Los Alamos
National Laboratory
1995
SELF ASSESSMENT
REPORT

June 30, 1995
Los Alamos, New Mexico

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Safeguards & Security (S&S) Assurance Program (AP) is designed to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of the LANL S&S program. The Assurance Program provides a mechanism for discovering deficiencies, determining causes, conducting risk assessments, implementing corrective actions, and documenting the assessment process. The period of assessment for 1995 began with the start of the fiscal year ((FY) October 1994) and continued into June 1995.

II. METHODOLOGY

Selection of organizations for self assessments is based on the criteria established in the LANL S&S Assurance Program. For FY 1995, 12 organizations were selected for self assessments, these organizations are identified in the schedule at Appendix A. The S&S topical areas selected for review in each organization varied depending on their security interests and included:

- Program Planning and Management (PPM)
- Protection Program Operations (PPO)
- Material Control & Accountability (MC&A)
- Computer & Communications Security (COMPSEC & COMSEC)
- Information Security (INFOSEC)
- Personnel Security (PERSEC)
- Operational Security (OPSEC)

The assessment teams followed the requirements of the DOE Orders as referenced in the DOE Standards and Criteria for measuring the effectiveness of S&S management and operations. University of California (UC) and LANL policy and directives were also used to conduct the assessments. The objective was to ascertain the effectiveness of S&S programs in each organization, its formality of operations, and its integration with the overall Laboratory S&S program. The goal was to meet both the DOE self-assessment requirements and the UC performance criteria and document the results.

Organizations were scheduled for self-assessment team visits from 30 Jan 95 through 21 April 95 as shown on the schedule contained in Appendix B. Security specialists from FSS Planning and Assessment Office (FSS-PAO) (PPM), FSS-10 (PPO), FSS-15 (INFOSEC), and LANL Audits & Assessments (AA-2) participated as regular team members during the assessment visits. The Los Alamos DOE Area Office (LAAO) also participated as an official observer. During the assessment, team members interviewed the organization security representatives and conducted in-depth reviews of all aspects of their respective programs. At the out-briefings, observations, concerns, and issues
were presented and discussed with organizational line management. Reports were
given to each organization assessed.
FSS-12 - Material Control & Accountability (MC&A), FSS-14 (COMPSEC and
COMSEC), FSS-15 (PERSEC), and the Reliability Program Office (PSAP) have been
accomplishing their self-assessments by assistance visits scheduled throughout the
year. This made best use of their security specialists and also meets the compliance
requirements of DOE. Their reports, documentation, and issues have been
incorporated within this report.

A comprehensive self assessment of the protective force, Protection Technology Los
Alamos (PTLA), was also conducted. The protective force assessment consisted of
evaluating their compliance with DOE and Laboratory requirements. Laboratory
oversight for the management and operations of the protective force was also a key
area of the self assessment.

The PTLA self-assessment team consisted of the Laboratory organizations previously
mentioned along with topical experts from the DOE Central Training Academy (CTA)
and the LANL Safety Office (ESH-5). The assessment team was divided into four
topical areas addressed in the DOE orders: Protective Program & Protective Force
Management, Skills & Knowledge, Training, and Equipment and Facilities. Safety was
added because of its importance in PTLA daily operations.

III. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Assurance Program emphasis for 1995 was on identifying Laboratory-wide
systemic problems that influence the overall quality, effectiveness, and cost of
safeguards and security at the Laboratory. Particular attention was paid to potential
issues that indicated a fundamental weakness in the S&S program. Where warranted,
organizational-level issues were identified and corrective action plans developed.

Program Planning and Management (PPM): Members of the Safeguards and
Security Self-Assessment team assessed the internal management and operations of
the S&S Program. They met with Laboratory personnel and reviewed the PPM
functions of divisions, offices and groups responsible for the program.

The PPM topical area was generally found to be in compliance with applicable DOE
orders and Laboratory policy. Formality of operations, assurance program
implementation, personnel training, LANL oversight of PTLA contract operations, and
the lack of a viable S&S assurance program within P Division were issues of particular
concern.

Protection Program Operations (PPO): The S&S Self-Assessment team assessed
the internal management and operations of the LANL protection program, to include
LANL oversight functions for the protective force. Particular attention was paid to the
core and key program, physical security, and formality of operations within FSS-10.
The PPO topical area was in general compliance with DOE and LANL requirements. Significant improvements have been made in the core & keys program and in upgrading the Site Safeguards & Security Plan. One issue was identified concerning FSS-10 oversight and guidance for the protective force.

**Material Control & Accountability (MC&A):** The MC&A aspects of the 1995 self assessment were evaluated using the existing Internal Review and Assessment (IRA) program managed by FSS-12. The IRA program evaluates Laboratory performance at the Material Balance Area (MBA) level. An objective of the IRA program is to identify systemic problems in the MC&A system based on the results from individual assessments. Scheduled assistance visits are made on a quarterly basis and IRA reports are maintained by FSS-12. Individual issues are tracked through to completion in the FSS-12 database and reported to FSS-PAO. One issue was identified during the 1995 assessment process concerning the validity of data contained in the accountability database.

**Computer & Communications Security (COMPSEC & COMSEC):** The Computer Security Assurance Program consists of continual reviews of the status of the classified and unclassified computer security program implementation in the Laboratory organizations that meet computer security compliance requirements as defined in DOE orders. These reviews include formal, scheduled team assistance visits of an entire Laboratory organization, formal program reviews of a portion of an organization’s program, and informal, one on one assistance/training sessions with an organization’s computer security representative. Two issues were identified during the assessment. The first, concerning the lack of a computer security plan for P Division, will be included in the overall PPM issue concerning the lack of a viable S&S program within P Division. The second issue identified the lack of a viable computer security program for CIC Division.

**Information Security (INFOSEC):** The Information Security section includes Classified Matter Protection and Control; Security Education and Awareness; and Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence. The Classified Matter Protection and Control (CMPC) approach was used to track the location of all classified information at the Lab, recognize all users of that information and ensure that matter is properly protected. Security Education and Awareness was evaluated to ensure the Laboratory population was aware of their security responsibilities. Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) office has developed a proactive and compliant program. Emphasis was placed on a joint BUS/FSS effort to quickly process classified interest contracts while meeting DOE requirements. No issues were identified during the self assessment.

**Personnel Security (PERSEC):** The Personnel Security Program includes: Access Authorization, Access Control, Unclassified Visits and Assignments by a Foreign National, Counterintelligence and Foreign Travel. No issues or observations were identified by the FSS-15 topical representatives.

**Operational Security (OPSEC):** OPSEC self assessment reviews were conducted using the OPSEC Data Collection Procedures Form. An after hours walk through of
each organization was accomplished along with interviews with facility managers, Organizational Safeguards and Security Officers (OSSOs), Organizational Computer Security Representatives (OCSRs), OPSEC representatives, secretaries and custodians. Particular attention was paid to trash and recycle receptacles, along with open literature, in an attempt to find potential OPSEC vulnerabilities. One issue was identified concerning sensitive unclassified data.

IV. 1995 SELF ASSESSMENT RESULTS

Each S&S topical area is presented below in narrative form. Initiatives and program strengths are listed first, followed by identified issues and observations.

PROGRAM PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Initiatives & Improvements

The Laboratory S&S Program is the responsibility of the FSS S&S Program Manager through his staff offices and functional security groups. According to the UC contract each FSS S&S office/group shares in the self-assessment process by providing its expertise internally as well as through assistance visits to Laboratory organizations.

During the past year, the S&S staff has formalized the S&S program by publishing or revising a number of security documents. The S&S program is now articulated in the Laboratory Director's S&S Policy letter (DP-123, March, 1995). This policy is supported by the Laboratory S&S Manual (being updated), the FSS S&S Strategic Plans (draft being updated), the LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program, the Organizational Safeguard & Security Plan (OSSP), and the Property Protection Program. Once these documents are fully implemented there will be a substantial increase in formality of S&S operations, consistency of approach in the S&S program, and compliance with S&S requirements.

Similarly for the organizations with SNM interests, the Site Safeguard and Security Plan (SSSP) is presently being updated to include radiological and toxicological issues. It should be completed by FSS by the end of September 1995, and re-submitted to DOE AL and DOE HQ. for approval.

Electronic versions of the DOE Orders and S&S publications have become available on the Laboratory computer network. These electronic publications are user friendly, easy to access, and are available to all Laboratory organizations. Providing these publications electronically will have a significant impact on S&S ability to provide current and accurate guidance to Laboratory personnel and will contribute to better overall compliance with DOE and Laboratory requirements.

FSS-PAO is currently in the process of completing a table-top analysis of the OSSO function. The results of the analysis will be used to develop a formal training program for OSSOs.
**PPM Issues and Observations**

Five issues have been developed for the Program Planning and Management topical area. Two of the issues were considered systemic since they impact a number of Laboratory organizations and three were considered individualized since they directly impact only one organization. The Issues Reports are located in Appendix A.

**Issue:** Lack of formality of operations in the Organizational Safeguards and Security Plans (OSSPs). The OSSPs, required by the Laboratory Director's Policy (DP-123) for each Laboratory organization, have not been fully developed or implemented. Initial OSSP's have been written and are being tailored and implemented to meet the safeguards and security interests of the organization. Many of the OSSPs need significant upgrades to make them a usable product. Likewise, the compliance check sheets developed by the FSS topical security experts need additional work to make them an effective tool.

**Issue:** Lack of formality of operations in the OSSO program. The OSSO program is not fully implemented in all Laboratory organizations. The interaction of OSSO's with S&S is limited, there is lack of communication and OSSO understanding of the Assurance Program elements, and a lack of support from some Laboratory organizations.

**Issue:** The Laboratory protective force subcontractor, PTLA, receives management oversight from the several LANL organizations and operational guidance from FSS-10. The Laboratory has not developed a formal written oversight plan for PTLA, nor guidance for working with the line organizations, such as ESH-5.

**Issue:** The present threat guidance provided to PTLA by the Laboratory and the DOE does not specifically address local threat circumstances as required by DOE Order 5632.7A. Currently the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP) is based on the DOE design basis threat and is not tailored to include local circumstances. PTLA plans, policies and procedures should also reflect the local threat environment.

**Issue:** No action has been taken to address the lack of a safeguards and security planning process in P Division since identification of the concern in the March 1994 S&S self-assessment. Discussions were held with P Division Operations Manager and team members; plus a review and discussion with FSS-PAO. This issue needs the attention and meaningful support of P Division management. P Division does not address S&S in a detailed manner in any of its management plans; it does not have an OSSO nor an OSSP as required in the Laboratory Director's Policy (DP 123) of April 1995.

**Observation:** Participation by LAAO and AA-2 in the 1995 FSS S&S self assessment provided valuable insight on how we do business. They opined that more attention has to be given assisting Laboratory organizations in the field and there has to be better coordination among the S&S groups. This observation will be incorporated into the "formality of operation" issues identified above.
Observation: FSS-PAO has not provided sufficient guidance or training to FSS topical area security personnel, or OSSOs, concerning the relationship between the three tiers of the assurance program. Similarly, the program requirements have not been sufficiently integrated into LANL operations. This observation will also be incorporated into the "formality of operation" issues identified above.

PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS

Initiatives & Improvements

Over the last nine months, the Key and Core program has been enhanced through process improvements to the point that a Laboratory-wide system of control is now effectively in place. Although there are no significant problems, efforts will be focused to achieve the following goals: 1) 100% completion of annual Key/Core inventory; 2) even distribution of Key/Core Custodian responsibility; and 3) resolve discrepancies before new Key/Core Custodians assume responsibilities. A centralized LANL Key & Core data base has just been developed that will greatly enhance the accounting system.

PPO Issues and Observations

Issue: The lack of formality of operations in FSS-10 has reduced the effectiveness of the oversight for the protective force. This oversight function was also addressed in the PTLA Self-Assessment Report. This issue will be partially rectified by the development of "Desk Top Procedures." These procedures will be provide day-to-day guidance to both FSS-10 and Laboratory personnel.

Observation: The various operations and the constant program changes taking place at LANL, are generating an enormous level of changes to Protective Force orders. Current level of resources applied to this crucial area needs to be reevaluated.

Observation: The complications and lack of funds to support a central package search facility for the Protected Areas has been resolved with a commitment for design funding during FY-95 and construction during FY-96. The facility will be centrally located within the LANL shipping and receiving warehouse, SM-30.

Observation: The Classified Interest Data Base needs improvement in the timely updating of the relocation of classified containers. With the constant movement and restructuring of organizations, the changes are arriving on a daily basis and the staffing required to maintain the data input is not sufficient. The Tour Watch program provided to the Protective Force has proven incapable of meeting the identified needs and therefore will soon be replaced with the manual signing of the Standard Form 702. The process for reporting classified repositories that cannot be located by the Protective Force has recently been improved. If discrepancies are noted, as to the location or availability of classified containers for inspection by the Protective Force, "Security Discrepancy" forms are immediately completed and forwarded to FSS-15 for inquiry.
Observation: A CQI team needs to be formally established to address the recent changes in DOE Order 5632.1C. The changes in this order provide opportunities to reduce the operational costs of the Protective Force. Although considerable effort has been underway to identify and implement these cost saving impacts, formally establishing a CQI team will increase productivity.

MATERIAL CONTROL & ACCOUNTABILITY

Initiatives & Improvements

The IRA has undergone significant modification in the past year. The following IRA improvements have been made:

- Identified previous weaknesses corrected through documented corrective action plans.
- Entire program strengthened by publishing additional guidance.
- Identified issues corrected and closed in a timely manner.
- Scheduled assessments being met.
- Program has met with acceptance from the nuclear material (NM) user organizations.
- DOE has acknowledged the improvements in the program.

MC&A Issues and Observations

Issue: One systemic problem has been identified this year that relates to the quality of the data contained in the Materials Accountability Safeguards System (MASS). This issue has been identified in the past but attempts to resolve the problem have not been successful. There appears to be multiple, unrelated causes behind this issue. Previous attempts to solve the problem did not focus on a root cause and did not attain universal support from the individuals involved. Some of the solutions were so technically involved that they became unworkable. A Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) team, headed by FSS-12, is being formed to address this problem.

The CQI team will attempt to identify multiple causes through customer surveys and interviews. These individual causes will be given to existing CQI teams working in that area or a new team will be established.

COMPUTER SECURITY

Initiatives & Improvements

FSS-14 has implemented an aggressive security assistance program that includes both large scale team visits and smaller one-on-one program visits. Team assistance visits are scheduled and conducted for Laboratory organizations that have major computing installations (mainframes and networks), have experienced difficulty in the administration of their classified and unclassified computer security program, or have requested a total organization visit. Program reviews are conducted by a single
Computer Security Specialist and one or more of the organization's security personnel. The program reviews are conducted at least once a year for all organizations, with a goal of conducting two per year. In addition, to meet DOE order requirements, detailed reviews of specific computer systems, including all classified systems, are conducted annually.

Both team assistance visits and program reviews follow similar methodologies for conducting the reviews and recording results. Major elements of the computer security program are reviewed with the organization's security personnel including documentation review, interviews, and system reviews. Up to 10% of the organization's systems users are interviewed to determine the extent of their knowledge of their computer security responsibilities. For scheduled team assistance visits, in briefings and out briefings are held for the organization's management and security personnel. All review results are recorded in a standard, official memo format with statements of what areas were reviewed, the status of the program, and the follow up actions to be taken by the organization in conjunction with the Computer Security Specialist assigned. The memo is distributed to the organization's line and security management.

**Computer Security Issues and Observations**

From January 1995 through May 1995, team assistance visits were conducted with 13 Laboratory organizations and program reviews were conducted with 15 Laboratory organizations. In general, most organizations were found to have successfully implemented the major elements of the computer security program. In some cases, minor follow up actions were established with milestones scheduled for completion within a 30-60 day time frame. The assessment did not reveal any Laboratory systemic issues.

**Issue:** In two organizations it was evident that the major elements of the unclassified computer security program were not in place. P Division had trained personnel but had not made program compliance a priority and did not indicate that this situation would change. The other organization, CIC Division, had just recently assigned the required security personnel to implement the program and 2/3 of the organization was just getting the program started. It was apparent that the organization's management and security personnel, for the most part, had a positive attitude and would be committing the resources necessary to implement a successful program.

**INFORMATION SECURITY**

**Initiatives & Improvements**

The Classified Matter Protection and Control (CMPC) team began planning strategies in February 1994. The goal was to break a trend of marginal ratings from previous DOE/AL and HQ/DOE security evaluations. It was understood that continued marginal ratings at a facility would result in an unsatisfactory rating. The team subsequently visited all designated control stations and established working relationships with the Classified Document Custodian's, as well as many individual users of classified
information. These ongoing visits have continued to present and include required annual self assessments of organizations in conjunction with FSS-PAO.

The LANL Security Education and Awareness program is functioning at optimal performance levels. The DOE order requirements mandate four security briefings. The first or initial security briefing has been incorporated into the LANL General Employee Training (GET). An update of the lesson plan has been completed to ensure current information is included as part of this training. A significant change was implemented last year and live briefings are scheduled three times a week in place of a video that was shown when personnel received their L or Q clearance. This fulfills the requirement for the comprehensive security briefing. There have been some very positive changes in the way the annual refresher briefing is implemented. Numerous live presentations are scheduled every month. This a more proactive mechanism for making certain that current information is being relayed to the Lab customers. The briefings are open to all personnel. Security Education also tailors presentations that are customer specific as certain organizations have unique issues or requirements that need to be addressed. Termination briefings are conducted by Badge Office and personnel security personnel as part of out-processing.

As part of a process improvement and cost reduction plan, Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and LANL recently teamed to provide facility security officers with required annual security training. This initiative was undertaken when last year customers questioned attending two separate workshops, one for SNL and one for LANL. That initiative was completed and cost savings were recognized due to this effort. Evaluations and comments from the subcontractor representatives and DOE participants who attended were extremely positive.

There is an additional component to the security education and awareness program that is worth mentioning. LANL offers a classified matter procedures course. Last year a reference/guide was developed and included as part of the training. DOE/LAAO and DOE/Albuquerque reviewed the reference and gave the training and guide high marks. The Los Alamos Area Office enrolls their personnel in the course and all of the evaluations their staff have completed rated the course "Very Satisfactory" or higher.

The Laboratory's Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence program is a joint team effort between FSS and BUS, and continues to progress positively in 1995. The program, which went from nonexistent in 1994 to a well established program in 1995, is recognized by HQ/DOE and other DOE facilities for its methodology and has been used as a pilot for establishing programs at other locations.

Management support from FSS-15, BUS-5 and BUS-9 have made the FOCI program a success. Currently, FSS-15 personnel along with BUS-5 and BUS-9 contract administrators continue to team together to ensure compliance with DOE and Laboratory FOCI requirements. The publishing of FOCI procedures, a continuing self assessment program and the establishment of a FOCI process improvement team ensures a professional and productive program in the future.
Information Security Issues and Observations

There were no issues identified during this self assessment.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Initiatives & Improvements

The Personnel Security Program includes: Access Authorization, Personnel Access Control, Unclassified Visits and Assignments by a Foreign National, Counterintelligence and Foreign Travel. The 1995 assessment narratives for each of these areas is included below:

Access Authorization

The Access Authorization Program was found to be in overall compliance with the DOE Order requirements. There are no issues in this area.

Personnel Access Control

The Personnel Access Control Program serves to ensure that a security badge system has been implemented to indicate access limitations and/or approvals for the purpose of controlling ingress and egress into security areas and facilities and for Safeguards & Security related identification purposes. There are no issues in this area.

Foreign Visits and Assignments (FV&A)

This assessment focused on the Foreign Visits and Assignments Program and evaluated the program based upon visit control records. The records were checked for completeness and accuracy to ensure that only approved foreign visitors are afforded access to Los Alamos National Laboratory. Data for the assessment included documentation review, examination of visit request files, and evaluation of the internal operating procedures.

Internal procedures have been implemented and are in place to ensure compliance with DOE Order 1240.2B, and LANL’s exception to DOE Order 1240.2B, Foreign Visits and Assignments. There have not been any documented discrepancies in this area during the review period and this assessment did not identify any new issues.

Visitor Control

The purpose of the Visitor Control Program is to ensure that only authorized personnel are afforded access to classified information. DOE/LAAO delegated the Control of Classified Visits function to LANL, referenced memorandum dated December 11, 1992, Gurule/Bellows. In addition, DOE/LAAO is conducting quarterly audits of the Control of Classified Visits Program. There are no issues in this area.

Counterintelligence

The self-assessment of the Counterintelligence (CI) program structure reveals that the DOE CI requirements, as specified in DOE Order 5670.3 are being met. The self-assessment was conducted by reviewing CI program policies, files and documents.
LANL has developed a satisfactory Counterintelligence Program. CI requirements, as contained in DOE order 5670.3 and the Office of Counterintelligence Procedural Guide, are being met. The LANL CI policies assure prompt notification of the Albuquerque CI Program Manager (CIPM) of all significant CI contacts and incidents. There are no issues in this area.

**Foreign Travel**

This assessment focused on the Internal Security Foreign Travel Program. This program ensures that Forms 1512.1 and 1512.3 are processed for authorization for travelers who hold or have held within the last 5 years, a DOE access authorization and are proposing official or unofficial travel to sensitive countries. Data for the assessment included documentation and file review and evaluation of the internal operating procedures.

According to DOE/AL on-site inspection of June 1993, (Foreign Travel was not scheduled for review in 1994) there were no open issues, however a recommendation was made to FSS-15 personnel to retain travel records according to “return date”. Internal procedures were implemented at that time and are currently part of the operating procedures to include that recommendation. There have not been any documented discrepancies during the review period and this assessment did not identify any new issues.

**Personnel Security Issues and Observations**

The Personnel Security Program was found to be in overall compliance with the DOE Order requirements. There were no official issues or observations identified during this self assessment.

**OPERATIONS SECURITY**

**Issues and Observations**

**Issue:** An operations security review through May 1995 of selected Laboratory divisions and offices revealed a serious need for continuous awareness training laboratory wide in regard to the identification, handling, and disposal of sensitive unclassified information. The reviews were conducted using OPSEC Data Collection Procedures Form. An after hours walk through of each organization was accomplished along with interviews with facility managers, OSSOs, OCSRs, OPSEC representatives, secretaries and custodians. Trash and recycle receptacles along with open literature were reviewed for vulnerabilities.

**PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY LOS ALAMOS**

**Program Planning Management**

The FSS S&S Program includes programmatic physical security oversight for PTLA. The PTLA contract document and the PTLA Performance Handbook for Contract Performance Award Fee (CPAF) for subcontractors are the primary tools used to provide FSS S&S management oversight. There is currently no specific Laboratory
S&S program management document that provides formal guidance or a formal organizational structure with assigned duties and responsibilities to accomplish this oversight. PTLA has a Policy and Resources Manual that defines their management and staff duties and responsibilities as well as their organizational structure.

**Protective Force Management:**

PTLA provides the Laboratory with a protective force of trained and qualified personnel to meet its contractual obligations. FSS S&S provides oversight of the physical security aspects of the program provided by PTLA, their supporting systems and their reliability and personnel security programs. FSS S&S also provides PTLA with threat environment guidance through the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP). The threat guidance is not tailored to local circumstances. This prevents PTLA from developing operating plans, policies and procedures which can be most effective on site.

To assist the Laboratory and the PTLA support contractor in the accomplishment of the Safeguards and Security Mission, memorandums of understanding (MOU's) with outside agencies are required to support the protection program. The current MOU's appear to be outdated and are in need of review and updating.

**Skills and Knowledge**

The self-assessment team limited its scope to focus on areas that had been identified as potential problems in previous audits, surveys, evaluations or QA surveillance's. The assessment indicated that PTLA employees have the skills and knowledge to perform all their functions in support of the Laboratory contract. Some weakness were identified in certain areas and the team developed a 73 question test, based on current DOE/OSS lesson plans, and Limited Scope Performance Tests (LSPTs) that were given to Security Police Officers (SPOs) and Security Officers (SOs). There were some weakness identified in a number of those taking the tests and issues identified.

This self-assessment has indicated that a number of SO's and SPO's may be deficient in training, skills & knowledge, LSPTs, use of equipment and understanding of general and special orders.

**Training**

PTLA is fundamentally covering the basic requirements for a sound protective forces training program. All aspects of the performance-based training model are being employed to train, qualify and certify armed and unarmed personnel. There is an ongoing weakness in the area of a formal Professional Development Program for PTLA employees having specialized duties. Also it is essential that PTLA implement a comprehensive evaluation program that complies with performance-based training evaluation standards.

The PTLA Training Department is isolated from critical PTLA activities that impact training, such as the Security Response Team (SRT) Training. It is also not involved in the planning, development, execution and evaluation of exercises such as system performance tests.
Equipment and Facilities

PTLA has the responsibility for, and control over, weapons, ammunition, pyrotechnics, explosives, vehicles, equipment and facilities needed to accomplish its mission. There was a concern about weapons inventories in vehicles and those stored in the WEIR. The need to compare these inventories at the beginning of each shift was emphasized. Also, the storage of weapons, ammunition, explosives and pyrotechnics was reviewed and concerns discussed. Vehicle operations, maintenance, and serviceability indicated a number of concerns and possible improvements and replacements. Review of protective force equipment and usage indicated some deficiencies and enhancements to improve operations. Communications equipment and operations were reviewed and suggestions made on rapid, reliable and protected exchange among the on-site protective forces, the central alarm station, and secondary communications stations. The maintenance of fixed posts was identified as a concern.

Safety

In October 1994, the reorganization of PTLA operations included the safety function. The safety section has three safety specialists and a compliance director collaterally assigned the safety manager’s responsibilities. The PTLA organization would benefit if each of its safety specialists had a professional development plan. Two of these specialists have limited safety training. Oversight for PTLA is provided by the Laboratory through Group ESH-5.

There appears to be no Laboratory Safety oversight plan ensuring that DOE safety orders will be complied with or identifying the formal linkages between ESH-5, FSS-10, and PTLA. Communications between the Laboratory and PTLA on upcoming exercises and safety requirements and concerns is not consistent. This problem is based in part on the lack of a clearly defined relationship between ESH-5 and PTLA. This relationship must be formalized, to include the requirement for ESH-5 to review and observe PTLA conducted exercises.

Safety meetings for PTLA employees and management safety reviews should be reestablished and coordination between the operations, training and safety organizations enhanced.

PTLA Issues and Observations

Specific issues and observations resulting from the PTLA Self Assessment are found in “PTLA Self Assessment Report”, dated 17 May 1995. A copy of this report is available from FSS-PAO upon request.

APPENDICES

- Appendix A: Issue Action Plans
- Appendix B: 1995 Self Assessment Schedule
- Appendix C: 1995 PTLA Self Assessment Issues
1995 LANL SELF ASSESSMENT REPORT

APPENDIX - A: LABORATORY ISSUE ACTION PLANS
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Don Bruckner  Phone: 667-7565  Fax 665-3810  MS: G729

DATE: May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPM-001  PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Program Planning & Management (PPM)

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: Yes
PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE: N/A

DESCRIPTION: The Safeguard and Security Program lacks formality of Operations and consistency of approach in the area of not having completed and approved Organizational Safeguards and Security Plans (OSSP) for all organizations.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5630.11B, 7 b,c,d; 9 b 1 and LANL DP 123,

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LEAD PERSON: Kevin Leifheit  Phone: 667-7565
Fax 667-3810  MS G729

REMARKS:
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Don Bruckner Phone: 667-7565 Fax 665-3810 MS: G729

DATE: May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPM-002 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Program Planning & Management (PPM)

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: YES

PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE: N/A

DESCRIPTION: The Organizational Safeguard and Security Officer (OSSO) program has not been fully implemented in a number of line and support organizations. Training of OSSOs has not been adequately addressed. OSSOs are not provided with the necessary tools, such as compliance check sheets, to assist them in meeting their responsibilities.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5630.11B, 7(b, c, d), Safeguards and Security Program, 8/2/94; LANL DP 123.

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<td>1</td>
<td>Review status of OSSO program</td>
<td>15 June 95</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Develop table top analysis</td>
<td>15 July 95</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Provide Necessary Tools</td>
<td>10 Sept 95</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Train OSSO's</td>
<td>30 Sept 95</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Validate Closing</td>
<td>10 Oct 95</td>
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LEAD PERSON: Susan Kirk Phone: 667-7565
Fax 665-3810 MS G729

REMARKS:
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Don Bruckner, Phone: 7-7565 Fax 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPM-003 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Program Planning & Management (PPM)

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: NO

PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE FSS-10, PAO, PTLA

DESCRIPTION: The oversight of the PTLA contract lacks formal definition and policies from Laboratory organizations. There are no planning documents or policies that indicate an integrated oversight program by the Laboratory organizations now providing functional direction and/or expertise. Laboratory functional direction and oversight includes: safeguards and security, firearms and range safety, and laboratory/site wide ES&H. There is no organizational chart or structure indicating the Laboratory's interface with PTLA management or operations in these matters.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5630.11B, 7(d), Safeguards and Security Program 8/2/94

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<td>Develop FSS S&amp;S Management Oversight Plan</td>
<td>15 Oct 95</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Develop ESH-5 Safety Oversight Plan</td>
<td>15 Oct 95</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Develop BUS Business Operations Plan</td>
<td>15 Oct 95</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Implement integrated oversight of PTLA</td>
<td>15 Nov 95</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Implement PTLA oversight process</td>
<td>15 Dec 95</td>
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</table>

LEAD PERSON: Gene Tucker, PAO, Phone: 667-5911 Fax 665-3810 MS G729

REMARKS
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Don Bruckner Phone: 667-7565 Fax 665-381 0 MS: G729

DATE: May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPM-004 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Program Planning & Management (PPM)

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: NO

PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE: FSS-10, PAO, PTLA

DESCRIPTION: The present threat guidance provided to PTLA by the Laboratory and the DOE does not specifically address local threat circumstances as required by DOE Order 5632.7A. Currently the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP) is based on the DOE design basis threat and is not tailored to include local circumstances. PTLA plans, policies and procedures should also reflect the local threat environment.


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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Review current approved SSSP</td>
<td>27 Jun 95</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Develop a local threat statement</td>
<td>1 Sept 95</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>LAAO approval of threat</td>
<td>15 Sept 95</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DOE approval of threat</td>
<td>15 Oct 95</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Incorporation of threat by PTLA</td>
<td>15 Nov 95</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Validation of Closure</td>
<td>25 Nov 95</td>
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</table>

LEAD PERSON: John Fitzgibbons Phone: 665-1212
Fax 665-5143 MS G728

REMARKS:
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Don Bruckner  Phone: 667-7565  Fax 665-3810  MS: G729

DATE: May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-P-PPM-005  PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Program Planning & Management (PPM)

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: NO
PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE: P Div

DESCRIPTION: No action has been taken to address the lack of a safeguards and security planning process in P Division since identification of the concern in the March 1994 S&S self-assessment. Discussions were held with P Division Operations Manager and team members; plus a review and discussion with FSS-PAO. This issue needs the attention and meaningful support of P Division management. P Division does not address S&S in a detailed manner in any of its Management Plans; it does not have a S&S plan as required in the Laboratory Director's Policy DP 123 of March 1995.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5630.11B, DOE Order 5630.13A, 4, DOE Order 5630.14A, 7.b; DP 123

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Develop P Div. OSSP</td>
<td>15 Sept 95</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>FSS S&amp;S approval of OSSP</td>
<td>29 Sept 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Validation of closure</td>
<td>1 Nov 95</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

LEAD PERSON: Staley Hadden  Phone: 7-2624
Fax  MS G434

REMARKS: At this point P Division has not agreed to comply with the Director's S&S policy letter DP123. The above milestones were developed by FSS-PAO and have not been accepted by P Division.
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Don Bruckner Phone: 667-7565 Fax 5-3810 MS: G-729

DATE: May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPO-001 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: PPO

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: NO
PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE: FSS-10

DESCRIPTION:
Insufficient formality of operations to include oversight of the protective force, physical security, and the SSSP.

REFERENCES: DOE M 5632.1C, 1, 1

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Accomplish Desk Top Procedures</td>
<td>15 Oct 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Develop Oversight Plans and Procedures</td>
<td>15 Nov 95</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Validate Plans and Procedures</td>
<td>1 Dec 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Close Finding</td>
<td>15 Dec 95</td>
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</table>

LEAD PERSON: Reuben Peck Phone: 665-5143
Fax 665-5143 MS G-728

REMARKS: Desk Top Procedures in progress.
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Michael Kaufman, Phone: 665-7142 Fax 665-5566 MS: C508

DATE: June 1, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-FSS-MC&A-001 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: MC&A

SYSTEMIC ISSUE: NO
PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE: MC&A

DESCRIPTION: The quality of the data contained in the Material Accountability Safeguards & Security (MASS) database is suspect.

REFERENCES: MC&A Procedural Handbook, Section 3.2

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Form CQI team to develop solution</td>
<td>17 Jul 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Develop &amp; assess possible solutions</td>
<td>30 Sept 95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Implement selected solution</td>
<td>15 Oct 95</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluate &amp; implement selected solutions</td>
<td>15 Dec 95</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Validate closure</td>
<td>1 Feb 96</td>
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LEAD PERSON: Ronald Blankenship Phone: 667-5882
Fax 665-5566 MS E508

REMARKS: The updating of the MASS system is essential to providing credible data. A number of solutions may be required to meet program needs and DOE requirements.
LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: Randy Hoebelheinrich, Lisa Lopez, Phone: 5-1795
Fax 5-1799 MS G727

DATE: 15 May 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-2-ISE-CIC-CS-001
PRIORITY: 3

TOPICAL AREA: Computer Security

LABORATORY SYSTEMIC: NO
PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION: CIC

DESCRIPTION:

During the May 1995 CIC computer security assistance visit, it was determined that the CIC Division had approximately two thirds of its groups that had not sufficiently implemented the main elements of the Unclassified Computer Security Program. This included assignment of OCSR, identification of sensitive applications and systems, implementation of computer protection plans, training users in their computer security responsibilities, and scheduling and conducting misuse and abuse audits.

REFERENCES:  DOE Order 1360.28, LANL Computer Security Handbook

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<td>Assign OCSR where required</td>
<td>23 May 95</td>
<td>23 May 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Train OCSR</td>
<td>TBD*</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Review requirements with OCSR and develop system inventories and data sensitivity determinations</td>
<td>TBD*</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Complete security and protection plans with all required documentation</td>
<td>TBD*</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Establish Misuse and Abuse Schedules and conduct required number of audits.</td>
<td>TBD*</td>
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</table>

NOTE: * CIC is in the process of establishing milestone dates

LEAD PERSONS: Randy Hoebelheinrich, Lisa Lopez FSS-14
Robert Ayars, Kathleen Jackson CIC
SAFEGUARDS & SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

ISSUE ACTION PLAN

LANL 1995 Self Assessment

Assessor: David T. Bibb  Phone: 5-3372  Fax 7-7340  MS: A 115

DATE:  May 26, 1995
ISSUE NO:  95-2-ISE-OPSEC-001  PRIORITY:  3
TOPICAL AREA:  Operations Security

SYSTEMIC ISSUE:  YES
PARTICULAR ORGANIZATION/DIVISION ISSUE:  N/A

DESCRIPTION:
An Operations Security (OPSEC) review of the selected divisions revealed a serious need for continuous awareness training Laboratory wide in regard to the identification, handling, and disposal of sensitive unclassified information.

REFERENCES:  LANL DP 123; DOE M 5632.1C,1, 1

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<td>Review the Security Awareness Training Program for OPSEC content</td>
<td>15 Aug 95</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Monitor some SA training sessions</td>
<td>30 Aug 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Add necessary OPSEC training material</td>
<td>15 Sept 95</td>
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<td>Validate closing</td>
<td>30 Sept 95</td>
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LEAD PERSON:  Bob Milford  Phone: 665-3372
Fax 667-7340  MS  A115
1995 LANL SELF ASSESSMENT REPORT

APPENDIX - B: 1995 SELF ASSESSMENT SCHEDULE
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**SELF ASSESSMENT**

- PTLA - 3 Week Window
- ESH

**STAFF ASSISTANCE**

- AB (5 Week Window)
- SS (5 Week Window)

**ES**

- A-36

**Specific**

- TA-39
- JCI

**Other**

- HR
- TA-55
- TA-48/52
- MST
- CIC (Lab Wide Systems)
- TA-3 (4 Week Window)
- NIS

**ODD/ET**

- PTLA
APPENDIX - C: 
PTLA SELF ASSESSMENT ISSUES
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Management Team
Phone: 7-7565    Fax 5-3810    MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: See 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPM-003     PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Protection Program Management

ISSUE: Oversight of the PTLA contract lacks formal definition and policies from Laboratory organizations. There are no planning documents or policies that indicate an integrated oversight program by the Laboratory organizations providing functional direction and/or expertise. This Laboratory provided functional direction must articulate and organize oversight with duties and responsibilities for: safeguards and security, firearms and range safety, and laboratory/site wide ES&H. There is no organizational chart or definable structure indicating the Laboratory’s interface with PTLA management or operations in these matters.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5630.11B, 7(d), Safeguards and Security Program 8/2/94

ROOT CAUSE: Lack of Formality of Operations.

LEAD PERSON: Gene Tucker     LEAD ORGANIZATION: FSS-PAO
Phone: 7-7565    Fax 5-3810    MS: G729

SUMMARY: The PTLA contract oversight requires the skills and knowledge of a number of organizations in the Laboratory. The primary mission of PTLA has been the physical security of the Laboratory and its resources this oversight has become the responsibility of FSS-10. Both the business aspects and ES&H requirements to support PTLA are handled by others with informal linkages to FSS. At the same time PTLA has through its Policy and Resources Manual established a more formal operating posture. Thus there is a need for bringing a more unified methodology into place.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Review of existing oversight documentation, interviews with FSS S&S managers, ESH-5 specialists, the Lab contract administrator and FSS-10 personnel dedicated to PTLA support and oversight indicate very little structure, organization or consistent procedures.
REMARKS: There is a need to develop Laboratory oversight plans, policies, procedures, and a management plan structure that integrates the PTLA operations and other Laboratory organizations and disciplines. Other Laboratory organizations need to formalize and integrate their DOE and UC requirements and formalize the Laboratory structure that can most effectively work with PTLA.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Management Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 19, 1995
ISSUE NO: See 95-2-ISE-FSS-PPM-003 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Protection Program Management

ISSUE: Oversight of the PTLA contract lacks formal definition and policies from Laboratory organizations concerning the planning and response to various types of on-site emergencies by the PTLA subcontractor. DOE orders state that appropriate action must be taken to ensure acceptable safeguards and security on site.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5630.11B, 8k(1)(b) Safeguards and Security Program 8/2/94

ROOT CAUSE: Lack of formality of operations and consistency of approach by the Laboratory

LEAD PERSON: Gene Tucker LEAD ORGANIZATION: FSS-PAO
Phone: 7-7565 Fax 5-3810 MS G729

SUMMARY: DOE Orders require the Laboratory to take such action as may be appropriate to ensure the safeguards and security, including the curtailment or suspension of operations when such operation would result in an unacceptable risk to national security, or the health and safety of employees, or the public. This requirement is not presently formally addressed in the Laboratory documents, plans or policies. The Laboratory has assigned responsibility for interaction with PTLA for disaster type emergencies to FSS-20. Other types of emergencies such as work stoppages and confrontations (arrest authority, search & seizure, prisoner custody, transportation, etc.) need to be more formally addressed and have organizations assigned with defined duties and responsibilities. A number of types of emergencies lack formal policies defining Laboratory interactions and responsibilities. PTLA has a written policy and procedures to cover their involvement in Demonstrations/Riots.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Review of existing documentation with FSS S&S organizations and PTLA. It appeared that emergencies were handled on a case by case basis with PTLA providing FSS-10 information on specific incidences.
REMARKS: The Laboratory needs to develop concepts of operations, policies and procedures that then can be integrated into PTLA operations, policies and procedures for approval by the Laboratory. A Laboratory Protective Force Support Contractor Program Plan should be developed that defines all Laboratory organizations providing support to PTLA and outline their duties and responsibilities.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Skills & Knowledge Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax: 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S&K-001 PRIORITY: 3
TOPOCAL AREA: Skills and Knowledge

ISSUE: Indications of weakness in certain areas of skills and knowledge: Nuclear material, standard defense response, search and seizure, mission, fresh pursuit, vehicle search, insider threat, life endangerment, low profile search, alarm system, thoroughness of vehicle searches (LSPT), immediate action and weapons function checks, defining apprehension, and arrest authority.


ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax MS: G724

SUMMARY: Past PTLA QA reports indicated weaknesses in some areas of skills and knowledge. Additionally, prior audits, surveys and assessments have identified additional weaknesses. Using this information, the team developed a 73 question test (using existing validated test questions) and LSPTs obtained by the PTLA Training Department. This written test and LSPTs were given to 27 SPOs and 6 SOs (eleven from each shift) which represented approximately 10% field force. The results of the tests and LSPTs are attached.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Reviewed Training and PA&E Section LSPTs, QA Assessments, General Security Orders, Standards and Criteria, DOE Order 5632.1C and 5632.7A, Job Analysis, Post checks, QA Trend Analysis, post observation and interviews with PTLA and FSS personnel.

REMARKS:

1. Establish a training validation cycle program (JAs, GSOs, need assessments, LSPT results, lesson plans, position descriptions, annual training plan, supervisor and QA input, and the results of self assessments).
2. Conduct comprehensive needs assessment.

3. Evaluate training program using Training Approval Program (TAP) criteria and regulatory requirements (DOE, LANL, U of C).

4. Institute Protective Force weapons function checks and reinforce immediate action on all assigned weapons.

5. Reinforce the thoroughness of vehicle searches through supervision/management chain of supervision/command.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Skills & Knowledge Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax: 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO. 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S&K-002 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Skills and Knowledge

ISSUE: A high percentage of SPOs observed demonstrating "handgun presentation" did not acquire "secure firing grip" because the thumb was placed on the pistol hammer. This is an unsafe procedure. It forms a habit that could result in a fatality during a lethal confrontation.

REFERENCES: CTA firearms safety

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax MS: G724

SUMMARY: The above procedure is a deviation from DOE-CTA firearms instruction.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: LSPTs and observations.

REMARKS:

Conduct training on the proper hand grip of the handgun.
PTLA Self Assessment Report

PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Skills & Knowledge Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax: 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995

TOPICAL AREA: Skills and Knowledge

OBSERVATION: The Training Department does not track the results of LSPTs.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5632.7A Para 2.d.4.d.3

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax MS: G724

SUMMARY: Tracking of the LSPTs will provide a capability to trend the results so that emphasis can be placed in the areas where additional training is required.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: LSPTs and observations.

REMARKS:

Keep the results of the LSPTs for trending purposes and as documentation supporting minimal/marginal performance of protective force personnel. Trending would show recurring training weakness and assist in the identification of personnel unable to maintain required skills and knowledge.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ISSUE: After a line by line self assessment of DOE Order 5632.7A, the following non compliance issues were identified:

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<th>Issue</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ch. I. 4.b.</td>
<td>JTAs are not used in developing job descriptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. II, 2.a.(4)(e)</td>
<td>Design Basis Threat was not identified in the PTLAs 1995 SPO IIs Job Task Analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4.</td>
<td>Even though the Special Operations department has a process for the selection of SPO III s, it has not been formalized in a written procedure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4, 4. a. (7)</td>
<td>Legal requirements and responsibilities, including limited arrest authority and fresh pursuit policies have not been developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4, 1.</td>
<td>There is no documentation showing that a formal evaluation of equipment has not been conducted so that the equipment could be tailored to counter adversaries identified in the &quot;Design Basis Threat Policy&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4, 1.a. (2)(g)</td>
<td>Security Police Officers who are not assigned to the Special Response Team and who are assigned crucial tasks do not have protective masks available for use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch 4, 1.b.(3)(c)</td>
<td>There is no documentation stating that stored firearms shall be inspected prior to return to active inventory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. 4, 1. b. (3)(d)</td>
<td>Even though PTLA Procedure #50300, &quot;Ammunition,&quot; Section 5.5.5., &quot;Rotating Ammunition,&quot; dated July 14, 1994, discusses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ammunition rotation, it does not specify PTLA will exchange fresh ammunition annually for all required personnel.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5632.7A

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Lloyd Foster LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax MS: G724

SUMMARY: The above items are non compliant issues pertaining to DOE Order 5632.7A.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: PTLA'S line by line assessment of DOE Order 5632.7A.

REMARKS:

Correct non compliant issues.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Training Team
Phone: 5-5712 Fax: 5-8984 MS: G737

DATE: 4/7/95
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S&K-004 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Skills & Knowledge

ISSUE: Exercises (system performance tests) are not conducted with the involvement of the Training Department.

REFERENCES: Standards & Criteria 4.10.2.3

ROOT CAUSE:

LEAD PERSON: Lloyd Foster  LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: 5-1072 MS: G724

SUMMARY: Exercises are not currently conducted in the field by training. “Field” exercises (LSPTs, force-on-force) are conducted by the PA&E section, but there appears to be little to no communication/interaction between the departments to develop, document and track “training” issues from these exercises. Valuable training data is generated that the training department is not aware of or taking advantage of.

REMARKS: Policy and procedures are required to assure training department personnel are involved in the design and participation of any system performance test where training evaluation data is to be generated. PTLA Training Department should in-turn have a formal evaluation program in-place to assure the data is utilized to its maximum potential.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Training Team
Phone: 5-5712 Fax: 5-8984 MS: G737

DATE: 4/12/95
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S&K-005 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Skills & Knowledge

ISSUE: System Performance Assessments

REFERENCES: Standards & Criteria 4.10.2.3.1

ROOT CAUSE:

LEAD PERSON: Lloyd Foster LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: 5-8984 MS: G724

SUMMARY: The PA&E Section currently identifies several types of performance checks. They are conducted anywhere from daily to yearly based on the type. The Daily Security Exercises used by the shift supervisors is currently conducted on shift, with the supervisor filling out a form and returning it to PA&E. Any remediation is conducted immediately. There is not a system in-place to track or trend remediated errors to identify potential training problems.

REMARKS: This information should be fed into the Training Department’s level - III evaluation program.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: R.J. Peck/B.A. Starkovich Phone: N/A Fax: N/A MS: N/A

DATE: 04/21/95
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S&K-006 PRIORITY: 2

TOPICAL AREA: Skills & Knowledge

ISSUE: False/Nuisance Alarm Corrective Action Plans are not being developed.

REFERENCES: "LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY FSS-10 FALSE ALARM RATE AND NUISANCE ALARM RATE REPORT AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURE"

ROOT CAUSE: The above stated procedure was completed and initiated in November 1994, and has not been fully complied with.

LEAD PERSON: Reuben Peck LEAD ORGANIZATION: FSS-10
Phone: 5-1212 Fax: MS: G728

SUMMARY: The FAR and NAR report was developed to track and trend LANL false and nuisance alarm rates. When the FAR/NAR exceeds review rate or an unusual pattern appears corrective action plans are required by the responsible organization. To date corrective actions are not being developed, which potentially impacts the integrity of security system.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Documents validated as stated above

REMARKS: Each responsible organization, as identified in the procedure, review the weekly report and develop the appropriate corrective action plans.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Training Team
Phone: 5-5712 Fax: 5-8984 MS: G737

DATE: 4/4/95
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-T-001 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Training

ISSUE: No guidance is provided via procedure or training plan for instructors on lesson plan utilization in the classroom or field.

REFERENCES: Standards & Criteria 4.10.2.2 and 4.10.2.4.3

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax MS: G724

SUMMARY: Guidance on the proper use of lesson plans should be documented in lesson plans, training plan and procedure. This ensures instructors utilize lesson plans appropriately and teach only OSS and/or PTLA accepted techniques, models, theory, etc. This minimizes the inclination of instructors to “freelance”.

REMARKS: Guidance on lesson plan utilization should be noted at minimum in lesson plans and implementation procedures.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Training Team
Phone: 5-5712 Fax: 5-8984 MS: G737

DATE: 4/7/95
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-T-002 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Training

ISSUE: Instructor effectiveness is not adequately measured.

REFERENCES: Standards and Criteria 4.10.2.4.5. through 10.

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax MS: G724

SUMMARY: PTLA Training Department currently evaluates instructors in the classroom by student critique. A lack of resources has created a situation where PTLA procedures requiring quantitative analysis and summary of those critiques is not being completed and circulated through the PTLA management chain.

REMARKS: This activity should be documented and performed in accordance with a level - I type of evaluation system described earlier.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Training Team  
Phone: 5-5712    Fax: 5-8984    MS: G737

DATE: 4/3/95  
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-T-003    PRIORITY: 3  
TOPICAL AREA: Training

ISSUE: Due to the lack of detailed training department management responsibilities outlined in the Training Plan and lack of procedural guidance, it is not clear what the relationship is between the Training Department and Special Response Team training personnel.

REFERENCES: Standards & Criteria 4.10.2, 4.10.2.5.1 and 4.10.2.5.6

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler    LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax    MS: G724

SUMMARY: Based on interviews with PTLA’s Training Department, SRT Operations Manager (acting) and SOD Manager and reviewing the PTLA Training Plan it was unclear what the working relationship (if any) exists between the two organizations. On the surface, the impression is made that there are two autonomous training organizations. There is no documentation showing that both organizations analyze, design, develop, implement and evaluate training from a common set of procedures. Furthermore, without a common set of training procedures detailing the corporate training process it is unlikely to find consistency in training products and/or activities within the two organizations.

REMARKS: If PTLA decides to keep the “status quo”, it is imperative that both organizations follow one corporate training strategy, document the relationship and interactions between the two programs and layout a career development path for personnel describing how training staff are to be trained and qualified to perform their instructional job assignments (i.e., JTA specialist, curriculum designer, evaluation specialist, etc.). Furthermore, PTLA management must understand the impact of compliance with formality of operations within the SRT training program. Based on the quantity, depth, scope, formality of operations, and risk associated with SRT training, the SRT should be staffed at minimum by one FTE training professional which is instructionally qualified and dedicated to manage these activities.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Training Team  Phone: 5-5712  Fax: 5-8984  MS: G737

DATE: 4/3/95
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-T-004  PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Training

ISSUE: Lack of LANL policy or guidance for site specific training.

REFERENCES: Standards & Criteria 4.10.2.2.5

ROOT CAUSE: Lack of DOE/LAAO & LANL policy

LEAD PERSON: Gene Tucker  LEAD ORGANIZATION: FSS-PAO
Phone: 7-5911  Fax
MS: G729

SUMMARY: SPO basic training must include “legal requirements and responsibilities, including use of deadly force, limited arrest authority, and fresh pursuit”. Site specific policy is not available from DOE/LAAO and LANL, therefore SPO’s are only taught from DOE generic lesson plans without the benefit of site specific training on fresh pursuit issues and arrest authority. These problems were noted due to vague law enforcement jurisdiction land agreements with federal and tribal entities. Training cannot be developed until these management issues are corrected.

REMARKS: DOE/LAAO and LANL must provide PTLA guidance.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Equipment & Facilities Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax: 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-E&F-001 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Equipment & Facilities

ISSUE:
1. Bunkers need to be cleaned on a scheduled basis for health/safety reasons (Hanta Virus).
2. Bunker TA-28/2 has a leaky room which exposed stored duty ammunition to water damage.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5632.7A, Protection Program Operations Standards and Criteria, March 10, 1995, Chapter III, Par

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Lloyd Foster LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: 724 MS: G-724

SUMMARY: Weapons, pyrotechnics, and explosives are safely stored and under the direct control of protective personnel or controlled within established security areas. Alternatively, they may be stored in vault-type rooms or buildings or substantial construction. If intrusion detection systems are in use to detect a penetration into the area and response is such that unauthorized removal is unlikely.

- Verification was made on the following bunkers. TA-8/32, TA-28/5, TA-28/2 and TA-28/3.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Review of General Security Orders, Standards and Criteria, DOE Order 5632.1C and 5632.7A, and PTLA documents; visual inspection of posts; and interviews with PTLA and FSS personnel.

REMARKS: Consolidate all stored duty ammunition in one location. (Possibly TA-16/360).
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Equipment & Facilities Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax: 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-E&F-002 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Equipment & Facilities

ISSUE: Weapons assigned to a vehicle that is in the shop are stored in the WEIR. However the inventory for those weapons are not compared to the inventory of the weapons that are still in the vehicles to ensure that all weapons are accounted for.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5632.7A, Protection Program Operations Standards and Criteria, March 10, 1995, Chapter III, Par

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by FSS-10

LEAD PERSON: Reuben Peck LEAD ORGANIZATION: FSS-10
Phone: 5-1212 Fax MS: G728

SUMMARY: All issued weapons are inventoried by a number count at the beginning of each shift.
- 10 weapons were selected at random from the (WEIR). All were inventoried by count at the beginning of each shift. Recorded on PTLA inventory form 507-RO.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Review of General Security Orders, Standards and Criteria, DOE Order 5632.1C and 5632.7A, and PTLA documents; visual inspection of posts; and interviews with PTLA and FSS personnel.

REMARKS: Shift commander or designee compare the two inventories for accountability at the beginning of each shift.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Equipment & Facilities Team
Phone: 7-7565 Fax: 5-3810 MS: G729

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-1SE-PTLA-E&F-003 PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Equipment & Facilities

ISSUE: The protective force is in compliance with this requirement, however, in the event the assessment rooms within the individual Protected Areas must operate as an Secondary emergency communications center, they would require the Local Law Enforcement (LLE) communications ability which they do not have.

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5632.7A, Protection Program Operations Standards and Criteria, March 10, 1995, Chapter IV, Para. 4.10.3.3.3.

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Robert Wagner LEAD ORGANIZATION: FSS-10
Phone: 5-1212 Fax: MS: G728

SUMMARY: The hardened central alarm station (and protective force communications center) is provided with radio and telephone channels of communication with local law enforcement agencies. An emergency alternate communications capability from a secondary station is provided for use in the event the primary station is compromised.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: Review of General Security Orders, Standards and Criteria, DOE Order 5632.1C and 5632.7A, and PTLA documents; visual inspection of posts; and interviews with PTLA and FSS personnel.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda
Phone: 665-5651 Fax: 665-7384 MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-001 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Firearms Safety

ISSUE: Do operating procedures state the instructor-to-shooter ratio for the type of firearms training being conducted? (Chapter I (1) f (3) a, b, and c)

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A and 5480.16A Assessment Guide 2.2.3. Bullet #6

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Mike Grimler ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: The live fire range operations does not contain instructor-to-shooter ratio for night firing and initial training.

ASSESSMENT: GSO #10 and Range Ops Procedure 40106 were reviewed.

REMARK: The instructor-to-shooter ratio for night firing and initial training should be included in the Live Fire Ops procedure.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda:

Phone: 665-5651 Fax: 665-7384 MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-002 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Safety

ISSUE: Do emergency plans and procedures required by DOE 5500.1B specifically address incidents involving firearms? (Chapter III (6))

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A and 5480.16A Assessment Guide 2.5.1

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Phil Burnworth LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: Personnel at both the Live Fire Range and PTLA's Headquarters (TA-64) did not have an emergency plan or procedure that specifically addresses incidents involving firearms.

ASSESSMENT: Emergency Plan

REMARK: The Emergency Plan should be clarified to include incidents involving firearms.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda
Phone: 665-5651 Fax: 665-7384 MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-003 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Safety Appraisals

ISSUE: Those who provide protective force functions on, at, or for a DOE site shall have a firearms safety committee formally organized and chartered to assist management in providing safe firearms activities. [Chapter II, 3.]

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A and 5480.16A Assessment Guide 3.2.1

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by LANL Safety Committee

LEAD PERSON: LANL Safety Committee LEAD ORGANIZATION: LANL
Phone: Fax: MS:

SUMMARY: The LANL Firearms Safety Committee has responsibility under its committee charter for conducting reviews of some of the same items mentioned in DOE Order 5480.16A.

ASSESSMENT:

1. The LANL Firearms Safety Committee has not reviewed various firearms related incidents as listed in the charter.

2. Audits and Assessments (AA-2) performed an audit of PTLA activities in 1994 but the findings of this report were not transmitted to the Firearms Safety Committee, PTLA, or LANL ESH-5.

REMARK: LANL should revise or clarify the Firearms Safety Committee Charter
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda

Phone: 665-5651 Fax: 665-7384 MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-004 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Safety

ISSUE: Disciplinary actions for violations of firearms safety procedures or regulations [Chapter III (1) g (1-11)]

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A and 5480.16A Assessment Guide 3.2.2.g

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Phil Burnworth ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: Documents reviewed and interviews with PTLA personnel concluded that a disciplinary procedure as required by DOE Order 5480.16A does not exist at PTLA.

ASSESSMENT: No documents were found that indicated a procedure or policy exists. Guidance exists for general violations and penalties at the firing range. However, this is not a policy and addresses violation of safe carrying rules only. No further documentation was seen or offered for other firearms safety procedures or regulation violations.

REMARKS: Procedures should be developed for disciplinary actions related to firearms safety.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda

Phone: 665-5651      Fax: 665-7384      MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-005      PRIORITY: 3
TOPICAL AREA: Safety

ISSUE: Has the site used for basic firearms training been approved by the manager of the Operations Office? [Chapter I (2) b], [Chapter I (4) b]

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A and 5480.16A Assessment Guide 4.3.3 and 5.2.1

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Phil Burnworth/Bob Wagner      LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072      Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: Copy of Live Fire Range Safety Assessment submitted to DOE/AL for approval, memorandums for DOE/AL SPD recommending approval to the DOE/AL Operations Manager.

ASSESSMENT: Range Safety Assessment pending approval by DOE/AL.

REMARKS: None
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda
Phone: 665-5651 Fax: 665-7384 MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-006 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Safety Requirements

ISSUE: The loading and clearing of firearms shall take place only in an approved area or when the barrel of the firearm is in or pointing toward a bullet containment device. Each site shall have an approved procedure for loading and clearing firearms under field conditions when no bullet containment device is available. [Chapter II, 2.e.]

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Lloyd Foster LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: PTLA does not have a field clearing procedure for loading and clearing of firearms.

ASSESSMENT: General Security 10, 6.6 Clearing Chambered Rounds, Post Auxiliary Weapons, provides guidance on the mentioned topic. However, loading and unloading tube trays are, in some cases, some distance from posts. The instructions do not address how to field clear a weapon "safely" or how to transport a weapon "safely" to the nearest loading and unloading tube location in the event a round is chambered.

REMARKS: This issue should be addressed and specific procedures written. When the procedures have been completed, PTLA employees should be informed of the new procedure. LANL ESH-5 and the Firearms Safety Committee should review the procedures prior to implementation. The safety team understands PTLA has a policy under review on field clearing of weapons. When PTLA gets ESH and FSS-10 approval on this policy the observation will be closed.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda

Phone: 665-5651 Fax: 665-7384 MS: K403

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-007 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Safety

ISSUE: An exercise plan shall be approved by a safety representative designated by the manager of the organization responsible for the exercise. For each force-on-force training exercise, all participants, safety representatives, or controllers shall have the authority to stop an activity if in their opinion unsafe conditions develop. [Chapter I, 5. a. (4)]

REFERENCES: DOE Order 5480.16A

ROOT CAUSE: TBD by PTLA

LEAD PERSON: Phil Burnworth LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: LANL ESH-5 has not always received notification of upcoming exercises. When LANL ESH-5 did receive notification of upcoming exercises, it was frequently one day before the exercise was scheduled. During the last quarter of 1994, LANL ESH-5 was dropped from the signature line, and therefore, was not called to review force-on-force exercises. The team is aware of two exercises, one of which was the fatality, that was not reviewed or approved by LANL ESH-5.

Although LANL ESH-5 attended the TA-18 and TA-41 exercises in 1994, ESH-5 was not informed of the simulated weapons and munitions being issued prior to the live ammo being fully accounted for. LANL ESH-5 discovered this while reviewing the Type A investigation.

The Firearms Safety Committee was not notified of these incidents prior to publication of the DOE Type A investigation report.

ASSESSMENT: LANL ESH-5 and the Firearms Safety Committee have been excluded from firearms safety issues. LANL ESH-5 and Firearms Safety Committee are charged with oversight of Firearms Safety at LANL.

REMARKS:
1. PTLA should provide LANL ESH-5, as a minimum, one weeks notice prior to each exercise. ESH-5 verifies compliance with DOE Order 5480.16A. Failure to notify may impact PTLA's CPAF.
2. LANL ESH-5 and the Firearms Safety Committee should verify compliance with DOE Order 5480.16A. During exercises the LANL Safety Representative should view the exchange of live weapons, the issuing of exercise munitions, review exercise, and safety plans, and observe the exercise.
PTLA Self Assessment for 1995

ASSESSOR: Safety: Paula Whitehead & Valerie Miranda

Phone: 665-8456 Fax: 667-1945 MS: K494

DATE: April 18, 1995
ISSUE NO: 95-6-ISE-PTLA-S-008 PRIORITY: 2
TOPICAL AREA: Safety

ISSUE: A cohesive firearms safety program should be established where PTLA and ESH sections function actively.

REFERENCES: TBD by PTLA

ROOT CAUSE: PTLA management has not identified this need.

LEAD PERSON: Phil Burnworth LEAD ORGANIZATION: PTLA
Phone: 5-1072 Fax: MS: G724

SUMMARY: Elements of a firearms safety program are being performed by PTLA ESH. A cohesive program should be developed that would coordinate and function with the LANL Firearms Safety Committee and LANL ESH-5.

ASSESSMENT: PTLA Policy & Resource Manual, 16.0 Firearms Safety, establishes the policy and responsibilities of such a program. This policy gives responsibility for development and implementation of a firearms safety program in conjunction with DOE/DOE-AL 5480.16A, and all other applicable standards and regulations to the PTLA ES&H and Training Departments.

REMARKS: A firearms safety program should be established within PTLA.