ANTHROPOLOGY AS ADMINISTRATIVE TOOL:
THE USE OF APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY BY
THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

THESIS

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Beginning in the 1930's a debate emerged within the American Anthropological Association over applied versus pure research. With a few exceptions the members refused to endorse or support the attempt to introduce applied anthropology as a discipline recognized by the Association. This refusal resulted in the creation of a separate organization, the Society for Applied Anthropology, in 1941. In order to prove the validity of their discipline the members of the Society needed an opportunity. That opportunity appeared with the signing of Executive Order 9066, which authorized the forced removal of Japanese-Americans from the west coast. Members of the Society believed the employment of applied anthropologists by the War Relocation Authority would demonstrate the value of their discipline. When provided with this opportunity, however, applied anthropology failed.
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CHAPTER I

THE GROWTH AND REACTION TO APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

The social sciences in the United States underwent a dramatic growth in the twenty years prior to World War II. The catalyst for the rapid professionalization and specialization of the scientific community was the financial support provided by the large number of philanthropic organizations whose growth was as dramatic as that of the social sciences. From a relatively insignificant few at the turn of the century the nonprofit organizations numbered 179 by 1926. The millions of dollars provided by these institutions initiated a period of intensive research that established much of the theoretical and methodological groundwork that led to the subsequent growth and recognition for the young and less established disciplines of psychiatry, sociology and anthropology.¹

Ironically, coinciding with the economic windfall that presented itself to the academic community was the economic disaster of 1929. The social chaos caused by the depression and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt created an environment that demanded immediate cures to social ills with the result that the social sciences were given a status and recognition that previously escaped them. Both industry
and the federal government looked upon the psychiatrist, sociologist and anthropologist as scientists whose expertise could be used to develop solutions to industrial and social problems. Further, the social scientist was to provide not merely answers but to become an integral part in the administration of those solutions.

This demand, however, meant that the social sciences had to broaden their research to include specific areas of contemporary society. For the psychiatrist and sociologist this request did not threaten the fundamental structure of their disciplines. Anthropology, on the other hand, based its research on the study of people and culture in primitive, relatively stable societies. Much of anthropology's theory was based on a conviction that certain generalizations or truths could be discovered about people and their culture. This open ended, pure research did not lend itself well to the demands placed upon the social sciences in the decade before the war.

Beginning in the 1930s a small group of young anthropologists began to argue that anthropological research should include the study of contemporary society. These young social scientists believed that fieldwork should not consist only of exploring the culture of some distant exotic isle but it should also include a trip to industrial manufacturing plants as well as the cities in which the
plants operated. This group argued that the theories and methods of their discipline could be utilized to solve the problems of modern America. Their attempt to broaden anthropology from a theoretical science of discovery to a science of utilization, initiated a debate among anthropologists that was to last for over a decade. The academic community, with few exceptions, was less than enthusiastic about the value of applied anthropology and the notion of scientific activism. The young applied anthropologists, encountering little encouragement from their peers, eventually turned to non-academic pursuits, convinced that they could demonstrate the validity of their arguments if only provided an opportunity to do so.

The concept of employing anthropology to solve the problems of contemporary society was not in itself new. In 1879 Major John Wesley Powell organized and became chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology of the Smithsonian Institute. Ten years before, Powell led a congressionally supported exploration of the Colorado River that had a lasting impact on him. During the trip Powell recognized the inevitable cultural conflict between the frontiersman and the native American. In an attempt to lessen the negative impact of that conflict, the newly appointed director initiated a series of ethnological studies of Indian tribes. Powell hoped that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs would take the results of the research into consideration in the development of its policy. Although historically valuable, the ethnological studies received little attention from the Bureau. 3

A similar attempt to use anthropological studies to assist administrators took place twenty years later. The people of the Philippines became the responsibility of the Department of Interior following the Spanish-American War. Under the direction of Albert Jenks a survey comparing the natives of the islands with other civilizations took place. The survey's information was intended to be one factor used by the administration in its decisions regarding the Philippino people. The project had barely begun, however, when local pressure, the fear of unfair comparisons and lack of administrative support combined to block the completion of the survey. 4

These early attempts to use anthropology to assist administrators failed, in part, because the discipline lacked the recognition and status needed to gain support for projects of this nature. It was not until the arrival of Franz Boas from Germany and his subsequent appointment as professor of anthropology at Columbia in 1899 that cultural anthropology became an accepted member of the social sciences. Its stature and influence grew steadily in the next twenty years. 5
Although Boas' university training was in physics and geography, his growing interest in ethnology soon overshadowed these earlier concerns. After participation in an expedition that studied the Eskimos on Baffin Island, Boas decided his sole academic pursuit would be anthropology. He left Germany and became an American citizen in 1877 while an instructor at Clark University. But it was in his forty years at Columbia that Boas achieved his greatest influence. The foundation for modern cultural anthropology in America can be traced to the arrival of the German scholar. Boas is credited with the introduction of cultural objectivity and scientific methodology into field work, as well as emphasizing the importance of the functional interconnections of group institutions.6

Boas' most important contribution, however, may have been his role as teacher and mentor to a generation of students who dominated the development of anthropology until well after World War II. Some of these students received their degrees just as anthropology entered its period of intensive field research funded by such philanthropic organizations as the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations. Pure, self-directed research of primitive societies characterized the fieldwork of the discipline up to the 1930s. The results of this research were primarily for other anthropologists and rarely escaped the confines of the academic community.7
In the decade before the war some of Boas' students and some of his contemporaries suggested that the methods of anthropology be applied to contemporary society and be utilized to solve contemporary problems. Initially, the strongest interest and financial support for this argument originated outside the academic community. Both industry and government leaders experimented with the application of anthropology to solve the problems that confronted them. One of the earliest and most influential projects involving the social sciences took place in the 1930s. At its Hawthorne Plant in Chicago, the Western Electric Company sponsored a research project that examined the causes of worker fatigue. The focus of the study centered on the relationship between the employees and the plant environment. Chosen to direct the study was Elton Mayo, cofounder of the Committee on Industrial Physiology at Harvard, whose life-long interest was the effect of industrialization on society.  

Mayo, an Australian psychiatrist, conducted a series of experiments that focused on the physiological causes of fatigue. His initial findings, however, indicated that human interrelationships were more influential in determining employee physical well being than physiological factors. Mayo concluded that the plant was a social system unto itself and that it was the social and cultural factors of
this system plus the interpersonal relationships of the workers that had the greatest impact on an employee's work habits, not the physical environment. 9

Another outcome of the Western Electric survey was the work of William Lloyd Warner. A young anthropologist at Harvard, Warner became a consultant to the project at Mayo's request. His observation of employee social interaction influenced Mayo's conclusions about the causes of worker fatigue. Warner's work at Hawthorne also helped to refine the field techniques of observation, participation, and the open-ended interview. 10

Warner's association with Mayo and the Committee of Industrial Physiology resulted in the use of anthropological methods in the study of modern communities. Warner's interest in the interconnection between family, church, work, and other systems of community organization led to a project that became known as the Yankee City Series. Begun in 1931 and lasting until Warner's departure for the University of Chicago in 1935, the project examined a "typical" modern American community, Newburyport, Massachusetts, or "Yankee City" as it later became known. Two other studies which evolved from the Yankee City Series were the community studies of County Clare, Ireland, and Natchez, Mississippi. 11

As project chief of the Yankee City Series, Lloyd Warner did not participate directly in the day-to-day fieldwork,
but he trained his students and research assistants in the field techniques which were used to gather data. Three of these students later became active in the field of applied anthropology: Eliot Chapple, Solon T. Kimball and Conrad Arensberg. During the Yankee City study, Chapple was a research assistant in industrial research at the Harvard Business School. He completed work on his Ph.D. in 1933 and became a pioneer of interaction analysis in industry. Kimball received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1936 and, with Arensberg published a social analysis of County Clare, Ireland, in 1940, *Family and Community in Ireland*. Arensberg completed his doctoral requirements at Harvard in 1934. While working on the Irish project, he became professor of social anthropology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The professional careers of the three criss-crossed from the late 1930s on as their common interests in the application of anthropology led them to become participants in a number of similar projects during the next decade.12

By the time of the completion of the fieldwork of Warner's project, the Roosevelt administration had begun to employ social scientists in government service. The President answered critics who were not enamored with the number of college professors in Washington with the argument that "it seems to me a pretty good practice--a
practice which will continue—this practice of calling on trained people for tasks that require trained people." It was the Roosevelt policy, that social scientists should be used to solve the problems facing the nation, that resulted in the dramatic increase in the number of social scientists involved in the development of federal policy. Roosevelt's energy, enthusiasm and demand for action created a favorable environment in which recent graduates in anthropology were given the financial and administrative support that resulted in the first extensive use of applied anthropology in America.\(^{13}\)

The man responsible for this first attempt to apply anthropology on a large scale was John Collier. His experience as a social worker in Atlanta and New York created in him a deep concern for the effects of industrialization on society. This interest gradually led Collier to the belief that modern technology had little to offer the common man. This feeling became stronger after an extended stay among the Indians of the southwest in which Collier observed and studied the culture of the native American. In 1923 he became executive secretary of the American Indian Defense Association and was soon a militant advocate for Indian reform. In 1933 when Roosevelt chose him to become Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Collier found himself in a position to do more than just criticize.\(^{14}\)
From the moment he took office, Collier initiated steps to reverse the trend of Indian land loss and to preserve the social and cultural traditions of Indian tribal society. The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 was the strategic weapon used to accomplish those goals. The act's purpose was the creation of political and economic autonomy for those tribes who still held reservation lands. To preserve the cultural distinctions of each tribe the commissioner turned to anthropologists for assistance.\(^{15}\)

In 1933, Collier sent a letter to a number of prominent anthropologists outlining his ideas and asking for their support. The commissioner received a generally positive response and an invitation to speak before the American Anthropological Association (AAA) at its annual meeting in Pittsburgh. Collier's speech to the members discussed the provisions of the IRA and asked for the support of the anthropologists in achieving his goal of protecting Indian culture. This meeting created a relationship between Collier and a number of anthropologists that lasted until his retirement in 1945.\(^{16}\)

Attending the meeting were a group of individuals who advocated that anthropology be more than just an academic pursuit. Among this group were a number of notable figures, such as A. R. Radcliff-Brown, who as early as 1931 argued that the application of anthropology could be an assistance...
to administrators in colonial areas; Robert Redfield, the University of Chicago's first Ph.D. graduate, whose work was already seen as an important step in the development of community studies; and Margaret Mead, considered an expert on primitive cultures and author of the successful and popular *Coming of Age in Samoa*. Also in attendance, although not necessarily supporters of the idea of applied anthropology, were such established scholars as Leslie Spier of Yale, Ralph Linton of Wisconsin, Melville Herskovits of Northwestern and Elsie Clews Parsons.¹⁷

The contacts established at Pittsburgh enabled Collier to obtain the services of a number of young anthropologists interested in utilizing the techniques of their discipline for contemporary study. Beginning in 1934 he initiated a series of research projects that brought the majority of those interested in the application of anthropology together under one administration. For the next decade the Bureau of Indian Affairs provided the experience and training necessary for the development of the discipline as well as the opportunity for applied anthropology to demonstrate its value.¹⁸

The first of these projects was in connection with the IRA of 1934. In order to achieve the goals of the act it was necessary to examine the contemporary social organizations of each tribe, focusing on the means tribal members
used to achieve political decisions. This was the purpose of the Applied Anthropology Unit (AAU), created in 1936. Appointed to head the AAU was H. Scudder Mekeel, who in 1932 received the first Ph.D. in anthropology awarded by Yale. Mekeel hired five men to accomplish the tasks of the unit. The University of Chicago provided two of the members: Morris Opler and Charles Wisdom. The other three were Gordon Macgregor of Harvard, David Rodnick of Pennsylvania, and Julian Stewart of the University of California at Berkeley.\(^{19}\)

Unfortunately the work of the unit had barely begun before a conflict developed between the AAU and the Tribal Organization Division, which had as its responsibility the drafting of tribal constitutions. Due to this conflict and congressional opposition to Collier's programs, the AAU's work was never integrated into the tribes' constitutions. The unit's brief existence ended in 1938.\(^{20}\)

Although disappointed in the meager results of the AAU, Collier nevertheless did not lose interest in employing anthropologists, to assist both the Indian and Indian administrators. Beginning in 1935, Collier and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace discussed a possible cooperative venture of their respective departments. The two decided to conduct a series of physical and human
dependency surveys on Indian reservation lands. The purpose of the surveys was to draw up plans to control soil and water erosion and to integrate Indian land use methods with those of modern soil conservation.21

The organization created to perform the surveys was known as the Technical Cooperation-Bureau of Indian Affairs (TC-BIA). It was composed of both Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel and technicians from the Soil Conservation Service. Eshref Shevky of Stanford, a friend of Collier, headed the Division of Human Surveys in region eight of the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), while Walter Woehlke, another friend of Collier's directed the TC-BIA. Both men turned to anthropologists to conduct the surveys. Shevky recruited Solon T. Kimball and Burleigh Gardner, both students of Lloyd Warner, and he also employed John Provinse who joined the SCS in 1936. Woehlke hired a number of anthropologists, among them Ruth Underhill of Columbia, Gordon MacGregor of Harvard, a former member of the AAU, and one sociologist, John Pearmain.22

Of these two groups, the team of Kimball and Provinse had the greatest success in achieving the aims of the surveys. Beginning in 1938, the two undertook an extensive study of Navajo land use practices utilizing their training in social anthropology. The outcome of this intensive research was the discovery of a socio-economic group among
the Navajos known as the "outfit." This social unit consisted of a group of families of common descent who traditionally worked the land in a cooperative spirit. Unfortunately, at the time of the discovery the Navajo tribal council's relationship with the BIA was at a low point and any cooperative action between the two was destined to failure.\(^2\)

Meanwhile, TC-BIA had its own problems. A series of resignations, including those of the director, Woehlke, hampered the completion of the surveys. Replacing Woehlke was Alan Harper, who was less than enthusiastic about using anthropologists. In 1937 and 1938, resignations continued and Harper did little to support the remaining members of the unit nor did he recruit social scientists to replace those who left. When TC-BIA ended in 1939, little had been accomplished.\(^2\)

As the decade came to a close the Department of Agriculture began a project that also involved a number of anthropologists. The success of community studies, primarily those of Warner and Redfield, stimulated the interest of Carl C. Taylor, chief of the Farm Population and Rural Life division in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture. Taylor hoped to accomplish in rural agricultural communities what Warner had achieved in the Yankee City Series and in 1939 he met
with Warner, Redfield, Conrad Arensberg, and John Provinse in Washington, D. C., to organize the project. The immediate goal was the systematic accumulation of data in rural areas which the department would use to plan its economic policy.  

This project ended abruptly in 1942 with the completion of just six studies. The immediate reason for the project's demise was the outbreak of World War II. Funds for the project, however, had begun to decline even before the war, when fiscally conservative congressmen became unwilling to support research studies that were critical of existing land ownership patterns.  

Despite the failures of those early applied projects, in 1941 John Collier managed to initiate the largest experiment using social scientists to that time with his belief in utilizing anthropology apparently unshaken by the problems encountered by the AAU and TC-BIA. Collier contracted with the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development to carry out a series of studies on Indian education personality development. Hired to coordinate the varied research programs was Laura Thompson, whose recently published *Fijian Frontier* had described the use of anthropology in colonial administration in the South Pacific. Returning to the United States, in 1941, Thompson was introduced to Collier in Washington and accepted the commissioners' offer to gain the research programs.
Unfortunately, the Indian Education, Personality, and Administration Project, as the program became known, suffered the same fate as had previous efforts involving applied anthropology. A philosophical disagreement between the committee on Human Development and the BIA over the focus and eventual use of the research deteriorated into a personality conflict between Collier and Warner. In 1944 the two agencies dissolved their relationship. The publication of the research of the project, which was to be published by the University of Chicago, was temporarily delayed.\textsuperscript{28}

The disagreement between the Committee on Human Development and the BIA over the purpose of the research was characteristic of the problems of applied anthropology in this period. As a result of the number of failures involving the applied use of anthropology in the decade 1930 to 1940, the value of the discipline came into question. The academic community took a hesitant, cautious approach to the idea of utilizing anthropology to analyze problems of contemporary society. Some members of the American Anthropological Association argued that scientific activism might result in an attempt to predict and thereby alter human behavior to fit a role envisioned by the scientific expert. Others, though sympathetic toward those who wished to utilize anthropology to solve
contemporary problems, nevertheless felt that in the long run pure research would be more constructive for the discipline and have a more lasting impact on society than the short term benefits, if any, of applied research. 29

Melville Herskovits of Northwestern University, a pioneer in acculturation studies and a member of the audience at Pittsburgh when Collier spoke in 1934, discussed this latter point in an article published in Science in 1936. Herskovits was sympathetic to anthropologists who wished to help the American Indian, but he noted that the degree of assistance applied anthropologists might provide to administrators was slight. Herskovits argued that anthropologists could be of help only when administrators did not perceive them as a threat to their work. As an example, Herskovits pointed out that a colonial administrator in the south pacific had to maintain law and order, provide labor, and make sure that the trade between the colony and mother country was not disrupted. If the policy suggested by the anthropologist conflicted with those duties the administrator would have no choice but to ignore the suggestions. 30

Herskovits believed that the debate should not be over the alleged benefits of applied anthropology, but "that the point at issue is an evaluation of wisdom of procedure." He agreed that anthropologists, as experts in the study of
man, should not turn their back on society but he concluded that an indirect approach, teaching administrators, rather than a direct approach, working with or being administrators, would in the long run prove more beneficial. Herskovits sided with pure research in the belief that only the scientific search for truth would result in "our fundamental contributions toward an understanding of the nature and process of culture and, through this, to the solutions of some of our basic problems."\textsuperscript{31}

The other major concern in the debate over applied anthropology, the ability to predict and alter human behavior, was the topic of Elsie Clews Parsons' presidential address at the annual dinner of the AAU in 1942. The tone of her talk was set by the opening remark, "Soothsaying is illegal in Massachusetts." Parsons alluded to the fact that the people of that state were protected from persons who claimed to be able to foresee the future. She pointed out that prediction, although a basic human desire, was unreliable and should not be taken seriously. She acknowledged that science was capable of providing a basis for intelligent choices but added that if there were to be a revolution in human relations it would be a "revolution of the verifiable . . . which is science."\textsuperscript{32}

Parsons told her audience that the demand for prediction in the social sciences originated from the University
of Chicago where anthropologists were told, "'to sell our goods.' This meant of course that there was a market for an applied science, in other words a demand on anthropology for prediction." Where Herskovits' concern was the possible conflict between the anthropologist and the administrator Parsons feared that the need to fulfill their predictions would turn the anthropologists from objective observers into subjective participants. The anthropologist would become involved with policy implementation rather than the collection of data.\textsuperscript{33}

In her conclusion Parsons sympathized with those who wished to make the world a better place, but like Herskovits, she believed that pure research and the conveyance of that research through teaching would ultimately prove more advantageous to society.\textsuperscript{34}

The critical and disapproving remarks of Herskovits and Parsons were a reflection of the overall attitude of the members of the American Anthropological Association. Even after a decade of use, applied anthropology had received little formal recognition from the organization. In the cumulative Subject Index of the American Anthropologist, 1929-1938, the term "applied anthropology" does not appear. From 1939 to 1944 the journal published only one article that dealt with the new discipline.\textsuperscript{35}
This lack of support and criticism from within the academic community did not go unchallenged. By the end of the decade the small group of young applied anthropologists, with a confidence based on the experience and training gained while working for Collier, the Department of Agriculture, and on the projects of Warner and Mayo, not only publicly answered their critics but took the offensive and decided to create a separate organization that recognized and supported the development of their chosen field.
FOOTNOTES


4 Ibid.


10 Spicer, "Early Applications of Anthropology," pp. 120-121.


16 Ibid., pp. 7-8; Taylor, "Anthropologists and the Indian New Deal," pp. 156-159.

17 Science, 81 (1935), 170-171.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., pp. 125-126.


29. In an interview conducted by Lawrence C. Kelly, Eliot Chapple argued that it was the schools controlled by "Boasians," who were not interested in developing laws of prediction, that played a leading role in the conflict between the applied social scientists and the academic world. Lawrence C. Kelly, transcript of an interview with Eliot Chapple, April 16, 1978, pp. 26-27. In fact Boas did question Collier's attempt to use anthropologists and felt that teaching administrators might be more beneficial, see Taylor, "Anthropologists and the Indian New Deal," p. 157; Kelly, "Anthropology and Anthropologists," p. 7.


31. Ibid., pp. 217, 222.


34. Ibid., p. 342.

CHAPTER II

THE CREATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR
APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

The call to use the techniques of anthropology to solve contemporary problems was a natural response by the small group of applied anthropologists to the world in which they found themselves. Their growth both as professionals and individuals took place as the nation confronted the problems created by depression, the threat of fascism, and war. Traditional methods of solving political, economic, and social problems had apparently failed. New approaches were needed and the Roosevelt administration seemed more than willing to support experimental methods. Much of the New Deal legislation was based on the advice of social scientists who wished to apply their knowledge to solve contemporary problems.¹

Whether or not anthropologists should be included with the group of social scientists that helped to formulate policy was the question the American Anthropological Association had to address. Could cultural solutions be applied to political problems? Would the objective, scientific methods of research become subjective in order to
fulfill an administrator's needs? Would the end come to justify the means? Many felt that an administrative and scientific elite would become the determinates of policy, thereby undercutting the basic foundation of democracy. It was these questions and concerns that the applied anthropologist attempted to answer as the decade of 1940 and World War II began.  

The leading advocates and defenders of the new discipline were John Provinse and Eliot Chapple. Despite the limited success of the applied projects of the 1930s both men still believed that social anthropology could become an important tool for overcoming the country's problems. This belief combined with a distaste for what they perceived to be the sedate life of the traditional scholar convinced them of the necessity and usefulness of their adopted discipline. Both men turned their intellectual conviction into pragmatic action and championed the banner of applied anthropology.  

John Provinse initially intended to pursue a legal career after receiving his L.L.B. from the University of Chicago in 1925, but he soon became dissatisfied with the profession and returned to graduate school to study anthropology. At Chicago he worked under some of the most influential anthropologists of the day: Robert Redfield, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, and Edward Sapir. He received his
M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Chicago in 1930 and 1934. Before completing the requirements of his doctorate, however, he took a position as assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Arizona in 1932. Just as he had become dissatisfied with the daily routine of a law firm, so he became restless within the life of an academic community. In 1936 his career in applied anthropology began, when he joined the Soil Conservation Service. From 1940 to 1942 he served under Dr. Carl C. Taylor in the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Provinse's position with the Department of Agriculture was, in part, a result of a letter he sent to Taylor in which he argued that Warner's Yankee City Series, while beneficial for research purposes, had little if any practical value. Provinse felt that research should be integrated with administration and assist in the formulation of policy. Taylor agreed and offered him a job in the Rural Agricultural Community Studies.3

Provinse arrived in Washington in 1940 and immediately began to argue that anthropology could be useful if only it were applied. In October before the Western Farm Economic Association he presented a paper entitled "Sociological Considerations in a National Policy for Agriculture." Two months later, before the American Sociological Association,
he discussed "Cultural Factors in Land Use Planning." That same month, Provinse made his strongest plea to his most important audience. At the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Philadelphia he appeared to speak on behalf of "Anthropology in Program Planning."  

Provinse announced at the opening of his speech that anthropology could make two contributions to the study of modern communities. The first was the solving of practical problems. There, the anthropologist could act as a day-to-day technical advisor and counselor to the administrator. The second was that anthropology could provide an important method of approach and point of view:

The insights anthropology had been able to develop place it in a more strategic position than any other discipline to portray total situations and to impress upon social program makers of all kinds the need for full knowledge of how any program is likely to affect the total social situation and the lives of the people to whom it is applied.

Therefore, Provinse concluded, anthropology must be applied in order to assist in the solving of the problems of the modern world. A refusal to do so, he insisted, would be scientific short-sightedness, a disservice to the field of anthropology, and a "shirking" of responsibility to the larger community as a whole.

Eliot Chapple echoed Provinse's appeal before the same audience. After working with Lloyd Warner, Chapple went on to become a pioneer in developing the concept of
interaction analysis in the study of modern industry. In
1940 he published a broad overview of this concept in
Measuring Human Relations: An Introduction to the Study of
the Interaction of Individuals. Like Provinse, his
address before the American Anthropological Association
appealed for anthropology to become more involved in the
contemporary world. He began his speech noting the
suspicion and confusion which surrounded the word anthro-
pology. Many believed it to be "an apparently useless
occupation," that measured skulls or studied the "unwashed
cannibals." He added that the profession had done little
to alter that opinion. He then argued for the necessity to
apply the knowledge gained from the scientific, systematic
approach or traditional anthropology to the study and
solving of the problems facing the modern world. He labeled
this approach "anthropological engineering." 6

Chapple explained that this approach could assist
administrators, and as a result, assist the people being
administered. The goal of an administrator, according to
Chapple, was the maintenance of equilibrium. A change of
policy would affect the equilibrium of the individual;
therefore, the policy had to be developed in such a way
that the natural state of the individual was only momentar-
ily affected and the equilibrium preserved. If the admin-
istrator desired to maintain a state of equilibrium, Chapple
argued, then the anthropologist "is specially equipped to assist him." The anthropologist, because of his "command" of a science of human relations, could "predict what will happen to the relations of people when such methods are introduced."7

Chapple realized that the mention of prediction and engineering conjured up in the minds of many an elitist group, responsible to no one, controlling and changing human behavior at their whim. He argued, however, that the reverse was true. The failure to develop a science of human relations was what had "caused our difficulties." He concluded with the argument that the democratic privileges of the country would be enhanced through the use of "engineers of human relations" because administrators would have the benefit of specialists in human relations as their assistants.8

The appearance of Chapple and Provinse and their arguments on behalf of applied anthropology in Philadelphia created some interest but did little to persuade the members of the AAA to endorse the new discipline. After a decade of use applied anthropology was no closer to being recognized as an official branch of the organization. This resulted in the decision by the few but enthusiastic supporters of the new field to organize independently of their parent organization.9
The man behind the campaign to create a separate organization was Eliot Chapple. He felt this move was necessary because "the kinds of things that we applied types were trying to do were getting nowhere." A letter writing campaign began in early 1941 in which Chapple announced that it was now time for those who believed in the value of applied anthropology to apply themselves to create an organization that would support their beliefs. In a letter to M. L. Wilson, director of Extension Services in the Department of Agriculture, Chapple pointed out that the "existing anthropological organizations do little or nothing to promote the application of anthropological methods to the problems of our own society." After mentioning that a number of individuals agreed with the idea of forming a separate organization, Chapple added that the "present moment is a good one, because of the interest aroused by Provinse's paper as much as by my own in Philadelphia." Wilson replied by letter that he agreed with Chapple and pledged his support.10

After reading Chapple's suggestion, Provinse wrote in March that he was for the idea "because I agree with you that those of us who are interested in more practical affairs do not get an opportunity to be heard as frequently as we should like." That same month Chapple's student and associate in the Harvard Business School, Frederick
Richardson, Jr., wrote to Julian Steward of the Smithsonian Institute. In his letter, Richardson traced the role of the discipline in the past decade, stating it had been a "hit or miss process" primarily because of the lack of organized effort to promote the discipline. He added that the American Anthropological Association could not support a separate branch just for a specialized field as that would "foster one branch as against another." Hence, a separate, independent organization devoted to applied anthropology was necessary.\textsuperscript{11}

Unlike earlier replies, Steward's letter contained a note of caution. He felt the shift from the study of a primitive to a contemporary society had taken anthropology so far from its origins that it had become "indistinguishable from sociology." Steward also argued that it was not clear what applied anthropology meant, pointing out that "John Provinse, for example, is very much in doubt as to what to call himself." Steward suggested a year of informal status to allow the various opinions and plans of actions to crystallize into an accepted whole.\textsuperscript{12}

But for the small group of applied anthropologists any delay was too long. The problems facing the country would not wait and the momentum for the creation of the organization might be lost. Therefore, with Chapple's argument that "the present moment is a good one," the
first general meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology was held at the Littauer Center for Public Administration at Harvard University on May 2-3, 1941. Fifty-six people attended the conference and an additional forty-two expressed an interest but were unable to come. Chosen as the first officers of the Society were: President, Eliot Chapple; Secretary, D. W. Lockard; Treasurer, Frederick Richardson, Jr.; while the executive committee included these three and Conrad Arensberg and John Provinse. In the fall of 1942 Chapple became editor of the Society's journal and Provinse replaced him as president. The organization's total membership after one year was 198 with seventy-one of this number being professional social scientists. Two meetings of the Society took place in 1942 but because of the war another was not held until 1946.13

The men who were the visible spokesmen for the idea of applied anthropology became the force behind the Society in its first five years of existence. With hindsight it appears that each accepted or gravitated toward the role that was most natural to him. Provinse early on "knew what he wanted to do and his determination was to become a full fledged administrator utilizing his anthropological background." In 1942 he accepted the post of chief of the Community Services Division of the War Relocation Authority, and continued in that position until 1946. From that
vantage point, he was able to employ a relatively large number of anthropologists and hoped to base policy decisions on their research. Chapple, on the other hand, exercised leadership through the Society's journal, *Applied Anthropology*. As editor, he aimed his guns at the critics of the new discipline. His editorial statement in the journal's first issue drew the battle lines.\(^4\)

Chapple began by stating that the goals of the Society for Applied Anthropology were to "promote scientific investigations of the principles controlling the relations of human beings to one another and to encourage the wide application of these principles to practical problems." He pointed out that research and prediction without experimentation were "little more than idle speculation" and therefore the journal would attempt to apply the results of analysis to a specific problem, thereby testing the hypothesis of their observation. This position was based on the premise "that a science of human relations can only be developed if theories are tested in practice." The logical extension of this premise was that the journal "will publish only articles which contribute to the solution of practical problems."\(^5\)

There were a number of reasons for the tone and attitude of Chapple's editorial. In part, it was merely a reflection of Chapple's aggressive personality and with the introduction of a new journal it was necessary to describe
the purpose and the goals of Applied Anthropology as well as the requirements for publication. But because there was so much of Chapple within the editorial, rather than an objective statement of purpose, it was obvious that he addressed his remarks to those who were and were not members or supporters of the Society. The American Anthropological Association, as well as the academic community in general, had done little to support the development of applied anthropology. The result was that instead of being an accepted member of the parent organization "the newborn was regarded by most anthropologists as something of a monstrosity and as a consequence it began its first growth in the limbo of illegitimacy." Hence Chapple's purpose was not simply to articulate the idea of the Society but to legitimze the value of modern anthropology by comparing it to traditional anthropology. Just like the child who is rejected by his parents wishes to prove himself, and does so by measuring his success against that of his parents, so applied anthropology wished to prove itself to the organization that had rejected it.16

To prove itself, however, the Society for Applied Anthropology needed an opportunity. Ironically coinciding with the birth of the organization and the publication of its journal was the entrance of the United States into World War II. The war presented social scientists with an
opportunity to demonstrate the value of their disciplines and anthropologists seized the moment in order to do just that. Ripley P. Bullen, a recent Ph.D. graduate of anthropology from Harvard, in a letter to the American Anthropologist, wrote that the war was a challenge and asked "will anthropology be found lacking in this, its first big opportunity." Bullen argued that "the job of laying the formulation for a lasting peace must not be left entirely to the politicians," adding that "anthropology is the only new discipline which is peculiarly fitted by the nature of its subject matter to work this task." B. W. Aginsky, director of the Social Science Field Laboratory in Northern California, echoed Bullen in a similar letter to the journal. "We must emerge from our Ivory Tower and help with our knowledge." Aginsky also expressed concern about the peace to follow, "we will win the armed war but we must insure our winning of the social war."17

Similar appeals appeared in other journals but perhaps the most elaborate argument for the need to apply the social sciences appeared in Applied Anthropology. Alexander Leighton, a psychiatrist trained at Johns Hopkins who was a member of the Indian Education, Personality and Administration project on the Navajo reservation in a preventive medicine research program, expressed his hope in an article entitled "Training Social Scientists for Post War Conditions."
Leighton began his article stressing the need to recognize the "essential oneness" of all disciplines and the necessity for sharing or coordinating efforts in training and research. He cited three examples of this recognition or trend: the Social Science Research Council, and the journals Psychiatry and Applied Anthropology. He believed that the war presented a pressing need to further a combined effort by the social sciences adding "certainly this must be done if scientific humanism is ever to be anything more than a happy thought." 18

Leighton also stated that the war placed the social sciences under pressure "to deliver goods of immediate value or cease to exist" and concluded that what could be learned from war could be used in peace. "We were all caught unprepared by war. Let the social sciences be not caught unprepared by peace." To accomplish this goal Leighton called for the training of social scientists for the eventual work of the post war period. He hoped for the experience of an interrelated discipline which would train students in a variety of backgrounds and develop the techniques of gathering data and information which then might "transform their knowledge into planning, action and accomplishment." He pointed out that the opportunities for an internship of his design already existed, in the reservation lands of the Indian, in industry, the department of
agriculture and most recently in what he called the "colonies of American-Japanese."19

The bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese resulted in an emotional response by white Americans on the west coast. Overnight the years of submerged or subtle racism emerged with the news of the attack. All Japanese, citizens or not, became the enemy and a daily reminder that if the planes could reach Hawaii they could also reach California. The fear and suspicion increased as the emotional momentum continued to build with the appearance of Walter Lippman's "The Fifth Column on the Coast," February 12, 1942. The next day the west coast Congressional delegation sent a letter to President Roosevelt that recommended the "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage . . . aliens and citizens alike" from the "strategic area" of California, Washington and Oregon. On February 19 Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066 which authorized the Secretary of War to establish military areas and exclude "any or all persons" from those designated regions. To facilitate the movement of the 112,353 Japanese in the three western states, 62 percent of whom were citizens, the President, a month later, March 18, signed Executive Order No. 9102 which created the War Relocation Authority.20
By the end of March the largest evacuation of citizens to occur in the United States began. By October ten relocation centers to house the evacuees, as they became known, were established in seven states. One each existed in Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah, with two each in Arizona, Arkansas, and ironically, in California. It was these "colonies of American-Japanese" that Leighton suggested might be considered an opportunity to train social scientists for the post-war period. This view was not held by Leighton alone. Members of the Society of Applied Anthropology and supporters of the new organization felt the relocation centers presented them with the chance to demonstrate and prove the validity of their arguments for the application of anthropology and by so doing legitimize the discipline. 21

2. This debate over objective vs. subjective methodology, was not restricted to the field of anthropology but involved the social sciences as a whole from the late 1920s through the 1940s. For a discussion of the evolution of the issues and positions involved in the debate see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), especially Chapter 10, "Crisis in Social Science;" and "Science and Social Theory" in James C. Malin, *Essays on Historiography* (published by the author in Lawrence, Kansas, 1953).


8. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

Lawrence C. Kelly, transcript of an interview with Eliot Chapple, 16 April 1978, p. 35; Eliot Chapple to M. L. Wilson, 10 February 1941; M. L. Wilson to Eliot Chapple, 25 February 1941, Frederick Richardson, Jr. Papers (private correspondence of Richardson in possession of author).


Julian Steward to Frederick Richardson, Jr., March 1941, HSAI, Smithsonian.


This brief synopsis of the events following the bombing of Pearl Harbor is based upon the chronological table in Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans: The Japanese

21 Myer, Uprooted Americans, pp. xxv-xxvi.
CHAPTER III

THE RELOCATION OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN:

JOHN COLLIER AND THE DEMOCRATIC SHOWCASE

John Collier, like Alexander Leighton, also recognized that the internment of the Japanese-Americans provided a unique opportunity for social scientists concerned with the science of human management. Both men shared a similar belief in what Leighton termed "scientific democracy," democracy based upon the expertise and research of the social sciences. Unlike Leighton, Collier was in a position to take advantage of the opportunity. Where previous attempts to integrate anthropology into the policy making process had been less than spectacular, the war initiated a new enthusiasm in Collier and renewed his hope that the discipline might yet prove successful.¹

When it became apparent that the Japanese-Americans on the west coast were to be forced to leave their homes and placed in some type of holding facility for the duration of the war, Collier began to petition that the 112,353 evacuees become the responsibility of the Interior Department. In a memorandum sent to the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, on March 4, 1942, Collier argued that Interior was more suited to handle the evacuation than any other branch
of the government. He noted the amount of land under the department's authority, including Indian reservation land, and he pointed out the experience his office had in dealing with minority groups. Therefore, he concluded, an experienced administrative staff could be organized quickly. He went so far as to suggest seven specific areas that might be used: Gila River, Arizona; Boise, Idaho; Coachella Valley, California; Yuma, California; Colorado River Project, Arizona; Columbia Valley, Washington; Rosa, Washington. He concluded his memorandum by stating that his plan would provide for the protection of the public as well as the "salvaging of the dignity and self respect of a group of our population."^2

Collier's suggestion found little support among the other departments of Interior. He did succeed, however, in having two of the eventual ten camps placed on Indian reservation land in Arizona: one at the Colorado River reservation near Parker and the other on the Pima reservation near Gila Bend. Rather than place the evacuees under Ickes' department, however, a new agency was created. The War Relocation Agency began operations March 18, 1942 with Milton Eisenhower as its director. Eisenhower was formerly with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and was sympathetic to the idea of applied social science. As a result of this feeling and as a personal favor to Collier he issued
a memorandum on March 21 authorizing that the administration of the Colorado River camp be directed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. He advised Collier to draw from his department individuals who would be equal to the task.  

Although he did not get all that he wanted, Collier quickly put together a small administrative staff for the camp. Wade Head, formerly superintendent of the Papago reservation, became director of the relocation center. Collier's interest, however, was not the day-to-day administration but the use of the relocation center as a means of correcting the mistakes which the BIA had made in its administration of the Indian. He extended this concern to all the camps. In a note to E. Reesmen Fryer, director of the San Francisco regional office of the WRA and former member of the Soil Erosion Service, Collier warned that no "exclusive pattern of social organization ought to be adopted in advance." He believed that that was one of the mistakes he made in the first years as head of the BIA. This fear of repeating mistakes also prompted a letter to Eisenhower. The Commissioner argued against adopting a set of uniform regulations for all the centers because he felt that such regulations had disrupted the implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act.  

Also reflected in the letters to Eisenhower and Fryer was Collier's other major interest. He wrote that the
confinement of the Japanese-Americans was an opportunity to perfect the "science of human management" and that such an experiment on a controlled group done in an "inconspicuous way," would aid in the larger job of administering the millions of Japanese in the post-war period. Collier discussed the idea of the relocation center as a controlled social experiment with a number of social scientists, including Harold Lasswell, Leonard Outhwaite, John Provinse, Conrad Arensberg and Laura Thompson.\(^5\)

It was Laura Thompson whom Collier first chose to direct the project. At that time, however, she was also the director of the Indian Personality Study. Collier believed that she could perform both duties if she had an assistant. Three individuals were suggested for the position: Fred Eggan, Kurt Levine and Cora Dubois. Thompson preferred Dubois and when contacted by Collier she initially accepted, but approximately six weeks later she declined the offer to take a position with the Office of Strategic Services. Meanwhile, Thompson's time was completely taken up in the preparation of the psychological tests for BIA employees so she also withdrew.\(^6\)

Collier then offered the job to Alexander Leighton, whom he had met previously as a result of his work on the Navajo Reservation. Leighton believed the proposal to be "a rather farsighted idea" and in sympathy with the
suggestions expressed in his article "Training Social Scientists for Post War Conditions." He accepted the offer in mid-April 1942. At the time he was a lieutenant in the Navy but Collier's appeal to Admiral Ross McIntyre succeeded in getting Leighton transferred to the BIA for the duration of the project.⁷

After their initial meeting Collier and Leighton met a number of times to decide upon the goals of the project. First Leighton was to provide the administration of the camp with facts and suggestions regarding the attitude and sentiment of the Japanese-Americans. Second, he was to gain experience and gather data of a general character, that might be of value in the administration of dislocated communities in occupied areas. Third, Leighton was to train a research staff capable of working in occupied areas after the war. Finally, Collier believed that part of the project's purpose should be the attempt to develop a democratic community within the camp as a showcase for the country. Both Collier and Leighton realized that the treatment of the Japanese-American in the United States would affect the country's ability to administer alien communities after the war. Collier was convinced that applied anthropology could play an important role in the development of that democratic community.⁸
Alexander Leighton arrived at Poston June 26, 1942, six weeks after the first evacuees. Located seventeen miles from Parker, Arizona, the relocation center was named after Charles Poston, a government engineer, and was divided into three separate units or camps. Leighton and his research staff planned to base their study on one camp rather than the whole center. This decision was partially based on personal problems, as well as on the belief that a concentrated study of one unit was better than a superficial examination of the whole center. Before his departure for the relocation center Leighton requested the services of an anthropologist, a sociologist, and a psychologist. The first assistant to join him at Poston was Edward Spicer. A recent Ph.D. graduate from Chicago and former student of John Provisce, Spicer left his teaching position at the University of Arizona to take part in the project. Tamie Tsuchuyamia, a Ph.D. candidate at California recommended by Laura Thompson, briefly worked with Leighton, but she quickly returned to Berkeley to participate in a study of the relocation of the Japanese-Americans that had begun there. She was replaced by Elizabeth Colson in November. The sociologist and psychologist positions were never filled. On occasions Laura Thompson served as a consultant, as did Conrad W. Arensberg. Leighton and Spicer, however, were responsible for most of the project's work.
Undergraduate or postgraduate Nisei, second generation Japanese born in America, were hired to assist Leighton. By requiring some college background, Leighton hoped to find evacuees who had experience or an interest in the social science field. The evacuee staff consisted of nine field workers, four of whom spoke fluent Japanese, two secretaries, four typists, an artist, a draftsman, and a teacher of Japanese who acted as an instructor and translator. There were also a number of high school students who were part-time workers. The staff received a monthly salary of sixteen dollars. Through the efforts of Robert Redfield, the University of Chicago extended college credits to the evacuees as students at large.\(^1\)

Leighton developed a teaching program that included regular lectures, supervised field work, and twice-a-week staff meetings. With this program he hoped to create a sense of purpose, personal achievement and believed this would develop an incentive to pursue the goals of the project as well as assist in the evacuees' adjustment to the center. To keep morale up Leighton took the staff on picnics, parties and extended trips away from Poston. He realized that the project's research depended on successful penetration into the population of the relocation center and that could only be possible if he achieved a good working relationship with the evacuee staff.\(^1\)
Aware of the difficulty he and Spicer would have in conducting interviews with the Japanese-Americans, Leighton wanted to use a name to describe the research project that would not offend or antagonize anyone. For that reason he rejected using the word anthropology in the title for fear that the name would suggest a study of primitive people. Finally decided upon was the title Sociological Research Bureau (SRB).

Five types of research techniques were used to analyze the evacuee community: general observation, intensive interview, collection of public records, public opinion polls, and personality sketches of a few selected individuals. Added to these forms of analysis each evacuee on the staff maintained a personal journal. This staff diary became a very important tool of analysis for the community study since the writers themselves were members of the community. In order to gain credibility for his study Leighton had to guarantee that all materials and information gathered would be used only by the bureau and that all informants' names would be protected. Wade Head, director of Poston, recognized this necessity and issued a memorandum forbidding all persons not members of the staff, including himself, access to the bureau's files. Only specific members within the bureau received permission to have the authority for complete access.12
The work of the SRB was hampered at first because of the late arrival of Leighton. The administrative staff arrived the week of April 9, quickly followed by the 17,814 Japanese-Americans who were to spend the duration of the war at Poston. Leighton and the bureau did not begin operations until two months later. By that time the administration had developed its own procedures and was unprepared for a research analysis group. There was no spot in the organizational structure of the center for a new department.  

Added to the bureaucratic problem was a manpower shortage. Upon his arrival Leighton became chief of the Public Health Department and later was designated Acting Chief Medical Officer. When Spicer arrived he became his medical assistant. Although Leighton understood the necessity for this dual appointment, he also realized valuable research time was being lost. Unfortunately, his disappointment, which he expressed to the camp director and others on the staff, did not help him in his attempt to develop a working relationship with the WRA personnel at the center. Some of Poston's staff did not understand Leighton's role while others felt the bureau was attempting to make life easy for persons whom they perceived to be the enemy. One administrator who testified before a congressional committee investigating the WRA's handling of the evacuation, believed the analysts' appearance at Poston
changed the nature of the camp "from a custodial job to a social experiment honeycombed with silly sentimentalism."\textsuperscript{14}

Leighton did manage to establish a working relationship with the Project Director, the Assistant Project Director of Unit I, the head of the Community Management Division, and the Project Attorney's office. He described these individuals as "people minded," those who saw the evacuees as people first and as Japanese second, and therefore were sympathetic to their plight. Leighton was unsuccessful in establishing a good relationship with the Engineering, Agricultural, Fiscal, and Personnel Departments. These groups he described as "stereotype minded" people who saw the evacuees as enemies and felt they were inferior and not to be trusted.\textsuperscript{15}

Just as some of the administrative staff was suspicious and unsure of the bureau, so were the evacuees reluctant to cooperate with the research team. Because part of the work consisted of investigation and Leighton wore a naval uniform, the research was considered intelligence operations and residents' reactions were often hostile. Some identified the bureau with the administration and as a result the staff suffered the brunt of the community's frustrations. A few residents resented the special status and privileges the evacuee assistants received. At one time or another all members of the staff received indirect threats while
on one occasion a member was physically confronted. To combat this, Leighton's staff attempted to keep a low profile, established a relationship with evacuee leaders who were respected and influential in the community, and developed a small number of residents who came to trust the staff and allowed themselves to be interviewed by them. In this manner the SRB developed a number of reliable informants.16

Another reason for the contributions was the fact that the centers were "about as boring as communities could be," many informants talked "because there was nothing more interesting to do." It was not long in fact before the low profile of the SRB disappeared. As one Japanese-American reported, "anthropologists were running around on the roofs" so that Collier's hope for an inconspicuous research team never materialized.17

Nevertheless, the evacuees did talk for whatever reason, and the SRB was able to gather information and form general conclusions based on their research. By the end of the summer of 1942 Leighton discovered, besides the expected problems between the administration and the evacuees, the existence of major conflicts within the evacuee community itself. Although Japanese-Americans who arrived at Poston shared the common bond of being interned in a relocation center, the SRB learned that their reaction to
confinement depended to a large degree on their background. The evacuees were made up of three groups. The older Japanese internees were Issei, who had immigrated to America with the plan to return to Japan. As a result, they had not integrated into American society but remained a segregated group. They arrived at Poston with feelings of fear and bitterness and were apathetic when asked to become participants in the development of a normal community. Their children, Nisei, made up the second and largest group of evacuees. Unlike their parents, the Nisei were American citizens and were culturally oriented to American life. Because they felt more American than Japanese, the Nisei were on the one hand angered at being interned but on the other hand determined to prove their loyalty. Therefore, they were generally more easily persuaded to follow administrative guidelines. This, however, brought them into conflict with their parents. The third and smallest groups of evacuees were the Kibei. Like the Nisei they were children of Issei but had been sent to school in Japan. Some Kibei, because of their education in Japan, tended to be arrogant and aloof from the Nisei. Others, because of their experience in each world, seemed to have had a broader understanding of the situation and assisted the Nisei in their conflict with Issei parents.18
These groups came into conflict with one another when the evacuees were ordered by the administration to create a constitution and government for Poston. A Civic Planning Board, made up of Kibei, submitted a constitution on June 23 that allowed all members of the camp to hold office. Three days later the board disbanded as a sign of protest when it learned that two weeks earlier the WRA had issued its own plan, which excluded the Issei from participation. According to WRA policy, only Nisei would be allowed to hold public office. This meant that the natural leadership of the Japanese social organization, the male parent, was omitted from the decision making process. 19

In compliance with the new directive and following the demise of the Civic Planning Board, the creation of a Community Council took place. All persons twenty-one or over, could vote for the eligible Nisei residents. The function of the council members was to make recommendations to the Project Director about internal affairs and to establish a judicial committee to deal with law and order in the community. There was no pay for serving on the council and the average member was a thirty-one-year-old Nisei with little experience in government or leadership. 20

To demonstrate their displeasure with WRA policy, the evacuees created the Issei Advisory Board. This placed the Community Council in a position of being between two
groups, the evacuees and the administration, and unable to please either. On the one hand the Council's power to take action was limited, as it functioned as an advisory body only. On the other hand, it did not receive total evacuee support, for many residents would follow only the advice of the Issei Advisory Board. The Council, therefore, could not guarantee to the administration that the evacuees would act upon Council directives. By the end of the summer Poston had three different governmental bodies, the administrative staff, the Community Council, and the Issei Advisory Board. This arrangement resulted in a divided community. 21

Leighton believed the different governmental bodies divided the residents into three groups. The first were primarily the Issei, together with a scattering of Kibei, who felt resentment toward both the administration and the Nissei. The second group were a number of families who did not become involved in the political infighting but shared the common frustration of all evacuees in being confined to Poston. The third group were the Nisei. Embarrassed by their lack of achievement, and alienated from a large segment of the community, they blamed the administration for their problems. 22

Leighton also realized by the end of the summer that the SRB had a problem. One purpose of the Bureau was to
assist the camp director in the administration of the evacuees. To fulfill this requirement the SRB initially began submitting reports on evacuee reactions to their new environment and the problems they confronted. The reports were placed on the director's desk. This approach, however, was found ineffective, as the director felt the reports were interesting but he did little to implement the suggestions contained in them. Leighton then attempted a second approach, which consisted of a monthly report that discussed major trends that occurred in the evacuee community. Once again these reports received little attention. The research staff eventually realized that the momentum of daily events left the administration with little time to read reports. Most decisions were being made in conversations at staff meetings. Because of this procedure, Leighton maneuvered himself into being allowed to attend the staff meetings, thereby enabling him to present the bureau's observations. The bureau's first important discovery, therefore, did not involve the evacuees but the administration.

We thus became aware of what would seem to be a basic principle in the application of social science to a fast moving administrative program. Namely that the research staff have direct access to the policy makers and participation in policy meetings.  

Although Leighton attended the staff meetings, the skepticism of many of the camp administrators remained. They continued to question the value of the bureau's
existence. The information the SRB provided seemed to hold little relevancy to the day-to-day administration of the camp. Just as the internment of the Japanese-Americans provided an opportunity for applied anthropology to demonstrate its value, Leighton also was provided with an opportunity in which the SRB was given a chance to demonstrate its value. In November of 1942 the administration was faced with a strike of the evacuees of Unit I, the unit the SRB observed.

The incident that initiated the strike was the severe beating of a thirty-year-old Kibei on November 14. The man had been disliked in California for his role as a rice broker. Many of the evacuees claimed he had swindled farmers, and that after Pearl Harbor he gave names to the authorities. Following the beating the FBI interviewed a number of residents and detained two. One was a twenty-seven-year-old, well respected, intelligent Kibei. The other, also twenty-seven, was an uneducated Kibei who had been previously suspected in other beatings. Three days later many residents were upset that the two were still being held without apparent evidence or charges. Talk of not getting a fair trial began and meetings were held in the blocks where the two men lived. Representatives of the evacuee community went to the authorities to present evidence that they felt proved the two were innocent. They
were referred to the FBI, who treated them indifferently and sent them on their way. The next day the evacuees submitted a petition which contained 110 names, requesting the release of the men. The group was once again referred to the FBI and again nothing was done. That afternoon the Community Council and the Issei Advisory Board met and discussed the problem. Together they issued a petition that questioned the legality of holding the two men. The Assistant Director, John Evans, insisted that law and order must be maintained. In response to that declaration, members of both the Council and the Advisory Board resigned.24

In order to have an organization to represent their views, the evacuees met and formed an emergency committee of seventy-two, which consisted of two representatives from each block. Also part of the committee were twenty members of the Issei Advisory Board, twelve Council members and five Block Managers. This group proved to be too large to be an effective body, so it was trimmed to an Emergency Executive Council of twelve. That night demonstrations began at the jail where the two Kibei remained, and except for essential services the evacuees refused to go to their assigned duties the next day.25

Evans met with the members of the Council and Advisory board because he had been left in charge of the camp. The Project Director, Assistant Director, and Project Attorney
were out of town attending a meeting. At the first sign of trouble members of the administrative staff at Poston suggested the army be brought in. Evans, however, decided it was not necessary and might create further problems. As the conflict continued, Leighton became one of the advisors Evans depended on for suggestions and support. Apparently Evans' decision to not bring in the Army resulted from the influence of Leighton and his advice to keep open a dialogue with the evacuees and not force the issue at the point of a gun.26

Five days after the beating took place the FBI informed Evans that under the circumstances their investigation could not proceed; therefore, the two Kibei did not have to be detained. It was decided, in light of this, that one of the Kibei, the suspected trouble maker, be held for the Yuma County Court because of circumstantial evidence. The other Kibei was released. Evans announced his decision to the Committee of seventy-two and the Emergency Council of twelve. At that meeting the evacuees suggested that the Kibei should be tried at Poston and, if found guilty, then be released to state authorities. On November 20 Evans called Washington about the evacuee's suggestion. He conferred with the Department of Interior, the War Department, and the WRA. All agreed with the suggestion and, when questioned, the Sheriff of Yuma County also agreed to the proposition.27
After the decision to allow the Kibei to be tried at Poston, Wade Head returned to camp and held three sessions with the Emergency Council. By this time, both sides had grown weary of the strike and apparently were willing to compromise to end the disturbance. The Issei, through their leadership during the strike, had gained the support of the evacuees and wanted assurances from Head that their position in Poston would not change following the settlement of the dispute. To insure their position they proposed that all evacuees, not just the Nisei, be allowed to hold administrative jobs and that a City Planning Board be organized. According to the Issei, the board would act as an advisory body to the administration. Head agreed in principal with their proposal but made no promises that he could implement them. After the incident at Poston and the outbreak of violence at Manzanar, however, the WRA changed its policy so that the Issei were allowed to serve on the Community Council.28

Leighton and the SRB were given much of the credit for the nonviolent conclusion of the strike at Poston. Leighton's advice, based upon the research and generalizations made by the bureau, seemed to make the difference between the de-escalation of the conflict at Poston and the deaths that resulted from a similar incident at Manzanar. Unfortunately just as the bureau's work was being recognized
by some as a valuable asset to camp administrators, a series of policy and personnel changes within the WRA adversely affected the bureau's future research efforts. Milton Eisenhower resigned in June to join the Office of War Information. Never in agreement with the decision to relocate the Japanese-Americans, Eisenhower's departure meant that Collier lost one of the few supporters he had in the WRA hierarchy. Vice President Henry Wallace recommended Collier as Eisenhower's replacement. The Commissioner, however, had made too many congressional enemies in his work in behalf of the Indianso the choice went to Dillon Myer, a former executive with the Soil Conservation Service.29

Myer believed that the future security of the Japanese-Americans depended on their integration into American communities. He blamed their self-segregation on the west coast as one of the factors that aided in the hysteria that followed the bombing of Pearl Harbor and their eventual forced evacuation. Therefore he announced that a resettlement policy was to go into effect immediately. According to Myer's plan, the Japanese-Americans would be resettled throughout the country except on the west coast, where they were forbidden by the Army. The resettlement policy became official in November, 1942, and received a mixed reaction from the administrative staff of the centers. The personnel at Poston, colleagues and employees of Collier, disagreed with
the policy change. They argued that the American public was not prepared to handle an influx of Japanese into their communities. Others were sympathetic to Myer's idea of integration but felt that he had not taken into account the Issei. This group was older and had never been assimilated, and many believed that to close the camps and force the Issei out was cruel and unnecessary.30

The critical reaction to the resettlement policy was also based on a negative response by many to the personality of Myer. Fryer described Myer as a "first rate but cold blooded administrator" while Tom Sasaki, a staff member of the SRB, felt Myer was a typical "administrative type." Both Fryer and Sasaki cited Myer's visit to Poston as an example of the directors calculated approach to the evacuee problem. After a brief tour of the camp, Myer complained that the evacuees were too comfortable and living too well to ever want to leave. He suggested less be done for them so that they would want to resettle. The criticism of Myer was also based on the fondness held for Eisenhower, whom Fryer saw as a "humanist" who took a much more sympathetic approach.31

It was not unusual for the director of the WRA to visit one of the relocation centers, yet Myer's appearance at Poston in the winter of 1942 followed three trips made by John Collier to the camp earlier that fall. The two men had
completely different approaches and attitudes regarding the center's future. The evacuees became aware of these conflicting views in the speeches each gave upon their arrival. Collier, who still hoped to make Poston a democratic showcase, spoke to the evacuees about the "profound democracy" the Indians experienced and expressed his belief that the Japanese-Americans through participation in community development programs were also capable of experiencing that "profound democracy." The necessity to develop a viable sense of community was important to the residents, for, according to Collier, they would be held at Poston for the duration of the war. The Commissioner suggested that this might be as long as five or ten years. He added that their confinement at Poston was for their protection.  

During his visit in November Myer refuted the basic points of Collier's speech. The new director of the WRA insisted that only integration into American communities would insure the future protection and success for the Japanese-Americans. He announced immediate implementation of the resettlement program that meant the ten camps would be nothing more than brief stopping points. It followed therefore that since Poston was not to be a permanent settlement, the creation of programs designed to create the center into a self-sustaining community was not needed.
Shortly after Myer spoke to the residents of Poston the strike occurred. The conflicting viewpoints presented in the speeches of Myer and Collier have been held responsible for the conflict. Collier's visits to the camp, however, took place much earlier than Myer's and received little attention from the evacuees. The crowds who appeared to hear Collier speak were very small and some were unaware of who he was. The date of the address had been changed at the last moment from Friday to Saturday and few evacuees were made aware of the change. Actually the administrative staff, including the members of the SRB, seemed more concerned with Myer's policy than the evacuees. To the Japanese-American ever since the attack on Pearl harbor the only consistency in the policies directed at them was their inconsistency. Others have suggested that the disturbance was inevitable and a natural response to the daily frustrations the evacuees faced as residents of Poston. The harsh physical environment, the promises of more materials and a school, and the lengthy delay in being paid for their work all built up within the evacuees a tremendous tension and anger that any isolated incident might have touched off.34

Whether or not Myer's speech delivered to the evacuees in November had any relationship to the subsequent strike was never agreed upon by those involved. But the appointment
of Myer was a factor in the eventual demise of the SRB and of Collier's hope to create a democratic showcase at Poston. This was apparent to a few individuals soon after Myer announced his resettlement policy. Shortly after both men visited the camp a member of Poston's administrative staff concluded that "Wade [Head] seems to feel that Myer's speech knocked the bottom out of Collier's commitments. This is important. If that is so, then Mr. Collier may have to take a stand on this. We may have to split off."³⁵

Since his appointment by Roosevelt, June 17, 1942, Myer had gradually removed most of Eisenhower's appointees and replaced them with his own recruits. By that winter his control over the WRA was unquestioned except for the shared responsibility with Collier over Poston. The closing of the regional office in San Francisco in December was interpreted by some at Poston that Myer's next move might be to change the personnel of that camp, but Collier assured Wade Head that Myer had no intention of taking over Poston. But the new year did not resolve the strained relationship between the two departments. Head sent a memo to Collier in the first week of February in which he described Myer's attitude toward the Commissioner and the BIA as "belligerent." He added that Collier knew Myer well enough to realize "that he is very egotistical and sure of himself which makes it almost impossible to reason with him." Head
concluded that unless the situation changed, the BIA should end its involvement with Poston.\(^\text{36}\)

That same week Leighton also corresponded with Collier about the future of the SRB at the relocation center. He argued that if Myer's policy of resettlement were successful, then the camp would become nothing more than a way station and effectively end the reason for the existence of the SRB. But Leighton went on to question the future success of that policy and to argue that the research unit for that reason should remain at Poston. He stressed, however, that the bureau's involvement with the camp should be based on the acceptance of the idea of setting up a permanent community and that Poston would be independent of the other relocation centers. Leighton believed that Poston should be administered by the Indian Service alone.\(^\text{37}\)

Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes was not unaware of the battle lines being drawn between the WRA and the BIA. His initial reluctance to accept the responsibility for the relocation of the Japanese-Americans in June of 1942, combined with the personal conflict between Collier and Myer, persuaded him a year later to seek a way out of that involvement. On June 10, 1943 Ickes sent a memo to Collier, that expressed this feeling: "I think we had better get out from under our responsibilities with respect
to the Poston project without further loss of time." The secretary decided to issue an ultimatum to Myer: either the WRA or the BIA would administer Poston, but not both. Ickes realized, of course, that Myer would not allow Collier to have sole authority over the camp, and that the result would be the withdrawal of the Indian Service from Poston. Collier, after he received a copy of the memo, came to the same conclusion. He persuaded the Secretary not to send the ultimatum immediately, however, for he wanted to complete construction of an irrigation canal and school buildings. In this way Collier felt that at least the Indians would have something to show for the use of their land. 38

By the end of the summer Wade Head had had enough. In early August he suggested to Collier that the BIA at Poston was merely a "service agency for the WRA" and that "We are forced to put in to effect policies which we are convinced are contrary to the best interests of the evacuees, and in conflict with your own policies and principles." Further, he worried that the Indian Service might receive the political flak aimed at the WRA. He pointed out that the construction projects at the camp were completed, and therefore he saw no further reason for the BIA to remain at Poston. Later that same month Alexander Leighton communicated his complaint and letters to Myer directly. In a letter which he previously showed to Edward.
Spicer and John Provinse, Leighton argued that the resettlement policy was a failure and was doing more harm than good. He felt that the establishment of a permanent community at Poston was, both physically and emotionally, the best approach to the problem of the Japanese-Americans. Myer's reply three weeks later disagreed strongly with Leighton's points and reflected his strong conviction that the only proper course of action was resettlement.39

One reason for Myer's strong approach to Leighton was a letter to the director received three days before Leighton's memorandum arrived. Realizing that the democratic showcase at Poston could not be salvaged and with the construction projects completed Collier allowed Ickes' ultimatum to be sent. In the letter the Secretary pointed out that the agreement between his department and Milton Eisenhower signed April 14, had not been kept and that "with a growing sense of disappointment" he watched the BIA become superseded at Poston by WRA directives. Ickes questioned the policy changes that took place when Myer replaced Eisenhower and concluded that "your approach to the problem has been different and the solution that you offered cuts squarely across the objectives with which we set out." The Secretary then suggested, to resolve the problem, the BIA be given full authority over Poston, according to the agreement of April 14. If Myer did not agree to this
suggestion, Ickes proposed, the relationship between the two parties should be terminated.  

Myer's reply to the ultimatum did not surprise either Collier or Ickes. "While not altogether unexpected," Myer began, Ickes letter "presents a point of view which I regret very much." The Director of the WRA argued that his agency in fact complied with the agreement drawn up under Eisenhower's short term of office but added "that all centers must operate under the same body of basic policies." Therefore, Myer felt it best to terminate the relationship between the two agencies. In part he regretted his decision for "we have benefited materially from the assistance and counsel of Mr. Collier and members of his staff." He added, however, "we have not always had from Colorado River information and reports suitable to our needs nor in some instance have administrative practices been comparable with those in the other relocation centers." He concluded by suggesting that the transfer of authority from the BIA to the WRA take place January 1, 1944. In a memo to his staff that announced this decision Myer called the relationship with the BIA an "exceptionally smooth" one.  

The circumstances that ended Collier's experiment to create a democratic showcase and develop the science of human management at Poston were to some extent beyond the Commissioner's control. As in the past, his ambitions
for such a project tended to stretch beyond his reach. During Poston's first full month of operation Collier wrote, "I think, if we go on there, we shall make history. I believe we will produce results of definite, recognized, possibly profound value for post war purposes in Asia." This enthusiasm almost immediately was curtailed by the reality of the situation. The emotional and physical life within the relocation centers limited what Collier, Wade Head, or Alexander Leighton could have conceivably accomplished. Of course the problems inherent in the administration of over 17,000 Japanese-Americans were aggravated by this ambitious idealism which brought Collier into conflict with Dillon Myer and the WRA. Years later Leighton was to admit as much. Although never satisfied with Myer's handling of the affair he recognized that Myer's resettlement policy was probably the only proper approach. Whereas Collier followed "a romantic ideal in wanting to give the Japanese the chance to make Parker Valley blossom," Leighton believed he failed to recognize that Poston was an artificial community populated by frustrated citizens located in the Arizona desert.42

With the announcement of Myer's decision to transfer authority, Leighton, in September, resigned to begin an analysis of the research material collected by the SRB. For John Collier the demise of the social experiment at
Poston marked the end of his involvement with applied anthropology. After a decade of support, with little success, the commissioner, disillusioned and tired after eleven years in office, did not initiate any further projects that included the recruitment of applied anthropologists. In an indirect fashion, however, Collier continued to assist the young discipline. The work of Leighton and the SRB were used by applied anthropologists as an example of the value social scientists could be to the WRA if placed in all ten relocation centers.43
FOOTNOTES


4 John Collier to E. Reesman Fryer, 8 April 1942; John Collier to Milton Eisenhower, 17 April 1942; Office Files of Commissioner John Collier, Internment of Japanese on Indian Land, NA, RG75.


7 John Collier to Laura Thompson, 17 April 1942, Office Files of Commissioner John Collier, Internment of Japanese on Indian Land, NA, RG75; Leighton, Governing of Men, pp. 374; Lawrence C. Kelly, transcript of an interview with Alexander Leighton, 10 April 1978, p. 6.

8 John Collier to Wade Head, 4 June 1942, Office File of Commissioner John Collier, Documents: Post, War Relocation Authority, NA, RG75; Leighton, Governing of Men, p. vii of appendix; Toshio Yatsushino, Ishino Iwao, and


10 Ibid., pp. 376, 378.

11 Ibid., pp. 377-378.


16 Ibid., p. 381; Lawrence C. Kelly, transcript of an interview with Tom Sasaki, 22 April 1978, pp. 17-18.


21 Ibid., pp. 124-126.

22 Ibid., pp. 155-159.

23 Ibid., p. 396.


26 Ibid., pp. 174-176, 183.

27 Ibid., pp. 184, 186, 189, 192.

28 Ibid., pp. 204-209; Myer, *Uprooted Americans*, p. 65.


34 Collier believed that it was Myer's speech that caused the strike. For his views see *From Every Zenith*, pp. 302-303; both Leighton and Fryer felt the strike occurred because of the general frustration that had built up among the evacuees. See Kelly, Leighton Interview, p. 9; ibid., Fryer Interview, p. 56; for an analysis by someone not involved but who also concluded that the conflicting speeches played little if any role in the strike, see Records of War Relocation Authority, Headquarters and Documents File, NA, RG210.

35 Personal Papers of Alexander Leighton, General Meetings, Box 5, 72/233/P, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley; John Collier to McCaskill, 27 May

36 John Collier to Wade Head, 22 December 1942; Wade Head to John Collier, 6 February 1943, Office Files of Commissioner John Collier, Internment of Japanese on Indian Land, NA RG75; Collier, From Every Zenith, pp. 302-303.


38 Harold Ickes to Franklin Roosevelt, 15 June 1942; Harold Ickes to John Collier, 10 June 1943, Records of the Secretary of the Interior, Central Files, file 1-88, Internment of the Japanese on Indian Land, NA, RG75.

39 Wade Head to John Collier, 11 August 1943, Records of the Secretary of the Interior, Central Files, file 1-88, Internment of the Japanese, NA RG48; the letter from Leighton to Spicer and Provins and their responses are contained in the Records of the War Relocation Authority, Central Files, NA, RG210; Dillon Myer to Alexander Leighton, 27 August 1943, Office Files of Commissioner John Collier, Internment of Japanese on Indian Land, NA RG75.


41 Dillon Myer to Harold Ickes, 16 September 1943, Office Files of Commissioner John Collier, Internment of Japanese on Indian Land, NA, RG75.

42 John Collier to Harold Ickes, 10 June 1942, Office File of Commissioner John Collier, Internment of Japanese on Indian Land, NA RG75; Kelly, Leighton Interview, p. 9.

43 Leighton, Governing of Men, p. 375.
Joining Alexander Leighton and John Collier in the belief that the internment of the Japanese-American provided a unique opportunity to demonstrate the value of applied anthropology was John Provinse. When Milton Eisenhower accepted the position of director of the WRA, he recruited heavily among his former associates from the Department of Agriculture. One of the men eager for the opportunity to work for the new agency was John Provinse who became chief of Community Services and was, at that time, the only trained anthropologist employed by the agency. Immediately, Provinse worked to change that status. He found himself in a situation where he could use his position to develop a project that employed applied anthropologists and be administered by an applied anthropologist, himself. The relocation centers presented the Community Chief with the ideal setting to develop such a project.¹

Provinse's first step was to recruit his former teacher and colleague from the University of Chicago, Robert Redfield, to work as a consultant to the Community Service Division. Redfield, in collaboration with
Provinse, submitted a report to the WRA suggesting the use of social scientists to assist in the administration of the ten camps. Provinse then issued a separate report specifically recommending that sociologists and anthropologists with a knowledge of Japanese culture be employed. As a result of Provinse's recommendations, John F. Embree joined the WRA in the summer of 1942 in the Division of Reports and documents. As a young man Embree had traveled to Japan and China, and after receiving his B.A. from the University of Hawaii he concentrated on anthropology as a graduate student. He completed his M.A. at the University of Toronto, where he married Ella Lury, who had grown up in Japan. Then, like so many anthropologists of his day, he traveled to the University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D. in 1937. Embree wrote extensively on the Japanese in Hawaii and Japan, and through the Chicago pipeline was made aware of Provinse's long range goal. In fact, in the small world of applied anthropology, word of Provinse's plan quickly spread. Alexander Leighton noted in his journal, August 28, 1942, that Provinse, with Embree as a "nucleus," was in the process of setting up a research project similar to the SRB for all the camps. Edward Spicer believed that the Community Chief "was obviously laying eggs for what he really wanted."2
No sooner did Embree join the WRA than he and Provinse began to campaign for the agency to employ additional social scientists. Both men submitted memorandums to their superiors urging a more systematic approach in reporting and evaluating the attitudes of the evacuees. A professional analysis of the problems and tensions within the camps was desperately needed or else, as Embree predicted, "a series of social explosions" would result. As an example of the usefulness of professional analysis, Embree presented a report in October that examined the behavior traits of the Japanese-Americans. In the report Embree argued that if the administrative staff had a better understanding of the evacuees, a more "harmonious" relationship between the two would result. 3

For months Embree pestered John Baker, Chief of Office of Reports, about the need for social analysts in the relocation centers. Following the strike at Poston and the violence at Manzanar, in which one evacuee died, Embree submitted another proposal and reminded Baker that he had predicted an outbreak of violence as early as September. In his memorandum Embree pointed out that the administration was capable of describing the physical but not the emotional development of the centers. To accomplish this latter task he proposed that a social analyst be established at each project. According to Embree, the analyst would discover,
record, and report on the social organization of the center. After establishing the basic patterns of center life the analyst would be able to keep abreast of the social developments and trends that characterized the camp. He then would report these findings to Washington, together with recommendations regarding policy and predictions of evacuee reaction to future policy. Embree concluded that not only would this assist the WRA in the administration of the Japanese-Americans, but it would also provide a "solid factual base" for dealing with other relocated groups that the United States might be responsible for in the future.  

Where previous memoranda by Embree had only been glanced at, following the incidents at Poston and Manzanar, Baker passed on the proposal to E. M. Rowalt, Deputy Director of the WRA. In his note to Rowalt, Baker submitted that he previously believed Embree's suggestions would create nothing more than a "boon-doggle" in each center but that the strike at Poston and violence at Manzanar had "made a convert of me," and he strongly suggested that steps be taken to implement the plan.  

One of the conclusions drawn from the strike at Poston was the agreement by both those involved and those who investigated the incident that the information and knowledge provided by the Sociological Research Bureau (SRB), through
Leighton, had played an important role in avoiding the violence that occurred at Manzanar. Although the immediate reasons for the conflicts were different at each camp, both relocation centers shared the same basic underlying problems, which needed only a catalyst to bring them to the surface. The difference seemed to be that at Poston the administration was made aware of evacuee feelings and therefore knew in which direction to proceed to avoid placing a further strain on the situation. To those in Washington who favored the use of social scientists, the non-violent conclusion of the conflict at Poston demonstrated the value and necessity of placing an analyst in each project. The hierarchy of the WRA agreed with this view. Fearing further outbreaks of violence and recognizing the need to better understand the evacuee community, the WRA initiated steps to implement the proposal that Provinse and Embree had campaigned for in the previous six months.6

As a result of this change in attitude, Embree was transferred from the Office of Reports and Documents on December 15, 1942, to the Community Management Division, so that he and Provinse could work together to organize a team of social scientists. Provinse also was able to get Edward Spicer transferred from Poston so that the former SRB member could spend approximately a month surveying another center prior to the appointment of a social analyst there.
Embree did the same, leaving Washington in January to travel throughout the ten camps to see at first hand the problems an analyst might encounter.7

That same month a series of meetings was held at San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rock, between the national staff of the WRA and the administrative personnel of the camps. It was at these meetings that the creation of a community analysis group was first announced. The proposal was well received. However, as John Embree noted, one reason for the enthusiasm was that a large proportion of the staff members attending the meeting were previously with the Indian Service, and were familiar with and more open to the idea.8

By the end of January a number of personnel and administrative decisions were agreed upon. At first some consideration was given to the idea that the social analyst at each center should be independent from the other departments in the camp and report directly to the project head. But the directors of the centers were already overburdened by individuals and departments who desired direct access. It was decided, therefore, that the analyst would have to be assimilated into one of the already existing agencies at the camp and communicate through the head of that department to the project director. Initially proposed to fill this role was the Reports and Documents department. This agency, however, was not concerned with the community as a whole but
dealt more with public relations. Another drawback was that in many centers the evacuees concluded that the reports officer was an intelligence agent and avoided any contact with him. The next choice was the community management division. Since John Provinse had nurtured the idea of a community analysis program, it was decided that the analysts report to the community management chief of each center. He, in turn, would communicate with the project head and be supervised by Provinse from Washington. Although technically part of the community management department, the analyst would be free to consult the files of other divisions within the center.  

Involved in these early decisions were a variety of people, including Alexander Leighton. He and Provinse had corresponded on and off since the creation of the SRB. Just as Leighton had debated what to name his research unit, so was Provinse concerned with a title which would not mislead and yet correctly describe the purpose of the group. The choice of social analysis was discarded because it was felt that the word social was not descriptive enough for the layman. Finally agreed upon was the name Community Analysis Section (CAS). Officially established January 17, 1942, the chief of the new agency was John Embree.  

Embree's immediate problem was the recruitment of a staff both in Washington and in the ten relocation centers.
for the new agency. Although Edward Spicer worked with Embree, he was technically still an employee of Provinse's community management division. The first person to officially join the CAS was Frank Sweetser, who became the assistant director. Sweetser received a Ph.D. in sociology from Columbia in 1941, and for the previous two years had worked as a psychologist with the Office of Strategic Service, where he and Embree first met. Assisted by Spicer, Embree and Sweetser began the long and difficult process of discovering experienced social analysts for the new organization. The personnel for the new section were to be recruited from the social sciences, have a year's field experience in a different culture, preferably Japanese, and have some governmental experience in order to know how to deal with administrative behavior.¹¹

Dismayed at the prospects after the first few weeks, Embree contacted Robert Redfield for assistance. Redfield's involvement with the relocation of the Japanese-American and his connections in the academic community qualified him and the University of Chicago to work as a clearinghouse for the CAS. Also assisting Embree was John Provinse. As a former member of projects supported by Collier and the Department of Agriculture, as well as President of the Society for Applied Anthropology, Provinse was in a position to tap sources otherwise unavailable to Embree. Even with
such professional assistance, however, the pace of the recruitment process did not measurably increase. By the middle of April, two months after the creation of the agency, only three analysts were in the field. Assigned to Manzanar was Morris Opler, and at Minidoka and Gila River were John DeYoung and J. H. Barnett. Three other centers received social analysts by the end of May: Edgar McVoy at Jerome, Weston LaBarre at Central Utah, and Forrest LaViolette at Heart Mountain. It was not until August that Embree succeeded in supplying a social analyst to each relocation project and filling the staff positions in Washington. At Poston David French replaced Leighton, while E. Adamson Hoebel went to Granada, Marvin K. Opler to Tule Lake, and Charles Wisdom to Rohwer. Joining Embree and Sweetser in Washington were Katherine Luomala and Rachel Sady.12

Of this original group all but four had previous experience working for the government. Three had served in the Office of Strategic Services, two in the Office of Indian Affairs, and one in the War Department; two had been employees of a national or state agency. The dozen social scientists represented only two fields: seven were anthropologists and five were sociologists. By 1944, however, this ratio had changed, as a number of personnel changes took place. Five analysts in the field resigned that year.
Four stepped down to take positions elsewhere, while one, J. H. Barnett, left due to illness. Only one of the five projects did not receive a replacement. The director of Manzanar resisted any replacement for Morris Opler. From the summer of 1943 to the demise of the agency, the number of personnel replacements and transfers that took place resulted in some camps being without the service of an analyst for extended periods of time. The total number of social scientists employed by the CAS grew from the original dozen to twenty-two. Of this final number, fourteen were anthropologists and eight were sociologists.  

Because of the number of personnel changes involved in the first year of its existence, it was not until the summer of 1944, eighteen months after the evacuation order, that the CAS established a permanent staff. It took the new agency over seven months before the rules and regulations of the organization were officially announced. According to the administrative manual produced by the WRA, the civil service rating of an analyst with the CAS was a P-4. A P-4 received an annual salary of $3800, based on a forty-eight-hour work week. There were few specific goals outlined in the manual that the CAS was expected to achieve. Rather, the description of the purpose of the new agency was in general terms. For example, according to the WRA, the CAS was "to analyze the cultural patterns existing in the community at
each relocation center, and to observe social trends and
study their underlying causes." By understanding the social
organization of the camp the analyst could then assist the
director in avoiding internal conflicts as well as predict
evacuee responses to future policy decisions. The study
of the social development of the center also would provide
"a guide for dealing with any comparable social institution
that may become the responsibility of a federal agency."
The CAS analysts were required specifically to "facilitate
the program of resettlement and reassimilation of evacuees
into American life" and to maintain a "liaison" with other
research projects that involved the Japanese-Americans.14

Unlike Leighton at Poston, the social scientists of the
CAS did not have a large number of professional assistants.
Generally high school students, most with little or no
knowledge of anthropology or sociology, were the only assis-
tants each analyst had. The lack of professional assis-
tance made the work of the CAS all the more difficult, for
only three of the field analysts had had any previous experi-
ence with applied social science. Morris Opler and Charles
Wisdom had been members of the Applied Anthropology Unit
created under Collier's direction in 1936, while G. Gordon
Brown had worked with British colonial administrators in
Africa. To compound the problem, none of the camp directors
had previous experience in dealing with relocated people.
The result was a learning experience for all involved, although not necessarily a pleasant one. As Leighton discovered at Poston, written reports were fine for Washington but the pace within the center was such that direct oral communication was necessary. Leighton was fortunate enough to have a sympathetic administrator in Wade Head. Unlike the camp directors at other centers, Head had been in charge of an Indian reservation and thus had some familiarity in dealing with the type of problems created by the forced relocation of a large group of people. The analysts of the CAS were not so lucky as Leighton. In most cases the analysts were sympathetic to the plight of the evacuees and tended to support a liberal attitude toward them. The project director, however, although not perceiving the Japanese-Americans as the enemy, took a more detached, pragmatic position. For some of the analysts this resulted in a conflict that was never overcome. Because oral communication was an important factor to the success of the CAS, the relationship between the analyst and the administration very often determined the achievement or failure of the CAS in that center.

Although personality conflicts were a major problem, at some centers it was simply a lack of understanding on the part of the administration that created a difficult situation. A few camp directors simply did not understand
what the analyst was supposed to do. Often the social scientist became a recruit to assist the director in administrative work. One analyst threatened to resign because the project director overloaded him with administrative functions. In another case an analyst became so involved in work that was outside his duties as a CAS employee that he eventually transferred to an operations unit. Normally, if this type of situation occurred, the analyst was able to solve the problem by requesting that Washington send a memorandum that explained the duties and status of the analyst to the camp director. 17

A few administrators, however, welcomed the arrival of the analyst. They had learned that the simplest administrative decisions, much less a major policy decision that affected the camp as a whole, resulted in a long, complex series of unexpected conflicts before a decision could be agreed upon. The staff at these centers discovered that it was important to keep abreast of the day-to-day activities and attitudes of the community. An individual whose sole function was to perform this duty was an asset rather than an obstacle to the administrators. A few analysts, therefore, found themselves in an environment that supported their work. 18

The analysts' work included not only the establishment of a personal relationship with the administration and the
evacuees but a tremendous amount of paperwork as well. The notes taken from personal observations and interviews in both formal and informal situations was enough to consume most of the time of the analyst. Added to that was a variety of reports that Washington expected on a semi-regular basis. The community analysis annotated bibliography contains 2,356 items produced by the agency in its brief existence. The first six formal reports issued by the CAS originated from Washington. John Embree was the author of five of them, while Frank Sweetser wrote the sixth. These Community Analysis Reports, as they were entitled, were approximately a dozen pages in length and dealt with the background of the Japanese-Americans. Begun in October, 1942, they were intended for both the staffs of the WRA in Washington and the relocation centers. Because they were not going to be read by professionals, the reports contained little jargon or statistical information. At first general in scope, the themes of these reports narrowed as time went on, and the number increased. They ranged from a general description of life before the evacuation, stressing the prejudice and discrimination the Japanese-Americans experienced, to more specific concerns such as a discussion of Shinto Sects, the Buddhist church, and an examination of the Nisei and Kibei. Eventually more than fifty of these reports were circulated: the
first, "Dealing with Japanese-Americans," became part of the kit issued to new personnel of the WRA.¹⁹

Where the Community Analysis Reports dealt with the background of the evacuees, the Project Analysis Series contained the field analyst's description of the situation within the relocation centers. These reports originated in February, 1943, and dealt with evacuee reaction to administrative policies, specifically the problems that were particular to one camp. Labor disputes, descriptions of the social organization of the community, and evacuee attitudes towards sudden policy changes made up the bulk of the Project Analysis Series. The nature of some reports, however, reflected the interests of the analyst and academic training rather than the problems that faced the camp director. For example, John De Young in "The Fence at Minidoka" wrote a history of the fence and watchtower of the center and described evacuee attitudes toward them. He followed that analysis with one entitled "English Words in Current Use at Minidoka Center that Have Been Given a 'Japanese-English' Pronunciation or Have Been Translated into a Japanese Equivalent."²⁰

The Project Analysis Series was primarily circulated among the Community Management Division to keep Washington informed of evacuee activities and attitudes. The analysts in the field were in turn kept abreast of the activities
of their colleagues through a Community Analysis Letter series that began in April, 1943. This enabled analysts to communicate with one another, as well as Washington, and to keep in touch with the developments that occurred at other centers. Because of time restraints and distance it was difficult for the analysts to meet or exchange thoughts and suggestions about their duties. Had it not been for the Community Analysis Letters, they would have been completely dependent upon Washington for information and moral support. The letters also provided a way for analysts to release their frustrations to those few who were in a position capable of understanding their problems.\(^2\)

The information Washington received was not based solely on the writings of the analyst. Evacuees, through the Community Analysis Notes, provided the staff in Washington with personal observations about life within the relocation centers. The Notes, begun January, 1944, were statements made by the Japanese-Americans or formal reports prepared by the evacuees themselves. In some cases the evacuees hired as assistants to the analyst were responsible for the reports. The Notes ranged from an examination of the "Social and Political Organization of the Block at Manzanar" to the "Biography of a Nisei Celery Farmer from Venice, California," and included the reasons why "A Nisei Requests Expatriation." The Community Analysis Notes
provided the opportunity for the personnel in Washington to receive evacuee input rather than just the impressions of the community analyst.\textsuperscript{22}

In March, 1944, Trend Reports were added to the list of documents prepared by the CAS. The Trend Reports became some of the few documents whose value both administrators and social scientists agreed upon. Because of the delicate balance between order and conflict within the camps it was considered necessary to know the attitudes of the evacuees at any given moment. In order to keep the camps under administrative rather than army rule and preserve the world's image that the centers were not concentration camps, the government wanted no further incidents like those that occurred at Poston and Manzanar. By being aware of the attitudes of the evacuees from week to week it was believed that future confrontations could be avoided. Therefore these reports were to define the trends in community life and change, if any, in evacuee attitudes toward WRA policy. Based upon that information the analyst was then to predict evacuee reaction to future policy decisions. Ideally, this would enable the administrator to achieve the goals of a policy without disturbing community life, and avoid a possible confrontation that might lead to violence. Beginning on an experimental basis in the summer of 1944, the analysts at Heart Mountain and Topaz were the
first to issue the reports. The first few submitted received Washington's support, and by November of that year the weekly report became a regular feature of the analyst's job. The report did not have a formal structure but varied according to the camp that was under observation. 23

Many of the reports produced by the analysts received a wider circulation than just the staff of the CAS or the personnel of the WRA. Through the journal *Applied Anthropology* the academic community was made aware of the work being conducted in the relocation centers under the banner of the new discipline. This process began even before the formal organization of the CAS. Conrad Arensberg had been sent by John Collier to Poston to prepare a report on the first relocation center established. Arensberg's report, with an introduction by Collier, was printed in *Applied Anthropology*. The journal announced that Arensberg's article was the first of a new venture started by the Society. Government agencies which wished to have a consultant observe, analyze, and perhaps assist in the formulation of policy were encouraged to contact the Society, which would then submit a qualified applicant for the job. 24

*Applied Anthropology*'s involvement in the relocation centers increased with the organization of the CAS. The journal reprinted two of the first five Community Analysis Reports in 1943 and published four more reports prepared
for the CAS by the winter of 1946. The journal also printed other articles that dealt with the administration of the Japanese-Americans, which did not originate within the agency. The seemingly open door policy regarding articles about the evacuees was, in part, due to the difficulty Eliot Chapple had in discovering appropriate material that fulfilled the requirements of the journal. Chapple had made it clear in the first issue of *Applied Anthropology* that the journal "will publish only articles which contribute to the solution of practical problems." At that time the SRB and CAS were the best examples of applied anthropology in practice.25

The withdrawal of Collier from Poston, however, and the Commissioners' lack of interest in future projects that involved social science placed John Provinse and the members of the CAS in the position of being representatives of the most ambitious effort undertaken by applied anthropology up to that time. In his position as head of the Community Management Division and President of the Society, Provinse used the one organization to assist the other. The journal of the Society became the vehicle used to communicate to those outside Washington the efforts of the CAS, which in turn demonstrated the uses of the new discipline. Although sincere in his concern for the Japanese-Americans, Provinse, together with the members
and supporters of the Society, never lost sight of the need to publicize the achievements of applied anthropology. Just as some felt that the successful administration of the relocated Japanese-Americans would assist the United States in post war occupied territories so they also believed that success would enhance the reputation of applied anthropology.
FOOTNOTES

1 Edward Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists by the War Relocation Authority," Applied Anthropology, 5 (1946), 17; Provine's title was later changed to Chief of Community Management.


3 Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," p. 18.


5 Ibid.


Records of War Relocation Authority, Community Analysis Section File 61-311, NA, RG210; Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," p. 18.


Ibid., p. 227.


Ibid.


By the winter of 1943 the focus of attention among anthropologists shifted from John Collier and the work of the Sociological Research Bureau (SRB) to John Provinse and the Community Analysis Section (CAS). Although both men and organizations shared a common goal, there were a number of important differences between the two. Alexander Leighton and the members of the SRB were employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and loyal to John Collier. As a result, the social analysts at Poston were outside the administrative structure of the WRA. The CAS did not have this luxury. Collier, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was responsible to the Secretary of Interior, Harold Ickes, while John Provinse, as Chief of Community Management, answered to Dillon Myer. This arrangement may explain the reason why, in August 1942, Myer accepted the decision of the SRB to leave Poston, and then in December supported the idea of placing a social analyst at each relocation center. The Director of the WRA apparently felt the social scientists were of value as long as they were under his control. Unlike the SRB, therefore, the
CAS was not an independent body but an integral part of the overall organization. The result was that the members of the CAS found themselves required to implement policy with which they did not always agree.

The CAS, however, did have an advantage the SRB lacked. The departure of Eisenhower left Collier without an influential voice within the WRA. With the appointment of Myer, Collier found himself removed from the policy-making process. John Provinse, on the other hand, was one of the best informed officials in Washington about the relocation centers. Much of his information regarding the camps originated from the Community Government Section, directed by his former colleague in the Soil Conservation Service, Solon T. Kimball. Provinse, aware of the facts gathered and presented to Myer, was able to use that information in a way that enhanced his position with the director. This was important, for, like Collier, Provinse had a difficult relationship with the head of the WRA. Provinse felt a great sense of loss with the departure of Eisenhower. Myer was a different personality with a different approach, an approach with which Provinse did not always agree. Kimball believed that Provinse took an "incredible beating from Dillon Myer," to such an extent that at one point Provinse thought of resigning. But where Collier was an ineffectual voice outside the agency, Provinse was in a
position of influence within, and the possibility that his voice might be heard persuaded him to stay. His decision also was based upon the realization that he held the highest position an applied anthropologist had yet attained.¹

Another consideration in Provinse's decision to remain was his awareness of the difficult situation the Director was in. Provinse knew that Myer's policy decisions had to take into account the critics of the WRA. Some citizens complained about the eighty million dollars that was spent in the removal of the Japanese-Americans from the west coast and for the construction of the camps. The governors of the ten western states initially considered as sites for the camps criticized the use of their lands to hold potential saboteurs. But the most consistent thorn in the side of the WRA was Martin Dies. As chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, the Texas Representative led the attack against the WRA and the agency's handling of the evacuees. He appointed a three-man subcommittee to investigate the agency and held hearings in the House that often questioned the patriotism of the administration of the relocation centers. The WRA also received criticism from a different direction. Executive order 9066 came under attack from those concerned with the way citizens of the United States were being treated. Pamphlets, articles, and editorials appeared condemning the forced removal
of the Japanese-Americans from their homes. To these writers the centers were concentration camps and a constant reminder that what happened in Europe might happen in America.²

Caught in this crossfire was Dillon Myer. On the one hand he had to ensure that the evacuees were not being cuddled, while at the same time he had to attempt to erase the concentration camp image created by certain critics. To Myer, the strike at Poston and the violence at Manzanar proved that above all else order must be maintained. When the camps were peaceful the critics were quiet. Conflict only provided ammunition to both sides. Myer realized that to avoid future trouble a thorough knowledge of the problems in each camp was necessary. The social analysts could use their expertise to gather information that might help maintain peace within the camps. With those thoughts in mind Myer supported the creation of the CAS. To sustain order became the analysts' primary function.³

Well before the formal organization of the agency, Provinsé realized the need to spot possible patterns in the evacuee community which might lead to a conflict between the administrative staff and the Japanese-Americans. John Embree was sent to examine the trouble patterns that existed in the centers, analyze the causes, and submit possible solutions to the tensions that he discovered.
His report, "Causes of Unrest at Relocation Centers," was the second Community Analysis Report published. The seven-page document linked the problems that existed in the centers with the sudden changes that had taken place in the life of the Japanese-American. Besides the obvious difficulty presented by the physical conditions of the hastily built camps, Embree noted that the evacuation destroyed the traditional community and family life of the evacuees. This in turn led to social and financial insecurities over the future and a loss of respect for democracy. Embree also found that "out groups" had been created as a result of the evacuation and WRA policy decisions. He noted that the Issei had no role to play in the community and that the Nisei found themselves distrusted by large segments of the population because of their connection to the administrative staff. Embree concluded that "in general the speed of settlement in the centers, the heterogeneous population and the artificial social and economic situation of center life have created a new society with no regular system of social controls." He suggested that the Issei be given a role in the life of the camp and that the administrative staff have more respect for traditional Japanese customs.  

Embree's report presented overviews of the tensions that existed in the camps but did not discover any new
facts or suggest solutions that had not already been considered. Most administrators felt the report told them what they knew and they were not impressed by it. Nevertheless, Provinse felt the trouble pattern report was a valuable tool, and, after the creation of the CAS, asked that a weekly report be sent to Washington from each camp.  

Many officials in Washington were sympathetic to the frustrations and anger of the evacuees. When pressure began to build for the forced removal of the Japanese-Americans, in early 1942, members of the Justice and War Departments, as well as the Attorney General of the United States, Francis Biddle, had criticized the suggestion. When Myer announced his resettlement plan as an attempt to undo the harm created by the evacuation order, he discovered that many in the capitol supported him, including John Provinse. In the summer of 1942 Provinse, together with Robert Redfield, recommended that Myer's open door policy be continued. Redfield included a recommendation that the WRA use social scientists to assist in the implementation of the resettlement program. He felt that Japanese assimilation into American life should be stimulated and that the relocation center would retard any possible integration. This feeling contradicted the reaction by Collier and Leighton, who were against any forced removal of the evacuees from the camp. The members of the
SRB realized that if the evacuees left Poston the experiment in social analysis conducted by them would be futile. Provine, on the other hand, realized that if social scientists were brought in to assist the WRA in its resettlement program, then the number of analysts hired and used by the agency would increase.  

Both those for and against Myer's policy presented strong arguments to defend their position. Those who favored the resettlement policy pointed out that there was no need to hold evacuees who were not classified as dangerous. Further, they argued, it would be easier to integrate the Japanese-American during an expanding wartime economy than to attempt assimilation following the war, when there would be an economic slow down. Some argued that the relocation centers would create a dependence on the federal government which would result in an "inevitable Indian reservation psychology." To counter these arguments those who opposed Myer's approach suggested that another sudden shift in WRA policy would undermine what little stability the evacuees had been able to maintain within the camp. Others noted that the house Un-American Activities Committee was continuing to hold espionage hearings which supported the myth of a fifth column. This endangered the safety of the Japanese-American who, at the least, were protected within the camps. Others suggested that the
Issei had lost everything, and that with California excluded as a place of possible resettlement, they had nothing and no one to support them. Many were against Myer's policy simply because they did not believe it would work. 7

This last argument seemed to be the most viable. By the early spring of 1943, one year after the decision to resettle the evacuees, job opportunities were more available to those who wished to leave the camps. Yet by May only 4,000 of the 100,000 Japanese-Americans had decided to take advantage of the opportunity. Of this number the majority were young men. The older Japanese-Americans were not interested and many persuaded their children and grandchildren to remain with them. Initially the WRA hoped to resettle three-fourths of all evacuees by the end of 1943 and the remaining number by June 30, 1944. But the experience of the first year suggested that those dates could not be met. 8

To increase the rate of resettlement the WRA asked the CAS to analyze and determine why so few evacuees decided not to leave the centers. At this time there were only a half a dozen analysts in the field, some of whom had just arrived. Therefore, John Embree conducted much of the analysis and presented his findings in June. In "Evacuee Resistance to Relocation" Embree determined there were two factors behind the failure of the resettlement program.
The evacuees, after the upheaval of their withdrawal from the west coast, evolved a new social organization within the camps. This new social order produced a degree of stability that replaced the frustration and insecurity they felt upon their arrival. In part this social unit was a return to the strong bonds of the Japanese family and traditions, which in turn led to Issei domination of the political and social life of the camps. Embree concluded that "the relocation program threatens this new equilibrium and the society is bound to resist this threat to its existence." Embree suggested that the resettlement program must take into consideration the attitudes of the Issei; if they could be persuaded to resettle, they would lead the rest of the community into accepting the program. For this reason, he believed, the camp administrators should discuss the program with older evacuees, hold family discussions, and avoid the temptation to force the policy on the Japanese-Americans.9

Following Embree's analysis, a series of reports began to arrive in Washington from individual analysts which echoed his findings in the field. J. Ralph McFarling at Granada argued that the WRA's hard sale of the resettlement program "is translated in the evacuees mind into pressure and pressure is translated into loss of self-determination, and loss of self-determination leads to
resentment and resentment results in emotional blocking and inaction or immobilization." Charles Wisdom of Rohwer described the reluctance of the Issei to leave a world of Japanese culture for the unknown world of American society. "The Issei felt safer within the confines of the camp because it is self-sufficient and completely isolated from the host of social and economic difficulties in Issei necessarily encounter in cutting lose from its protection and relocating on their own." Wisdom noted, however, that some evacuees stated they would resettle if allowed to return to California. 10

The variety of reports prepared by the CAS regarding resettlement were circulated among a select group of WRA personnel. At first, some administrators argued that only if camp life were made uncomfortable would the evacuees decide to leave. Others felt that this would only increase their sense of insecurity and reluctance to leave a protected environment. By the middle of the summer this latter argument resulted in a new soft-sell approach by the WRA. Included in this new policy were the suggestions made by Embree in his June report. Interviews were held with families in which any questions or concerns the evacuees might have were openly discussed. Respected members of the community, Nissei and Issei, received permission to travel to the proposed sites of resettlement and were allowed to report on their trip to the evacuees' community. 11
Together with Embree's suggestions, the CAS also recommended that a social analyst be sent to the cities targeted by the WRA as possible sites for the resettlement of the evacuees. The WRA had created a relocation division which was to conduct programs aimed at gaining public acceptance for the resettlement of the Japanese-Americans. Under the CAS proposal each area officer in the relocation division would have the services of a professionally trained community analyst who would not be burdened by daily administrative tasks. The relocation division, however, did not adopt the suggestion. The members of the division argued that such an analyst would merely be duplicating the work of the relocation officer. 12

The refusal to adopt the suggestion did not deter the CAS. John De Young, stationed at Minidoka, traveled to Denver in the summer of 1943. Denver was one of the few cities outside the west coast where a sizable Japanese population existed prior to the war. De Young was to analyze the various Japanese neighborhoods, their relationship to the Caucasian population of the city, and the general attitude Denver held toward the Japanese. De Young's report received little enthusiasm from the WRA. In part this was due to the lack of preliminary planning before the analysis was undertaken, an uneasy working relationship with the area relocation officers, and an overburdened staff
in Washington, that was already deluged by a variety of reports and paperwork. De Young's trip also revealed another problem that the CAS apparently had not considered. The project director at Minidoka did not approve of the sudden departure of De Young from his camp. It had been understood that the analyst was to assist the administrator at the relocation center. To the project director it was impossible for De Young to develop an understanding of the evacuee community at Minidoka while he was at Denver. 13

Lack of personnel to complete the tasks the CAS undertook was a recurrent problem for the agency. At the time of De Young's trip only half of the relocation centers had the services of an analyst. To some it appeared that the CAS attempted to take on more than it could handle. For this reason two other resettlement studies conducted by the CAS did not involve field analysts. A Chicago study was created by the University of California Evacuation and Resettlement Study group. Although the California group had the cooperation of the relocation officer, he issued a critical evaluation of their work at the conclusion of the analysis. He felt the report was too long and detailed. In addition he argued that the pace of events made the report out of date before it could be read. He added that he felt that he gave more information to the researchers than they gave back. The other resettlement
report prepared for the CAS did not fare much better than
the Chicago study. In Washington the relocation officer,
Robert Dolins, agreed to cooperate with analyst Ann Freed.
Given the racial makeup of the city, her study was eagerly
anticipated. Unfortunately Freed's comments about the
racial problems of Washington were believed not to be in
the best interests of the WRA. As a result, the report was
simply filed away. According to Katherine Luomala, a member
of the Washington CAS staff, this was common procedure with
reports that were controversial or which might strain per-
sonnel relationships within the WRA.14

The three resettlement studies conducted under the
guidance of the CAS were completed by the end of the summer
of 1943. At that time there was a slight increase in the
number of evacuees who were willing to relocate. This
change in attitude was in response to the WRA's adoption of
the suggestions in Embree's June report. The increased
numbers, however, were not sufficient to meet the deadline
established by Myer. Most evacuees were still reluctant
to leave for places unknown. Then in late 1944 the War
Department announced that, effective January 2, 1945, the
exclusion order that restricted the west coast states from
resettlement was rescinded. With this news the attitude
of most evacuees changed, for now they could return to
their homes. This presented the problem of how the western
states would react to their return. Within two weeks of the announcement the CAS sent two analysts to the west coast to examine the type of behavior and attitude the evacuees would meet upon their return. Elmer Smith, who replaced De Young at Minidoka, and Katherine Luomala spent approximately two months studying Oregon, Washington and California. Their report suggested that extreme caution be used to provide for the safe return of the evacuees. They discovered that there still existed a strong anti-Japanese prejudice because of the war, and that feeling, combined with the number of problems California faced because of a dramatic population growth during the war, might produce incidents of violence.  

It was this fear of violence that created a difficult working relationship between the two analysts and the relocation officers they dealt with. West coast officials felt that the attempt by Smith and Luomala to assess public opinion regarding the return of the evacuees might crystallize the hatred felt for Japanese-Americans. If the public were not encouraged to organize their thoughts toward the evacuees, the officers believed, the hatred that might exist would remain submerged and little or no organized violence would occur. This was the same attitude John De Young discovered when he traveled to New York to assess public opinion in that state. At first the relocation
division refused to cooperate with De Young. Robert Dolins, after being transferred from Washington to New York, persuaded the division to allow De Young to conduct his study. Because of Dolins' cooperation, De Young's report received more attention from the relocation division of New York than the California officer gave the studies prepared by Smith and Luomala.  

The problems and criticisms discovered by the analysts who worked outside the relocation centers reflected the difficulties the CAS personnel encountered within the ten camps. The resettlement policy was an ongoing program that lasted from the spring of 1942 to the closing of the centers in January 1946. Within that period of time an additional number of policy decisions by the WRA forced the analysts to forego any attempt to develop a long-term research project. Provinsse hoped the CAS would produce tangible benefits and reveal certain behavioral generalities that might assist future administrations of dislocated people. Instead the analysts found themselves, much like the evacuees, reacting to sudden policy shifts by the WRA. The professionally trained social scientists became trouble shooters for administrators who had difficulty enforcing the latest WRA directive.

At the same time that CAS placed analysts in all ten relocation centers to assist administrators with the
resettlement program, the War Department announced that evacuees who were American citizens would be required to register for possible enlistment in the armed forces. Myer decided to use the registration to lessen the harsh criticism his resettlement policy had come under. The Dies subcommittee questioned the desirability of releasing potential saboteurs from their confinement. To reduce the fear of a fifth column, Myer extended the registration form to all adult evacuees, not just American-born Nisei. He hoped to create an application for leave clearance through the addition of a number of questions attached to the registration form. Through this method Myer believed the WRA could segregate the dangerous evacuees and refuse them permission to relocate. This program, Myer hoped, would demonstrate to the critics of the agency that only those evacuees who did not present a threat to the country would be released.\textsuperscript{17}

The reaction of the evacuees to the questions asked during the registration process was openly critical. The anger and frustration administrators had become used to over the pay scale or food were now surpassed by the bitterness, confusion, and anxiety the Japanese-Americans demonstrated when presented with the questionnaire. One question, referred to as the loyalty question, initiated the strongest response. That question, number 28, asked:
Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization.\textsuperscript{18}

Initially many of the evacuees refused to answer the question. At Manzanar 288 of the Japanese-Americans did not reply. Some went even farther in their reaction. When the evacuation of the Japanese-Americans on the west coast began, the United States government allowed those who wished to return to their country to do so. A small number did decide to leave. By the middle of the summer of 1943, however, as a result of the registration program, 3,000 Japanese applied for expatriation forms. One camp director became so alarmed at the sudden rush for applications that he refused to issue any.\textsuperscript{19}

The camp directors, as well as the WRA staff in Washington, were caught unprepared by the evacuee response to the questions. The not yet fully staffed personnel of the CAS was called upon to assist the administrators in discovering the reasons for the lack of cooperation. At the time of the registration crisis the agency had no more than seven analysts in the field, with John Embree and Frank Sweetser still doing most of the work in Washington. Many of the analysts were recent arrivals who had yet to familiarize themselves with the relocation center or
establish a working relationship with the camp director. As a result, Embree, Sweetser, and one field analyst, Morris Opler, prepared the reports that examined the causes for the evacuee unrest over the loyalty question.

The reports of the three analysts determined that a refusal to comply with the questionnaire or a "no" answer did not suggest that that individual was a potential threat or enemy of the country. They discovered that the evacuee response was not based on their concept of loyalty as much as it was a reflection of the situation they found themselves in. To many of the Issei the question seemed hypocritical yet threatening. They saw themselves, as people legally denied the right to be citizens, asked to pledge allegiance to the country that denied them that right. Many of the Issei had given up any hope of returning to California and starting over. To these evacuees their future was in Japan. Yet as persons within a barbed wire encampment, the Issei believed to answer "no" would result in harsh punishment from which they could not protect themselves. The analysts emphasized that the Issei response was important because it could determine what other members of the evacuee family might do. If the Issei father answered "no," the family feared that it would never see him again. The family unit was all many of the Japanese-Americans had left. This placed the young Nisei son and
daughter under tremendous pressure to answer according to the family's wishes. The analysts felt that the loyalty question in many cases measured family or peer pressure rather than evacuee patriotism. 20

After examining the reports prepared by the CAS and the project director's suggestions, the WRA changed the wording of the loyalty question. The revised question asked, "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?" This revised version coupled with a different approach at many of the centers produced a much more cooperative reaction by the evacuees. Most of those who refused to answer before the change did respond to the new wording. Some Issei who answered "no" changed their answer to "yes." Unfortunately, in a few instances their Nisei children were not given a second opportunity to answer. Others had convinced themselves that "no" was the proper response and because of peer pressure refused to change their minds. Out of 75,000 adult evacuees who responded to the loyalty question 8,500, or 11 percent, answered "no." 21

Five months after the initial studies prepared by the CAS, Frank Sweetser, in a confidential report that dealt with the "principles for administration behavior," compared the registration activities of all the relocation centers. He
discovered that the camps that allowed the evacuees to vocally oppose the questionnaire and vent their frustration at meetings had fewer problems than centers where the evacuees were merely told to fill out the form. Sweetser found that at the camp in central Utah the administrative staff prepared themselves for the variety of questions and comments the evacuees might have. This enabled the administrative staff to deal in a sympathetic manner with the Japanese-American's anger and their questions. Such a procedure avoided confrontation and the need to use force. Sweetser concluded that the successful implementation of policy depended on careful preliminary preparation and the education of both the administrative staff and the Japanese-Americans. He also suggested that representative evacuee groups be consulted as early as possible when an important policy change might take place.

Once the registration program ended, the WRA faced the problem of what to do with the over 8,000 evacuees who answered "no" to the loyalty question. As early as January 1943 at a WRA conference in San Francisco the suggestion to segregate trouble makers from the ten relocation centers was made. No one, however, from Myer on down developed a procedure to select what evacuees would be removed. To John Provine the idea of segregation, initially brought up by the Western Defense Command, would make the camps little
more than "glorified orphanages." But by the summer his attitudes changed to such a degree that he thought "serious consideration" should be given to the segregation of older bachelors and childless couples. After the war, however, Provinse returned to his original position and attacked the policy of segregation. In a speech in 1946 he argued that congressional committees initiated the concept of segregation and mobilized opinion for the policy with undocumented accusations that suggested the evacuees were a threat to the country.23

One of the reasons Provinse may have favored a form of segregation in the summer of 1943 was the realization that Myer intended to initiate such a policy. At the time of the decision the CAS was still in the process of recruiting a permanent staff and had not yet convinced the administration of the camps or those in Washington of the value of professional analysis. The resettlement policy was only two months old and the registration program had not begun. Provinse may have felt that in order to provide an opportunity for the CAS to prove itself it was best to work with Myer rather than fight him. Although not in total agreement with the policy, Provinse recognized that segregation was inevitable and that it was better for the CAS to assist in the implementation of the policy than to suffer the fate of the SRB at Poston.
In fact, the CAS did more than merely assist. The first time the analysts played a major role in the shaping of administrative policy was their involvement in the segregation program. The reports prepared by the CAS regarding resettlement and registration took place after the programs were underway; it was only after problems in those programs developed that the analyst became participants. The reverse was true in the case of segregation. The WRA requested that the CAS perform two duties. First, the analysts were to survey the centers to determine probable evacuee reaction to the proposed segregation policy. Secondly, with the implementation of that policy, the analysts were to evaluate Japanese-American reaction to administrative handling of segregation in weekly reports submitted directly to Washington.24

During CAS involvement with segregation the fall and early winter of 1943, a number of personnel changes occurred. For the first time all ten relocation centers had the services of an analyst, and the agency, after six months of existence, finally had a permanent field staff. In Washington, however, the same claim could not be made. The man who helped originate, and was the guiding force behind the CAS, John Embree, resigned to take a new position. Embree left the CAS in the fall to become head of the Japanese area studies of the Civil Affairs Training School.
for the Far East at the University of Chicago. His assistant, Frank Sweetser, also resigned to take an officer's commission in the Navy. Edward Spicer replaced Embree as director of the CAS. No one individual was officially designated as Sweetser's replacement. Working with Spicer in Washington at different times were Katherine Luomala, Rachel Sady, Ann Freed, and Margaret Lantis.25

As a result of Embree's resignation Spicer directed the CAS staff throughout the segregation program. The surveys requested by the WRA regarding evacuee reaction to the removal of selective individuals produced at least one surprise: the evacuees expected such a decision. Many Japanese-Americans believed the trouble-makers were not merely a nuisance to the project directors but to the families of the evacuees as well. Because of this attitude, the analysts believed that, if handled properly, segregation could be implemented with few problems. The CAS presented a number of suggestions that the WRA included in a statement of instructions sent to the project directors. One of the first points mentioned was that the administrator was to emphasize to the community that segregation was a "non-punitive" measure. The camp director was also to meet and inform representative evacuee leaders about the details of the eventual transfer. During this discussion the project head was to explain that ample time
to prepare for the move and exchange farewells would be provided. The instructions did include one warning. Tule Lake had been chosen as the segregation center. This meant that those evacuees already at the camp who were not to be part of the segregated group had to be distributed throughout the other camps. The administrators were told to take precautions when these individuals arrived as they would be angry and frustrated at being forced to relocate once again.26

Completed the second week of October 1943, the segregation program presented few problems for the WRA. The transfer of approximately 9,000 evacuees to Tule Lake proceeded without major disturbance. With the conclusion of the registration and segregation programs and with the pace of resettlement increasing after the lifting of the exclusion order, the winter months of 1943-1944 was one of relative peace for camp administrators and a period of unusual calm and stability for the CAS. The WRA saw evacuees by the thousands leave the relocation centers to take up residence, first in the cities of Denver, Salt Lake City, Chicago and then throughout California. The 442nd Combat Team, made up entirely of Nisei soldiers, landed in Italy in May, and evacuee families, at first reluctant to see their sons enlist, became proud of their decisions and courage. The 442nd Unit and evacuee support
also assisted Myer in his ongoing battle with the Dies subcommittee. For the CAS the fall of 1944 marked the first time the agency had had a permanent staff both in the field and in Washington. For much of that year the analysts were able to observe the evacuee community without their time being suddenly diverted by new policy decisions. This increased time and the relative stability within the centers may explain why the Community Analysis Notes and Trend Reports originated that year.27

Unfortunately, just as the CAS began to function as many of the members thought it should, the WRA announced on December 18, 1944 that all relocation centers would be closed before the end of 1945. In February of that year representatives from the relocation centers held a conference to discuss the possible problems and procedures in the closing of the camps. At the meeting the WRA staff from Washington expressed the hope that the first centers could be closed by October 15 and the remaining camps no later than December 15. When the CAS learned of the closing schedule, many of the analysts felt that it could not be met. Some pointed out that the eventual purpose of the resettlement program was to empty the camps, and even with the lifting of the exclusion order, that goal had not been attained. Others questioned the decency of forcing an elderly Issei, without family or friends, to leave an environment where
he had been protected and to enter a community that did not or would not take care of him. 28

With the west coast now open for resettlement, however, the WRA believed that there would be few problems in meeting the proposed schedule. The agency planned to announce the closing of the camps to the evacuees in July. To determine the reaction of the Japanese-Americans to the announcement the WRA called upon the analysts of the CAS for assistance. The analysts were to perform the same role as they had in the segregation program. The WRA requested that the CAS predict the behavior of the evacuees to the announcement and provide periodic reports as to the change, if any, in their attitude once the policy began. The first studies submitted by the community analysts reported that many evacuees simply did not believe that the camps would be closed in a year or that they would be forced out. David French of Poston noted that accurate information regarding the closing process was necessary to relieve anxiety and dispel rumors. One rumor that circulated among the residents of Poston suggested that if an evacuee revoked citizenship he would be allowed to remain in the camp and the Army would then take over the management of the centers. 29

Later reports provided a more comprehensive perspective on possible evacuee reaction. A. T. Hansen, of Heart
Mountain, in a study conducted the latter part of June, concluded that an early closing date would not adversely affect the behavior of the Japanese-Americans. He divided the attitudes of the residents toward closing into four different groups. There were those who had already made plans to leave under the resettlement program that summer. There were others who were going to take advantage of the resettlement process but were in no hurry to do so. There was also a small group who decided that they would stay until the end. Finally there were evacuees who felt that the government, at the closing of the center, would take care of them. Hansen believed that if a center was to be closed earlier than expected the first group he identified would not be affected, the second group might be stimulated into taking action and the attitudes of the last two groups would not change. He concluded that the number of people who remained in the center would not be dependent on the date of closing, but would be determined "by the reports of conditions on the outside that came back to the center and by the kind of penalties for failing to relocate that are announced or people came to imagine."  

Although the analysts felt the schedule could not be met and the WRA never did understand the reluctance of the evacuees to accept a fixed date of removal, the projected dates were met. On December 1, 1945, the last relocation
center ceased operations. Four months later, March 20, 1946, the segregated camp of Tule Lake was officially closed. Three months later the WRA itself was officially terminated. In the four years and three months of its existence the agency had been responsible for 120,000 Japanese-Americans. Of this total over 54,000 returned to their homes on the west coast, while approximately 52,000 relocated in other areas of the United States. Close to 5,000 evacuees left the country for Japan, while the remaining number either died during the period of internment, were in the armed forces, or were hospitalized at the time of the WRA's final report. 31

In January of 1946 the CAS was also disbanded. Once the evacuees had left the camps, the field analysts prepared final reports that they submitted to Washington. With few exceptions, the reports reflected the dual loyalties of the social scientists. While concerned about the care of the Japanese-Americans, the analysts were also aware of their role as participants in the most important project in applied anthropology yet attempted. Asael T. Hansen, community analyst at Heart Mountain, opened his final report with the explanation that he intended to discuss the attempt to apply anthropology "in a new kind of situation." He believed his findings, combined with those of others, would "provide material for the development of an
adequate and realistic definition of the field." G. Gordon Brown made the same point in his final report on the Gila River Project. Brown stated that his purpose in writing was not merely to provide a summary of an analyst's experience but to suggest methodological changes that might improve the future application of the social sciences.32

The mention of applied anthropology in these final reports reflected the need to demonstrate the value and legitimacy of the young discipline. The community analysts knew that the skeptics of applied anthropology would measure the success or failure of the discipline by the performance of the CAS. Just as, following the war, the WRA and Dillon Myer became an issue in the debate over the internment of the Japanese-Americans so, the social scientists believed, the CAS would become an issue in the ongoing debate over the value of applied anthropology. The analyst's perceptions were correct. In the 1930s applied anthropology was an unrecognized discipline with little support within the academic community. There had been few completed projects through which to measure the discipline. By 1945, however, the projects conducted under the auspices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs had been completed. Those projects, combined with the SRB and the CAS, provided the material upon which the value of applied anthropology could be measured.
FOOTNOTES


4 Ibid., p. 21.

5 Ibid.


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8 Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," p. 25.


10 Ibid., pp. 27-28.


14 Ibid., p. 28.


17 Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," pp. 21-22; Spicer, Impounded People, p. 142.

18 Spicer, Impounded People, pp. 143, 155.


21 Spicer, Impounded People, pp. 43, 157.


23 Records of War Relocation Authority Headquarters and Documents File, NA, RG210; Myer, Uprooted Americans, pp. 75-76; Province and Kimball, "Building New Communities," p. 401.


26 Spicer, Impounded People, pp. 176-168; Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," pp. 24-25.


29 Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," p. 31.

30 Ibid., p. 32.


CHAPTER VI

APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY:
THE UNRESOLVED DEBATE

Published well before the closing of the relocation centers, the articles that originated from the research of Alexander Leighton at Poston and the community analysts of the Community Analysis Section (CAS) provided the academic community with a suggestion of the possible achievements and goals of applied anthropology. Half a dozen articles appeared in major scholarly journals during the four-year period in which the Sociological Research Bureau (SRB) and the CAS existed. In general, the journals published the results of research conducted by the two agencies, the sole exception being John Embree’s historical account of the first year of the CAS. These articles not only publicized the young discipline but they provided a means to fulfill the traditional academic requirement that scholars share their research and conclusions with one another.

The articles, however, were narrow in focus and most of them appeared in 1943, when the attention of the academic community was directed toward the war. It was not until 1945, when the war was over and publications dealing with applied anthropology in the War Relocation Authority (WRA)
increased in number and perspective, that the focus of academicians returned to a consideration of theory and methodology. The return to those concerns renewed the question of whether social anthropology could or should be applied to contemporary society. This resulted in a renewed defense by the supporters of applied anthropology who argued that their work for the WRA was evidence of the benefits of applied anthropology.

The work that reopened the decade long debate was the publication of Alexander H. Leighton's observations on the research of the SRB at Poston. Published in 1945, *The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp*, covered the period from December 7, 1941, to the middle of 1942, when the demise of the SRB had become a forgone conclusion. Divided into two parts, the first and shorter section of the book contained an impressionistic history of the events that led to the decision to remove the Japanese-Americans from the west coast. The second section consisted of general principles and recommendations derived from the observation of the behavior of both the evacuees and the administrative staff at Poston and recommendations to future administrators based on that discovery.\(^1\)

Hampered at first by the inherent difficulties involved in the creation of a large artificial community, Leighton...
believed that he and the SRB nevertheless were able to observe the residents of Poston and their "complex system of sentiments" during periods of both social organization and disorganization. The contrast between the two was important, he felt, because "the recognition of standardized behavior appropriate to individuals is the basis of all social organization." Once the set of behaviors of the social unit became identified, he believed, "we are in a position to predict approximately how the people in the society will act from day to day in their usual routine of living and we also have some basis for predicting how they will act if new stimuli are injected into their routine." With this knowledge, Leighton argued, an administrator needed only to discover the proper stimuli to alter that behavior so that a policy might be implemented with little or no resistance. 

Leighton believed, however, that the key to a successful administration did not depend solely on behavior identification or prediction but on the administrators' ability to develop a sense of community, a social organization, which would provide a social structure that would act as a guide for policy implementation. He argued that "social organization and systems of belief taken together constitute the core of what most anthropologists mean when they speak of "culture" and added that "no society can
perform work, elect a government, or pursue any other kind of collective activity for which it does not have social organization." As an example of administrative failures due to a lack of social organization, Leighton noted the dismal progress of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the attempt to convert the Indian into a farmer. He also blamed the problems that occurred at Poston on the inability of the WRA to develop a sense of community among the Japanese-American. Leighton not only emphasized the need to recognize the culture of social organization of the people being administered but also the necessity to realize that the culture of the administrators often determines the amount of conflict the two groups might have. He suggested that each problem and solution should be "studied as a compound of both."³

Leighton's final conclusions in Governing of Men discussed the achievements of the SRB. The information gathered by the bureau, Leighton believed, was of lasting value to the social sciences because of the general conclusions drawn about the behavior of the administrator and those being administered. He also believed the bureau had accomplished its goal of training an evacuee staff that the government could use in post-war occupied countries. Most importantly, however, Leighton argued, the bureau's assistance to the administration at Poston demonstrated the
value of using social scientists to assist administrators both in administering dislocated people outside the United States, as well as improving administrative practices in the United States.  

The Governing of Men, written in a clear, direct style with little jargon, received, for the most part, favorable reviews both from scholarly journals and the popular press. The book convinced Charles P. Loomis, who reviewed the study for Applied Anthropology, that "If administrators took time to read, this book would go far towards convincing them of the utility of anthropology and psychology." Carey McWilliams, in The Nation, called the relocation of the Japanese-Americans from the west coast "a godsend to sociologists and anthropologists," for it provided an ideal environment to examine how people react when their normal day-to-day living pattern and social structure became disrupted. He believed Leighton's observations were important but doubted that the recommendations suggested would be followed.  

Although most of the reviews were similar to those of Loomis and McWilliams, there were those who questioned Leighton's conclusions and recommendations, and a few who were uncomfortable with the notion of manipulating human behavior to suit an administrator's needs. One reviewer, Dillon Myer, disliked Leighton's suggestion that the WRA
caused more problems than it solved because of the agency's failure to establish a viable social organization. In *The New Republic*, Myer chastised Leighton for not being more sympathetic to the problems that the WRA faced. The former director defended himself with the argument that the troubles that occurred at Poston, Manzanar, and Tule Lake happened before his arrival, and that once a consistent policy developed the incidents of violence decreased dramatically. Another critic, Leonard Bloom, of UCLA, also took Leighton to task. Bloom pointed out that Leighton's research consisted of observations of Unit I at Poston, not the entire facility nor any other relocation centers. He argued that the social experiment was too small and too short to justify the conclusion Leighton drew, and also rejected the notion that the experience at Poston provided general principles that could be extended to the millions of displaced persons in Europe and Asia.\(^6\)

It was the section of the book that contained Leighton's principles and recommendations that H. E. Angus found "disappointing." Angus, former department chairman of Political Science, Economics, and Sociology at the University of British Columbia, and during the war special assistant to Canada's Under Secretary of State, called the conclusions presented in *Governing of Men* "matters of common knowledge or common sense." In fact Leighton had
previously argued as much. In 1943, in an article published in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, he admitted that "much of the work is nothing but the consistent application of common sense." He added, however, that the technique for the adaption of common sense needed to be developed in order to study and assist the community. Angus, though, felt that it was that technique that presented a danger to the community. He believed that "a problem of ethics is concealed in a problem of technique." As a social scientist turned administrator, Angus, who questioned whether democracy could survive the scientific expert, argued that Leighton should have been more concerned about the policy being implemented rather than the means of implementation. He believed that in a democracy the people are responsible for the tasks which their government presents to its administrators. Angus included in the group to be held responsible the community analyst, who he believed was not a dispassionate observer but someone who also should be held accountable. For these reasons, Angus attacked the proposal by Leighton that democracy existed within the relocation center. He pointed out the contradictions involved in the attempt by the SRB to create a democratic community among a group of people whose basic democratic rights were denied. He added that Leighton's suggestion that administrators not use racial stereotypes in their policy decisions was hypocritical.
when the people being administered were segregated for racial reasons.  

The theme of ethical responsibility raised by Angus often became an issue when former members of the CAS spoke on behalf of applied anthropology or discussed their experience within the relocation centers. At a Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith held in New York in 1945, Morris Opler, a former CAS analyst at Manzanar, argued on behalf of applied social sciences. He believed the social sciences were a valuable tool for society but that society continued to reject the scientists and their findings. Opler discovered that administrators paid "lip service to a 'scientific age'" but that they steadfastly refused "to alter their habits of mind or action one iota in response to it." He added that this response was not restricted to suit business or government but a reflection of the overall attitude of society toward the social scientist. Opler called the attitude of the general public anti-intellectual and anti-scientific. He concluded that the treatment of the Japanese-Americans proved that America was still "pre-scientific and that we are passing through the infantile stage of democracy." Opler finished his address with the suggestion that the social sciences be taught, applied, and exemplified in the conduct and thinking of everyone's daily life.
Asked to respond to Opler's argument, Felix Cohen, legal advisor to John Collier, agreed that the social sciences should not be shunned by administrators or the general public, but advocated that, as Leighton had, the scientific method should be used to study the administrative staff as well as those who were being administered. He went on to add that the scientists, as experts, should not presume that their findings and suggestions should become policy. Cohen argued that social scientists must not assume "to govern in the name of a higher wisdom" for "social ideas should be set by the people and not by experts." He concluded with the thought that "government by experts seems to me to be the very antithesis of democracy." 9

That same year Sol Tax, an influential anthropologist at the University of Chicago, argued that the social sciences should not become involved in the policy-making process at all. In an article entitled "Anthropology and Administration," Tax stated that the term "applied anthropology" was a "misnomer," because the accumulation of data for an administrator was not the proper function of the discipline. He added that even if an individual used the techniques of anthropology to collect the data and in fact was a trained anthropologist, "the project is not one of anthropology unless it is undertaken with a scientific purpose in terms of anthropological theory." Tax believed that science should not have a practical purpose. He felt
that once a scientist became an employee, the focus of his study narrowed and prejudiced the results of his research. He rejected the notion of applied anthropology and called for a return to traditional pure research.10

Tax was not alone in his demand that anthropologists return to the problems of theory and methodology and abandon policy implementation. The fact that Tax represented a substantial group who shared his distaste for applied anthropology prompted John Embree to respond. In "Applied Anthropology and Its Relationship to Anthropology," Embree criticized the suggestion that university research was the best path for a social scientist to pursue. Although agreeing with Tax that applied anthropology, because of its involvement with specific policies, was not a "true science" Embre nevertheless argued that government would profit from the services of an anthropologist. He argued that if the methods and techniques of social science were applied to the field of administration, it would reduce "the monetary and the human costs which result from misunderstanding and maladministration." He stated that some social scientists left the academic environment with the hope the application of their skills might "ultimately aid in establishing peaceful self respecting relations between peoples and cultures."11
As examples where applied anthropology had been socially useful, Embree noted the work of the CAS and the variety of applied studies conducted for the BIA. In his conclusion he acknowledged the bitterness that existed between those who favored either applied or pure science. He believed, however, that one did not have to dominate or destroy the other but that both could coexist, for each had a different role to play and a different goal to attain.  

After the appearance of Embree's article the American Anthropologist published a letter from Alexander Leighton supporting Embree's arguments. Leighton compared applied anthropology to medical research. He suggested that clinical research was as important to the science of medicine as applied anthropological projects were to the science of anthropology. Just as the former gathered data and factual information to test medical theories, so did the latter provide a means to measure the cultural insights of academic anthropologists. Leighton agreed with Embree that applied anthropology and anthropology should not work against one another but work for one another so that the resources and benefits of each could be shared.

Leighton's response to Embree's article shared the same page on which an exchange between Melville J. Herskovits, an early critic of applied anthropology, and renowned
anthropologist M. F. Ashley-Montagu appeared. Their correspondence was the result of Herskovits' earlier review of Montagu's *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*. In his review Herskovits stated the hope that Montagu "will be content to remain the anthropologist, and not aspire to follow the dim, treacherous path of what is coming to be termed the 'social engineer'." Montagu, taking exception to Herskovits' opinion that social scientists should not become involved in the governing of contemporary society, argued that those who knew the "truth" concerning the workings of society should be allowed to help shape that society. He asked, "who else is better equipped to do so than the anthropologist?" In response Herskovits suggested a number of articles that were critical of applied anthropology, including one of his own. The Tax article and Herskovits-Montagu exchange reflected the unchanged opinion of most academicians toward the discipline.

The same year as the Herskovits-Montagu debate, John Provinse attacked the idea of pure research and the attitude of those who supported it. In a speech given in collaboration with Solon T. Kimball before the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, Provinse declared that many of the problems the WRA faced could have been avoided if the academic community had been prepared. He believed that
"the unplanned and often whimsical character of social science research carried on in America is not geared to provide a government, or for that matter any other agency, either with the scientific knowledge or more important 'the know how,' that it should have in dealing with such emergency problems of human relations." Provinse then made an appeal that the applied sciences be used more often, noting that "the social sciences are making a rather pitiful showing in the translation of their scientific knowledge into the 'know how' of action."\(^{15}\)

Having made this appeal Provinse and Kimball went on to evaluate the WRA's handling of the Japanese-Americans and the assistance provided by the CAS. Leonard Bloom, who had written a negative review of Leighton's book, focused his critical remarks following their presentation on the suggestion by Kimball that the WRA had established a viable active social community in the ten relocation centers. Whatever community sentiments the Japanese-Americans expressed, Bloom believed they were the feelings of "an aggregate of frustrated and confused persons." He also felt that the analysis of the CAS had little influence in policy decisions, noting that most of their recommendations were never used. Bloom disliked the word "whimsical" to describe social science research, and concluded that "It does not seem to be in the best grace for Dr. Provinse to
criticize social scientists for not having made an important contribution to the operation of a bureaucracy." 16

It was the limitations of a bureaucratic structure that Edward Spicer discussed in Impounded People: Japanese-Americans in the Relocation Centers, published in 1946. Spicer, unknowingly, supported Bloom's argument that the WRA functioned like any other group of bureaucrats within government, and not like social scientists. He believed the attempt to extend the traditional administrative superstructure used in government or business to oversee the Japanese-Americans resulted in the failure of the WRA to adequately develop a policy that met the challenge the evacuation order presented. To Spicer, WRA policy was merely a "paternalistic set of decisions" that did little more than physically contain the evacuees for the duration of the war. He argued that "administrative techniques as such are not equipped to be designers for public policy."

The public policy of a community, Spicer concluded, must be made by that community. 17

Implicit in Spicer's criticism in Impounded People was the idea that administrators, because they were dealing with people, not products, needed the assistance of professionals trained in the field of human behavior. Spicer elaborated on this point in an article in Applied Anthropology that appeared the same year as Impounded People. In the "Use of
Social Scientists by the WRA" Spicer argued that the CAS provided a communications link between the administrator and the evacuees. The agency measured the needs of the people, and where there was room for adjustment in policy, Spicer noted, the CAS was useful. When policy framework did not allow adjustment, however, the agency then became a tool used to define the issues and measure the response to the policy. Spicer concluded that the CAS presented a systematic evaluation of what had taken place, which, in turn, provided a key to what was and was not working. Spicer argued that because the community analyst worked outside the bureaucratic framework, he was able to provide professional insight to the project director.18

Spicer admitted, however, that it was difficult to evaluate the influence the analyst had with the project director. Although the CAS considered that the trend reports contained valuable information, Spicer realized that "some staff read and used them, many did not." The inconsistent use by camp directors was not restricted to the trend reports. In discussing the variety of reports prepared by the CAS, Spicer noted that "what they actually accomplished in giving better understanding of the human problems to staff generally cannot be measured."19

Two final reports by members of the CAS discussed the conclusions drawn by Spicer. The final reports of Asael
T. Hansen, of Heart Mountain, and G. Gordon Brown, of the Gila River Project, demonstrated the uncertainty the field analyst had about themselves, and the subordinate role the camp director placed them in. When Hansen arrived at Heart Mountain, for example, he was not quite sure of what his job was. The project director apparently did not care what he did either, as he did not meet with Hansen for six weeks. In fact, according to Hansen, many of the administrative staff could not "see why the government would pay a man to do only what the analyst said he was doing." At first, Hansen attempted to establish a long-term research project but soon abandoned the idea when he realized that "the urgent practical needs of the situation dictated his actions." It was the urgency of the registration crisis that enabled Hansen to finally establish a working relationship with the administrator. The basis of the relationship, however, was dependent upon the director's approval of the findings contained within Hansen's reports.20

G. Gordon Brown's final report revealed a similar pattern. The administrator of Gila River used the analyst and his reports only when the opinions and conclusions were not in conflict with his own perceptions and decisions. Hence, the CAS reports appeared not to influence the development or implementation of a policy, but only to reinforce the policy decisions already agreed upon. Brown also
doubted the analysts' ability to predict evacuee behavior. "To the degree that the culture of the administrator and that of the people he administers are different," he wrote in his final report, "the results of any administrative action will be unpredictable or predictable with a great margin of error." Brown added that the information the analyst gathered often was nothing more than idle gossip, what the evacuees felt the camp director or Washington wanted to hear. According to Brown, the Japanese-American always suspected that the analyst was a member of the administrative staff and believed he was not to be trusted.21

The suspicion that the analyst was more concerned with the administrator rather than the Japanese-American was correct. Although the CAS did not perceive the evacuees as the enemy nor wished to add to their physical or psychological discomfort, the community analyst nevertheless acted as a trouble shooter for Dillon Myer and the WRA. The CAS did not act as an agency designed to solve the problems of the evacuees, which according to Spicer's final report on the CAS, was the main objective of the organization. With few exceptions the basic policies of the WRA were established well before the CAS began operations and, as a result, the analysts had little to do with setting policy as Provinse had hoped. The analysts instead determined what problems stood in the way of executing the policies
already decided upon. The result was that the CAS used its skill and knowledge to measure and manipulate evacuee behavior in such a way that WRA directives were implemented with little resistance. Myer's need to maintain law and order took precedence over the needs of the evacuees and ignored analysts reports that did not support WRA policy decisions. There was never a consensus among the analysts that favored Myer's policies of resettlement, segregation, the loyalty question, or the closing schedule of the camps.

In each case many of the analysts questioned the value of the WRA's decision. To many, resettlement was impractical and cruel, segregation unjust and inadvisable, and the early closing of the camps pointless. But the CAS, unlike Collier and Leighton, carried out their orders and the policies were implemented. In part this was due to the recognition by Provinse and others that the success of applied anthropology depended on the success of the CAS. But the effectiveness of the organization depended on administrative support, which resulted in the CAS becoming a tool of the administrator. The use of applied anthropology by the WRA therefore became a subtle form of coercive social engineering in which the carrot was substituted for the stick. Ironically, Spicer later stated that "Collier's policy, to me, smacked of control of individuals, involuntarily, from their point
of view." Spicer, however, in numerous articles on the CAS never questioned the ethical responsibility of his agency.23

But it was, to paraphrase Angus, the confusing of technique with ethics that led to an inevitable conflict of interest, with the result that the social analyst became an administrative assistant rather than a professional consultant. The development of the science of human management, hoped for by Collier, Leighton, Chapple and others, failed to materialize. The SRB's withdrawal because of the ethical and administrative conflict with Myer convinced Provinse that the CAS's existence depended on avoiding that conflict. The CAS kept peace with Myer by keeping peace within the camps. Long-term research projects, lengthy community analysis, the examination of human behavior were sacrificed as field analysts assisted camp directors in their attempt to maintain order in an administration characterized by sudden policy changes. In short, the science of human management gave way to the science of human control. Looking back, Eliot Chapple remarked "in 1943 we thought applied anthropology was going somewhere. But it didn't."24

The continued debate following World War II in which applied anthropology seemingly added few converts supports Chapple's conclusion. The failure of the CAS as a social
science tool for contemporary society also provided convincing evidence for early critics like Melville Herskovits and Elsie Clews Parsons. The skepticism that applied anthropology would only be used when it did not interfere with the goals of the administrator was fulfilled. The warning that applied anthropologists might attempt to manipulate behavior to fit the world of the scientific expert also seemed justified. The consensus of the American Anthropological Association remained what it had been in the 1930s. The idea that anthropologists should not specialize in "people culling people" persisted. When provided with an opportunity to demonstrate its value applied anthropology failed.\textsuperscript{25}
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., pp. 383, 386-387.

3 Ibid., pp. 221, 322, 325.

4 Ibid., pp. 367, 394.


9 Ibid., p. 15; Cohen's remarks appear at the end of Opler's address.


12 Ibid., p. 637.


16 Ibid., pp. 409-410; Bloom's remarks appear at the end of the address by Provinse and Kimball.


19 Ibid., pp. 32-33.


22 Spicer's final report of the CAS is contained in the Records of the War Relocation Authority, Central Files, National Archives, Record Group 210; Spicer, "The Use of Social Scientists," p. 19.


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