AN ANALYSIS OF RICHARD M. WEAVER'S PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY AS APPLIED TO TWO OF BARBARA JORDAN'S SPEECHES

THESIS

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This rhetorical thesis analyzes Richard M. Weaver's theories of rhetoric and his methodology for ranking argument types according to their perceived ethicality. Two keynote speeches by former U. S. Representative Barbara Jordan have been subjected to the Weaverian analysis. Ms. Jordan's argument types are characteristic of what Weaver considered ethical oratory. Weaver's axiological judgments and his dogmatic ranking of the hierarchy have generated some criticism from rhetorical scholars. Although this criticism is justified, Weaver's philosophy and methodology provide insight to a given's orator's philosophical perspective. The Weaverian analysis contributes to the understanding of not only the superficial aspects of an address, but also the underlying and sometimes hidden motivations of an orator.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A modern Platonic idealist and political conservative, Richard Weaver saw true rhetoric in the light of values and courses of action. His theory of rhetoric stressed invention, style, and argumentation, arguments capable of leading men to clearer visions of themselves in relation to the ultimate good. Though provocative, his insights stimulated modern academic interest in the classical values of modern rhetoric.\footnote{Richard Johannesen's succinct description of Richard Weaver accurately depicts the nature of Weaver's concern for the reestablishment of conservative thought and the search for universal truths by applying his classical, rhetorical concepts. Weaver suggests a method to evaluate and analyze what a speaker may truly be saying, but the validity of that method may be questionable. Though Weaver has been surveyed and examined, little if any effort has been made to apply his criticism to contemporary speakers, and thus attempt to validate his methods objectively. As Richard Johannesen points out, "Although no one has analyzed his theory of rhetoric and criticism, his writings have influenced several theorists."\footnote{An application of Weaver's theories of rhetorical criticism, including his hierarchy of topics, to a contemporary politician whose style is highly regarded would provide a means by which the validity and applicability could be determined. If, in fact, some interesting and practical applications of}}
Weaver's philosophy can be ascertained, then the rhetorical scholar as well as the interested layman can benefit. The scholar would then have at his disposal an alternative or supplementary means by which speakers could be evaluated on ethical and political motivation. Working from Weaverian definitions, students could assess philosophical conservatism or liberalism through the rigid confines of Weaver's hierarchically arranged arguments. Although theoretically extreme, other applications could be made from examining historical texts to examining the ethicality of T.V. commercials. These extreme examples are not the purpose of this study, but they do serve to show the possible extent of, the meaningful relationship between, rhetorical criticism and contemporary applications.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine the validity of Richard Weaver's method of analysis by applying it to the speeches of a person widely accepted as a superior speaker. Validity has been determined by comparing the Weaverian analysis with available criticism of the chosen speaker and her work. Further, the validity of such an approach has been weighed with regard to arguments of rhetorical scholars in the field.

U. S. House of Representative Barbara Jordan was chosen as the superior speaker. Ms. Jordan was selected because of her national recognition and popularity, her dynamic style,
and also because of her relative availability. Her apparent political and social attractiveness typically warrant such laudatory reviews as this:

Barbara Jordan: the first black woman everything. The symbolic orator of the south, with the stained-glass voice who in 1976 electrified TV viewers and milling delegates alike, as the Democratic National Convention Keynoter.3

Two of Representative Jordan's speeches have been subjected to a Weaverian analysis to determine the degree of usage of arguments of definition or genus, similitude, cause and effect (consequence), or circumstance. There will be an attempt to discover identifiable, unifying trends within the texts. Specific examples of the different types of arguments identified in Ms. Jordan's speeches should reveal such trends and characterize the type of orator Weaver would consider Ms. Jordan to be.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a description of Richard Weaver's background and philosophy—most specifically related to rhetorical criticism and the foundations thereof; also a discussion of his methods and applications. Chapter II includes criticism of Weaver's philosophy and methods and a discussion of the inherent problems involved with trying to apply those methods. Chapter III is the actual application of Weaver's theories to two of Representative Jordan's speeches. Also, the rationale for Ms. Jordan's selection and brief biographical sketch is included. Chapter IV offers conclusions and comparisons of available criticism of Barbara Jordan's speech to the Weaverian analysis.
Biographical Background

In an autobiographical essay entitled "Up From Liberalism," Richard Weaver traces his philosophical growth, strongly claiming his Southern, conservative, agrarian heritage. At the age of seventeen, Weaver entered the University of Kentucky which he declared, by European standards, to be a "provincial university." He qualified this perspective by commenting, "but I have since come to believe that if it had become more provincial in the right way and less sedulously imitative of the dominant American model, it would have offered better fare." 

His political philosophies reflected a liberal influence which he attributed to his professors at the University of Kentucky. By his third year at Kentucky, Weaver recalled, "I had been persuaded entirely that the future was with science, liberalism, and equalitarianism, and that all opposed to these trends were people of ignorance or malevolence." Weaver graduated in May 1932, as the Depression was reaching its lowest economic depths. At this time Weaver joined the American Socialist Party. Although Weaver's professed ideals aligned with those of the party, he had trouble identifying with the members on a personal level. "My disillusionment with the left began with the first practical step." 

At this time, he entered into graduate work at Vanderbilt University to study literature. His liberalism was waning, and again his professors were having a marked effect upon Weaver's perspective. "I found that although I disagreed with these men
on matters of social and political doctrine, I liked them all as persons." Heaver's critical view thus influenced, he began to reexamine his allegiance with social groups. "It began to dawn upon me uneasily that perhaps a right way to judge a movement was by the persons who made it up, rather than by its rationalistic perfection and by the premise it held out."  

Weaver professed to be greatly influenced by John Crowe Ransom, a teacher of literature and a psychologist. Weaver said of Ransom, "He had a gift of dropping living seeds into the minds." Ransom's book entitled, *God Without Thunder*, provided some clarification for Weaver with regard to the perpetuation of the traditional view. Weaver reveals an insight he obtained from the book: "I began to perceive that many traditional positions in our world had suffered not so much because of inherent defect as because of the stupidity, ineptness, and intellectual sloth of those whom, for one reason or another, were presumed to have their defense in charge."  

Weaver left Vanderbilt to accept a teaching post with "a large technical college in Texas." Weaver said of Texas:  

It has been remarked that in the United States, California is the embodiment of materialism and Texas of naturalism. I found the observation true with regard to my part of Texas, where I encountered a rampant Philistinism, abetted by technology, large-scale organization, and complacent acceptance of success as the goal of life.  

At the age of thirty, Weaver studied history preferring "first-hand accounts" of the American Civil War. At this
time Weaver was also becoming disdainful of historical and political references that were rationalized as pursuits of progress. His idealism is revealed through statements such as the following.

But it is good for everyone to ally himself at one time with the defeated and to look at the 'progress' through the eyes of those who were left behind.13

Weaver completed his formal education at Louisiana State University. He also taught for several years at the University of Chicago. He accepted a post with Vanderbilt University and a chance to return to the South, but died before returning. In spite of Weaver's early liberal influences, he viewed himself in later life as an arch conservative. He summed up the gradual change by remarking: "I had felt a powerful pull in the direction of the agrarian ideal of the individual in contact with the rhythms of nature, of small-property holding and of the society of pluralistic organization."14

Philosophy/Analysis

Richard Johannesen, Rennard Strickland and Ralph T. Eubanks, in an interpretation of Richard M. Weaver on the nature of rhetoric, describe Weaver's role as a social critic and rhetorician:

Weaver as a social critic has sought to clarify the role of rhetoric in improving a declining modern culture. At one point in Visions of Order he describes a kind of doctor of culture; a description which could also serve as a virtual self portrait.15
Richard Weaver, educator, writer, social philosopher and critic, believed that the study and application of rhetoric are essential elements for the social evolution of a culture. His studies were not concerned with abstract philosophy, but founded upon the belief that man's use of language acts as a barometer for the culture; as the culture ascends and descends so does the nature of language. From Language is Sermonic, Weaver amplifies this idea by quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson: "The corruption of man is followed by the corruption of language." 16

Weaver's philosophy reflects the works of such men as Plato, Quintilian, John Milton, and Kenneth Burke. His writings are critical of pluralistic values in society. He suggests that the search for truth should be the main criterion for any rhetorical or philosophical endeavor, and that circumstances or acts of expediency that inhibit the search for the truth are detrimental. Further, he is critical of those who believe that the passage of time solely warrants philosophical or attitudinal changes that are characteristic of what is considered modern. Weaver explains:

By thus assuming that we are prisoners of the moment, the objection well reveals the philosophic position of modernism. The believer in truth, on the other hand, is bound to maintain that the things of highest value are not affected by the passage of time; otherwise the very concept of truth becomes impossible. In declaring that we wish to recover lost ideals and values, we are looking toward an ontological realm which is timeless. Only the sheerest relativism insists that passing time renders unattainable one ideal while forcing upon us another. Therefore those who say we can have the integration we wish, and those who say we cannot,
differ in their ideas of ultimate reality, for the latter are positing the primacy of time and of matter. And this is the kind of division which prevents us from having one world.17

Weaver's belief in universals is inherently rigid. He is an idealist who hopes man can find redemption through ethical public address and the purity of thought.

The only redemption lies in restraint imposed by ideas; but our ideas, if they are not to worsen the confusion, must be harmonized by some vision. Our task is much like finding the relationship between faith and reason for an age that does not know the meaning of faith.18

Weaver sought out that relationship between faith and reason by examining representative public address that was either consistent with his own high idealism or inconsistent, and, therefore, less ethical. As Donald Cushman and Gerald Hayser point out: "Richard Weaver shares with most rhetorical theorists an interest in uncovering and explaining the springs of human activity, but unlike a significant number of rhetoricians, he ventures to be evaluative of the sources he unearths."19

The relationship between faith and reason exists in a balance that Weaver perceives through the ethical discretion of a particular orator.

Abraham Lincoln, Edmund Burke, Clarence Darrow, and Williams Jennings Bryan were among the orators he studied. Weaver viewed rhetoric thusly: "Rhetoric must be viewed formally as operating at the point where literature and politics meet, or where literary values and political urgencies can be brought together."20 Weaver's theoretical boundaries provide a justification for an examination and
application of his idealistic scrutiny. Further, this idealism is reflected in the way particular orators used every aspect of language.

Richard Johannesen points out: "An essential element in Weaver's view was the belief that all language is ser-
monic, all language choices reflect tendencies, attitudes,
and assumptions."²¹ Weaver views language as having the power to cure the evils of society or the power to bring it to its knees. Weaver explains the ideal nature of language through rhetoric as an art:

I must turn here to what should be called the office of rhetoric. Rhetoric seen in the whole conspectus of its function in an art of emphasis embodying an order of desire. Rhetoric is advisory; it has the office of advising men with reference to an independent order of goods and with reference to their particular situation as it relates to these.²²

According to Weaver, the speaker who utilizes this power of language has an ethical responsibility. The responsibility entails more than logistics or plans for personal gains. In this sense, Weaver characterizes speakers by their style because the style denotes the explicit and implicit intent. This idealistic view is partially derived from Weaver's analysis of Plato's essay "The Phaedrus." Again, Johannesen suggests Weaver's interpretation of the essay.

Among other things it was a commentary on rhetoric in the guise of the metaphor of love. Weaver's perception of the Phaedrus thus allows him to explain three types of lovers: the nonlover, the evil lover, and the noble lover which he in turn equates with the neutral speaker, the evil speaker, and the noble speaker.²³

Weaver cautions audiences to scrutinize a speaker's method because "a man's method of argument is a truer index
of his beliefs than his explicit profession of principles." Weaver sees the honest rhetorician as having two things in mind: "A vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of special circumstances of his auditors. Toward both of these, he has a responsibility." It is to this end that Weaver seeks to analyze speakers.

Weaver's methods go beyond literary criticism for he critiques not only the context, but also the source. Weaver outlines a hierarchy of topics to assess the types of ethical appeals. Ranked from the most desirable to the least, they are: arguments by genus or definition, similitude, consequence, cause and effect, and circumstance. Not all speakers Weaver sought to analyze argued exclusively from one style or topic, but Weaver found general trends from which he could characterize the general mode.

Weaver maintains that by examining the major premise of a body of arguments, one can ascertain the philosophical lean of a particular orator. This is an example of the rigidity inherent within Weaver's philosophy. Weaver makes it clear that his systematic formula distinguishes the noble rhetorician from the ignoble or indifferent one.

All men argue alike when they argue validity because the modes of inference are formulas, from which deviation is error. Therefore we characterize inference as valid or invalid. But the reasoner reveals his philosophical position by the source of argument which appears most often in his major premise because the major premise tells us how he is thinking about the world.
Weaver thus concludes that a speaker reveals more than policy for given topics; a speaker's philosophical/political motivation is revealed through his choice of arguments.

Weaver's assumptions concerning the ethicality of a speaker are similar to those of Quintilian. Weaver notes, "... we speak as rhetoricians affecting one another for good or ill." Weaver's hierarchy of topics provides a means by which the rhetorical arguments of a speaker can be ranked according to their perceived ethicality denoting the rhetor's philosophical intentions. Weaver comments:

As rhetoric confronts us with choices involving values, the rhetorician is a preacher to us, noble if he tries to direct our passion toward noble ends and base if he uses our passion to confuse us and degrade us.

According to Weaver, if a speaker chooses to argue chiefly by defining principles and referencing the values of his audience, and by avoiding emotional or purely statistical appeals, the speaker must be perceived as an ethical practitioner.

Underlying the choice of argument types is the method of investigation. Weaver believes that rhetoric is preceded by dialectic.

Dialectic is that stage which defines the subject satisfactorily with regard to the logos, or the set of propositions making up some coherent universe of discourse; and we can therefore say that a dialectical position is established when its relation to an opposite has been made clear and it is thus rationally rather than empirically sustained.

Weaver clarifies the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic explaining: "What a successful dialectic secures for
any position . . . , is not actuality but possibility; and what rhetoric thereafter accomplishes is to take any dialectically secured position . . . and show its relationship to the world of prudential conduct." 31 A dialectical investigation naturally precedes Weaver's hierarchy of topics.

The philosophical choices which speakers make are revealed through the hierarchy of topics alluded to previously. Weaver clarifies by noting:

We no sooner begin to talk about the world than we find ourselves saying that such and such thing exists as a member of such and such a class, or that it is the known cause for a certain effect (or the known effect of a certain cause) or that it has certain points of similarity with some other thing. 32

The validity of those choices cease being artistic, according to Weaver.

Weaver has borrowed the label of topics from the classically derived "topoi or regions."

They are so called because they constitute regions of experience from which the substance of an argument can be drawn. It is a matter of everyday observation that arguments are made by saying that X is a kind of thing, or that X has a known definite effect or that X has important points of similarity with a thing better understood than itself. 'The topics' represent only an analysis of those kinds of predictables that may appear in arguments. 33

From this classical perspective, Weaver developed the hierarchy of topics including genus or definition, similitude, consequence, circumstance, and testimony. Testimony is generally not included because the ethicality of the person being referenced is always judged independently for every given audience.
The most ethical topic in the hierarchy is that of genus or definition. According to Weaver, a true conservative argues this topic as his main premise, although the argument need not be employed exclusively. The argument is based upon an axiom that states that there are fixed orders or concepts within society and within a specific audiences' mind. Weaver wrote, "To argue from genus or definition was to get people to see what is most permanent in existence, or what transcends the world of accident."34

The argument from genus or definition comprises all arguments made from the nature of a thing. In presenting this type of argument, we merely take whatever fact or idea is the subject of our deliberation and refer it to its class. If our audience is sufficiently impressed with the actuality of that class, (i.e., with its reality as a class containing this member among others), it will grant whatever is true of this fact or idea in question, which is the point we are seeking to make by our argument.35

One of the examples Weaver cites is that of a preacher arguing from the genus of "sin." The congregation needs no clarification or redefinition, the argument is an accepted presupposition.

The argument from definition, unlike the argument of genus, requires clarification or qualification to clearly establish the new generic term in the mind of the audience. Weaver clarifies the relationship:

The first type (genus employs a universally accepted convention. ... But there are many terms whose scope is by no means fixed, so that any successful employment of them requires a certain amount of explicit definition. One has to define them because one knows that their correct definitions are not perceived.36
Weaver cites more ambiguous examples of new generic terms that require qualification such as "democracy" and "liberty."

Democracy is surrounded by so much nebulosity that one cannot, until this labor is performed, expect much similarity of conception. That is to say, it is now in the public mind a clear genus.37

Weaver perceived Abraham Lincoln as a speaker whose main premise was often representative of the argument from definition or genus. He provides an example by illustrating Lincoln's typical reply to the proponents of slavery.

Yet while other political leaders were looking to the law, to American history, and to this or that political contingency, Lincoln looked -- as it was his habit already to do -- to the center; that is, to the definition of man. Was the negro a man or was he not? It can be shown that his answer to this question never varied, despite willingness to recognize some temporary and even some permanent minority on the part of the African race. The answer was a clear 'yes,' and he used it on many occasions during the fifties to impale his opponents.38

Weaver stated that argument by similitude is generally used by poets and theologians. These arguments are metaphors, analogies, and comparisons. The inverse, selecting and comparing differences, also is structurally similar. Weaver points out that some logicians refer to such comparative differences as "negative analogies."39 "An important thing to remember in both is that they rest, as arguments, on two instances; that is, in using likeness or difference, we argue from one case to another, unlike the practice of induction, where we argue from a large number of particular cases to a general rule or law."40
Weaver also commented on the predictive nature of this type of argument.

If required to characterize the outlook it implies, we should say it expresses belief in oneness in the world, which causes all correspondence to have probative value. These further could be characterized as arguments by association, ethical for the audience must accept the proposed association if the argument is to be effective. 41

Weaver perceives this type of argument as not being that far removed from the argument of genus or definition with regard to ethicality.

Arguments from consequence are characterized by the cause and effect relationships inherent within the premise. Weaver comments:

Another way to interpret a subject is to place it in a cause-and-effect relationship. The process of interpretation is then to affirm it as the cause of some effect or the effect of some cause. And the attitudes of those who are listening will be affected according to whether or not they agree with our cause-and-effect analysis. 42

The validity of this type of argument is dependent upon the specific audience's ability or desire to reason or accept the reasoning of a given speaker.

Examples of such arguments are cited by Weaver. "The classical argument from effect to cause is the proof of existence of God from the existence of order in the universe. The argument here consists of observing the effect and then postulating a cause which will explain the effect." 43 The cause to effect argument is illustrated by Edmund Burke's speech on American taxation: "The cause (unjust treatment
of the American colonies) to the effect (discontent, disorder, disobedience)."\(^{44}\)

Weaver cites one more example of a subset of the argument from consequence, the argument from "sign." "When one observes some of the effects and argues from them and thence to another effect, then it is arguing from sign."\(^ {45}\) Weaver's example of such an argument is, "a cold snap will not only produce ice on ponds but will cause people to dress warmly."\(^ {46}\)

The use of argument from consequence is ranked lower on the hierarchy than genus or definition or similitude because causal reasoning cannot be widely applied: therefore, the predictive nature of these arguments is limited by the perception of a given audience, and also by the biased reasoning of a speaker. Weaver is critical of this argument's use and he explains why in the following:

To associate this source of argument with its habitual users, I must note that it is heard most commonly from those who are characteristically pragmatic in their way of thinking. It is not unusual today to find a lengthy piece of journalism or an entire political speech which is nothing but a series of arguments from consequence -- completely devoid of reference to principle or defined ideas. We rightly recognize these as sensational types of appeals.\(^ {47}\)

Weaver defines the least desirable type of argument as that kind characterized by circumstance. "This argument merely reads the circumstances--the facts standing around, and accepts them as coercive, allows them to dictate the decision."\(^ {48}\) Weaver associates this type of argument with the true liberal practitioner. It is generally the more substantive
argument today because of the relative important so many place on facts and figures. Arguing from circumstance is the least idealistic for the method generally argues symptoms, but not the true nature of a problem. Weaver thus clarifies his view of the liberal practitioner.

Argument from circumstances characterizes those who are easily impressed by existing tangibles, and such argument marks the true liberal. The arguers from circumstance, concerned not with the conceptions of verities but qualities of perceptions, lack moral vision and possess only the illusion of reality. We are driven back upon this method of argument when a course of action cannot be vindicated by principle or when effects cannot be demonstrated. The argument simply cites brute circumstances; it suggests expediency.49

Weaver cites Edmund Burke as the main proponent of this style. Weaver cites many examples of Burke's speeches in which Burke used arguments that were marked by reference to number or size. Weaver points out an explicit passage from a speech in which Burke makes a plea to the House of Commons suggesting that they be indulgent with the colonists and lists the circumstances that warrant such an appeal.

The circumstance is that America is a growing country, of awesome potentiality, whose strength both actual and imminent, makes it advisable for the Mother Country to overlook abstract rights.50

The key point is that it is the size and potential of America which is the important consideration with regard to England's ability to compromise. Burke is suggesting that this idea is the main consideration and does not consider argument from genus; in fact, he is opposed to it. In this sense, Weaver viewed orators such as Burke not only as
a liberal practitioner, but through the arguments of circumstance, a potential harm to the conservative thinker. Weaver feared that expedient factors could have undue influence upon an otherwise conservative, but naive or unassuming audience. Weaver concluded: "The argument from circumstance is the argument philosophically appropriate to the liberal. Indeed, one can go much further to say it is the argument fatal to the conservative."\(^5\)

Weaver's limiting philosophy provides the basis and criteria by which to judge the character of a speaker. His goal is to examine man's rhetorical opinions and the balance between historical responsibility and local expedient factors of which his audience are aware. Weaver believes in universal standards and searches for the expression of such standards in the orators he evaluates.

For Weaver, rhetoric is concerned not with abstract individuals, but with men in being. Rhetoric begins with the assumption that man is born into history. If he is to be moved, the arguments addressed to him must have historicity as well as logicality.\(^5\)
NOTES


18. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, p. 34.

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46 Bilskey, Hazlett, Streeter, and Weaver, p. 214.
47 Weaver, Language Is Sermonic, p. 214.
48 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 57.
49 Weaver, Language Is Sermonic, p. 24.
50 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 114.
51 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 57.
CHAPTER II

CRITICISM OF WEAVER'S PHILOSOPHY AND APPLICATION OF HIERARCHY

Richard Weaver's philosophy and application of his hierarchy of topics has generated some criticism due to the inherent rigidity of the system. Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks have generally been proponents of Weaver's views and, in the following chapter, opponents' views are discussed.

From the forward of the book entitled, Language Is Sermonic, Johannesen, Strickland and Eubanks restate Weaver's basic contentions regarding rhetorical criticism and analysis:

Weaver's writings on rhetoric emphasize the processes and techniques of invention and the elements of effective style, giving minor place to organization and none to the classical canons of delivery and memory. He aims indeed at revitalizing invention and argumentation. To Weaver true rhetoric involves choices among values and courses of action; it aims at showing men better visions of themselves and better visions of ultimate good. As a Platonic idealist and political conservative, he praised the ideal, the essence, the unchangeable, and condemned the particular, the transitory and the expedient. A speaker's characteristic use of the argument from genus, definition, similitude, cause and effect, consequence and circumstance, Weaver regarded as an index to the speaker's philosophical viewpoint and ethical stature. 1

Weaver's complex philosophy and dogmatic application provides the rhetorical critic a wide latitude for criticism.
Weaver maintains that the "philosophical viewpoint" and "ethical stature" of a given orator are revealed through the recurring use of one or more of the argument types from the hierarchy previously mentioned in Chapter I. Rhetorical critics such as Dennis Bormann raise the question: "Can one label a man a conservative or a liberal from a consideration of the rhetorical positions he adopts?"  

Bormann has criticized Weaver's system, especially with regard to his analysis of Edmund Burke. In this passage, Weaver summarizes his general view of Burke.

Burke was widely respected as a conservative who was intelligent enough to provide solid philosophical foundations for his conservatism. It is perfectly true that many of his observations upon society have a conservative basis; but if one studied the kind of argument Burke regularly employed when at grips with concrete policies, one discovers an addiction to the argument from circumstance... the argument from circumstance is philosophically appropriate to the liberal.  

Bormann believes Weaver's system is an inadequate means by which assignment of political philosophy is determined by argument usage. Bormann charges this is antiquated, limiting and unrealistic. "I am afraid that unless we are willing to return to the 'old armchair' analysis prevalent before the Renaissance, and unless we are willing to believe that argument can take place in a vacuum without reference to reality, we must disagree with Weaver's approach to argument."  

Bormann notes inconsistencies from Weaver's studies by comparing the argument types of Burke to those of Lincoln.
Bormann theorizes that Burke's speeches on America are examples of arguments from genus. Bormann maintains that because the argument's major premise was not explicit, Weaver ascertained that one (a major premise) did not exist. Bormann explains Burke's major premise with a citation from one of the speeches.

Burke's major premise may, however, be stated as follows: Englishmen have certain rights and freedoms. Then he defined the Colonists as Englishmen. It follows that the Colonists are entitled to the same rights and freedoms as all other Englishmen. . . . Now this is the same type of argument that Weaver says underlies Lincoln's speaking on slavery. Lincoln said that all men have certain unalienable rights. Next he defined the negro as a man.5

Discrepancies noted by Bormann suggest that at least one difficulty in trying to apply Weaver's hierarchy may lie with interpretation. From the previous argument, Weaver assumed no major premise was evident, but Bormann's application suggested an argument from genus was the central premise.

Bormann presents, perhaps, a more serious question: Does Weaver furnish enough evidence to provide a rationale for realistic application? Bormann points out:

It would seem, then that the rhetorical situation in which a speaker finds himself will have a great influence on the type or argument he must use if he is trying to be effective. One must be careful in making generalizations and giving labels on the basis of the types of argument a man has used, without examining the context in which he employed it.6

Not only does Bormann suggest that Weaver does not consider the whole context of a speech, but he also infers that Weaver is perhaps disdainful of an Aristotelian perspective.
"Good practitioners in the art of public address have done as much as Burke did and used all the available means of persuasion within a given context." Bormann concludes that Weaver's system of analysis is superficially static because Weaver views the speech situation in its parts, rather than as an integrated process.

J. Michael Sproule is in accord with Bormann's conclusion. His criticism of Weaver revolves around three questions:

1. Is it possible to classify arguments objectively, as belonging to the categories of circumstance or genus?
2. Do circumstance-based contentions arise only from expedient, factual inquiries which are devoid of underlying universal values?
3. Do arguments of genus flow only from a process of invention which includes appropriate attention to dialectic and rhetoric?

Sproule, like Bormann, finds it difficult to assume Weaverian classifications for arguments from only a superficial examination of an argument. A statement may appear arbitrarily to be based on an argument from circumstance, but the underlying motives may represent an argument from genus. Sproule cites one of Burke's arguments that Weaver considered to be an argument from circumstance. Burke commented, "That because of the great number of people in Ireland, the English government will find the disabilities against the Irish impossible to maintain." Sproule maintains that this argument represents an argument from genus, and justifies his position thusly: "Burke's citation of the human tendency not to suffer repression is an argument based,
at least in part, on the same genus" (that genus of the inalienable rights of men).\textsuperscript{10}

Sproule's second question, "Do circumstance-based contentions arise only from expedient, factual inquiries which are devoid of underlying universal values?"\textsuperscript{11} is similar to Bormann's reference to artistic choices that arise from an Aristotelian approach. Sproule views that the rhetorical aspects of a given situation may warrant specific argument types and even a dialectically secured position does not necessarily warrant definitional type arguments. "In viewing the connections of the construct, one is struck by the possibility that, in a rhetorical sense, the outcome of a dialectic may be publically presented via claims other than those of definitional types."\textsuperscript{12}

Sproule's third question, "Do arguments of genus necessarily spring only from dialectically secured positions?"\textsuperscript{13}

begins an inquiry into the "hidden nature of the genus.

Sproule elaborates:

The hidden nature of an argument's intellectual origin would seem to allow for the possibility that conclusions may be reached on the basis of prejudice (i.e., ignorance) or ideology, as well as dialectic, and yet be communicated under the rubric genus. First, let us consider the possibility that a genus has, as its source, a hasty prejudgment.\textsuperscript{14}

Sproule's reasoning is exemplified through Weaver's examination of the Scopes trial. Weaver believed that the prosecution argued from genus, the law, and that the defense argued from circumstance, evolution is fact. According to
Weaver, the argument from genus is the argument of the highest order. Weaver notes that, "The defense disputed the allegedly dialectical nature of the law against teaching evolution, arguing that it was based on ignorance and prejudice." Sproule suggests that if the defense's contention was correct, then the prosecution is no longer arguing from the highest order of knowledge, although it is still an argument from genus. Sproule concludes:

If, then, because of prejudice (ignorance) or ideology, terms may be falsely applied, what guarantee have we that a definitionally stated argument is a product of a legitimate application of dialectical terms? Surely the mere fact that as arguer uses 'ultimate terms,' professes moral values and invokes definitions, does not necessarily allow a favorable judgment of his moral philosophical worth.

Sproule provides a summary that is inclusive. His summary is not only representative of a narrow perspective from his own research, but his arguments reinforce those brought by rhetorical scholars such as Richard Johannesen, Dennis Bormann and Ralph T. Eubanks. Sproule concludes:

The limitations of Weaver's critical construct are, then, basically three-fold: (1) it is not a straightforward matter to classify arguments as representatives of Weaverian typologies, (2) a circumstantial assertion may arise from a dialectical source, and (3) a definitional may proceed from a prejudicial or ideological analysis.

John R. E. Bliese is also critical of Weaver's hierarchy, and especially the corresponding labeling of argument types to political ideologies. "Much of the controversy surrounding Weaver centers on his political application of his axiology of argument." Bliese suggests that, "It
certainly is the point at which his system was weakest, and the problems encountered here may have led him toward a transcendence of the system later in his life.\textsuperscript{19}

Much of the confusion stems from Weaver's unique definitions for "liberal and conservative." Weaver believed that the liberal practitioner is characterized by his use of the argument from circumstance. Bliese clarifies Weaver's use of the term "liberal." "By liberal he does not mean one who identifies with the political left, rather he means one who identifies with the center, 'a middle-of-the-roader'."\textsuperscript{20} Bliese maintains that this explanation is not clearly stated in Weaver's books, \textit{The Ethics of Rhetoric} and \textit{Language Is Sermonic}.

Bliese notes that confusion exists with the association of the term leftist with liberal or "relativist." Once again, Bliese interprets Weaver's explanation of a leftist or radical. "The radical position is not one occupying central ground; rather it is 'one of the polar positions,' it is the 'vivifying opposite' of conservatism, which occupies the other pole."\textsuperscript{21} Bliese suggests that Weaver is inconsistent on this point, noting that on some occasions radicals argue from consequence, but also reporting that pragmatists also argue from consequence, the argument that incites an action. The confusion arises because a radical is not necessarily pragmatic, nor is a pragmatist necessarily radical--Weaver is vague on this point.
Bliese's criticism of Weaver's use of the term conservative is similar to the critical view held by Borman and Sproule. Weaver believed that the argument from genus is the argument that serves as the central premise for the conservative approach. The argument from genus or principle is indicative of a conservative. Bliese points out the contradictory nature of this perception.

Weaver's position that the conservative should argue from principle, obviously poses a problem. Russel Kirk identified the difficulty at its extreme: if arguing from principle alone qualifies one as a conservative, then Robespierre is a better conservative than even Lincoln, 'because Robespierre always guided himself by reference to abstract definition, with a fine indifference to particular circumstances.' That is radicalism, the polar opposite of conservatism, would become the conservative paradigm.22

Although Kirk's interpretation suggests the conflict between principle and reality, Bliese defends Weaver's comprehensive view. "Weaver does not claim that just any principle or definition is proper for a conservative's major premise. It must be one that is ethical, founded on a thorough and honest dialectic."23 The essential problem Bliese seeks to illustrate is one of complexity and ambiguity in trying to apply Weaver's definitions to the historical text.

"Compounding the problem of analyzing and evaluating speeches further, is the medium itself. The rhetorical theorist or critic is handicapped because speech cannot be adequately represented in writing; it is illogical and presumptuous to study, critically, oral communication received from an inappropriate medium (the printed page) via an inappropriate..."
sensory channel (vision)." Phillip Tompkins, the author and proponent of this view, concludes that the written text, although useful, often causes incorrect interpretation. Wayne Thompson points out, "a study that only considers the written draft of a speech, although useful in reaching limited objectives, is incomplete. The effects of figures of speech, comparisons, varied sentence structure, parallelism, and repetition depends upon delivery as well as composition."

The analysis put forth by these critics is valid and provides an insight for the application of the Weaverian hierarchy and principles. Keeping in mind the concern of Bormann and Sproule of examining the total context and not just superficial statements, Ms. Jordan's argument can be more accurately identified. From this perspective, a consistent application has been sought which allows for the qualification of the context and connotative inferences.

Secondly, it is important to discern the speaker's intent, and to accurately establish that speaker's major premise. The problems of identification and interpretation are compounded by Weaver's sometimes vague system and further by the speeches themselves when random argument types are interwoven. One example from Ms. Jordan's Keynote Address to the 1976 Democratic National Convention exemplifies the interpreter's difficulty with analysis. Ms. Jordan defines government through a series of propositional statements. Each definition-type argument would be considered an "ethical" appeal by Weaver's standards.
One of the propositional statements, "We do not reject our traditions, but we are willing to adapt to changing circumstances" suggests an argument from circumstance. If the adoption of new ways is warranted by only changing events or expedient circumstances as the statement superficially suggests, this statement is indeed an argument from circumstance and according to Weaver unethical. But considering the total context from which the statement is drawn, it must be concluded that the argument is not representative of the typical, unethical, circumstance mode. The statement is supportive of the theme which suggests changes occur through citizens who, "... participate in the management of the government." Historically, legal changes have occurred in this democratic manner. Should the individual critic label argument types by considering the overall context or placing the emphasis on the face value? Weaver's system lacks sufficient guidelines in this area.

Weaver believes that the central premise is revealed through recurring argument types. As previously stated, the two speeches selected exhibited interweaving, different argument types, often one reinforcing the other. The Keynote Address to the First National Women's Conference revealed as many arguments from cause and effect or consequence as definitional arguments. These were the main types of argumentation. Whether or not these arguments represent the speech's central premise, it is again determined through the individual critic's judicious analysis.
The concerns of Tompkins and Thompson are important ones for any rhetorical study, but lessened through the choice of Ms. Jordan whose audience has included most of the country via television and whose style and speaking ability have often been critiqued. The central issue for this study is to test Weaver's idealistic approach for its practical applicability. Bormann, Sproule, Bliese, and Johannesen accurately illuminate the problems that are inherent within Weaver's axiology and hierarchy. Their criticism provides a tempering guide and a warning with regard to the areas that cause the most confusion.
NOTES


4. Bormann, p. 305.

5. Bormann, p. 299.


10. Sproule, p. 298.


15. Sproule, p. 300.


17. Sproule, p. 303.


20 Bliese, p. 282.
21 Bliese, p. 284.
22 Bliese, p. 285.


CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF TWO OF BARBARA JORDAN'S SPEECHES

Two of former U. S. Representative Barbara Jordan's speeches have been examined to determine the type argument associated most often with the major premise. The arguments from genus or definition, similitude, consequence, circumstance, and to a lesser degree, testimony, have been sought. The argument revealed in the major premise is singularly most important, but recurring use of dissimilar arguments may also provide an insight into Ms. Jordan's preference (intentional or unintentional) for Weaverian argument types.

The Keynote Address to the 1976 Democratic National Convention and the Keynote Address to the First National Women's Conference were chosen as representative works of Ms. Jordan. The speeches were selected primarily due to the important issues and national attention and criticism each generated. The Democratic National Convention's purpose was to select the candidate who ultimately became President of the United States. Ms. Jordan's selection as the first woman and the first Black to speak at a convention of such magnitude emphasized the respect and the national prominence she had attained. Lady Bird Johnson said of her: "She is no longer ours
exclusively. Her voice is an American voice now, speaking with compassion and with wisdom . . . speaking for justice . . . speaking with a compelling eloquence that has gripped this nation's heart and held its people spellbound."¹

The First National Women's Conference, held in Houston, was newsworthy because of the precedent it set and, also, because of the importance of its ultimate goal: to "Hold hearings, interview experts on women's issues, conduct research and surveys, and produce 115 specific recommendations for remedial action that were incorporated by the national commission into its formal report to the President in 1976."²

The choice of Ms. Barbara Jordan honored her greatly when one considers that the National Women's Conference was the first Congressionally and Presidentially sanctioned and financed gathering of women to discuss issues concerning women. It was the first such conference to be held in this country. It was the first such meeting for women of such heterogenous backgrounds, ideals, philosophies, and political preferences.

Biographical Background of the Speaker

At the apex of a brief but spectacular political career, Barbara Jordan's popularity and exalted status as an orator and proponent of constitutiounal ideals generates admiration and respect from a plethora of sources. From the 1976 Democratic Keynote Address, she explains her own perception of the personal and historical significance of her selection as the Keynote Speaker:
But there is something different about tonight. There is something special about tonight. What is different? What is special? I, Barbara Jordan am a keynote speaker.

A lot of years have passed since 1832, and during that time it would have been most unusual for any National political party to ask that a Barbara Jordan deliver a keynote address. But tonight here I am. And I feel not withstanding the past, my presence here is one additional bit of evidence that the American Dream need not ever be deferred.3

The following account from Good Housekeeping magazine adds to our picture of her.

Even as a child she was one of the rare ones, Barbara Jordan's father once said. . . . They're still saying that about the tall earnest, black woman from Texas. At 41, she is one of the most admired women in the country. At least 20 requests for her to speak come in every morning's mail. She has been awarded honorary degrees by 24 universities, among them Harvard and Notre Dame and has been singled out for honors and awards by more than 200 national organizations--all in the four short years she has served in the U. S. House of Representatives.4

Ms. Jordan's ascension into political life is noteworthy. Her father was a laborer and a Baptist preacher in Houston where she grew up. She attended Texas Southern University and graduated magna cum laude in 1956. Disdaining her familiar surroundings, she attended the Boston University School of Law. She was the first and only Black woman to attend the university at that time, but she succeeded and received her degree in 1960.

Upon returning to Texas, Ms. Jordan became interested in local politics and candidates. Due to this interest and the fact that she had an unusually good speaking style, her
friends urged her to run for public office. Ms. Jordan ran for the Texas legislature in 1962 and 1964, but lost. When the federal government ordered redistricting in Houston, she won a seat in the Texas Senate as the first Black senator in a century. Ms. Jordan was elected to the U. S. House of Representatives in 1972 and obtained a position on the influential Judiciary Committee. Lyndon Johnson once said of Barbara Jordan, "I don't know where her future is going to take her, but wherever she goes, we'll be right behind her."5

In 1975, an article in Newsweek magazine provided an analysis regarding Ms. Jordan's ability to influence and relate to a diversified audience.

The intellectual rigor and self-assurance that make her manner disagreeable to some, however, are the same qualities that have inspired her expansive and vengence free approach to the rightings of old wrongs. For unlike many others on all sides of the lines dividing and embittering our politics she insists that the particulars of her own experience--being poor, being black, being a woman--are relevant to much more than being an advocate for any single group. A lot of people evidently agree. She gets standing ovations in improbable places--at a sleepy morning seminar at the Democratic miniconvention, for example. And she has been able to move with skill among groups not known for their compatibility; the blacks, House and party leadership, and the leaders of the Texas delegation.6

Part of Ms. Jordan's ability to communicate effectively with great authority and impeccable organization can be traced to her father's influence. He prompted her precise speech, and her interest and participation in college debate honed her persuasive skills. One biographical account of Ms. Jordan's active debate interests reveals:
She got involved in competitive debate, an activity that consumed her for the next four years. Her strong resonant voice was a natural gift. Her diction was a gift from her father, who taught her precise, accentless English, almost syllable by syllable. Debating polished those gifts, and carried her outside of Texas. The debate team visited colleges in the North, won many championships and even tied Harvard. She was poise under fire.7

Most importantly, Barbara Jordan's critics and proponents recognize her potential as a national political candidate. Her oratorical prominence does not overshadow the content of her speeches. The impact from the 1976 Democratic Keynote Address and her address during the Nixon impeachment hearings attained widespread media coverage, but Ms. Jordan's intent was not primarily to attain media coverage. Her main interest was to be a good politician.

'I am a politician first, and a black and a woman second and third,' Barbara Charlene Jordan declared. The Texas congresswoman became a national figure and a rising star in the Democratic Party with her eloquent ode to the constitution during the 1974 Nixon impeachment hearings. She delivered the keynote speech at the party's 1976 convention and for a time there was giddy talk of a Vice Presidential nomination.8

Barbara Jordan has since retired from public office and is now a professor in the L. B. J. School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas in Austin, Texas. Though she was highly touted as a politician whose reachable goals might have included U. S. Speaker of the House or Vice President, she is content in her new role as a teacher, Ms. Jordan commented:

Those students are exciting to me, and they're going into the larger arena, and I am going to help them be good at what they do when they go out there, and that is satisfying to me. And that makes me happy.9
The Weaverian Analysis

In order to examine Ms. Jordan's speeches, it is necessary to reemphasize Weaver's main aim.

We are now in a position to affirm that the rhetorical study of an argument begins with a study of the sources. But since almost any extended argument will draw upon more than one source, we must look to answer the inquiry we are now starting, at the prevailing source, or the source which is most frequently called upon in the total persuasive effort.\textsuperscript{10}

After operationalizing the arguments from the hierarchy, genus-definition, similitude, consequence, and circumstance, representative arguments from both speeches were selected. The major premise or "prevailing argument" was noted, especially with regard to its relevance as the most identifiable main thrust or singularly most important theme. Minor argument types have been pointed out to provide examples of the variance. Arguments by testimony and the rhetorical impact of those statements were noted.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the hierarchy would be to operationalize it. The same theme could be demonstrated through different argument use. Weaver has done this with the arguments from genus, similitude, consequence, and testimony. In his essay "Looking for an Argument," he wrote:

Let us suppose, for illustration, that you are accosted one night by a robber who threatens you with a pistol and demands your money. Assuming that you can get him to listen to your argument, you might find yourself ranging over the following 'regions' or possibilities.

(1) You could tell him what he is attempting is a crime. This would be an argument from genus.

(2) You could tell him his act would result in his having to spend years in the penitentiary. This would be an argument of consequence.
Although Weaver did not include an argument from circumstance, the logical continuation might resemble: You should resist such an act because ten policemen are coming from around the corner. These argument types have been sought in order of their rhetorical importance within the speeches.

The 1976 Democratic Keynote Address's main argument or premise is from the argument most elevated on the hierarchy—genus or definition. This argument is an appeal to the audience, originating from a concept already accepted by the audience, or as Weaver said, "A universally accepted convention for which the speaker does not feel that description, analysis, or proof is required."\textsuperscript{12}

In the Keynote Address to the Democratic Convention, Ms. Jordan's argument from genus is the generic class that addresses human rights. "We are attempting to fulfill our national purpose: to create or sustain a society in which all of us are equal."\textsuperscript{13} In order for a society to be equal, one must argue in favor of human rights. Equality is an inherent part of the class of human rights. This equality is enthymemetic in that it is an assumed state residing within the genus.

The same argument type serves as part of the dual premise in the Keynote Address to the National Women's Conference.
We endorse personal and political freedom as a national right of human pride. Human rights are more than an abstraction, particularly when they are limited or nonexistent. Human rights apply equally to Soviet dissidents, Chilean peasants, and American women.\textsuperscript{14}

The genus (human rights) is established with a subclass (the conference), although the purpose of the conference must be defined. The second part of the main premise is an argument from consequence. The role of the argument from consequence is deliberated in subsequent pages.

Although terms such as political freedom and personal freedom reference the genus, they are not in themselves distinct generic classes. They are elements of the larger class and require definition. Weaver used the term "liberty" as an example of a term that requires definition in order to become a generic class in itself.

A good example of this type of term is Liberty. In John Stewart Mill's essay of that same name, Mill proposes to argue certain propositions about liberty and the individual, but before he can do this he must go through a long process of definition.\textsuperscript{15}

The genus of humans (and their inalienable rights) is recognized by Weaver as a legitimate genus that proposes an ethically defensible position. Weaver noted that Lincoln argued from this same genus.

In sum we see that Lincoln could never be dislodged from his position that there is one genus of human beings; and early in his career as a lawyer he had learned that it is better to base an argument upon one incontrovertable point than try to make an impossible case through a whole array of points.\textsuperscript{16}

Although both speeches' main premise is that of genus, specifically the rights of human beings, each seeks to make
a different case. In the Democratic Convention speech, the national ideals embodied within the Democratic Party's philosophy are defined. To clearly establish their sub-genus, Ms. Jordan distinguishes between the relationship of the proposed genus (the nature of democratic government) and the central premise (the rights of human beings). She elaborates upon the relationship by answering her own question.

What is it about the democratic party that makes it the instrument that people use when they search for ways to shape their future? . . . Well I believe the answer to that question lies in our concept of governing. Our concept of governing is derived from our view of people. It is a concept deeply rooted in a set of beliefs firmly etched in the national conscience of all of us.17

This passage serves as a preface to defining the nature of government. The central premise is viewed thusly: the nature of human beings and their inalienable rights determine the role of government. Government does not dictate the role of people. Government is subordinate and derives its power from people.

Ms. Jordan then defines the subordinate genus through five propositional statements. Three have been chosen to illustrate the point.

(1) First we believe in equality for all and privileges for none.
(2) We believe the people are the source of all governmental power; that the authority of the people is to be extended and not restricted.
(3) We believe that the government that represents the authority of all people, not just one interest group, but all the people, has an obligation to actively underscore, actively seek to remove those obstacles, which would block individual achievement . . . obstacles emanating from race, sex, economic condition.18
These definitions are philosophically appropriate because they do not illustrate "what is" through number or volume (circumstance) or suggest a causal prediction (consequence), nor are they analogies or metaphors (similitude), but define by proposing "what should be." An interpretation of Weaver's argument from definition by Johannesen, Strickland, and Eubanks emphasizes that, "Good definitions should be stipulative, emphasizing what ought-to-be, rather than operative, emphasizing what is." 19

Ms. Jordan seeks to define the nature or the genus of the First National Women's Conference in much the same way that she defines the role of government in the Democratic National Convention address. The conference is subordinate to the people who define and limit its power. The genus is stated, "Women are human." Ms. Jordan then defines the nature of the conference through stipulative definitions. The conference can be described as a heterogeneous gathering; this is the intended nature.

This conference is conclusive: everybody is here and everyone must be free to define the meaning of total woman, for herself. . . . The difference among us at this conference cannot and should not be ignored. 20

By contrasting the two speeches, it can be pointed out that whereas the Democratic Address defined government in terms of equality with the hope of perpetuating unanimity in the party, the National Women's Conference Address defined equality in terms of the conference as an exclamation of converging dissimilarity. The key point is that both
speeches establish generic definitions which are stipulat-
tive and are accepted by the respective audiences.

One further example of the stipulative definition
process is referenced with regard to the conference and
its members. "The delegates to this conference are cer-
tainly not of a single mind. We should not be of a single-
mind." The conference is the sum of its members; only
by recognizing the ideal characteristics and defining
those ideals can the conference maintain its proposed genus.

Though the rights of human beings is the central pre-
mise and the conference is a natural outcrop of that premise
as previously define, the goals and aims of the National
Women's Conference are generally deliberated through an
argument from consequence.

The argument from consequence is an argument of cause
and effect or a statement that argues from effect to cause,
or the case of a "sign" that leads to an effect. For example:

If this conference succeeds, there will be ample acco-
lades for everybody, and if it fails, all of you may
look into your mirror and identify a contributing cul-
prit.

In this single statement, Ms. Jordan has argued from both
cause (a successful conference) to effect (congratulatory
response) and effect (failure) to cause (member's individual
effort or lack of it). The argument from sign is noted,
"We know our rights are violated, we need a domestic rights
program." The causal sign is violated rights; the assumed
remedy or effect is "a domestic human rights program."
Though the frequency of arguments from consequence is essentially equal to the number from genus or definition, the prominent argument is that of genus. The argument from consequence is dependent upon the genus because Ms. Jordan uses argument from consequence to accentuate and perpetuate the ideals of equality for human beings. The final passage illustrates this relationship.

The cause of equal and human rights will reap what is sown November 18th through the 21st, 1977. . . . What will you reap? . . . What will you sow?

Although there are also several instances of argument from consequence in the Democratic Keynote Address, the rhetorical significance of this argument is less than the usage in the Women's Conference speech. Ms. Jordan announces that arguments from a causal nature, specifically those things in government that cause people to feel cynical and frustrated, are unworthy and shallow.

I could list the many problems that Americans have. I could list the problems that cause people to feel cynical, angry, frustrated. . . . I could recite those problems and sit down and offer no solutions. But I don't choose to do that either. . . . The citizens of America expect more. They deserve and want more than a recital of problems.24

Ms. Jordan uses the argument from consequence sparingly, and first develops a definitional statement prefacing the causes and effects. From Ms. Jordan's strict attention to the genus, arguments from consequence are developed. She defines the nature of American's fears. These statements refer directly to the genus and the nature of the class of
human beings. Ms. Jordan's description of society further amplifies the nature of the genus and serves also as the cause.

Many fear the future. Many are distrustful of their leaders, and believe that their voices are never heard. Many seek only to satisfy their private work wants. To satisfy private interests.25

This is the nature of the American public, but it is also a danger which serves as a cause in a cause to effect argument. She amplifies the effect:

But this is the great danger America faces. That we will cease to be one nation and become instead a collection of interest groups; city against suburb, region against region, individual against individual. Each seeking to satisfy private wants.26

There is only one other instance that Ms. Jordan uses this argument type and that reference, like the previous one, presumes a consequence in a hypothetical fashion. Unlike the arguments from consequence in the National Women's Conference speech which suggested more tangible effects or causes, the arguments from the Democratic address focussed on ethicality rather than actuality. The Democratic Keynote Address idealistically suggests what ought to be done:

We believe that the government which represents the authority of all the people, not just one interest group, but all the people, has an obligation to actively underscore, actively seek to remove those obstacles which would block individual achievement . . . obstacles emanating from race, sex, economic condition. The government must seek to remove them.27

The Women's Conference reports what is not being done, "We know our rights are being violated."28

The argument from similitude, an argument of comparison from similar ideas, most commonly metaphors or analogies,
is not an important rhetorical argument in either speech. Only a few examples of this type of argument were found in either speech.

From the Democratic Nation Convention speech, Ms. Jordan speaks of the need to approach the future objectively. She compares an overly subjective society with a puritan society. "We must not become the new puritans and reject our society." In another passage, Ms. Jordan compares governmental bureaucracy with a physical condition.

And when the People raised their voices, we didn't hear. But our deafness was only a temporary condition, and not an irreversible condition.  

In the National Women's Conference speech, Ms. Jordan reminds her audience that answers do not come from individuals with supernatural ability. The allusion is illustrated by drawing the attention of the delegates away from unrealistic impressions. "Wonder Woman is not a delegate. The Bionic Woman is not here either." In another colorful example, Ms. Jordan compares the roles of the delegates with corresponding military roles. "This is the time for foot soldiers, not 'Kamikaze' pilots."

The least ethical argument type—circumstance, an argument concerned with statistical forms of proof, volume of secular events, or expedient matters that warrant change, is practically absent from both speeches. The most singularly identifiable argument from circumstance is one from the Keynote Address to the Women's Conference. "American history
is peppered with efforts by women to be recognized as human beings and as citizens and to be included into the whole of our nation. The number of historical efforts by women does not warrant recognition by Weaverian standards. No arguments from circumstance were clearly identified in the Democratic Keynote Address.

Finally, several supportive references of argument from testimony are cited. Once again this argument type is not the argument most frequently used, but supports the different types of argument that appear within the context of both speeches. Ms. Jordan quotes such politicians as Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, Hubert Humphrey, and Lyndon Johnson. In each case the person chosen was supportive of either the issue referenced or the philosophical foundation from which the issue evolved. For example, Ms. Jordan quotes Mr. Lincoln and prefaces the quotation with the inherent implications:

Well I am going to close my speech by quoting a Republican President and I ask that you listen to these words of Abraham Lincoln, relate them to the concept of a national community in which every last one of us participates: 'As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of Democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference is not Democracy.'

This example of testimony is supportive of previously defined democratic ideals.

From the Keynote Address to the Women's Conference, Ms. Jordan selected Hubert Humphrey to accentuate the cooperative motives amplified through argument from consequence.
"There are no problems between the different points of view in this body that cannot be reconciled, if we are willing to give a little and share a little." 35

Both speeches could be characterized as being highly philosophical. The ideal freedom of men and women is the main concern. Although Ms. Jordan does not argue exclusively from the argument of definition or genus, all of her arguments are supportive of the central premise, the genus of the rights of people. Weaver concluded:

If a speaker should define a man as a creature with an indefeasible right to freedom and should upon this base an argument that a certain man or group of men are entitled to the freedom, he would be arguing from definition. Freedom is the unchanging attribute of his subject. It can be accordingly predicated of whatever falls within the genus of man. 36
NOTES


2 Bird, p. 9.


4 Mary Lynn Kotz, "Meet the Real Barbara Jordan," Good Housekeeping, 186 (June, 1978), 44.

5 Bird, p. 221.


7 Kotz, p. 52.

8 Richard Booth, Evert Clark, and John J. Lindsay, "Barbara Jordan Calls It Quits," Newsweek, 90 (19 December 1977), 23.


12 Bilskey, Hazlett, Streeter, and Weaver, p. 213.


15 Bilskey, Hazlett, Streeter, and Weaver, p. 213.

16 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 95.


20 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

21 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

22 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

23 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.


31 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

32 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

33 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

34 Jordan, 1976 Democratic Keynote Address.

35 Jordan, Women's Conference Keynote Address.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Richard Weaver's philosophy entails a system of moral/philosophical analysis that can be applied to given speakers. Weaver seeks to discover the most important and prevalent argument types employed by the given speaker, thus revealing that speaker's true political and philosophical intentions. According to Weaver, the central premise or the most important argument type is the key to discovering the aforementioned goals. After reviewing Weaver's book, The Ethics of Rhetoric, J. Michael Sproule summarized the most important thesis of the section dealing with argument types associated with moral/philosophical analysis by stating: "Two rhetorical forms--the argument from circumstance and that from definition (genus)--are especially useful for gaining insight into an advocate's moral-epistemological position." Simply put, the ethical conservative speaker is characterized by his use of arguments from genus or definition, and the liberal, less ethical practitioner is characterized by his habitual use of arguments from circumstance.

"Weaver believed that ethical rhetoric presupposes sound dialectic, a method of investigation whose object is the establishment of truth about doubtful positions." An
orator who argues from a dialectically secured position, avoiding arguments that are based entirely upon statistics or empirical data, is one who argues from a Weaverian perspective. For Weaver, this is the ethical approach to argumentation and that ideology is an expression of belief in universal values. Once again Sproule amplifies:

Weaver expresses a preference for the universalist approach for gaining knowledge and compares it to the morally inferior fact-based approach. He believes that true knowledge resides in universals as opposed to what he describes as the modern assumption, that knowledge exists as a collection of empirically discovered facts.  

If Weaver's propositions for discerning ethical rhetoric are to be identified, then these indicative characteristics must be considered: (a) the limited use or absence of arguments from circumstance; (b) the identification of arguments of principle (universals such as equality or freedom); (c) the use of the argument from genus, providing that it is an ethical genus accepted by the audience, or a new generic class that must be defined and accepted. Using these guidelines, a Weaverian epistemological analysis can be drawn. Ms. Jordan's status as an ethical, Weaverian orator can be revealed by applying his guidelines to her speeches and asking the following questions:

(1) Is the central argument or premise in each speech that of genus or definition?
(2) Are arguments from circumstance avoided?
(3) Are universal ideals sought or addressed?
(4) Is a dialectical process revealed?
Conclusions of the Analysis

Barbara Jordan exemplifies the ethical orator, according to the aforementioned standards of the Weaverian analysis. Although examples of each argument type can be identified, the central premise or argument is the argument from definition or genus. All arguments support the principles contained within the philosophy of the genus, a genus proposing equality among all people. Ms. Jordan stated: "First we believe in equality for all and privileges for none." Then in a series of statements concerning the foundations of government, the role of people is reinforced. Ms. Jordan noted: "We believe that the people are the source of all governmental power; that the authority of the people is to be extended, not restricted."

From the 1976 Democratic Keynote Address, the ideals of patriotism, morality, equality, and tradition are confirmed. These values are defined in terms of the genus which proposes a thesis of moral/political human rights. The genus represented through the stipulative definitions of the given ideals is very much in line with the concepts Weaver considers to be characteristic of ethical oratory. Ms. Jordan's speech has a broad appeal, attracting not only Democrats, but also Republicans and other non-political viewers. Weaver would perceive this appeal as a product of Ms. Jordan's use of ethical arguments and the appropriately philosophical, dialectical approach to the address.
Specifically, arguments of circumstance have been avoided, thus non-alienating argumentation has resulted in a wider audience appreciation.

The Weaverian analysis of Ms. Jordan's address to the First National Women's Conference essentially revealed the same genus as that expressed in the 1976 Democratic National Convention address, the genus of the rights of people. The role of the Women's Conference was defined under the precepts of the genus. Due to the specific nature of the audience and the conference, arguments from consequence were more frequently used. Ms. Jordan employed such arguments in order to more clearly delineate the individual and group responsibilities of perpetuating the goals of the conference. One example is stated thusly: "The cause of equal and human rights will reap what is sown November 18th through November 21st, 1977. What will you reap? What will you sow?" Weaver maintains that arguments from cause and effect that express a consequence are less ethical than arguments from genus or similitude. "Those who argue from consequence tend to go all out for action; they are the radicals."

Although this analysis has revealed examples of arguments from circumstance and especially the noted arguments from consequence, the findings do not suggest an unethical approach or argumentation indicative of the radical orator. The arguments from circumstance or consequence are not exclusively or strategically utilized for any reason other
than supporting the genus and defined principles. Weaver may have preferred a more strict adherence to singular argument usage, but Ms. Jordan's oration clearly evolves from a genus with subordinated supportive statements of the various argument types.

The qualities that Abraham Lincoln exhibited as an ethical orator who argued from genus and definition prompted Weaver to characterize him as the epitome of the conservative thinkers. Weaver said of Lincoln: "The essence of Lincoln's doctrine was not the seeking of the middle, but reform according to law; that is, reform according to definition." Those qualities that Weaver admires most in Lincoln are exhibited by Barbara Jordan. Ms. Jordan, who has demonstrated the use of argument from genus and definition in both the speeches analyzed, must be considered a conservative by Weaver's standards. Weaver established the criterion when he said, "Those who prefer argument from definition, as Lincoln did, are conservatives in the legitimate sense of the word."9

The similarity between Lincoln's style of addressing an issue and Ms. Jordan's style is evident. Weaver notes of Lincoln: "This type of conservative is sometimes found fighting quite briskly for change; but if there is one thing by which he is distinguished, it is the trust in the methods of law."10 Ms. Jordan's belief in constitutional ideals provides the basis for her advocation of changes that promote legal, ethical, radical, and sexual equality. Ms. Jordan
asks her audience rhetorically: How many people shape their future? She suggests changes through the governmental processes ideally derived from the people. Ms. Jordan's own idealism is similar to that of Lincoln's idealism and belief in the law. From the Keynote Address to the 1976 Democratic National Convention, Ms. Jordan describes that idealism:

Well I believe the answer to that question lies in our concept of governing. Our concept of governing is derived from our view of people. It is a concept deeply rooted in a set of beliefs firmly etched in the national conscience of us all.11

The analysis of the two speeches revealed Ms. Jordan's idealism in the American governmental system, her recognition of the prominence of historical tradition, and her attempt to provide a philosophic basis which encourages constitutionally legal changes. Ms. Jordan's arguments are not radical in the Weaverian sense. She does not base her arguments on statistics that can be contradicted and the changes she advocates are consistent with the principles outlined in the genus or central theme of both speeches. Although the speech to the First National Women's Conference provides some arguments from circumstance and consequence, the general trend of arguing ethically by Weaverian standards is established. Weaver comments:

If a leader asks only consequences, he will find himself involved with naked competition of forces. If he asks circumstance, he will find himself intimidated against all vision. But if he asks for principle he may get that all tied up and complete, and though purchased at a price, paid for. Therefore, it is of first importance whether a leader has the courage to define. Nowhere does a man's rhetoric catch up with him more completely than in the topics he chooses to win other men's assent.12
Ms. Jordan has won the assent of many men and women. If Weaver attributes the respect and approval attained by a given orator to that orator's adherence to the use of ethical appeals and argument types, then Ms. Jordan's success can provide one more bit of evidence for his thesis. "'A Harris Survey showed that fifty-four percent of the respondents were positive toward the speech and only nine percent were negative'."\textsuperscript{13}

Wayne Thompson's study of the Democratic Keynote Address yields results parallel with the Weaverian analysis. Thompson's study is an attempt to discover factors that: "Might produce at least a tentative conclusion concerning the reasons that the speech was a success with dual audiences (partisan and nonpartisan)."\textsuperscript{14} Thompson confirms that arguments concerned with patriotism, the value of the individual, and sociality (people working together) are the most influential factors for producing the favorable audience response. Thompson's study provides concurring support to Weaver's contention that ethical arguments are concerned with principles and values.

Of the three values mentioned, patriotism was stressed most. Thompson writes:

First in frequency as a value appeal, with twelve instances according to the writer's analysis, is patriotism, whose particular forms in the address were repeated affirmation of the justness and nobility of the American constitution and 'system' and a repeated expression of faith in the present and future workability of these institutions.\textsuperscript{15}
Other value appeals mentioned are puritan and pioneer morality, ethical equality, and equality of opportunity. Further, Thompson notes that value appeals associated with change and progress and rejection of authority, among others were less frequently mentioned.

Thompson's study of the Democratic Keynote Address indirectly supports the findings of the Weaverian analysis and several Weaverian contentions. Thompson reports that value appeals rather than statistical proofs contribute to an audience's appreciation of a speech. Thompson states that, "The value appeals generally were in philosophic terms and unrelated to specific events and grievances." The philosophic values that elicited the most favorable responses were the values of patriotism, morality, and a sense of community. These values are representative of the type of idealistic themes Weaver believed inherent in ethical oratory. Also, Thompson points out that negatively polarizing, connotative language was avoided. "The appeals were short and the language was low in emotiveness. The word Republican appeared only twice, and in neither instance was the reference derogatory." Ms. Jordan could have employed "Republican" as a negatively polarizing term, but chose not to; this reflects an ethical Weaverian choice. Finally Thompson reveals the limited use of value appeals that stress change and progress—a concept Weaver viewed most negatively.

Thompson concludes his analysis by reemphasizing the strengths of the speech, identifying the elements that were attractive to the broad audience.
The dominant theme throughout the speech was the affirmation of America's historic traditions and institutions, the assertion of the importance of national unity, and the stand that the nation's political leaders must be responsible and responsive servants. The reason that this set of values is a plausible explanation of the very low percentage of respondents reporting negative reaction is clear: patriotism, sociality, and traditional morality, no matter whether the individual was conservative or liberal, Republican or Democrat, partisan or neutral, were not controversial. Whereas many potential materials and arguments from this keynote address would have been offensive to significant segments of the audience, these positions approached the universal acceptability of apple pie and motherhood.18

Thompson's findings are consistent with this writer's Weaverian analysis of Barbara Jordan's work. Barbara Jordan, who argues ethically, basing her appeals on universals, avoiding polarizing terms, and defining her principles as she speaks, is an example of a conservative, Weaverian orator.

Although Thompson's study did not include the Women's Conference speech, a study of that speech may have also revealed similar philosophy and argumentation. Ms. Jordan did use appeals from some of the same values that were addressed in the Democratic Keynote; values such as equality, opportunity, and sociality. The two speeches are different and the speech to the Women's Conference could conceivably alienate people who were not alienated by the Democratic address. The key aspect of this analysis is to identify the central themes or trends, and, working within this context, it must be noted that there is a recurring, definitive theme from which both speeches are based. This theme amplifies values and principles.
Although Thompson's study seeks to reveal a key to positive audience response, in so doing he has revealed much about the style and rhetorical choices that Barbara Jordan makes in the Democratic Keynote Address. Thompson's study provides some concurrent reinforcement for the use of Richard Weaver's hierarchy analysis. Weaver's contention that an ethical orator argues by defining principles and addressing universals is evidenced by Thompson's conclusion that rhetorical success is attained through "the skillful use of value appeals."^19

Many speakers could be considered popular and successful but not necessarily practitioners of Weaver's standards. Barbara Jordan may be one of the exceptions. The evidence brought by Thompson confirms her ability to argue effectively through the use of value appeals. The Weaverian analysis has revealed her use of ethical argument types and dialectical investigation. The question arises: Is Ms. Jordan's perceived ethicality, source credibility, and success partially derived from those characteristics? The evidence presented by Thompson stated that the speech received bipartisan, favorable responses; this suggests that Ms. Jordan's source credibility is high. This writer's conclusion is that the ethical appeals that Ms. Jordan employs enhance her source credibility and influences favorable audience support. Certainly many other factors have contributed to Ms. Jordan's success, but her characteristic use of nonalienating,
broad-based, universal appeals perpetuates her perceived status as an ethical orator.

Richard Weaver's philosophy and methods of analysis are useful when applied in conjunction with other methods of analysis. Thompson's analysis complements the Weaverian analysis by assessing archetypal arguments, but Thompson does not choose to hierarchically arrange the different arguments, thereby tempering the dogmatic Weaverian perspective. Weaver's methodology is an effective tool for examining political discourse. It is the view of this author that this study does not represent an isolated instance. Ms. Jordan is an ethical orator who uses appeals that generate respect and admiration from the public and her colleagues. Inherent within Weaver's philosophy are some guidelines that could be useful in assessing political discourse. Richard Johannesen clarifies those guidelines.

Throughout his writings on rhetoric, Weaver evinces concern for the ethicality of political/governmental discourse. After discounting for Weaver's conservative political views, citizens may still find useful for analysis his discussion (without their rankings) of typical modes of argument. And his warnings about intentional pseudo-neutrality, unwarranted meaning shifts, blurring of basic distinctions, and overly idealized discourse are important matters to consider in evaluating the ethicality of communication from politicians and governmental bureaucrats. His description of the characteristics of archetypal noble and evil rhetors also should stimulate careful evaluation of political/governmental communicators.20

The analysis of Ms. Jordan's speeches has provided evidence that supports Johannesen's contentions concerning Weaver's philosophy. By applying Weaver's methods,
it has been revealed that Ms. Jordan is an ethical orator. Ms. Jordan's popularity notwithstanding, an unbiased researcher could conduct a Weaverian analysis of her speeches and reach the same conclusions of this analysis. A conscientious application of Weaver's theories can contribute to the understanding of the motivation and philosophical intentions of a given orator. The hierarchy serves as a basic guide to establish argument types and their respective subheads.

Although the hierarchy analysis can be useful and Thompson's analysis provided concurrent support, several of the reservations discussed in this chapter seem to be warranted. Generally individual arguments have been difficult to classify. The critic's ability to classify argument types is dependent upon whether the critic examines a statement for its apparent face value or whether he examines the total connotative context from which the statement is drawn. The different critics may label the same argument or series of arguments differently. Further, Weaver's axiological belief in argument types may not be justified. A fine line exists between what Weaver considers an ethical choice of argument and what another might classify as an artistic choice of argument. Another important area of disagreement between Weaver and his critics concerns Weaver's criteria for determining conservatism. Borman, especially, is critical of Weaver on this point.

If Weaver's criteria for determining political conservatism or liberalism falls short, Weaver is then no more or
no less accurate than his fellow political observers. Weaver notes, "It is true that Lincoln has been placed in almost every position, from right to left, on the political arc." Even Barbara Jordan's critics are careful not to label her political stance too dogmatically. "Her liberal voting record seems to be genuine enough, but it is hard to envision an issue so transcendent that it would not be a perverse form of slumming for her to fight for it." In Weaver's defense, being able to determine anyone's steadfast political orientation is difficult, if not impossible; and Weaver's contentions must be viewed as being as coherent as the next man's views.

Weaver's theories on rhetoric are controversial, complex, often dogmatic, and misunderstood. Weaver suggests a method to examine a speaker's motivation and philosophical beliefs, and though it is not perfect, the system does identify orators who argue from principles and values. Often orators who argue from principles rather than "facts" are perceived as ethical orators. Weaver's system serves to identify these speakers. Weaver may consider some speaker's arguments as unethical and this view may be in opposition to other critic's evaluation, but Weaver's assessment of the ethical orators will rarely be challenged. This analysis has revealed Barbara Jordan to be one of those ethical orators--providing evidence that Weaver's theories, at least in part, are sound.
J. Michael Sproule summarizes probably the most widely leveled criticism.

Perhaps Weaver's fault lies in his zeal which produced an admittedly elegant construct but one which has been labeled as 'overly simplistic,' 'inadequate,' and as dangerously close to what Paul Elmer Moore called 'the demon of the Absolute.' Both analysis and application of the construct seem to suggest that moral epistemological criticism is more risky and less certain than Weaver sought to make it.23

Often Weaver's system might not provide the most perceptive insight, but it is at least an attempt in an area which most critics avoid. Weaver's contribution is significant, if for no other reason, because he provides a guide that can be subjectively considered even if it is an extreme base. Too often only audience response is considered as criterion for assessing a speaker's ability. There is a need to examine philosophical intentions of given speakers, especially in political discourse. Weaver has provided a basis that few rhetoricians have attempted. Though the specifics of Weaver's system can be argued extensively, his own motivation for analyzing other's political motivation must be recognized as a valuable attempt to ascertain new knowledge. This essential art and its application is promoted by one of Weaver's critics, J. Michael Sproule.

An understanding of the rhetorical motive is essential. An immoral or amoral speaker might knowingly invoke an invalid or inferior genus for base rhetorical purposes, thus misleading or misinforming an audience. An advertiser might stress the 'sex appeal' value of a toothpaste while ignoring the health question. Again the critic must go beyond argumentative taxonomy and take the more involved approach of making and supporting conclusions about speaker motives.24
NOTES


3Sproule, p. 291.


6Barbara Jordan, Keynote Address delivered to the First National Women's Conference held in Houston, Texas, November 19, 1977.


8Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 113.

9Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 112.

10Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 113.


12Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 114.


14Thompson, p. 224.

15Thompson, p. 225.

16Thompson, p. 229.

17Thompson, p. 230.

18Thompson, p. 228.
19 Thompson, p. 232.


21 Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 112.

22 Walter Shapiro, "What Does This Woman Want?," Texas Monthly, 4 (October, 1976), 205.

23 Sproule, p. 308.

24 Sproule, p. 308.
APPENDIX
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION KEYNOTE ADDRESS

"Who Then Will Speak For the Common Good?"

By Barbara Jordan, Congresswoman from Texas

Delivered to the Nation, New York, New York, July 12, 1976

One hundred and forty-four years ago, members of the Democratic Party first met in convention to select a Presidential candidate. Since that time, Democrats have continued to convene once every four years and draft a party platform and nominate a Presidential candidate. And our meeting this week is a continuation of that tradition.

But there is something different about tonight. There is something special about tonight. What is different. What is special? I, Barbara Jordan, am a keynote speaker.

A lot of years passed since 1832, and during that time it would have been most unusual for any national political party to ask that a Barbara Jordan deliver a keynote address . . . but tonight here I am. And I feel that notwithstanding the past that my presence here is one additional bit of evidence that the American Dream need not forever be deferred.

Now that I have this grand distinction what in the world am I supposed to say?

I could easily spend this time praising the accomplishments of this party and attacking the Republicans and I don't choose to do that.

I could list the many problems which Americans have, I could list the problems which cause people to feel cynical, angry, frustrated: problems which include lack of integrity in government; the feeling that the individual no longer counts; the reality of material and spiritual poverty; the feeling that the grand American experiment is falling or has failed. I could recite these problems and then I could sit down and offer no solutions. But I don't choose to do that either.

The citizens of America expect more. They deserve and they want more than a recital of problems.

We are people in a quandry about the present. We are a people in search of our future. We are a people in search of a national community.
We are a people trying not only to solve the problems of the present: unemployment, inflation... but we are attempting on a larger scale to fulfill the promise of America. We are attempting to fulfill our national purpose; to create and sustain a society in which all of us are equal.

Throughout our history, when people have looked for new ways to solve their problems, and to uphold the principles of this nation, many times they have turned to political parties. They have often turned to the Democratic Party.

What is it, what is it about the Democratic Party that makes it the instrument that people use when they search for ways to shape their future? Well I believe the answer to that question lies in our concept of governing. Our concept of governing is derived from our view of people. It is a concept deeply rooted in a set of beliefs firmly etched in the national conscience, of all of us.

Now what are these beliefs?

First, we believe in equality for all and privileges for none. This is a belief that each American regardless of background has equal standing in the public forum, all of us. Because we believe this idea so firmly, we are an inclusive rather than an exclusive party. Let everybody come.

I think it no accident that most of those emigrating to America in the 19th century identified with the Democratic Party. We are a heterogeneous party made up of Americans of diverse backgrounds.

We believe that the people are the source of all governmental power; that the authority of the people is to be extended, not restricted. This can be accomplished only by providing each citizen with every opportunity to participate in the management of the government. They must have that.

We believe that the government which represents the authority of all the people, not just one interest group, but all the people, has an obligation to actively underscore, actively seek to remove those obstacles which would block individual achievement... obstacles emanating from race, sex, economic condition. The government must seek to remove them.

We are a party of innovation. We do not reject our traditions, but we are willing to adapt to changing circumstances, when change we must. We are willing to suffer the discomfort of change in order to achieve a better future.
We have a positive vision of the future founded on the belief that the gap between the promise and reality of America can one day be finally closed. We believe that.

This my friends, is the bedrock of our concept of governing. This is a part of the reason why Americans have turned to the Democratic Party. These are the foundations upon which a national community can be built.

Let's all understand that these guiding principles cannot be discarded for short-term political gains. They represent what this country is all about. They are indigenous to the American idea. And these are principles which are not negotiable.

In other times, I could stand here and give this kind of exposition on the beliefs of the Democratic Party and that would be enough. But today that is not enough. People want more. This is not sufficient reason for the majority of the people of this country to vote Democratic. We have made mistakes. In our haste to do all things for all people, we did not foresee the full consequences of our actions. And when the people raised their voices, we didn't hear. But our deafness was only a temporary condition, and not an irreversible condition.

Even as I stand here and admit that we have made mistakes I still believe that as the people of America sit in judgment on each party, they will recognize that our mistakes were mistakes of the heart. They'll recognize that.

And now we must look to the future. Let us heed the voice of the people and recognize their common sense. If we do not, we not only blaspheme our political heritage, we ignore the common ties that binds all Americans.

Many fear the future. Many are distrustful of their leaders, and believe that their voices are never heard. Many seek only to satisfy their private work wants. To satisfy private interests.

But this is the great danger America faces. That we will cease to be one nation and become instead a collection of interest groups: city against suburb, region against region, individual against individual. Each seeking to satisfy private wants.

If that happens, who then will speak for America?

Who then will speak for the common good?

This is the question which must be answered in 1976.
Are we to be one people bound together by common spirit sharing in a common endeavor or will we become a divided nation?

For all of its uncertainty, we cannot flee the future. We must not become the new puritans and reject our society. We must address and master the future together. It can be done if we restore the belief that we share a sense of national community, that we share a common national endeavor. It can be done.

There is not executive order; there is not law that can require the American people to form a national community. This we must do as individuals and if we do it as individuals, there is no President of the United States who can veto that decision.

As a first step, we must restore our belief in ourselves. We are a generous people who why can't we be generous with each other? We need to take to heart the words spoken by Thomas Jefferson:

Let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and that affection without which liberty and even life are but dreary things.

A nation is formed by the willingness of each of us to share in the responsibility for upholding the common good.

A government is invigorated when each of us is willing to participate in shaping the future of this nation.

In this election year we must define the common good and begin again to shape a common good and begin again to shape a common future. Let each person do his or her part. If one citizen is unwilling to participate, all of us are going to suffer. For the American idea, though it is shared by all of us, is realized in each one of us.

And now, what are those of us who are elected public officials supposed to do? We call ourselves public servants but I'll tell you this: we as public servants must set an example for the rest of the nation. It is hypocritical for the public official to admonish and exhort the people to uphold the common good if we are derelict in upholding the common good. More is required of public officials than slogans and handshakes and press releases. More is required. We must hold ourselves strictly accountable. We must provide the people with a vision of the future.

If we promise as public officials, we must deliver. If we as public officials propose, we must produce. If we say to the American people it is time for you to be sacrificial; sacrifice
If the public official says that, we (public officials) must be the first to give. We must be. And again, if we make mistakes, we must be willing to admit them. We have to do that. What we have to do is strike a balance between the idea that government should do everything and the idea, the belief, that government ought to do nothing. Strike a balance.

Let there be no illusions about the difficulty of forming this kind of a national community. It's tough, difficult, not easy. But a spirit of harmony will survive in America only if each of us remembers that we share a common destiny. If each of us remembers when self-interest and bitterness seem to prevail, that we share a common destiny.

I have confidence that we can form this kind of national community.

I have confidence that the Democratic Party can lead the way. I have that confidence. We cannot improve on the system of government handed down to us by the founders of the Republic, there is no way to improve upon that. But what we can do is to find new ways to implement that system and realize our destiny.

Now, I began this speech by commenting to you on the uniqueness of a Barbara Jordan making the keynote address. Well I am going to close my speech by quoting a Republican President and I ask you that as you listen to these words of Abraham Lincoln, relate them to the concept of a national community in which every last one of us participates: As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of Democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference is no Democracy.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS (excerpts)

By Barbara Jordan, Congresswoman from Texas

Delivered to the First National Women's Conference

Houston, Texas, November 19, 1977

. . . . If you read the 31st Chapter, it begins a litany of praise for the worthy woman. It begins this way: "Who can find a virtuous woman for her price is far above others." From virtue to power. What we are about here now will require no small amount of virtue and a great deal of power.

The value of women mostly in a narrow construed fashion has been recognized throughout the ages, but the value of women has been periodically re-evaluated and is sometimes devaluated.

American history is peppered with efforts by women to be recognized as human beings and as citizens and to be included in the whole of our national life.

This Conference is one more effort on the part of women for total recognition and total inclusion.

The success or failure of this Conference is our responsibility and we should not waste one moment trying to find scapegoats.

If this Conference succeeds, there will be ample accolades for everybody, and, if it fails, all of you may look into your mirror and identify a contributing culprit . . .

The goals of this Conference are as logical and reasonable to me as the goals of President Carter talks about of human rights in America's foreign policy.

If Americans were asked to differentiate or distinguish between what characterized other countries and what characterizes us, we would say our high regard for the individual. That's the thing which makes us different.

We endorse personal and political freedom as a national right of human pride. Human rights are more than abstractions, particularly when they are limited or non-existent. Human rights apply equally to Soviet dissidents, Chilean peasants and American women.
Women are human. We know our rights are limited. We know our rights are violated. We need a domestic human rights program.

This Conference could be the beginning of such an effort, and we should not allow ourselves to be brainwashed by people who predict chaos for us and failure for us.

Tell them they lie and move on.

This Conference is inclusive; everybody is here and everyone must be free to define the meaning of total woman, for herself.

The differences among us at this Conference cannot and should not be ignored. They are national; the difference is economic, cultural, social, political, ideological--the differences are there.

The delegates to this Conference are certainly not of a single mind. We should not be of a single mind. No one person and no subgroup at this Conference has the right answers. "Wonder Woman" is not a delegate. The "Bionic Woman" is not here either.

American representatives are here to try to work through the problems of this Conference. Of course we will debate, of course we will differ. We will plead and placate... We will persuade and dissuade, and, when a debate becomes heated, I hope you will remember Lyndon Johnson's invocation, and, Isaiah's invocation: "Come now, let us reason together."

This statement was made by Hubert Humphrey recently on the floor of the United States Senate, and, he was talking about the Senate when he said: "There are no problems between the different points of view, and this body that cannot be reconciled if we are willing to give a little and share a little." Do that. We can't expect it all to be our way.

At a time when this country is drifting, if it is not shifting to the right, civil rights and affirmative action efforts are lagging.

This is the time for foot soldiers, not "Kamikaze" pilots. What occurs here and what does not occur here can make a difference in our personal and selective lives.

The legislation which authorized this Conference mandated a course of future action. One hundred and 20 days after we finish here, a report is to be submitted to each house of the Congress. What will you have in it?
A hundred and 20 days after that, President Carter is to submit recommendations to each house of the Congress based on the report which emanates from this body. What will he recommend? Eight months from the time we leave here, something is supposed to happen.

Recommendations will be submitted. Well, I have no doubt that legislation which emanates from this Conference . . . will have a better chance of passage if support for that recommendation is widespread.

Congress approved $5 million with congratulations, but, if we do nothing here productive, constructive or healing, we will have wasted much more than money.

We will have wasted, lost, negated an opportunity to do something for ourselves and for generations which are not here.

Not making a difference is a cost we cannot afford.

The cause of equal and human rights will reap what is sown November 18th through November 21st, 1977.

What will you reap?

What will you sow?
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