Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management Page: 3 of 14
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surplus material constitutes a clear and present danger to national and international security." This report
defines the need to safeguard and more comprehensively manage surplus inventories until permanent
disposition options can be selected. The state of technology to address this inventory will be explored.
DISCUSSION
Recently, numerous studies have been published concerning the management of plutonium.1- This fact
indicates the keen interest that the international community places on managing this material safely and
properly. Over the 50 years since the discovery of plutonium, the main use for plutonium in the U.S. was
in national defense. A second major use of plutonium has been as an energy source in advanced fuel
programs. At the time of the discovery, all plutonium work was conducted under self-imposed secrecy,
as a result of the recognition that it was possible to produce a powerful explosive through the rapid
fissioning of plutonium by neutron bombardment. This precedent was maintained during the cold war,
and very little actual information concerning the use and inventories of weapons plutonium was
published. Nume-rous physical security measures were deployed to protect against the diversion of either
information or the actual material outside the nuclear weapon community. This was accomplished fairly
easily because all the material was handled under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy Office of
Defense Programs (DOE/DP), and Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE/NE).
The New Requirements
The end of the cold war has brought about a significant change in how plutonium inventories are
managed. First, the Secretary of Energy began an initiative to increase the quality of ES&H management
within Department facilities.5 This step exposed the nuclear defense community to a broader range of
oversight organizations, most of which are outside the Department. At the same time, Congress
established the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), with the charter to evaluate the
performance of the Department of Energy (DOE) in the execution of its safety and health obligations.6
This became a very public vehicle for bringing scrutiny on the Department's nuclear operations. Congress
and the Department established the Office of Environmental Remediation and Waste Management
(DOE/EM) with the charter to clean up excess cold war nuclear facilities and sites.7 This resulted in the
transfer of a significant amount of plutonium to the new DOE/EM in the form of residues, waste, and
contaminated equipment and facilities. The DOE/EM Office is heavily involved in the privitization of
facility clean up functions, and most of the new contractors are unaware of the historical basis of nuclear
material management. The Secretary announced the "Openness Initiative" wherein previously classified
information was released for public consumption. This included the disclosure of quantities of plutonium
that exist in the defense inventories.8 Congress recognized the fact that plutonium would become an
inventory challenge and initiated the DOE Office of Material Disposition (DOE/MD) to evaluate
permanent disposition options for excess weapons materials. An additional dimension to the charter of
DOE/MD was the opening of relations with the Russian Federation and the discussion of plutonium
stabilization and disposition.9 In 1995, the President announced that the U.S. would place 200 metric
tons of special nuclear material under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
program.10 This action exposed the DOE facilities to the potential for international safeguard controls
over material. During 1994, two weapons DOE Complex-wide plutonium safety assessments were made;
one by the DNFSB and the other by the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Safety and Health.1,12
The latter assessment resulted from a 1993 Presidential initiative on nuclear nonproliferation and DOE's
effort to develop strategies for the eventual disposition of excess fissile materials.12,13 Both of these
assessments identified the imminent dangers to workers, environment, and the public associated with the
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Christensen, D. C.; Dinehart, S. M. & Yarbro, S. L. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management, article, December 31, 1995; New Mexico. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc668666/m1/3/: accessed April 18, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, UNT Digital Library, https://digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.