A BURKEIAN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMEAN WAR SPEECHES
OF JOHN BRIGHT

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
North Texas State University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

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Denton, Texas
August, 1974

This study investigates the motives behind the rhetorical strategies of rejection and acceptance used by John Bright in his four Parliamentary speeches opposing the Crimean War. Kenneth Burke's dramatistic pentad was used to evaluate the four speeches.

An examination of the pentad's five elements reveals that Bright had six motives for opposing the war. To achieve his purpose in giving the speeches—to restore peace to England and the world—Bright used the major rhetorical agencies of rejection and acceptance. Bright's act, his selection of agencies, and his purpose were all definitely influenced by the scene in which they occurred.
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In 1853, a dispute between Russia and France arose out of the question over whether the Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox Church would assume full protection of the Holy Places in Palestine. At that time, Palestine was under the dominion of Turkey. When Russia tried to assert the claims of the Greek Orthodox Church, this move was interpreted by both Great Britain and France as a Russian attempt to extend its influence over the Turkish Empire and force its will upon the less powerful Turks. The Turkish refusal to comply with these demands led to the Russian occupation of the Turkian provinces of Moldavia and Walachia. Despite the efforts of Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia to avert a conflict, the Turks declared war on Russia. The brutal manner in which the Russians had put down the Hungarian revolt and their defeat of a Turkish squadron at Sinope, which the British mistakenly felt was a massacre, incited strong anti-Russian feeling throughout the country. This also heightened the strong pro-war feelings already held by the British public. According to the historian Donald Read, the public supported the war for two reasons:

The British public, stirred up by the press, entered the war enthusiastically in the belief that it was necessary, firstly, to punish Russia for her oppression of nationalities like the Hungarians and the Poles and, secondly, to prevent Russia from dismembering
the Turkish Empire and thereby dominating the Eastern Mediterranean to the injury of British trade and also of the route to India. 2

Obsessed with the fever of war, Great Britain, along with France, entered the war on the side of Turkey in March, 1854.

This obsession, however, was not shared by John Bright, a member of the House of Commons and the man whose efforts in behalf of the Anti-Corn Law agitation of the 1840's had gained him national recognition and respect. A devout Quaker with a basically pacifistic nature considered fighting a war for the independence and integrity of Turkey to be "stupid, un-Christian, insane." 3 That two Christian nations like Great Britain and France would ally themselves with a country whose persecution of the Christian religion was notorious in order to wage war against another Christian nation, Russia, caused Bright to make the remark "that we had restored the Pope to his throne and now we were going to fight for Mahomet." 4 Alarmed by what he thought to be the irrationality, arrogance, and brutality that had quickly spread throughout the country Bright felt that his main concern should be to bring the war to a speedy end. In spite of public feeling, then, John Bright took a stand for peace.

Because the conflict in the Crimea was a popular one, any politician who openly opposed Britain's involvement in it was running the risk of losing his popularity with his constituents, and, consequently, his office. Bright fully realized this and yet refused to relinquish or even modify his demands for peace. This stand caused Bright's popularity to decline. In fact, he
was even "burned in effigy by a portion of the population at New Cross Ward." The factors that would cause a man to willingly risk his political future in such a way as this are many and complex.

Not only was Bright a Quaker but he could also be classified as a humanist. For example, his father's cotton mill had been comparatively free of the poor working conditions and atrocities that were so common in 19th century England. Among other things, Bright's father tolerated no mistreatment of the children working for him, had a school set up in the factory for the children, was always generous with his employees in times of hardship, and encouraged the free mingling of his son with the employees. Consequently, Bright grew up with a stronger feeling of identification with the lower classes than most English middle class boys. Perhaps a more important factor, however, was his opposition to the control of the landed aristocracy over the domestic and foreign policies of Great Britain. Bright's feeling about the domestic policy of the landed gentry had already been made clear in his stand on the Corn Law question a decade earlier. His opposition to the foreign policy of the upper class was no less vehement. From Bright's point of view, Britain's foreign policy was a tool of the ruling class used to maintain "expensive military, naval, and colonial establishments, officered by the sons of the landed aristocracy." Instead, non-intervention was the right policy to follow. If Britain were to concentrate upon purifying her outdated institutions at home,
then she could exert "more influence through domestic good example than would ever be attained through direct involvement."  

Despite the overall truth of these three factors, they become superficial when one tries to explain the motives behind the rhetorical strategies of denunciation and conciliation employed by Bright in his Crimean War Speeches. For example, would a true humanist take a malicious delight in each increase in taxation and every business reverse that the war caused? Furthermore, would a man who was truly sympathetic with the problems of his fellow man take a view such as the following analysis of Herman Ausubel:

These economic hardships, he hoped, would serve as excellent devices by which to teach the British Public that neither war nor international meddling was worthwhile. Above all, however, the war disclosed and confirmed Bright's fears of the stern and vengeful God of the Old Testament. He believed that divine punishment was being meted out to the British through the instrument of this stern and evil conflict.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to apply a Burkeian analysis to the four speeches delivered in the House of Commons by John Bright in opposition to the Crimean War in the hope of gaining a better understanding of the motives behind the rhetorical strategies of rejection and acceptance which he used to respond to the specific situations of the conflict.

Speeches to be Analyzed

Because Bright was not consistent in his rhetorical strategies throughout the four Parliamentary speeches, and even
shifted almost inconsistently from one strategy to another in one particular speech, all four Crimean War Speeches will be analyzed. In spite of the complexity of the Burkeian method, this task is not as awesome as it might seem. In the first place, the speeches are comparatively short; the longest being 18 pages. Secondly, because of widespread public hostility, a campaign against the war such as the type waged by the Anti-Corn Law League could not have been mounted. Bright formed no organization, but had to depend solely upon his speeches and public letters, both of which received widespread press publicity. The fact that he gave only a few speeches was probably an advantage in that "if he had spoken more often he might have been less fully reported and less noticed." 9

Bright's first speech was given in the House of Commons on March 31, 1854. In it he argued that the interests of Britain were not involved in the Russian-Turkish conflict and that it was hopeless and foolish to fight for such a hopelessly decadent and declining power as Turkey. In denouncing the idea of the 'balance of power' as both vicious and mad, Bright maintained that "as long as diplomats thought in terms of this balance, peace would be in jeopardy because power was always shifting." 10 He also maintained that Britain should stop trying to assume the role of 'knight-errant of the human race'. All in all, the speech was a scathing attack upon the ministry of Lord Aberdeen.

In his second speech, delivered on December 22, 1854, Bright again attacked the government's war policies. Once again
he asserted the hopelessness of the Turkish cause and pointed out that Russia had been willing to settle with the Turks on terms satisfactory to both Britain and France. After proclaiming the war unnecessary, he made it very clear that "no word of mine had tended to promote the squandering of my country's treasure, or the spilling of one single drop of my country's blood."  

On February 23, 1855, Bright changed his rhetorical strategy to that of reconciling himself to the government. This particular speech, despite its brevity, is the most famous of all Bright's speeches. Its fame rests upon one sentence: "The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings." Trevelyan considered this sentence to be "one of the half-dozen most famous phrases that ever passed the lips of an English orator." The speech was also "outstanding for its moderation." In it, Bright denounced neither the war nor the terms of peace being offered by the British. He did not concentrate on the plight of British troops in the Crimea or the horrors of the siege of Sebastopol. His object was "to urge Lord Palmerston to avoid any petty complication and quibbles that might delay the return of peace."  

This attempt at conciliation having failed, Bright turned once again to attacking the government in a speech delivered before the House of Commons on June 7, 1855. After placing the blame for the war on Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, he condemned them for needlessly prolonging it. Furthermore, he
stated that nothing could be gained in the struggle worth "the human and financial sacrifices that the British people had been called on to make."\textsuperscript{16}

The speeches that have been analyzed are considered to be among the more famous speeches of John Bright. They are included in most collections of Bright's speeches. In that they were all delivered before the House of Commons, they are, of course, included in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates.

Method of Analysis

In this study, the method used for analyzing Bright's four speeches will be the dramatistic pentad of Kenneth Burke. Burke is considered by many to be "the most brilliant and suggestive critic now writing in America."\textsuperscript{17} His trilogy of works, Grammar of Motives, Rhetoric of Motives, and Philosophy of Literary Form, are viewed as milestones in the art and theory of rhetorical criticism. His influence and reputation in this field is "massive."\textsuperscript{18} In utilizing a Burkeian approach to rhetorical criticism, the critic does not merely limit himself to a study of the speech, the speaker, or the occasion. Instead, he must commit himself to the task of "using all there is to use."\textsuperscript{19} In doing so, his criticism will reveal a "systematic view of man and the drama of human relations, and a methodology for its application of great power, beauty, and persuasiveness."\textsuperscript{20}

In the Burkeian scheme of things, man is a symbol-using animal acting out his life with a purpose in view. In order to
attempt to answer and understand situations in which he is placed, man employs stylized symbols or language. These verbal symbols are meaningful acts in response to situations from which motives can be derived.²¹ Because language is used by man to cope with a situation, it also serves the function of being "a symbolic means of urging cooperation in being that by nature respond to symbols."²² This ties in with what Burke feels to be the purpose of rhetoric: the formulation of attitudes or the inducing of actions in human agents through the use of verbal symbols.²³ By applying this point of view in the context of public speaking, then: "A speech is one kind of strategic answer to a situation. It is the answer of a man who speaks and who stylizes and fits his answers to the needs of a speaking situation, of an audience, and of himself."²⁴

Burke also feels that society is a dramatistic process and that man is an actor in this process. If this is the case, then, the rhetorical critic must approach the object of his criticism from a dramatic point of view. According to Burke: "The titular word of our method is dramatism. It invites one to consider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from the analysis of drama, treats language and thought primarily as modes of action."²⁵

Another important term in the realm of Burkean criticism is that of identification. In fact, Burke felt that if there were one key term that best described the new rhetoric, it would be identification.²⁶ Identification is the process of the
speaker's overcoming those things that divide men by providing them with concepts, images, ideas, and attitudes that might cause established rapport between himself and his audience. In order to determine whether or not a speaker was able to achieve this identification with his audience, a critic must have a grasp of the Burkeian concept of properties. Properties may be either physical or intellectual. Some properties may be shared by all people while others may differ from person to person. An example of a physical property shared by all men is the need for food. However, this property may also differ from person to person in that one may be a vegetarian while another may be a meat-eater. Intellectual properties may include such things as education, socio-economic status, and citizenship. Whereas physical properties represent the animal nature of man, intellectual properties represent man's rational or symbolizing capacity. For example, while a great body of people consider themselves to be United States citizens, they may also classify themselves in such diverse categories as southern, Texan, democrat, etc.

In attempting to achieve identification with his audience, then, the speaker psychologically analyzes the audience by playing upon the physical and intellectual properties the group may have in common with one another. By appealing to such things as the audience's values, political beliefs, etc., and causing them to identify with his own interests and needs, the speaker is fulfilling the purpose of rhetoric in that he is forming
attitudes and inducing actions through the use of verbal symbols.

Another Burkeian term that the critic must have an understanding of is consubstantiality in that identification is the process by which a speaker attempts to achieve consubstantiality, the state of being united in one common substance. In other words, only when men overcome those things that divide them are they able to become substantially one. Consubstantiality occurs when the speaker unites his substance of audience. Substance is the philosophical foundation or contextual reference of the speech. It is the source of the subject matter for the speech, of the motives and attitudes of the speaker. In short, it is the frame of reference of the speaker himself. Every experience in the speaker's life, in one way or another, shaped and molded the speaker as a person and caused him to react to the situation in the way he did. Substance is man's nature; language is his "second nature."

The Dramatistic Pentad

The methodology of Burke's rhetorical criticism is known as the dramatistic pentad. In her article "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism," L. Virginia Holland outlines its five parts:

The strategy of the pentad considers man's actions from all of the perspectives which anything can have—from five interrelated motivational or causal points of view. The pentad considers the act (that is, it names what took place in thought or deed), the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which
it occurred), the agent (the actor, or kind of person who performed the act), the agency (what means or instruments he used), and the purpose (motive or cause which lay behind a given act).  

Act

According to Burke: "Any verbal act is to be considered symbolic action. Words are symbolic of something, representative of a social trend." The Act, then, is what took place in thought or deed. In a public speaking situation, the Act will most likely be the speech itself. In this study, John Bright's four speeches on the Crimean War constitute the Act.

Scene

The classical counterpart of the Scene would be the occasion in which the speech was given. However, to merely state that a speech occurred in a particular location at a certain time could not be considered to be an adequate treatment of the Scene. The Scene includes not only the occasion, but also such things as what had happened to the speaker, the audience, and the events that caused the speech to be given. First, the situation and the factors that led to the Crimean conflict will be discussed. Secondly, the factors that led to Great Britain's involvement in it will be taken up. Under this such things as public sentiment and the view of the press will be examined. Also, an examination of the British government's feelings will be necessary. Thirdly, John Bright's personal situation will be
looked at. Finally, the day of each speech and its contextual reference will be dealt with.

**Agent**

The Agent is, of course, the speaker himself. An examination of the Agent should attempt to ascertain such things as the type of person he was and the factors that caused him to act as he did. An extensive analysis of Bright's life has been conducted in an effort to answer these and other pertinent questions.

**Agency**

The term Agency refers to all the means used by the speaker to accomplish his purpose. In a rhetorical analysis, the critic should place his main emphasis on the task of determining what the speaker's agencies were.

Another term closely related to agency is strategy. A strategy is "a plan of attack, a way of meeting a problem or situation." It is the pattern or plan the speaker follows in trying to achieve his ends. Man develops strategies to explain situations he may encounter and indicates his strategies for dealing with these situations through his use of language. As verbal symbols are meaningful acts in response to situations from which motives can be derived, a critic should be able to discover a speaker's rhetorical strategies by a careful study of the language he employed in the speech. Furthermore, "an attitude initiates the strategy." In her article, "Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Method," Holland states: "A speaker may
approach an audience with an attitude of righteous indignation over a problem that he feels is going to be solved in the wrong way. In order to get his own remedy accepted by them he may decide that the best method or strategy to use in his particular case is invective. The name of a strategy is determined by the type of language a speaker uses.

**Purpose**

The Purpose is the motive or cause behind the act. Speeches are not delivered in vacuums for no reason at all. They are usually given for a specific purpose. In order to determine what a speaker's purpose was in a given speech, the critic tries to answer such things as what the speech was designed to do and why it was given.

**Ratios**

A mere definition and description of the five component parts of the pentad would be an incomplete Burkeian analysis. Interrelationships exist between the five parts of the pentad and these interrelationships are known as ratios. For example, a scene-act ratio indicates that the nature of the act was implicit or present in the nature of the scene. An act-scene ratio indicates that the act had a bearing upon the scene. From the elements in the pentad, the following ratios are possible:

1) Scene-act
2) Scene-agent
3) Agent-purpose
4) Agent-agency
5) Act-purpose
During the course of this study, it was discovered that there are five relevant ratios. These were the act-agent, scene-act, purpose-scene, agency-scene, and agent-agency. The five ratios were dealt with in Chapter III and Chapter IV.

The Burkeian Approach and the Rhetorical Critic

Kenneth Burke's view that "the function or ultimate end of the rhetorical critic is to promote social cohesion and to perfect society" is a traditional one. Furthermore, his method of rhetorical criticism deals with the traditional questions or "what was said, why it was said as it was, and how it was said." His view, however, broadens the scope of the traditional approach because he contends that the aim of criticism is to use all that there is to use.

Hence Burke believes that the substance of ideal criticism is something more than historical, biographical, sociological, or psychological criticism. This something more, from Burke's point of view, is the "whatness" that emerges from a consideration of the overlap and interrelationship of all these approaches.

What are the advantages, then, in taking a Burkeian approach to rhetorical criticism? First, the use of the dramatistic pentad would serve to remind the critic of "all the factors present in any speech situation." It would prevent him from spending too much time on any one element. Secondly, there is
"dynamic stress upon the speech as the 'action' of an actor in a scene." In other words, the critic would be able to see more clearly the speech in the context of its entire setting. Thirdly, the utilization of Burke's strategy concept is one way of "descriptively and dynamically classifying speeches." Without doing away with the informative, persuasive, or entertaining classifications, the strategy concept could furnish a system for classifying the kinds of informative, persuasive, or entertaining speeches. Furthermore, the strategy concept could provide a "descriptive method for classifying the kinds of speakers." For example, judging from his rhetorical strategy of 1854, John Bright could be classified as a denouncer.

Finally, there is the possibility that the strategy concept might suggest a method of analysis which would give greater insights into the sociological and psychological factors that influence speakers, and into sociology and psychology per se. We might determine the answer to this question, or to questions like this: in what kind of a situation does a speaker more often use the master strategy of crusading or of exploitation?

Although the Burkeian approach to rhetorical criticism does not answer all the problems, its advantages cannot be ignored.

Finally, Bernard L. Brock, rhetorical critic, lists some specific ways that a critic can use Burke's dramatistic rhetoric in establishing norms or principles for judgment:

1) Each of the Burkeian rhetorical concepts can be used to discover stylistic characteristics of a given speech or speaker.

2) The critic can observe the conditions under which various strategies are employed, thereby inductively constructing a theory about their use.
3) He can identify correlations in the various strategies to learn more about man's basic rhetorical tendencies and patterns. The relationship between substance and other strategies could be especially interesting.

4) He should also discover the circumstances in which incompatible strategies are used—for example, when two terms from the pentad receive equal stress so that no discernible substance evolves.41

Summary of Design

Chapter I includes a statement of purpose, an introduction to the Burkeian method of rhetorical criticism, a survey of the speeches selected, and a justification for the selection of the method of criticism. Chapter II includes an analysis of the Scene in which the four speeches were delivered. Chapter III examines John Bright the Agent, his Act, and the relevant Ratios. Chapter IV analyzes the Agencies and Purpose of the speeches and the relevant Ratios. Chapter V contains conclusions.
In 1852, the Hungarian Magyars revolted against their Austrian rulers. Their leader, Louis Kossuth, travelled to Great Britain in order to gain support for the cause. Although Britain would not commit herself to open military support of the Magyars, feeling in favor of European nationality ran high among the British public. When the Russians supported Austria in its successful suppression of the revolt, the British public was incensed. After Turkey had declared war on Russia, the Turks began to attack the Russian Forces in Moldavia and Walachia. The Russians retaliated by destroying a Turkish fleet harbored at Sinope. In the eyes of the British, this was a massacre.

2 Donald Read, Cobden and Bright (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1967), p. 121.
6 Read, p. 200.
7 Read, p. 111.
8 Ausubel, p. 66.
9 Read, p. 123.
10 Ausubel, p. 69.
12 Rogers, p. 250.
14 Ausubel, p. 73.
15 Ausubel, p. 73.
16 Ausubel, p. 75.
18 William Howe Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drums of Human Relations. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 3.
19 Rueckert, p. 43.
20 Rueckert, p. 5.
23 Brock, in Scott and Brock, pp. 315-316.
26 Holland, pp. 300-305.
27 Brock, in Scott and Brock, p. 325.
28 Holland, p. 353.
31 Holland, p. 445.
32 Holland, p. 445.
33 Holland, p. 352
34 Holland, p. 352.
35 Holland, p. 353.
36 Holland, p. 355.
37 Holland, p. 355.
38 Holland, p. 357.
39 Holland, p. 357.
40 Holland, p. 357.
41 Brock, in Scott and Brock, p. 327.
CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF THE SCENE

According to Burke, the scene is both the background out of which the act or speech grows and the circumstances in which it occurred. He stated that "the scene should be a fit container for the act."¹ John Bright's four Parliamentary speeches which constituted his act of opposition were shaped and molded by the events in nineteenth century Europe and England which led to the Crimean War, the scene out of which the speeches grew.

The scenic influences that affected John Bright were ambiguous and complex. The larger circumstances of the scene, the movement in Europe towards war must be considered first as the larger circumstances of the scene. The movement was a result of religious conflict and the desire of two European rulers to increase the holdings of their respective Empires.

The events that occurred in England itself must be considered as the next scenic circumference. The English had enjoyed approximately forty years of peace. The economic crises of the 1840's were behind them, and they had just entered a period of prosperity. They yearned for the days of military glory that the Duke of Wellington had given them. Furthermore, the government was concerned with maintaining the balance of power that existed in Europe as well as keeping open the eastern Mediterranean as a trade route to the far east.
Finally, in narrowing the scenic circumference even further, the circumstances surrounding each speech must be examined. Such things as the mismanagement of the war, the suffering of the soldiers, the effects of the war upon the economy of Britain, the Government's handling of the peace negotiations, and the changes that occurred in Parliament all exerted an influence upon Bright's speeches.

The Scenic Circumference in Europe

According to historian Peter Gibbs: "The chain of events which by 1854 had induced Britain and France to embark, with no small degree of enthusiasm, on a full-scale war with Russia had started with a dispute between a handful of monks in Jerusalem about the keys to certain doors of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre." Three keys were involved: The key of the main church door and one for each of the two doors leading to the Sacred Manger. When the dispute came to a head, the monks of the Greek Orthodox Church were enjoying access to the Church.

Rivalry between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church over the rights in the Holy Places had been going on for centuries. Furthermore, the porter who sat at the main doorway of the Church was an 'infidel', a Mohammedan. The Catholics accused him of showing an "unworthy favoritism by restraining Christians of their denomination from entering the Church except at certain hours, and allowing the Greeks right of access at any time of the day." This was one reason why the Catholics wanted a key for themselves.
This porter was appointed by the Governor of Jerusalem, a loyal pasha of the Sultan of Turkey. Palestine had been part of the Ottoman Empire since 1516 and the Turkish sultans "had embraced so much of the old Empire of Greece that they ever numbered among their subjects many Christians of the Greek Church." By the middle of the nineteenth century, the time of the trouble over the keys, there were approximately fifteen million Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire.

The number of Roman Catholics in Palestine was practically negligible, but a stream of Pilgrims from both Churches to the Holy Places provided Turkey with a source of income that the country would have been foolish to discourage. In 1740, the Government of Louis XIV entered into an agreement with the Sultan that, in effect, guaranteed that Catholic pilgrims to the Holy Places, whether they were French or not, would enjoy the protection of the French flag while in Palestine. What this amounted to was a capitulation on the part of Turkey. The Turks saw nothing wrong in the arrangement. They did not feel that the French might be acting in an overbearing manner toward them. In their view, "the privilege of Turkish citizenship [or protection] was much too good to be extended to foreigners." Because of the internal upheavals that had plagued France for almost half a century, the French had not concerned themselves with Holy Places since the 1740 agreement. France had suffered through the Revolution of 1789, the rise and fall of Napoleon, the restoration of the monarchy, and the Second Republic. By
1854, the Second Empire had arisen with Prince Louis Napoleon at its head.

Napoleon had attained his imperial position by unscrupulous means. He needed to consolidate his position. According to Gibbs:

The people of France, having acquired a new Emperor a little unexpectedly, now needed an Empire, and their notion of empire had been prescribed for them by their first Emperor on an ambitious plane. The prescription required a successful war. So Louis Napoleon set about kindling one, and as a first spark in the conflagration that in the end was to involve Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, he fanned the almost extinguished embers of dissension between the Greek and Latin monks in Jerusalem. He knew that, remote as the Holy Places were, any interference there would annoy Russia, and there was nothing that would make him more acceptable to his at present unconvinced subjects than if he were to stage a revenge for 1812.

Consequently, Napoleon instructed his ambassador at Constantinople to present a formal demand to the Turkish Government to restore all the rights of the Catholics in the Holy Places. The Turks were also requested to hand over duplicates of the three keys that were causing all the trouble and to instruct their porter at the church to stop discriminating against Catholics. The Turkish authorities at Constantinople were, quite frankly, uncertain of what the trouble was all about. They suggested appointing a commission of inquiry. The French agreed to this with the stipulation that no documents dated after the 1740 agreement would be admissible as evidence to the commissioners.

Napoleon had been right. The action of the French did irritate the Czar of Russia, Nicholas the First. The Emperor of
all the Russians was also the champion of the Greek Orthodox Church. The rights of this Church had been upheld many times in past years by the might of the Russian armies. In 1742, two years after the 1740 agreement made with France, the Russians and the Turks had signed the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji which gave the Russians the right of protection over all Greek Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. According to the French, however, the 1854 Turkish commission of inquiry investigating the Holy Places was to disregard this agreement because it had been drawn up after 1740.

A succession of notes from the French and Russian governments were sent to Constantinople. One government demanded a supply of keys. The other protested that these should not be handed over. The insistency of the French demands and Turkey's age-old antagonism to Russia resulted in Turkish acquiescence to the French demands. The Turks announced their decision in a formal note to the two powers. The Russian government was understandably upset:

The note drew a heated remonstrance from the Tsar, whose Christian principles balked at any toleration of a sister Church. The Sultan, who was having trouble with his army organization and could not afford at the time to disregard Russian remonstrances altogether, hurriedly drew up a proclamation, known as a 'firman', ratifying the old exclusive privileges of the Greeks and thereby virtually revoking his acknowledgment of their claims which he had so recently given to the Latins. When it came round inevitably to the French turn to remonstrate, the Turks got over this new difficulty in truly Oriental fashion by promising not to read the firman in Jerusalem, so that in effect the people whose privileges it feigned to ratify need know nothing about it.
However, the Turks were impartial enough to make a concurrent promise to the Russians not to give any keys to the Latins. In the Sultan's view the wishes of both sides had been acceded to, so everybody ought to be satisfied. 8

Despite their efforts, the Turkish Government's attempts at compromise failed miserably. As it stood, the issue was as ambiguous as ever, no demands had been acceded to, and no one was satisfied.

According to historian Harold Temperley, Nicholas the First seemed to feel that "the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji gave him much more of a religious control in Turkey than Russia actually exercised." 9 Moved presumably by the highest motives of Christianity, Nicholas sent two armies to the border of the Turkish principalities of Walachia and Moldavia and a special envoy, Prince Menshikov, to Constantinople with instructions to adopt a bullying attitude toward the Turkish Government. Menshikov held the Turks in even greater contempt than he held the French. Nicholas felt sure that he could rely on him to "brow beat the Sublime Porte into a sensible acquiescence of Russian demands to keep the Latins out of the Holy Places." 10 He was also instructed to demand of Turkey a more effective protectorate by Russia of all the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire.

Menshikov arrived in Constantinople with an entourage calculated to demonstrate to the Turks the gravity of Russian feelings. His staff included the commander-in-chief of the Russian fleet and the chief-of-staff of the Russian army. Menshikov and his party arrived in two Russian men-of-war.
At this time, the British ambassador to Constantinople, Stratford-de Redcliffe, was on leave in London. He was acknowledged to be the prime authority in England on Turkish affairs. He had been ambassador to Turkey since 1824. When, in 1833, the armies of both Russia and Egypt had threatened Constantinople, de Redcliffe had been instrumental in causing the British government to issue a threat of British intervention if the aggression did not cease. A few months later, the Prime Minister at the time, Lord Grey, chose de Redcliffe as ambassador to the court of the Czar at St. Petersburg. Nicholas, however, refused to have him because of his actions on behalf of Turkey. According to Gibbs: "The refusal was probably one of the contributory causes of the Crimean War twenty years later . . . As it was, the two men (de Redcliffe and Nicholas) glared at each other across Europe in mutual antagonism for nearly a quarter of a century—antagonism that had much to do with the uncompromising stand taken in 1853 by both Menshikov, at the Tsar's prompting, and the newly-created Viscount de Redcliffe." 11

Furthermore, in 1840, the British had entered into an agreement with Russia that no warships would pass through the straits of the Dardanelles in times of peace. In other words, Russian warships could not enter the Mediterranean and British warships could not enter the Black Sea. However, Russian demands made by Menshikov for a more effective protectorate in Turkey would give the Russians the right to send warships and troops to any portion of the Ottoman Empire at any time Russia deemed it
necessary to protect the rights of Orthodox Christians. This Russian demand was based upon the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. The British, though, felt that the more recent 1840 agreement should take priority. Consequently, de Redcliffe was sent back to Constantinople with instructions from the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, to urge the Turkish Government to reject the Russian demand for a more effective protectorate.

In a dispatch, Clarendon instructed de Redcliffe to express to the governments of France, Russia, and Turkey the position of the British Government regarding the dispute. Above all, de Redcliffe was to let it be known that it was the purpose of the British Government to preserve "the independence and integrity of Turkey." Clarendon stated that the purpose of de Redcliffe's mission was to "counsel prudence to the Porte, and forbearance to those Powers who are urging her compliance with their demands. You are instructed to use every effort to ward off a Turkish war and to persuade the Powers interested to look to an amicable termination of existing disputes."

Clarendon made clear to de Redcliffe the difficulty of the Turkish position:

However indifferent to their respective merits, the Porte is now unavoidably exposed to the rival pretensions of Russia and France, each animated by a political interest, as well as by religious zeal, and both appealing to engagements alleged to have been contracted towards each of them by the Porte. Threatened from both sides, and unable to satisfy one party without displeasing the other, the Sultan is placed in a position of embarrassment and danger, rendered more critical by the internal weakness of the Empire and the special character of the points at issue.
England did have the advantage of "having no special interest in
the pending questions, and of being viewed by the Porte with
less mistrust and stronger hopes of eventual assistance than any
other Power in Christendom."\textsuperscript{15}

Clarendon ended the dispatch with the following order: "It
remains only for me to say that in the event, which Her Majesty's
Government earnestly hope may not arise, of imminent danger to
the existence of the Turkish Government, Your Excellency will in
such case dispatch a Messenger at once to Malta, requesting the
Admiral to hold himself in readiness, but yet will not direct Him
to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from
Her Majesty's Government."\textsuperscript{16}

By the time that de Redcliffe arrived from England, Menshikov
had impressed his demands on the Porte to the stage of insistence.
The Turks were much relieved when de Redcliffe arrived. The
Turks had much confidence in de Redcliffe, and viewed him as a
"stern father who might perhaps have their happiness at heart but
was never one to be ready to romp with them."\textsuperscript{17} At his prompting,
the Turks informed Menshikov that there was no reason that the
Russians should not have what they wanted with regard to the Holy
Places. However, the Russian demand for a more effective protec-
torate was refused because of the British fear that, if Russian
warships were allowed into the Mediterranean, their trade route
to the far east would be threatened.

Menshikov had failed to bully the Turkish government into
submission. As a result, the Russian government broke off
diplomatic relations with Turkey. Europe had moved one step closer toward war.

Because of his actions at Constantinople, British critics of the war claimed that de Redcliffe had encouraged the Turks to make war on Russia. This allegation was partly true and partly false. Stratford de Redcliffe was merely following the instructions of his Government when he urged the Turks to reject the Russian demand for a more effective protectorate as outlined in the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. In doing so, however, he gave the Turks the impression that they would have full British support in whatever course of action they chose to take.

Because of the conflicting treaties she had entered into with three major European powers, Turkey found herself in the position of being unable to satisfy the demands of all three. She had tried to do this since 1852 and failed. By 1854, she was tired of trying. By this time, however, she felt that she had the support of the strongest of those powers. This bolstered her national self-confidence and set off a wave of nationalism throughout the country. In other words, she was tired of being bullied and was ready to fight.

Nicholas was outraged by the Turkish rejection of his demands and decided that the time had come for positive action. He ordered the Russian armies to invade the Turkish principalities of Walachia and Moldavia located in what is now Rumania. In attempting to justify the move, Nicholas sent a letter to the European powers. In it he explained that he intended to press his demands on Turkey by force but without war.
His occupation of the principalities, he declared was mere security for the Sultan's compliance with his wishes. In a manifesto to the Orthodox Church he said, "We have no intention to commence war. But if blindness and obstinacy decide for the contrary, then we shall call God to our aid, leave the decision of the struggle to Him, and march forward for the Church". Surely nobody could twist such words into a declaration of war; so it was left to Turkey to remedy the omission and make the declaration herself.\(^1^8\)

Nicholas was not a smart man and the Turkish declaration of war came as a shock to him. He thought that this blatant show of power would frighten the Turks into submission. He was unaware of the current nationalistic mood that had gripped the Turkish government and nation. According to Temperley: "What he did not understand was that the Turks, having yielded twice to Napoleon in 1852 and once to Austria in 1853, could not yield to Russia or anyone else a fourth time."\(^1^9\)

After a time, the idea of war began to appeal to Nicholas. He was a fervent admirer of the Duke of Wellington and patterned his personal behavior after him. He thought of himself as a military man. He made frequent and painstaking inspections of his troops. As has been mentioned, though, he had a remarkably poor intellect. He had a room in his palace filled with toy soldiers. He never tired of moving them across the floor in intricate battle formations. This childish pastime constituted the depth of his knowledge of military strategy and tactics.

He was now engaged in a war against a less powerful country. He had great expectations of winning victory after victory for his country and his Church. As for outside intervention, he felt that his armies could defeat the armies of the new French Emperor.
Furthermore, he believed that the British were so involved in commerce that they would never agree to go to war. It was a belief that was supported by the actions of the British. The British Prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, had made many declarations about his personal aversion to war. Also, the British had been instrumental in gathering the leaders of the western European powers in Vienna to try and avert a possible war.

The Vienna conference began after the Russians had occupied the Turkish principalities but before the Turks had declared war. The British, French, and Russian representatives drew up what was called the 'Vienna Note'. However, according to Temperley: "The transaction relating to the 'Vienna Note' was undertaken by men who did not understand the Turkish temper, or that religious feeling and Turkish nationalism had really been aroused." As it turned out, the Note was a farce. Gibbs describes it in the following manner: "The Note was neither fish nor fowl, and when Turkey received it she blandly agreed to its terms on condition that certain amendments were made which she well knew Russia could be relied on to reject. Russia obliged by rejecting them; and so on October 23rd, 1853, convinced as he was of western European support, the Sultan declared that a state of war existed." Russia then responded with her own declaration of war.

The excitement in Constantinople nearly touched off a Muslim rising against the Christians there. The British Government sent its fleet to the Dardanelles for the purpose of helping the Sultan maintain order. According to Temperley: "The sending of the
fleet to Constantinople was decided in December by Clarendon and Aberdeen in deference to public opinion. They acted from different motives, and Aberdeen certainly did not expect that the result would be war." In a letter, Clarendon attempted to justify the Government's actions: "Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire to see the relations between Russia and the Porte reestablished on a friendly and permanent footing; and they consequently can be no party to an arrangement which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has shown would frustrate the object which they have at heart." The French fleet followed the British fleet with great speed.

Despite such shows of outward hostility, the British and French were still not officially at war with Russia. The reason for this was the reluctance on the part of the British to join in an alliance with France. According to Cecil Woodham-Smith: "The British detested Napoleon III, who had just seized the throne by means of a bloody coup d'etat. They were horrified by the spectacle of the French nation once more intoxicated with imperialism and joyfully submitting to a despot. Only a menace to their sea power could have induced them to enter into an alliance with France." In November, 1853, an event occurred which soon changed that.

A Turkish naval squadron consisting of six frigates (two corvettes and a sloop, all sailing vessels, and two steamers whose main job was to tow the sailing vessels in calm weather), sailed into the harbor of Sinope, a little town on the Turkish coast of Asia Minor. No sooner had the squadron anchored when
the Russian fleet (consisting of five line of battle ships, two frigates, and three steamers), from Sebastopol appeared at the entrance of the harbor. With its heavier and superior armament, the Russians destroyed the Turkish squadron except for one steamer. Nearly three thousand Turkish sailors died.

From the moment the news spread across western Europe, the people of Britain, as well as of France, were convinced of the righteousness of embarking on war with Russia. The British public "regarded Turkey as a lamb and Nicholas as a brutal and ravening wolf." Woodham-Smith wrote, "The people were intoxicated. Memories of past victories went to their heads, the names of Waterloo and Trafalgar were on every lip, crowds paraded the streets delirious with excitement, inflated with national pride." Although Aberdeen was against war, he had no choice.

On March 27, 1854, the Queen's message of war was read in the House of Commons. The next day war was declared.

The Scenic Circumference in England

The mood of the British people was one of being ripe for a war. They felt that war with Russia could be justified on political, moral, and Christian grounds.

Following the Napoleonic Wars, England had enjoyed forty years of peace. During that time, her whole social life had changed. England had changed from an agricultural nation into an industrial one. The industrial revolution had created new towns and had transformed most of the old towns into unsightly manufacturing centers. More than half the people lived in the towns
and cities. The revolution had also divided the country "as she had never been divided before, into classes of rich and poor living not only on different economic levels but in physical segregation as complete and rigid as any colour bar." A new class had emerged, the upper middle class, and was coming into power.

Politically, decision-making powers were being transferred, slowly but surely, from the aristocracy to the middle and lower classes of the nation. The change was not as noticeable in the rural areas. There, the aristocrats were still powerful. Squires were still the magistrates. Gentlemen Justices of the Peace still exercised considerable authority. In the towns, however, "shopkeepers were taking over from noblemen, as mayors and councillors gravely took up their new civic responsibilities; and the struggle for parliamentary reform was at its height." Although aristocratic privilege was to flourish for many years, it was beginning to lose its exclusiveness.

In her book, A Liberal State at War, Olive Anderson states that the English people of the mid-nineteenth century were a "very historically minded generation." They were hungry for the military glory that England had enjoyed under the Duke of Wellington during the Napoleonic Wars. Also, according to Anderson: "In the years immediately before the outbreak of the Crimean War Sir William Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula and Wellington's Despatches were among the leading best-sellers."

It was a technologically minded generation as well. In technological progress, the English felt that their country led
the world and that of all the great powers Russia lagged the farthest behind. The Crimean War was seen as an opportunity for English technology to prove itself. A war might be bloody, but it would be rapid and decisive. Anderson states, "The electric telegraph, railways, shell-firing guns, rifled and breech-loading gun barrels, unnumerable inventions ranging from daguerrotype pictures and gutta-percha bivouacs to that most significant development of all in English eyes, the screw-propeller steamship, convinced them that a new and impressive chapter in the history of warfare was about to be written." This was the hope of the English people and it was shared by almost the entire business world.

Politically, radicals and their radical sympathizers were convinced that Europe was on the brink of a tremendous and epoch-making struggle which would mark the end of despotism as a form of government. This feeling had been stimulated by the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-9. At this time, the Hungarian Magyars had revolted against their Austrian rulers. Their leader, Louis Kossuth, had travelled to England in order to gain support for the cause of Hungarian independence. Historian Asa Briggs describes these European sentiments that were transmitted to the English people in the following passage:

There was a strong ideological element in the opposition to Russia in 1854. Hungarian, Polish, and Italian exiles were seeking an international war of liberation; to them Russia was the great enemy, the tyrannical force which had crushed the revolutions of 1848. As early as 1851 Kossuth, the Hungarian nationalist, had written to an English friend, "there
is something in my mind which tells me we are on the dawn of great events and must everywhere meet them in the best manner we can. We must crush Russia, my dear Sir! We must, and headed by you we will". Marx and Engels were equally eloquent: "it would seem whoever may have had any conservative leanings in Europe must lose them when he looks at this everlasting Eastern Question. In this instance the interests of the revolutionary democracy and England go hand in hand". Hand in hand too with the interests of old, unreformed Turkey. "What now glitters in the desperate grasp of Turkey", wrote Victor Hugo, "is not the old bent scimitar of Othman, but the brilliant lightening of revolution".

Although the British government would not commit itself to open military support of the Magyars, feelings in favor of European independence and nationality ran high among the British populace. When the Russians supported the Austrians in their successful suppression of the revolt, the British people were incensed. Feeling as they did, the British welcomed a war with Russia. According to Briggs, however, they were not interested in a war for the balance of power or in a small war in the Crimea. Instead, they wanted a war of ideas and a war of liberation. They "dreamed of large-scale operations on the Finnish Coast, then held by the Russians, of marches deep into the Ukraine, of open declarations on behalf of Polish and Hungarian freedom." Immediately preceding the Crimean War, the argument that since Russian military power had been responsible for the course of events in 1848-9, the absorption of the Russian army into a war of its own would "allow the 'Revolution' to continue whereas it had been obliged to stop a half a dozen years before," was stated by many. According to Anderson:
Middle-class liberals warmed to the theme of England's renewed leadership in an age-old struggle for constitutional liberty, in which Tsar Nicholas I embodied the ancient enemy of despotism, as Napoleon I had done earlier. Indeed of all the many conceptions of what the war was to be about, this notion that it was to be one of a constitutional system of government against the despotic principle was perhaps the most widely accepted by the general public... Moreover this view accorded particularly well with the type of Russophobia which had developed in England a generation earlier.35

Thus, the war was to prove the superiority of British constitutional democracy over Russian despotism.

A fourth factor which influenced the warlike mood of the British public was the "popularity of certain eschatological interpretations among so many devout evangelicals and nonconformists of the day."36 In her article "Church Reactions and Dissent Towards the Crimean War", Anderson describes two such beliefs:

There were two predominant views of the spiritual significance of the war: that to fight was a high duty to which God called the nation and, on the other hand, that the war was a divine punishment for the nation's sins. Before and immediately after the outbreak of war the first view was more often preached, but during the difficult months in the middle of the war it was quite often replaced by or combined with the second. A third interpretation, that the war was a merely human act overruled by God for his own purposes, was never so widely urged.37

Anderson went on to state that it was untrue that the English clergy demonstrated a lack of abhorrence of war as such. Very many preachers stressed the evils of war and the suffering it entailed even before the sobering battles of the Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman were fought. However, they supported the war because it fulfilled each of the requirements of the scholastic
concept of a just war. These two requirements, according to Anderson, were that "hostilities should be undertaken only as a last resort and only in defense of the moral order." The first requirement seemed to be fully met by the prolonged diplomatic negotiations which preceded the final declaration of war in March, 1854. It was more difficult to convince the earnest Christians that the war was in defense of the moral order. This difficulty was overcome, however, when "the moral order was equated with the rule of international law, and the defense of international law was shown to be the real issue at stake . . . not Turkey's survival nor religious, constitutional, or national issues of any kind."

Furthermore, many Christians were then concerned with the interpretation of Biblical prophecy about the end of the world. They regarded the trouble in the near east from the special point of view of the return of the Jews to their national home in the last days. Anderson describes two such interpretations that were popular at that time:

One of the most popular preachers in London, Dr. John Cumming of the National Scottish Church in Crown Court, Covent Garden, repeatedly declared (as did many others) that the "last vial" of the Apocalypse was to be poured out between 1848 and 1865, that the fall of Turkey was symbolized in the prophesied "drying up of the Euphrates" and would prepare the way for the return of the Jews to Palestine, and that only after this would Russia, Ezekiel's great power "out of the Northern Parts", be destroyed. Another, less popular, interpreter thought differently—for him, not only was the mission of the Russians to bring about the fall of the Turkish Empire, but in the course of the coming struggle Britain would be invaded and defeated, in order to usher in "the reign of
liberty in the New World'. Armageddon was to be fought in Britain.\(^{40}\)

However much the interpreters differed in prophecies, they were all united in the common theme that the last days were coming and that it was Britain's divine mission to act out her part in whatever came to pass.

Upon entering the war, the British people possessed supreme self-confidence in themselves, their technology, their form of government, and their mission. It made no difference which view a person held. He could yearn for a recreation of the military glories of the past. He could hope that the triumph of British technology over the Russian army would eventually fatten his purse. He could idealize the coming conflict in terms of democracy versus despotism. He could sermonize about the role of England in God's divine plan and piously declare that the conflict was necessary because it was a just war. These four views, combined with the British government's fear of Russian warships in the Mediterranean obstructing the British trade routes to the Far East, made the Crimean War extremely popular with and anticipated by the British people.

The Immediate Scenic Circumference

Immediately preceding each of Bright's four Parliamentary speeches, various scenic elements which pertained to the war and Bright occurred which, in one way or another, eventually influenced each speech.
March 31, 1854

During the autumn of 1853 and the winter of 1854, the English people were clamoring for war with Russia. On November 1, 1853, Russia declared war on Turkey and shortly afterwards destroyed the Turkish naval squadron at Sinope. In February, 1854, a treaty of alliance was entered into between England, France, and Turkey. On March 11, 1854, the Baltic Fleet sailed for Constantinople under Sir Charles Napier.

Before the Admiral left London, he was entertained at a banquet at the Reform Club. In responding to a toast to his health, Napier said, "I suppose we are very nearly at war, and probably, when I get to the Baltic, I'll have an opportunity of declaring war." In reply to these remarks, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham, said, "My gallant friend says that when he goes into the Baltic he will declare war: I, as First Lord of the Admiralty, give him my free consent to do so."

The light, arrogant tone in which these statements were made infuriated Bright. He brought the matter before the House of Commons on March 13 and asked whether "the language which the right honorable baronet had used, and the tone he had adopted, had the sanction of the Cabinet, or the authority of his Sovereign." In responding, Lord Palmerston referred to Bright as "the honorable and reverend gentleman," and was called to order by Richard Cobden. Palmerston completely lost his composure and stated further, "I deem it right to inform the honorable gentleman (Bright) that any opinion he may entertain either of me
personally, or of my conduct, private or political, is to me a matter of the most perfect indifference." In spite of this, Bright's attacks on Palmerston continued.

Towards the end of March, a Royal Message to Parliament formally announced that England had come to an open rupture with Russia, and that war was to actively commence. The message announcing the declaration of hostilities was discussed in both Houses on March 31st. In the House of Commons, Lord John Russell moved the address to Her Majesty. In the debate that followed, Bright delivered his first speech on the war.

December 22, 1854

Before Bright delivered his next speech on December 22, 1854, the battles of the Alma and Balaclava had been fought. In October, Bright received an invitation from Absalon Watkin to attend a meeting of the Manchester Patriotic Fund. Watkin stated in his communication that in his opinion the war was justified by the authority of Vattel. Bright replied to this invitation in a letter on October 29 in which he declined to attend the meeting and very eloquently refuted the arguments of Vattel.

According to Smith, "this letter caused quite a ferment of indignation amongst the war party, which was further enhanced when it was published in the St. Petersburg Journal, and all the leading continental newspapers." Bright's opponents did not concern themselves with attempting to answer Bright's arguments. War had come and it was "deemed patriotic to support a war policy."
In December, the Mayor of Manchester called a public meeting in the Town Hall, in order that the citizens might have an opportunity of discussing this letter with Bright himself. Public feeling was so strongly against him, however, that he was unable to speak to the unruly crowd from the platform. Later, his constituents in the New Cross Ward section demonstrated their feelings by burning Bright in effigy.

On December 12, 1854, Parliament again assembled and was opened by the Queen in person. War debates began immediately, and Ministers were severely attacked for mismanagement in the administrative departments. In the Crimea, "incapacity and stupidity reigned in the camp before Sebastopol, in the harbours of Balaklava, and in the hospitals of Scutari." 49

In order to provide for emergencies, the Duke of Newcastle introduced the Foreign Enlistment Bill. The object of this bill was to raise a force of 15,000 foreigners (afterwards reduced to 10,000) to be drilled in England. The bill was opposed by many members in both Houses as dangerous in principle and policy. In the end, though, it was successfully carried through both Houses. Russell moved the third reading in the House of Commons on the 22nd. Bright was the last member who spoke before the division.

February 23, 1855

Prior to Bright's speech of February 23, 1855, the scandalous condition of things in the Crimea was formally brought to the attention of the House of Commons. A motion for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into these conditions was
made. Russell resigned his office because he could not see now this motion could be resisted. In an eloquent speech, William E. Gladstone opposed the inquiry because "it would never take place as a real inquiry; or, if it did, because it could convey no consolation to those whom they sought to aid, while it would carry malignant joy to the hearts of the enemies of England."  

In spite of this, the Aberdeen Cabinet found arrayed against them the large majority of 157 in a House of 453 members. The result of the division took almost everyone by surprise, and instead of the "usual cheering after the numbers were announced, a murmur of amazement was heard culminating in loud and derisive laughter."  

As a result of this vote, the Aberdeen Government resigned. Russell and Lord Derby respectively failed to form a Ministry. On February 6, Palmerston succeeded in this task and became Prime Minister.  

In that same month, the philosophy of conducting the war changed. According to Trevelyan:

The hopes of dismembering Russia, or of taking away from her the Crimea, had vanished. No country engaged in the war now expected any great gain, but the difficulty of making peace lay in saving the face of all parties. Unfortunately the obvious way to save the face of England and France was to continue the war until Sebastopol fell—and then hand it back before the fall of Sebastopol would look like military failure. Such was the instinctive feeling of the war party in England during the spring and summer of 1855, and this sentiment, it cannot be doubted, was shared by the new Premier.  

Palmerston's Cabinet was chiefly composed of members of the old Cabinet. Palmerston tried to hold off the action of the
Sebastopol Inquiry Committee by promising a most stringent investigation into the conduct of the war. Because peace negotiations had started in Vienna, Palmerston did not want anything to occur in England that would jeopardize England's position in the talks. Palmerston's promise of an investigation, though, caused the resignations of Sir James Graham, Gladstone, and Sidney Herbert. On February 23, the three explained in the House of Commons why they had withdrawn from Palmerston's Ministry.

During the debate which arose out of these Ministerial explanations, Bright delivered his "Angel of Death" speech which became his most famous one.

June 7, 1855

The peace negotiations at Vienna broke down because Palmerston refused to negotiate seriously until the Allied armies had captured Sebastopol. On May 24, Disraeli submitted a motion to the House of Commons expressing the dissatisfaction of the House with "the ambiguous language and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's Government in reference to the great question of peace or war." An amendment was moved by Sir Francis Baring expressing regret that the conferences at Vienna had not led to a termination of hostilities. Disraeli's motion was rejected by a majority of 319 to 219.

The debate was continued over the Whitsuntide recess, on an amendment proposed by Lowe, declaring that the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea had exhausted the means of suspending hostilities by negotiation.
Bright's final Crimean address was delivered on the fifth night of this debate.

It can be seen that there were three scenic circumferences which influenced John Bright. The first was in Europe and the Crimea, or the scenic elements that occurred which led to hostilities. The second was in England itself. The mood of the people was probably the greatest scenic element here. The final scene was in Parliament where personal debate among the members and expressions of a strong pro-war sentiment influenced the four speeches. The ways in which these elements influenced Bright's vocal utterances will discussed in Chapter III in the section on Scene-Act Ratio.
NOTES


3Gibbs, p. 13.


5The principle of capitulation was based upon the theory that the sovereignty of a state could only apply to its own subjects, and that foreigners, visiting or even living in the country, should still be governed and protected by the laws of the country from which they came.


7Gibbs, p. 15.

8Gibbs, p. 16.


10Gibbs, p. 20.

11Gibbs, pp. 21-22.


13Temperley and Penson, p. 310.

14Temperley and Penson, p. 310.

15Temperley and Penson, p. 311.

16Temperley and Penson, pp. 312-13.

17Gibbs, p. 23.

18Gibbs, p. 28.

19Temperley, p. 511.
20 Temperley, p. 507.
21 Gibbs, p. 28.
22 Temperley, p. 511.
23 Temperley and Penson, p. 319.
25 Temperley and Penson, p. 320.
26 Woodham-Smith, p. 131.
27 Gibbs, p. 36.
28 Gibbs, p. 38.
30 Anderson, p. 2.
31 Anderson, p. 3.
33 Briggs, 548.
34 Anderson, p. 4.
35 Anderson, p. 5.
36 Anderson, p. 5.
38 Anderson, p. 211.
39 Anderson, p. 211.
40 Anderson, p. 211.
42 Smith, p. 212.
Vattel was a sixteenth-century Swiss jurist and political theorist.

CHAPTER III

ACT, AGENT, AND RATIO ANALYSIS

In the dramatistic pentad, the act is "what took place, in thought or deed."¹ According to Burke, "using 'scene' in the sense of setting, or background, and 'act' in the sense of action, one could say that 'the scene contains the act'."² The act, however, is more than just action set against a backdrop. Many times, the act is a response to the scene and should be viewed "in terms of a situation and a strategy for confronting or encompassing that situation."³ John Bright's four Parliamentary speeches in opposition to the Crimean War constitute his act or his response to the scene. These four speeches are symbolic of his motives for opposing the war. In each speech, the specific utterances that represented these motives have been identified and analyzed. This has led to an explanation of why he used certain rhetorical strategies in each speech.

The first speech to be considered was delivered on March 31, 1854. It was given in response to the message from the Crown to the House of Commons announcing the declaration of war against Russia. His first line of argument symbolized an attitude of disgust with Turkey and its Mohammedan government. Although he claimed to be sympathetic with the Turks, he devoted a great deal of his speech trying to prove that Turkey was a hopelessly decadent and declining power that had fallen "into a state of
decay, and into anarchy so permanent as to have assumed a chronic character."4

This speech was also symbolic of a strong sympathy for the needs of the working and middle classes. Bright could not see how the war could be conducive to the interests of England. As long as the country tried to assume the role of "knight-errant of the human race,"5 her people would be the real sufferers.

Bright's remarks further reflected an emphasis upon reform as the most important issue facing the country and economic beliefs based upon a policy of non-involvement and non-intervention. England had more important matters at home to deal with. The war fever which had gripped the nation and its Government had prevented the people from being "instructed in their social and political obligations."6 In closing, he asserted that if the Government had practiced a foreign policy based upon non-intervention, then "this country might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, and every person who treads its soil might have been sufficiently educated."7

The second speech was given on December 22, 1854, during the debate over the Enlistment of Foreigners Bill. Once again, the attitudes of disgust toward Turkey and sympathy for the suffering of the common man were expressed in this speech. He said that Turkey was primarily responsible for the war, and the decadence of the Turkish Empire was again asserted. He said that England was "making war against the Government which accepted your own terms."8 This statement was with regard to Russia.
Bright then noted the recent deaths of two members of the House of Commons in the Crimea. He noted the hardships that their families were being forced to endure because of this. The suffering was nationwide, and "in every village, cottages are to be found into which sorrow has entered, and, as I believe, through the policy of the Ministry, which might have been avoided." He criticized certain members of the Ministry for making satirical speeches on the war at a Reform Club banquet in the midst of such sorrow.

The third speech was delivered on February 23, 1855. Bright astonished his audience by abandoning his previous rhetorical strategies. Bright pleaded with his audience to end the war. He commented upon the terms of the treaty which were being debated in Vienna. He expressed the hope that these negotiations would prove to be fruitful. He conceded that Lord Palmerston "had long been a great authority with many persons in this country upon foreign policy." The same was true for the government's present envoy to Vienna, Lord John Russell. However, Bright said that "there are no men in this country more truly responsible for our present position in this war than the noble Lord who now fills the highest office in the State and the noble Lord who is now, I trust, rapidly approaching the scene of his labours in Vienna."

Bright then asked Lord Palmerston if Lord Russell had the power to declare an armistice if peace proposals were agreed upon by all parties involved in the conflict. As if in answer to his question, a cry of 'No! No!' was heard from somewhere in the
House. At this point, Bright's tone changed, for he went on to denounce the war and England's desire to prolong it.

Later Bright attempted to return to his plea to end the war. He was not entirely successful in doing so, however. He stated that the members of the House did not realize the desperate state of the nation's economy and industry. Those members of the House who were "not intimately acquainted with the trade and commerce of the country do not fully comprehend our position as to the diminution of employment and the lessening of wages." His next statement certainly did not serve to conciliate his audience. Bright stated that there existed "a bitter and angry feeling against that class which has for a long period conducted the public affairs of this country.""13

Bright concluded with another appeal to Palmerston. If he ended the war, Bright predicted that, of all his accomplishments, Palmerston would be remembered as the man who "restored tranquillity to Europe, and saved this country from the indescribable calamities of war."14

Of the four speeches, this was probably the most unusual. In it, Bright shifted strategies and contradicted himself. He attempted to reconcile himself with his political adversaries while denouncing them. He reproached the aristocracy and yet made a solemn appeal for them as well as the middle and lower classes.

On June 7, 1855, Bright delivered his last major Parliamentary speech on the war to a crowded House of Commons, but this
time his remarks were not conciliatory in tone. Having failed to reconcile himself with his political opponents, Bright expressed an attitude of disgust with the present government and the people in it. Because some statements made by members outside of the House did not correspond with those made by the members when Parliament was in session, Bright questioned whether or not anything they said could be believed. His attacks then centered on two men, Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston.

Bright also expressed moral outrage at the unfair treatment of Russia by Britain. The one demand which stood in the way of peace concerned the limitation of Russian ships in the Black Sea. Bright felt that the government was being extremely unfair to the Russians by asking them to make such a concession. Furthermore, he said the British negotiators were treating the Russians in a condescending manner. Bright considered this treatment to be unjust and unwise. Bright ended the speech with several remarks regarding the almost unbearable taxes which the people labored under.

Six motives for opposing the war appeared consistently throughout the four speeches. The first was Bright's sympathy with the needs of the working and middle classes. Closely related to this was the emphasis which Bright placed upon domestic reform as being the most important issue facing the country. Another motive was his adherence to economic philosophies based upon non-involvement and non-intervention. The fourth motive was a disgust with Turkey and Mohammedan rulers. The fifth
motive was an opposition to the English aristocracy and in particular, Lord Palmerston. The sixth motive was a sense of outrage at what Bright considered to be the immoral and unfair policies of the government.

John Bright's act of opposing the Crimean War can be divided into two segments. In the first, Bright opposed the war by denouncing the country's involvement in the war and the government's handling of the war and the peace negotiations. In another, Bright tried to reconcile himself with his political opponents in order to bring the war to an end.

Bright failed in his act of opposing the war. He did not transcend the differences between himself and his audience. While his speeches did present to his audience a new way of seeing things, his audience apparently did not wish to view the situation in that way. His attempt at compromise was a dismal failure. According to historian Donald Read: "Bright's speeches did not end the war a single day sooner than it would have ended if he had never delivered them." His only satisfaction was that, in his own mind, he had done the right thing.

John Bright, the Agent

John Bright was born at Rochdale, Lancashire, on November 16, 1811, to Jacob and Martha Bright. His parents were Quakers. His father was a successful cotton manufacturer, owner of a mill at Greenbank, and a self-made man. Jacob Bright believed strongly in the essential equality of all men. He practiced this philosophy
in the administration of his mill by freely mixing with his employees and refusing to regard them as an inferior class. He encouraged his son, John, to do this as well. In this respect, the elder Bright differed from other employers of the same period. The Brights had always been regarded as different, however. They were Quakers and, throughout the family’s history, had been actively involved in opposing and resisting religious persecution practiced against them. At an early age, John Bright developed feelings of sympathy for the common man and a fierce pride in his Quaker heritage.

As far as his education was concerned, John Bright was also a self-made man. At the age of eight, Bright began to attend Townsend School at neighboring Rochdale. He stayed there, however, only a few months. Between the ages of ten and fifteen, he attended a series of Quaker schools at Lancashire and Yorkshire. Later, Bright remarked that out of this mixed and fragmentary education he learned only a little Latin and Greek. He did, however, acquire a lasting love for English literature. At the age of fifteen, Bright began to help his father at the mill. He fixed up a small room over the counting house where he could read a good deal before breakfast without being disturbed. In this way, he tried to fill in the gaps that his formal education had left. His chief reading materials were books of history and poetry. He also studied books of statistics and read the Spectator, a radical publication with Anti-Corn Law views.

Bright began to develop as a speaker during his membership in the Rochdale Literary and Philosophical Society, an educational
and debating group. He soon established himself as a prominent local speaker and a formidable debater. Most of the information he used came from his readings done before breakfast at the mill. These studies also resulted in the high standards of language which he always set for himself. In addition to the Literary and Philosophical Society, Bright was a frequent speaker at Bible meetings and Temperance lectures.

The second most important factor influencing the speaking of Bright was probably the Reverend John Aldis. Like many beginning speakers, Bright wrote out his speeches and memorized them. Aldis attended a Bible Society meeting near Manchester in 1832 at which Bright was the principal speaker. Although his speech was moving and elaborate, Aldis noticed that Bright had memorized it and seemed nervous as a result of this. After the meeting, he congratulated the young man but warned him against memorization. He advised him to merely put down the main points in the desired order and leave "the wording of them to the moment."  

Bright later recalled:

I spoke a carefully prepared speech, full I doubt not of the faults of youth and inexperience, and it had cost me so much in the preparation and in anxiety that I resolved from that day never to speak another written speech, and I have kept my word.

As a mill owner, Bright became drawn into the radical agitation of the 1830's. His temperament was suited for it. By this time, Bright was an angry young man. He could realize and appreciate the hardships the common people were having to endure. He knew that their plight was the result of economic policies
created to protect the agricultural interests of the landed aristocracy. He was also aware of his own position. He was a middle-class manufacturer and, more important, a member of a dissenting religion. Members of his sect had been persecuted for centuries. Furthermore, Quakers were still deprived of such things as equal educational opportunities. It is not surprising, then, that Bright came to distrust and dislike the members of the English aristocracy.

In 1838 he joined the Manchester Provisional Committee which founded the Anti-Corn Law League a year later. Overcome with grief, he almost abandoned this when his first wife died. Richard Cobden, however, spurred him back into action and soon Bright became the leading orator for the League and Cobden the leading organizer. He was elected as a free-trade candidate to the House of Commons from Durham in 1843. Together, Cobden and Bright were instrumental in achieving the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. In 1847, he remarried and was elected representative from Manchester.

In Parliament, Bright soon distinguished himself as a strong advocate for domestic reform for he believed that the condition of England had to be improved. In order to do this, however, Parliamentary representation had to be changed. The aristocracy had bought and controlled membership in the House of Commons for too long. As long as the aristocracy controlled the government, they would use it for their own selfish purposes, and the people would continue to suffer. Consequently, Bright became a
supporter of Parliamentary reform. Finally, Bright supported the efforts of Cobden and Gladstone to continue a policy of free-trade in England. Such a policy, Bright believed, would pave the way for peace among nations. He fiercely opposed imperialism or forced trade, though, because this inevitably led to foreign involvement and costly wars.

Bright became popular among the people of England. Since he first came into prominence as a League speaker, his speeches had been widely reported. His efforts on behalf of the middle and lower classes made him a very popular and admired member of Parliament.

During the 1850's, Bright lost this popularity and admiration because of his opposition to the Crimean War. When Britain declared war on Russia in 1854, Bright became the most eloquent and persistent opponent of the Aberdeen and Palmerston Ministries. This time, however, public opinion was against him. The people of Manchester supported the Government's policy. They denounced Bright as a Russian and burned him in effigy in the streets.

Heartbroken and feeling he had been betrayed by the people he had worked so hard for, John Bright suffered a complete mental and physical breakdown in 1856. He lost his seat in the House in the election of 1857. In 1858, however, Bright was elected representative for Birmingham without contest.

Ratio Analysis

In doing a Burkeian analysis, one must do more than analyze the five parts of the pentad. Such an analysis would be incomplete.
According to Rueckert, there is much more to the pentad than meets the eye because of "relationships which necessarily exist between various terms of the pentad." In the Grammar of Motives Burke himself states that "certain formal interrelationships prevail among these terms, by reason of their role of . . . common ground or substance." For the pentad, it is possible to have the following ratios:

1) Scene-act
2) Scene-agent
3) Scene-agency
4) Agent-purpose
5) Agent-agency
6) Agent-act
7) Act-purpose
8) Act-agency
9) Act-agent
10) Purpose-scene
11) Purpose-agency

An attempt to analyze all of the significant ratios pertaining to this study will not be made at this time. Two parts of the pentad, the act and the purpose, have yet to be defined. However, analysis of the first three parts of the pentad have indicated that the act-agent and scene-act ratios are significant.

Act-Agent Ratio

In an examination of the act-agent ratio, one attempts to explain the act by or through the character of the agent. In the act-agent ratio, one looks for causal relationships between the agent and his act. The act is what it is because of the agent who performed it.
In his speech of June 7, 1855, John Bright made the following statement:

I ask hon. Gentlemen what are the taxes of a whole village, and what they mean? They mean bareness of furniture, of clothing, and of the table in many a cottage in Lancashire, in Suffolk, and in Dorsetshire. They mean an absence of medical attendance for a sick wife, an absence of the school pence of three or four little children--hopeless toil to the father of a family, penury through his life, a cheerless old age and, if I may quote the language of a poet of humble life, at last--'the little bell tolled hastily for the pauper's funeral'.

This statement and others in the four speeches like it are symbolic of Bright's sympathy for the plight of the common Englishman. Bright's rapport with the common man began when he started to work in his father's cotton mill. This was because the conditions in his father's mill were different from those in other factories:

Although Greenbank mill at Rochdale was only ten miles from Manchester, in some respects it was worlds away. In the smaller manufacturing towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, many masters were still relatively poor, still preserved the simple habits of life and expenditure, and the old way of mixing on more or less intimate terms with their men, that had marked the manufacturers of former generations. When John Bright at the age of fifteen began to 'help in the warehouse', he was entering a society democratic in its atmosphere and singularly free from social distinctions.

Bright's father, Jacob, was a man who truly cared about his employees. He did not believe in beating children and established a school in the mill for his child laborers. He was always available for conferences with his employees. He tried to help them financially in hard times. Most important, however,
he encouraged the free mingling of his son with the employees. Bright's days in the mill left a lasting impression on his mind. "His experience of his father's benevolent methods as an employer ensured that he never felt separated from the operatives. His early religious experience and his early business experience both taught him to believe in the essential equality of men."23

In his first speech opposing the war, Bright mentioned the problem of domestic reform. Pointing to Richard Cobden, he said:

"Here is my right hon. Friend and Colleague, who is re-solved on the abolition of the newspaper stamp. I can hardly imagine a more important question than that, if it be desirable for the people to be instructed in their social and political obligations; and yet my right hon. Friend has scarcely the courage to ask for the abolition of that odious tax."24

This statement is symbolic of Bright's belief that Parliamentary efforts in behalf of domestic reform should take priority over all other matters.

This belief was closely related to the closeness he felt with the working classes. Bright had first-hand knowledge of their problems and hardships. Bright felt it was his moral duty to do all he could to improve their condition. Consequently, he pushed again and again for domestic reform.

During the early 1850's, however, the public mind was not interested in reform measures. It was interested in halting Russian aggression in the near east. The war fever caused by the arrogant, aristocratic Palmerstonian foreign policy had the nation in its grip. It had replaced in the minds of the people
the issue that really mattered, reform. Herman Ausubel describes the feeling of both Bright and Cobden on this matter in the following passage:

Worst of all, Bright knew—and Cobden was there to remind him, if he forgot—that a war would stifle any real possibility of reform, and that desirable domestic changes would be postponed for the duration of the conflict. As a student of history, he remembered, moreover, how the French revolutionary wars had delayed reforms for years and then ushered in one of the worst periods of repression in all of British experience.25

As has been mentioned, Bright closed his first Crimean War speech with the assertion that if the government had practiced a foreign policy based upon non-intervention, then "this country might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, and every person who treads its soil might have been sufficiently educated."26 This statement reflects his adherence to the economic policy of free trade.

While favoring the middle and lower classes, this concept was not favorable to the landed aristocrats. Bright's belief in free trade was greatly influenced by Richard Cobden. Cobden was, perhaps, the most outspoken advocate of free trade in the early years of the Victorian era. If Britain would only do away with her restrictive tariffs and adopt a policy of free trade, he argued, the country would experience increased prosperity. Furthermore, free trade would eventually result in a lessening of international tensions and would promote a lasting peace. M. W. Flinn condenses the Cobden free trade philosophy in the following passage: "Cobden thought of free trade as 'the means, and I
believe the only means, of effecting universal and permanent peace'. 'Free trade', he wrote, 'by perfecting the intercourse and securing the dependence of countries upon one another, must inevitably snatch the power from the governments to plunge their people into wars'. His arguments, however, could gain no audience among the foreign policy makers:

British foreign policy in the 1850s and early 60s, associated especially with Lord Palmerston . . . was not devoted to promoting peace through the world or wide spread of free trade, but to vigorous promotion of British interests. With these interests in mind Palmerston was always busy seeking to maintain an elusive balance of power and to support liberalism and nationality in Europe and beyond.26

Instead of this, Cobden wanted "non-involvement and non-intervention."29 It was his contention that "all would be well if only the power of diplomats and soldiers in shaping the foreign policies of their states could be minimized."30 International contacts through diplomatic channels should be reduced at the same time as contact through commercial channels under free trade should be increased.

Cobden further argued that Britain's foreign policy was supposedly designed to support the national interest, and that "peace was Britain's foremost national interest."31 Under the control of the aristocracy, however, British foreign policy had plunged the nation into "unnecessary wars for generation after generation."32 Cobden believed that these wars could have been avoided if only Britain had adopted a policy of non-intervention. "Non-intervention was the right Christian policy. Let Britain concentrate upon purifying its outdated institutions at home."
She could then exert more influence through domestic good example than would ever be attained through direct involvement.  

Bright was in firm agreement with these principles. With regard to lessening the relations between governments, George B. Smith stated that: "He did not believe in the grand schemes of policy advanced by kings, queens, or cabinets, which flew in the face of almost ordinary resolutions of Christian morality; and there was no greater evil that came from a condition of national twilight than that we were always getting into a state of panic."

Bright also agreed with Cobden's views on non-intervention, as can be seen from the following passage from Ausubel: "Bright insisted that Britain's task was not to regenerate other countries; there was too much regenerating for the British to do at home and in Ireland. By improving their own institutions and by treating other countries justly, generously, and courteously, they could do far more for humanity than by allowing a Palmerston to despatch troops abroad."

Finally, Robertson sums up the overall similarity of their economic views best in the following passage: "They well knew that warfare glory and want went hand in hand, and that the splendid reviews of troops, with their bristling arms, as they left their native shores, would leave behind them women in lone despair and poverty."

In his speech of February 23, 1855, Bright made the statement that there existed "a bitter and angry feeling against that class which has for a long period conducted the public affairs
of this country." This is representative of Bright's own feelings of anger and distrust against the British aristocracy. Ausubel comments on this fact in the following manner: "Since he believed that the source of most of the abuses that afflicted early Victorian society was the great landowning class, a large-scale crusade against the landowners was necessary. Once they were deprived of their unwarranted privileges, the United Kingdom would be a better place of politics, religion, culture, and social and economic life." 

Bright disapproved of the traditional, privileged positions in society afforded to the aristocracy. He was incensed at the repression inflicted by this class upon the peoples of the country. He disagreed with their imperialistic foreign policies.

Bright also felt that the aristocrats were responsible for the condition of Parliament:

The much vaunted British Constitution, as he saw it, was a mass of hypocrisy. It was bad enough that the House of Lords was an aristocratic institution, but the real tragedy was that the House of Commons was hardly less aristocratic. Furthermore, both the Whig and Tory parties were dominated by the aristocracy, and all the members of the cabinet were either aristocrats or their hangers-on. To Bright, it was both a scandal and a disgrace that the Reform Act of 1832 had not been followed by measures distributing the seats in the House of Commons more equitably and extending the right to vote to much more than one-seventh of the male adult population.

Almost everything Bright believed in and fought for was in direct opposition to the wants and desires of the aristocracy. As has been shown, Bright was the antithesis of the aristocrats. Furthermore, his feelings toward the aristocracy never mellowed:
The more Bright thought about the state of Parliament, the more he raged at the aristocrats. They were Philistines who made the English people grind at their mills; they were wretches who by their failure to learn anything from the disturbances on the Continent showed their wish for self-destruction; they were brutal in their tendencies and blind to the retribution that awaited them. Unless they were ousted as the dominant class ... "they will destroy us." 40

AlthoughBright's opposition to the aristocrats bordered almost on extremism, the extremity of this sentiment was not shared by other radicals and members of the "Manchester School." For example, Richard Cobden shared the same views as Bright on such matters as reform, enfranchisement, and the abolition of restrictive tariffs. However, he did not feel that the way to improve the lot of the common man was to "get the rich man before he gets you." Cobden was more practical than Bright and was content to chip away at the position of the upper classes in the hope that one day Britain's middle and lower classes would enjoy the rights that were inherently theirs. Furthermore, realizing that one does not change the centuries-old social make-up of a country in one swift stroke, Cobden was able to accept things as they were for the time being. This, Bright could never do.

Up until this time, Bright's criticisms had primarily centered on the area of domestic inequities. As the country began to drift towards war in the early 1850's, Bright disliked the "prominence that foreign affairs came to assume for the British people." 41 With public sentiment overwhelmingly in support of a war with Russia, Bright added a new dimension to his criticism
of the aristocracy by attacking their handling of foreign policy. Although Cobden once again agreed with Bright's sentiments, he disagreed with his methods:

During the Crimean War he was sorry to find Bright concentrating his attacks too much upon Ministers, who had been reluctantly led in hostilities by public opinion. He told a mutual friend that he had often tried to persuade Bright to rely less upon criticism of Ministers, 'and more on the enforcement of sound principles upon the public'. But, added Cobden indulgently, 'his pugnacity delights in a knockdown blow at something as tangible as a Minister of State'.

One minister, however, had not been reluctantly led into the hostilities by public opinion. He had urged Britain's entry into the hostilities. Of all the Ministers of State whom Bright delighted in knocking down, Lord Palmerston soon emerged as his favorite. By the time Bright delivered his last major Parliamentary speech in opposition to the war on June 7, 1855, Palmerston had taken over as the Prime Minister. In this speech, Bright not only criticized his handling of the war, but also attacked Palmerston personally in the following manner: "I judge the noble Viscount as a man who has experience, but who with experience has not gained wisdom--as a man who has age, but who with age has not the gravity of age, and who, now occupying the highest seat of power, has-- and I say it with pain--not appeared influenced by a due sense of the responsibility that belongs to that elevated position." The reason for this hostility on the part of Bright was because Palmerston symbolized everything that Bright despised. Ausubel describes Palmerston in the following way: "He was an
Irish aristocrat and absentee landlord; he disapproved heartily of Parliamentary reform; and, totally lacking in Christian humility, he displayed in his dealings with foreign countries the kind of rashness, arrogance, and insolence that was certain to bring on either war or war scares.  

Bright's hostility toward the aristocracy was great. The fact that the intensity of this hostility was not shared by most other radicals and members of the 'Manchester School' raises the question of why Bright was different in this respect. According to Read, one reason for this was Bright's religion:

Bright's virulent political tone sprang from his temperament, but his temperament had been stimulated from his earlier days by a sense of exclusion, religious exclusion as a Quaker, political and social exclusion as a new manufacturer. Bright's Quaker sense of religious penalty was especially strong . . . He brought this sense of past Quaker suffering and deprivation even into his advocacy of political reforms which might seem to contain no religious element. He saw religious and political privilege as parts of one exclusive system intended to advance the interests of the Anglican landed aristocracy.  

Bright recognized this exclusion in his March 31, 1854, speech by saying, "I shall not discuss this question on the abstract principle of peace at any price, as it is termed, which is held by a small minority of persons in this country, founded on religious opinions which are not generally received."  

Bright's upbringing had a lot to do with making him aware of this exclusion and persecution. The Bright family was extremely proud of one of their ancestors, Henry Gratton, who had made a name for himself by boldly preaching and spreading
his religious ideas in direct defiance of the Anglican Church.

Robertson gives us this description of the man:

Gratton, who died in January, 1712, was an untiring Quaker preacher. He travelled all the country through, his fervid oratory in the counties of Cheshire and Derbyshire having all the effect of modern revival, and bringing the duties of religion home to the hearts of many. Scotland and Ireland were also visited by him, the persecutions of the time bating nothing of his zeal. He was arrested several times, and subjected to the statutory fine of £20 for non-conformity of doctrine; yet he persevered in the cause and continued to preach. In the reign of Charles II, he was thrown into prison for refusing to desist from public exhortations, and we must go back to the days of the early Christians to find anything so touching as the heroic tranquillity, the unflinching firmness, the unresisting meekness with which he bore his cruel wrongs and sufferings.

The family pride in this man's efforts was transmitted to the young Bright.

These early impressions of Quaker deprivation and persecutions of the past were important in instilling in Bright the realization that he was different, and that because of this he and his family had been deprived of those rights enjoyed by Englishmen who observed the Anglican religion. This, plus the strong identification he felt with his rebellious ancestor, produced a fighting spirit in him that first came to the forefront in his opposition to the arbitrary levying of church-rates.

According to Trevelyan:

In the period immediately following the Revolution of 1688, when the dissenters were barely a twentieth part of the population, glad to enjoy, under the shelter of the Whig magnates, a precarious and limited toleration, it was not unnatural that the inhabitants of a parish should from time to time be subjected to a 'rate' for the purpose of the
church where nearly all of them worshipped. But after the Wesleyan movement and the rapid growth of nearly all forms of dissent that followed on it, active non-conformists became as numerous, at least in North England, as active churchmen, and church-rates became, therefore, a most invidious privilege.48

As a Quaker, Bright was extremely indignant that he and his fellow Quakers should be forced to pay for the support of a religion that had caused nothing but trouble for them. In 1838, he addressed a large, open meeting in Rochdale cemetery who had met to oppose the paying of the church-rates. From the top of a tombstone, he confronted several Anglican vicars and "told them more truth than they were accustomed to hear."49

Proud and defensive as he was about his religion, his stand on the war was contradictory to his professed religious principles in one respect:

Bright's attitude was the same as Cobden's. He was not a total pacifist, unlike many Quakers, as his staunch support for the North was to show during the American Civil War. "I have never advocated the extreme peace principle, the non-resistance principle, in public or in private . . . I opposed the late war as contrary to national interests, and the principles professed and avowed by the nation, and on no other ground. It was because my arguments could not be met that I was charged with being for "peace at any price", and by this our opposition to the war was much damaged".50

In fact, the religious stand that Bright took regarding the Crimean conflict was not based upon the traditional Quaker pacifism. Instead, it was based upon the fact that this war was causing British and French Christians to fight on the side of Turkish Moslems against Russian Christians.
Bright's religious convictions also helped to develop his strong moral convictions. John Bright was a moralist, and he consistently defended his stand on moral grounds. He was not only concerned with what was morally right for England, but also with what was morally right for other nations. In his last speech on the war, Bright spent considerable time denouncing the British peace proposals as being unfair to Russia. Bright declared that:

Some hon. Gentlemen talk as if Russia were a Power which you could take to Bow Street, and bind over before some stipendiary magistrate to keep the peace for six months. Russia is a great power, as England is, and in treating with her you must consider that the Russian Government has to consult its own dignity, its own interests, and public opinion, just as much at least as the Government of this country.51

This statement is representative of Bright's strong moral convictions.

In 1965, Walter R. Fisher describes Bright as being "one of the few statesmen in the history of public address who had the courage, the moral conviction, and the rhetorical skill to challenge a popular war."52 In fact, one can say that most of the arguments that Bright used against the war were moral arguments, in one way or another. Fisher goes on to discuss the Victorian "reverence for morality in all aspects of social and political life,"53 and cites Bright's own guiding moral principles as being one reason for his taking his unpopular stand. According to Fisher: "Seen through eyes trained to measure issues, ideas, people, places and institutions by moral standards, it is not
surprising that Bright saw England's participation in the Crimea as a heinous crime. 54

One argument used by proponents of the war was that Russia was a despot nation. But, as Bright persistently pointed out, Turkey was also a despot nation. In Bright's own words, Turkey was one of the "most immoral and filthy of all despotisms." 55

In spite of denying that he was hostile toward the Turks, Bright's utterances clearly reveal that he was. In his first speech, he described Turkey as a hopelessly decadent and declining power that had fallen "into a state of decay, and into anarchy so permanent as to have assumed a chronic character." 56

In his second speech, Bright sarcastically stated that: "Another sign of improvement is, perhaps, that they have begun to wear trousers; but as to their commerce, their industry, or their revenue, nothing can be in a worse condition." 57 These remarks, and others like them, are representative of Bright's disgust with Turkey.

The fact that John Bright was a humanist sincerely interested in the plight of his fellow man is almost irrefutable. His disgust with the Turkish people and their way of life and the reason behind this disgust, though, reveal a distorted side of this humanism that is completely overlooked by his early biographers. While Bright vigorously opposed many of the practices and beliefs of the early Victorians, there was one belief to which he was firmly committed. This was the Victorian belief that any and all forms of labor was a virtue. In other words,
a person had complete control over his own destiny and was capable, through work, of improving his lot in life. Consequently, a value judgment could be made on a person according to his success in life. Bright sincerely believed this. His father was a self-made man and, in some respects, so was he. Consequently, he opposed factory reforms intended to lessen the workers' burden. On this point:

Bright saw the point in restricting child labor, but he denounced governmental limitation of the hours of work of adults as well as of young people between 13 and 18. His opposition was based upon two considerations above all: since British factories had to compete with foreign factories, factory legislation would put the British at a serious competitive disadvantage and inevitably would result in unemployment for British workers; besides, it was unjust to use state powers to prevent people from working longer hours so that they could improve their position and that of their families.58

From this belief grew Bright's disgust with the Turks and their way of life. As a young man he had made an extensive tour of the Mediterranean area and had returned with the following views:

By the time he was in his mid-twenties Bright held a host of convictions that mirrored his religious, social, and family background. He revealed the intensity of these beliefs in a journal that he kept from 1835 to 1836 during a grand tour of the Mediterranean. Appalled by what he saw of laziness in Portugal, of begging and bribery in the Italies, and of torpor in the lands of the Ottoman Empire, he had no doubt that the poverty, ignorance, and degradation of the peoples was due to bad government, false religion, and lack of education. Yet what repelled him particularly was the fatalistic outlook of the Turks--their notion that whatever happened would have happened despite their efforts to prevent it from happening. 'Thus', he noted with disgust, 'the Turks are not solicitous about bettering the condition of
their neighbors, nor do they trouble themselves for
the sake of any prospective advantage which posterity
might reap from their labors; but they come into the
world, live as their fathers did, with as little
trouble as possible, and sink into the grave without
having performed any positive and visible service to
their fellow men'. The Turkish way was repugnant to
everything that Bright stood for--his family, his
religion, his class, his community.

Bright continued to hold these convictions as a middle-aged
man opposing a popular war. He could not reconcile himself to
the fact that a civilized, Christian, working nation would
willingly enter into an alliance with a people as useless as he
thought the Turks were. It was as inconceivable to him in 1854
as it must have been in 1836.

John Bright's life experiences and attitudes shaped and
molded his act. By viewing his act in terms of his character,
it becomes clear why he chose the lines of argumentation that
he did. Driven by a sense of exclusion and persecution, a
strong sympathy for the plight of the lower, working classes,
and adherence to the economic philosophy of free trade, Bright
became the aristocracy's most vociferous opponent. Because the
Crimean War was an aristocratic instrument that took the people's
minds off of what should have been their main consideration, the
winning of their rights, he opposed it. Because the Crimean War
was unfair not only to England, but also to Russia, he opposed
it. Finally, he opposed the war because it was responsible for
attempting to maintain the independence of a hopelessly decadent
nation and people at the expense of spilling English blood.
Scene-Act Ratio

The scene is responsible for an act. Something must occur in the scene to produce a rhetorical response. An act can be an acception or rejection of the scene. Thus, the act is controlled to a certain extent by the scene. According to Burke: "The nature of the act should be analogously present in the scene. There is no act without a scene, and no analysis of the speech is complete until one has shown how the act functioned in the scene." 60

In the case of John Bright's Crimean War speeches, this is particularly true. There would have been no speeches opposing the Crimean War if there had been no Crimean War. The very nature of Bright's rhetoric clearly demonstrates how dominant the scene actually was. Bright was influenced by the events in Europe, in England, and those events immediately preceding each speech.

In his first Crimean War address of March 31, 1854, Bright spent considerable time attacking the concept of the 'balance of power'. In one way or another, attacks upon this concept were made or implied throughout the four speeches. Bright was particularly appalled when this was used as an excuse for going to war to protect the 'independence and integrity' of other nations. When a member of Parliament attempted to justify the war by stating that the spread of Russian power must be checked not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also throughout all of Eastern Europe, Bright replied:
What a notion a man must have of the duties of the 27,000,000 of people living in these islands if he thinks they ought to come forward as the defenders of the 60,000,000 of people living in Germany, that the blood of England is not the property of the people of England, and that the sacred treasure of the bravery, resolution, and unflattering courage of the people of England is to be squandered in a contest in which the noble Lord says we have no interest, for the preservation of the independence of Germany, and of the integrity, civilization, and something else, of all Europe!  

Despite all of Bright's arguments, the balance of power in Europe was a constant concern to the government of Europe. According to Briggs: "The language used by British statesmen was the language of the balance of power in Europe—the curtailment of the power of Russia and the maintenance and creation of counterbalancing forces. The Whigs were anti-Russian because they wished to see the 'claims of public law vindicated against the ambitions of an aggressor'; the Tories were anti-Russian because they trembled with rage at the policy of 'sap and mine' by which Russia was increasing its power."  

Since French power had been broken at Waterloo, the British had enjoyed the position of being the most powerful nation in Europe. As has been mentioned, the French had been through a period of unstable government. They were not yet ready to present England with a serious challenge. The Russians were growing stronger, though. Although they were not as advanced technologically as England was, they were attempting to spread their power. Even if the British did not consider the Russians advanced enough to challenge them, the Russians did. The Emperor Nicholas told the British ambassador at a party in January, 1853:
"When we are agreed, I am quite without anxiety as to the rest of Europe. It is immaterial what others may think or do."  

Such frankness caused the British to grow increasingly suspicious of the Russians. Years earlier, the British had tried to limit the sea power of the Russians by a treaty which stated that the Russian navy must stay in the Black Sea. In return, British warships would not enter the Black Sea from the Mediterranean. If the Russians demands were agreed to by Turkey, then Turkish warships could enter the Mediterranean on the premise of protecting Greek Orthodox Christians. Britain feared this because Russia would then be in a position to block the British trade route to the far east. Only a threat like this, combined with public opinion, could have induced the Aberdeen government to enter into a war.

Another scenic element that strongly influenced Bright's speeches was the condition of the British soldiers in the Crimea and their families at home. Bright's concern for these people can be seen in all four of his speeches. In his speech of February 23, 1855, Bright included a passage that was eloquently representative of all his utterances upon this subject:

The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings. There is no one, as when the first born were slain of old to sprinkle with blood the lintel and the two side-posts of our doors, that he may spare and pass on; he takes his victims from the castle of the noble, the mansion of the wealthy, and the cottage of the poor and lowly, and it is on behalf of all these classes that I make this solemn appeal.  

Bright had good reason to make an appeal such as this. Conditions in the Crimea were horrible. According to Robertson:
About this time it was found that the English troops, many of whom were mere boys, had been suffering terribly in the Crimea through mismanagement, and it was proved before a select committee of the House of Commons that there had been inefficiency and utter confusion. Mr. Dundas had seen shiploads of fresh vegetables lying in Balaklava which remained there until they went rotten; the army at that time was suffering severely from scurvy, and these vegetables had been expressly sent for as the only remedy for that disease. At the cavalry camp, about a mile from Balaklava, horses were picketed without clothing or any other protection from the inclement weather. They were, moreover, starving; although all the time, within a mile and a half of Balaklava, tons of bran in bags were lying on the muddy banks of the harbour, and it seemed to be the duty of no one to convey this to the horses. While the army was perishing with cold at the camp and in the trenches, there were lying in the harbour, close at hand, and easily procurable, immense quantities of driftwood, the remains of numerous vessels wrecked in the severe snowstorm; but no hand was allowed by those in authority to touch or gather it. 65

The cause of this terrible state of things was not brought about by a lack of bravery or deficiency of morale. It was not caused by brilliant Russian strategy or an unyielding defense. According to Briggs: "The reason was simply that, although the workshop of the world, Britain was well-equipped to buy military glory. The army machine was creaking and inefficient; there was no adequate provision for food, supplies, transport, or the care of the sick and wounded. Forty years of Parliamentary economy had left the army incapable of facing the daily problems of active service, particularly in such a remote and unfriendly theatre of operations." 66

Although a great many men died in battle, a great many more of them died of cholera and sickness. The reason for this was
that the hospitals were also kept in a filthy state. In order to try and remedy this situation, Florence Nightengale was commissioned to take charge of all hospitals and nurses in the Crimea. One of the nurses under her, Martha Clough, wrote the following passage to her friend, Mary Roxburgh: "But what I can gather, and what I know of the weather, which is here most bitter—snow and frost for the last three weeks and frequent storms—the sufferings of our Army must be fearful. Many of the sick and frost-bitten arrive at the hospitals almost without clothing. Hundreds of shirts and other have been given—and yet more are and will be wanted." In another letter, she wrote: "I hope we shall be able to do all the good that is required for those poor sick and suffering creatures—God help them! The amount of sick is something fearful—5,000 I have been told—their toes and feet dropping off from being frost-bitten; oh! it makes one's heart ache." In spite of the brilliant work of these few nurses, there were still 5,700 cases of cholera in the allied camps in a single month. Of these only 2,000 recovered.

While the condition of the troops in the Crimea was atrocious, the condition of those people in England was also growing steadily worse. According to Robertson:

The mourners of those who had perished were to be seen frequently parading English towns and villages; their hearths had been rendered desolate; their modest homes had been broken up for ever by the criminal waste of British life in the East; and thousands 'of desolate women in their far-off homes waited to hear the step that never came'. Meanwhile,
persons who had been in pretty good circumstances when the war commenced lost their situations through the depression in trade. 69

Bright's concern for the people and their economic hardships was also clearly demonstrated in each of his four speeches. In his third speech, Bright reiterated what he had stated in each of his three previous ones:

Your country is not in an advantageous state at this moment; from one end of the kingdom to the other there is a general collapse of industry. Those members of this house not intimately acquainted with the trade and commerce of the country do not fully comprehend our position as to the diminution of employment and the lessening of wages. An increase in the cost of living is finding its way to the homes and hearts of a vast number of the labouring population. 70

Passages such as this did cause the government to try and alleviate the economic hardships of the people. In her article, "Economic Warfare in the Crimean War," Olive Anderson states that the government took three steps to regulate the economy of the nation to correspond with the war effort: "First, control of the export from Britain of certain war material; secondly, abstention from seizing enemy property on neutral ships and from privateering coupled with the blockade of enemy ports and capture of contraband of war and enemy despatches; and thirdly, the legalizing of trade with the enemy, apart from the actual entry of British ships into Russian ports." 71 These first two steps occurred early in the war. As the economic situation grew worse, the third step was formalized.

Despite all of this, the economy in England still continued to suffer. The economies of France and Russia also suffered:
As soon as the war was declared, British industry received a check. Russia at once commenced to neglect agriculture, and the French peasant was called to leave his fields to enlist. The English artisan experienced the dire misfortune of witnessing his handicraft decline, and many were induced to join the army to be slaughtered in defense of a treacherous ally. Instead of taxation being reduced as was expected in the previous year, the income-tax had to be doubled, and the spirit duty and the malt-tax increased.72

Because he was a cotton manufacturer, Bright was able to see first-hand some of the effects that the war was having in England. He would have been the first to agree with the suitor of Florence Nightingale, Richard Milnes, when he commented at the end of the hostilities, "we shall have 10% income tax and 0% benefit to mankind."73

As the situation in England grew steadily worse, the English press kept the people well-informed of the blunders in the Crimea. According to Briggs:

The English Press during the course of the war behaved like a 'fourth estate' of the realm. Led by the Times, the leading newspaper in Europe with a circulation of 40,000, it provided not only information but constant criticism and propaganda. Delane, the editor of the Times, had visited the Near East to view the theatre of operations, and was better prepared for the war than was the government; Russell, his famous war correspondent, exposed every blunder in the Crimea with such ruthlessness that his critics at home accused him of treason. Journalists during the war began to realize that publicity was their trade and that their readers welcomed sensational revelation more enthusiastically than bare facts. Such a realization enlivened the newspapers but shocked the ministers in the government.74

Sensationalistic journalism such as this caused some of the radical politicians in the House to demand the creation of a
Parliamentary committee to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol. The eventual vote on the formation of this committee caused the fall of the Aberdeen Government. Palmerston then became the new Prime Minister.

The emergence of Palmerston as Prime Minister had a very great effect on Bright's final two speeches. The English people and press were very disgusted with the war and the way in which it was being handled. Bright was greatly encouraged by this, and made a colossal error in judgment. He evidently interpreted the disgust of the people as a desire for peace. In his first speech after Palmerston became Prime Minister, Bright tried to conciliate himself with those he had previously criticized. Although he placed the blame for the conflict on Palmerston and Lord Russell, he complimented them on their abilities and their knowledge of foreign affairs. This was very surprising in that Bright had commented bitterly that "50,000 men had died to make Palmerston Prime Minister." Nevertheless, Bright pleaded with him to end the war and, thus, win the love and gratitude of the people.

Palmerston, however, was able to interpret public feeling more accurately than Bright. The people did not want peace. They wanted a great war leader like Lord Chatham. To the great mass of the people the situation called for the replacement of "those found wanting by more heroic individuals." In the eyes of the people, the replacement of Aberdeen by Palmerston "pontended the triumph of the strong war leader for whom they craved more than ever."
While Palmerston realized all of this, he also recognized that the British could not hope to defeat Russia, secure as it was in its great land mass. But Palmerston needed military victories in order to end the war on a victorious note. As a result, he was never serious about the peace negotiations in Vienna until Sebastopol had fallen.

When Bright realized what Palmerston's strategy really was, he made his most bitter attack on the Government since the war had begun. After he had attempted to demean the reasons for fighting the war, he attacked both Palmerston and Lord Russell personally.

The influence of the scene upon Bright's speeches cannot be emphasized enough. Almost every element of the scene was present in some way in all four speeches. The four speeches were truly rhetorical responses to the situation.
NOTES


2Burke, p. 19.


18Trevelyan, pp. 26-7.

20 Burke, Grammar of Motives, p. xix.


22 Trevelyan, p. 17.

23 Read, p. 72.


29 Read, p. 109.

30 Read, pp. 109-10.

31 Read, p. 112.

32 Read, p. 112.

33 Read, pp. 112-3.


35 Ausubel, p. 52.


38 Ausubel, p. 4.


40 Ausubel, p. 32.

41 Ausubel, p. 44.
Read, p. 86.


44 Ausubel, p. 40.

45 Read, p. 91.


47 Robertson, p. 5.

48 Trevelyan, pp. 35-6.

49 Trevelyan, p. 37.

50 Read, p. 117.


53 Fisher, 161.

54 Fisher, 162.


58 Ausubel, p. 11.

59 Ausubel, p. 4.

60 Burke, Grammar of Motives, pp. 3-7.


63 Briggs, 545.


65 Robertson, pp. 314-5.

67 Briggs, 550.
68 Roxburgh, 75.
69 Robertson, p. 315.
72 Robertson, p. 304.
73 Briggs, 542.
74 Briggs, 551-2.
77 Anderson, 550.
CHAPTER IV

AGENCY, PURPOSE, AND RATIO ANALYSIS

According to Burke, "The primary emphasis of rhetorical criticism should be vested in agency." The term agency refers to all the means used by the agent to accomplish his purpose.

Another closely related term is strategy. According to Holland, a strategy is "a plan of attack, a key to meeting a problem or situation." Nichols defined strategy as a "naming of the associative grouping of ideas which the speaker makes in his language." A strategy is the pattern or plan the agent follows in trying to achieve his ultimate end of identification or consubstantiality.

Because Man is a symbol-using animal, he develops strategies to explain situations which he may encounter, and indicates his strategies for dealing with these situations through his use of language. Because verbal symbols are meaningful acts in response to situations from which motives can be derived, a rhetorical critic should be able to discover an agent's rhetorical strategies by a careful study of the language he employed in the speech or speeches. The name of a particular strategy is determined by the type of language an agent employs and by what the language attempts to accomplish.

Another concept related to Burkean identification is that of properties. Even though each person differs from other people,
one can still find common properties for the purpose of identification. For example, an agent might appeal to the values of an audience. People's properties can be viewed as substance through which sender and receivers are united by identification strategies, hopefully into consubstantiality. Consubstantiality is the ultimate in identification. In the *Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke summarized the concept of consubstantiality: "For substance was an act and a way of life, an acting together. In acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas that make them consubstantial."\(^4\)

The audience becomes a very important factor in an agency analysis. Obviously, if identification is to be achieved, there must be receivers of the message. Because the four speeches to be analyzed were delivered during Parliamentary sessions, Bright's immediate audience consisted of members of Parliament and such spectators as chose to sit in the galleries. Furthermore, because the four speeches were delivered during debates on crucial matters, the speeches were well attended.

Bright's secondary audience consisted of England itself. Since Bright had won fame during the days of the Anti-Corn Law League's campaign for the abolishment of the corn tariffs, Bright's utterances were always well reported in the English press. Aside from such radical members of the 'Manchester School' as Richard Cobden and Milner Gibson, the members of Parliament who heard Bright's speeches supported the war and were thus against the stand that Bright advocated. Neither were the
English people in the mood for peace. All factors taken into consideration, the audiences who either heard or read Bright's speeches tended to be against his anti-war stand.

Bright was well aware of the problems he faced with regard to achieving identification with his audience. His desire for peace had isolated him not only from most of his fellow members of Parliament, but also from his countrymen and his constituents. Bright's knowledge of this was very instrumental in his selection of a rhetorical style and rhetorical strategies to meet the situation. While Bright was not the type to sit by and say nothing regarding a course of action he felt to be wrong, he realized that he must be very careful in opposing the government, the people, and the press in their current state of frenzy. The method Bright used to attack the Crimean War is summed up best by George M. Trevelyan:

If he had taken high 'Quaker' ground, condemning all war, he would have accomplished little. But he never denied the abstract right to take up arms on good occasion, and shortly afterwards proved his good faith by supporting the suppression of the Indian Mutiny and of the slave-owners' secession in America. On the Crimean question he met the wise men of the Foreign Office and of the Treasury Bench on their ground, and routed them on their own dispatches as reported in their own Blue Books. He showed them, in the mysteries of which they claimed to be high priests, to be the muddlers that such lofty claimants often are. He exposed the wordy superstitions of the Foreign Office for which England gave 30,000 gallant lives of her own, and sacrificed half a million lives of men of other nations, and brought a misery and starvation once more to the doors of our people at home. Only the union of a clear understanding of the facts and issues with an oratory as dignified as it was telling in its emotional effects, could have driven home that most
needful lesson to the rulers and people of Britain, for a while.\textsuperscript{5}

Bright's voice and delivery were very conducive to the method he had chosen to oppose the war. According to Trevelyan, Bright could not debate in the manner of a Gladstone with "arms overhead and eyes flashing."\textsuperscript{6} Instead, he had "no gesture except to raise his hand, and that not above the level of his breast."\textsuperscript{7} This type of delivery added much to the cool, deliberative style of debate that Bright tried to use. Furthermore, his voice was very helpful in that "he never had to shout in order that it might thrill with its music the farthest corner of the largest hall."\textsuperscript{8}

In a Burkeian analysis of agency, a rhetorical critic must ask the questions, 'What were the symbols of authority?' and 'Did the agent accept or reject these symbols?' During the period in which Bright's four speeches were given, the Ministries of Aberdeen and Palmerston represented the symbols of authority. They were the symbols of authority because they were responsible for England's involvement in the Crimean War and only they could extricate the country from it. In his speeches of March 31, 1854, December 22, 1854, and June 7, 1855, Bright rejected the symbols of authority. In these speeches, rejection was his major rhetorical strategy. Only in his speech of February 23, 1855, did Bright accept these symbols. Thus, the major strategy here was acceptance. Because the sub-strategies Bright used to reject the symbols of authority overlapped considerably in the
first two speeches, these have been examined together. Although
Bright also used the same strategy of rejection in his speech of
June 7, 1855, certain scenic events caused him to change his
sub-strategies. Thus, this speech has been examined separately.
Finally, the sub-strategies employed in the speech in which he
accepted these symbols of authority have also been examined
separately.

In the speeches of March 31, 1854, and December 22, 1854,
the first major sub-strategy Bright used was that of disasso-
ciation. Bright employed this sub-strategy on two levels.
First, Bright wished to let it be known that he had disasso-
ciated himself from the policies of the British government. At
the beginning of the speech on March 31, Bright stated: "I feel,
however, that we are entering upon a policy which may affect the
fortunes of this country for a long time to come, and I am
unwilling to lose this opportunity of explaining wherein I
differ from the course which the government has pursued, and of
clearing myself from any portion of the responsibility which
attaches to those who support the policy which the government
has adopted." Bright reiterated this disassociation again on
December 22, 1854: "And, even if I were alone, if mine were a
solitary voice, raised amid the din of arms and the clamour of a
venal press, I should have the consolation I have tonight--and
which I trust will be mine to the last moment of my existence--
the priceless consolation that no word of mine has tended to
promote the squandering of my country's treasure or the spilling
of one single drop of my country's blood."
Bright also used the sub-strategy of disassociation to separate himself from his religion. He did this on March 31, in the following manner:

I shall not discuss this question on the abstract principle of peace at any price, as it is termed, which is held by a small minority of persons in this country, founded on religious opinions not generally received, but I shall discuss it entirely on principles which are accepted by all members of this House. I shall maintain that when we are deliberating on the question of war, and endeavoring to prove its justice or necessity, it becomes us to show that the interests of the country are clearly involved; that the objects for which the war is undertaken are probable or, at least, possible of attainment; and further, that the end proposed to be accomplished is worth the cost and sacrifices which we are about to incur.

As was noted by Trevelyan, Bright would have accomplished little if he had based his arguments on Quaker principles. He decided not to argue about abstractions but about realities. Thus, it was necessary to inform his audience of this.

Although this sub-strategy was disassociation, Bright used it to attain identification with his audience. Words and phrases such as "fortunes of this country," "country's treasure," "country's blood," and "interests of the country" all represent properties or common substance that Bright shared with his audience. On the other hand, Quaker religious principles were a property that was not shared by Bright and his audience. Thus, Bright tried to disassociate himself from it. Furthermore, in that the war was damaging to the country, Bright disassociated himself from the policy that advocated it. By pointing out the ways in which the war was harming the country, Bright hoped that
his countrymen would see the errors of their ways and join with him in pressing for peace. This was not to be the case, however. By using the sub-strategy of disassociation, Bright implied that he was willing to stand alone and continue his course whether anyone joined him or not. Most of the members of the House were perfectly willing to let him do just that.

The next sub-strategy that he used in the March and December speeches was that of degradation. In his speech of March 31, Bright referred to the Turkish Empire as having "fallen into a state of decay and anarchy so permanent as to have assumed a chronic character." He also stated that the current government was committed to a policy which placed the country in the hands of the Turks, "the very last hands in which I am willing to trust the interests and the future of this country." On December 22, Bright stated that: "The only sign of improvement which has been manifested that I know of is, that on a great emergency . . . the Turks managed to make an expiring effort, and to get up an army which the Government, so far as I can hear, has since permitted to be almost destroyed."

Another sub-strategy closely linked to degradation was that of Christian Superiority. Bright used this sub-strategy in the following manner on March 31:

But suppose that Turkey is not a growing power, but that the Ottoman rule in Europe is tottering to its fall, I come to the conclusion that, whatever advantages were afforded to the Christian population of Turkey would have enabled them to grow more rapidly in numbers, in industry, in wealth, in intelligence, and in political power; and that, as they thus
increased in influence, they would have become more able, in case any accident, which might not be far distant, occurred, to supplant the Mahomedan rule, and to establish themselves in Constantinople as a Christian State, which, I think, is infinitely more to be desired than that the Mahomedan power should be permanently sustained by the bayonets of France and the fleets of England.15

Bright also stated that, if the English had not interfered with the Russian demands, "the whole matter would have drifted on to its natural solution—which is, that the Mahomedan power in Europe should eventually succumb to the growing power of the Christian population in the Turkish territories."16

Bright employed these two sub-strategies to attempt to correct what he felt was a false impression the English people had of the Turks. As has been previously mentioned, the English viewed the Turks as 'helpless lambs being threatened by a ravenous wolf'. Because this was also the view of the pro-war advocates, Bright attempted to refute this by charging that the Turks, under a Moslem government, were degenerate and unworthy to be the ally of a Christian nation such as England. Bright attempted to do this through the common property of Christian Superiority. This was a common property because until 1858 every member of Parliament had to take an oath "on the true faith as a Christian." He tried to show that, if it had not been for English and French interference, the Russian demands would have eventually resulted in the ascendancy of the Turkish Christians to the position of rulers. Bright tried to get his audience to identify with the injustice that the war had done to the Turkish adherents of their religion.
The next sub-strategy used by Bright was that of derision. Bright used this strategy on two levels. First, he attempted to ridicule the balance of power theory that was held by many Parliamentary members. In the March 31 speech, Bright stated:

Austria has a divided people, bankrupt finances, and her credit is so low that she cannot borrow a shilling out of her own territories; England has a united people, national wealth rapidly increasing, and a mechanical and productive power to which that of Austria is as nothing. Might not Austria complain that we have disturbed the 'balance of power' because we are growing so much stronger from better government, from the greater union of our people, from the wealth that is created by the hard labour and skill of our population, and from the wonderful development of the mechanical resources of the kingdom, which is seen on every side?17

Bright noted on December 22 that the final outcome of the war was likely to upset the balance of power that everyone seemed so anxious to preserve with the statement that "whatever else may be the result of the war in which Turkey has plunged Europe, this one thing is certain, that at its conclusion there may be no Turkish Empire to talk about."18

The second level on which this sub-strategy was used had to do with the official policy towards Turkey. Bright ridiculed this by asking on March 31: "At the present moment, there are no less than three foreign armies on Turkish soil; there are 100,000 Russian troops in Bulgaria; there are armies from England and France approaching the Dardanelles, to entrench themselves on Turkish territory, and to return nobody knows when. All can hardly contribute to the 'independence' of any country."19 On December 22, Bright asked the House the following question: "Is
it that he (Palmerston) has discovered, when this war is over, that Turkey, which he has undertaken to protect, the Empire which he is to defend and sustain against the Emperor of Russia, will have been smothered under his affectionate embrace?" 20

On the first level, Bright attempted to achieve identification with his audience through such common properties as "united people," "national wealth," "mechanical and productive power." The point he tried to make to his audience was that it was foolish to risk all that England had gained over the past forty years for the maintenance of something that did not exist. Bright followed up on this by trying to show that the object for which the English went to war, to maintain the independence of Turkey, was impossible to attain, regardless of the outcome.

The next sub-strategy used by Bright was the property of nationalism. This sub-strategy used substance on two levels. The first was national pride. Bright attempted to demonstrate to his countrymen that European alliances and the wars that were often the result of these were draining away England's manpower and resources. In order to reinforce this claim, Bright made several references to the growing power of the United States. By following a policy of isolationism, the United States would one day surpass England as the world's greatest power. Bright expounded upon this belief in his March 31 speech:

Give us seven years of this infatuated struggle upon which we are now entering, and let the United States remain at peace during that period, and who shall say what will then be the relative positions of the two nations? Have you read the reports of your own
commissioners to the New York Exhibition? Do you comprehend what is the progress of that country, as exhibited in its tonnage, and exports, and imports, and manufactures, and in the development of all its resources, and the means of transit? There has been nothing like it hitherto under the sun. The United States may profit to a large extent by the calamities which will befall us; whilst we, under the miserable and lunatic idea that we are about to set the worn out Turkish Empire on its legs, and permanently to sustain it against the aggressions of Russia, are entangled in a war. Our trade will decay and diminish--our people, suffering and discontented, as in all former periods of war, will emigrate in increasing numbers to a country whose wise policy is to keep itself free from the entanglement of European politics--to a country with which rests the great question, whether England shall, for any long time, retain that which she professes to value so highly--her great superiority in industry and at sea.

Bright knew that the English pride in their position of being the world's greatest power was a substance with which all Englishmen could identify. By using the sub-strategy of nationalism on this level, Bright hoped that the English pride would overcome their desire for war.

The second level on which Bright used the sub-strategy of nationalism was that of national suffering. On this level, Bright tried to illustrate that the suffering endured by the nation as a result of the war was both emotional and economic. On December 22, Bright stated: "In every village, cottages are to be found into which sorrow has entered, and as I believe, through the policy of the Ministry, which might have been avoided."

On March 31, Bright issued the following warning about the state of the economy:

With regard to trade, I can speak with some authority as to the state of things in Lancashire. The Russian
trade is not only at an end, but it is made an
offence against the law to deal with any of our
customers in Russia. The German trade is most
injuriously affected by the uncertainty which pre-
vails on the continent of Europe. The Levant
trade, a very important branch, is almost extin-
guished in the present state of affairs in Greece,
Turkey, in Europe, and Syria. All property is
diminishing in value, whilst its burdens are
increasing. The funds have fallen in value to the
amount of about £ 120,000,000 sterling, and rail-
way property is quoted at about £ 80,000,000 less
than was the case a year ago.23

By arguing on these two levels, Bright tried to show the
pro-war advocates that the suffering of the nation was both emo-
tional and economic, and that the objects for which the war was
being fought were not worth it. He attempted to achieve iden-
tification with his fellow members of Parliament by stressing
that they all shared in the nation's miseries.

When Bright used the sub-strategy of nationalism on the
level of emotional national suffering, he was very effective and
achieved the identification that he sought. However, he committed
a serious error when he employed the sub-strategy on the level of
economic national suffering. Bright used this sub-strategy in
all four speeches. By using this sub-strategy, Bright earned for
himself the following description by Alfred, Lord Tennyson:

This Broad-Brimm'd Hawker of Holy Things,
Whose ear is cramm'd with his cotton, and rings
Even in dreams to the chink of his pence;

In other words, the English people felt that Bright was opposing
the war because the decrease in trade was harming his own busi-
ness in cotton, and he was losing profits because of it. While
this assumption was false, Bright's use of the sub-strategy of
economic national suffering did little to disprove it. Furthermore, in using this sub-strategy, Bright was arguing practicalities. The English people, however, were not interested in such mundane things as economy and trade. They were interested in liberating the oppressed nationalities of Europe. Thus, Bright's use of this sub-strategy on this level was a dismal failure.

The final sub-strategy used by Bright in his speeches of March 31 and December 22 was that of moral indignation. While this sub-strategy was implied throughout all of the speeches, Bright used it very effectively when denouncing the behavior of certain Ministers of the Aberdeen government at the Reform Club banquet. Bright was appalled at their flippant remarks regarding the declaration of war, and, on December 22 asked: "There was the buffoonery at the Reform Club. Was that becoming a matter of this grave nature? Has there been a solemnity of manner in the speeches heard in connection with this war--and have Ministers shown themselves statesmen and Christian men when speaking on a subject of this nature?" On March 31, Bright made the statement: "I believe, if this country, seventy years ago, had adopted the principle of non-intervention in every case where her interests were not directly and obviously assailed, that she would have been saved from much of the pauperism and brutal crimes by which our Government and people have alike been disgraced."
By using this strategy, Bright was seeking identification with his audience through the common property of Christian morality. Bright attempted to show his audience that England had not and was not conducting herself in the manner of a Christian nation. By pointing this out to his audience, Bright hoped that they would be ashamed enough to correct it.

The final sub-strategy used by Bright in the two speeches was that of scapegoating. Once again, this was directed at the Turks. On March 31, Bright stated: "The Turkish Council, consisting of a large number of dignitaries of the Turkish Empire—not one of whom, however, represented the Christian majority of the population of Turkey, but inspired by the fanaticism and desperation of the old Mohammedan party—assembled; and, fearful that peace would be established, and that they would lose the great opportunity of dragging England and France into a war with their ancient enemy the Emperor of Russia, they came to a sudden resolution in favor of war."26 Again, on December 22, Bright made the Turks the scapegoats for causing the war in Europe by referring to the war "in which Turkey has plunged Europe."27

By using this sub-strategy, Bright was trying to dispel some of the anti-Russian feeling that pervaded the country. He knew that this hostility toward Russia was one reason why the war had received such enthusiastic support. By claiming, however, that Turkey was the cause of such hostilities, he hoped to channel some of this hostility toward the Turks. Bright felt that they, and not the Russians, were the real instigators. Thus,
Bright tried to identify with his audience through the common property of humiliation, his receivers would react with anger toward the Turks for having fooled them.

In his speech of June 7, 1855, Bright retained the major strategy of rejection. However, because of certain scenic events that had occurred, Bright shifted his sub-strategies. The effect of these scenic events on Bright's strategies have been discussed in greater depth in the scene-agencies ratio later in this chapter.

Up until this speech, Bright's sub-strategies had been used to contradict philosophies or policies. In one case, that of the Turks, Bright used sub-strategies to attack a nation. In the June 7 speech, though, Bright's sub-strategies were not directed at issues, but at personalities. He did use two strategies that he had used in his two previous speeches; moral indignation and appeal to nationalism on the levels of national pride and national suffering. He also used the sub-strategy of scapegoating, but in an entirely different way.

In this speech, he used the sub-strategy of chastisement. His most outstanding use of it was with regard to the British behavior towards the Russians at the peace negotiations. Bright believed that the British negotiators were making impossible demands of the Russians, and treating them in a condescending manner. He voiced his disapproval of this on June 7 in the following manner:

Some hon. Gentlemen talk as if Russia were a Power which you could take to Bow Street, and bind over
before some stipendiary magistrate to keep the peace for six months. Russia is a great Power, as England is, and in treating with her you must consider that the Russian Government has to consult its own dignity, its own interests, and public opinion, just as much at least as the Government of this country.28

Bright then used the sub-strategy of villification. This sub-strategy was used by Bright to demonstrate to his audience that those in authority were not fit to govern. He used this sub-strategy particularly well against members of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet because of their blunders and inconsistencies. Bright summed up his feeling about them in the following statement: "I will ask the House in this state of things whether they are disposed to place implicit confidence in Her Majesty's Ministers? On that [the Opposition] side of the House there is not, I believe, much confidence in the Government; and on this side I suspect there are many men who are wishful that at this critical moment the affairs of the country should be under the guidance of men of greater solidity and better judgment."29

However, the two men who felt the brunt of this sub-strategy were Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell. Bright felt that these two were primarily responsible for the current crises that England was facing. In his speech, Bright stated that Lord John Russell was afflicted with "moral cowardice which in every man is the death of all true statesmanship."30 Lord Palmerston fared even worse as Bright attacked him as "a man who has experience, but who, with experience has not gained wisdom—as a man who has age, but who, with age, has not the gravity of age, and who, now
occupying the highest of power, has—and I say it with pain—not appeared influenced by a due sense of the responsibility that belongs to that elevated position."

Bright then employed the sub-strategy of scapegoating. Instead of directing this sub-strategy toward the Turks as he had done in his first two speeches, however, he directed it in this speech toward both Palmerston and Russell. Whereas he had made the Turks the scapegoats for causing the war, he now made Palmerston and Russell the scapegoats for involving England in the war in the following manner: "We are now in the hands of these two noble Lords. They are the authors of the war. It lies between them that peace was not made at Vienna upon some proper terms. And whatever disasters may be in store for this country or for Europe, they will lie at the doors of these noble Lords." By employing the sub-strategies of chatisement, villification, and scapegoating, Bright tried to show that those in the positions of authority were unfit to govern and to unite his audience against them. Britain was facing crises both in the Crimea and at home. Bright hoped that by proving that these crises were the fault of the Palmerston government, they would be ousted, and peace would return.

These sub-strategies represented poor choices on Bright's part, however. It was true that Britain was in trouble. Most Englishmen, however, felt that immediate peace was not the answer. They wanted a Prime Minister who could extricate from Crimea with some semblance of national honor. They needed a
charismatic leader they could rally around. They felt that Palmerston was the only man in England who could do all of these things. Thus, when Bright made such bitter attacks on Palmerston, his sub-strategies only added to his unpopularity.

The one speech in which Bright used acceptance as his major strategy was delivered on February 23, 1855. Of the four speeches, this was undoubtedly the strangest and the most interesting.

Bright began this speech with the sub-strategy of conciliation. He addressed Lord Palmerston in the following manner: "I am one of those who do not wish to see the Government of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton overthrown. The House knows well, and nobody knows better than the noble Lord, that I have never been one of his ardent and enthusiastic supporters . . . but I hope that I do not bear to him, as I can honestly say that I do not bear to any man in this House . . . any feeling that takes even the tinge of personal animosity."33

Bright then reinforced his conciliatory sub-strategy with the sub-strategy of disassociation. In this speech, however, he was not disassociating himself with the Government. Instead, he was disassociating himself with his previous rhetorical strategies. He stated, "We are at war, and I shall not say one single sentence with regard to the policy of the war or its origin, and I know not that I shall say a single word with regard to the conduct of it."34

Another reinforcing sub-strategy of Bright's was that of commendation. He directed this sub-strategy toward both
Palmerston and Russell in this way: "The noble Lord at the head of the Government has long been a great authority with many persons in this country upon foreign policy. His late colleague and present envoy to Vienna, has long been a great authority with a large portion of the people of this country upon almost all political questions."35

These three sub-strategies were representative of a strong appeal for unification. Bright tried to demonstrate to Palmerston and his audience his sincere desire for peace. What he tried to accomplish was to show Palmerston that he was not concerned with ruining the Prime Minister's political career. Peace was his first and foremost desire. As long as peace was attained, it made no difference to Bright who attained it.

Bright then used the sub-strategy of peace appeal. This sub-strategy was a further demonstration of Bright's sincere desire for peace. He asked the following question of Palmerston: "I should like to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government—although I am not sure if he will feel that he can or ought to answer the question—whether the noble Lord the Member for London (Russell) has power, after discussions have commenced, and as soon as there shall be established good grounds for believing that negotiations for peace will prove successful, to enter into any armistice?"36 This was another strong appeal for unification. Bright felt that if the nations of Europe could be re-united, then re-unification could once again occur at home.
This question was answered by a cry of 'No! No!' from somewhere in the House. At this point, Bright's sub-strategy changed. He shifted back to the sub-strategy of moral indignation he employed in the rejection strategy speeches. In reply to this outburst, Bright replied:

I know not, Sir, who it is that says 'No! No!', but I should like to see any man get up and say that the destruction of 200,000 human lives lost on all sides during the course of this unhappy conflict is not a sufficient sacrifice. You are not pretending to conquer territory—you are not pretending to hold fortified or unfortified towns; you have offered terms of peace which, as I understand them, I do not say are moderate; and breathes there a man in this House or in this country whose appetite for blood is so insatiable that, even when terms of peace have been offered and accepted, he pines for that assault in which of Russian, Turk, French, and English, as sure as one man dies, 20,000 corpses will strew the streets of Sebastopol. 37

Bright then shifted back to the sub-strategy of peace appeal by repeating his question regarding the armistice to Lord Palmerston. He also returned to the sub-strategy of disassociation with the statement: "I am not now complaining of the war—I am not now complaining of the terms of peace, not, indeed, of anything that has been done." 38 It was obvious that he was trying to recapture the mood he had created before his strategy shift.

Bright's final two sub-strategies complimented each other perfectly. The first of these was the sub-strategy of reproach. He used this strategy to maximum effectiveness by blaming the pro-war advocates for the current state of unrest in the nation and the Parliamentary crisis. He stated:

The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings.
There is no one, as when the first-born were slain of old to sprinkle with blood the lintel and the two side-posts of our doors, that he may spare and pass on; he takes his victims from the castle of the noble, the mansions of the wealthy, and the cottage of the poor and lowly, and it is on behalf of all these classes that I make this solemn appeal.39

The effect upon the House was electric. Through the use of the Angel of Death metaphor, Bright achieved consubstantiality. Death was as common a property as life. It was a property belonging to everyone. Furthermore, death was a substance that was becoming shared by too many people in Britain at that time.

Upon uniting his audience as one, Bright followed with the sub-strategy of exoneration. Because the Angel of Death passage had filled everyone with a sense of guilt, Bright attempted to relieve this sense by offering his audience a way to exonerate themselves. He stated that the only way out was an immediate restoration of peace. Once again this was used as a unification symbol. Bright closed with the sub-strategy of sustenance by assuring Palmerston that "if he be ready, honestly and frankly to endeavor, by the negotiations about to be opened at Vienna, to put an end to this war, no word of mine, no vote of mine, will be given to shake his power for one single moment, or to change his position in this House."40

Of the four speeches given by John Bright, this one came the closest to being successful. Bright honestly and sincerely tried to affect a compromise between himself and the pro-war advocates. He made the strongest attempt he made during his
Crimean War speeches to end the war, not through rejection but through acceptance. Unfortunately, one scenic event which he could neither foresee nor control prevented this speech from attaining its purpose. That event was Palmerston's determination to continue the war until the fall of Sebastopol so that English honor would be satisfied.

Regarding Bright's use of sub-strategies, he made three mistakes which prevented his speeches from being effective. First, his sub-strategy of disassociation was misleading to his audience. Even though he was trying to achieve identification, his language implied that he was content to stand by and criticize instead of joining and attempting to change. Second, his over-use of the sub-strategy of nationalism on the level of economic national suffering damaged his image. His audience believed that his purpose in opposing the war was that the war was injuring him financially. Third, his attack of Lord Palmerston was badly timed. At that time, the English regarded Palmerston as their 'saviour', and people did not appreciate such an attack on such a figure.

An analysis of the strategies or agencies is not complete without some mention of the various types of forms an agent used. There are five types of form an agent can make use of; syllogistic progression, qualitative progression, repetitive form, conventional form, and minor or incidental form.

Syllogistic progression lists the types of arguments in such a way that their total development seems reasonable. Where
there is an effect, there must be a cause and vice-versa. In his Crimean War speeches, John Bright used very few, if any, syllogisms. He would list for his audience his points of argument and then tell them the conclusion that they were to arrive at. He made very little use of syllogistic progressions.

Qualitative progression deals with tone. This element of form attempts to create a mood whereby another can smoothly follow. Bright used this element in the three rejection strategy speeches. He would begin with a tone of calm argumentation, progress to a more emotional tone when dealing with such topics as national suffering, and conclude with remarks that were of a high moral tone. In his one acceptance strategy speech, this element of form is missing because of his unexpected shifts in strategy.

Bright was a master of repetitive form. This element of form is the restatement of the same thing in various ways. In describing Palmerston, Bright described him "as a man who has experience, but who with experience has not gained wisdom--as a man who has age, but who, with age, has not the gravity of age." In describing the effect of the increase in taxes, Bright said that they meant "bareness of furniture, of clothing, and of the table in many a cottage in Lancashire, in Suffolk, and in Dorsetshire. They mean an absence of medical attendance for a sick wife, an absence of the school pence for three or four little children."
Conventional form embodies the traditional interpretation of form as form. By using this type of form, a speaker must have an introduction, a body, and a conclusion in his speech. In all the Crimean War speeches, Bright used conventional form.

Minor or incidental form includes such rhetorical elements as metaphor, simile, parallelism, etc. Bright used this element of form with great effect. His most famous use of this form is the "Angel of Death" metaphor using language to unite his audience through their shared substance of loss or fear of death. He also used such parallelisms as "Austria has a divided people, bankrupt finances, and her credit is so low that she cannot borrow a shilling out of her territories; England has a united people, national wealth rapidly increasing, and a mechanical and productive power to which that of Austria is as nothing."

Finally, Bright used descriptive words and phrases to emphasize his sub-strategies. For example, his strategy of vilification towards Palmerston was emphasized by his description of Palmerston as a "reckless captain." Such references to the Turkish Empire as "decaying and dying" gave emphasis to the sub-strategy of degradation. In describing what England might have been if it were not for her habit of forming European alliances that led to wars, Bright said, "This country might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, and every person who treads its soil might have been sufficiently educated." These words lent poignancy to his strategy of derision. Finally, his metaphorical reference to Russia as "a
Power which you could take to Bow Street" gave added emphasis to his sub-strategy of chastisement.

Purpose

According to Burke, the purpose of all rhetoric is the salvation of mankind. This purpose of salvation is responsible for creating and justifying the strategies aimed at achieving it. In dealing with purpose, the rhetorical critic must ask such questions as, "Why was the speech given? What was the speaker trying to do?"

The analysis of purpose will be the shortest because of its implications in the act, agent, and agency analyses. In other words, the agent's choices of rhetorical strategies in the act reveal what his purpose was.

In the case of John Bright and the Crimean War, Burke's argument that salvation is the purpose of rhetoric is very strong. In every sense of the word, John Bright was trying to save his nation from the emotional and economic hardships of the war.

Bright's overall purpose was the restoration of peace. He tried to restore peace through two sub-purposes. The first was to discredit the symbols of authority in five ways.

1. He attempted to prove that the Turks, because of their decaying system of government, were unworthy as allies and not worth fighting a war over.
2. He tried to show that the actions of Russia were justified in that their demands would eventually have
resulted in the substitution of a Christian for a Moslem government in Turkey.

3. Bright hoped to show that the English government's philosophies and policies regarding foreign affairs were false and contradictory.

4. He tried to show how England would lose her position of world dominance to the United States if she continued to waste her manpower and resources in useless wars that did not relate directly to her interests.

5. He tried to prove that those in authority were not fit to govern a Christian nation.

Discrediting those in authority was the sub-purpose of his rejection strategy speeches. Bright hoped that if he could prove to the Parliament and English people how they had been led astray by those in authority, there would be a demand for peace.

The second sub-purpose was that of unification on his terms. Bright tried to unite himself with his Parliamentary opponents in the hope that this would bring about a more rapid restoration of peace. He tried to do this on four levels.

1. He tried to reconcile himself with the authority figures whom he had previously tried to discredit.

2. He disassociated himself from his previous rhetorical strategy of rejection.

3. He tried to impress upon those in authority that the government and the country were facing a serious
crisis, and that the only way to alleviate that crisis was by the immediate restoration of peace.

4. He pledged his loyal support to the government of Lord Palmerston providing Palmerston would seek peace in the manner prescribed by Bright.

In other words, Bright would not oppose those in authority. He would accept them as the symbols of authority. Before he would do so, however, the Palmerston government must follow Bright's prescription for peace.

As can be seen, strategy or agency and purpose are closely related. Bright's overall purpose was the restoration of peace. When Bright tried to achieve this through the sub-purpose of discrediting those in authority, he chose the strategy of rejection and its corresponding sub-strategies. When he tried to achieve this through the sub-purpose of unification on his terms, his major strategy was that of acceptance and the corresponding sub-strategies.

Ratio Analysis

After concluding the examination of the five elements of the pentad, it was discovered that the following three ratios were of significance.

Purpose-Scene Ratio

The third ratio of significance was the purpose-scene ratio. As was mentioned above, Bright had two sub-purposes. The reasons for this dual sub-purpose lay in the scene.
During Bright's first two speeches, he kept the strategy of rejection and the sub-purpose of discrediting those in authority. However, on February 23, 1855, he adopted the sub-purpose of unification on his terms along with acceptance as a strategy. The reasons for this unusual shift have been found in an analysis of the Parliamentary scenic circumference before the February 23 speech.

The Aberdeen Ministry found itself bearing the brunt of the criticism of the press for the mismanagement of the war and the state of things in the Crimea. According to Asa Briggs: "The mass of inflammatory matter stirred up some of the radical politicians to demand the setting up of a Parliamentary committee to inquire into the condition of the Army before Sebastopol. The leading advocate of direct investigation by Parliament was the vigorous independent member for Sheffield, John Arthur Roebuck, a shrewd politician who dealt in denunciations more happily than in proofs or arguments." 41

Roebuck was supported by the press and pushed his motion for a committee of inquiry with vigour. The Aberdeen government tried to resist Roebuck's motion for a committee of inquiry, but it was defeated by the enormous majority of 305 votes to 148. The House of Commons was so amazed at the size of the majority that when the figures were announced they were greeted not with the usual cheers but with "profound silence followed by derisive laughter." 42
As a result of this, the Aberdeen Ministry fell. According to Briggs, "the government had been condemned "to the most ignominious end recorded of any Cabinet in modern days". Later, Lord Derby was asked to form a ministry. He was unable to do so and thus, at the age of seventy, Palmerston became the new Prime Minister. For the most part, his appointment was greeted with approval by the press and the people. A War Minister was needed after the mold of Chatham. To the majority of the English people, Palmerston seemed to be the only man in the country capable of extricating the country from the Crimean situation with some semblance of honor.

When Bright learned of Palmerston's appointment as Prime Minister, he recorded in his diary, "Palmerston Prime Minister! What a hoax! The aged charlatan has at length attained the great object of his long and unscrupulous ambition ... it passes my comprehension how the country is to be saved from its disasters and disgrace by a man who is over 70 years of age, partly deaf and blind, and who has never been known to do anything on which a solid reputation could be built, and whose colleagues are, with one exception, the very men under whose Govt. everything has been mismanaged."

This entry was written of February 14, 1855. From this it seemed that Bright would pursue the same sub-purpose of attempting to discredit the authorities. However, this was not to be the case. Bright was tired of the abuse he was receiving at the hands of the press and the people of England.
At the successful conclusion of the Anti-Corn Law crusade, both Cobden and Bright were famous, popular, and very much in the public's eye. The way in which each reacted to this sudden fame was interesting. To be sure, Cobden was no publicity seeker. It was simply that the newspaper writers had needed an individual on whom to focus attention in order to humanize the repeal movement. They had seized on him, and he became famous. However, he could have cared less. On the other hand, John Bright "learned how powerful his own need for recognition was and how gratifying it was to be recognized."\textsuperscript{45}

For taking his anti-war stand, however, Bright was ridiculed by the press and burned in effigy by a portion of his constituents. Bright was crushed. The very people he had labored so hard for had turned against him. According to Herman Ausubel:

Although Bright never questioned the correctness of his view of the war, he did worry a great deal about the effect that his unpopular stand might have on his political future... At one moment he felt confident that Cobden and he would emerge undamaged by their anti-war position; at another he doubted that they could survive politically. More and more he came to believe that they would have to wait for the return of peace for their exoneration. Then the British would know how many lives and how much money they had sacrificed to achieve so little, and he and Cobden would at last be appreciated.\textsuperscript{46}

Thus, Bright hoped that the war would soon end so that he might once again satisfy his need for public recognition and approval.

On the sixteenth of February, Bright received hope that the war might be coming to an end. On that day, he had a conversation with Sidney Herbert who, at that time, was still a member
of Lord Palmerston's newly formed cabinet. He asked Herbert about the possibilities of peace. He recorded in his diary that Herbert had said that "he thought there were hopes of a settlement; that Lord John would hardly go to Vienna if he did not believe he could make peace." 47

On the twentieth of February, Bright talked with Disraeli. Disraeli warned him that, with the state of the nation and Parliament being what it was, "one or two speeches weekly like the one I made before Christmas (December 22, 1854) would break up the Govt. in a month. I said I wanted peace, not to break up the Govt.; but if they would not make peace, then I would make war upon them." 48

Finally, on the twenty-second of February, Bright met with Aberdeen, the former Prime Minister. Bright met with him for an hour. The most important thing to come out of the conversation was the following assurance made to Bright by Aberdeen. Bright recorded this in his diary in the following passage: "Palmerston had given him (Aberdeen) specific assurances in favor of peace, and he now thought peace very probable from Lord John's mission to Vienna. Alluded to the alliance with France as a difficulty, but hoped that Louis Napoleon would be induced to go with English Govt. for peace, notwithstanding position of affairs in the Crimean." 49

These, then, were the three reasons why Bright changed his sub-purpose from discrediting authority to unification on his terms, and his rhetorical strategy from rejection of the
authority symbols to acceptance of the authority symbols. First, he desired that the war be ended because of his unpopular position with the people of England. Second, after being warned by Disraeli about the state of the nation, Bright decided to be very careful of what he said so that Palmerston’s government would not fall and throw the nation into further confusion. Finally, Aberdeen told Bright that Palmerston had assured him that peace was probable. Consequently, Bright did not want to say anything that might endanger the peace effort.

Palmerston, however, did not end the war as Bright thought he would. Thus, Bright returned to his sub-purpose of discrediting authority and his rhetorical strategy of rejection.

Agency-Scene Ratio

The fourth relevant ratio was the agency-scene ratio. This ratio is closely related to the purpose scene. Just as the scene affected Bright’s choice of sub-purposes, it had a corresponding effect on the agencies that Bright employed.

In his first two speeches, those of March 31, 1854, and December 22, 1854, Bright’s sub-strategies were more concerned with disproving the claims of the authority figures. In other words, Bright chose to attack issues and not personalities. The sub-strategies that dominate are those of disassociation (with government policy, with Quaker religion), degradation (Turks), Christian superiority, derision, the appeal for nationalism on two levels, and moral indignation.
The reasons for Bright's shift in sub-strategies were also responsible for Bright's shift in rhetorical strategies. On February 23, 1855, Bright adopted unification on his terms as his sub-purpose and acceptance of the authority figures as his major rhetorical strategy. There was also a shift in sub-strategies with this speech. The sub-strategies were conciliation, disassociation (with past rhetorical strategies), commendation, peace appeal, moral indignation, reproach, exorcism, and sustenance. Of these eight strategies, one does not correspond with the major strategy of acceptance; moral indignation. The inclusion of this strategy evidently was not planned by Bright. It seemed to be a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Bright to the reply of ‘No! No!’.

In his final speech on the Crimean War of June 7, 1855, Bright kept the promise that he made to Disraeli that "if they would not make peace, then I would make war on them." He did so with a vengence. Bright had thought that Palmerston was serious about peace. He had tried to reconcile himself with him and had offered him his loyalty and support if he would end the war. Palmerston, however, was determined to continue the war until the fall of Sebastopol so that some amount of English national pride could be salvaged. This enraged Bright and he returned to the strategy of rejection of authority.

The speech of June 7 differed from his first two. In these, Bright was primarily concerned with attacking the validity of issues and policies. In this speech, however, his attack
centered more on personalities than any of his others. The dominant sub-strategies in this speech were moral indignation, villification, chastisement, and scapegoating. It can be seen, then, that the scene definitely influenced Bright's choice of strategies and sub-strategies.

Agent-Agency Ratio

The fifth and final ratio of significance is the agent-agency ratio. Bright's choice of sub-strategies was influenced by his own personality traits and beliefs.

The sub-strategy of disassociation seemed to be a product of Bright's religious faith. Bright was a Quaker. He knew that he would inevitably be stereotyped as a 'peace at any price' advocate because of the Quaker opposition to all forms of war. Consequently, Bright's decision to argue facts and not abstractions dictated his choice of the sub-strategy of disassociation. Furthermore, Bright realized that if he was to argue effectively against the war, he would have to inform his audiences that he would not argue as a Quaker.

Bright's dislike of the Turkish people dictated his choice of degradation as a sub-strategy. As a young man, Bright toured the Near East and visited Constantinople. He recorded these impressions of the Turkish people in his diary:

There exists no spirit of emulation amongst them, and they drag on their existence as nearly as possible in the same listless and apathetic manner in which their fathers have done before them. As to this the religion they profess does not point out those duties of charity which give such a zest to the enjoyment of
those who practice them, nor does inclucate those
principles of universal love and that desire to
spread around them all the joy and happiness of
which they may be capable which shine forth so
beautifully in the Christian code. Thus the Turks
are not solicitous about bettering the condition
of their neighbors, nor do they trouble themselves
for the sake of any prospective advantage which
posterity might reap from their labours; but they
come into the world, live as their fathers did,
with as little trouble as possible, and sink into
the grave without having performed any positive
and visible service to their fellow men.51

Thus, his choice of degradation as a sub-strategy to deal with
the Turks is not surprising.

During that same trip, Bright formed the attitude that re-
sulted in his choice of Christian superiority as a sub-strategy,

Bright wrote in his diary that:

Unfortunate as it would apparently be for England
in a political point of view were Russia to become
the master of Constantinople, yet such a circum-
stance I for one would scarcely regret, believing
that it would serve so far to break down the stub-
bornness in which the Turks preserve their faith
in the Prophet, and to destroy those extraordinary
notions which they have so long entertained, that
on the whole the human race would be a very great
gainer by such an event.52

Bright felt, even as a young man, that a Russian conquest
of Turkey would result in Christianity becoming the dominant
religion. Thus, Bright used this appeal of Christian superi-
ority to try and achieve identification between his audience and
the Russians. Because the Russians and English were Christians,
Bright argued that the Russian demands of the Turks were justi-
ified in that it would spread the common religion of the two
countries.
Bright's appeals for nationalism stemmed from his strong sympathy for the working and middle classes. He did not want to see their hardships increase because of the expenses incurred by the war. Furthermore, Bright's references to the growing power of the United States were dictated by his strong admiration for the American people and their ideals. Thus, when Bright was warning his audience that one day the United States might overtake them because of their isolationism, he was also hoping that one day England would follow the example of the United States and adopt a similar policy of isolationism.

Bright's use of the sub-strategy of moral indignation was indicative of his own strong moral convictions. His use of the strategies of villification, chastisement, and scapegoating represented his disgust with the aristocratic class which had ruled England for so long.

As can be seen from this chapter and the one preceding, five ratios were dominant during John Bright's Crimean War speeches. These were agent-act, scene-act, purpose-scene, agency-scene, and agent-agency. The most dominant ratios were those having to do with the scene. This was because the scene itself was so dominant. The ratios overlapped in that one part of the speech led the reader to anticipate another. The scene influenced the act, purpose, and the agencies. The agent influenced the act and the agencies.
NOTES


8. Trevelyan, p. 384.


42 Briggs, 554.

43 Briggs, 554.


46 Ausubel, p. 75.

47 Bright, p. 186.

48 Bright, p. 186.

49 Bright, p. 187.

50 Bright, p. 186.

51 Bright, p. 49.

52 Bright, p. 49.
In 1856, the year the Crimean War ended, John Bright suffered a complete physical and mental breakdown. The next year, 1857, he lost his seat in Parliament as representative for Manchester. His decline in popularity was completed. His constituents regarded him as a "traitor" and a "Russian." Few people understood why he chose to adopt and follow his anti-war stand and risk his political future in the process.

It has been the purpose of this thesis to examine John Bright's Crimean War speeches in order to try and discover the reasons for his actions regarding the war between the years of 1854 and 1856. Because the aim of Burkeian criticism is to "rechart human experience out of its wasteland to a better way of life,"¹ the critical method known as the dramatistic pentad was chosen to analyze Bright. Through an analysis of the five parts of the pentad, the scene, the act, the agent, the agency, and the purpose, a more complete picture of John Bright has emerged.

A scenic circumference was used to analyze the scene. The European circumference examined the events in Europe that led to the Crimean War. The English circumference examined the events in England and the mood of the English people prior to
the outbreak of hostilities. The Parliamentary circumference examined the events that immediately preceded each of the four speeches.

Bright gave four Parliamentary speeches in opposition to the Crimean War that constituted his act. An examination of the act revealed that Bright had six motives for opposing the war. These motives were sympathy for the working classes, emphasis upon reform as the most important task facing Parliament, economic beliefs based upon non-intervention and non-interference, disgust with Turkey and its Mohammedan government, distrust of the aristocracy, and outrage at the "immoral and unfair" policies of the English government.

An examination of the life of the agent, John Bright, was done. Through the application of the act-agent ratio, it was found that these six motives were formed by experiences in the agent's life.

Through an application of the scene-act ratio, it was discovered that the scene also exerted an influence upon John Bright's act of opposition. With regard to the European circumference, Bright repeatedly attacked the "balance of power" theory. Furthermore, the wretched condition of the English soldiers in the Crimea received mention in his speeches.

With regard to the English and Parliamentary circumferences, the emotional and economic sufferings of England received a great deal of attention in Bright's speeches. Also, the fall of the Aberdeen government and Palmerston's rise to the position of Prime Minister had a tremendous effect on Bright's speeches.
An examination of Bright's language in each of the speeches revealed his rhetorical strategies. As his two major rhetorical strategies, Bright chose rejection and acceptance. In his speeches of March 31, 1854, December 22, 1854, and June 7, 1855, Bright used rejection as his major rhetorical strategy. In these speeches, he used the sub-strategies of disassociation, degradation, Christian superiority, derision, nationalism, moral indignation, scapegoating, chastisement, and villification.

In his speech of February 23, 1855, Bright used the major rhetorical strategy of acceptance. In this speech, he accepted the symbols of authority. He employed the sub-strategies of conciliation, disassociation with past rhetorical strategies, commendation, peace appeal, reproach, exoneration, and sustenance.

Bright used these strategies and sub-strategies in attempting to achieve his overall purpose of restoration of peace. He also had two specific sub-purposes. The first was to discredit the symbols of authority. The second was unification on his terms.

An analysis of the purpose-scene ratio revealed that the reasons for the dual sub-purpose lay in the scene. There were three reasons why Bright shifted from the sub-purpose of discrediting the authorities to the sub-purpose of unification on his terms. First, Bright desired that the war be ended because of his unpopular position with the people of England. Second, after being warned by Disraeli about the state of the nation,
Bright decided to be very careful about what he said so that Palmerston's government would not fall and throw the nation into further confusion. Finally, former Prime Minister Aberdeen told Bright that Palmerston had assured him that peace was probable. Consequently, Bright did not want to say anything that might endanger the peace efforts. He accepted Palmerston on the terms that Palmerston work for peace.

An examination of the agency-scene ratio revealed that the scene also influenced Bright's choice of agencies or strategies and sub-strategies. In his first two speeches of March 31, 1854, and December 22, 1854, Bright chose to attack issues and not personalities. The sub-strategies or agencies that were dominant were those of disassociation, degradation, Christian superiority, derision, appeal for nationalism, and moral indignation. The scenic events that caused the shift in sub-purposes also caused the corresponding shift to the strategy of acceptance and its corresponding sub-strategies.

The fact that Palmerston did not end the war as Bright had hoped caused him to return to the major strategy of rejection in his June 7, 1855, speech. In this speech, Bright's attacks centered more on personalities than on issues. The dominant sub-strategies in this speech were moral indignation, vilification, chastisement, and scapegoating.

The fifth and final ratio of significance was the agent-agency ratio. It was discovered that Bright's personality affected his choice of sub-strategies. The sub-strategy of
disassociation seemed to be a product of Bright's faith as a Quaker. Bright's dislike of the Turkish people dictated his choice of degradation as a sub-strategy. Bright's appeals for nationalism stemmed from his strong sympathy for the working and middle classes. The strategies of vilification and chastisement were the result of his distrust of the aristocracy. Finally, the use of the sub-strategy of moral indignation was dictated by his own strong moral convictions.

Regarding Bright's use of sub-strategies, he made three mistakes which prevented his speeches from being effective. First, his sub-strategy of disassociation was misleading to his audience. Even though he was trying to achieve identification, his language implied that he was content to stand by and criticize instead of joining and attempting to change. Second, his over-use of the sub-strategy of appeal to nationalism on the level of economic national suffering damaged his image. His audience believed that his reason for opposing the war was that the war was injuring him financially. Third, his attack on Lord Palmerston was badly timed. At that time, the English people regarded Palmerston as their 'savior' and did not appreciate such an attack on him.

According to Burke, the purpose of all rhetoric is that of salvation. In the case of John Bright and the Crimean War, this was particularly true. Through his rhetoric, Bright offered the people of England a way of salvation and redemption from their "evil" course of action; however, people will not be saved if they do not wish it.
NOTES

1 William Howe Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 43.
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