DOGMATISM AS RELATED TO ANXIETY AND SELF-IDEAL DISCREPANCY

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Franklin D. Davis, B. S.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the various personality dimensions which has received increasing research attention recently is the construct of dogmatism. Dogmatism, as delineated by Rokeach (9, 10, 11), is characterized as a relatively closed system of beliefs and disbeliefs regarding reality. Rokeach has suggested that the more closed an individual's belief system, the more it may be seen to represent a cognitive network of defenses against anxiety.

To the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant and the need to ward off threat absent, open systems should result . . . . But as the need to ward off threat becomes stronger, the cognitive need to know should become weaker, resulting in more closed belief systems (10, pp. 67-68).

As implied here, dogmatism may be conceptualized as resulting, in part, from anxiety producing threat. Results of recent research (5, 6, 8, 12) have indicated that dogmatism constitutes a defense mechanism which is significantly related to anxiety. Pannes (7) has found that high school students with favorable self-images tend to exhibit a higher level of closed-mindedness than students
with less favorable self-images. Other investigators (1, 3, 4) have supported the proposition that highly dogmatic subjects are less able to synthesize incongruent or dissonant information than are subjects low in dogmatism. These results may be interpreted as supporting the contention that a relationship exists between dogmatism and anxiety which leads to a lowered level of conflict within the self. If an individual fails to recognize certain incongruencies, it seems plausible that his actual and ideal self-concepts will show more congruency than one who is more open to inconsistent information. General anxiety level, however, would not seem to be significantly lowered by utilization of the dogmatic belief system.

Sex differences have been found to influence the level of dogmatism as measured on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. Using this scale in an extensive normative study, Alter and White (2) found that women score consistently lower than men.

Thus, a relationship between the concepts of dogmatism, anxiety, and self-concept discrepancy may be inferred. It would also appear that sex differences influence scores which purport to measure dogmatism.

Statement of the Problem

This study was concerned with the relationships between the concepts of dogmatism, anxiety, and self-ideal discrepancy.
In order to measure these relationships, Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, Cattell's IPAT Self Analysis Form, and Bill's Index of Adjustment and Values were utilized. Sex differences, as measured on the Dogmatism Scale, were also investigated.

Hypotheses

In keeping with the aforementioned theoretical background, the following hypotheses were tested:

(I) Subjects with high-dogmatism scores will exhibit a significantly higher level of anxiety than will subjects with low-dogmatism scores.

(II) Subjects with high measured levels of dogmatism will have significantly lower self-discrepancy scores than subjects with low measured levels of dogmatism.

(III) Women subjects will exhibit a lower level of dogmatism than will men subjects.


CHAPTER II

RELATED STUDIES

As previously stated, a relationship between dogmatism and anxiety has been found by several investigators. The use of dogmatism as a defense mechanism has also been pos- tulated by various psychologists. Additionally there has been limited work done in regard to the relationships be- tween dogmatism, self-ideal discrepancy, and sex differences on the Dogmatism Scale. A sample of these studies will be presented in this chapter.

Rokeach (15, p. 348), in an extensive study consisting of 1,025 American students, English students, and English workers, investigated the relationship between anxiety and dogmatism. The Dogmatism Scale was used to measure the cognitive openness or closedness of the subjects. Thirty items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were used to determine anxiety level. Very significant positive correlations were found between high levels of dogmatism and high levels of anxiety in all groups. Rokeach concluded that anxiety and dogmatism emerged together as part of a single factor.
Ziller and Shear (21) showed twenty-one clinical psychologists from four Veterans Administration hospitals and sixteen trainees assigned to these same hospitals a twenty-seven minute mental health film. The subjects were then given a questionnaire in which they were asked to respond to items concerning possible behavior of the central character in the film. It was found that the professional psychologists, in making this highly subjective judgment, were more dogmatic than the trainees, but only under conditions in which a comparison of professional judgment between the two groups was implied. These results were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that dogmatism is a status defense mechanism.

Using 154 male students who represented six college fraternities, Pilisuk (12) tested the suggested relationships between anxiety and self-acceptance and compared the relationships of each with measures of open-mindedness. The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale was used to measure anxiety and the Self-Ideal Index of Self-Acceptance was used to measure degree of self-acceptance. The Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale and the Intellectual Non-Conformity Test were used to measure open-mindedness. A highly significant negative correlation of - 0.624 between anxiety and self-acceptance was found. Manifest anxiety scores held small but significant positive correlations with tendency to reject threat and authoritarian defense scores. Self-
acceptance showed small but significant positive correlations between tolerance for ambiguity and tendency to accept threat, while manifest anxiety was negatively related to these variables. This study was interpreted as leaving tenable the hypothesis that anxiety represents a threat to the self which tends to be met by cognitive constriction in matters pertaining to the self-concept.

Byrne, Blaylock and Goldberg (5) used seventy-six introductory psychology students at the University of Texas and 500 University of Illinois' students in order to study the relationship between dogmatism and certain defense mechanisms. To measure dogmatism, an instrument combining Dogmatism Scale items and Opinionation Scale items was employed. The Repression-Sensitization Scale was utilized to measure differences in responding to threat. Significant positive correlations were found between the dogmatism-opinionation and repression-sensitization measures. Thus, contrary to the hypothesis that dogmatic persons utilize repressing or denying defenses more than non-dogmatic persons, it was found that as dogmatism increased, sensitization increased. It was suggested that dogmatic beliefs may have constituted a defense against anxiety, but the mechanisms used were intellectualization and sensitization instead of repression and denial. In this way, conflicts may have been expressed in the nonpersonal cognitive sphere.
In another study using the Repression-Sensitization Scale, Byrne, Barry and Nelson (4) used seventy-seven students enrolled in an adjustment course at the University of Texas in order to investigate the relationship between measures of repression-sensitization and Worchel's Self Activity Inventory which is purported to measure self-ideal discrepancy. It was hypothesized that subjects who utilized repressive defense mechanisms would be less likely to verbalize negative self descriptions than subjects who utilized sensitizing defense mechanisms. This hypothesis was confirmed. In a second part of this investigation, the relationship between the subjects' reactions to incongruency or dissonant percepts and repression-sensitization level were investigated. The Hostility Incongruency Test and the Repression-Sensitization Scale were used to measure these two variables. A small but significant relationship between incongruency and sensitization was found. These findings indicated that repression-sensitization scores were related to self-descriptive measures which were thought to be indicative of maladjustment. The possibility was raised that psychodiagnostic instruments which relied on self-ratings may have tended to identify maladjustment, conflict or dissonance only in individuals who responded to stress with sensitizing mechanisms.

Becher and Dileo (3) investigated the hypothesis that low, medium, and high scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale
would differ in the tendency to present to themselves and others a positive social image and a positive personal image. Two hundred sixteen students enrolled in four introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State University were selected as subjects. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was used to measure tendency to present a positive social image, and Worobel's Self Activity Inventory yielded a self-ideal discrepancy score which was interpreted as measuring tendency to project a positive personal image. Males and females were trichotomized into low, medium, and high subgroups on the basis of their scores on the Dogmatism Scale. Results indicated that males were more motivated to present a positive personal image than were females, and that females were more motivated to present a positive social image than were males. It was also found that low scorers on the Dogmatism Scale were motivated to present a positive personal image but not motivated to present a positive social image.

Using a sample of thirty-five hospitalized, neuropsychiatric patients, Lomont (9) investigated the relationship between the defense mechanisms of repression-sensitization and the cognitive variable of anxiety. In order to measure these two constructs, the Repression-Sensitization Scale and the IPAT Self-Analysis Form were employed. In addition, a sixty-six word association list including words relevant to sex, hostility and commonly unpleasant experiences was
used as an additional measure of anxiety. The subjects' reactions to words on the list were scored by an observer according to amount of disturbance displayed by the subject when presented with each word. A highly significant correlation was found between sensitization and anxiety as measured by the IPAT Form. A significant negative correlation was found, however, between sensitization and anxiety as measured by the word association list. These results were interpreted as indicating that, although repressers appeared to be healthier on the self-report instrument (IPAT), they were more vulnerable to threatening stimuli actually encountered.

Wohl and Hyman (17) investigated the relationship between anxiety, cognitive constriction, and defensiveness in test taking behavior. The measures of anxiety used were the Taylor Scale of Manifest Anxiety and the IPAT Anxiety Scale. The two measures of constriction were Canter's Emotional Constriction Scale and Wohl's Constriction Scale. The K scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory was used as a measure of test taking defensiveness. Subjects were comprised of sixty-four students in a class on the "Socialization of the Child." The Manifest Anxiety Scale and the IPAT were found to be significantly correlated with Wohl's Constriction Scale, but a significant relationship was not found between measures of anxiety and the Emotional Constriction Scale. When the defensiveness scale
was held constant, however, these correlations were rendered insignificant. Similarly, an insignificant correlation between the IPAT and Manifest Anxiety scales when the defensiveness scale was held constant, inferred that different aspects of anxiety were being measured by the two scales. A general set of test taking defensiveness thus appeared to be a factor in the seemingly significant relationship between anxiety and cognitive constriction.

Adams and Vidulich (1) used thirty-six volunteers from introductory psychology classes at Louisiana State University as subjects in a study of the relationship between dogmatism and belief congruence in a paired associate learning situation. The subjects were divided into two groups, on the basis of their scores on the Dogmatism Scale. Those subjects scoring high were placed in one group, and those scoring low were placed in the other group. Each subject learned two paired associate lists of words on a two-second exposure interval memory drum. One list contained fifteen belief-congruent word pairs while the other list contained fifteen belief-incongruent word pairs. It was hypothesized that belief-congruent associations would be learned more easily than belief-incongruent associations by all subjects. It was also hypothesized that highly dogmatic subjects would have greater difficulty than subjects low in dogmatism in learning incongruent relative to congruent associations. These hypotheses were confirmed, and
an additional finding indicated that the highly dogmatic subjects were poorer learners irrespective of the congruence or incongruence of the material presented.

Similar findings are reported by Ehrlich (6), who set forth the hypothesis that dogmatism was inversely related to classroom learning, and that this predicted relationship was independent of academic aptitude. Subjects consisted of fifty-seven students enrolled in introductory sociology sections at Ohio State University. These subjects were divided into high and low dogmatism groups on the basis of their Dogmatism Scale scores. The Ohio State Psychological Examination was used to measure academic aptitude. Sociology test scores, administered during the first week of the academic quarter, readministered the last week of the quarter, and readministered five months after the quarter was completed, were employed in order to measure level of classroom learning. All hypotheses were confirmed, indicating that subjects low in dogmatism entered the classroom with a higher level of learning, learned more as a result of the classroom experience, and retained this information significantly longer than the more dogmatic subjects.

Kleck and Wheaton (8) used seventy-two male and female high school students in western Massachusetts in order to investigate dogmatism and its relationship to opinion-consistent and opinion-inconsistent information. It was hypothesized that closed minded subjects, as measured on
the Dogmatism Scale, would show a greater preference for information consistent with their opinions than would the open-minded subjects. It was also proposed that the closed-minded subjects would recall less of the opinion-inconsistent information and evaluate this information less favorably than would the open-minded subjects. All subjects were administered the Dogmatism Scale and a teen-age attitude questionnaire on five issues. Subjects were also given articles to read, of which some were in agreement with the subject's opinion, while some were in disagreement. The articles were followed by scales which required each subject to evaluate the article. Two weeks later, subjects were given a test to see what they remembered from the articles which they had previously read. Using data derived from these sources, it was found that highly dogmatic subjects showed significantly less recall of inconsistent information and a greater tendency to evaluate consistent information in a more positive manner than did open-minded subjects. The hypotheses that highly dogmatic subjects would show a greater preference for information consistent with their opinions and would evaluate opinion-inconsistent information less favorably than open-minded subjects were not confirmed.

White and Alter (18) attempted to determine whether highly authoritarian and dogmatic subjects tended toward one-dimensional rather than more complex classification
systems. The second phase of the study tested the assumption that high dogmatism and authoritarianism would indicate more resistance to change than low scores on these variables. The Dogmatism and Fascism scales were used to measure degree of dogmatism and authoritarianism among one-hundred ten students in introductory psychology courses at the University of Utah. Subjects who scored in the top and bottom fifteen per cent of this group were utilized in this investigation. These subjects were assessed according to their judgments of a series of lifted weights during a training session and an anchoring session. It was found that high scorers on the Dogmatism and Fascism scales were more resistant to change, but high scorers did not differ from low scorers in the number or range of judgment categories used in the training session.

Fillenbaum (?) examined the relationship between individual differences in the amount of dissonance reduction and dogmatism scores. His sample consisted of forty-seven female students in introductory psychology and sociology courses at the University of North Carolina. These students were subjected to varying degrees of embarrassment in order to gain admittance to various groups set up by the experimenter. After admittance, however, the group activities were, by design, rather unrewarding. Undergoing the unpleasant initiation in order to gain entrance to an unrewarding group experience was defined as a dissonant
situation. One way to reduce dissonance might have been to over-value the group. Thus, the higher an individual valued the group, the more was his estimated tendency to reduce dissonance. Product-moment correlations were significant between high levels of dogmatism and greater tendency to reduce dissonance. A control condition, however, in which students were allowed to enter the group without undergoing an embarrassing initiation showed similar significant results. These results were explained by the proposition that features of the control condition might also be considered a dissonant situation from the subject's viewpoint.

Long and Ziller (10) studied the hypothesis that limited or inadequate predecisional search was a manifestation of high dogmatism. Predecisional search behavior was defined as the activities of seeking, acquiring, and processing relevant information before a decision is made. The Dogmatism Scale and four measures of tendencies to reserve judgment were administered to seventy-two women at the University of Delaware. Intercorrelations between the five measures revealed significant negative relationships between the Dogmatism Scale and each of the four tasks used to measure tendencies to reserve judgment. These results supported the initial hypothesis and indicated that the non-dogmatic subjects tended to delay decision or reserve judgment in order to search for additional information to
a greater degree than did the more dogmatic subjects. These results were interpreted as indicating that dogmatism works as a defense mechanism against anxiety arousing threats to an insecure self-concept.

Zagona and Zurcher (20) studied the relationship between cognitive openness, closedness, and intelligence. The thirty highest scorers and the thirty lowest scorers on the Dogmatism Scale were picked from a sample of five-hundred seventeen freshman, elementary psychology students to participate in this investigation. The verbal subtest of the College Qualification Tests was used to measure intellectual ability among the entire sample of five-hundred seventeen students. A midterm examination was also administered to all students. It was found that the low-dogmatic students scored significantly higher on the tests which purported to measure intellectual ability. Striking personality differences were also observed between the two groups in a classroom situation. These results were interpreted as indicating that a significant relationship did exist between lower intelligence and high dogmatism scores.

Using the same subjects in another investigation, Zagona and Zurcher (19) observed the subjects' behaviors in a variety of classroom situations. It was hypothesized that the high-dogmatic group would be more leader-oriented, show a preference for more structured classroom situations, become insecure and waver in conviction when challenged by
an authority figure, and spend less time in reaching group consensus than the low-dogmatic group. All of these hypotheses were considered to be confirmed on the basis of the experimenter's observations of the two groups. It appeared that the high and low-dogmatics did reveal consistent behavioral patterns as expected.

Plant, Teleford, and Thomas (13) investigated personality differences between individuals with high and low measured dogmatism as indicated on the Dogmatism Scale. Subjects consisted of 4,506 freshmen in a California public junior college. All subjects, in addition to the Dogmatism Scale, were given a battery of psychological tests designed to measure various aspects of personality, values and interests, and scholastic aptitude. Males with high measured levels in dogmatism were compared with males measured low in dogmatism, and high scoring females were likewise compared with low scoring females on the different variables being measured. Without exception, it was found that low-dogmatic subjects, both male and female, scored significantly higher on positive personality variables such as sociability, self-control, independence, intellectual efficiency and responsibility. These relationships held true when the subjects were paired according to scholastic aptitude as measured by the School and College Aptitude Test. On the basis of these results, the low-dogmatic subjects, as compared with high-dogmatic subjects, were described as outgoing
and enterprising, calm, mature, efficient, responsible, and more likely to succeed in an academic setting. It was found that the high-dogmatic college freshman group had scores similar to high school students on the California Personality Inventory. These findings indicated that the highly dogmatic college freshmen were psychologically immature and less mature than many high school subjects. In general, it was concluded that highly dogmatic subjects, as a group, tended to be impulsive, defensive, psychologically immature and conventional, and stereotyped in thinking.

Pannes (11) used 675 Connecticut students in grades seven through twelve in order to study the relationship between dogmatism and degree of self-acceptance. The Dogmatism Scale and the Bills-Silverman Index of Self Acceptance were used to measure these two variables. Results showed a small but significant positive correlation between high dogmatism and high self-acceptance.

Rebhun (14) studied the parental attitudes of dogmatic subjects and the relationship of these attitudes to dogmatism. Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale and eight sub-scales of the Parental Attitude Research Instrument were used to measure these cognitive variables. Three different groups were used in this study: 108 male undergraduates in a highly selective college, another group of seventy-eight male undergraduates in the same college the following semester, and
a third group of 125 male undergraduates from a less selective college. Significant positive correlations were found between higher levels of dogmatism and the eight scales which measured the subjects' parental attitudes. The findings were interpreted as suggesting that the highly dogmatic individual tends to hold parental attitudes which lead to dependence on the parent or authority figures. As a result, the child might be less experienced with, and less comfortable with the outside world, thus needing a firm leader. The child would need to organize repressive defense mechanisms in order to help deny the existence of ideas and approaches outside of the parent's belief system. Findings were essentially the same for all three groups.

The relationship between geographical mobility, dogmatism, anxiety and age were investigated by Sticht and Fox (16). It was hypothesized that individuals who frequently moved from one geographical location to the next would be more anxious, higher in dogmatism and would tend to change residence earlier in life than do individuals of low mobility. Subjects were composed of ninety introductory psychology students at the University of Arizona. All subjects were given a test booklet composed of the Dogmatism Scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, and a geographical mobility questionnaire. The previously stated hypotheses were confirmed. The more mobile subjects did tend to be more dogmatic and anxious than less mobile subjects.
The more mobile individuals also tended to move earlier in life.

Alter and White (2) computed regional norms for the Dogmatism Scale on a sample of 1,000 male and 1,000 female students at the University of Utah. The major finding was that female subjects scored significantly lower than male subjects in this sample. Wide variations in mean scores of different regional samples indicated that the Dogmatism Scale was highly sensitive to subcultural differences.

In summary, dogmatism has been characterized as a defense mechanism (9, 10, 21) which is related to anxiety (9, 15, 16, 17) and self-acceptance (5, 11, 12, 19). Dogmatic individuals have been found to differ from nondogmatic individuals in ability to learn certain types of information (1, 6, 7, 20). Different personality traits have also been observed between high and low dogmatism (8, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20). Sex differences on the Dogmatism Scale, with females scoring lower than males, were also found (2).
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER III

METHOD

Subjects

Ninety-six subjects from three introductory psychology classes at North Texas State University were selected to participate in this study. The particular three classes involved were not selected according to a prescribed sampling plan. They were chosen because of their availability for research use at the time data for this study were being collected. The sample consisted of forty-six males and fifty females. Their chronological ages ranged from seventeen to thirty-four years with a median age of nineteen. Of the total sample, thirty-one subjects were freshmen, twenty-nine were sophomores, seventeen were juniors and nineteen were seniors. No specific major field of study was common to all students.

Description of Measures

The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale

The Dogmatism Scale, Form E, was the instrument used to measure dogmatism. The primary purposes of this scale,
which was developed by Rokeach (8), are the measurement of individual differences in the openness or closedness of belief systems, general authoritarianism and general intolerances.

The specific dimensions measured are (a) isolation within and between belief and disbelief systems, (b) relative degree of differentiation of the belief and the disbelief systems, (c) specific content of primitive beliefs, (d) formal content of the intermediate belief region, (e) interrelations among the different belief systems, and (f) perceptions involving the time-perspective dimension. Rokeach first used a sixty-six item scale and subsequently chose the forty items which best discriminated between high and low dogmatism for the final revision of the scale. The final revision is duplicated in Appendix I.

In an initial investigation by Rokeach (8), Dogmatism Scale items were interspersed with each other and with items from other scales, in order to disguise their purpose. The questionnaires were administered to introductory psychology students in Michigan State University, students in two New York area colleges, students in two English colleges, and a worker sample in an English automobile factory. Odd-even split-half reliability coefficients ranged from .70 in the Michigan State University sample (N=202) to .91 for the English college group (N=137).
Alter and White (1), in reviewing normative literature for the Dogmatism Scale, found wide variations in mean scores for different populations (from 124 to 183.2). It was concluded that the scale was highly sensitive to sub-cultural differences. It was also found that males showed consistently higher scores than females in all populations.

Zagona and Zurcher (9) obtained fifteen week test-re-test reliabilities ranging from .186 to .506 for high, low and medium-dogmatic subjects. Their sample consisted of 517 elementary psychology students. The overall reliability coefficient was .697. The thirty high scorers and the thirty low scorers were separated into two discussion sections and observed over the course of an entire semester. It was found that the two groups differed in many behavioral aspects. The high-dogmatic group was leader oriented, showing little spontaneity and indicating a preference for clearly structured topics. Members of this group were characterized as typically uncreative, routine and conventional. When group consensus was reached, challenges by an authority figure caused the high-dogmatic group to waver in conviction and evidence signs of reduction in group cohesion. The low dogmatic group, on the other hand, tended to defend its consensus, express more creativity, spontaneity, and indicate less concern for a structured situation. It was found that by using the subjects' scores on the Dogmatism Scale,
the investigators could accurately predict behavior of the two groups in accordance with the hypotheses outlined by Rokeach.

Plant, Teleford and Thomas (6) used 4,506 freshmen students at a California junior college in order to investigate cognitive differences between subjects with high and low measured levels of dogmatism. A battery of psychometric devices, including the Dogmatism Scale, were administered to all subjects. Significant differences between high and low-dogmatics were found on all variables measured. It was indicated that the low-dogmatic subjects were outgoing, calm, mature, efficient, responsible and more likely to succeed in an academic setting than would the high-dogmatic subjects. It was also indicated that the high-dogmatic subjects tended to be psychologically immature.

In summary, the Dogmatism Scale has been found to be a reliable measure which differentiates between high and low levels of dogmatism. Its validity has been established by a variety of measures ranging from behavioral observations to psychometric scores.

**The Cattell IPAT Anxiety Scale**

The *IPAT Anxiety Scale* consists of forty questions distributed among five factors which group together as anxiety components. The five factors are (a) lack of self-sentiment, (b) lack of ego strength, (c) suspiciousness,
or paranoid insecurity, (d) guilt proneness, and (e) frustrative tension. The questionnaire is included in Appendix II.

Validity was established by correlating the test items and components with the single total anxiety score. This method yielded correlation coefficients of .83 to .90. It was also found that test scores distinguished sharply between anxiety levels of 795 normals and fifty-nine anxiety hysterics in an outpatient clinic. The difference reached statistical significance at the .001 level (4).

One and two week test-retest reliability studies using eighty-seven American adults and 277 Japanese students yielded correlation coefficients of .87 and .93. Split-half reliabilities, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula, yielded correlations of .84 and .91. Test-retest reliabilities over long periods, however, were low. This was explained as a function of fluctuation of anxiety itself, and not a measure of test unreliability.

In an attempt to establish validity, IPAT Anxiety Scale scores were correlated with psychiatric evaluations of anxiety on the same individuals. In two separate studies, it was found that the consensus of psychiatrists' diagnoses of anxiety level correlated higher with scores on this test factor than with any other known personality factor. The correlations ranged from .30 to .40.
Robinson (7) found a small correlation of .17 between the IPAT Anxiety Scale and ratings of anxiety. All ratings were made by the same clinician on thirty-nine patients.

It has been suggested by Bendig (2) that the IPAT confounds two second-order factors of anxiety rather than measuring one unitary factor. In this study, 200 students were administered the IPAT Anxiety Scale. Items were intercorrelated by the product-moment method. Little relationship to the assumed factor content appeared. The reliability coefficient for the total anxiety score was .81.

In summary, reliability coefficients for this scale appear to be satisfactory. Although the scale does appear to differ between levels of anxiety, some question has arisen as to the factors measured. For the purposes of this study, however, the scale was considered adequate.

The Bills Index of Adjustment and Values

This index was designed to measure self-concept, self-acceptance, concept of the ideal self, discrepancy between self-concept and concept of the ideal self, and perceptions of how other persons accept themselves. For the purposes of the present study, only discrepancy scores between actual perceived self and the ideal self were used. The list is reproduced in Appendix III.

Validity of the scale was established by administering a list of 124 traits to forty-four subjects. They were
asked to make three ratings for each of the traits. These ratings asked for the subject's perception of himself, how he felt about being this way, and what he would like to be. Three weeks later, the same subjects made the same ratings for the 124 traits. Results of the two administrations were compared to determine the variability of the items from first to second administration. Those words which showed a greater average variation than the average variation of the subjects on all the items were eliminated. This process resulted in the retention of forty-nine words which were used in the revised form.

Utilizing 113 students at Agnes Scott College, Omwake (5) investigated the relationships between scores on the Index of Adjustment and Values, the Phillips' Attitude Toward Self and Others Questionnaire, and the Berger Scales for measuring self-acceptance and acceptance of others. Positive correlations, ranging from .13 to .55 were found among the three scales. Of these, seven out of nine of the measures reached statistical significance at the P=.05 level or better. A significant correlation was not found between acceptance of others or acceptance of self versus acceptance of others on the Index of Adjustment and Values and Phillips' indexes. It was concluded that the three measures of self-acceptance agree closely, but that measures of attitudes toward others agree less well.
Bills (3) separated fifty-six subjects into two groups of twenty-eight each on the basis of their scores on the Index of Adjustment and Values. It was hypothesized that subjects with a high discrepancy score would show more signs of depression on the Rorschach than subjects with low discrepancy scores. Of the six Rorschach factors believed to be indicative of depression, five showed statistically significant differences between the two groups.

Bills (3, p.54), using 237 and 100 college students in separate studies, obtained split-half reliability coefficients of .88 and .87 for the self-ideal discrepancy index. In a six weeks test-retest study using the 237 students, a coefficient of .87 was found. A sixteen week test-retest study consisting of ninety-three and 300 students yielded reliability coefficients of .69 and .52. All previously mentioned reliability coefficients were corrected by use of the Spearman-Brown formula and were significant at the .01 level.

In summary, this scale has been found to be comparable with other measures of self-ideal discrepancy and to differentiate reasonably well between levels of self-ideal discrepancy. Reliability of the scale appears to be satisfactory.

Procedure

The three scales were administered to three freshmen psychology classes at North Texas State University in the
Fall semester of 1968. For a given subject the three tests were combined in a single booklet for administrative purposes. Within the various booklets, the three tests were arranged in different orders for each of the three classes as a precautionary measure against order effects. For Classroom I, the scales were presented in the following order: first, the IPAT Anxiety Scale; second, the Dogmatism Scale; and third, the Index of Adjustment and Values. For Classroom II, the following order was used: first, the Dogmatism Scale; second, the IPAT Anxiety Scale; and third, the Index of Adjustment and Values. In Classroom III, the Dogmatism Scale was administered first, the Index of Adjustment and Values second, and the IPAT Anxiety Scale third. These orders were selected at random from a total of six possible sequence arrangements.

The class instructors introduced the administrator to their respective classes and explained that the main purpose of the battery was to collect data for a research project. The examiner further explained that the battery measured general attitudes and assured the subjects that the results would not in any way affect their course grades. Subjects were told that there were three untimed scales, and the instructions for each test were printed on the test booklets. They were free to leave after completion of all three scales. All test protocols were complete, thus there was no need to eliminate any student from the sample.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The three principal hypotheses with which the present research investigation was concerned will be repeated in the interest of clarity:

(I) Subjects with high-dogmatism scores will exhibit a significantly higher level of anxiety than will subjects with low-dogmatism scores.

(II) Subjects with high measured levels of dogmatism will have significantly lower self-ideal discrepancy scores than subjects with low measured levels of dogmatism.

(III) Women subjects will exhibit a lower level of dogmatism than will men subjects.

Statistical Techniques

The major statistical procedure employed to test the tenability of the three hypotheses was analysis of variance. As a supplementary device a multiple correlation was computed among the three major variables in which the dogmatism scores served as the criterion, and the anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy scores served as the predictors. The analysis of variance data and their relevance to Hypotheses I, II, and III are presented first.
Analysis of Variance

The first step involved in the statistical treatment was to divide the dogmatism score distribution of all subjects (N=96) into high and low segments. The high-dogmatic group (HD) consisted of subjects who scored at the seventy-fifth percentile and above (N=24). The score which ranked at the seventy-fifth percentile was a value of 166. Similarly, the low-dogmatic group (LD) was comprised of those subjects who scored at the twenty-fifth percentile and below (N=24). The score value at the twenty-fifth percentile was 130. Although those subjects whose scores were between the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles were not relevant to the hypotheses, this group (middle-dogmatic--MD) was included in the analysis in the interest of retaining all data. In summary, this truncation procedure yielded three principal base groups: a high-dogmatic group, a middle-dogmatic group, and a low-dogmatic group.

An analysis of variance was computed on these three groups in order to verify the validity of degree of disparity between groups. The means and standard deviations of the dogmatism groups are presented in Table I. As can be seen by comparison of the means, the low dogmatism group had a considerably lower mean (M=116.42) than did the medium (M=148.73) or high group (M=183.25).
TABLE I

NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE DOGMATISM SCALE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>183.25</td>
<td>13.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>148.73</td>
<td>9.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>116.42</td>
<td>14.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>149.28</td>
<td>26.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An analysis of the variance of the three groups was computed; a summary is presented in Table II. As shown in this table, the groups were significantly differentiated on the basis of their dogmatism scores. The obtained F ratio (F=177.49, df=2/93) was statistically significant at better than the one per cent level of significance.

TABLE II

SUMMARY TABLE OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF DOGMATISM SCORES AMONG DOGMATISM GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53629.60</td>
<td>26814.80</td>
<td>177.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>14049.90</td>
<td>151.07</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>67679.50</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at p<.01
A direct test of Hypothesis I was made by subjecting the anxiety means of the high-, medium- and low-dogmatic groups to an analysis of variance. Presented in Table III are the anxiety means and standard deviations of the three groups. It will be observed that, although the medium-dogmatic group and the high-dogmatic group means were almost equal, the low-dogmatic group mean was lower than the other two. This seemed to indicate a slight difference among the groups in the hypothesized direction.

TABLE III

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE ANXIETY SCORES FOR THE DOGMATISM GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>31.63</td>
<td>13.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>31.73</td>
<td>11.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>15.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.67</td>
<td>13.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The means and standard deviations presented in Table III were put into a simple analysis of variance scheme. A summary of the resultant analysis of variance is presented in Table IV. The obtained F ratio of .65 was not significant using the five per cent probability level as the critical value. Therefore, on the basis of this nonsignificant F test, Hypothesis I was not substantiated.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY TABLE OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF ANXIETY SCORES AMONG DOGMATISM GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>304.39</td>
<td>152.19</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>16504.95</td>
<td>177.47</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>16809.34</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A direct test of Hypothesis II was made by subjecting the means of the self-ideal discrepancy scores obtained by the high, medium and low dogmatism groups to an analysis of variance. The means and standard deviations of the self-ideal discrepancy scores of the three groups are presented in Table V.

TABLE V
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE SELF-IDEAL DISCREPANCY SCORES FOR THE THREE DOGMATISM GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>47.25</td>
<td>15.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>43.23</td>
<td>19.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD</td>
<td>36.96</td>
<td>14.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.67</td>
<td>17.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen by inspection of the data, the low dogmatism group had the lowest self-ideal discrepancy mean, the high group had the highest mean, and the middle group had an intermediate value. These mean trends were opposite in direction to the hypothesized differences.

The means and standard deviations presented in Table V were used in an analysis of variance in order to test Hypothesis II. A summary of the results of this technique is presented in Table VI. The obtained F ratio of 2.06, df=2/93, was not statistically significant using the five per cent probability level as the critical value. Thus, Hypothesis II was not confirmed.

**TABLE VI**

**SUMMARY TABLE OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SELF-IDEAL DISCREPANCY SCORES AMONG DOGMATISM GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1301.40</td>
<td>650.70</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>29353.94</td>
<td>315.63</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>30655.34</td>
<td>. .</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis III pertained to differences between male subjects and female subjects with respect to dogmatism.
A Fisher $t$ test was computed in order to test this hypothesis. It will be recalled that forty-six males and fifty females served as subjects in the study. The females' mean score was 150.94 with a standard deviation of 29.02. The males mean score was 147.48 with a standard deviation of 23.45. A $t$ value of -0.63, df=94, was obtained between the two groups. The obtained $t$ value was not statistically significant using the five per cent probability level as the critical value. Thus, on the basis of this nonsignificant $t$ test, Hypothesis III could not be substantiated. The females, in fact, had a slightly higher mean score than the males.

Multiple Regression Analysis

As an indirect means of gathering information relative to Hypotheses I and II, a multiple correlation was computed using a stepwise regression procedure. A positive correlation between the variables of dogmatism and anxiety was expected based on the prediction offered in Hypothesis I. A negative correlation between dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy was anticipated, which is consonant with Hypothesis II. The simple (zero-order) correlation coefficients resulting from the intercorrelation of all three variables are presented in Table VII. Also included in this table are the relevant regression coefficients (Beta weights) derived from the multiple correlation solution.
**TABLE VII**

SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AND BETA COEFFICIENTS FOR DOGMATISM, ANXIETY AND SELF-IDEAL DISCREPANCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Beta Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism and Anxiety</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism and Self-Ideal Discrepancy</td>
<td>.270**</td>
<td>.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety and Self-Ideal Discrepancy</td>
<td>.318**</td>
<td>. . .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significantly different from zero at p<.05
**Significantly different from zero at p<.01

The simple correlation coefficient between dogmatism and anxiety (r=.144) was not statistically significant at the five per cent probability level. Thus, a slight but non-significant relationship between these two variables was evidenced. The correlation was in the expected direction, however. The correlation between dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy (r=.270) was significantly different from zero at the one per cent level. This low positive relationship was not in the expected direction, however. This latter result was contrary to Hypothesis II and indicated that dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy may be positively related at a relatively low level. As a byproduct of the multiple correlation procedure an additional correlation was computed between anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy—the two predictor variables. A positive correlation (r=.318),
significant at less than one per cent probability level, was found. This indicated that anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy were related positively but at a low order of magnitude.

The Beta coefficients (standard partial regression coefficients) obtained for the predictor variables are also presented in Table VII. These coefficients were generated by a multiple correlation technique. The Beta coefficients reflect the relative contribution of each independent variable to the criterion variable in the multiple correlation problem solution. More specifically, the product of each Beta coefficient and its respective validity coefficient yielded a per cent of contribution for each of the two predictor variables. This statistical procedure indicated that the anxiety variable contributed 0.94 per cent, and that the self-ideal discrepancy variable contributed 6.71 per cent. The coefficient of multiple determination ($R^2$) was 0.0766. Thus, the two variables together were found to have contributed 7.66 per cent to the criterion variable.

The multiple coefficient of correlation ($R$), which is the square root of $R^2$, was 0.277. This value was significantly different from zero at the five per cent probability level (df=3/93). These results indicated a rather low joint relationship between the criterion of dogmatism and the two
predictors, anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy. Therefore, at a general level the low overall relationship ($R = .277$) did not lend strong support to Hypotheses I and II.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

Included in the present chapter are comparisons between the results reported in Chapter IV and other studies presented in the survey of literature. Additionally, speculations are offered to account for the major findings.

The expectation that dogmatism and anxiety would be related, as stated in Hypothesis I and reflected by mean differences, was not confirmed. A small positive correlation between the two variables was found ($r=.144$), but did not reach a statistically significant level. The present findings seem to contradict those of Rokeach (5, p. 348) and Pilisuk (3), both of whom found significant relationships between dogmatism and anxiety. A possible reason for this discrepancy might have been the specific scales used to measure anxiety. Rokeach and Pilisuk used items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. In the present study, the IPAT Anxiety Scale was utilized. As Wohl and Hyman (6) have suggested, these two scales may measure somewhat different aspects of anxiety. If this proposition is correct,
dogmatism may have been related to the aspects of anxiety measured on the one scale and not with those aspects which the other measured. Thus, the results did not indicate an interaction between dogmatism and anxiety as measured by the IPAT Anxiety Scale.

A significant positive correlation between dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy was found ($r = .270, p < .01$). These results repudiated Hypothesis II which stated that a negative relationship would hold between the two variables. The three groups which were differentiated by level of dogmatism and subjected to an analysis of variance did not differ significantly in self-ideal discrepancy scores. The mean trend did, however, indicate a positive relationship between dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy.

A possible explanation for the positive relationship obtained between these two variables might be recent cultural changes, increased scientific advances and so on. Rokeach (4) has postulated that isolation among the various cognitive components of the belief system is a basic ingredient of dogmatism. This hypothetical arrangement of parts within the belief system allows reality to be coerced into congruence with the individual's subjective interpretations of reality. This type of cognitive system, to the extent that it is based on subjective reality, is continually subjected to stress from objective and social reality. It is suggested that this
type of cognitive isolation may be challenged more in the present, relatively well informed, cultural climate than in previous years.

Social policies and institutions which were once accepted in a matter of fact way are now being questioned by large numbers of people. A variety of social problems are being discussed. In this climate of increased controversy, the highly dogmatic individual would probably be exposed to a wider variety of discrepant viewpoints which challenge his own beliefs concerning reality. Higher amounts of this dissonant information and negative feedback might constitute a situation which causes the dogmatic individual to become less sure of his somewhat absolute beliefs. This would seem to be particularly true when authority figures question beliefs. Thus, cognitive isolation may have been so difficult that the efficiency of the dogmatic belief system in reducing incongruency was lowered.

A study by Pannes (2) which indicated that a positive relationship existed between dogmatism and favorable self-concept, seems to contradict the present results. It may be noted, however, that high school students served as subjects for Pannes' sample. In the present study, college students were used. It is possible that the high school students with favorable self-concepts were more dogmatic, because the high school environment offered fewer challenges.
to their concepts of reality. A college setting, however, might be viewed as offering a wider variety of discrepant views which posed more challenge to the dogmatic subjects relatively closed belief systems. Thus, the highly dogmatic college students were more uneasy and less confident in their self-evaluation.

A significant positive correlation between self-ideal discrepancy and anxiety was also found ($r = .318; p < .01$). This result is congruent with current research findings, and was interpreted as supporting the position that anxiety is produced when the self-concept is threatened. Results of a multiple correlation technique carried out between dogmatism, self-ideal discrepancy and anxiety ($R = .277; p < .05$) offered limited support for this proposition.

A Fisher t test did not yield a significant difference between the means of the males and females on the Dogmatism Scale ($-.633$). Thus Hypothesis III was not confirmed. Surprisingly, the mean dogmatism score of the females (150.94) was slightly higher than the mean dogmatism score of the males (147.49). This result is contrary to the findings of Alter and White (1) who, using thirty-seven different samples, found that males scored consistently higher than females. It must be concluded, however, that the females utilized in the present study were more dogmatic than the males.
CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

This investigation was concerned with determining the interrelationships between the cognitive variables of dogmatism, anxiety, and self-ideal discrepancy. Various research studies have directly or indirectly indicated a relationship among the three variables. On the basis of the previous research work, three hypotheses were tested. In essence it was predicted that: Hypothesis I--dogmatism and anxiety would be positively related; Hypothesis II--dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy would be negatively related; and Hypothesis III--males would score higher than females on measures of dogmatism.

Subjects for the study were three introductory psychology classes at North Texas State University. The ninety-six subjects consisted of fifty females and forty-six males.

The three scales selected to measure the variables of dogmatism, anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy were, respectively: Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, Cattell's IPAT Anxiety Scale, and Bills Index of Adjustment and Values.
On the basis of their **Dogmatism** scores, subjects were divided into three groups. Those scoring at the seventy-fifth percentile or above (N=24) constituted the high-dogmatic group (HD), and those scoring at the twenty-fifth percentile or below (N=24) constituted the low-dogmatic group (LD). Those subjects scoring between the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles (N=48) comprised the middle-dogmatic group (MD). An analysis of variance technique indicated that the groups were significantly differentiated (F=177.49; p<.001).

Analysis variance results showed that the anxiety means of the three dogmatism groups did not differ significantly (F=.85). An inspection of the anxiety means, however, revealed a slight trend in the direction predicted in Hypothesis I. Similarly an analysis among the dogmatism groups with respect to self-ideal discrepancy was not significant (F=2.06). Inspection of the means revealed a trend in a direction opposite the hypothesized relationship. Thus, the results did not support Hypotheses I and II.

In order to gather additional information relevant to Hypotheses I and II, a multiple correlation was computed between the dogmatism criterion and anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy predictors. This procedure revealed a nonsignificant relationship between anxiety and dogmatism (r=.144), but a correlation of .270 (P<.01) was found between dogmatism and self-ideal discrepancy. An additional finding indicated
that anxiety and self-ideal discrepancy were positively related \( (r=.318; P=.01) \). The total \( R \) of \( .277 \) was significant at the \( .05 \) probability level. These results did not lend strong support to Hypothesis I and offered evidence contradictory to Hypothesis II.

A Fisher \( t \) test was computed in order to test the hypothesized difference between the scores of males and females on the **Dogmatism Scale**. A nonsignificant \( t \) value \( (t=-.63) \) did not support Hypothesis III. Contrary to the hypothesis, the males mean score (147.48) was lower than the mean score of the females (150.94).

It was concluded that dogmatism and anxiety were not directly related, but the proposition that the **IPAT Anxiety Scale** may not have measured all facets of anxiety was considered. It was considered that sample differences and recent social changes may have been factors in the more dogmatic subjects' high measured levels of self-ideal discrepancy as compared to a relationship in the opposite direction found in other studies.
APPENDIX I

ATTITUDE SCALE

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of very important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write /1, /2, /3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

/1: I AGREE A LITTLE   -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
/2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE   -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
/3: I AGREE VERY MUCH   -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

14. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

17. If given the chance, I would do something of great benefit to the world.

18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.
22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

30. There are two kinds of people in this world; those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
Inside this booklet you will find forty questions, dealing with difficulties that most people experience at one time or another. It will help a lot in self-understanding if you check Yes, No, etc., to each, frankly and truthfully, to describe any problems you may have.

Start with the two simple examples just below, for practice. As you see, each inquiry is actually put in the form of a sentence. By putting a cross, X, in one of the three boxes on the right you show how it applies to you. Make your marks now.

1. I enjoy walking. ............................................................
   Yes          Occasionally        No

A middle box is provided for when you cannot definitely say Yes or No. But use it as little as possible.

2. I would rather spend an evening:
   (A) talking to people, (B) at a movie ............................................................
   A In between B

About half the items inside end in A and B choices like this. B is always on the right. Remember, use the “In between” or “Uncertain” box only if you cannot possibly decide on A or B.

Now:

1. Make sure you have put your name, and whatever else the examiner asks, in the place at the top of this page.

2. Never pass over an item but give some answer to every single one. Your answers will be entirely confidential.

3. Do not spend time pondering. Answer each immediately, the way you want to at this moment (not last week, or usually). You may have answered questions like this before; but answer them as you feel now.

Most people finish in five minutes; some, in ten. Hand in this form as soon as you are through with it, unless told to do otherwise. As soon as the examiner signals or tells you to, turn the page and begin.

STOP HERE—WAIT FOR SIGNAL
1. I find that my interests, in people and amusements, tend to change fairly rapidly.

2. If people think poorly of me I can still go on quite serenely in my own mind.

3. I like to wait till I am sure that what I am saying is correct, before I put forward an argument.

4. I am inclined to let my actions get swayed by feelings of jealousy.

5. If I had my life to live over again I would: (A) plan very differently, (B) want it the same.

6. I admire my parents in all important matters.

7. I find it hard to "take 'no' for an answer", even when I know what I ask is impossible.

8. I doubt the honesty of people who are more friendly than I would naturally expect them to be.

9. In demanding and enforcing obedience my parents (or guardians) were: (A) always very reasonable, (B) often unreasonable.

10. I need my friends more than they seem to need me.

11. I feel sure that I could "pull myself together" to deal with an emergency.

12. As a child I was afraid of the dark.

13. People sometimes tell me that I show my excitement in voice and manner too obviously.

14. If people take advantage of my friendliness I: (A) soon forget and forgive, (B) resent it and hold it against them.

15. I find myself upset rather than helped by the kind of personal criticism that many people make.

16. Often I get angry with people too quickly.

17. I feel restless as if I want something but do not know what.

18. I sometimes doubt whether people I am talking to are really interested in what I am saying.

19. I have always been free from any vague feelings of ill-health, such as obscure pains, digestive upsets, awareness of heart action, etc.

20. In discussion with some people, I get so annoyed that I can hardly trust myself to speak.

CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE.
21. Through getting tense I use up more energy than most people in getting things done. 

22. I make a point of not being absent-minded or forgetful of details. 

23. However difficult and unpleasant the obstacles, I always stick to my original intentions. 

24. I tend to get over-excited and "rattled" in upsetting situations. 

25. I occasionally have vivid dreams that disturb my sleep. 

26. I always have enough energy when faced with difficulties. 

27. I sometimes feel compelled to count things for no particular purpose. 

28. Most people are a little queer mentally, though they do not like to admit it. 

29. If I make an awkward social mistake I can soon forget it. 

30. I feel grouchy and just do not want to see people: (A) occasionally, (B) rather often. 

31. I am brought almost to tears by having things go wrong. 

32. In the midst of social groups I am nevertheless sometimes overcome by feelings of loneliness and worthlessness. 

33. I wake in the night and, through worry, have some difficulty in sleeping again. 

34. My spirits generally stay high no matter how many troubles I meet. 

35. I sometimes get feelings of guilt or remorse over quite small matters. 

36. My nerves get on edge so that certain sounds, e.g., a screechy hinge, are unbearable and give me the shivers. 

37. If something badly upsets me I generally calm down again quite quickly. 

38. I tend to tremble or perspire when I think of a difficult task ahead. 

39. I usually fall asleep quickly, in a few minutes, when I go to bed. 

40. I sometimes get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests. 

STOP HERE. BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY QUESTION.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A Score (Covert, indir.)</th>
<th>B Score (Overt, manifest, sympt.)</th>
</tr>
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Qualitative Observations:

Diagnostic Summary:
APPENDIX III

SELF INSTRUCTIONS FOR IAV

There is a need for each of us to know more about ourselves, but seldom do we have an opportunity to look at ourselves as we are or as we would like to be. On page three is a list of terms that to a certain degree describe people. Take each term separately and apply it to yourself by completing the following sentence:

I AM A (AN) _______ PERSON.

The first word in the list is academic, so you would substitute this term in the above sentence. It would read--I am an academic person.

Then decide how MUCH OF THE TIME this statement is like you, i.e., is typical or characteristic of you as an individual, and rate yourself on a scale from one to five according to the following key,

1. Seldom, is this like me.
2. Occasionally, this is like me.
3. About half of the time, this is like me.
4. A good deal of the time, this is like me.
5. Most of the time, this is like me.

Select the number beside the phrase that tells how much of the time the statement is like you and insert it in Column I on page 3.

EXAMPLE: Beside the term ACADEMIC, number two is inserted to indicate that--occasionally, I am an academic person.

Now go to Column II. Use one of the statements given below to tell HOW YOU FEEL about yourself as described in Column I.

1. I very much dislike being as I am in this respect.
2. I dislike being as I am in this respect.
3. I neither dislike being as I am nor like being as I am in this respect.
4. I like being as I am in this respect.
5. I like very much being as I am in this respect.
You will select the number beside the statement that tells how you feel about the way you are and insert the number in Column II.

EXAMPLE: In Column II beside the term ACADEMIC, number one is inserted to indicate that I dislike very much being as I am in respect to the term, academic. Note that being as I am always refers to the way you described yourself in Column I.

Finally, go to Column III; using the same term, complete the following sentence:

I WOULD LIKE TO BE A (AN) _________ PERSON.

Then decide HOW MUCH OF THE TIME you would like this trait to be characteristic of you and rate yourself on the following five point scale.

1. Seldom, would I like this to be me.
2. Occasionally, I would like this to be me.
3. About half of the time, I would like this to be me.
4. A good deal of the time, I would like this to be me.
5. Most of the time, I would like this to be me.

You will select the number beside the phrase that tells how much of the time you would like to be this kind of a person and insert the number in Column III.

EXAMPLE: In Column III beside the term ACADEMIC, number five is inserted to indicate that most of the time, I would like to be this kind of person.

Start with the word ACCEPTABLE and fill in Column I, II, and III before going on to the next word. There is no time limit. Be honest with yourself so that your description will be a true measure of how you look at yourself.
APPENDIX III--Continued

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<td>III</td>
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<td>25. meddlesome</td>
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</table>
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