army in Europe. This is understandable given the subject matter, but leads to some errors,
such as his declaration on page 43 that the “seat of all military planning for the occupation was, from the onset of the war, located in London.” *Come as a Conqueror* is also clearly intended for the lay public, as it lacks meaningful citations, and little note of doctrine. Regardless, Davis’ book is the first to attempt to synthesize operations into a narrative form.

In 1974, the first major historical scholarship on the subject appeared in Earl Ziemke’s *U. S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944 – 1946*. Published as part of the Army Historical Series by the Center of Military History, the book offers a detailed and professional analysis of the development and execution of military government operations. As with Davis, Ziemke focuses almost exclusively on operations in Germany, only briefly mentioning events in Italy or the liberated countries. The author’s strongest contribution is in his detailed but concise review of the development of civil affairs and military government training and doctrine. Ziemke, along with Coles and Weinberg, form the core of most professional writing on the subject.

*Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands*, by Arnold G. Fisch, filled part of the hole in the historiography in 1988. Also published by the Center of Military History as part of its Army Historical Series, *the Ryukyu Islands* builds on the previous work of Ziemke and Coles and Weinberg. Fisch, however makes a significant departure from previous studies by focusing on efforts by the United States Navy to establish military government operations independent of the Army. The greatest contribution Fisch makes is in his focus on operations in Okinawa, which poses a great point of comparison to previous works. The author condenses his personal contribution to the furtherance of the historical narrative to 177 pages, just over half the book. The remaining 150 pages of the book is composed of reproductions of official military orders and regulations, as well as other documents, relating to military government in Okinawa.
There has been a resurgence of writing on the subject of occupation, liberation and military government since 2001. This renewed interest is largely due to the return of military government operations to the realm of conventional Army thinking. Since the early part of the Vietnam War, civil affairs and military government was the exclusive domain of Army Special Forces and their Civil Affairs teams. After the United States seemingly abandoned its policy of overt regime change, military government found a comfortable home in the world of ‘black ops’. The aftermath of 11 September 2001 thrust military government back into conventional operations as the United States prepared to dismantle the governments of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein. Much of the political angst over these wars is directly attributable to missteps in planning for military government. Largely due to an institutional hesitancy to assume such roles, the military failed to incorporate lessons from operations in the two World Wars. Planners were ignorant of doctrine that had developed over generations. The upshot of these errors has been a renewed interest in civil affairs operations. In 2002 came the publication of The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1941 – 1945, by Michael Beschloss. The author provides a revealing insight into the Roosevelt administration, particularly the role of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau in the development of an occupation policy for Germany. In 2004 Stephen G. Fritz published Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich, a solid account of Germany during the initial stages of occupation, with a particularly good analysis of the Jewish experience of liberation. The most recent contribution to the historiography comes from William Hitchcock’s The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe. While Hitchcock bills his book as a “New History,” it is more of a reminder of the human cost of liberation and war that has been left out of the modern historical narrative.⁶

⁶ Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947);
This thesis seeks to address a shortcoming in the historiography of a comprehensive review and analysis of the development of United States military government operations. This thesis attempts to trace the evolution and expansion of military government operational doctrine, beginning with America’s reluctant participation in the first major international occupation after World War One and concluding with the start of the ongoing occupation of Germany after World War II. The bulk of this thesis is primarily focused on the Second World War and examines the emergence of civil affairs and military government as part of combat operations. The thesis also highlights changes in the United States’ international role and how that extended role drove the further development of military government. This thesis deals with several themes including institutional memory, tension between American military and civilian leaders, the importance of coherent national policy in all aspects of military operations, and the difficulties of developing military government doctrine during combat operations.  

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7 Though technically referring to differing degrees of civil administration, throughout this thesis the terms “civil affairs,” and “military government” are used interchangeably to refer to military administration of what are normally considered civilian governmental functions.
CHAPTER 2

AMAROC – THE AMERICAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION

The First World War was not an event into which the participants blindly stumbled. Indeed it is likely that the Great War was one of the most thoroughly planned and prepared of human debacles. Offensive operations began in 1914 with the combination of Count Alfred von Schlieffen’s plan to wheel into France via the Low Countries and Conrad von Hotzendorf’s War Case R + B, designed to invade both Serbia and Russia. The Allies responded with the British Expeditionary Force landing troops in Europe to support France’s Plan XVII and Russia’s Plan 19, which called for a French offensive into Lorraine and a Russian invasion of East Prussia.8

Unlike the detailed planning and preparations preceding the Great War, the abrupt end of the war in 1918 caught the Allies without a plan for occupation. During the preparation for armistice, up to November 1918, the French, via their commander Marshal Ferdinand Foch, attempted to persuade the Allies to mark the new German western border at the Rhine River. This move would have greatly weakened Prussia – the most influential German state – by creating a separate state in the Rhineland. A secret agreement between Russia and France in February 1917 called for the creation of just such a state. The area was to be occupied by the French until Germany had fulfilled all the terms of the peace treaty. The move would have separated the industrial heartland from Germany and expanded French military influence to the Rhine. While the idea was understandably popular with the French, British and American

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authorities refused to support a separate Rhenish state due to reasonable fears that such a move would precipitate a future war.\(^9\)

The debate over the future occupation of the Rhineland continued over six months of negotiations. British Prime Minister Lloyd George and Field Marshal Douglas Haig both openly opposed occupation, particularly by joint forces, but ultimately the Anglo-American contingent supported a compromise agreement.\(^10\) There would be no separatist republic of the Rhineland, and Britain and the United States would defend France if Germany attacked. Furthermore, a demilitarized zone was created along the entire east bank of the Rhine, thirty miles deep. Most importantly to the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force, the Allied forces would occupy the Rhineland, with bridgeheads at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz for five, ten, and fifteen years respectively, subject to Germany’s compliance with treaty terms. In accordance with British wishes, a single Allied nation would administer each bridgehead. Britain and America found this agreement more palatable because instead of expanding French influence into Germany, it pushed back the frontiers of German military power thirty miles east of the Rhine.\(^11\)

If the Allied armies were caught short by the need for occupation, the American people were completely blindsided by the thought. As late as 17 September the *New York Times* declared, “We have no intention of seizing and holding German cities or forts” and decried the idea of holding such territory “in pledge” as “beyond the pale of reason.”\(^12\) Thus, the 1918

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announcement of the establishment of an American Army of Occupation (AMAROC) came as something of a surprise to the public in general.  

Americans were not strangers to the concept of occupation. Indeed, in Mexico in 1847, during Reconstruction after the Civil War, and recently in Cuba, the Philippines, and Central America after the Spanish – American War, the United States military had been involved in occupation and reconstruction activities. Clearly, an occupation was a foreseeable consequence of United States involvement in the Great War. Why then did Americans in 1918 overlook the possibility of postwar military occupation? In his book, *Victors Divided*, Keith Nelson answers that, generally, “Americans were simply not ready to think of themselves as part of the European world.” He explains that many Americans of the era were isolationist with respect to Europe. To these Americans, the United States had been drawn into war against her will by German perfidy and the United States had thus willingly joined the “crusade against the Kaiser.” However, many of these same Americans did not view involvement in the World War as a cause to abandon the Monroe Doctrine of non-involvement. These people viewed the war as a noble exercise, but felt American involvement ended with the fighting, a sentiment clearly expressed in the lyrics of Nora Bayes’ jingoistic song *Over There* – “We'll be over, we're coming over / And we won't come back till it's over, over there.”  

The political class of the United States was likewise blind to the eventuality of occupation. Those American powerbrokers on the right, typically conservative internationalists, in the Republican Party, maintained a philosophy of social Darwinism and viewed war as “part of each nation’s continuing struggle for power and survival.” These “unilateralists” would

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13 The acronym AMAROC is used to refer to the American forces throughout the entire period of occupation from 1918 to 1923. The term AEF refers to the American Expeditionary Force of 1918 to 1919 and AFG refers to the American Forces in Germany from 1919 to 1923.

support international action as an addition to unilateral efforts at self-defense. Theodore Roosevelt, the leading face of this group, saw the outcome of the war as a weaker but largely unchanged Germany. On the political left, liberal internationalists placed great faith in the German’s “ability to redeem themselves.” These Americans “looked for the early appearance of a system of rationally motivated, self-governing nations,” and assumed that war and defeat would be sufficient to motivate Germans to overthrow the Kaiser. Nelson exemplifies this attitude with a quote from the *Chicago Daily News* from 26 October 1918, “Our task is to bring the Germans to the point of themselves spewing forth all Hohenzollerns and all Junkers.” The result was that neither conservative isolationists nor liberal internationalists in America had intellectually prepared for the future of Germany beyond the war – victory in battle was all that was necessary to meet the war’s aims. “Americans were almost totally lacking in a realistic attitude toward the peace.” Regardless of this initial blindness to eventualities, once the occupation of Germany materialized, both ends of the American political spectrum made an issue of occupation that further complicated the dynamic between the Germans, British, and French – complexity that would shape the events of the American occupation until its withdrawal on 23 January 1923.15

Prepared for or not, occupation duties followed the Armistice agreement on 11 November 1918. As the reality of occupation hit home, the American people embraced their Army’s new role, quickly establishing relief efforts like the United War Work Campaign, which was dedicated to raising soldier morale. This shift in attitude, or sudden awareness, is reflected in the editorial board of the *New York Times*, which reversed its position of two months prior. On 14 November the editors petitioned Americans for support for the Army of occupation via relief organizations, claiming, “The American Army is now on the point of beginning an essential part

15 Ibid., 2 – 3.
of the conduct of the war,” and that “this work (occupation duty) is just as necessary to complete victory as was the fighting itself.”

On the morning of 1 December 1918, one million men of the victorious Allied Army, under command of French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, moved forward to their occupation positions along the Rhine River. Since 11 November the German Army had been evacuating the presumptive demilitarized zone at a rate of 20 miles per day. Allotted six days of ‘breathing space’ by Marshal Foch, in which no Allied elements moved, the German soldiers were well out of contact with their erstwhile enemies. The 250,000 men of the newly formed Third Army, American Expeditionary Force, made up the American Army of Occupation (AMAROC), and were placed under the command of Major General Joseph T. Dickman. They now moved north down the Moselle Valley to the Rhine to their positions at Coblenz to “keep watch on the Rhine, while at Versailles statesmen were gathering in from the furthermost corners of the earth to redraw the map of the world.”

While the Ruhr basin is renowned for its large population and industrial development, the Rhineland the Americans discovered as they entered was much different. The heavily industrialized areas lay along the lower Rhine in the northern half of the province. The American sector, comprised mainly of the Eifel agricultural district, was largely rural and relatively dispersed – of the over seven million inhabitants of the Rhineland, fewer than 900,000 lived in the American sector. Coblenz, capital of the province, was the largest population center with

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over 65,000 people. Trier, originally in the American zone, had a population of about 55,000 inhabitants.\(^{18}\)

General Henry Allen, the final United States Commissioner in the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (IARHC), emphasized the advantage in tranquility that the relatively pastoral nature of the sector gave to the American Army. The German labor strikes of 1918 brought an end to coal production and rail transportation in the industrialized regions, “by December, 1918, Bolshevism seemed to have smothered lawful authority. The American occupied territory, primarily agricultural, felt the disorder less than (other sectors).” He also credits this to the Catholic faith of the workmen in the American zone, who organized into Christian trade unions which were “more conservative” than ordinary unions. Thus the Americans never had to face a labor situation like that confronting the British, French, and Belgians in cities like Cologne, Ludwigshafen, and Aachen. For emphasis, General Allen remarked, “in following the development of American administration it must be remembered that the people we were governing were largely of an agricultural population.”\(^{19}\)

The German political institutions the American Army encountered during the occupation were all from the imperial regime. “Ostensibly, the revolution of November, 1918, had converted imperial Germany into a republic. Practically, the transformation of an autocracy into a democracy can not be accomplished in a day.”\(^{20}\) Though the officials of the old regime were discredited in the eyes of the majority of the people, the new Weimar government chose not to make sweeping changes to its structure. Additionally, the Armistice required retention of the ex-imperial officials. This constraint was largely the result of conservative political and military influences because, while some desired fundamental transformation of Germany into a republic,

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 4.
\(^{20}\) Hunt, 8.
they were not willing to sacrifice the effort and resources to realize that vision. In the end the military expediency of economy of force won out as, “trained and responsible officials could transmit and carry out orders better than the creatures of a Workman's Council,” a proposition that simplified the Allies’ administrative responsibilities. Besides, the Allies wanted to avoid a potentially explosive political atmosphere that may have attended the toppling of established local political institutions.21

That the Great War devastated the German economy is indisputable. As the war progressed, German factories had increasingly been brought under government control to produce weapons and munitions. As those fit for war were mobilized, the original workforce was replaced with women and old men and new machinery for the manufacture of armaments was installed. Once the factories were demilitarized, the workforce was reduced to a collection of novices, with no understanding of the original manufacturing process. Even if the factories had been able to produce goods, the Allied blockade remained in effect, eliminating the ability to replace necessary raw materials depleted by the conflict. The evaporation of the German Army further compounded the problem. Rather than an orderly demobilization, German soldiers simply returned home at will and found no jobs. Unemployed, these former soldiers became easy prey for revolutionaries. Additionally, a lack of coal and the Allies demand for the return of 5000 engines and 150,000 rail cars seized by Germany from France, Belgium, Romania, Poland, and Serbia during the war crippled German rail infrastructure. By December 1918, the possibility of a return to normalcy looked bleak “as Bolshevism appeared certain to engulf the country.”22

In addition to its agricultural nature, the population centers of Coblenz and Trier were predominantly governmental and residential towns, without a large industrial workforce, so a

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21 Ibid., 9.
22 Ibid., 15–16.
serious labor situation never developed in the American zone. There was, however, a serious food crisis nationwide that affected even the American sector. During the war, food rationing led to black marketeering, which drove up prices. As the war continued, workmen were unable to afford the prices farmers could get from the rich. The 9 November revolution and the armistice terms precipitated a critical food crisis. Defeat and disorder lowered morale and the resulting turmoil eliminated practical enforcement of food laws. The chaotic situation was worsened by limited food distribution due to a paralyzed rail system such that, “when the Americans, in December, 1918, entered the Rhineland, they found a predominantly agricultural country threatened in the near future with actual starvation.”

Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs during the occupation, dated American military government from the entrance of American forces to the sector on 1 December 1918 to the empowerment of the IARHC on 10 January 1920. The IARHC, in Colonel Hunt’s opinion, supplanted American Army officers as the supreme Allied authority in military government affairs in the sector, though American officers would not leave the Rhineland or cease administration activities until 1923. For the purpose of this thesis, the initial phase of American military government operations will be defined as the period from the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918, to the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty by Germany on 28 June 1919.

The only guide for the organization and doctrine for the initial phase of American military government operations was the Hague Convention of 1907. However, the philosophical premise of the Hague Convention was making war more humane and limiting its impact on

\[\text{\textsuperscript{23}}\text{Ibid., 18.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{24}}\text{Ibid., VI.}\]
civilians – compassion and chivalry were the guiding principles, not military necessity.\textsuperscript{25} Even without a clear foundation governing military government, the month between the Armistice and the occupation of the Rhine should have been ample time to establish a solid framework for military government. Unfortunately, General John J. Pershing’s staff, including young officers like George Marshall and Jonathan M. Wainwright, appears to have underestimated the task.

By 13 December 1918, General Pershing’s headquarters had produced the first of two documents that formed the fundamental charter for military government, the \textit{Anordnungen} or ‘ordinances’. The \textit{Anordnungen} outlined regulations for the civil population in the occupied territory and effectively defined the relationship between the occupying army and the native inhabitants. The ordinances addressed such items as the sale of liquor, the prohibition of the sale or carrying of deadly weapons, communications including telegraph, telephone, post, and carrier pigeons, fraternization, and the procedures for billeting troops in local homes. The staff understood that these initial regulations were made without direct knowledge of the enemy economic and political situation, and expected them to undergo revision.\textsuperscript{26}

The Office of Civil Affairs at Advance General Headquarters (AGHQ) was established at Trier to represent General Pershing and publish and oversee the initial orders of the military government. Brigadier General H. A. Smith was made Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory at AGHQ with Colonel Irwin Hunt as his assistant. General Pershing designated the Office of Civil Affairs at AGHQ as the “supreme civil authority within the American Zone,” with General Smith as his direct representative. The Office of Civil Affairs at AGHQ promulgated further \textit{Anordnungen} and undertook to direct the activities of the chief


civilian official of the occupied territories, the *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province. However, Rhineland geography prevented effective direct communications. While Trier was a governmental town, it was incomparable to Coblenz in governmental prestige. Coblenz was not only the capital city of the Rhine Province, but also of the *Regierungsbezirk Koblenz* – or Coblenz region – which extended beyond the American occupied territory to encompass the entire British and Belgian zones and much of the French sector, as well as areas not occupied at all.  

The importance of Coblenz directly impacted the command structure of Allied military government once Third Army Headquarters was established at Coblenz on 15 December. In order to smooth communications, General Smith dispatched Colonel Hunt to be the Third Army’s Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, to transmit orders and decisions published by the American authorities to the German civil leadership. As Colonel Hunt had more frequent and close contact with the highest civil authority in the region, it is understandable that the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for Third Army would, in German minds, occupy a dominant position. Furthermore, Major General Joseph T. Dickman, the Third Army commander, was entitled to overrule General Smith, at first by Army protocol, but later by directive of AGHQ, which decided to “leave all matters pertaining to the *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province to the Army commander.” In order to prevent confusion, General Dickman ordered that Colonel Hunt would conduct all direct communication with the Oberpräsident, effectively relegating General Smith to a distant advisory capacity. Acknowledging the unusual nature of the command relationship, the official history of the Army in the World War remarks, “that discord did not arise from such an

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27 Ibid., 156.
awkward division of authority, must be ascribed largely to the spirit in which the several headquarters subordinated personal matters to the public welfare.”

General Allen noted that the Oberpräsident was the single most influential German official, and a directive sent through him from Third Army Headquarters was the most effective way of communicating to the German people. The Oberpräsident would in turn submit petitions, queries, and suggestions to the Third Army commander via his civil affairs officer. Thus, eventually, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for Third Army would become the most influential position with the German officials, and be regarded by the civilian population as the real source of American authority.

The Office of Civil Affairs at AGHQ was comprised of five sections: Public Works and Utilities, Fiscal Affairs, Sanitation and Public Health, Schools and Charitable Institutions, and the Legal Department. The Public Works and Utilities section was given supervision of all railroads, telephones, and light and gas plants under authority of Article 53 of the Hague Regulations. Under Article 48 of the Hague Regulations, the Fiscal section was initially given responsibility for the supervision of all banks, treasuries, and financial institutions. However, the Germans quickly proved themselves better able to handle their own financial affairs and thus the section was given the duty of collecting fines imposed by the American Provost Courts. The Legal section was directed to supervise all provost courts and maintain court records, as well as provide technical advice to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. Ultimately, the Legal section was responsible for all the actions of the German civil courts. The Sanitation and Public Health section was tasked with the identification and elimination of any threat of disease from the population. It was responsible for the sanitary conditions of all German villages and towns.

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28 Ibid., 157, 160, 162.
including the food supply. This section was also responsible for efforts to eliminate the threat of venereal diseases from the local prostitute population, a threat that expanded as the occupation progressed. Finally, the School and Charitable Institutions section was to supervise all German schools as well as coordinate the efforts of German and international relief organizations. Other sections would be created as necessity arose.\(^{30}\)

The second key document outlining military government was “Orders No. 1” of the AGHQ. Orders No. 1 delineated the organization of military government that would enforce the Anordnungen and other, future, ordinances. The order called for army, corps and division commanders to appoint a staff officer to be in charge of civil affairs, but failed to outline their duties and responsibilities. Division commanders were responsible for military government in their area of control and ordered to assign a suitable officer to handle civil affairs in each occupied town. Officers like Colonel Hunt and General Allen had recognized early on the error in using tactical formations for military government, but could not rectified it until July 1919. The mistake was due in large part to the American Army’s failure to recognize the structure of German government as one amenable to adaptation by an occupying army – each level of German administration had a civil commander and supporting staff – an error the French and British, with better understanding of the Germans, did not make.\(^{31}\)

Problems arose as the AGHQ had tasked corps Headquarters to appoint an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs without defining the duties of the office. Since divisions were held responsible for civil affairs, not corps, corps commanders simplified their responsibilities by appointing Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs, but permitting Third Army to direct the activities of the divisions directly through them. Thus, corps Civil Affairs Officers contributed nothing to

\(^{30}\) The United States Army in the World War, 159 - 160.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 158.
the administration of military government, and in reality were nothing more than an extra step in communications between division and the Army.\textsuperscript{32}

During the initial phase of military government, divisions were the actual administrators of civil affairs. Division commanders could convene military commissions to try civilians, appoint superior provost courts and, if he wished, invalidate their findings. Civil Affairs Officers in the division, when they were appointed, supervised the administration of towns and villages and had the most direct contact with local leaders. According to both Colonel Hunt and the Army Historical Division, Division commanders were not required to appoint an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs to the division staff, the result being that civil affairs duties were divided among other staff members, who invariably gave them less than their full attention.\textsuperscript{33}

The jumbled chain of command for civil affairs between AGHQ and Third Army combined with the communications inefficiency of the corps Civil Affairs Officers and the lack of directed military government policy at the division level eventually led to conflicts. Colonel Hunt cites one such conflict, as an unnamed division commander took initiative to ensure the security of his men. The commander was faced with an exceptionally “unruly civilian element within his district” and directed an earlier closing time for local pubs than Third Army had directed. While the order seems reasonable, Third Army viewed it as a threat to “unity of policy” and revoked the division commander’s order. Thereafter, division commanders were required to clear their directives through the Third Army headquarters.\textsuperscript{34}

Additionally, frequent transfers of division elements obstructed effective administration of military government. Near constant troop transfers from town to town within the division areas created high turnover in civil affairs officers – who were typically detailed infantry

\textsuperscript{32} Hunt, 75-76.
\textsuperscript{33} Hunt, 76, and \textit{The United States Army in the World War}, 164.
\textsuperscript{34} Hunt, 77.
officers. Each transfer required that a new civil affairs officer familiarize himself with the local circumstances. Likewise, the civilian administrators had to accustom themselves to the new officers’ particular proclivities in administration. The resulting inconsistency disturbed the civilian population and severely hindered efficient administration.\textsuperscript{35}

The initial phase of military government by the American Army of Occupation exposed a flaw in the American Army – a lack of institutional preparation for civil affairs and military government operations. While assigning tactical units to administer civil affairs was the only practical solution to the immediate need of 1918, it amplifies the fact that the Army had no prior preparations for its commanders and staffs. Tactical units had to find ‘qualified’ officers and detail them to the task. The qualifications, however, were only listed as the ability to understand German. Colonel Hunt lamented this, saying, “it is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions.” Hunt cites the examples of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, and the Philippines as events which should have demonstrated the need to establish military schools devoted to civil affairs training. However, no military training in civil affairs existed in and of the American service schools. Hunt continues, “the majority of the regular officers were, as a consequence, ill equipped to perform tasks differing so widely from their accustomed duties.” He notes that there were a considerable number of senior officers who had received valuable practical experience in Cuba and the Philippines, as well as many reserve officers with administrative experience in government service, or in large industrial enterprises. However, largely due to institutional ignorance, the Army failed to take advantage of these

\textsuperscript{35} The United States Army in the World War, 167.
officers’ skills as “a very limited number of trained regular officers were assigned from the former group to the occupying forces, and none at all from the latter group.” Ultimately, the initial phase of military government taught three immediate, interrelated lessons: first, civil affairs duties should not be assigned to the conventional staff; second, a separate staff must conduct civil affairs; third, civil affairs staffs must coordinate with the conventional general staff sections.

Despite Colonel Hunt’s and others’ criticisms, it must be remembered that America was still technically at war with Germany during the period between the Armistice and the peace treaty. The organization of military government during the initial phase was not the priority of American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) commanders; paramount to Allied commanders was influencing the German government to sign the Versailles treaty. This priority is evidenced in A.E.F. records as, from 15 November 1918 to as late as 30 April 1919, A.E.F. commanders were busy maneuvering units into occupation positions in the Rhineland and the Bridgehead at Coblenz. By 22 May 1919, commanders were making plans for a general advance into Germany while the treaty was being drafted in case the enemy refused to sign. On 17 June, however, the Allies were faced with the real possibility that Germany might balk at the treaty. As Margaret Pawley notes, the possibility that the Germans might not sign the treaty was ever present, “and increased upon the French desire to detach the Rhineland from Germany and create an independent province under French patronage and control.” Marshal Foch ordered the concentration of Allied forces at the bridgeheads in preparation for an invasion as a show of force, movements for which were ongoing when the Germans signed the treaty on 28 June 1919.

While it is easy to condemn commanders for mistakes caused by their inattention, it needs to be

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36 Hunt, 64.
37 Pawley, 5.
remembered that they assigned Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs and empowered them to make military government decisions to allow commanders the time to plan conventional military operations.  

The possibility of a resumption of hostilities ended when Germany signed the Versailles treaty, as did the need for a large offensive capability. Consequently, the bulk of American troops now began to return home, and both the A.E.F. and Third Army were dissolved. On 2 July 1919 the American garrison in the Rhineland was designated the American Forces in Germany (AFG), with Major General Henry Allen in command. By October, the AFG consisted of about 15,000 men. According to General Allen, the reduction in American troop strength improved military government, “it was… with the departure of the Third United States Army that (military government) was at its best.” This was primarily because the peace freed military government operations from the problems associated with tactical unit control. The withdrawal of American troops also resulted in a reduction in the size of the American zone. France took control of Trier and the surrounding counties (Kreise), and the area of the bridgehead reverted from tactical control to direct supervision by military government organized along native administrative lines rather than American military ones. The result was far more efficient and alleviated much of the conflict caused due to the bifurcation of native German governmental regions among tactical elements. The new organization placed American ‘Kreise Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs’ over the seven Kreise in the American zone: Cochem, Adenau, Ahrweiler, Mayen, Coblenz, Unterwesterwald, and Neuwied.

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38 Orders directing the movement of A.E.F. troops can be found in The United States Army in the World War, 1917 – 1919, Volume XI, pages 60 - 120.
39 Pawley, 37, though numbers as high as 19,000 are cited in other studies.
40 Allen, The Rhineland Occupation, 47.
41 Hunt, 85.
The Rhineland Agreement, signed concurrently to the peace treaty on 28 June, established the IARHC to “ensure, by any means, the security and satisfaction of all the needs of the Armies of Occupation.”\(^{42}\) On 10 January 1920, the peace treaty came into force and established the IAHRC as “the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated powers within the occupied territory…(and was recognized) as such by all the allied military authorities and by the German civil authorities.”\(^{43}\) Colonel Hunt marks the empowerment of the IARHC in January as the end point for military government. However, as the United States had not ratified the peace treaty, the American Army was not legally bound by the convention. The simple solution would have been to extend the IARHC’s jurisdiction into the American zone, but the British (and the Germans) feared that such a move would render the American presence obsolete and precipitate the United States Army’s early withdrawal.\(^{44}\) In order to forestall such difficulties, all parties agreed that General Allen would publish the High Commission’s ordinances in the Coblenz sector as military orders.\(^{45}\) This arrangement gave Americans a strong place on the Commission since General Allen not only voted on the IARHC but also executed their decrees via the American Kreise Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs. As executor of the Commission’s ordinances, the General had an effective veto power since he could simply refuse to publish and enforce ordinances with which he disagreed. General Allen noted that since IAHRC ordinances were uniform across the Rhineland but had to be published in the American sector as the orders of the commanding general, “the ordinances drafted by the High Commission for the entire Rhineland had to conform to our requirements. Under this condition,


\(^{43}\) Pawley, 21.

\(^{44}\) From 1918 the British and Germans were both fearful of France’s intentions to occupy the Ruhr and felt America’s participation in the occupation and place on the commission acted to mute French efforts. Eventually French influence on the IARHC

\(^{45}\) Nelson, 160 – 161.
the influence of America’s representation on the High Commission was far greater than its informal designation would indicate."\(^{46}\) Thus, with few exceptions, the Americans were able to temper belligerent French attitudes on the Commission.\(^{47}\)

Between January and October 1920 to the High Commission assumed much of the supervisory responsibility for civil affairs. During this period, the American Department of the Commission was given responsibility for overseeing German civil government in the Coblenz sector. This shift appears to be largely symbolic as representatives of the IAHRC under the direction of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Colonel David Stone, replaced the Kreise Officers of the Office of Civil Affairs in the American sector. Thus civil government at the local level continued to be supervised by military sources.\(^{48}\)

The Office of Civil Affairs was reorganized in June 1921 into the Executive, Legal, Fiscal, and Sanitation and Public Health departments. The previous Public Works and Utilities Department and Schools and Charitable Institutions Department were disbanded, with their duties falling to the new organizations. The Executive Department was the administrative office for the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and helped organize and administer all his responsibilities, including liaison with German and Allied officials, enforcement of ordinances and regulations, approval of marriage requests, and any other activity which could impact the safety and welfare of military forces in the American zone of occupation. The Legal Department’s responsibilities remained largely unchanged. It continued to review the impact of new German laws on occupation forces, oversee the German courts, and advise General Allen on legal matters. The Fiscal Department managed the funds received from the collection of fines.

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\(^{47}\) French diplomatic actions on the IAHRC and elsewhere are well documented by both Nelson in chapters 7 – 9 of *Victors Divided* (pages 97-230), and Allen in chapter 13 of *The Rhineland Occupation* (pages 142 – 158).

\(^{48}\) In March 1920, Colonel David Stone was appointed as the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs by General Allen, and worked directly for him.
and sale of confiscated liquor and the payment of German claims against American Forces. The Sanitation and Public Health department’s responsibilities remained largely unchanged – it continued to attempt to protect American troops from disease by controlling sanitation in the public areas of the Coblenz sector such as bath houses, hospitals, prisons, theaters and slaughterhouses. The Office of Civil Affairs remained in this configuration for the duration of the occupation.⁴⁹

As critical as the presence of the AFG was to the diplomatic situation between Germany and the Allies, its power lay more in the personality of General Allen, Colonel Stone’s Civil Affairs Officers, and the various American diplomats working in European affairs rather than in the numerical representation of the AFG. Throughout 1920 the American troop levels remained at about 15,000 men, but by the inauguration of Warren G. Harding in 1921 the strength of the AFG had been reduced to 6500. Before their final withdrawal in 1923 the number would steadily fall to just below 1000.⁵⁰ During this period, the IARHC worked through initial German struggles to pay reparations and French designs to seize the Ruhr – two interrelated issues that diplomats contended with into the 1930’s.

The dwindling of the AFG was a function of American domestic attitudes toward Europe rather than a reaction to the situation in the Rhineland. The duration of AMAROC’s presence in the Rhineland was determined by American political will. In 1918 the Republican Party captured control of both houses of Congress under the leadership of conservative Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. As a result, Lodge became the Senate majority leader and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. In this position he was able to block ratification of the Versailles peace treaty because it included the League of Nations. By 1920 Lodge’s support played a

⁴⁹ Philip H. Bagby, American Representation in Occupied Germany, 1920 - 1921 (United States Army, 1922).
⁵⁰ Pawley, 84.
significant role in the Republican nomination of Warren G. Harding for president. Harding’s record landslide victory – with 60% of the popular vote – effectively ended Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a role for America in postwar Europe. Harding’s inaugural address of 4 March 1921 included statements like, “confident in our ability to work out our own destiny…we seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old World,” which signaled that the duration of the occupation was coming to an end.\footnote{As cited in Pawley, page 81.}

The growing reality of an American withdrawal threatened the political dynamic on the IAHRC. British and Belgian resistance to aggressive French policies was difficult to maintain without the support of General Allen. This included French efforts to replace German officials, conduct a forest census, and shift the Rhineland to French daylight savings time.\footnote{Allen, \textit{My Rhineland Journal}, 403 – 405, 414.} In all these cases it was the inordinately strong American influence on the Commission that counterbalanced the French. In an effort to extend the American presence in Germany, the British Commissioner, Sir Malcolm Robertson, wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Marquess George N. Curzon in July 1921:

\textit{As regards to the American troops, I feel that the consequences of their withdrawal might easily be of so grave a nature that I would beg your Lordship to consider whether it might not be possible to make earnest and unofficial representations at Washington with a view to their retention… Should I have no American colleague, and should French troops occupy the whole length of the Rhine, my French colleague (Paul Tirard) would be in a strong position to argue that… as his army was the most numerous… his view should prevail on all important matters…}\footnote{Nelson, 210.}

Undoubtedly, British influence did moderate American political efforts to withdraw their forces. Throughout the remainder of 1921 and 1922, momentum to withdraw the AFG grew since German failure to make reparations payments failed to defray occupation expenses.
A statement by the French Première, Raymond Poincaré, reported in the *New York Times* on 13 March 1922, strengthened the position of Senator Lodge and others in the Senate who favored immediate withdrawal. Provoked by American efforts to claim the estimated $241 million of the cost for AMAROC from payments made to the Allies under the Treaty of Versailles, Poincaré responded that since the United States was not a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies were not bound by America’s separate peace outlined in the Treaty of Berlin. “Why should (the Allies) act as bill collectors for the United States? Why doesn’t the United States collect its German debts under its own treaty?”

On 22 March General Allen received “a definitive cable” stating the President had ordered the withdrawal of all troops by 1 July. Inability to collect payment for the occupation and intervention by the French Première temporarily quelled the debate in the Senate. Poincaré’s overtures hinted at a potential resolution of the disagreement over the debt, and resulted in a 3 June telegram authorizing General Allen to remain in Germany “indefinitely” with a force “of not more than 1200.”

Ultimately, the interaction of German inability to pay reparations and French designs to occupy the Ruhr valley proved insurmountable. In January 1923, the Senate again took up discussion of the recall of the AFG, sparked by the renewed plans for Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. Germany had again defaulted on reparations payments and France and Belgium threatened seizure of the Ruhr – Germany’s most fruitful manufacturing area – as security for payment. On 6 January, Senator James Reed proposed a resolution requiring President Harding to withdraw all American troops immediately. Reed argued that the Franco-Belgian occupation

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55 Allen, *My Rhineland Journal*, 335. Though it was not understood that way at the time, a modern reading of Poincaré’s letter to the American Ambassador hints that the French were concerned that the American withdrawal would erode the image of the international character of the occupying ‘coalition’, Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation*, 251-252.
of the Ruhr would weaken Germany and reduce the chances of recouping costs for the occupation. The Senator also noted that since General Allen was commanding French troops at the time – deployed by France to mitigate American troop reductions – the French might demand access to Coblenz as an avenue for invasion. The Senate record of the debate contains glowing reports on the performance of AMAROC by many Senators including William McKinley and James Reed, sponsor of the legislation, who included this statement in the resolution, “Every German who loves the Fatherland, as he calls it, resents the foot of any foreign soldier on his soil, but he prefers having an American to a Frenchman or an Englishman or a soldier of any other Nation, because he knows that he gets fairer treatment from us than from them.”

Despite this praise and acknowledgement of the moderating influence of General Allen on the IARHC, the Senate passed Reed’s resolution on 7 January by an overwhelming vote of 57 to 6. According to Keith Nelson, “League Democrats had joined with isolationist Republicans… because the Rhineland army (1000 men at the time) was so much less than what they thought was necessary in the crisis. Both agreed that only trouble could result if the AFG remained in Europe.”

At a 5 January 1923 press conference, President Harding had expressed that, while he favored withdrawal, France, England, Germany, and Belgium did not, since they regarded AMAROC as a moderating force among belligerent elements. Thus, the President did not want the withdrawal to spark a European crisis. However, after the French and Belgians entered the Ruhr on 11 January 1923, in light of the decisive vote in the Senate, the President ordered the withdrawal of all American troops. At noon on 24 January 1923 the American flag was

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56 The complete record of the Senate debate is contained in the Senate Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 6 January 1923, (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1351 – 1359.
57 Nelson, 246.
lowered on the castle of Ehrenbreitstein, the American seat on the Rhine, and replaced by the French tricolor, marking the official end to AMAROC.

A frequent criticism leveled against AMAROC in 1918 is that the initial phase of American military government failed to capitalize on the inherent advantages of the Coblenz sector. In 1918 the American zone was predominantly agricultural, including the major urban center of Coblenz. As previously discussed, the sector faced a lesser degree of the food and labor crises common in the country. Coblenz also happened to be the governmental seat, staffed with ex-imperial Prussian bureaucrats in a quasi-military structure. This organization, according to the critics, should have been better utilized to facilitate the administrative functions of the occupiers, since there had been no prior planning for the occupation or the formation of a capable military government organization.

Until the Armistice the focus of the American Army was on defeating the enemy quickly, there was no thought given to the civil problems involved in an occupation of German territory. Consequently, the American Army initiated military government operations with limited information about both the specific situation in Coblenz and the general nature of German society, which would have facilitated the intelligent formation of a military government organization. “From the beginning therefore there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation.”

Throughout the American Army’s tenure as an occupation force, military government operations were not intended to govern the Rhineland. Civil administration was left to the

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60 To varying degrees General Allen, Nelson and Pawley and others lament what ‘could have been’ accomplished politically and diplomatically in the sector had the AMAROC been utilized effectively as a tool of international policy. Other students of the era, including John C. Rasmussen in his 1971 dissertation *The American Forces in Germany and Civil Affairs, July 1919 – January 1923*, argue that the occupation was a success simply because Americans “had converted enemies into friends,” through their lenient policies.


62 Hunt, 64.
Germans under conditions it met Allied requirements. The structure and purpose of AMAROC ensured that the Americans played international diplomatic and tactical roles, but not strategic or operational ones. General Allen mitigated belligerent forces on the IARHC and the Kreise. Officers of the Office of Civil Affairs monitored German civil government effectively, but made no effort to help reintegrate Germany into the family of nations, “a task that involved supervising that nation suitably, reinforcing its new government, and in general, helping the country to relate to its neighbors.”63 This was largely due to American feelings of self-determination expressed by President Wilson at the announcement of the deployment of the AEF:

> Let us be very clear and make clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. We are glad to fight for the ultimate peace of the world, and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. We have no selfish ends to serve, we desire no conquest, no dominion. We fight without rancour, seeking nothing but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it, because there are no other means of defending our rights, in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right, and is running amuck. The day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured, God helping her she can do no other.64

While it is clear in hindsight that American military government in the Rhineland missed an opportunity to fundamentally alter the political dynamic of Europe and potentially prevent the circumstances leading to the Second World War, it is foolish to condemn them since their mission was a combination of the expression of the will of the American people and the exigencies of military operations.

Fundamentally, military government operations during the period between the signing of the Armistice to the declaration of peace in Paris on 10 January 1920 were intended to protect

63 Nelson, x.
64 As cited in Hunt, v, (emphasis added).
Allied armies and enable their maneuver by stabilizing the domestic situation in the Rhineland. From 11 January 1920 until the withdrawal of American forces three years later, the IARHC was likewise charged to ensure the safety and support requirements of the occupying forces by acting as a mediator between the Germans and the troops. Allied military government ordinances were enacted by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs over everything from the health laws regulating prostitution to the ordinances protecting the food supply, in order to preserve the combat power of the American Army. While the derivative salutary effect of these measures on the German population is indisputable, it is clear from the American policy of indirect supervision of German government that there was little official effort to improve German life for its own sake. Thus, in general, improvements to German welfare often came as a fortunate consequence of attempts to protect soldiers in spite of German traditions, rather than from purposeful efforts to reform German policies for ‘their own good’. 65

However, considering the human tendency to try and alleviate suffering, it is likely that many of the military’s ‘charitable’ efforts were couched in terms of defending AFG troops for minimal or non-existent threats. This is logical in light of American domestic political attitudes that were formed from press reports and propaganda, which would look askance at genuine mercy. At his departure, General Allen received great praise from Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno for the American policy:

General: In accordance with the communications of your government, the day when the last American troops will leave the occupied territory on the Rhine is imminent. I seize this opportunity to tell you that the German government appreciates highly the spirit in which you have administered the authority vested in you. By maintaining proper relations between your troops and the population, by non-interference in purely German political affairs, you have materially lightened in the section occupied by your troops the depression and the hardships

65 Hunt, 121 – 153.
which are unavoidably connected with the occupation. Accept, General, the assurance of my sincerest respect. Cuno

Likewise, the German newspaper Coblenzer Volkszeitung voiced its appreciation for the “lack of pernicious interference in economic affairs,” and Allgemeine Zeitung praised the American forces as “the best of all occupation forces” and feared that the ideals of Americans would disappear with the French influx of power. Otto Weidfeldt, the German ambassador, proclaimed, “the American Troops had proven themselves to be as magnanimous victors in peace as they had been formidable foes in battle.”

Assessments of the performance of AMAROC are mixed. One assertion is that while General Allen and his Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs played an important moderating role on the IAHRC, the presence of AMAROC soldiers in the Rhineland was essentially superficial, since they largely amused themselves with polo, attending horse shows and playing games, all of which contributed little to the improvement of the occupied zone. General Allen himself admits that since he viewed AMAROC soldiers as “undersized and ill-shapen,” he ordered to them to spend their days in physical and military training, including eight-hour marching days, shooting, maneuvers, and readiness drills.

Further analysis leads to the conclusion that the occupation was successful since the Army viewed its performance positively enough to codify the lessons of AMAROC as policy in its 1940 filed manual on military government, FM 27-5. That manual states that one of the hallmarks of successful military government is “convert(ing) enemies into friends.”

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70 United States Army, Field Manual 27-5 (1940), 3.
International press accounts from the era are replete with accounts of German-American comity, but hardly convincing as a conversion.\(^{71}\)

Ultimately, the results of AMAROC actions in the Rhineland were only conclusively satisfying to the American soldiers themselves. The soldiers volunteered for duty in the Rhineland since even a private was paid “more than some of the highest salaried German officials.” Many officers, including General Allen, brought their families over to live in relative luxury. After the ban was lifted in September 1919, American soldiers enjoyed fraternizing with the German women, which resulted in the naturally attendant consequences: war brides, illegitimate children, and venereal disease. Many soldiers on Rhineland occupation duty called it “a wonderful experience,” and Lieutenant Edwin T. Wheatley, who spent many of the days between 1921 and 1923 with his new wife touring Europe, likely spoke for many others when he called the occupation “the happiest days I ever spent.”\(^{72}\)

In the final analysis, American military government was pragmatic rather than evangelical. Civil affairs operations were reluctantly embraced, as General Allen said, “once having consented to participate in the occupation under the terms of the Armistice, America could not divest itself of exercising governmental suzerainty in the Rhineland.”\(^{73}\) Once installed as occupiers, the AEF continued to resist governing, “the belief was indulged in many (US) quarters that the armies could occupy enemy soil and yet dispossess themselves of most of the responsibility of government.”\(^{74}\) This reluctance to govern was characteristic of the American effort and clearly was linked to the ‘hands-off’ approach that was so highly praised by the

\(^{71}\) John C. Rasmussen in his 1971 dissertation *The American Forces in Germany and Civil Affairs, July 1919 – January 1923,* argues that the occupation was a success simply because Americans “had converted enemies into friends,” through their hands off approach and lenient policies.


\(^{73}\) Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation*, 47.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 48.
Germans. Certainly the Americans were aware, from their previous experiences, of the potential of military government to effect change in an occupied society. However, whether for reasons of racism, ancestor worship, or feelings of cultural inferiority, Americans clearly did not view Europe as needing social intervention to the same level as the Philippines, Cuba, or Mexico.

Furthermore, had the Americans endeavored to promulgate social and governmental changes in Germany – otherwise known as ‘nation building’ – it is not clear that the result – a Second World War – would have been different. Germany was not capable of paying the reparations required under the Versailles Treaty. Had America been more intransigent, the Ruhr Valley could have been occupied prior to 1923, further reducing Germany’s ability to pay. Without an American ‘friend’ on the IARHC, Germany may have offered less resistance to militant domestic forces. As it was, American unpreparedness for military government operations had mixed results: Germany was partly converted into a friend of the United States, but America could exert little constructive influence over her.
CHAPTER 3
“A PERIOD OF MILITARY NECESSITY”

As “war is politics by other means,” military governance has been a natural outgrowth of military conflict. American wars have been no exception. The United States gained its first experience with military government in 1847 after the Mexican War. After the American Civil War, the Army governed the conquered South as part of Reconstruction. In 1898, after the Spanish-American War, the American military administered the Philippines and Cuba. As American Air Force Major Troy Thomas notes, though these conflicts spanned a generation, with a select few individuals experiencing all three conflicts, “these experiences were not institutionalized.” After World War I, the American military was ill-prepared to govern the United States occupation zone at Koblenz in the German Rhineland. In 1920, Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the Third Army, released his report, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany*. In it he declared, “the American Army of Occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”

This judgment of Colonel Hunt sought to alert both the American government and its military institutions to a serious deficiency in officer training. However, it was not until 1940 that the Army codified an official doctrine on military government, and began to train soldiers in its application.

During the interwar period, the American military gained further experience in governance operations in the Caribbean and Central America. Nicaragua and Panama, the

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Dominican Republic and Haiti all gave the United States military experience in governing civilians. These small wars also served as a reminder to military leaders like George C. Marshall and Douglas MacArthur that military government was a responsibility that fell to a conquering army whether the army wanted it or not.77

Lessons from the small wars, the Hunt Report, and the personal experiences of the Army’s senior leadership resulted in military government being added to the curriculum of the Army War College. The courses drew on lessons from the ‘Banana wars’ and World War I, resulting in two statements of official doctrine of military government: the United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940, with a single chapter on military government, and the United States Army and Navy manual of military government, Field Manual 27-5, of the same year. Combined, these manuals established doctrine for governance operations, recognizing that they are required even in situations “where the inhabitants of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was neither declared nor contemplated.”78

Even with the emerging awareness that governance was the inevitable result of modern war, mainstream military institutions remained reluctant to embrace the mission. Although there was now official doctrine, military government remained the theoretical domain of an enlightened few. Military institutions are conservative, slow-moving creatures that are reluctant to embrace changes or additions no matter how obvious the benefit. As a result, planning for eventual institutional improvements often falls to a powerless few who must await an appropriate time to bring an idea forward.79

77 Ibid., 79.
79 Thomas, “Roaming Dogs”, 80.
The authors of the Army’s official history of military government, Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg declared, “because of the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances, the civil affairs function of the United States Army evoked bitter debate.” As Arnold Fisch puts it, “Professional officers (of the era) considered civil affairs assignments little more than accidents of war.” President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s view of military government as “strange and abhorrent” was consistent with General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s desire to turn responsibility over to civilian authorities as soon as possible. Once a Military Government Division on the Army Staff was established and the first School of Military Government opened at the University of Virginia in 1942, deliberate planning for governance operations began in earnest. In 1943 Roosevelt shifted responsibility for occupation from the State Department to the War Department. With the publication of a draft of the *Handbook for Military Government in Germany* in December 1944, operational level commanders in Europe received their instructions on how to administer military government. Due to the foresight of key individuals, inspired by the Hunt Report, personnel trained to execute those instructions were also available. These officers had been trained under the School of Military Government.

Colonel Hunt realized that exercising governmental authority, even over a defeated enemy, required preparation. He explained, “no corps of specially trained officers existed to handle civil matters and, in consequence, each American policy had to be developed bit by bit, with the inevitable mistakes and failures which must ever follow in the wake of lack of

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82 Coles and Weinberg, 5.
83 Thomas, “Roaming Dogs”, 80.
organization and inexperience. The Army, he urged, should not wait until the responsibility was thrust upon it but should develop training in civil administration among its officers during peacetime.

After World War I, as American isolationism and anti-war sentiment made another conflict seem remote – let alone the possibility of occupying foreign territory – the Hunt Report nearly disappeared. As it was the only practical report on military governance, War College students working on civil affairs projects occasionally brought it out of storage. However, these students in the 1920s tended “to look at civil affairs and military government entirely as they related to military law, the assumption being that they were not much more than the functions of observing and enforcing law.” After the 1935 Army Personnel Committee at the War College prepared a draft military government manual, and the 1939 class produced a manuscript on administration of occupied countries, the subject began to take on greater significance.

Since 1920, War College committees had repeatedly recognized the need for a field manual on military government. The responsibility logically belonged to the Judge Advocate General due to the apparent relationship between military government and military law. In 1939, the Judge Advocate General, General Allen W. Gullion, refused the task because his office had recently published Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare, which included a section on civil administration. However, war had broken out in Europe, and the studies of several War College committees had recently highlighted the increasing importance of military government. The next year, at the urging of the Army Operations and Training staff and Personnel Staff, Gullion's office began writing a manual using War College studies and the Hunt Report as a guide. FM 27-5, Military Government (1940) was the result. This manual combined with FM 27-84

84 Hunt, 346.
Military government was not useful in World War I until after it ended. Since most of the fighting had been in France, civil affairs matters during combat, for all the armies, had been left rightfully to the French authorities. World War II was different. By 1941, Germany and Italy occupied nearly all of Europe. The Wehrmacht was driving into the Soviet Union and across North Africa to Egypt. Governments had disappeared, gone into exile, or collaborated. When Allied ground forces fought the Germans, they had to deal with local civilian populations. The British had already had civil difficulties in 1940 in Africa, leading them to develop training for their officers in reconstruction and military government.

It was not the British program, however, that sparked American preparations. As Earl Ziemke noted, “Army field manuals, even those in as little demand as FM 27-5 was in 1940 and 1941, have stature, for unless superseded, declared obsolete, or rescinded they represent the Army's intent to do something in a specified way.” Field Manual 27-5 established a schedule for procurement and training of military government personnel in section IV. In keeping with this guidance, in September 1941, General Gullion, as Judge Advocate General, recommended that the Army Personnel Staff initiate a training program.

FM 27-5 assigned responsibility for training military government personnel to the Army Personnel Staff (G-1). In September, the G-1 proposed to start training officers in military government and reconstruction. Other Army staff sections objected. The idea of military government of occupied and liberated territories must have seemed too distant in 1941, months

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86 Ibid., 4.
88 Ziemke, 5.
before Pearl Harbor. They could not justify diverting officers who were needed to train the expanding Army. After bickering over resources, all sides reached a compromise in which the G-1 would plan for contingency courses that could be given on short notice when a need arose.

On 3 December, the G-1 asked the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to authorize military government training in a school to be operated by the Provost Marshal General. As the Japanese overran the southwest Pacific, military government must have seemed less essential than ever to the Army at large. It is noteworthy that, in spite of the situation in the Pacific, General Marshall approved the G-1’s request on 6 January 1942. Marshall had served under General Hunter Ligget on occupation duty in Germany after World War I, where he had experienced first-hand the failings Hunt wrote about in his report. These experiences must have influenced his foresight at a time when Army resources were thin.89

In January 1942, Gullion, now Provost Marshal General, decided that training in civil affairs and military government should be outside standard military channels. Gullion made Jesse I. Miller (a civilian at the time, later direct commissioned as a colonel) his adviser on military government training and asked him design a standardized curriculum. Miller had served in World War I in the Judge Advocate General branch and practiced law in Washington, D.C. Miller worked from FM 27-5 and a few reports from American students in the British military government school. He decided to include a broad area orientation, like the British, but added a “program directed at developing skills in handling practical problems of civil government.” His program “undertook to train officers in technique and practice, as well as to give them a certain area (of) expertise.”90

89 In light of the scarce resources available to the Army in 1942, it is doubtful that a Chief of Staff without direct experience in occupation would have realized the lessons of the Rhineland Occupation and understood the importance of training.
90 Coles and Weinberg, 10.
By February 1942, General Gullion obtained authorization to establish a school. Based on the British use of civilian institutions like Cambridge, Gullion looked for a university. The University of Virginia in Charlottesville was selected, as it was little more than two hours from Washington. The university offered to provide all the necessary facilities for $75 per month.\footnote{Fisch, 9.} Low expense was the school’s strongest feature. “The largest item of expense, professional personnel, was $11,000 in 1942, and the total budget for 1943 was $98,680, increased somewhat by expansion during the year.” The budget was miniscule compared to the $238,329 cost for just one B-17.\footnote{Peter Bowers, \textit{Fortress in the Sky}, (California: Sentry Books Inc., 1976).} In an effort to stretch the budget, more savings were generated as neighboring households provided locations to room and board officers attending the courses.\footnote{Stuart O. Van Slyke, \textit{The Life of Stuart O. Van Slyke: An Autobiography, Book One: Memories of a Forgotten Age May 1916 - May 1946} (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2006), 327. In a conversation with the author in 2010, he emphasized that officers were required to pay for their own room and board.}

In April 1942, an order of the Secretary of War established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, and Brigadier General Cornelius W. Wickersham was appointed its commandant and director.\footnote{C. W. Wickersham, “the School of Military Government,” \textit{Military Review}, January 1943: 37 - 39.} General Wickersham was chosen for his experience as a lawyer, he also had been the G-2 of the First Army. Colonel Miller became associate director. Wickersham began visiting various universities and government departments looking for lecturers. He hired three civilian experts, one each for Germany (Arnold Wolfers from Yale), Italy (Henry Powell from Johns Hopkins), and Japan (Hugh Borton from Harvard). Overall, the staff numbered twelve officer and civilian instructors, twenty-five other civilians, and one enlisted man.\footnote{Ziemke, 8.}

The school’s European bias was clearly evident, and particularly surprising, especially in light of the situation in the spring of 1942. The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and the
United States was naturally focusing war fervor against them. It is interesting to note that the school would ignore the vast array of Asian cultures while recognizing the differences between two European cultures, Germany and Italy. In fact, Japanese language would not be taught until the fifth class matriculated – due to a lack of instructors. Asia would not become a major focus until the eighth class – well into the program.\textsuperscript{96} Perhaps this stemmed from a general ignorance of Asian culture, resulting in an overall lack of understanding. School officials readily acknowledged that Americans’ “acquaintance with Far Eastern languages, institutions and points of view (was) practically nonexistent.”\textsuperscript{97} Whatever the reason, it is clear that later American difficulties in Asia result from cultural blindness, particularly in China and Korea.

The first class of forty-nine officers began on 11 May 1942. The course was four months long. Since some students had only recently been civilians, Army organization and regulations were also on the curriculum. The students attended lectures and worked out assigned problems as part of a committee. This method enabled the school to research and solve problems.\textsuperscript{98}

One of the first problems assigned to students at Charlottesville was to try and determine how many officers trained in military government the Army would need. Colonel Hunt’s Rhineland occupation after World War I only involved a population of about one million and required 213 military government officers, or 0.1 percent of the occupation force. The study concluded that an Army of four million men, without considering the civilian population, would need 4,000 trained officers. This was a problem since it was as many as the School of Military Government could produce in ten years.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{96} Fisch, 10.
\textsuperscript{97} Memo from Gullion, to Chief, CAD, 31 December 1943 reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 83.
\textsuperscript{98} C. W. Wickersham, 37.
\textsuperscript{99} Ziemke, 8.
The Army found itself in a dilemma. The School of Military Government could not train enough officers. The Army had either to find and train the officers itself, or let another agency do it. If another agency assumed the responsibility, operational commanders would have to contend not only with the enemy but also with high-ranking American civilians, creating an extra layer of Clausewitzian friction.

The most important threat to the Army’s control of the school came from the Board of Economic Warfare. The Board worked directly with President Roosevelt in directing all government economic activities related to the war, and the Board’s directives bound all facets of the government, including the War Department. Army military government operations were clearly the domain of the Board, thus Miller and Gullion were relieved when members of the board recommended that the Army retain control of the program after visiting the Charlottesville campus. These members even offered to help locate qualified individuals to participate in the training.\(^{100}\)

The Army was still at a disadvantage. In early 1942, while the Army was busy planning OPERATION TORCH, the Board of Economic Warfare had time to plan for post-war occupation and develop plans that would infringe on Army control. In June, Gullion decided to assert Army leadership in military government by creating a department in his office. “Since the primary responsibility for the administration of any military government rests with the Army”, he stated, “it follows that the Army should take the initiative in the preparation of policies and plans, including the procurement and training of personnel.”\(^{101}\)

On 28 June, Gullion requested authority to expand the program and deconflict issues between interested military and civilian agencies. The next month, Arthur Ringland of the War

\(^{100}\) Ziemke, 7; The Army remained suspicious of the Board, as seen in a memorandum from Wickersham to Gullion on 17 June 1942, cautioning “not to rely upon then for direct assistance - Coles and Weinberg, 13.

\(^{101}\) Coles and Weinberg, 15.
Relief Control Board raised concerns to President Roosevelt that he did not believe that the War Department could raise the requisite number of trained personnel in time. Ringland recommended that civilian resources be applied to the personnel problem. The Undersecretary of War, Robert Patterson, forwarded Ringland’s memorandum to Roosevelt to Miller.\textsuperscript{102} The memo was met with alarm by Gullion and his staff, however, as Earl Ziemke points out, “The Ringland memorandum immediately accomplished what Gullion, working through several staff levels, might have needed months to do; it made civilian involvement a War Department concern.”\textsuperscript{103} Though occupied with North African operational planning, military government would have to have War Department attention if it wanted to retain control of training and post-war operations. Another impact of the Ringland memo was Secretary Patterson’s support for Gullion. Patterson agreed in principle with Gullion, and recommended to Roosevelt on 20 July that exploration and development of a training plan be conducted "informally and with no publicity whatsoever."\textsuperscript{104}

War Department consultations with congressional leaders and representatives from the Board of Economic Warfare satisfied all concerned about the adequacy of the Army plan. On 14 August, Gullion was granted authority to set up a military government division in the Provost Marshal General’s Office “to engage in broad planning.” Acknowledging the shortage of officers across the Army in 1942, the expansion was allowed, “provided this can be done without any increase in the allotment of officers assigned to the Provost Marshal General.”\textsuperscript{105}

In September the Army faced the final challenge to its primacy in military government. On 4 September, Secretary Patterson met with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau,

\textsuperscript{102} Coles and Weinberg, 15.  
\textsuperscript{103} Ziemke, 9.  
\textsuperscript{104} Coles and Weinberg, 15.  
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 18.
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and various State Department and Board of Economic Warfare officials. The topic for the meeting was initially a discussion of monetary policy in North Africa. However, Morgenthau had the subject of post-war planning on the agenda. The crisis came when Secretary Knox said that the President had told him that he thought that military government should be a Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility. Patterson then met with Gullion to codify War Department policy on military government in order to stop further meddling by well-intentioned officials like Morgenthau. Gullion, Wickersham, and Miller met and crafted a document entitled "Synopsis of the War Department Program for Military Government."

The “Synopsis” was intended "to assert and maintain War Department leadership in military government and at the same time invite and employ a wide cooperation with other departments and agencies of the government." The document divided occupation into two phases: first, “a period of military necessity,” and second “an ensuing period when military necessity will no longer exist.” In the first phase the armed forces were obliged to “establish and maintain military government.” The second phase was to be the time when civilian authority would assume the mission from the Army. Until the civilian authority was established, it was the Army’s responsibility to govern the occupied areas.

Significantly the “Synopsis” described the overall framework for national application of military government. Government agencies would develop policies in their areas of expertise, which they would send to the Army to administer and enforce. In this way all the elements of national power would be brought to bear on technical governance problems as they arose.

106 Ziemke, 11.
107 Coles and Weinberg, 19.
Economic, health, transportation, and other problems would be solved by policies developed by federal department planning and Army administration.\textsuperscript{108}

The “Synopsis” also addressed procurement and training. The War Department was responsible for “procuring and training of an adequate personnel to fulfill its mission of military government.” The “Synopsis” included a request to other agencies to help the Army find specialists and technical experts. It also requested assistance from some agencies to help teach and lecture in technical areas. Later in September, in order to streamline coordination and planning, recipients of the memo were requested to “establish liaison with Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Provost Marshal General, who is directly in charge of the military government program.” The matter was tentatively settled; the Army was officially in charge of military government training, planning, and administration effective 15 September 1942 with the establishment of the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General.\textsuperscript{109}

Controversy within the government had been settled in secret at Secretary Patterson’s request. Earl Ziemke describes a second source of opposition to the Army plan: public discomfort with the concept.

Military government was distinguished above all (other Army duties) by its capacity for generating early and durable controversy. The term alone sounded vaguely unconstitutional and seemed to imply a sternness that probably ought not to be visited even on US enemies. Although the United States had conducted military government in nearly all of its past wars, it had always done so as a kind of reluctant afterthought. Deliberate planning seemed to suggest cold-bloodedness, disregard for the traditional civil-military relationship, and disdain for the presumed natural superiority of civilians in the art of government.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 19 – 20.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 20.
Once news of the school in Charlottesville was released to the press, a series of stories
“describing the Army’s “school for Gauleiters””\textsuperscript{110} rapidly followed. The Army banned news
from the school, and the stories waned. However, the school was public knowledge and a
political firestorm was beginning as cabinet members and their departments sought to expand
their roles in the planned post-conflict occupation.\textsuperscript{111}

The matter exploded on 29 October when President Roosevelt weighed in on the
program: “The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds, but in most instances it
is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men.”\textsuperscript{112} The
President was not swayed by the concept of military necessity. Thinking in terms of domestic
government, he argued that civil governance was a civilian responsibility.\textsuperscript{113}

In response to the President, Secretary Stimson described a statement he made at the
cabinet meeting on 6 November:

I brought the matter of the Military School at Charlottesville up myself and
explained the objectives of the school and the manner in which it had been
created, and showed how ridiculous was the proposition that we were trying to
train Army officers for proconsular duties after the war was over.

The Secretary’s statement may have satisfied the President, but it did little to quell the stream of
criticism directed at the program.\textsuperscript{114}

Internal debate in the War Department centered around manpower usage. Was the
training worthwhile? Should the Army create such a large pool of unassigned officers at a time
when they were scarce? Charges against the program and Gullion from other departments

\textsuperscript{110} The \textit{Gauleiters} were infamous Nazi party ‘district’ (\textit{Gau}) leaders who oversaw party and civil
administration in their areas – becoming virtual dictators by the end of the war.

\textsuperscript{111} Ziemke, 12.

\textsuperscript{112} Memo, Roosevelt for the Secretary of War, 29 October 1942, reprinted in Harry L. Coles and Albert K.
Weinberg, 22. The authors opine that Roosevelt wanted earlier civilian control over occupied territories, before
fighting had been resolved.

\textsuperscript{113} Ziemke, 13.

\textsuperscript{114} Coles and Weinberg, 24.
focused on his personal ambition, the composition of the faculty, and most accurately, the caliber of the students. Wickersham argued that out of almost two hundred fifty officers scheduled for the third course at Charlottesville only thirty-eight would make suitable students, and these were "nothing to brag about."\textsuperscript{115}

While the debate over the role of the military in civil administration was never fully settled, it was suspended. The diplomat William C. Bullitt, investigating the matter for the President, reported on 30 December that, “the charges against the School were without foundation… that (the President) should cease to worry about the school.” Meanwhile, as the debate and political posturing over administration of the post-conflict world was raging, America’s role in the fighting was just starting.\textsuperscript{116}

On 8 November American and British forces landed in French North Africa, an area in which it had been assumed civil government could be left to local authorities. The War Department began to realize the accuracy of the first class’s estimates of requirements for military government administrators. The mainstream planners in the War Department had dramatically underestimated the impact military government and civil affairs would have on combat operations. Believing they were in relatively ‘friendly territory’, the military delegated control over “purely civil matters” to the State Department. In a memo dated 24 November from the War Department to General Eisenhower, the Theater commander, the State Department representative, Robert D. Murphy, was given authority over civil affairs except when they directly “affect or are affected by military operations.”\textsuperscript{117}

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\textsuperscript{115} Ziemke, 15.  \\
\textsuperscript{116} Coles and Weinberg, 25.  \\
\textsuperscript{117} Message from War Department to General Eisenhower, 24 November 1942, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 38.  
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Like many concepts the Army was testing in North Africa, the idea sounded good, but in practice was impractical. General Eisenhower responded to General Marshall on 26 November that “no one could be more anxious than General Clark and myself to rid ourselves completely of all problems other than purely military.” It was an interesting comment in light of Marshall’s later directive to Eisenhower to “give your complete attention to the battle in Tunisia.” Eisenhower correctly identified the major flaw in the War Department plan that “until North Africa is made thoroughly secure… everything done here directly affects the military situation.” Eisenhower also addressed State Department directives to Murphy, arguing that Murphy could not be a member of the theater staff and at the same time be independently responsible to the State Department. The American commander had realized that Clausewitz’s concept of “Unity of Command” extended to civil affairs as well.\footnote{Message 609, General Eisenhower to General Marshall, 26 November 1942, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 43.}

On 28 November, Marshall responded to Eisenhower that Murphy would remain subordinate to him and that the State Department would not assume control of civil matters until the military situation permitted, as determined by Eisenhower. At that point, Marshall promised, Eisenhower would be able to divorce himself of some governance responsibilities.\footnote{Message from General Marshall to General Eisenhower, 28 November 1942, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 43.}

North Africa typifies the common view of military government and civil affairs throughout World War II. Civilians in the State Department and other high levels of government viewed the governance tasks as primarily civilian functions that had to be wrested out of military hands as soon as possible, regardless of military chain of command conflicts. These civilians only acquiesced to continued military control when confronted with the reality of an unstable security situation. The military, likewise, underestimated the challenge in conducting relief
operations and major combat simultaneously. This tension between civilian and military thinkers began in North Africa and continues to this day.

Another current military government problem that was conceived in North Africa is bureaucratic redundancy. Warning of an “impending breakdown in (United States) international operations,” James Webb, Roosevelt’s Budget Director, observed that “the Bureau of Economic Warfare plans, hopes to rehabilitate, and may develop; Lend Lease (Administration) plans, procures, finances, and distributes; the Department of State plans and attempts to direct; the Army plans, administers and directs; all with respect to the same geographical area.” The answer proposed by some, including New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, was to leave long-term planning to the civilian agencies, but give the military responsibility to coordinate all civil operations that were concurrent with combat operations.\(^{120}\)

In 1942, the United States was unprepared organizationally and in numbers of trained personnel for the scope of civil affairs and military government operations it faced. The Army had less than one hundred officers trained in military government, and only twenty-two individuals on its military government planning staff at the Military Government Division at the beginning of 1943. Eisenhower highlighted the situation in February 1943 when he asked for guidance regarding civil affairs and military government operations related to OPERATION HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily. “What concerned him most were the relationships between civil and military authorities, the handling of the civilian population, and the arrangements with respect to both which would have to be made with the British.”\(^{121}\)

Eisenhower’s enquiries laid bare the War Department’s lack of adequate civil affairs planning and coordination capability. In mid-February, General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and

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\(^{120}\) Memorandum from James Webb, Director of Bureau of Budget to President Roosevelt, 6 February 1943, as printed in Coles and Weinberg, 60.

\(^{121}\) Ziemke, 17.
other key Department heads met to discuss various solutions. By the end of the month the War Department tasked General John Hull, Chief of Theater Operations Division, to create a Civil Affairs Division on the General Staff. The Civil Affairs Division was established on 1 March, with General John Hilldring as its director. By creating the Division, the War Department retained control of leadership in civil affairs and military government. The Civil Affairs Division was responsible for detailed planning for civil affairs in all planning to occupy enemy territory.¹²²

Though it had an adequate planning organization, the War Department was still dramatically short of trained personnel. The original Charlottesville study conducted by the first class was revised upward to 6,000 trained officers. As Charlottesville could only graduate four hundred fifty officers per year, the War Department proposed expanding the program to additional locations. To meet the more immediate need, Wickersham and Gullion suggested that 2,500 specialists should be directly commissioned from civilian life. Their motivation appears to be fear that the officers selected from the ranks would be of poor quality since operational commands would not let their best quality officers leave. In the end the War Department chose both solutions.¹²³

In order to meet the immediate tactical need for officers trained to handle civil affairs matters, the Army established the Civil Affairs Training School (CATS). The program was designed to recruit civilians, and train them for one month in basic military government at Fort Custer, Michigan. After completion, the officers would attend an additional three months training at one of several universities. The training was technical in nature rather than administrative like the School of Military Government. A CATS graduate was expected to work

¹²² Coles and Weinberg, 66-68.
¹²³ Ziemke, 18-20.
directly with people in occupied areas, thus they learned languages and foreign area studies. The basic curriculum allowed for rapid expansion of the program as needed.\textsuperscript{124}

The invasion of Sicily in summer 1943 dramatically increased demand for civil affairs and military government trained officers. In August 1943, General Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff, ordered Gullion to “bring 2,500 additional officers into civil affairs training programs by the end of the calendar year 1943.” The tactical and operational need for trained officers forced the War Department’s recently reticent hand. The Department made major changes to civil affairs acquisition policies, including allowing direct application of individuals, accelerated civilian recruitment, and direct commissioning of older civilians and those with specialized skills to the field grades. With these policy changes and dramatically improved recruitment, the Charlottesville program expanded to one hundred seventy-five students per month and the CATS to four hundred fifty per month. The rapid expansion allowed the programs to train over 2,000 officers in just the last four months of 1943, filling the Army’s projected European requirements. It is important to note that the Army filled these positions from more than 75,000 military and civilian applications. Clearly this interest indicates that recruitment and publicity by the Civil Affairs Division and School of Military Government had been heavy well before the War Department relaxed its acquisition policies, indicative of Gullion and Wickersham’s foresight.\textsuperscript{125}

The debate over military administration of government and civil affairs did not end in 1943. President Roosevelt and many military commanders remained convinced that the task was primarily the domain of civilians. In 1943 the President attempted to place military government

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 18-19.
under civilian oversight by placing a civilian director in charge of economic operations in occupied areas. He would be subordinate to the military commander, but would answer to the State Department, once again dividing Unity of Command. Secretary Stimson protested, to no real effect. Regardless of Roosevelt’s preferences, by the summer of 1943, the course of the war dictated its own policy. Sicily had demonstrated that military governments were necessary, and the Army had met the need. Men with the training and resources to administer civil affairs were required, and the Army was prepared. The civilian agencies were not. On 10 November the President acquiesced. In a letter to Secretary Stimson he acknowledged "although other agencies are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connection with relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden." He then tasked the Army to plan and execute civil relief and rehabilitation "until civilian agencies are prepared to carry out the longer range program." The debate over military administration of civil affairs was suspended.126

As preparations for civil affairs and military government officers for Europe reached completion, the schools were directed to begin preparing for requirements in Asia. On 10 December 1943, Gullion was directed to prepare a plan for procurement and training of 1,500 civil affairs and military government officers for Asia, with ten percent available in October 1945, and the remainder in March 1946 – dates that clearly did not anticipate an abrupt end to the war in the Pacific Theater. Recognizing that Americans were unacquainted with Asian languages, institutions and culture, the directive included a requirement that students spend no less than six months in language and area studies.127

126 Ziemke, 20-22.
127 Memo from Gullion, to Chief, CAD, 31 December 1943 reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 83.
By 31 December 1943, Gullion had formulated a plan that called for the further expansion of the School of Military Government and CATS. The first Asia oriented courses would begin in June 1944. There would be two CATS classes per term at between five and ten universities. The School of Military Government classes would train one hundred students and the CATS two hundred fifty. The school would hire one hundred fifty Japanese language instructors, and the classes would be lengthened from four months to between six and eight months to accommodate the language requirement.  

Gullion also presciently expressed concerns for circumstances that could adversely affect the Far Eastern program. First, the difficulty in teaching Japanese compounded the aforementioned American ignorance of Asian languages. Also, while four months was adequate to give an officer a rudimentary understanding of Italian, six months of Japanese instruction was insufficient to meet the same proficiency. Lastly, Gullion “feared that a certain amount of war-weariness (would), in the end, adversely affect the Far Eastern program.” He thought that the conclusion of European hostilities would result in diminished interest in Far Eastern occupations, hindering recruiting. He also commented that diminished interest in war would make it difficult for students to maintain “a necessary degree of zeal in their studies.” The War Department approved Gullion’s recommendations on 31 March 1944.

The planning for military government in 1943 – 1944 has fascinating implications. Clearly Gullion, Wickersham, Hilldring and others in the War Department saw that the end of the war in the European Theater was quickly approaching – ironic at a time when Eisenhower had just been named head of OPERATION OVERLORD and the Allies were having trouble slogging through the German Winter Line defenses in Italy. More interesting is the projection

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128 Memo from Gullion, to Chief, CAD, 31 December 1943 reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 83-84.
129 Ibid.
that the War in the Pacific would end in 1945 – 1946, at a time when the Marines were consolidating after Tarawa. The most dramatic revelation from this plan, however, is in what it does not address. While Gullion called for the hiring hundreds of Japanese language and culture experts, he made no mention of a need for Chinese or Korean experts. This oversight can be explained from a policy standpoint, since the School of Military Government and CATS were training officers to administer formerly hostile occupied zones. However, it is still noteworthy that men who projected the Army’s need for trained civil affairs specialists in 1940 and could accurately foresee the end dates of world conflict, failed to anticipate a possible need for training for what would become critical areas of American interest for the next fifty years.

The development of military government for World War II was neither smooth nor deliberate. By comparison, the chaos of military government policy in Iraq in 2006 is similar to that of the 1940’s. In both eras there was friction between the civilian and military components of the Executive Branch over control of civil affairs. The military in each instance was anxious to turn over responsibility, but not at the expense of unity of command. In both times, the military also recognized the limitations of civilians to operate in active combat zones. The demands of combat mandated in both conflicts that the Army conduct civil affairs and military governance.

The striking difference between the two conflicts is in how prepared each era was for civil affairs and military government. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq under that misguided assumption that such operations would be limited in duration and scope since either Iraqis would quickly be found to assume the responsibility, or the State Department would be able to manage the role as liberated Iraqis would peacefully allow temporary American
administration. Much of this erroneous, hopeful planning can be attributed to an institutional lack of experience with civil affairs operations that were national in scope.

In World War II, the United States possessed a contingent of enlightened military officers with experience in military government from World War I. These officers formed an enlightened cadre that maintained the institutional memory of military government for the Army. This cadre laid the foundation that allowed the War Department to prepare for massive civil administration once it became cognizant of the mission.
No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength

- Helmuth von Moltke

It is often noted by historians, with some irony, that the American offensive in Europe in the Second World War was not directed at the enemy’s main strength in Europe, but rather at the secondary theater of North Africa. The explanation given for this indirect approach is pragmatic – the United States Army was not organized or equipped well enough in 1942 to execute offensive operations against an inveterate, entrenched, and well-equipped foe. While American Army planners were generally not seen as lacking in enthusiasm or confidence, it is frequently noted that many less impassioned decision makers – predominantly British – felt that the Army needed a mature, experienced partner – also British – in its first foray against the Axis. Thus America’s offensive entry into Europe came under the tutelage of the British on 8 November 1942 with OPERATION TORCH.\textsuperscript{130}

As noted in the preceding chapter, the Army lacked adequate resources in men and experience to undertake military government operations in North Africa in 1942. Generals Clark and Eisenhower were overwhelmed to the point of distraction by the burden and complexity of military administration. In addition to the previously discussed organizational changes in military government that subordinated civilian efforts to the military commander, Eisenhower alleviated much of the pressure with the controversial Darlan-Clark deal. The agreement reached between General Mark Clark and Admiral Francois Darlan simply “stated that, provided the French forces and the civil population would obey Darlan’s orders to co-operate militarily with (the United

States Army, the Army) would not disturb French administrative control of North Africa.”\(^{131}\)

North Africa would effectively be treated as ‘friendly liberated’ territory rather than ‘occupied enemy’ territory, obviating the need for formal military government and greatly simplifying the situation. That Darlan’s fascist ideology was overlooked provoked outcry among many idealistic Americans at home.\(^{132}\) However, the agreement effectively ensured that the United States Army’s first direct experience with military government came not in North Africa in 1942, but in Sicily in 1943.

Planning for the invasion of Sicily in 1943 – codenamed OPERATION HUSKY – necessarily included planning for military government. In a message to General Marshall seeking guidance on 8 February 1943, Eisenhower declared that Sicily was “the first United States operation involving the invasion and occupation of enemy territory.” As such, the General was concerned about the structure and organization of military government, since those established for Sicily would become precedents for the remainder of the war and beyond. Normally, the Army’s doctrinal guidance is found in its regulations and Field Manuals (FM’s), but the governing manual for planning military government at the time, \(FM\ 27-5\) from 1940, was wholly inadequate for Eisenhower’s needs.\(^{133}\)

Though the 5 July 1940 edition of \textit{Field Manual 27-5 – Military Government} addressed shortcomings noted in the Hunt Report on training and preparation of military government officers, it provided only superficial guidance for planning and organization of military


\(^{132}\) The public cry for ideological purity in those who are selected as native administrators of occupied lands is a common theme in modern warfare as is seen in the de-Nazification of Germany, the anti-communist efforts in Korea and Vietnam, and de-Baathification in Iraq. These wars take on an ideological aura as United States leaders depict the conflict in terms of good and evil. The result tends to be either complications in administration due to the exclusion of able native administrators or controversy over their inclusion.

\(^{133}\) Eisenhower to War Department, 8 February 1943, CAD Message Files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
government operations. In a scant five pages, the manual assigns responsibility for planning military government operations to the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff, provides vague guidance for planning military government. This guidance included the ideas that military government should be subordinate to combat operations, and should be “as humane as practicable.” It also advised that plans be flexible, use a separate body of soldiers trained in military government, and make use of loyal existing native personnel as an economy of force. Two pages are devoted to an organizational concept that assigned responsibility for operational execution to the theater civil affairs section or office “of a similar title” and directs that the office be organized as the officer in charge of civil affairs and the commanding general “shall see fit.” The manual does make recommendations on the areas of expertise that should be represented in the civil affairs section, and unequivocally prescribes the wearing of a purple armband with the letters “CA” in white as the distinct uniform. Three additional pages address the organization of the government along extant city, county, and provincial lines where possible, and again emphasizes against the use of non-military government trained personnel for the task. In keeping with its heritage as the product of legal minds, the remainder of the book – forty-seven pages – is comprised of instructions for conducting military tribunals and the supporting legal appendices.

The 1940 edition of Army Field Manual 27-5 – Military Government was truly insufficient as an operational guide for planning for several reasons. First, it failed to outline a coherent, unified framework for building a comprehensive military government. It instead delineated a rough chain of command and series of generic duties and responsibilities in the sort of verbiage that seems sufficient during peacetime, but proves unsatisfying in war, such as “the

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134 See chapter II, page 44.
personnel section (G-1) of the (theater) staff... will, in advance of the necessity for the establishment of military government, make such further and more detailed plans as may be necessary.” Admittedly, it is impossible for a manual to address specific planning potentialities with any credibility, but *FM 27-5* was so generic that it amounted to little more than a statement of common sense organizational theory.\(^{136}\)

Likewise, the manual also grossly understated the impact of modern warfare on a society. The book is replete with platitudinous phrases like, “it is incumbent upon those who administer (military government) to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity,” instead of practical guidance on how to prioritize scarce medical and food resources to the local population. Again, the book could not have foreseen every possibility, but it failed to address the direct impact of war on modern populations at all, literally leaving all planning and preparation to the common sense of the commander and his staff, without a unifying strategic objective. Furthermore, as the *FM* only applied to American forces, it was inadequate for planning combined operations such as the ones the Americans would conduct with the British.\(^{137}\)

In light of such anemic general guidance, Eisenhower’s proposal was as remarkable as it was unprecedented. He envisioned a fully integrated joint Allied system of military government answerable to the Allied military commander. Rather than dividing Sicily and Italy into national zones as had been done in the First World War – one geographic region for the Americans of the Seventh Army and one for the British in the Eighth Army – Eisenhower proposed consistency across the occupied territory by placing the entire country under a unified military administrative system. Furthermore, instead of managing the country with a superfluous diarchy of equal British and American administrators at each level, he recommended merging all available

\(^{136}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{137}\) Ibid., 4-5.
military government personnel into a truly unified system, a coequal partnership with British and American officers accountable to members of the other nation where they held positions of greater administrative authority. The ultimate, diplomatically balanced, effect was that each major Division of Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) was staffed with a primary officer from one nation and an assistant from the other nation.\(^\text{138}\)

In addition to a weak governing document, Eisenhower and his staff also had to overcome the rivalries and philosophical differences between the civilian governments of Britain and America. Initially, both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill held concerns over which nation would have the lead role in planning and execution of administrative operations. Roosevelt argued that the overall character of military government should be American in order to take advantage of “the strong pro-American feeling in Sicily and southern Italy” and the close contact Italian-Americans held with their families in Italy.\(^\text{139}\) Churchill’s position was less nuanced and somewhat reflective of an effort to maintain unity of command; he simply stated that since the military operational commander was the British General Alexander, “a British General Officer should be appointed Military Governor.”\(^\text{140}\)

The two nations also held divergent views on the extent to which military administration should be implemented. The debate was over whether military officers should be appointed to administrate affairs directly – literally making and implementing decisions. The alternative position was that Allied officers should simply appoint and advise the most trustworthy and qualified local natives available to administrative positions. The American position, reflective of

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\(^{138}\) Eisenhower to War Department, 8 February 1943, CAD Message Files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

\(^{139}\) Roosevelt to OPD as cited by Secretary Leahy, 9 April 1943, CAD message files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

public outcry over the Darlan-Clark agreement, was that fascists should be purged from administrative posts and that such posts should be filled by allied officers since it was too difficult for a commander to select a trustworthy Italian official while maintaining political impartiality. The British position was robust and pragmatic. There simply were not enough trained military government officers to fill all the administrative positions in Italy. Furthermore, native fluency in the language would minimize administrative errors and reduce the impact of strikes and social unrest. Finally, under Italian administration in an indirect system, breakdowns would be attributable to failings of natives rather than Allied officers.\textsuperscript{141}

The multitude of problems faced by Eisenhower and military government planners like American Colonel Charles Spofford and British Major General Lord Rennell were largely due to the nature of coalition warfare. Both Britain and America had fundamentally differing views on the relationship between the military and the government. Both countries’ executives understandably wanted their nation to take the lead role in administration in order to exert political influence in support of their national interests. And each nation differed on the possible duration of military administration. However, in the end as a matter of exigency, both nations ultimately agreed to relinquish final decisions over such matters to the judgment of General Alexander, the supreme military commander for HUSKY.

With political bickering and debate set aside for the moment, military government planners at Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) codified Eisenhower’s concept in an administrative memorandum dated 1 May 1943, which announced the establishment of AMGOT. This document became part of the canon of military government, and combined with planning documents over the next few months to form “what was colloquially known as the

‘AMGOT Bible’.” In large measure, the 1 May memorandum became the doctrinal foundation for all future military government operations in Europe.\textsuperscript{142}

AFHQ placed all functions of AMGOT under direct supervision of the Military Governor, General Alexander, Commanding General of Force 141 – later renamed Fifteenth Army Group – and made him answerable to General Eisenhower. The document named British Major General Rennell as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) and Chief of AMGOT. Initially, the 1 May memorandum named Lieutenant Colonel Charles Spofford as the Acting Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, but American Brigadier General Frank McSherry was appointed the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) and the Deputy Chief of AMGOT before operations commenced.\textsuperscript{143}

The stated purpose of AMGOT was “to administer the military government of HORRIFIED (the code name for Sicily) in accordance with international law.” AMGOT’s fivefold directed objective was militarily more pragmatic: ensure the security of occupying forces, restore law and order and provide relief to civilian populations, relieve combat troops of civil administration duties, provide economic resources from the occupied territory to the occupying forces, promote political and military objectives of Allied forces in support of future operations. It is clear that military government, as envisioned by the Allied assault forces in 1943, was planned solely as an economy of force military operation, the intent of which was the pacification of the native population while simultaneously relieving combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration in order to facilitate combat operations by securing rear areas and logistical lines.\textsuperscript{144}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{142} Harris, 4.  
\textsuperscript{143} AFHQ Admin Memo, 1 May 1943, CAD Message Files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.  
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., para. II.}
The AMGOT plan organized military government along extant provincial lines. A Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) was assigned to each Sicilian province to direct and oversee the Prefect. To this end, the SCAO was assigned several Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) to assist in general administration of the various cities and towns, as well as several specialist officers from the six ‘special divisions’ outlined in the plan: Legal, Financial, Civilian Supply, Public Health, Public Safety, and Enemy Property. The emphasis on organizational structure more than specific policy is worth noting. Clearly planners saw that policies would vary over time and geography, but a properly constructed organization should be flexible enough to respond rapidly and appropriately.

The Legal Division of AMGOT was chartered with ensuring that all military government actions were in accordance with the Hague rules and other international conventions. As such, legal officers were extensively involved in the planning phases of all aspects of military government operations. They advised Generals Rennell and McSherry on the limitations of their powers, and were responsible for drafting the various proclamations and policies by which the Military Governor, General Alexander, established military government procedures. They were also naturally responsible for establishing the Allied Military Tribunals and overseeing the Italian courts.

Charged with the deceptively straightforward mission of managing the fiduciary integrity of the Allies, the AMGOT Finance Division’s mission was fourfold: manage revenue collection in the occupied territories; ensure sufficient liquidity of native financial institutions while preventing a sudden, panicked, massive withdrawal of specie – a mission British military

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145 Ibid, para. IV.
146 Forming reliable policy was most likely impossible in light of the dearth of reliable information on conditions in Sicily.
147 Harris, 5.
historian Reginald Harris referred to as “a delicate task of nicely calculated less or more;” ensure sufficient supplies of money for military and civilian use; maintain accounting of all Allied financial transactions in order to facilitate collection of liabilities from a future Italian government.\textsuperscript{148} To facilitate the planning and execution of what was in reality new Italian national monetary policy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff later ordered the creation of the Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA) as a subdivision of the Finance Division, answerable to the Chief Financial Officer of AMGOT. The AMFA was intended to act somewhat like the American Federal Reserve Bank in combating inflation and setting interest rates, and was the lending institution of last resort.\textsuperscript{149}

The Civilian Supply Division was charged with meeting the logistical requirements of supplying the needs of the native population. The Division’s first task was to estimate, procure, and import the food and medical supply requirements for the entire population for ninety days. This period was intended to allow the Division time to assess the indigenous resources’ potential to meet future needs. The Division was expected to supervise rationing, transportation of supplies, and development and control of resources for both civilian and military use. The Division was thus responsible for a diverse array of interests, including public utilities, agricultural, industrial and labor policies, and railways and other transportation infrastructure. With so many interests, the Division worked closely with most of the other Divisions of AMGOT.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{148} AMGOT General Administrative Instruction (GAI) number 15, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 184 - 185.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.

The Public Health Division was staffed with both British and American medical doctors and given responsibility for combating diseases attendant to a massive invasion and high intensity combat. This naturally included controlling venereal diseases, typhoid, cholera, and dysentery, as well as other epidemic diseases that result from destruction of large numbers of dwellings and sanitation systems. As well as being the focal point for all direct human medical care, the Division was given responsibility for all sorts of public welfare, including child welfare, care of refugees and displaced persons, and public assistance with food and housing – all viewed as directly related to the general health of the public.\textsuperscript{151}

The Public Safety Division was given the responsibility to preserve public order without diverting unnecessary military manpower. The Division was tasked with policing, prison administration, and control of civilian motor vehicles, as well as civilian fire protection and the organization of civil defense. As it was deemed impractical to police metropolitan Italian cities by diverting the required numbers of Allied military police units, planners decided to use Civil Affairs Police Officers (CAPOs) to supervise the administration and control of native police forces. This decision was not superficial, since the main Italian police force was the \textit{Carabinieri Reali}, a former unit of the fascist Italian Army.\textsuperscript{152}

The Enemy Property Division was largely an inheritance from British military government experiences in Africa. The Division was assigned custody of all property belonging to the Italian or other governments, absentee owners, or that was simply abandoned and was not being utilized or occupied by Allied military forces. All state owned Italian business and property were thus in the Division’s control. After it declared war, Italy had seized and sequestered all property belonging to Allied owners. Once the Allied Force Headquarters

\textsuperscript{151} Harris, 6.
\textsuperscript{152} GAI number 15, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 182, and Harris, 5.
planners decided that such property also be given over to the custody of the Division, its name was changed to the Allied and Enemy Property Division.\textsuperscript{153}

The final organizational structure for AMGOT was simple. At the ‘tactical’ level of military government, a Civil Affairs Officer (CAO) was supposed to be stationed in each significant municipal area. A Civil Affairs Police Officer (CAPO) assisted each CAO and oversaw the Public Safety issues in the region. The CAOs and CAPOs answered to their Senior Civil Affairs Officers (SCAOs) at the provincial level, who in turn answered to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer at AMGOT headquarters.\textsuperscript{154}

The ‘operational plan’ for military government was likewise simple. During the initial phase of the invasion, CAOs were to be attached to the headquarters of each assault force (division, corps, and army) as a special staff member. At the discretion of the unit commander, preferably as soon as possible after the assault had consolidated territory, the CAOs would be sent ashore to contact local authorities. As the assault forces expanded, and more AMGOT officers landed, the CAOs would consolidate and form provincial administrations under the direction of the SCAO and tactical unit commanders. Once enough territory had been captured to enable the landing of AMGOT headquarters, the military government command channels would replace tactical ones as combat units moved forward, leaving military government in their wake.

Planners realized that CAOs would be low in priority for military transport to shore, and included the instruction to assault commanders to “assist Civil Affairs Officers in their duties,” ostensibly by prioritizing the movement of CAOs.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{153} Harris, 8.
\textsuperscript{154} AFHQ Admin Memo, 1 May 1943, CAD Message Files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
\textsuperscript{155} Civil Affairs Handbook: Italy, 6-7.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) ratified the AFHQ organization and operational plan in May 1943, but Anglo-American discussions over policy details delayed publication of a final draft of the CCS directive until 28 June.\textsuperscript{156} The main points of discussion involved three politically interrelated areas – the status of Fascist Party elements in essential government departments, the policy for replacing Italian officials, and the status of Allied political influences in AMGOT. The first was aimed at banning enemy political influence. While there was no dispute over the total dissolution of the Fascist Party, the CCS recognized that some essential government services would be critically disrupted by the complete dismemberment of the party. Verbiage was thus included in the second and final drafts that drew a distinction between Fascist organizations that held no benefit to the public in general, and those whose removal would harm the public good – the former were to be liquidated immediately.\textsuperscript{157}

Likewise, there was little dispute over the appointment of replacements for vacated government posts. All drafts granted the military commander authority to appoint replacements from either the local population or Allied military officer corps at his discretion. The key difference between drafts lies in the appointments’ permanence – early drafts stated “no permanent appointment of Italians to important posts” would be made without CCS approval. The final draft simply asserted that all appointments of Italians were temporary, leaving the CCS to make all permanent appointments. The Combined Chiefs of Staff clearly wanted to protect the local commander from distraction by the politicking of local political influences.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} According to Coles and Weinberg, the directive was sent forward in two drafts on 31 May and 10 June, prior to the final release in order to allow units time to prepare. Soldiers Become Governors, page 177, note 30.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., emphasis added.
In all drafts of the CCS Directive, political guidance for military government of Sicily barred Allied political representation in AMGOT. Early drafts banned Allied political agencies and representatives from being “members of the prospective military administration,” while the final draft used the phrase, “the military government… shall contain no political agencies or representatives of either government.” The differences between the two statements are purely legal or diplomatic. Clearly the phrases were intended as an effort to eliminate Allied political friction and influence, both internationally and domestically, from General Alexander’s decision making – leaving him free to make decisions based purely on military considerations.\(^{159}\)

In discussing the CCS efforts to divest military government of political influences, it is important to understand their efforts in the context of 1943. As recently as 1942, wary politicians and suspicious editors accused the School of Military Government at Charlottesville of being a ‘school for Gauleiters’.\(^{160}\) Any American public perception of the use of the military as a political force would create an exceptionally difficult domestic political situation for senior Army leadership. In this light, the Allied hesitance to use military government as a political force is completely understandable, though it would have consequences later.\(^{161}\)

Military government organization was designed to parallel the tactical combat force organization, with Civil Affairs Staff at every level down to the division. When Task Force 141 under General Alexander was organized into two subordinate elements – Task Force 343 (Seventh Army under General Patton) and Task Force 545 (Eighth Army under General Montgomery) – the Chief Civil Affairs Officer staff assigned two Senior Civil Affairs Officers to the respective Task Force commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Poletti was assigned to

\(^{159}\) Ibid.  
\(^{160}\) See chapter II, page 51.  
General George S. Patton at Mostaganem, Algeria, and Group Captain C.E. Benson was assigned to General Montgomery at Cairo, Egypt. Neither of these officers arrived at their respective units until 15 June 1943, when they immediately began to direct planning efforts for military government operations at their level in coordination with Lord Rennell.  

The invasion opened with an address from General Eisenhower to the people of Italy outlining the objectives of the occupation. He stated that the purpose of the Allies was to destroy Fascism and “restore Italy as a free Nation.” The address also abolished all laws that discriminated on “the basis of race, color, or creed.” Eisenhower restored freedom of religion, “and, to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press” were restored. He denied any effort to change or undermine the “traditional laws and customs of Italy,” and announced a ban on the Fascist party organization in all its forms, as well as a general ban on all political activities of any kind during the period of military government.

On 10 July 1943, Allied forces began landing in Sicily and the operational plan for military government faced its first tests. The operational progress of military government in Sicily naturally shadowed combat operations. The initial phase of military government began with the establishment of the beachheads. The Eighth Army under Montgomery landed its XIII corps near Syracuse and its XXX corps at Cape Pasero. AMGOT officers were, unsurprisingly, not included on the early British landing manifests, but “about thirty officers were literally smuggled into the beachhead area” over the first few days. As AMGOT reinforcements arrived, they were held in reserve at Army headquarters and “took over towns as they were occupied.” The Americans in Seventh Army landed at Scaramina, Gela and Licata with only seventeen

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163 Proclamation of Eisenhower, CINC Allied Forces, on invasion of Sicily, 10 July 1943, CAD Message Files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
military government officers. These officers stayed with the headquarters of the units to which they were attached until the beachhead expanded enough to allow for the establishment of provincial military government. The initially low numbers of military government officers were due to a combination of the reluctance of combat commanders to allocate space on transport ships to personnel they viewed as a “luxury,” and the diffident efforts of military government planners to minimize numbers in order to diminish their impact on limited transportation resources.¹⁶⁴

The American advance was swift and by 22 July had entered Palermo, with the entire western half of Sicily overrun by the end of the month. The British faced a more stubborn German defense at Catania and did not capture the town until 5 August. The Seventh Army moved east from Palermo and the Eighth Army drove north until they met at Messina on 17 August – placing all of Sicily in Allied hands.

Lord Rennell, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, established the initial AMGOT headquarters at Syracuse on 22 July. In an interesting dichotomy, as the tactical problem of confronting the enemy diminished, the administrative problems of military governance of the occupied territory grew, creating a critical point where combat priorities and administrative priorities were equal. Many of the civil administration challenges in the first days of the occupation were too complex for a local CAO to address. However, AMGOT communications were not high enough priority to garner to the resources to enable a larger coordination of efforts. As the island was gradually brought under military control, AMGOT headquarters was moved to Palermo and began exerting centralized control on 1 August. Headquarters established direct communications with CAOs across the island as combat units released control of the island and military resources over to military government. Due to the impending invasion of Italy, many

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 188.
tactical commanders retained control of their Sicilian districts until 10 September, after the Salerno landings. However, all nine Sicilian provinces were eventually placed under the administration of a SCAO and his staff, answerable to Lord Rennell and General Alexander, enabling coordination and true unity of effort.\(^{165}\)

From the beginning of the invasion, AMGOT faced severe challenges and setbacks. Initially both combat troops and civil affairs officers were greeted enthusiastically as liberators. However, enthusiasm waned as the disparity between Sicilian expectations and military government reality became apparent. The destruction of modern war created a baseline of crises that would daunt a firmly founded native administration. In light of the announced policy of defascization, many able, key civic leaders had abandoned their posts. This combined with the small numbers of CAOs to create a nearly overwhelming situation of administrative chaos.

The post-conflict situation CAOs faced vindicated the wisdom of AFHQ planners in focusing on AMGOT organizational structure versus systems of prioritization or policy. Public, private and commercial structures were heavily damaged, corpses lay in the streets, clean food and water were scarce, the local police were detained, disarmed, or useless, and hospitals had been looted by the retreating German Army. Amidst all this chaos was a populace that had been paralyzed by the battle.\(^{166}\)

The Civilian Supply Division’s initial plan for food distribution was stopped completely by a lack of transportation. Assaulting troops had seized all available civilian transport, “including many mules and carts.” Since AMGOT had no organic transportation assets,

\(^{165}\) Digest of Field Reports on Civil Affairs Operations and Experiences in Sicily and Italy, Section A.2., July 1944, National War College records, RG334, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. 
\(^{166}\) All the key AMGOT leaders discuss the crises in their official reports on the invasion. Most prominent are Lord Rennell’s reports of 2 and 8 August 1943 to General Alexander found in CAD Files, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
distribution of both Allied and Sicilian food supplies was inhibited. Likewise, there was no
electricity to run the flour mills, and insufficient fuel to power smaller generators. Lord Rennell
reported that “local ingenuity and resources displayed by (AMGOT) officers tided over this
situation and no town has starved.” The local CAO’s ingenious solution was the borrowing and
lending of food among local municipalities, seizing food from stores (a Fascist practice known as
ammasssi), as well as “loans” of food from Allied military units.\textsuperscript{167}

Problems with the water supply in Sicily were solved largely by the efforts of local
civilians. Though parts of the water supply had been completely destroyed, many other pipes and
pumps were merely damaged, and local residents had the wherewithal to make the repairs
themselves. While the situation was simply resolved, the immediate impact and potential for a
larger overall catastrophe made the water crisis a major concern.\textsuperscript{168}

Due to the pragmatic approach of many assault troops, any individuals in non-Allied
uniforms were detained. This created a crisis for the Public Safety Division as many firemen and
police officers were detained in the initial assault and shipped to the local stockades. Some were
even forwarded to regional detention centers in Africa. Conversely, well-meaning Allied
‘liberators’ often emptied the prisons under the assumption that all the inmates were political
prisoners. The resulting multiplying of the criminal population combined with the diminution of
the police force to create a serious public safety crisis.\textsuperscript{169}

The invasion of Italy hindered organization of the civil administrative structures in Sicily
nearly as soon as Senior Civil Affairs Officers began the task. The surrender of Italy changed the
nature of military government from one of imposition to that of cooperation. The complication

\textsuperscript{167} Lord Rennell’s report to General Alexander, 2 August 1943, CAD Files, RG 165, National Archives and
Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
came when members of the SCAO’s staff were transferred to the mainland in ever increasing numbers as the Allied area of control expanded. By December, the Sicilian contingent of AMGOT was reduced from over 1000 to 275 personnel, “many of whom were merely attached pending… transfer to other areas.” In January 1944, the entire region lost a significant number of its experienced American officers to Headquarters European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA), as part of preparations for OPERATION OVERLORD.170

The surrender of Italy fundamentally changed the character of military government. Both the Allies and the Italians had demonstrated in Sicily that their intentions as a whole were honorable, and in some measure this enabled sufficient trust to allow the surrender; “(Marshal Pietro) Badoglio needed only to consider Sicily to realize that (the Allied occupation) would be humane.” As the status of Italy changed to cobelligerent, the Allies dropped “Occupied Territories” from the acronym and AMGOT became simply Allied Military Government (AMG).171

The changes in operational and organization structure of AMG in Italy proper went beyond a simple modification of an acronym. With the experience of Sicily, AFHQ and the CCS took advantage of the time offered by the invasion of Italy and associated surrender to reorganize. As the status of the Italians had changed from enemy, the Allies were able to control Italy under an armistice rather than an imposed system of military government,

At 0001 hours, 11 February 1944, all territory south of the northern boundaries of the provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, together with the Islands of Sicily and Sardinia, was restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, under the

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170 Digest of Field reports on Civil Affairs Operations and Experiences in Sicily and Italy, Section A.4., July 1944, National War College records, RG334, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
171 Coles and Weinberg, 219.
AMG personnel were divided into two groups, those attached to the tactical military units – the unit military government officers – and those assigned to work with the Italians directly after the Army had moved on – the provincial and regional AMG teams. The first group, designated AMG 15th Army Group, was responsible for consolidating the situation during combat and creating as stable circumstances as possible to turn over to the provincial and regional teams. The provincial and regional teams, called Headquarters AMG, were directed by the ACC to supervise the restoration of civilian life until administration was fully restored to Italian control.\footnote{Robert M. Hill and Elizabeth Craig Hill, \textit{In the Wake of War: memoirs of an Alabama Military Government Officer in World War II Italy} (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 19 - 26.}

The reorganization served two purposes. First, it isolated tactical military responsibility for civil affairs, theoretically, to the immediate combat zone, freeing commanders from an expanding administrative burden. Second, it gave responsibility for the rear areas to an organization with the single mission of civil administration. The empowerment of the ACC represented the beginning of transition from military to civilian authority. The CAOs, CAPOs and SCAOs all continued to be military personnel, but the strictures against civilian and political influences were relaxed and systems were established allowing the eventual involvement of international civil agencies, like the United Nations and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).\footnote{Digest of Field reports on Civil Affairs Operations and Experiences in Sicily and Italy, Section A.2., July 1944, National War College records, RG334, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.}
AMG 15th Army Group was further subdivided into AMG 5th Army, AMG 8th Army, as well as various AMG regions. By March 1944, AMG 15th Army Group reported a general improvement in the overall condition of the Italian people, which they attributed partly to improved food and commerce conditions and partly to “more vigorous administration.” The increased ‘vigor’ of civil administration was due in large part to the overexertion of the CAOs, who admirably assumed personal responsibility for many administrative functions. Their efforts were mainly due to the overall lack of Italian administrators, many of whom had fled. In a dual effort to foster the eventual rebirth of the Italian government and reduce the numbers of AMG officers required, CAOs were encouraged to transfer the burdens of administrative responsibility to the Italians: “try to preserve the local administration and (do not) try and do everything yourself… we have not the personnel for this. Remember that there are other areas in Europe where Civil Affairs personnel will be needed.”

The last sentence illustrates the motivations of the CCS and AFHQ – close military government operations in Italy as quickly as possible in order to free personnel for the cross channel invasion. By the spring of 1944, Italy was a secondary theater for military government.

Analysis of military government operations in Italy usually leads to two main conclusions. The first is that there were never enough Civil Affairs Officers to effectively administer the occupied area. This argument is typical, and completely accurate – there were

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175 As of March 1944 Region I was, of course, Sicily; Region II was Calabria, Reggio, Catanzaro, Cosenza, Salerno and Lucania – including all of ‘the King’s Italy’; Region III was Avellino, Benevento and Naples; and further Regions were created as allied movement progressed.
176 Among the general notations of welfare and administrative issues in their report, the author of the AMG 15th Army Group report makes the curiously understated comment that the 18 March 1944 eruption of Mt. Vesuvius, “created appreciable problems.” Digest of Field reports on Civil Affairs Operations and Experiences in Sicily and Italy, Section A.4., July 1944, National War College records, RG 334, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
177 Ibid., section A.13. Many CAOs reported to AMG 15th Army Group that the Fascist leadership had fled; in one report a SCAO claimed, “not six of the original top administration personnel were left.”
178 AMGOT General Administrative Instruction (GAI) number 1, reprinted in Coles and Weinberg, 211.
179 As seen in the accounts of actual military government officers like Robert Hill in In the Wake of War, Stuart O. Van Slyke in his eponymous autobiography, and Thomas Fisher in "Allied Military Government in Italy."
never enough people helping and there never would be – but that is just a constraint that AMGOT had to operate under. AMGOT simply had to make do since, by its own admission, fighting and winning the war had to take priority.

The second conclusion is likewise superficially true – civil affairs and military government personnel were inadequately trained and prepared for their responsibilities. Again the rejoinder is that soldiers are never trained as well as they should be – but they were trained as best as they could be. The School of Military Government, the Civil Affairs Training School, and the theater military government school at Chréa, Algeria were all established to give soldiers as much – and likely more – information that was available and thought pertinent. The real answer to the lack of adequate education was not training, but experience. America simply did not have enough officers with experience in military government. There were many who had served in the occupation of the Rhineland in 1919 to 1923, but that experience was singular, and offered largely organizational lessons, which directly led to the training programs and planning that existed in 1943. Lack of experience led planners and decision makers to be overly cautious and slow to address problems.

The prolonged development of the Directive for Allied Military Government in Sicily is an example of one of the main problems with the Allied military government efforts. AMGOT was lethargic, and laden with bureaucracy due to its decision-making and consultation ties to the CCS. The primacy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in military government planning solved the problem of reconciling the views of Washington and London, but required the creation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), in 1943, to study problems and make recommendations to the CCS. Later, as civil supply systems broke down in Sicily and Italy, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for Supply (CCAC/S) was established to augment the efforts
of the CCAC. The creation of the Civil Affairs Division in 1943 in the Operational Plans Division of the War Department, and its British analog, added further layers of discussion and required approval for each military government effort. Ultimately, the multiple layers of advice and consent proved to be unwieldy, negating the ability of AMGOT to act quickly to resolve crises – clearly a disadvantage in a war zone. Tactical commanders were given final authority, but told to ensure a unified policy in the theater. As communications, transportation, and supply systems broke down, isolated CAOs began implementing their recommendations prior to requesting approval.\textsuperscript{180} Ultimately, the success of American military government operations in Italy is attributable to the collective effort of these individual officers.

AMGOT in Italy was, like AMAROC, a singular event. The Sicilian and Italian people did welcome the Allies largely as liberators. Military government operations were conducted concurrent to – and in some cases collocated with – major combat operations. The occupied territory was the victim of the destruction of modern warfare, largely unrestricted by static front lines. The relatively small numbers of largely ill prepared men worked with their Italian charges to address crises as they arose – gaining valuable experience for the invasion and occupation of Germany from their first contact with military government operations.

\textsuperscript{180} The development of these organizations is discussed extensively in Coles and Weinberg. However, researching military government related communications in the National Archives quickly reveals that the complexity of the decision making process extended beyond the CCS and CAD into the Joint Chiefs, the State and Treasury Departments, Congress, the Presidency and their British counterparts. It is understandable then, why so many first hand accounts of civil affairs officers in Italy express frustration at the lack of quick, clear, consistent guidance, and also why many solutions to immediate problems were found at the local level, with relatively junior officers who took initiative out of expediency, and asked permission afterwards.
Plans for the Allied cross-channel invasion of German occupied Europe were developed as early as 1940. In July of that year, even as losses from the evacuation of Dunkirk were being tabulated, Prime Minister Churchill ordered planners to organize tank raids into countries along the Channel coast. By September, General Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, directed planners to prepare for a major invasion of the Continent, and instructed them to include United States capabilities as a planning consideration. Staff studies supporting the planning convinced the British commanders that, due to German fortifications, “no sustained land operation could be made in… 1942.”

Any allied cross channel invasion plan would be founded on a combat organization and fighting doctrine that had been developed over generations. Even new technologies like airpower and armor had tactical employment doctrine that was tested and developed over decades in war games and maneuvers prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The plan for the military government of the liberated and occupied nations, by contrast, was based on organizations that were developed ‘on the fly’ – as events unfolded. Likewise, due to the absence of prior planning, the development of civil affairs and military government doctrine and policies were essentially a ‘pick-up game’ that, while generally based on international legal precedents in the Hague Conventions, only addressed issues and crises in detail as they emerged during the progression of

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181 See the U.S. Army in World War II ‘green book’, The Supreme Command by Forrest C. Pogue for a comprehensive discussion of strategic planning in the ETO, and particularly the Invasion of Europe.

the war. Initially this is understandable since priority has to be given to defeating the enemy, yet when victory was becoming more concrete in mid to late 1943, the Allies failed to establish a clear, unified military government policy. The main factor in this failure was a lack of commonality in Allied military government philosophies. Allied combat formations shared basic tactical organization and doctrine and thus could work side by side with little tactical friction. However, Allied military government doctrine, driven as much by international politics as military necessity, suffered under the diversity of national political aims. Despite these complications, organization, doctrine, and plans for United States military civil affairs and military government operations in Europe were codified into a functioning operation – an operation that dramatically impacted the last half of the 20th century.

American movement toward an invasion began in January 1942 with its ‘Germany First’ policy and the deployment of V Corps Headquarters to Northern Ireland. By March, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) began feasibility studies in two areas: one of landing and maintaining forces in 1942, the other of a full invasion in early 1943. In April, General Marshall met with British commanders to discuss these and other options. On 14 April, the British agreed to a build-up of one million men in preparation for an offensive against northwestern Europe – operation BOLERO. They further approved preparations for an emergency cross-channel operation in case either Germany or Russia were seriously weakened – called Operation SLEDGEHAMMER – as well as a full-scale invasion in 1943 named Operation ROUNDUP. Planning for these offensive operations yielded the first explorations of the method and organization for the administration of occupied territories by the eponymous Administration of

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183 Pogue, 100.
Territories (Europe) Committee (AT(E)) – a British Cabinet level committee, with American observers, established in June or July of 1942.  

Anglo-American comity eroded somewhat as British experience and pragmatism revealed the impracticality of early operations in Europe. The resulting delay clashed with American exuberance and their perception of the urgency of aiding Russia in 1942. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill recognized the importance of initiating offensive operations in 1942, and agreed to an Allied invasion of North Africa – operation TORCH. As many American commanders – including General Marshall – feared, Operation TORCH diverted many resources from BOLERO and thus made operation ROUNDUP unfeasible in 1943. At the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Allies agreed that a cross channel invasion would be delayed until 1944, and that in the mean time the Mediterranean forces should not be left idle. The invasion of Sicily was thus the next major operation – codenamed HUSKY.  

At the Allied conference in Washington in May 1943, the CCS ordered the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, to begin planning a cross channel invasion for 1 May 1944. Throughout the summer of 1943 the Allies enjoyed a steady stream of encouraging news. The Italians overthrew Mussolini in July, the Allies captured Sicily in August, and Italy surrendered in September. The Russians likewise had staggering success in throwing the Germans back from Kharkov to the Dnieper. Events were so positive that on 9 September, the same day as operation AVALANCHE (the invasion of Italy

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184 Earl F. Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975), 24. The American theater Judge Advocate General, Colonel Edward C. Betts, sat on the AT(E) as an observer in the early days of the committee. According to both Ziemke and Harry Coles, Betts was so impressed with British devotion to the gravity of administration of occupied territory that he recommended a Civil Affairs Section be created in ETOUSA as a counterpart.

185 Pogue, 101 – 103.
at Salerno), the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet announced their belief that Germany was in worse condition than in August 1918, and predicted an imminent collapse and armistice.\footnote{Ibid., 104 – 105.} This estimate proved to be overly optimistic, yet it combined with the possibility of a harsh winter for Germany to spur COSSAC to establish contingency plans for an emergency cross-channel operation that was weakly resisted or unopposed. These Cases were collectively codenamed RANKIN.\footnote{Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1959), 225.}

For the Allied combat arms, the RANKIN Cases represent an operational and strategic series of sanguine scenarios which posed little risk of massive Allied casualties, but which demanded rapid mobilization and agile logistics. RANKIN Case A addressed the possibility of a weakening of German resistance. The case dealt with speculation that the Wehrmacht might diminish their presence on the Atlantic wall in order to strengthen resistance on the Russian Front. Case B only slightly varied from Case A in that it envisioned a German withdrawal from the occupied territories, similar to the startling 1917 German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. RANKIN Case C was the most optimistic for combat planners because it visualized a complete, unconditional, German surrender.\footnote{Ibid., 226.}

While the RANKIN Cases may have been best-case speculation for combat commanders, they represented a most dangerous course of action to civil affairs and military government planners. The operational plans for Cases A and B represented no serious deviation from the existing planning for OVERLORD; they simply addressed operations prior to the planned 1 May 1944 date for the invasion with the men and equipment on hand. General Morgan realized that with Case C, however, combat power would be of little value in controlling and directing civil
affairs. If, as in 1918, Germany suddenly surrendered, the country would have to be occupied – a task for which COSSAC in August 1943 “had nothing from which even to improvise a civil affairs organization.” He thus urgently requested that the British and United States governments establish a policy for “military government in occupied territory and civil affairs in liberated territory and provide resources with which to execute such policy.”

The ultimate effect of the development of RANKIN Case C was the initiation of deliberate planning for the military government of continental Europe. Under the RANKIN conditions of German collapse, the first priority was the rapid establishment of military government. Under more deliberate invasion scenarios, particularly OVERLORD and ANVIL/DRAGOON (the invasion of southern France), civil administration was secondary to combat victory, but no less important than in RANKIN. This was particularly the case for those nations that would be liberated from Nazi occupation: Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. Rapid reinstatement of friendly governments in the liberated countries would not only remove the governance burden from Allied commanders, but also, hopefully, make available resources for the military needs of the liberators.

Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg all had governments in exile that were recognized by the Allies as the de jure representatives of their respective countries. In February 1943, the British AT(E) committee initiated discussions with the exiled government of Norway on a tentative civil affairs agreement. By 10 June an approved draft agreement was forwarded to General Hilldring, director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, with a recommendation from United States Forces, European Theater of Operations (ETO)

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190 CCS JCS study 710, Administration of Civil Affairs in the Netherlands, Enclosure: Report by the Director, Civil Affairs Division, Undated, page 7, Records of Interservice Agencies, National War College, RG 334, Box 318, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
commander, Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, that it form the framework for future agreements with liberated nations, and that the United States Theater Commander be authorized to agree to future agreements that were thus similarly worded. With both General Devers and General Morgan requesting action on civil affairs and military government plans, policies and procedures, it is clear that the summer of 1943, marks the starting point for concrete planning for the administration of both liberated and occupied Europe.

Once the necessity of occupying Germany ceased to be a distant theoretical event that would be addressed at a future point, Allied senior leaders faced the reality that they were inadequately staffed to plan and formulate policy for such a monumental operation. In July 1943 the CCS approved the creation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) to study civil affairs problems in occupied or liberated areas and make recommendations to the CCS that would lead to a unified statement of policy.

The presentation of the draft Norwegian civil affairs agreement to the CCAC by the AT(E) for evaluation revealed fundamental points of disagreement between the British and Americans over which country would have preeminence in shaping civil affairs and military government policy. The Americans felt, since they were providing the preponderance of men and equipment, and since the United States was likely to provide the vast majority of post-war aid to Europe required by civil affairs and military government operations, the CCAC in Washington should be preeminent in promulgating policy via the CCS. The British disagreed and argued that, since they were more attuned to and experienced in European affairs, and had proximity to both the various exiled governments and the Supreme Allied Commander, the

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AT(E) should be the advance planning element for all civil affairs matters, and that CCAC merely needed to review documents, leaving the United States representatives on AT(E) to work out American concerns in London.\footnote{Ziemke, 37.}

The result was an impasse in which the British refused to deal with the CCAC and the Americans refused to address any issue from AT(E) unless it was communicated via CCAC channels. General Hilldring eventually ordered General Barker to withdraw American representation from the AT(E), a move which effectively rendered the body irrelevant, but did not resolve the problem. Hilldring later said that the “net effect of the impasse was to deprive the Supreme Commander for three months of any guidance on military government and civil affairs.”\footnote{Pogue, 78.} By November two developments emerged that eventually relieved the impasse but failed to remedy the underlying causes: the establishment of the European Advisory Committee (EAC) and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London (CCAC(L)).\footnote{Ziemke, 38-39.}

On 1 November 1943 Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov signed a secret protocol establishing the EAC – and charged it with responsibility for tripartite planning for occupation.\footnote{Pogue, 78.} The final agreement creating the EAC vaguely, and seemingly innocuously, stated, “The Commission will study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions… which the three Governments may consider appropriate to refer to it.”\footnote{United States Department of State, \textit{Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1943. General}, Vol. I (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 757.}

Clearly a concern for the War Department was the subsequent paragraph which directed one of the EAC’s “first tasks” to be the consideration of and recommendations on the “terms of surrender to be imposed” and
the “machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms.” This would of course empower the Commission to act in the development of civil affairs and military government plans and policy, and threaten the autonomy of the American military in that area.198

Following the EAC’s creation, Eden proposed that the Commission be seated in London and be the primary body for all tripartite decisions. The War Department viewed this as a renewed effort to center postwar planning in London while jettisoning the increasingly extraneous AT(E). The Department likewise realized that the Commission would directly infuse an undesired political aspect into the Supreme Commander’s civil affairs and military government planning. Rather than being guided simply by military considerations, the Supreme Commander would “constantly have to adjust his plans to any developments in national or international policy conveyed to him either by the governments or through the EAC.”199

In an effort to get United States support for the EAC, Eden suggested that the British would be willing to abandon their efforts to have civil affairs control moved to London and have all EAC recommendations submitted to CCAC for comment. The War Department did not support this idea, but did eventually concede the creation of a subcommittee of CCAC in London – CCAC(L) – which was approved on 29 January 1944. CCAC(L) was chartered to “give guidance and make recommendations to European and Mediterranean Theater commanders” within the bounds of established CCS directives, but not to act independently of the Combined Chiefs. The end result was that in January 1944, the Allies had completed the formation of the “Allied and combined” planning agencies that would, in theory, form policy for the occupation of Germany. In reality, the CCAC in Washington became the central planning agency for combined civil affairs and military government, but was never given authority to decide major

198 Ibid.
199 Ziemke, 38.
international issues.\textsuperscript{200} The CCAC provided the appearance of combined policy, but not the substance. The EAC was likewise impotent, failing to adopt the British draft of the Norwegian civil affairs agreement that precipitated the tumult in the first place, which eventually led to three separate but identically worded agreements being adopted by the United States, Britain, and Russia.\textsuperscript{201}

The entire episode of the AT(E) versus CCAC, or British versus American policy prominence, marks a particularly ludicrous point in the relationship between the two allies, since the British had hoped to avoid delays in policy decisions they saw coming from referral of issues to the CCS, and the Americans hoped to avoid empowering London with final civil administration authority. Beyond the discussion of London vice Washington control, the entire episode is emblematic of the major underlying issue in all American military government operations – military pragmatism versus the desire for civilian control of government. The earlier domestic policy debates over civilian or military control of civil administration had evolved to become a major international stumbling block – one that would hamper effective administration in the next few years as the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAES) evolved out of COSSAC and began looking for a coherent policy by which to guide its planning and operational execution.

In mid-January 1944, General Eisenhower arrived in London and began converting COSSAC staff into SHAES. From March 1943, during the intra-allied debate over the primacy of strategic policy organizations like the EAC and CCAC, general planning for civil affairs and

\textsuperscript{200} There is some disagreement on the full extent of the CCAC’s authority – Ziemke states that the Civil Affairs agreements with the liberated countries were never given to CCAC, while Coles states the opposite. The National Archives contain CCS and JCS annotated drafts of the agreements, but with no indication if the drafts were ever reviewed by the CCAC. It is reasonable to assume that the Chiefs would have used their advisory committee to study the problems, but there is no clear evidence that CCAC made recommendations on the documents.

\textsuperscript{201} Ziemke, 40-41.
military government had continued under COSSAC. COSSAC had formed its core civil affairs section under Major General Sir Robert Lumley, which formed a planning board that supervised the work of four “country houses,” to direct the specialized planning for the liberated nations of France, Belgium, Norway, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These country houses had been intended to serve as the nuclei for the eventual civil administration staffs of their respective countries. As COSSAC transformed into SHAEF, the country houses were abolished and absorbed into the overall civil affairs staff. This move marks a transformation in military thinking about civil administration from a static, regionally focused cell that served merely as a substitute for native government to a more mobile element that would move with the Army and be part of ongoing operations.

The dissolution of the country houses streamlined the civil affairs staff of COSSAC and made it more amenable to integration into traditional Army staff organization. As an eclectic assembly of arcane specialties in the country house configuration, the groups were too diverse to be efficiently integrated into military command structures. As part of the COSSAC – SHAEF restructuring in February, General Lumley submitted a recommendation that fit the civil affairs division directly into the SHAEF staff. Lumley proposed the creation of a G-5 division at SHAEF that would coordinate civil affairs planning efforts and formulate policy.

The first task the COSSAC civil affairs division addressed was the general organizational framework for operations in Europe. As SHAEF formed, the prevailing opinion at the time

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202 Ziemke, The Occupation of Germany, 28, and Coles and Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 671.

203 Ziemke marks this change as fundamentally transformative, whereas civil affairs and military government had hitherto been “considered in both civilian and military circles as a primarily rear area and postwar activity” it was now decided “civil affairs would find a place in the war itself,” The Occupation of Germany, 30. This is validated by – and is probably the result of feedback from – civil affairs actions in Sicily and Italy, as AMGOT officers had not been included in the initial invasion plan, and were literally smuggled into Sicily.

204 Memorandum from SHAEF CAD to Chief of Staff, subject: Organization of CA at SHAEF, 5 February 1944, as cited in Ziemke, 45.
favored a ‘Mediterranean model’ of Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories (AMGOT) as was used in Italy. Under this model, military government officers and civil affairs staffs operated under a separate chain of command from the combat forces, both answerable to the supreme commander. Lumley, among others, raised concerns that this structure failed to address the varied civil affairs requirements of liberated vice occupied territories. Simply put, occupied Germany would need a more extensive military government structure than liberated Luxembourg. Since the liberated territories were supposed to be returned to friendly native government control as soon as practicable, a separate AMGOT-style staff structure would not be as nimble as one that was “integrated into the normal combat staffs.” With military government assuming control after combat operations had moved on, military government officers would hardly be functioning before they transferred their responsibilities to native government organizations. Lumley argued that since the first purpose of military government and civil affairs was to further military operations, military government had to assume control as soon as possible in areas “where military necessity was paramount, the zones of operations and communications.”

On 14 March, General Walter Smith, SHAEF Chief of Staff, directed the organization of the G-5 staff along the lines proposed by General Lumley. In his memorandum, Smith refuted the ‘Mediterranean organization’, stating, “Civil Affairs Staff must be more closely integrated with normal staffs throughout the chain of command,” that SHAEF would avoid the establishment of a civil affairs headquarters independent of a combat headquarters, and explicitly “avoid AMGOT organization.” Furthermore, Smith directed that command and staff channels would run “from SHAEF to subordinate military commanders with direct communications with the Civil Affairs Staff.” He emphasized that subordinate commanders would not be required to

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205 Ziemke, 47.
formulate policy, but rather required to ensure that Civil Affairs staffs implemented the Supreme Commander’s policies. Finally, Smith directed that “SHAEF will relieve combat commanders of Civil Affairs responsibilities behind combat zones, at the earliest possible moment.”

Under Smith’s guidance, G-5 SHAEF was organized into two sections, Policy and Operations, and placed under Lieutenant General Sir A. E. Grasett as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, with Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes as deputy. The Section was further divided into legal, fiscal, supply, public health, displaced persons, and economics sections. The Operations Section was organized into a plans branch and six country sections – similar to the erstwhile country houses – for the liberated countries and Germany. These country houses, according to Grasett, “would ultimately become the civil affairs sections of SHAEF missions sent to those (liberated) countries, and the German section would provide the nucleus of military government in enemy territory.”

The structure of G-5 SHAEF emphasized the principle that “civil affairs and military government were to be a direct responsibility of the military commanders.”

Responsibility for civil administration compounded the complexity of combat for military commanders. Units that were tasked to find, close with, and destroy the enemy were now also required to address the post-combat situation in their area. The principle that a commander was responsible for everything that occurred in his area of operations was a natural situation for the military commander, but the inclusion of a civil administration role increased the duration and scope of his responsibility. The civil affairs sections on the general staffs simplified planning by dedicating staff officers to address post combat operations. However, the nature of civil affairs and military government operations mandated the use of troops with unique skills and training.

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206 Memorandum, General Smith to Lumley and Holmes, 14 March 1944, as printed in Coles and Weinberg, 677.
207 Pogue, 82-83.
208 Ziemke, 51.
that the normal administrative channels were ill equipped to manage. The Civil Affairs
Detachments assigned to tactical commands ostensibly addressed the capability of tactical units
to conduct civil administration missions, but AMGOT in Sicily and Italy proved that the higher
priority given to combat operations by tactical commanders, limited the resources and
effectiveness of civil affairs elements.209

This is not to say that commanders neglected their civil affairs responsibilities out of
disdain. Instead, in combat, with limited resources, the highest priority necessarily went to
elements that met the immediate need for victory. Military government units, since they
generally operated in ‘rear areas’, lacked the relative priority. Civil affairs planners recognized
that military government operations needed a separate support channel if they were going to be
integrated into combat units. In the fall of 1943 ETOUSA planners proposed to the Civil Affairs
Division of the War Department that civil affairs personnel be incorporated into seven Military
Police battalions. This would relieve tactical commanders of the responsibility of administration
and provisioning of their attached civil affairs and military government elements. By December,
General Hilldring rejected this proposal and recommended the creation of an administrative
division to support all civil affairs personnel assigned to ETOUSA, apart from those assigned
directly to SHAEF. On 7 February 1944, ETOUSA formed the European Civil Affairs Division
(ECAD) with a total strength of 8,263 personnel. ECAD’s specified mission was “to perform the
administrative and operational functions for all CA personnel (operational) in the ETO, US
Army, but exclusive of CA personnel assigned to Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, and

209 Military Government was such a low command priority that many civil affairs officers were not
included on invasion manifests for Sicily. Typically, AMGOT officers were provisioned only with what they
initially could carry and later with what they could acquire outside of standard military channels. For more
information refer to chapter III and see Charles Reginald Schiller Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy,
First Army Group.”  This mission was soon amplified by including the directive “to receive, assign, train, equip and move to tactical units those officers who are to administer civilian affairs in European territories occupied by Allied authorities.”

Headquarters, ECAD was one of the first of what is now termed an administrative, or reporting, headquarters. The division headquarters maintained civil affairs personnel records, managed their pay and promotions, disciplined them, trained them and equipped them. The division exercised no tactical command functions. As the division was conceptually organized in December 1943 and January 1944, while RANKIN operations were still a real possibility, ECAD was given an A2 priority and equipped based on the table of equipment for seven military police battalions. In light of lessons learned from AMGOT about lack of organic transportation, these initial numbers were increased to include nearly two thousand vehicles.

Over the first five months of 1944, ECAD organization changed and adapted to various events and plans. On 6 June 1944, the division was organized into its combat configuration (Chart 1): the 1st, 2nd and 3rd European Civil Affairs Regiments (ECAR) and the 6th Civil Affairs Unit. Each ECAR was composed of a headquarters detachment, a medical detachment and eight to ten lettered companies. Each company had an administrative headquarters section and 80 civil affairs officers and 110 to 120 civil affairs enlisted men organized into detachments. A letter indicating the intended level of government they were targeted to support categorized the detachments and they were manned accordingly. Regional capitals received “A” detachments staffed with 16 officers, 3 warrant officers and 20 enlisted men. Departmental capitals had “B”

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210 The General Board United States Forces European Theater, “Study 32: Civil Affairs and Military Government Organization and Operations,” Undated, (hereafter referred to as “General Board Study 32”), 24, Records of Interservice Agencies, National War College, RG 334, Box 1117, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
211 Ibid., 25.
212 Ziemke, 71.
detachments assigned with 9 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 14 enlisted men. “C” detachments were composed of 6 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 7 enlisted men, and supported the equivalent of a French arrondissement. City levels were supported by “D” detachments of 4 officers and 5 enlisted men. Generally, each company held one “A” and one “B”, two “C”, and eight “D” detachments. Each detachment was designated by type, company, and regiment, thus the third “D” detachment of F Company, 2nd ECAR would be designated D3F2. Companies, in combat, maneuvered with the commands to which their detachments were attached. Likewise, the regimental headquarters moved in proximity to their companies. The vagaries of combat and the variances of geography necessarily meant that after the invasion, most detachments had unpredictable support from their regimental and division headquarters.  

213 General Board Study 32, 29.  
214 Ziemke, 70.
Chart 1 - U.S. Military Government Organization (September 1944 to July 1945)\textsuperscript{215}

Military government formations were fundamentally reorganized multiple times over the course of World War II, leading to confusion at all levels – from strategic planners at SHAEF G-5 to military government soldiers in the “D” detachments of third ECAR. Many civil affairs soldiers later reported that their morale was negatively impacted by the “confusion caused by complex command and administrative channels.”\textsuperscript{216} However, this complaint is superficial. The underlying problem, and greatest “weakness,” of military government operations was “confusion as to (its) objectives,” which ultimately drove the organization of tactical units and their command relationships.\textsuperscript{217} Civil affairs and military government officers were trained thoroughly on the combat aspects of military government, and understood their roles well. However, many military government soldiers lacked clear understanding of their larger objectives, to the extent that many “considered their work completed within a few weeks or at least a few months” of arrival in their operational area.\textsuperscript{218} This degree of lack of understanding is the ultimate result of an incoherent or non-existent national policy.

The tactical and operational combat plans for the invasion of Europe were based on strategic guidance given by higher headquarters to long established tactical formations, founded on principles of combat, such as security or mass, that were developed over generations of combat experience. Knowledge of the higher commander’s objectives, desired end state, and overall guidance allowed subordinate commanders to coordinate planning efforts efficiently, and react quickly and correctly to events that disrupted execution of the initial plan. Military government and civil affairs plans are likewise based on a combination of operational guidance

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} General Board Study 32, 124.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Harold Zink, \textit{American Military Government in Germany} (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), 21.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Zink, 21.
\end{itemize}
given by tactical commanders and on the political directives – policies – of national political leaders. Policy determines military government objectives and shapes civil affairs missions toward the desired end state. Properly formulated and clearly expressed policy allows officers to act efficiently in the absence of express directives. As Earl Ziemke phrased it, “what strategy is to military operations, policy is to civil affairs and military government.” One of the major problems with United States planning for military government in the Second World War was the late development of a single, coherent national policy objective for Germany.

In the Second World War, the Army conceived of military government operations in two phases: the combat phase, and the post-hostilities phase. The combat phase was literally during combat, when military government soldiers gained control over civilians in the immediate combat zone in order to prevent their hindering military operations and try to gain as much aid – logistical, provisional, or otherwise – from them as possible. The post-hostilities phase lasted from the point immediately after the end of locally immediate combat operations until the transfer of government powers over to a duly appointed civil authority. This phase was the largely composed of rehabilitation, relief, and rebuilding efforts. The indefinite length of this phase was referred to as “a period of military necessity” by Field Manual 27-5.

For the liberated nations, the post-hostilities phase of military government operations involved the transfer of civil authority to the rightful native government. The doctrinal underpinning for planning civil affairs and military government operations in these countries was therefore embodied in two documents, Army Field Manual 27-5, and an agreement with the legitimate government of whichever country was the subject of the operation.

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219 Ziemke, 35.
The 22 December 1943 revision of *FM 27-5* demonstrates the evolution of practical thought on civil affairs and military government operations in light of lessons learned in Sicily and Italy, tempered with American military attitudes toward Germany. Some authors have criticized the 1943 manual for its lack of detail or attention to post-combat military government operations, but it must be emphasized that this was the first manual that addressed the conduct of military government operations as primarily concurrent with ongoing hostilities.\(^{221}\)

The 1940 edition of *FM 27-5* was established on observations from the First World War and the Hunt Report, and is less a guide for military operations than a collection of aphorisms.\(^{222}\) The 1940 edition was clearly written with the expectation that the war would be fought to a conclusion or at least an armistice before military government operations truly began, as was the case in World War I:

> The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the war to a successful termination. So long as hostilities continue, the question must be asked, with reference to every intended act of the military government, whether it will forward that object or hinder its accomplishment. If hostilities are suspended by an armistice or otherwise, all plans and dispositions must be made so that the troops may resume hostilities with the least inconvenience to themselves and to the operations of the military government, and, above all, under conditions most conducive to a successful termination of the war.\(^{223}\)

The early edition’s outline of the phases of military government explicitly stated that, “while fighting is going on in the district… little can be done to set up military government,” and while combat units had to “deal with (civilians they encountered),” they “should do so as little as possible.”\(^{224}\) The 1943 revision was much more focused on the military phase of military government operations, but maintained the focus on the preeminence of combat operations.


\(^{222}\) See chapter 3, page 64.

\(^{223}\) United States Army, *Field Manual 27-5* (1940), 3. (emphasis added)

\(^{224}\) *FM 27-5* (1940), 19.
The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. So long as the operation continues, it is the duty of the commanding officer to exercise such control and to take such steps in relation to the civil population as will attain the paramount objective.225

Clearly the change in wording represented the codification of the anticipated role of military government during combat.

Another notable change in the 1943 edition lies in its tone. The 1940 edition spoke in terms of friendship, mild treatment, and “the welfare of the people governed” as the “aim of every person engaged therein.”226 The updated manual eliminated this sentiment entirely and adopted a harder tone. It declared, “while the welfare of the inhabitants should be considered also for humane reasons and should be safeguarded as far as military requirements permit, the primary purposes of just treatment are to facilitate the military operations and to meet obligations imposed by law.” The section included a brief listing of the benefits of humane treatment – preventing chaos, promoting order, facilitating the procurement of resources – before it concluded with an injunction that was clearly composed with Germany in mind, “Such a (humane) policy, however, should not affect the imposition of such restrictive or punitive measures as may be necessary to accomplish the objectives of military government in any area, but especially in one in which the population is aggressively hostile and engages in active and passive sabotage.”227

It is important to note the inclusion of an anti-fraternization policy in the update of FM 27-5. The 1940 manual made no mention of fraternization and arguably encouraged it through its discussion of “considerate treatment” and “making friends.” The 1943 edition, however, explicitly forbade fraternization, “Civil affairs officers and personnel, as representatives of the

225 FM 27-5 (1943), 5. (emphasis added)
226 FM 27-5 (1940), 4.
United States government, should keep their relations with local officials and inhabitants on a strictly official basis, avoiding unofficial social relationships.”

Likewise important was the establishment of a nascent denazification policy. In the interest of avoiding “additional burdens (on) the military government,” the first version of *FM 27-5*, advised against removal of native government. By 1943, the *FM* was updated to address the increasing reality of the impending invasion of Germany and the problem of confronting Nazism. “Usually it will be necessary to remove high ranking political officials from office,” but, “to avoid confusion and to promote simplicity of administration, it is advisable that local laws, customs, and institutions of government be retained, except where they conflict with the aims of military government or are inimical to its best interests.” Some scholars have noted the general, even vague, nature of these terms led to widely varied interpretations of their intent. This is precisely the purpose of military manuals. Field manuals are intended to give commanders enough general information to plan and conduct operations, but leave them flexibility to respond to varying situations. The manuals are never intended to be the sole source of information for operations – they are intended for use in conjunction with guidance from higher command, which is formulated based on national policy that is supposed to provide a framework in which to apply the maxims of the FMs. Admittedly, *FM 27-5* was inordinately important to planning at Army Group level and below in 1943 and 1944, since guiding policies from SHAEF were typically delivered late into the planning cycle – often after operations had commenced. Thus contributing directly to military government soldiers’ “confusion” about military government’s “objectives.”

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228 *FM 27-5* (1943), 10.
229 *FM 27-5* (1940), 5-6.
230 *FM 27-5* (1943), 8-9. (emphasis added)
SHAEF guidance for the liberated nations was eventually embodied in both the civil affairs agreements with Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, and France, and their respective Civil Affairs Handbooks. In February 1944, General Eisenhower sought specific guidance from the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department on policy concerning the liberated nations. Discussions had been ongoing throughout 1943, but no formal agreements had been reached that could form the foundation for SHAEF policy. By 1944, the urgency for agreements was growing as D-Day rapidly approached. The convoluted procedure of drafting and approving agreements acceptable to the Allied militaries had been established by February. Agreements were drafted by the Civil Affairs Department of the War Department and sent to CCAC (L) for approval. The drafts were then forwarded to CCAC in Washington for concurrence and then forwarded to the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval. By this process the Allied military approved civil affairs agreements with Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg by June 1944. Negotiated solely by the military, none of the agreements would be binding on the governments concerned since that required State Department involvement. In order to meet this requirement, the United States High Command contacted the Secretary of State and requested that the agreements be consummated by the State Department. Secretary of State Hull responded that since the agreements were of a temporary, military nature, he preferred that they be finalized by SCAEF. Thus, by June, General Eisenhower had consummated agreements with Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.232

Throughout the period of civil affairs negotiations with the various governments in exile, the United States did not recognize a duly constituted government of France. Thus the largest of the occupied European nations, during planning for a massive period of combat on its lands, did

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not have a body to represent the interests of its people. The fundamental problem was that President Roosevelt and members of his cabinet did not trust that General Charles de Gaulle and the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) truly represented the French people.\textsuperscript{233} Initial planning for civil affairs was based on an arrangement made at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943 called the Dunn–Wright agreement. This agreement stated that the purpose of the Allied landings in France was primarily to defeat Germany. Subject to that purpose it was agreed that the Allies would “create conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority might be able to assume responsibility for civil administration.”\textsuperscript{234}

By 19 January 1944, civil affairs planning for France had progressed to the point that General Eisenhower asked for permission to coordinate with the FCNL.\textsuperscript{235} The ambiguous response from CCAC on 25 January was that SCAEF could consult with whatever “suitable representatives” of whichever resistance groups he saw fit to deal with in the matter – a far cry from recognition of the FCNL, but enough to enter into consultations that would eventually generate a functional civil affairs policy for France.\textsuperscript{236} The policies generated from these ‘informal’ discussions with the FCNL remained in force until 6 July, when General de Gaulle made his official visit to Washington. After the visit, members of Roosevelt’s cabinet suggested a “fresh approach to the French situation,” which entailed negotiating civil affairs agreements similar to those constructed for the other liberated nations. The result was a series of five memoranda that were eventually

\textsuperscript{233} Coles and Weinberg, 655.
\textsuperscript{234} Coles, "Civil Affairs Agreements for Liberated Territories," 136.
\textsuperscript{235} Message from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and CCAC, 19 January 1944, as printed in Coles and Weinberg, \textit{Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors}, 665.
\textsuperscript{236} Message from Dr. McCloy of CCAC to Eisenhower, 25 January 1944, as printed in Coles and Weinberg, \textit{Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors}, 666. Based on this guidance to Eisenhower 21\textsuperscript{st} Army Group under Montgomery began planning on 15 March under the assumption that the FCNL would be the recognized National Authority for France, see Neptune 21 AGp CA Plan, 15 March 1944, as printed in Coles and Weinberg, 666.
consummated by General Eisenhower and General Marie Koenig, Chief of the French Military Mission on 25 August 1944, the day that Paris was liberated.\footnote{Coles, "Civil Affairs Agreements for Liberated Territories," 138-139.}

Civil affairs operations were divided into two phases under the finalized agreements with liberated nations. Under the initial, military, phase the Supreme Commander was granted absolute authority over civil administration in order to allow unhindered prosecution of the war and “the speedy expulsion of the Germans” from occupied lands. During the first phase, SHAEF was expected to “make fullest possible use of the advice and assistance” of Civil Affairs Officers native to the liberated country and any existing, loyal, local authorities. It was agreed that this military phase was to be “as short as possible” but that the duration would be determined by SHAEF. In the second phase, the native governments would assume full civil administration responsibility “as soon as practicable” over non-vital areas in order to relieve the Allied commanders of civil affairs responsibilities.\footnote{Vital areas included ports, railways, lines of communications, and airfields for example.} The agreements also outlined the legal framework for Allied troops and the types and amounts of aid exchanged between the Allies and the liberated nation. Thus constituted, the agreements allowed for maximum freedom for Allied commanders in fighting the war, and formed the framework for planning clear policies and a defined objective for civil affairs operations.\footnote{Combined Chiefs of Staff / Joint Chiefs of Staff Study 710, “Administration of Civil Affairs in the Netherlands,” Undated, 3-5, Records of Interservice Agencies, National War College, Box 318, RG 334, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.}

On 22 February 1944, the Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF ordered the various country units to begin production of individual \textit{Civil Affairs Handbooks} for each country. These handbooks were intended to serve as a single volume guide to military government officers in the field. The books linked the general procedures outlined in \textit{Field Manual 27-5} to the Allied
policies borne out of the civil affairs agreements for the liberated nations. The result was a pragmatic synthesis of policy custom tailored to national culture.240

Coordination with the governments-in-exile simplified the planning process and yielded clear policy that simplified operations. In spite of the careful planning, there was significant unrest in Belgium immediately after liberation. Friction in the newly returned, but somewhat unpopular, Belgian government threatened to collapse the government as the resistance refused to turn in their weapons to the Belgian authorities. Eisenhower intervened and had the Allied army accept the weapons instead, averting a potential disaster.241

The initial SHAEF guidance for the occupation of Germany was similarly based on the fundamental principles established in FM 27-5 and the Handbook for Military Government for Germany. Overall policy for Germany, analogous to the civil affairs agreements with the liberated countries, was supposed to distill from the various tripartite conferences. However, the Roosevelt administration was incapable of formulating practical policies based on the general agreements these conferences produced.242 The international agreements were hampered by friction among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin over the final disposition of Germany, preventing the conferences from generating the kind of specific policy that was required to plan operations. From late in 1943 and into 1945, much of the problem with policy generation within the administration resulted from a long term, serious disagreement between Secretary of the

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240 Belgium and Luxembourg Country Unit, Semi-monthly Historical Report, 15 May – 1 June 1944, as printed in Coles and Weinberg, 798.
241 For more information on SHAEF reactions to the Belgian crisis see Coles and Weinberg, 797-820, and Coles, "Civil Affairs Agreements for Liberated Territories," 138-139.
242 Zink, 4.
Treasury Henry Morgenthau and the Secretaries of War (Henry Stimson) and State (Cordell Hull) over the treatment of occupied Germany.\textsuperscript{243}

The Morgenthau Plan called for the dismantling the industrial areas of the Ruhr and Saar and the total pastoralization of Germany, which was at odds with the pragmatic approach of Hull and Stimson, who feared, justifiably, that such a plan would further stiffen German resolve and complicate the post-war political landscape of Europe.\textsuperscript{244} The debate was brought to the forefront when Morgenthau was given an early draft of the \textit{Handbook for Military Government of Germany} on 7 August 1944. The draft echoed the guidance in \textit{FM 27-5} in calling for the retention of some native administrators and such laws as were not “inimical” to the best interests of military government operations. The \textit{Handbook} stated that while Nazism should be banished, normalcy should return “as soon as possible, insofar as conditions will not interfere with military operations.” Morgenthau called the guidance outlined in the \textit{Handbook} “a nice WPA job.”\textsuperscript{245}

Until August 1944, the War Department’s thinking on occupation had been “on making the Army an instrument of enlightened administration when it occupied enemy territory.” The cabinet debates between Secretaries Stimson and Morgenthau over that summer resulted in a general hardening of public opinion, favoring a punitive occupation. Stimson ultimately acted so that the “enlightenment in the Army’s thinking gave way to justice,” not the Carthaginian peace of Morgenthau, but a politically pragmatic “hard and cold” justice.\textsuperscript{246}

In late September 1944, Stimson directed the production of a document entitled “Directive to SCAEF Regarding Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately

\textsuperscript{243} For a current discussion of the troubles the Roosevelt administration had formulating an occupation policy, see Michael R. Beschloss, \textit{The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).
\textsuperscript{244} Ziemke notes that the Morgenthau plan and Roosevelt’s demand for unconditional surrender were featured prominently in German propaganda throughout 1944, \textit{The Occupation of Germany}, 107.
\textsuperscript{245} WPA = Works Progress Administration – a 1935 American domestic program designed to put the unemployed to work on Federal projects. As cited in Beschloss, \textit{The Conquerors}, 71.
\textsuperscript{246} Ziemke, 103.
Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance,” a document that ultimately became JCS 1067. The document was transmitted to Eisenhower immediately in order to facilitate planning, but it could not be implemented as SHAEF policy until the CCS approved it in April 1945, after troops were already in Germany. In spite of its late approval, JCS 1067 was a clear directive to SHAEF that gave “workable instructions on which to base detailed planning,” after months of unclear policy regarding the occupation of Germany.247

JCS 1067 outlined four basic objectives for the occupation. The first was to teach “the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy,” and that “the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.” The second contained a specific injunction against fraternization, Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just but firm and aloof. You will strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population.

The third established denazification as a policy: “The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.” The means to accomplish this objective were “the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms,” the arrest of war criminals, disarmament and demilitarization, and “the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.” The final objective was enforcement of reparations and restitution, “to provide relief for the benefit of countries devastated by Nazi aggression,” and to facilitate the repatriation of displaced persons.248

247 Ibid., 104. The name JCS 1067 stands for Joint Chiefs of Staff study 1067.
The most ruthless aspects of the initial drafts of JCS 1067 involved the plan for reparations through the dismantling of German industry and slave labor. General Lucius Clay, General Eisenhower’s deputy and future Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation, argued in early 1945 that these aspects of the plan were unrealistic since “the progress of the war in Germany has accomplished, at least on the surface, very much more destruction than most people at home realize.” He instead advocated a program of controlled redevelopment of German industry, which he argued was critical for the long-term welfare of both Germany and Europe in general. JCS 1067 was revised several times over the months prior to the implementation of the agreements made at the Potsdam Conference, and most of those revisions involved softening the economically punitive aspects of occupation policy.

While a pragmatic policy for the occupation of Germany was long in development and underwent dramatic changes, the general concept for the country’s partitioning into three zones was established early at the Quadrant Conference in August 1943. By November of that year, Roosevelt had sketched out his vision of the geographic division of Germany in pencil on a National Geographic map (Map 1). This sketch represented his desire to break Germany into Eastern, Northwestern, and Southwestern zones, and was translated into a proposal to the European Advisory Commission in January 1944 (Map 2). The American proposal was not well received by the Soviets on the EAC, who complained that “the United States was awfully grabby for a country whose only troops on the European continent were now stalled in Italy.” The British proposed a trisection of Germany into a northeastern Soviet zone, a southwestern

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250 Ziemke, 116.
American zone, and a northwestern British zone (Map 3). Under the plan, Berlin was to be a jointly occupied city under the direction of an Allied Control Council.252

Map 1 Roosevelt’s sketch of his concept for the partition of Germany on a National Geographic map.253

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252 Matloff, 339. Additionally, Michael Beschloss claims that recently revealed, but un-cited, Soviet archival documents describe a Soviet proposal that would “have had the Soviet zone extend no farther west than the Elbe River,” but after the British proposal proved to be more generous, this proposal never saw the light of day. Beschloss, The Conquerors, 31-32 (see note 3).

253 Ziemke, 116.
Map 2 The American proposal to the EAC for German partition, January 1944.\textsuperscript{254}

\textsuperscript{254} Ziemke, 121.
Map 3 The British and Soviet proposal to the EAC for German partition, January 1944.\footnote{Ziemke, 120.}
President Roosevelt firmly resisted the British proposal for the American zone. He did not trust de Gaulle and did not want to become involved in “reconstituting France,” which he viewed as a “British Baby.” Roosevelt wanted the northwestern zone because of the ports at Hamburg and Bremen and because of its distance from post-war “trouble spots.” The military liked the British proposal because it meshed well with the tactical situation. As the British and Americans entered Germany, with the Americans on the right, the Allies would simply occupy the majority of their zones as a matter of natural progression, with little reorganization required. Under Roosevelt’s favored plan, the Allied armies would be required to reposition across each others’ lines immediately after the cessation of hostilities.\textsuperscript{256} This deficiency was brought to the President multiple times by the Joint Chiefs, the Combined Chiefs and General Marshall, to no avail. The President remained intransigent until 16 September 1944 at the Octagon conference where, for unexplained reasons, he suddenly changed his mind and accepted the southwestern zone for America.\textsuperscript{257} With Roosevelt’s opposition gone, the plan for the partition was completed; giving SHAEF planners the final piece of information they required to finalize operational plans for military government - the location of the zones.

All the bricks used to build the plans for the occupation were in place by the autumn of 1944. \textit{Field Manual} 27-5 and JCS 1067 together provided clear direction to SHAEF G-5 on the intended tone and tenor of military government operation. The partition agreement dictated where those operations would take place. The plan for the occupation promulgated by SHAEF

\textsuperscript{256} Matloff, 341-342.
\textsuperscript{257} Matloff argues that in light of the repeated failed attempts to explain the various tactical expediencies to the President; it was the acceptance of the Morgenthau plan at Octagon the convinced Roosevelt to reverse his position; Matloff, \textit{Strategic Planning}, 511n. More compelling is Ziemke’s assertion that, by September 1944, the specter of a perpetual commitment to French stability had evaporated as the FCNL and de Gaulle had efficiently seized control; Ziemke, 125.
was codenamed ECLIPSE. This was the final evolution of the RANKIN plan and incorporated all the guidance given to SHAEF by November 1944. ECLIPSE addressed five objectives for the occupation of Germany: first, the initial disarmament and control of German tactical forces; second, enforcement of the terms of surrender or terms imposed by SHAEF if there was no surrender; third, establishment of law and order; fourth, beginning of complete disarmament; and fifth, the redeployment of Allied occupation armies into their partitioned zones.²⁵⁸

Among many ideas, military government in occupied Germany differed from that in the liberated countries in the key concept that it was unilaterally imposed by the Allies on the Germans. In the liberated countries, military government units were deployed where and as they were needed to help minimize chaos, remedy crises, and facilitate combat operations. SHAEF realized early that Germany would undergo complete occupation and comprehensive dismantling of its government. The plan to deploy military government units in Germany was initially a straightforward movement of units to their predetermined – or “pinpointed” – assignments. Under ECLIPSE guidance, ECAD developed what became known as “the carpet plan.” As the Army approached the German border, ECAD (and many other Allied planners) felt confident that the military would simply sweep across Germany. Thus military government units were sent forward to the combat units that would seize the terrain planned for military government operations. The military government detachments would deploy to their pinpoint assignments as those locations were uncovered by the rapid eastward drive across the battlefield; like the effect of unrolling a carpet.²⁵⁹

The carpet plan was one of many military government concepts that changed once the reality of the occupation impacted operations. Combat operations slowed once the Allies entered

²⁵⁸ Ziemke, 163.
²⁵⁹ General Board Study 32, 110 - 112.
the Rhineland. Army boundaries changed due to the vagaries of combat, which in turn created a bureaucratic and logistical morass as the various military governments were detached from one Army and reassigned to another to ensure they arrived at their assigned location. These difficulties and the realization that United States forces would seize more territory than they would ultimately occupy prompted ECAD to create the “static plan” which reassigned and relocated military government units into the United States zone of occupation at the end of major combat. The static and carpet plans demonstrate the truth in Helmuth von Moltke’s maxim that even occupation plans do not survive contact with the enemy.

Indeed, a common theme in the execution of military government plans is that they did not survive American contact with the Germans. The most notable example is JCS 1067’s strict prohibition against fraternization. Plans and guidance directed SHAEF “to strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and German officials and the population,” without providing details on what such discouragement would actually entail. The guidance was driven by punitive political thinking along the lines of Morgenthau’s that American troops were there to punish not befriend the German people. A ban on fraternization was a clear and indisputable concept, until United States troops came in contact with Germans and realized that, far from the dehumanized enemy portrayed in war propaganda, the Germans were culturally similar and attractive. The first and most notable contacts came in mid-September 1944 as VII Corps soldiers wrestled their way through the German West Wall near the town of Aachen. American photographers snapped pictures showing Germans welcoming not-unfriendly American soldiers.

260 General Board Study 32, 113 - 114. Study 32 noted “these attachments and releases … involved First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies in 12th Army Group area and Seventh US Army in 6th Army Group area.” In several instances under the carpet plan, detachments were released from one command and attached to another, and then reversed back to the original command as the situation developed. Also, military government personnel waiting for their pinpoint assignment to be available were often placed on temporary duty wherever they were waiting, often occupying critical positions that then underwent serious disruption whenever the soldier was transferred to the intended assignment.

261 Combined Chiefs of Staff study 551, as quoted in Ziemke, 97.
When the pictures ran in American newspapers, the popular outcry caused leaders to attempt to clamp down harder on soldiers by strengthening the ban. However these efforts did little to stop friendly interactions. The only truly enforceable action was censorship, which Eisenhower employed by banning publication of pictures and stories depicting “American troops fraternizing with German population.”\textsuperscript{262} In fact, by August 1945, General Clay rescinded much of the ban on fraternization as “unenforceable,” since “the only fraternization that really interests the soldiers is going with the pretty German girl.”\textsuperscript{263}

Likewise, Allied efforts at denazification demonstrated the disconnect between the ideals of American political and popular intent, and the pragmatism of military expedient. As Harold Zink, a member of the German Country Unit from 1943 to 1946, explains, “the typical American military government detachment during the weeks immediately following the combat period found itself preoccupied with tangible problems, such as repairing water mains, starting street cars running… and finding sufficient food to maintain the ration system.” As such, “denazification, education, welfare… democratization and so forth seemed less pressing and more complex and hence they were left in abeyance to a considerable extent.”\textsuperscript{264} When denazification was implemented in the early stages of the occupation, it frequently had unsatisfactory results as soldiers elevated competent administrators and functionaries, only later to have them proven to be committed Nazis. Similarly, many accounts relate the removal of competent German authorities for superficial membership in the Nazi party that had been required to retain their jobs.\textsuperscript{265} Clearly, the military faced nearly irreconcilable tasks of removing

\textsuperscript{262} Memorandum from Eisenhower to Bradley, 17 September 1944, SHAEF Headquarters, RG 331, Box 113, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
\textsuperscript{263} Clay, \textit{The Papers of Lucius D. Clay}, 42.
\textsuperscript{264} Zink, 104
\textsuperscript{265} First hand accounts of the problems incurred in attempting to enforce denazification policies are common, a comprehensive discussion can be found in Zink, 130-146.
pervasive undesirable elements of the existing regime while reestablishing basic services and rebuilding infrastructure, an undertaking that was typically aided by competent administrators, most of whom were Nazis.

Perhaps the most significant deviation from planned operations came from displaced persons (DPs). DPs were men and women who had been transplanted from their home countries to serve as slave labor or shock troops for the German military machine. The total number of DPs in the aftermath of World War II, much like the number of casualties, may never be known. However, the escalating scope of the problem for military government is seen in a few comparative numbers. In January 1945, SHAEF held twenty-nine DPs (Poles); by 31 March the armies held 145,000 in camps and had transported 45,000 to the liberated countries. In April the repatriation rate was 35,000 per week; by May the weekly rate jumped to 200,000. SHAEF planners had anticipated that DPs working on German farms would remain in place, where food and shelter was readily available. This estimate proved wrong as DPs working in nearly every sector simply began making their way home, eventually clogging roads and becoming the charges of the first American units they contacted. G-5 SHAEF estimated on V-E day that there were 5.2 million DPs in Allied controlled areas, all of which were fed, sheltered, cared for, and ultimately repatriated by Allied forces.

The common thread linking the flaws in plans for displaced persons, denazification, fraternization, and even the carpet plan is that they were all based on guidance and policy that was formulated in the emotion of combat. Military government operations are the most enduring of military operations, and indeed, the United States continues to maintain military bases in

266 Sources vary, but the number most commonly cited is eight million.
267 Ziemke, 200.
268 Ibid., 284.
269 Ibid.
Germany to this day. The doctrine governing post-war occupation was generally established in the interwar era, and codified with the publication of *Field Manual 27-5* in 1940. However, doctrine is not policy. Staff officers require policy to guide their application of doctrine to achieve the end state desired by the commander. In the case of military government, the end state may be generations removed from the initial policy. In order to be rehabilitative and enduring, such policies, ideally, should not be established in the emotion of the moment. Unfortunately, “without a policy to guide its operations any military government organization will either flounder about… or it will be more or less paralyzed,” without the “stimuli necessary for movement.”

Arguments between Washington and London over preeminence in policy making for post-war Europe, Roosevelt’s indecision over treatment of Germany, and his hesitation to enter into potential commitments to France, delayed organizational and policy decisions that hindered planning and wasted effort. This is understandable given the unprecedented scope of destruction in the Second World War. Eventually, as wartime emotions cooled, Allied leaders developed policies that established a rehabilitative occupation that resulted in a period of European peace that has been uninterrupted since 1945. In the final analysis, the Allied armies’ imposition of their political will on Germany can be seen as the ultimate expression of Clausewitz’s maxim that ‘war is politics by other means’. In many ways, occupation is ‘war by other means’.

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270 Zink, 197.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

In February 2011, H-Diplo, the Diplomatic and International History Discussion Network, hosted a roundtable discussion of William I. Hitchcock’s 2009 book *The Bitter Road to Freedom: The Human Cost of Allied Victory in World War II Europe.*271 The author attempts to dispel, in overwrought tones, what he terms the “heroic register” of the traditional narrative’s depiction of United States efforts to liberate Europe from Nazi Germany, and asks why “the grim realities of liberation… have gone missing from the historical record of World War II.” Hitchcock seeks to offer “an alternative way of looking at… the indeterminate nature of liberation… and the heavy toll that liberation and its aftermath took upon the liberated peoples themselves.”272 Through an extensive series of vignettes, he provides a grim recitation of the toll in human lives that resulted directly from Allied combat operations, and indirectly from neglect. *The Bitter Road to Freedom* serves as a reminder that counting the cost of modern war is far more complex than a mere tally of dead and wounded soldiers. Overall, the roundtable’s generally positive review of the book is well deserved. Most of the criticisms focus on the omission or undue prominence given to various aspects of the subject, and a few of the participants question Hitchcock’s treatment of the liberation as somehow demeaning the greater overall purpose of the combat operations in the war, but most applaud his restoration of the human aspect to the liberation period.

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272 Hitchcock, 367-368.
However, there is a serious omission from both Hitchcock’s book and the roundtable discussion: recognition that liberation and occupation, far from being separate events following the ‘conclusion’ of the war, were an integral part of combat operations that extended past German surrender – an unprecedented feature of World War II. Doctrine, policy, and even combat operations and planning were focused not only on defeat of the Wehrmacht and her erstwhile allies, but also on the civil administration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of impacted areas in the combat and post-combat periods. While Hitchcock protests that the current historical narrative fails to adequately acknowledge the post-combat suffering during liberation, he, in a sort of cognitive dissonance, ignores the fact that military government operations extended well past the conclusion of hostilities, and did so by design.

May 8, 1945 may mark Victory in Europe, but it did not mark the end of military operations. Indeed, the current historical narrative’s disassociation of occupation / liberation from combat operations similarly fails to recognize that the simultaneity of civil affairs and combat in World War II was a watershed event in military history. The World Wars marked the transition of civil affairs and military government from a reluctantly endured, post-conflict chore, to fully integrated, multi-echelon component of modern combat operations, termed ‘phase four operations’ by current doctrine.

Many senior leaders in World War II similarly failed to recognize that the continuity of military operations extended past large-scale combat. Much of the suffering and pain Hitchcock and other scholars attribute to dithering on the part of Allied leaders is attributable to the failure of those leaders to recognize that in the scope of modern war, civil affairs and military government (CAMG) were integral to combat operations.273 Their failure was not a case of

273 Hitchcock directly accuses Roosevelt, Churchill and military planners of “dither(ing)” in the relief efforts, resulting in starvation; the Bitter Road to Freedom, 110. Likewise, Michael Beschloss repeatedly criticizes
indecision, but rather one of priorities: win the war first, then rebuild the country. Few realized that the two were fundamentally intertwined. This dissociation is evident as late as the winter of 1943 when President Roosevelt, after he had committed the full resources of the United States to the war, said America “should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence.”

Ironically, it was tactical military units that first reacted to the comprehensive, integrated nature of combat and post-combat civil affairs operations. In the First World War, CAMG took place only after combat was complete and the enemy defeated. In WWII Europe this was not an option, both as the destructive power of modern war was not contained at static ‘front lines’ and because the Germans removed millions of civilians hundreds of miles from their homes either in eradication pogroms or as slave labor. These German efforts created a situation where, as Allied armies advanced, they encountered millions of displaced persons (DPs). This problem increased as the war progressed. As the victors liberated and occupied more territory, they freed an ever-increasing number. As more native lands were liberated, larger numbers of DPs attempted to traverse the combat zone to return home, clogging lines of communications and interfering with Allied operations. By necessity, the Army had to embrace its role in CAMG, if only to prevent DPs from hampering combat operations. As combat ended, in order to maintain security, the military had to continue to care for DPs until they were relieved by civilian agencies.

CAMG organizational and operational doctrines were not established in advance of military operations, but during combat planning and operations in World War II. This created a situation where CAMG doctrine and policy were not uniform across the theater, and officials had to modify them ‘on the fly’ as civil affairs and military government operations were ongoing.

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The essential task of CAMG was clear quite early on: interact with local population in such a way that the native peoples are not a concern for the military commander. In the absence of strategic guidance, these operations did not at first have an overall, unified Allied purpose on which they were focused. Leaders failed to understand that the principles of war – OBJECTIVE and UNITY OF COMMAND in particular – applied to CAMG just as any other military operation. Senior Allied leaders failed to overcome the differences in their political objectives for Europe and publish a coherent unified policy to govern CAMG operations. Instead, they chose to address the immediate tactical need, and leave the long-term strategic policy objectives to some unnamed allied commission. The result was confusion, wasted time, and ultimately, civilian misery. But does misery signify the failure of Allied military government operations? Clearly not, since human misery and war are necessarily companions. In reality, military government operations in World War II reduced the impact of combat operations on the civilian populace.

Military government operations after World War II demonstrate the maturation of the United States in its acceptance of a role as a world power. Hitherto, American politicians, and American society in general did not tolerate well the open ended military commitments involved in CAMG rebuilding efforts. After World War I occupation duty caught Americans, their politicians, and their army by surprise. While they recognized it as important, politicians failed to realize the potential salutary effects of occupation and rehabilitation. Instead they used the occupation to hold hostage areas of the Rhineland to compel German fulfillment of treaty obligations. By 1947 the attitude had completely changed, as evidenced in that year’s update to Field Manual 27-5. In 1943, the manual had tolerated military government operations only “as long as military operations continue,” or “until it achieves the ends of national policy toward
which the operations are directed.” 275 By 1947, one of the primary missions of military government was defined as “to further national policies,” with the clarification that this was its “primary mission after combat is over.” 276 The 1947 edition also demonstrated the official acceptance of the indeterminate length of commitment by stating, “the period of time during which CAMG control is maintained will vary, depending on the following: (1) continuance of military operations, and (2) the use of the area as a base for future operations.... and policy regarding the future status of the occupied territory.” 277 Clearly, America had embraced nation building.

The final task is to assess the effectiveness of CAMG operations. Unlike combat operations, which can be assessed accurately within hours of the conclusion of hostilities, measures of effectiveness of civil affairs and military government operations are elusive. One could tally the number displaced persons returned home, the total monetary value of food distributed as relief, or the tonnage of national treasures recovered by the Monuments, Fine Arts & Archives sub commission. Or perhaps, as was done after the retirement of the American Army of Occupation from the Rhineland in 1924, one could use a more nebulous gauge like the degree of ‘friendship’ created in the former enemy country. In reality, however, the only accurate appraisal comes over time. As civil affairs operations are intended to support combat operations, the extent to which American military government operations can be regarded as successful lies in direct relationship to the effectiveness of the combat forces they supported. Likewise, military government operations are designed to restore stability and prevent future conflicts. Superficially but fairly, on both these scales American military government operations in Europe were

277 Ibid., 6.
successful, since Germany was decisively defeated and Europe has remained at peace since 8 May 1945.
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