U.S. Department of Energy physical protection upgrades at the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center, Latvia Page: 4 of 7
This article is part of the collection entitled: Office of Scientific & Technical Information Technical Reports and was provided to Digital Library by the UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
factors also influenced the system design: the
limited service life of the reactor and budget
constraints. With these two factors in mind, the
upgrades must be cost-effective and also must
provide the elements of detection, delay, and
response consistent with the recommendations
in INFCIRC/225/Revision 3 and LNRC facility
personnel requirements and must meet the
objectives of DOE's MPC&A program.
Even before the completion of a system design,
work was initiated at the LNRC through a series
of tasks outlined in contracts between SNL and
the LNRC. The first of these contracts, which
was executed in July 1995, specified the
removal of debris and vegetation from around
the LNRC's perimeter to define a perimeter
clear zone. The elimination of such debris and
vegetation would increase the chances of
detecting an intruder attempting to covertly
cross the perimeter. Subsequent tasks included
hardening of doors, windows, the central alarm
station, and the perimeter access control
building, as well as installation of sensors, an
access control system, and upgraded hardware
for the central alarm station.
Under the terms of these contracts, the LNRC
receives payment upon completion of tasks.
The tasks could either be performed by LNRC
personnel or be carried out by a sub-contractor
to the center. Once SNL received and approved
invoices for completed tasks, funds were wire-
transferred to LNRC's bank.
The contracting process was beneficial in
several respects. It allowed SNL to leverage
relatively few technical project personnel
against greater numbers of LNRC personnel,
who performed a substantial portion of the
installation. The process also allowed SNL
personnel to work on other project activities
and yet maintain costs within budget. Addi-
tionally, the process also achieved a sense of
ownership and "buy-in" with the LNRC
personnel. This is essential since the center
would assume ultimate responsibility for the
operations and maintenance of the upgrades.
The third, but very key element of the imple-
mentation process is task performance.
Although the contracts were the formal mecha-
nism for specifying the performance of tasks,
significant interactions between SNL project
personnel and LNRC personnel occurred
throughout all project activities. Initial inter-
actions included interviews with LNRC person-
nel to determine system objectives and require-
ments and also to observe demonstrations of
proposed hardware. Subsequent interactions
occurred frequently from hardening of doors
and windows through installation of the central
alarm station. In this capacity, SNL project
team members provided technical advice and
oversight on the performance of tasks and
ensured their successful completion.
PHYSICAL PROTECTION UPGRADES -
The LNRC is located in a remote, wooded envi-
ronment and is surrounded by a perimeter fence
that is less than 1 kilometer in length. The
primary building is a multi-story building that
houses the IRT reactor. The center also main-
tains fresh and spent fuel storage facilities in
support of reactor operations. -
From a systematic approach to physical protec-
tion, the elements of detection, delay, response,
and access control must be included as parts of
the overall system. Whenever possible, consid-
eration was given to incorporating existing
detection, delay, and response elements into
proposed physical protection upgrades. Finally,
LNRC and Latvian government officials were .
trained in operating and maintaining the system -
and also received basic training on physical
protection system design.
Since an exterior intrusion detection system
existed around the LNRC's perimeter, only
minor upgrades were made to the exterior
system. Interior intrusion detection sensors
were installed at doors leading to critical areas.
Volumetric and surface penetration sensors also
were included as part of the interior upgrades.
Here’s what’s next.
This article can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Article.
Haase, M.; Hine, C.; Robertson, C.; Soo Hoo, M. S.; Engling, E.; Lapenas, A. et al. U.S. Department of Energy physical protection upgrades at the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center, Latvia, article, December 31, 1966; Albuquerque, New Mexico. (digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc668501/m1/4/: accessed January 22, 2019), University of North Texas Libraries, Digital Library, digital.library.unt.edu; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.