THE REACTION OF BRITISH M. P.'S TO
THE PALESTINIAN POLICY OF THE
LABOR GOVERNMENT: 1945-48

THESIS

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This thesis is concerned with the reaction of British M. P.'s to the Labor government's Palestinian policy 1945-48. The primary data comes from the British Parliamentary Debates (Commons) and works by British leaders. There are great differences among British political parties and between individuals within the parties in their reactions to and suggestions concerning the deteriorating situation in Palestine. Most politicians supported the Jews prior to the terrorist activity of 1947, but many then shifted to the Arab side. Due to the anti-Zionist policy of Ernest Bevin and Clement Attlee, a solution to the Palestinian problem was delayed; the Jews were driven to desperation; and Great Britain, previously a friend to the Jews, became their bitterest enemy.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, many optimistic people felt their major efforts for a Jewish National Home in Palestine were at an end and only a few loose ends had to be tied up. Those among the Jews who were more realistic understood there was a long uphill struggle ahead, but even they did not foresee the Great Holocaust which was to reduce their numbers in Europe by two-thirds and make the creation of "Eratz Israel" (the State of Israel) even more imperative. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency and the first prime minister of the Jewish State, officially proclaimed Israel an independent state as the last of the British troops pulled out. More than forty years before this, the Balfour Declaration was issued in Great Britain in the form of a letter from Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, president of the English Zionist Federation:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.¹

This was an ambiguous and evasive statement at best, but its publication was preceded by much controversy and many debates. A few British statesmen were romantic enough to enjoy the idea of returning the Jews to their ancient homeland. Lord Balfour once said:

The Jews are the most gifted race that mankind has seen since the Greeks of the fifth century. They have been exiled, scattered, and oppressed. . . . If we can find them an asylum, a safe home, in their native land, then the full flowering of their genius will burst forth and propagate. . . .²

The real reasons for Great Britain's interest were practical and political. British statesmen began to be attracted to the Jews at a time when the war was not going well for the Allies. They hoped that Jewish sympathy for the Allies would make a substantial difference to their cause. Zionist leaders had promised to try to sway Jews to the Allied side if Great Britain came out for a Jewish National Home in Palestine.³ The British had to move quickly as there were signs that the Germans were thinking along the same lines.


It was also hoped that a Bolshevik Revolution in Russia could be averted if the Russian Jews were firmly on the side of the Allies. Moreover, the British hoped to sway the large and influential American Jewish community to pressure their government into entering the war. Many British statesmen also foresaw the eventual need for a pro-British faction along the Suez Canal.

Although there were several practical reasons for coming out in favor of a Jewish National Home, there were many more which could be argued against the idea. A number of secret treaties were entered into during the war years, and two in particular were at variance with the Balfour Declaration. In February, 1916, France and Great Britain entered into an agreement, known as the Sykes-Picot Treaty, concerning the Middle East. Essentially it said that after the war, France would get control of northern Syria and Palestine from St. Jean d'Acre to Lake Tiberias. The rest of Palestine would be internationalized. This led to a reluctance on the part of France to accept British control of Palestine.

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Another arrangement entered into by Great Britain as part of their war strategy was between Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Egypt, and Grand Sharif Hussein. On October 24, 1915, McMahon wrote to Hussein pledging British support to Arab ambitions for eventual independence, within certain limits which had previously been suggested by the Sharif. McMahon specifically excluded the Syrian coast and any other French interests from this independence. In return for this, the Arabs would work with the Allies militarily against the Turks. A controversy later arose over whether McMahon's specified exclusions included Palestine. The Arabs, who continually referred to Palestine as part of Syria, said that in this instance they could not be considered the same, while the British said they naturally included Palestine when alluding to Syria.

The Jews knew nothing of these conflicting promises on the part of the British government. The Zionists comprised the majority of the British Jews, but at the same time most of the influential Jews in Great Britain were against the Zionist program. Their main argument was that the Jews were only a religious community and were not in any way political. If the Jews in Palestine were given

7Hanna, British Policy in Palestine, p. 20.
economic and political privileges, the result would weaken
the Jewish position in every other country.⁹

In the British Cabinet the one man who violently and
consistently opposed Zionism was Edwin Montagu, the Secretary
of State for India, and the only Jew in the Cabinet. He
had no desire to identify with the Jews, saying "I have
been striving all my life to escape from the ghetto."¹⁰
He argued very vehemently and convincingly against Zionism
on the premise that there was no Jewish nation. If
Palestine, which was not currently associated with the Jews,
became a national home for them, it would give other coun-
tries a way to get rid of their Jewish citizens.¹¹ Montagu
claimed Zionist organizations were run by men who were enemies
of the Jews. They had, perhaps permanently, injured the
positions and opportunities of service for Jewish citizens
throughout the world.¹² The British government's first
duty should be to Englishmen and not to the Zionists. If

⁹Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet Papers,

¹⁰Esco Foundation for Palestine, Vol. I of Palestine:
A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, 2 vols.
(New Haven, Conn., 1947), 105.

¹¹Great Britain, Cabinet Papers, 1915-22, CAB 24/Reel 20,
G. T. 1868.

¹²Great Britain, Cabinet Papers, 1915-22, CAB 24/Reel 20,
G. T. 1868.
these Jews did not feel they were Englishmen, then they should be expelled from British citizenship.\textsuperscript{13}

Many non-Jews in Great Britain were also opposed to a Jewish National Home in Palestine or at least were against the more extreme Zionists. George N. Curzon, lord president of the council and member of the war cabinet, saw a declaration in favor of the Jewish people as useful propaganda; but he did not want to raise any false expectations. His most persuasive argument was that Palestine could only support 600 to 700,000 people and there were 12,000,000 Jews.\textsuperscript{14}

Palestine was poor agricultural land, but Curzon did not fully realize what Jewish money, initiative, and intelligence could accomplish when introduced into a land whose economy was both primitive and poverty-stricken. Curzon felt that Palestine could only hold a certain number of people; he saw the Arabs and Christians being driven out or becoming slaves of the Jews.

Curzon, while supporting a certain type of low-keyed Zionism, put forth his own policy for Palestine. It included: 1) setting up a European administration in Palestine; 2) safeguarding Christian and Jewish Holy Places and the

\textsuperscript{13}Great Britain, Cabinet Papers, 1915-22, CAB 24/Reel 23, G. T. 2263.

\textsuperscript{14}Great Britain, Cabinet Papers, 1915-22, CAB 24/Reel 25, G. T. 2406.
Mosque of Omar; 3) guaranteeing all people, including the Jews, equal civil and religious rights; 4) settling some, but only a few, Jews on the land. This would not provide a national or spiritual home for more than a few Jews.15

Despite the controversy aroused by the Zionist plan for a Jewish National Home, the British issued the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917. The immediate reaction in Great Britain and the world was almost completely favorable. The United States, France, and Italy came forward in quick recognition of and support for the Declaration. Sir Robert Cecil, the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, summed up the general jubilation by saying, "We want the Arabs to have the Arab lands; we want the Armenians to have Armenia; and the Jews, Judea."16 Within a month British feeling toward the Jews had reverted to normal. Cecil qualified his extreme statement by saying if the British got the Palestine Mandate they would have a difficult time in front of them. The Jews were a difficult people to govern and likely to quarrel with the mandatory power. If they did not get what they wanted all the Jews would become Bolsheviks with the Rothschilds as their leaders.17

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From the issuance of the Balfour Declaration until the Paris Peace Conference, Zionism entered a vacuum of inactivity. During February, 1919, the Council of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference heard statements from both Arab and Zionist representatives. After these men had spoken, the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference found themselves unable to agree on the subject of Palestine. The French Delegation maintained that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was still binding because they had never given official acceptance to the Balfour Declaration. David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, insisted that the Mandate for Palestine would be a heavy burden on England. Therefore they should have the Palestine of ancient history, including the headwaters of the Jordan, and not give up Transjordan in accordance with the McMahon Pledge. It was finally agreed upon to send the first of many delegations to Palestine to discover the wishes of the population on the Mandate and on Zionism.

The King-Crane Commission, composed mostly of Americans, set out for the Middle East on June 20, 1919. Their recommendations for Palestine were published a few months later with many criticisms of Zionism. The land in Palestine was owned by the Arabs, and the Jews would try to buy them

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19 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Paris Peace Conference, II, 759.
out. The Report of the King-Crane Commission claimed that the Jews as immigrants had always treated the natives cruelly. They wanted to forbid the use of Arabic, and they had not in any way influenced the Arabs toward progress.\textsuperscript{20} Based on these explanations the Commission recommended "serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State."\textsuperscript{21} Palestine should be included in a united Syria and the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth given up because it could only be accomplished by encroaching upon the rights of the non-Jews. No British officer felt that the program for a Jewish National Home could be carried through without an army of at least 50,000 men.\textsuperscript{22} The Holy Places should be placed under an International Religious Commission because the Jews were not appropriate guardians for them. Moslem and Christian sites were totally abhorrent to the Jews, and their being placed in charge of them would stimulate anti-Semitic feelings throughout the world.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{21}Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XII, 792.

\textsuperscript{22}Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XII, 794.

The Versailles Treaty was signed on June 28, 1919, but the settlement of Palestine was delayed pending the report from the King-Crane Commission and also due to controversy and complications in Great Britain and the Arab countries. This delay disturbed world Jewry and led to increased intrigue and religious animosity.

The letters from two British commanders in the Middle East, General Sir Gilbert Clayton and Colonel Meinertzhagen, to Earl Curzon illustrate both British and Arab attitudes toward the Zionist aspirations. In May, 1919, Clayton wrote that the Palestinians would resist Jewish immigration at all costs. For this reason they preferred the United States to Great Britain as the mandatory since they saw the United States as less committed to Zionism. If the British government wanted the Mandate for Palestine, Clayton recommended that they issue an announcement that British pro-Zionist policy would not be enforced in the face of Arab opposition. The Balfour Declaration could only be carried out using force and retaining large military units in Palestine. Clayton also said he had refused a Zionist request for an increase in their troops in Palestine because it would lead to increased trouble and distrust among the Arab population.

Meinertzhagen was in almost complete opposition to Clayton. On September 26, 1919, he wrote Curzon saying he considered himself an ardent Zionist who saw Palestine built up through Jewish brains and money. The Arabs opposed the Zionists because of their contact with the local Jew. Only under British Mandate could the real Jewish culture be established. British officials in Palestine were against Zionism, but Meinertzhagen excused them saying, "... on the whole our administration has exhibited laudable tolerance towards a subject they dislike and towards a community which is often unreasonable and by nature exacting." Meinertzhagen depended on Chaim Weizmann, a friend of Balfour's and later, the first president of the Jewish State, to make a statement explaining exactly what Zionism was and the enormous benefits the Arabs would reap from it.

On October 14, 1919, Meinertzhagen sent a "Draft Declaration on Zionism" to Curzon. Its essential theme was that any program which opposed Zionism would be frowned on by the British government as being against its established policy. At the same time the Mandate's main concern was

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that no injustice be done to the Arabs. Any preference which might be given to the Zionists would effect no hardship on the native Palestinians. Curzon said he could not approve this proposal because it committed the British government further than they wished to go in endorsing the Zionists and guaranteeing their actions. Curzon was only willing to elaborate on what the Balfour Declaration did not mean. The Mandate did not intend to interfere with the Holy Places, flood Palestine with Jews, evict the present population, or set up a government of the majority by the minority.\textsuperscript{30} Curzon said the worst of Great Britain's war commitments was the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists were arrogant and grasping and planned on expelling the Arabs from the country even though they formed a four to one majority.\textsuperscript{31}

By November 10, 1919, Meinertzhagen wrote, Weizmann had arrived in Palestine and already succeeded in solidifying the Zionist movement there. He was unable to calm the Arabs or improve their attitude toward Zionism. The Arabs were well armed, and the French had been spreading anti-Zionist feeling in the Middle East. It was up to the

\textsuperscript{30}Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-39, IV, 508.

Zionists to have patience and in some way improve the situation in Palestine.  

Herbert Samuel, Governor of Palestine, wrote Sir William Tyrrell, the Counsellor of Embassy in America, on June 5, 1919, complaining about the British administration in Palestine. They were not relating to the Arabs on the basis of the Balfour Declaration. This encouraged the Arabs to believe that a Jewish National Home in Palestine was not a certainty. With enough threats and terrorist activities the Arabs thought the British could be influenced to drop the Zionist cause. Samuel suggested that the British government emphasize to the administration in Palestine that they will carry through with the Balfour Declaration. They should explain to Arab leaders that British policy on the matter could not be swayed, but that the Arabs would not be forced out of their country nor would they be ruled by the Jews. If this was not possible, new officers should be appointed who would better understand Zionist policy.

Most British officers in Palestine thought that although the Balfour Declaration had once been expedient, it could now only be regarded as unfortunate. Peacetime conditions rendered it null and void. Colonel Hubbard,

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Governor of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, was one of the most outspoken of the British military officers. He openly encouraged the Arabs and discouraged the Jews. He said if trouble broke out he would not let his men interfere.34

When the Zionists complained about anti-Semitism on the part of the administration, they were told that their claims were invalid. The Zionist Commission should talk to the British authorities in Palestine instead of relaying their complaints to Europe.35 The Zionists were not cognizant of the difficulties the British encountered and refused to acknowledge the great things that had been done for them.36

During the summer of 1919 Weizmann spoke to General Clayton concerning the injuries the British administration in Palestine was doing to the Zionist cause. He cited specific cases of discrimination and asked if Great Britain had any intention of carrying out the Balfour Declaration. If the true situation ever became known to the Jewish public it would cause terrific bitterness against the British.37

34 Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 220.
Clayton replied that the troops were not there to carry out the Balfour Declaration but to maintain security.\textsuperscript{38}

Even though various opinions and plans continued to be tossed about concerning the Jewish National Home, an agreement was eventually reached. On December 11, 1919, a Draft Mandate for Palestine was agreed on by both the Zionist Organization and the British Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The British Mandate would:

\textit{... be responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home and the development of a self-governing Commonwealth. \ldots Nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. \ldots or of Jews in any other country.}\textsuperscript{39}

The Mandate also recognized the ancient right of the Jews to Palestine. A Jewish agency would be formed to work with the administration. Great Britain would do all it could to aid in Jewish immigration. Hebrew was recognized as the official language of Palestine.\textsuperscript{40} The British Mandate for Palestine, based in part on the Balfour Declaration, had at long last become official. It was now up to the


\textsuperscript{40}Hanna, \textit{British Policy in Palestine}, p. 66.
Zionists to push their advantage and realize their ancient longing for a reconstituted State of Israel.

While the western world was deciding the fate of the Middle East, the Arabs themselves were slow to realize their precarious situation. In 1918 Emir Feisal was the acknowledged spokesman for the Arab States. He was a moderate man and not unsympathetic with the Jewish cause. In June, 1918, he met with Weizmann and told him he was anxious to see the Jews and Arabs work peacefully together. Both their heritages were bound up in the same land. An informal agreement was signed by Weizmann and Feisal on January 3, 1919, entailing cooperation in carrying out the Balfour Declaration. Feisal agreed to encourage large-scale immigration of the Jews and their settlement on the land.

In March, Feisal was still viewing the Zionist movement with toleration. He wrote to Felix Frankfurter, a member of the American Zionist delegation, that he sympathized with the Jewish persecutions because the Arabs had suffered in the same way. "We [Arabs] will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home. . . . There is room in Syria for us both." By May, Feisal began to realize the difficulties

41Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 235.


43Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 246.
he would have in trying to reconcile the Zionists and the Arabs. Feisal asked the Zionists to curtail their demands because if they did not, there would be eventual civil war in Palestine. Nouri al Said, Feisal's adviser, was much more radical. He said the Arabs were prepared to defend Palestine militarily. "We Arabs are not imperialistic people. . . . Unlike these vagrants and troublemakers [Jews] we have no wish to start another world war. . . . If there is no other defense, we shall declare Holy War against the Unbelievers."

In Palestine itself matters with the Arabs worsened. In 1918 Jewish settlers who wished to escape persecution were still welcome in Palestine. Gradually the Arabs began to fear for the welfare and political rights of the people already in the Middle East. The Arabs wanted the union of Syria and Palestine, which they called Southern Syria, and they began to make their wishes known by protests in the press and general meetings to denounce the Balfour Declaration.

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45 Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles, p. 56.
46 Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles, p. 60.
The Arabs were afraid that their own autonomy and the Zionist plan were not viable together. They insisted they had been promised their independence in June, 1918, in addition to the McMahon Agreement. In June, the High Commissioner in Egypt had met with seven Arab leaders and issued a declaration by the British Foreign Office recognizing the complete independence of the Arabs. This was taken by the Arabs to mean the entire Ottoman Empire which included Palestine. On November 7, the British and French issued a joint declaration pledging their support and assistance in the establishment of an autonomous Arab government in Syria and Mesopotamia. Again this was taken to include Palestine as Southern Syria. These were expedient war maneuvers as the Balfour Declaration had been. The Arabs later insisted that they had been more important than the Jews in ensuring an Allied victory. Therefore, their commitments should be honored rather than the ones to the Zionists.

In an effort to safeguard their own position the Arabs drew up certain resolutions in the General Syrian Congress which met in Damascus on July 2, 1919. The independence of Syria, including Palestine, was reaffirmed, and Emir Feisal

49Hanna, British Policy in Palestine, p. 25.
was proposed as the king. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, and any other proposal for the partition of Syria or the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was summarily rejected. These plans represented a grave peril to their own people from national and political viewpoints. European assistance was accepted for a short while as long as it did not interfere with their independence.  

By 1920, Bedouin Arabs were already attacking Jewish agricultural settlements. Demonstrations were carried out by the Moslem Christian League against Zionism and for Arab independence and the unity of Syria and Palestine. Riots broke out in Jerusalem which resulted in the deaths of several Jews. Their bases were opposition to the Balfour Declaration and Arab claims that Zionists intended their spoilation and complete domination over Palestine.

The British began to realize the terrific opposition they faced in carrying out the Balfour Declaration. If the Declaration had adequately safeguarded Arab freedom, there would not have been such tremendous resistance. As it was,

52Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 293.


open opposition might still be averted if British policy was carried through without special privileges. A Mandate should be obtained by Great Britain, but it should not embody the Zionist plan. If it was decided to carry out the Balfour Declaration, it would have to be done under military force. Disorders in the entire Moslem world would result, and the British would have to take a firm stand against all agitators. Sir Mark Sykes, an avid supporter of Zionism, returned from Palestine in 1919 shocked by the opposition he encountered among the Arab population. He felt that Zionism had gone too far, and his convictions on the subject began to waver. He said it was now up to the British "... to qualify, guide, and if possible, save the dangerous situation which was rapidly arising [in the Middle East]..." 

The growing unrest of the Arabs, the activities of pro-Arab factions in England, and British officials' lack of faith in the Jews led to a long delay in setting up the British Mandate for Palestine. The Jews began to fear

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that Great Britain would try to get out of their commitments to the idea of a Jewish National Home, and instead vote for a British Protectorate with Emir Feisal as its Arab head. In fact, Great Britain had no intention of creating the autonomous Jewish State Chaim Weizmann and avid Zionists wanted. The Arabic language, culture, and population would still reign supreme in Palestine. The Mandate would promote Jewish immigration but not above the country's economic capacity. The main impetus behind Great Britain's final acceptance of the Mandate was its probability of increasing British worldwide prestige. The Jewish population was an influential one, and it could not hurt to have them behind Great Britain. With the Jews in Palestine the British were assured of a friendly base in the Middle East. These factors were enough to override the disadvantages of Palestine's unproductivity.

Although Great Britain had finally agreed to accept the Mandate for Palestine, there was a great deal of last-minute debate in 1920, both in England and in the Arab countries. On January 16, an Islamic-Christian Conference


met in Nablus to reaffirm their attitude toward Zionism. Because of the Jews' "covetous spirit to Palestine," the Arabs vowed to boycott them completely by refusing them places to live and hindering their admittance to the country. They would continue with this policy until all Zionism was wiped out or they themselves perished. 63

The British administration in Palestine wholeheartedly supported this policy. They were against carrying out the Balfour Declaration which they saw as leading to the exile of the Palestinian Arabs. Hebrew as the national language would lead to most official posts being held by the Jews. The submergence of Palestine was the first step in the arrogant Zionistic plan of world control by the Jews. The entire policy supporting a Jewish National Home was in total opposition to twentieth-century democratic ideals of self-government, and as such should be discarded. 64

It finally became necessary, due to the many conflicting ideas concerning British policy, for Great Britain to reaffirm her allegiance to the Zionists. At the San Remo Conference of April 19-26, 1920, the Balfour Declaration


64 "Palestine and the Mandate," The Nineteenth Century and After, DXXX, April, 1921, pp. 625-29.
was reiterated.\textsuperscript{65} The British government accepted the Mandate for Palestine on behalf of the League of Nations. They would be responsible for maintaining administrative, political, and economic conditions conducive to the establishment of a Jewish National Home, while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the existing population. The Mandate also had to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement on the land.\textsuperscript{66}

The British moved quickly after the San Remo Conference in an effort to settle the Palestine problem. The first endeavor they made in this direction, appointing Herbert Samuel, a British Jew, as the first Governor of Palestine, was subject to severe criticisms from certain factions. Many were afraid this action would be misconstrued and seen as the first step to a permanent Jewish State.\textsuperscript{67} Other censures quickly followed.

The French accused the British of including territory in their Mandate for which there was no historical connection with the Jews.\textsuperscript{68} The Zionists claimed two things had

\textsuperscript{65}\textit{Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-39, VIII, 159.}
\textsuperscript{66}\textit{Bentwick, England in Palestine, p. 41.}
\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Hanna, British Policy in Palestine, p. 70; Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-39, XIII, 255.}
\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-39, XIII, 387.}
been omitted in the mandatory and that this omission would make the Jewish task in Palestine more difficult. Mention should have been made of the Jews' historic connection with Palestine because it was on this that they based their claim. A Jewish agency in Palestine should have been specified which would represent the Jewish population to the administration.69 For the next thirty years the British were subjected to complaints such as these until they began to wish they had never gotten involved in such a potentially explosive situation.

Opposition to the principles embodied in the Balfour Declaration began as early as 1897 when Theodor Herzl and the First Zionist Congress met and set up the Zionist Organization. It continues to the present day. Although Great Britain accepted the Mandate for Palestine and included the Balfour Declaration in it, she did not make more than a cursory effort at carrying out the plan for a Jewish National Home.

In 1939 the British issued a White Paper clearly defining their latest objectives and policy for Palestine. This Paper said the purpose of the Balfour Declaration was not to convert Palestine to a Jewish State against the will of the native Arabs. The British government now declared

it was not their policy that Palestine become a Jewish State because that would be contrary to their obligations to the Arabs. Ultimately Great Britain wanted an independent Palestinian State to come into being within ten years, one in which Jews and Arabs shared the authority while the interests of both communities were safeguarded. In order to ensure this end, Jewish immigration could not continue unabated. If it did, a fatal hatred and mistrust between Jew and Arab would continue and Palestine might become a permanent source of friction. To prevent this, Jewish immigration would be limited to 75,000 over the next 5 years or at a rate to bring the Jewish population in Palestine up to one-third. After five years, no more Jewish immigration would be allowed without the consent of the Arabs.

The White Paper was an effort by the British government to appease the Arabs who had organized illegal armies, mostly from outside Palestine, many of whose members were actually involved in aiding the Nazi cause. It took hope away from the Jews who had always cooperated with Great Britain.

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73"War in Palestine?", New Statesman and Nation XXXI, May 11, 1946, p. 332.
Thousands of victims of Nazi persecution were turned away from Palestine and forced by Allied Great Britain to return to Europe and an ultimate death in Hitler's gas chambers. The White Paper was a major factor in the eventual transformation of the law-abiding Jewish community in Palestine into an armed resistance movement. In 1940, the British government went a step further in their program of placating the Arabs with the land transfer laws. These laws prohibited land purchases by Jews in about 95 per cent of Palestine. Before the Land Transfer Act was passed, the Jews had paid the Arabs five to six times the value of the land they purchased. The aggrieved cry of "dispossessed Arabs" was more propaganda than reality.

It was the Conservative party in Great Britain that had headed the National government from 1940 to 1945 and that had been directly responsible for the White Paper and the land transfer laws. Since before World War I, the Labor Party had regularly championed the Zionist cause. The Conservative party had become disliked by the Zionists, and the Labor party pressed their advantage with Jewish voters by making extravagant promises to them prior to the 1945 elections. At the Labor Party Conference of 1939, the

75 London Times, September 25, 1945, p. 5.
White Paper was declared to be in direct violation of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate. In 1940, the Labor Party Conference vowed their party would continue opposition to the White Paper with the view of rescinding it. In 1943, the Conference demanded equal status for Jews among the free nations of the world. The following year, they declared that unless Great Britain allowed Jews to enter Palestine in such numbers as soon to become a majority, there was no meaning in the Jewish National Home. The Labor Party National Executive in April, 1944 states, "Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in." In this the British Laborites went beyond the intentions of even the most avid Zionists who had no desire to remove the Arabs from their homes. Acts and statements such as these convinced the Jews they had a staunch friend in the Labor party.

The Zionists helped the Allies during the war and waited patiently for the Labor party to come into power. At the end of World War II they did, and the Jews were certain, now that the military danger of Germany had been quelled, Great Britain would administer Palestine in accordance with the Mandate. They soon discovered change of

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77 Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 436.
party control did not necessarily mean change of policy. The Labor party took office apparently with good intentions for the Jews, but their promises quickly lost substance against the pressures of forces which have always worked in opposition to the Jews. As the White Paper approach was maintained by the Labor party, a number of the Jews decided to secure by force the promises that they believed had been contained in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine.

From 1945 to 1948, the situation in Palestine progressively worsened under the British administration. Hundreds of British lives were lost at the hands of Jewish terrorists who, in their desperation, saw no other way to attract world attention to their plight. Many Jews would no longer cooperate with an administration which turned the remnants of European Jewry away from the only country which wanted them. Some Jews believed that the Labor government after 1945 could have relieved the explosive situation by withdrawing the White Paper's limitations on Jewish immigration and the Land Transfer Act, calling on the Jewish Agency to work in conjunction with the British in conquering terrorism, and

78 "War in Palestine?", New Statesman and Nation, p. 332.
79 Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 439.
80 "War in Palestine?", New Statesman and Nation, p. 332.
putting Haganah, the unofficial Jewish army in Palestine, at the disposal of the British administration. The Mandate only stimulated conflict between the Jews, Arabs, and British, as delay followed delay. There was nothing to be gained by postponing a final decision on the Palestine situation, and yet the British continued to do so.

Many diverse opinions and suggestions evolved in the struggle to solve the Palestine problem during 1945-48, and this was particularly in evidence in the House of Commons. There were differences of opinion between the Conservative and Labor parties, with accusations flowing freely between the two. Those within the same party often did not agree, and the men in office were frequently compelled to defend their actions to backbenchers in their own party and the opposition. Despite their different approaches to Palestine, the great majority of British politicians were hoping for the same miracle. They wanted somehow to reconcile two antagonistic parties, the Arabs and the Jews, in some solution that would be acceptable to both. Commission after commission was sent to Palestine, and no matter what their suggestions, they all agreed a solution acceptable to both parties could not be found. Eventually Great Britain was forced to admit defeat and submit the Palestine problem to

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81 "War in Palestine?", New Statesman and Nation, p. 332.
the United Nations, an act which had been foreseen and recommended by many as far back as 1945. This long delay only resulted in loss of world prestige for Great Britain, unrest at home, and needlessly cost the lives of many British in Palestine.
CHAPTER II

EARLY ATTEMPTS BY THE LABOR PARTY ADMINISTRATION
TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE

In the summer of 1945 the Labor party came into power in Great Britain, thus raising the hopes of the Jews for a quick solution to the Palestinian problem. Over the next three years these hopes were continually dashed as debate followed debate in the House of Commons, and British leaders continued to play for time. Jewish terrorism emerged as a primary impetus in forcing Great Britain to come to a decision and refer the problem to the United Nations. Although the Labor party had consistently taken a pro-Jewish stand and the Conservative party had been responsible for the White Paper of 1939, differences were not always that clear-cut during the parliamentary debates. By the end of 1946 large numbers of M. P.'s, regardless of party affiliation, disagreed with the administration's approach to the problems of Palestine and displaced Jewry. A few within the Labor party tried to discredit Zionism, while some members of the Conservative party wholeheartedly supported it. They all hoped to find one solution which would be acceptable to
the three parties involved, Great Britain, the Jews, and the Arabs.

Little was said in the House of Commons about Palestine between the summer of 1945 and the summer of 1946. Prior to the summer of 1946, the Labor party was mainly concerned with other troubles in post-war Great Britain, and since the situation in Palestine was relatively quiet, they saw no need to take immediate action. Colonel Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, did issue a few statements concerned primarily with Jewish terrorism. All Jewish terrorist organizations were declared illegal. British authorities in Palestine were given the right to confiscate all arms discovered in Jewish or Arab quarters of Palestine. Members of the House of Commons accused the police in Palestine of seizing innocent victims on any suspicion and deporting them to concentration camps where no visitors were allowed, including the Red Cross. They claimed the Jews were often kept there for years without trial. Stanley refused to confirm or deny this and said only that, due to recent outrages, drastic measures were often necessary.

On the whole, the Conservative party was against a Jewish State in Palestine and for quelling terrorism, using

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1Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) [hereafter cited as "Debates (Commons)"], CDVIII (1945), 234.
2Debates (Commons), CDVIII (1945), 1366.
3Debates (Commons), CDVIII (1945), 801.
any effective method. Daniel Lipson, an Independent Conservative who was Jewish, often spoke the loudest in favor of anything British and in opposition to Zionism. Lipson said the problem of Palestine was caused by Zionist nationalistic aims to get enough Jews into Palestine to create a majority and so a Jewish State. "If Great Britain had not stood firm in 1940 and Hitler had won the war, Jews everywhere would have been massacred and there would have been no Jewish problem left." Instead of making trouble for England, to whom they owed a great deal, displaced Jews should be willing to return to their European countries and help rebuild them.² Major Edward Legge-Bourke agreed with Lipson, saying Palestine had long since served its purpose as a haven for refugees. It was not fair to ask the Arabs to absorb the displaced Jews if Great Britain was not willing to do the same.⁵

Viscount Alexander Hinchingbrooke, as a Conservative, blamed the Labor party's Colonial Office for not giving enough power to the British administration in Palestine. The British government must take a firm stand against violence and ruthlessly crush these organizations in the Middle East which hoped to overthrow the present administration.⁶

²Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1375-77.
⁵Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1402-03.
⁶Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1413.
The White Paper of 1939 re-established British prestige and kept the Mandate for Palestine in its proper perspective because it did not plan to convert Palestine into a Jewish State. The problem could not now be solved unless the White Paper was enforced and a complete halt made on all Jewish immigration into Palestine.\textsuperscript{7}

Kenneth Pickthorn, always one of the most pro-Arab representatives in the House of Commons, went even further than Hinchingbrooke by saying Zionism was one of the greatest mistakes in history. Although one could not help but be sorry for the displaced Jews of Europe, that problem should be disassociated from the one in Palestine.\textsuperscript{8}

General Sir George Jeffreys also held that sympathy for Jews in Europe should not make Great Britain fail to uphold the rights of the Arabs. The British must concede nothing to terrorism while doing their utmost to bring the Jewish and Arab leaders together. The claims of the Arabs to political predominance in Palestine could not be contested. Even apart from these Arab rights, there was no room for unlimited immigration into Palestine. The ideal solution would be a bi-national State composed of Arabs

\textsuperscript{7}Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1414-16.
\textsuperscript{8}Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1887.
and Jews, which could be a member of any future Arab Federation.9

Oliver Stanley, who later became a supporter of Zionism, now chose the middle road. Although the Jews gave the Arabs undreamed of material prosperity, to the Arabs it was at the cost of something they valued more. Instead of Palestine, the displaced Jews should be absorbed by Great Britain, the United States, and other countries where anti-Semitism did not exist. This might help eliminate the crux of the problem, each side's fear of domination by the other.10 Great Britain had never declared war on the Jews, but the Jews were beginning to conduct war against British forces in Palestine. What had once been the actions of militant extremist groups such as the Irgun Zvei Leumi and the Stern Gang, by 1946 had become the actions of the Haganah, the semi-official Jewish Army.11

While at this time the Conservative party almost unanimously opposed Zionism, the Labor party, on the whole, supported it, as did several members of the smaller parties. Eleanor Rathbone, an Independent, was the first to bring the Palestinian problem to the attention of the House after the Labor party took office. She said the conditions in

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9Debates (Commons), CDXIII (1945), 370-71.
10Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1420-23.
11Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1879-81.
the liberated camps in Europe were deplorable. The Allies seemed to feel that, if they left the Jews in the camps long enough, most of them would be driven to claim repatriation, thus lightening the burden of those responsible for the "non-repatriables." Great Britain had a special responsibility to these Jews since it was the White Paper of 1939 which closed Palestine against them and thus indirectly contributed to the death of thousands. The Labor party voted against this White Paper and stated time after time that if they were returned to power, they would not be bound by it. It was now time for the Labor party to show their sincerity. Rathbone spoke in favor of a Jewish State as part of the British Commonwealth. England owed a bigger debt to the Jews than to the Arabs, both for their contributions to humanity and for what they did to aid the Allied cause during the war, compared, she insisted, to the grudging, half-hearted, and insincere efforts of the Palestinian Arabs. "We must immediately open the gates of Palestine or the spirit of Hitler . . . will be able to say the Allies finished his task of exterminating European Jewry." A Labor M. P. who was a Jew, Barnett Janner, said the Arab population of Palestine had increased from 700,000 to over 1,250,000 since the Balfour Declaration, but before

12 Debates (Commons), CDXIII (1945), 363.
13 Debates (Commons), CDXIII (1945), 364-65.
the coming of the Jews, their numbers had been decreasing.\textsuperscript{14} The Times enlarged on Janner's theme by crediting this increase to Jewish hospitals and government health services to which the Jews contributed eight to ten times more financial support than the Arabs. The Arabs certainly had no reason to complain on this score.\textsuperscript{15} Since the Arabs were only benefitting by Jewish immigration and the League of Nations had never accepted the White Paper, Janner demanded that it be withdrawn at once. It could not prevail legally or morally.\textsuperscript{16} Richard Stokes opposed Janner by saying the White Paper should not be modified at all because to do so would lead to civil war in Palestine. He was against handing over an Arab country to those to whom the Arabs thought it did not belong.\textsuperscript{17}

Members of the minority parties in the House of Commons exhibited diverse opinions. William Teeling, a Unionist, felt the Jews, with their modern ideas, would be more useful to Great Britain than the Arabs. At the same time, he argued, the Palestinian Arabs would be better off under Jewish control than Arab control.\textsuperscript{18} Sir Lambert Ward,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXIII (1945), 381.
\item \textsuperscript{15}London Times, September 25, 1945, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{16}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXIII (1945), 382.
\item \textsuperscript{17}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXIII (1945), 389-90.
\item \textsuperscript{18}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1387-89.
\end{itemize}
another Unionist, suggested solving the problem by converting part of northern Africa into a home for the Jews. Instead of this continuing debate, Sir Percy Harris, a Liberal, recommended a cooperative rehabilitation of Palestine by the three of four great world powers.

On November 13, 1945, Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, announced the formation of an Anglo-American Commission on Palestine. According to Richard Crossman, a Labor M. P., and member of the Commission, it was only appointed because Bevin was playing for time. Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Bevin felt the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine would imperil Great Britain's imperial communications and oil supplies, although they would not come out actively against Zionism. The Anglo-American Commission was a joint effort set up by the United States and Great Britain to examine the problems of European Jewry and the Palestinian problems. The Commission would: 1) examine political, economic, and social conditions of Palestine as concerned with Jewish immigration and the well being of people now living there; 2) examine the conditions and wishes of the persecuted Jews.

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19 Debates (Commons), CDVIII (1945), 1419.
20 Debates (Commons), CDVII (1945), 519.
22 Crossman, A Nation Reborn, p. 46.
of Europe; 3) make recommendations for the handling of and a permanent solution for the problems of Palestine; and 4) make recommendations to meet immediate needs arising from the conditions previously examined. In the meantime, the British government would consult with the Arabs so there would be no interruption of the present Jewish immigration. After considering the final recommendations of the Anglo-American Commission, Great Britain would explore other temporary arrangements until a permanent solution could be agreed on. The mandatory power would then prepare and submit this solution to the United Nations as soon as possible.  

Most of the men Bevin appointed to the Anglo-American Commission favored the Arabs or at least were lukewarm towards Zionism. Even Richard Crossman, later an avid Zionist, felt the Arabs were being cheated until he took part in the Commission. Lord Edward Halifax was one of the few members of the Commission to reveal his stance before the Commission's Report was completed. On February 20, 1946, Halifax said surrender to unlimited Jewish immigration in Palestine because it was owed to them for their suffering in Europe would be a gross injustice to the Arabs and would seriously endanger peace in the Middle East. Current activities of the Jews in Palestine showed the Arabs were

justified in their apprehensions, and the Zionist cause was being injured by terrorism. The Anglo-American Commission hoped to find a fair and equitable solution which would be acceptable to both Jew and Arab.  

While waiting for the Anglo-American Commission to complete its investigation, discussions continued in the House of Commons. Sydney Silverman, a Labor M. P. and a Jew, spoke fervently for Zionism throughout the British Mandate in Palestine. He claimed that Great Britain was pledged to facilitate a Jewish National Home in Palestine. On December 12, 1945, the Foreign Secretary wrote Silverman that the British government had no intention of evading their obligations to establish a home for the Jews in Palestine. To Silverman, the British presence in Palestine was only justified by the Mandate which they were not fulfilling by continuing to allow the White Paper to exist. The displaced persons camps in Europe must be cleaned out and the Jews allowed to go where they wished. Many Jews were now being driven to acts of desperation such as terrorism because of earlier years of tragedy and current indecisiveness on the part of the British government.

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25 *Debates* (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1367-71.
26 *Debates* (Commons), CDXV (1945), 787.
Thomas Reid, a member of the Palestine Partition Commission of 1938, was in direct opposition to the majority of his Labor party. He saw the historical claim of the Jews to Palestine as baseless. It was "fantastic and immoral" that Palestinian sovereignty should be transferred from the native Arabs to immigrant Jews. Unless the idea of a Jewish State was abandoned, there would be no peace in Palestine.27

Lieutenant-Colonel George Morris said Great Britain should at least let the European Jews into Palestine and thus confirm the moral leadership of England in the world. By setting up the Anglo-American Commission, Bevin was running away from the problem. Major Edward Legge-Bourke disagreed, saying Great Britain's first duty was to the Arabs who had originally owned the land. Viscount Alexander Hinchingbrooke reiterated his stand that all Jewish immigration into Palestine must be halted.28 Barbara Ayrton Gould pleaded that unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine be allowed. If it was not, terrorism by the Jews was bound to continue as their only way to fight the British administration.29

27 Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1381-85.
29 Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1418.
Squadron-Leader Samuel Segal was the only one to come out with a concrete plan for Palestine. Fundamentally, there was no violence in the Zionist movement, and if the British withdrew, Palestine would settle into peace. Instead of fighting the Jews, the Arabs should be concerned about disease and their poor living conditions and accept the help of Jewish technology. Segal suggested publishing the Anglo-American Commission's Report without delay, withdrawing 50,000 troops from Palestine, opening the gates of Palestine to everyone, enlarging the Mandate to a collective trusteeship under the United Nations, and letting the self-governing communities develop of their own accord.30

The Report of the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine was published on May 1, 1946. The Commission recommended British continuation of the Mandate for Palestine until a trusteeship agreement could be established under the United Nations. Palestine must not become either a Jewish or Arab State because this would cause civil war and endanger world peace. No country but Palestine had offered to find homes for the displaced European Jews, but the whole world shared the responsibility. One hundred thousand Jews should be allowed to emigrate to Palestine immediately. Great Britain should raise the Arab standard of living to that of the Jew. The Land Transfer Regulations of 1940 should be rescinded.

30 Debates (Commons), CDXIX (1946), 1405-10.
and replaced by freedom in the sale or use of land. Agricultural and industrial development of Palestine must be carried out in cooperation with the Jewish Agency and the neighboring Arab States. The Jewish Agency should actively cooperate with the mandatory power in eliminating terrorism. While the Jewish National Home had become a reality, it should not be allowed to become a Jewish majority controlling the Arabs. At the same time, further Jewish immigration could not be dependent on Arab acquiescence.\footnote{London Times, May 1, 1946, p. 4.}

Prime Minister Attlee announced that the 100,000 immigrants recommended by the Commission to be let into Palestine immediately would not be let in until all illegal private armies in Palestine had been disbanded and their arms surrendered. In addition, the Jewish Agency, which had never cooperated with the British administration in Palestine, had to take a positive part in suppressing terrorism. Nothing would be done about the displaced Jews in Europe until the Report of the Commission was reviewed as a whole.\footnote{Debates (Commons), CDXXII (1946), 197-99.} Attlee asked the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee to state in writing their positions regarding the Report of the Anglo-American Commission. Great Britain's policy for Palestine would not be announced until they had consulted
with the United States and Arab governments and the Jewish and Arab organizations.\textsuperscript{33}

The Arabs immediately met in Egypt and declared that a revolt throughout the Middle East would take place if Great Britain tried to implement the Anglo-American Commission's Report.\textsuperscript{34} The Arab Higher Committee announced they would not give their views on the Commission's recommendations. Only Arabs could decide the future of Palestine. They demanded an immediate end to the Mandate, cessation of all Jewish immigration and sales of land to Jews, and the establishment of an independent Arab State in Palestine.\textsuperscript{35}

At the same time, the Jewish resistance movement, through "Kol Israel," (Voice of Israel) radio declared they would stop all attacks if the 100,000 immigrants were immediately let into Palestine. However, they would not give up their arms which would be needed to defend themselves against possible attacks by the Arabs.\textsuperscript{36}

Attlee's statement saying the 100,000 immigrants would not be allowed into Palestine until terrorism ceased shocked many people. Bartley C. Crum, an American member of the Commission, said Attlee was being indecent and inhuman.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Debates (Commons)}, CDXXIII (1946), 334-35.
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{London Times}, May 2, 1946, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{London Times}, May 4, 1946, p. 4.
The immigration would not have been recommended if the Commission had not had evidence that the Jews would be accepted in Palestine with little trouble even from Arab extremists. Frank W. Buxton, another American member of the Commission, said if Attlee did not realize the impossibility of eliminating terrorism, he must be a very stupid man. Richard Grossman agreed with the American members of the Commission. He felt a British attempt to disarm Jews in Palestine by force would only encourage increased terrorism. It would involve more British troops than the implementation of the Commission's Report. Grossman favored the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish States. Great Britain, however, would not impose partition without American aid. Since Great Britain was evacuating troops from the rest of the Middle East, a base in Palestine was a matter of strategic importance.

Attlee had many reasons for not disrupting the current flow of immigrants to Palestine by allowing 100,000 to enter. The Arabs would have grounds for a breach of faith with Great Britain, and serious disturbances would arise throughout the Middle East. Great Britain would have to pledge a

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large number of military forces to Palestine, and this policy would arouse anxiety in India.\textsuperscript{39}

On May 10, 1946, Attlee wrote Harry Truman, the President of the United States, that America and Great Britain must make a careful study of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Commission before attempting to implement them. He clearly stated that England would not consider carrying out the Report until the United States agreed to share military and financial responsibilities for Palestine and the illegal Jewish armies had been eliminated.\textsuperscript{40} Attlee wrote Truman again on June 29, 1946, saying the situation in Palestine necessitated drastic action. The High Commissioner of Palestine had been given the authority to take any steps to break up illegal organizations, including the arrest of anyone who might possibly be responsible for violence. That very day, Saturday, the Jewish Agency was to be raided, occupied, and searched for any incriminating evidence. All Agency members implicated in any way with the Haganah were to be arrested.\textsuperscript{41}

During the occupation of the Jewish Agency, three Jews were killed and many injured. Three truckloads of documents


\textsuperscript{40}Williams, \textit{Twilight of Empire}, pp. 194-95.

\textsuperscript{41}Williams, \textit{Twilight of Empire}, p. 197.
were hauled away, and most of the officials of the Agency were sent to detention camps in Latrun. Sir Alec Cunningham, the High Commissioner of Palestine, said the operations were only directed at those few Jews who had taken an active part in terrorist activities. In all, more than 2,500 Jews were arrested. In Parliament, Attlee justified the searches by saying the Jewish Agency could not be allowed to continue as a cover for the illegal army, Haganah, which was closely connected with the Irgun.

Sydney Silverman, a Labor M. P., denounced the government's actions as the first step in an all-out war against the Jewish people. The British policy of indecision on Palestine was excused on the pretext they could do nothing without United States cooperation. Silverman demanded that the British government produce their evidence of collaboration between the Jewish Agency officials and the terrorists immediately. If they could not do so, then the men must be

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42 London Times, July 1, 1946, p. 4.

43 Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1795-97; The Haganah was the major underground military organization of the Jewish community. Along with its mobilized formation, the Palmah, the Haganah was sponsored by the Jewish Agency. With the creation of the State of Israel, the Haganah became the regular Jewish army. The Irgun Zvei Leumi was a radical offshoot of the Haganah. Its major target was the British administration in Palestine which was attacked primarily by blowing up buildings, trains, and roadways. The Stern Gang was formed in a breakaway in 1940 from the Irgun. Its members specialized in assassination and sabotage operations outside Palestine.
The Haganah was not a terrorist group nor was it secret or illegal. It came into existence with the full approval of Great Britain and was armed and equipped by the mandatory power. Silverman insisted the Jews could not cooperate with an administration which forcefully kept Jews out of Palestine, destroyed refugee ships, and in other ways showed their contempt for Zionism. Only by coming forward in agreement with the Anglo-American Commission's Report and establishing a set policy for Palestine could the British end the violence caused by sheer desperation.

Richard Crossman also attacked Attlee's statement. Terrorism was caused by the British government's continuation of the White Paper policy after the Labor party had pledged many times to repeal it. In order to end terrorism in Palestine, Great Britain would have to adopt Nazi tactics and liquidate the entire Jewish community. By arresting members of the Jewish Agency, the whole political left had been removed, giving the most militant extremists a free hand. The British administration had disarmed many Jews but had not prevented the organization of Arab guerillas. The mandatory power ought to stop their military operations against the Jews and announce their support of the Anglo-

44 Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1861-62.
45 Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1863-65.
46 Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1866.
American Commission's Report. Even by doing this, the Labor party would be carrying out less than their pledges to the Jews had promised in the past.⁴⁷

Two Laborites spoke up against these policy denunciations by Silverman and Crossman. Thomas Reid said the terrorists were fighting to impose their own policy by force, not for liberty which had never been attacked. The Jews had declared war on Great Britain, not Great Britain on the Jews.⁴⁸ Phillips Price claimed that the Jewish terrorists had always been protected by the Jewish Agency. The Zionist extremists in Palestine had adopted the ways of the Nazis and persecuted and pressured the moderate Jews into supporting them. Tragedy would come again to the Jews, as it had in the past, because of their refusal to compromise.⁴⁹

Until July 22, 1946, there was relative quiet in Palestine after the arrest of the officials of the Jewish Agency. On that day, members of the Irgun planted bombs in the basement of the King David Hotel, the British headquarters in Jerusalem. The explosion was one of the worst disasters in Palestine, with an eventual casualty count of eighty-three dead, forty-six injured, and twenty-three

⁴⁷ Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1870-78.
⁴⁸ Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1903.
⁴⁹ Debates (Commons), CDXXIV (1946), 1895-97.
missing presumed dead.\textsuperscript{50} Attlee told the House of Commons that the administration in Palestine had been vested with all authority necessary to capture these terrorists and prevent further attacks. According to Attlee, the British could find the terrorists only if the Jewish community co-operated. They now had the opportunity to prove they meant their expressions of horror at violence.\textsuperscript{51} General Barker, the military commander in Palestine, was so incensed by the King David Hotel incident that he sent a letter to his officers forbidding any social contact with the Jews. He wrote that the Jews should suffer punishment and be aware of the loathing with which the British regarded their support of the terrorists. "We will be punishing the Jews in a way the race dislikes . . . striking at their pockets and showing our contempt for them."\textsuperscript{52}

The bombing of the King David Hotel and General Barker's resultant anti-Zionist letter touched off a long debate in the House of Commons on July 31, 1946, concerning the Palestinian situation. The Labor party led the discussion. Captain Hugh Delargy was mainly afraid that terrorism in Palestine might trigger a new outbreak of worldwide anti-Semitism. It was imperative that the Jewish leaders openly

\textsuperscript{50}London Times, July 29, 1946, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{51}London Times, July 24, 1946, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{52}London Times, July 29, 1946, p. 3.
declare themselves against terrorist activities. Great Britain must not allow herself to be influenced by the anti-Semites. Delargy urged the creation of a system of federal unity in Palestine. It was his opinion that partition could only create more trouble especially with frontier and minority problems.53

Reverend Gordon Lang spoke in much stronger terms than Delargy. He denounced General Barker's letter as vulgar anti-Semitism and cited the Jewish Sabbath attack on the Jewish Agency as an example of the hatred Barker had for the Jews. Going even further, Lang spoke of the White Paper as anti-Semitism in the guise of official propaganda. It was the will of God that Palestine should be the home for the Jews.54

Richard Crossman spoke in his usual pro-Zionist vein. He insisted that the British had arrested everyone in Palestine except the terrorists. This included the moderates of the Jewish Agency and the Haganah who, since 1938, had handed over more than 1,000 members of the Irgun to the British administration. Several times the Haganah had told the British authorities that the Irgun planned to blow up the King David Hotel, but the administration ignored their warnings to employ better security. It was not until a

53 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 987-89.
54 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 998-1001.
few months ago that the Haganah, despairing that the Labor government would ever carry out their pledges to the Jews, discontinued their cooperation with the British against the terrorists. It was ironic that Great Britain did not seize the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who had been a collaborator of Hitler's, but did arrest thousands of innocent Jews. It was no longer possible to find a unitary solution to Palestine because Great Britain would never be able to regain the Jews' confidence. The only way open now was a federal system during a transitory period. Then the Jews and the Arabs could make their choice between federation or partition.55

Others in the Labor party did not speak as long or as eloquently as Crossman. Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Morris succinctly stated that Great Britain's game of power politics and military imperialism must end.56 Thomas Reid stood as the first in the debate to denounce the Jewish cause by calling the Balfour Declaration illegal and immoral. Even federation, much less partition, would be a breach of faith with the Arabs who had been promised independence. There could be no peace in Palestine until the idea of a Jewish State was abandoned.57

55Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1008-18.
56Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1033-34.
57Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1049-51.
Stanley N. Evans, conveniently ignoring more than 6,000,000 dead Jews, accused the Zionists of base ingratitude. If it had not been for Great Britain, there would be no Jewish home or problem because Hitler would have destroyed them all.58 Benn Levy blamed the British Labor party for the deaths in Palestine because they caused the desperation of the terrorists and encouraged Jewish nationalist ambitions without hope of their ever being realized. The problem should be submitted to the United Nations immediately so Great Britain would no longer have to bear the burden alone.59

Major Lyall Wilkes reminded the administration that while they were disarming the Jews, Great Britain was pledged to rearm the Egyptian Army and train the Arab Legion in Transjordan that might soon be fighting against the Jews. The present plan for Palestine by the Anglo-American Commission meant sacrifices by the Jews considering what had been promised them.60 A Jewish-Arab State with an Arab majority was the only feasible plan argued Phillips Price. The Jews had to abandon the idea of dominating the Arabs and be content with a minority and cultural home. Partition would not work because an Arab State without the Jews would

58 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1057.
59 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1070-74.
60 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1280-82.
be uneconomic. The United Nations must be told at once that the British would not remain the mandatory power for Palestine indefinitely.  

The Conservative party was not as outspoken as the Labor party, and on the whole tended to support the British government, whatever their actions. Oliver Stanley commented in favor of partition. The Jews would have their own country and could fix immigration, while the Arab State could be joined with Transjordan to make a solid sovereign state. Further encroachment by the Jews could be prevented by the United Nations, who would naturally protect the Arab, not the Jewish, State. The British government must quickly give their solution for the Palestinian problem whether it was partition or federation.  

Major Edward Legge-Bourke professed himself amazed that the British administration was not behind General Barker, no matter what he had said. This was sure to undermine the mandatory power’s authority in Palestine. The Arabs could not be asked to take 100,000 Jews no one else wanted. It was up to the western world to offer a home to any Jew who wished to accept it.  

Major Reginald Manningham-Buller accused the Jews of wishing to drive the Arabs out of Palestine in order to

61 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1300-03.
62 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 983-87.
63 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1002-06.
create their majority and because it would be impossible to make the Arabs subjects of the Jews or vice versa. Partition could not work without an agreement between the Jews and the Arabs. Otherwise, it would lead only to unmanageable frontiers and the rule of Jews over some Arabs and Arabs over some Jews. Palestine could not survive economically unless it was an integrated whole and part of the Middle East. If the United States would admit all the displaced Jews, the Arab attitude towards Zionism would become more favorable. 64

Henry Raikes agreed in principle with Manningham-Buller, but Raikes said all the free nations of the world would have to agree to take in the Jews before the Arabs would change their attitude. The British government had to decide if they would help make Palestine a Jewish State or let the Arabs have a say in their own land. 65

Kenneth Pickthorn spoke fervently as an anti-Zionist. It was unimportant if the Jews helped the Allies during the war and the Arabs supported Hitler. The Arabs were still the indigenous population of Palestine; and they, not the Jews, were the primary ones to be consulted on all decisions concerning their country. Great Britain was

64Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1022-27.
65Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1035-37.
trying to make the native population of Palestine take in Jews they did not want in their country. 66

Winston Churchill was the strongest supporter of Zionism in the Conservative party. Great Britain, and particularly the Labor party, had steadfastly carried the Zionist policy. Therefore, if they could no longer support the Jews, an offer must be made to the United Nations to lay down the Mandate. This would be easy to do because acts of Jewish terrorism released the British from their obligations to them. Almost any plan on which the United States and Great Britain agreed could be made to work. If the United States refused to work with Great Britain, it would become even more imperative to return the Mandate for Palestine to the United Nations and evacuate the country immediately. 67

Two Unionists in the House of Commons exhibited diametrically opposed viewpoints. Major Tufton Beamish said Great Britain should not let Jewish suffering under Hitler, the Warsaw ghetto, and the support of thousands of Jews who fought with the Allies during the war, in comparison to the Arabs, who supported Hitler, to cloud the issue of Palestine. Neither partition nor federation would work because those plans did not carry out the sacred trust the British owed

66 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1275-79.
67 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1253-57.
to the Arabs. 68 William Teeling said the British were asking the Jews to take in the Arabs without even giving the Jews their State. Great Britain was willing to give the Arabs money because of their supposed poverty, but the Jews would have to get it from relatives and friends. This was ironic when compared to what the Jews and Arabs had done for the British. The Labor party promised everything to the Jews and gave them nothing. If their pledges had been carried out, terrorism would never have happened. It was the duty of the Christians to maintain Palestine and give the Jews a home there. 69

Clement Davies, a Liberal, denounced the current breach between Great Britain and the Jews. The most important part of any plan for Palestine was to open its gates to all European Jewish refugees who wished to go there. 70 A Liberal Nationalist, Henderson Stuart, discussed the discrepancies of those members who voted against the White Paper, yet were now willing to go against England's solemn promises to the Jews. The British administration should ask themselves why the Jews, who were reasonable and sane people, would not cooperate with them. It was primarily because the White Paper was still in effect, and they had

68 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1066-69.
69 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1046-48.
70 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 995.
seen the British turn the remnants of European Jewry away from Palestine. 71

Sir Stafford Cripps, a Labor M. P., called on the British government to decide on a temporary state only as a transition to some ultimate conclusion. Partition would not work because it was too violent and sudden, and it diminished any hope for a future unitary Palestine composed of Jews and Arabs working together. The centralization of law and order should be used temporarily to regulate the initial stages of a new program for Palestine. 72

William Gallacher, one of the two Communists in the House of Commons, was adamant in his support of Zionism. Independence was the only solution for Palestine. It was the British presence which was causing the violence. Once the British left, the Arabs and Jews would work out their own problems. General Barker should be withdrawn and prosecuted by the War Office for his anti-Semitic remarks. Great Britain had already given the Arabs control of Transjordan which had always been regarded as part of Palestine. Only by ending this imperial policy could the Jews be assured of a stable home in Palestine. 73

71 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1295-98.
72 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1238-39.
73 Debates (Commons), CDXXVI (1946), 1038-44.
This debate on Palestine in the House of Commons was followed by a period of relative inactivity on the part of the British government for the remainder of 1946. In August, a statement was issued condemning Jewish "illegal" immigration to Palestine as being operated by unscrupulous persons who were trying to force the mandatory power into a premature decision. From now on, all "illegal" immigrants would be sent to Cyprus or back to displaced persons camps in Europe. The ships they traveled on were highly unseaworthy and overcrowded to the point of danger in capsizing. It would not be the British Navy's fault if any serious accident occurred, but it would be the fault of the Jews who organized the trips. The Jewish Agency replied to this by attributing the cause of "illegal" immigration to Great Britain's limitation on immigration. The government could not excuse their inhumane actions by pretending concern about the poor conditions of the ships.

As time passed the British administration became more and more pro-Arab. They tried to justify their failure to carry out their pledges to the Jews by claiming it was Great Britain and the Arab world, not the Jews, that were vitally interested in maintaining tranquillity and progress.

75 Debates (Commons), CDXXI (1946), 87.
76 London Times, August 14, 1946, p. 4.
in the Middle East. The Zionists were now trying to force England into a position for which the Balfour Declaration and other pledges gave no justification. Arab tradition was completely hostile to terrorist activities as a political weapon, and they were horrified by Jewish actions.\footnote{London\emph{ Times}, September 11, 1946, p. 5.} Great Britain would not be coerced by terrorism, but instead the administration would subject the Jewish population of Palestine to regulations, searches, and increasing inconvenience. Any future Jewish State would obviously be in trouble because the Jews in Palestine were not able to enforce a policy by the established leaders against the armed minority.\footnote{London\emph{ Times}, December 31, 1946, p. 5.}

Sporadic outbreaks of anti-Semitism began in Great Britain. On December 13, 1946, the Clapton Synagogue was broken into; and an attempt made to set it on fire. A phone caller said if terrorism in Palestine continued, the national guard in Great Britain would meet it with more violence.\footnote{London\emph{ Times}, December 14, 1946, p. 8.} On December 30, a synagogue in London was set on fire in retaliation for terrorist activities in Palestine.\footnote{London\emph{ Times}, December 31, 1946, p. 4.} The entire country was tired of being involved in the Palestinian problem and began to demand that the British government
surrender the Mandate to the United Nations. Still Attlee and Bevin refused to admit defeat and until the end of 1947, they did nothing constructive to alter the rapidly deteriorating situation in Palestine.

CHAPTER III

THE BRITISH APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PALESTINE

During 1947 several plans were proposed for Palestine, long after it had become obvious that one solution could not be found on which the Jews, the Arabs, and Great Britain could agree. Terrorism increased, and Palestine existed in a perpetual state close to martial law. Clement Attlee tried to excuse the British government's lack of a firm policy for Palestine by saying that the Balfour Declaration had been issued without realization of the possible consequences of such an action.\(^1\) Great Britain had made every effort possible to help the Jews and Arabs live together in harmony, but nothing worked.\(^2\) Due to the romance involved with the Jewish connection to Palestine and the geographical spread of Jewish influence, there was a great deal of support for the Jews. The Arab case was often ignored. Attlee claimed that Ernest Bevin had worked hard to change the backward economy of the Arab countries and raise their standard of living. All the British tried to


\(^2\)Williams, *Twilight of Empire*, p. 191.
do was hold a fair balance between the Arabs and the Jews, and they got small thanks for carrying out that difficult task.³

Although Attlee tried to excuse Great Britain's actions towards Palestine, some people were unable to do so. Chaim Weizmann claimed the British wanted the Jews to stay and help rebuild Germany so the Germans would have another chance at destroying them. He blamed Bevin for the eruption of terrorism in Palestine. Instead of making the smallest effort to understand the Jews, Bevin had adopted an overbearing and quarrelsome approach to them.⁴ Even though Bevin finally referred the Palestinian problem to the United Nations, he was sure it would never declare in favor of a Jewish State.⁵

Richard Crossman, a Labor M. P., also strongly criticized Bevin's and Attlee's policy in Palestine. He claimed Attlee and Bevin always viewed Jewish statements with suspicion, while putting the most favorable interpretation on the Arab case. Even so, it was not until early 1947, when the Jews turned down Bevin's proposal of an Arab puppet state run by Great Britain and giving only minority rights

⁵Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 452.
to the Jews, that Bevin became more openly pro-Arab.  
Crossman stated that Bevin and Attlee considered the Arabs to be a nation with the right to national self-determination. The Jews, however, did not have that right because they were only a religious community and not a nation. Bevin was annoyed because the Jews showed no gratitude for what he considered the tremendous things Great Britain had done for them. In contrast, Bevin saw the Arabs as straightforward, honest people who had considerable liking and respect for the British. Crossman contended that Bevin was convinced the Jews were engaged in organizing a worldwide conspiracy against Great Britain, and more particularly, against himself. Crossman maintained that by the summer of 1947, the British course of action in Palestine was impelled by Bevin's determination to teach the Jews a lesson.

Bevin accused Zionism of being 80 per cent propaganda and 20 per cent fact. Instead of having sympathy for the Jewish refugees, Bevin stated,

I am anxious that the Jews shall not in Europe over-emphasize their racial position. . . . I want suppression of racial warfare, and if the Jews . . . want to get too much at the head of the queue, you have the danger of another anti-Semitic reaction through it all.


7 Crossman, A Nation Reborn, pp. 79-81.

Although Bevin maintained that terrorism only hurt the Jewish cause, it was not surprising that militant actions were popular in Palestine. It was difficult to expect the Jews to trust Bevin, a man who kept his prejudices against them thinly disguised, to work towards a solution for Palestine which would be in their best interests.

By January of 1947, the British administration in Palestine had begun to operate in continual fear of terrorist acts that might on occasion either involve kidnapping or assassination. The Jewish press in Palestine was censored in an effort to prevent its condemnation of British policy.9 The British troops were given orders to be armed at all times, move only in groups of two or more, keep out of Jewish restaurants, and in the event of any attempted terrorist act, shoot to kill. The excuse for such extreme tactics was that the British had to preserve existing institutions until a new system of government was established. British officials regarded the Jewish community as obligated to cooperate with the British administration because the British had fought for Jewish freedom during World War II.10 Official Jewish agencies in Palestine passed several resolutions condemning the use of terrorism to achieve political aims and emphatically stating the Jewish community would

10London Times, January 8, 1947, pp. 4-5.
use force in resisting these militant extremists.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, the British administration continued to assert that the Jewish community had made no serious effort to cooperate with them in eliminating terrorism. If the Jews would not immediately end the kidnappings and destruction, the High Commissioner of Palestine threatened to begin a policy of military ruthlessness against the Jews.\textsuperscript{12}

The kidnappings by the Irgun of Major H. A. I. Collins and Judge Ralph Windlan on January 26 and 27, 1947, respectively, began a short debate in the House of Commons on the subject of Jewish terrorism. Creech Jones told the House that the abductions had probably been prompted by the imminent execution of Dov Gruner, a Jewish member of the Irgun. The High Commissioner informed three leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine that unless the two British men were released unharmed within forty-eight hours, Tel Aviv, Petah Tikva, and Ramat Gan would be cordoned off and placed under a military commander. Jones contended that the Jewish Agency had never cooperated with the British, and he reiterated the High Commissioner's threat to place all of Palestine under full military control. In addition, the evacuation

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{11}] \textit{London Times}, January 21, 1947, p. 6.  
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] \textit{London Times}, January 25, 1947, p. 4. 
\end{footnotes}
of British women and children and civil personnel was under close consideration.\(^\text{13}\)

Oliver Stanley began the Conservative party's criticisms of the British government's actions in Palestine. He cited the administration's eighteen-month lack of policy as the reason the Jews had turned against the British and resorted to terrorism.\(^\text{14}\) Daniel Lipson rejected any increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine as a justification for terrorism. He suggested offering Jewish informers protection against retaliation by the terrorists.\(^\text{15}\)

Major Reginald Manningham-Buller called on all moderate Jews to join together in the repression of terrorism. Great Britain had delayed too long before attempting to eliminate the Jewish extremism. Law and order should prevail at all costs. Without it, Manningham-Buller contended, neither the Jews nor the Arabs would be likely to accept any ultimate solution if they felt terrorism would give them what they wanted.\(^\text{16}\)

Brigadier Austin Low condemned the British government for its interference with security measures which had been

\(^{13}\)Great Britain, \(\textit{Parliamentary Debates (Commons)}\), CDXXXII (1947), 771-74.

\(^{14}\)\(\textit{Debates (Commons)}\), CDXXXII (1947), 1301.

\(^{15}\)\(\textit{Debates (Commons)}\), CDXXXII (1947), 1314.

\(^{16}\)\(\textit{Debates (Commons)}\), CDXXXII (1947), 1327-29.
proposed by the officials actually in Palestine. In this way, the British Labor party had prolonged and strengthened the existence of terrorism. A large scale search and hunt of all Jewish areas without any interference should take place at once. The situation in Palestine only showed the world how weak the British were in being unable to maintain law and order.\textsuperscript{17}

Air-Commodore Arthur Harvey criticized almost every aspect of the British program in Palestine. The British were losing the faith and goodwill of the Arabs throughout the Middle East. Unless a policy was immediately formed, the British would be in severe trouble there. Great Britain should discover the source of the terrorist arms supply and internationally protest any assistance to them by other countries. The Palestine police were not receiving enough training, rest periods, or pay for such an arduous job.\textsuperscript{18}

Winston Churchill concluded the Conservative party's viewpoint by praising British refusal to resort to general reprisals in conducting a squalid warfare with the terrorists. The Labor party caused the current loss of British world prestige by making promises to the Jews and Arabs and then not keeping them. All sentences of Jewish terrorists must be upheld in the face of reprisals. To not do so would

\textsuperscript{17}Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1337-39.
\textsuperscript{18}Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1341-42.
mean defeat and show the British inability to stand up to a small militant minority. A great amount of money and manpower, being expended on Palestine for nothing, was needed at home. Churchill claimed that honor no longer required a British presence in Palestine. The argument that Great Britain had to stay in Palestine to prevent a civil war was also without foundation. The responsibility for stopping a civil war belonged to the United Nations. Churchill repeated his plea to return the Mandate to the United Nations within the next six months if the United States refused to share the responsibility with Great Britain.

Several members of the Labor party, as usual, spoke eloquently and convincingly for the rights of the Jewish people. Barnett Janner, the Chairman of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, reminded the House that all official Zionist Organizations worldwide, as well as in Palestine itself, had condemned the terrorists. The Jewish Agency had no influence with the terrorists unless they were able to show they were getting results out of the British government. If the ban on Jewish immigration was lifted somewhat, terrorism would lose its importance.

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19 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1343-45.
20 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1348-49.
21 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1311-13.
Richard Crossman argued that since the Arabs had obtained the White Paper by violence, many Jews believed that they had to play the same game. The British Labor administration, by their lack of policy and indecision, ended the leadership of Chaim Weizmann, who had always been a friend to Great Britain, and increased the power of Jewish terrorists. Kennedy Younger claimed there was nothing else Great Britain could do against the terrorists. Even though they were criminals, they had political motives which aroused some sympathy among the Jewish population. If military security measures were instituted, the majority of Palestinian Jews would probably become active allies of the terrorists.

Sydney Silverman, always the one most adamant in his support of Zionism, spoke firmly against British practices in Palestine. The country was a police state, and there could be no law and order as long as those in power had no moral authority and those with moral authority had no power. The Jewish Agency had no authority to suppress terrorism by force, nor did the Haganah, which was regarded by the British as an illegal conspiracy. Order in Palestine could be restored only if the British gave the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) the status of a nation with authority over their own people consisting of Jewish institutions.

22 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1323-24.
23 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1339-40.
and armed forces. Unless the British did this, they had no right to demand that the Jews eliminate terrorism. A constructive policy on the part of Great Britain had been absent too long, and this had driven the Jews to desperation and despair.

Sir Peter Macdonald saw the Jews in Palestine engaged in one united conspiracy against Great Britain, as most of the members of his Unionist party seemed to do. He claimed the majority of Jews who were entering Palestine were not refugees from European concentration camps, but instead were young, well organized, and supplied with money. It was obvious to Macdonald that the Russian and American governments were working together in helping these young people get into Palestine. It was these young people who were causing all the trouble, and they must be kept out of the Middle East.

Creech Jones tried to answer many of these and other accusations against the British government. He claimed they were doing all in their power to find and implement a permanent solution to the Palestinian problem. Jones dismissed Brigadier Lows' accusations by saying local authorities in Palestine had taken all possible precautions to protect their administration. In 1946, twenty-six

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24 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1333-36.
25 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1319-21.
Jewish terrorists were killed and twenty-eight wounded, twenty-two were sentenced to death, and eighty-three received long sentences for carrying arms. Curfews were imposed on all Jewish areas, as were road restrictions. Extensive house to house military and police searches were carried out in many Jewish neighborhoods. Much of this took place with the aid of the Jewish community. In direct opposition to this, Jones later stated the British administration in Palestine was regarded as an alien government by many in the country who refused to cooperate with them. To compensate for this lack of cooperation, the High Commissioner was given orders to take the offensive against terrorists and use all necessary measures in rooting them out and securing order. Given the difficult situation in Palestine, Jones refused to admit that the British had failed in their commitment to that country.

On February 9, 1947, Ernest Bevin put forward his own solution for the Palestinian problem. He proposed that each Arab or Jewish area be administered locally with representative councils. The High Commissioner, with an advisory board of Arabs and Jews, would compose the central government which would legally maintain control. For the next two years, Jewish immigration would be set at the rate of

26 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1350-53.
27 Debates (Commons), CDXXXII (1947), 1356-57.
4,000 monthly. At the end of this time, the question would be referred to the High Commissioner.28

The Jews and Arabs summarily rejected Bevin's plan of placing Palestine permanently in the hands of the British. The Arabs demanded that Palestine had the right to independence every other Arab State had. The aim of the Jewish Agency was an independent Jewish State in any adequate area of Palestine. After these rejections of his plan for Palestine were made clear, Bevin told the House of Commons the British had no right to give Palestine to either the Arabs or the Jews. Consequently, Great Britain was submitting the problem to the United Nations to study and recommend a solution.29

Bevin excused the previous inaction on the part of the British government by saying that although the Mandate promised the Jews a national home, at the same time it promised that the rights of the Arabs would be safeguarded. This was an impossible task. The three choices now viable were a Jewish State, an Arab State, or a Palestinian State taking the interests of both the Jews and the Arabs into account. Bevin tried desperately to explain his own activities on the part of Palestine. He claimed if the White

29 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 987-89.
Paper of 1939 had been in the Jews' favor, those who now criticized it would support it. Although he realized the White Paper could not continue, neither could it be thrown out, and he had tried to find the right approach. Eighteen thousand Jews yearly had been let into Palestine, and that was more than the White Paper had called for.30 A solution to the situation in Palestine could only be found if the parties involved gave up their arbitrary stands. The Jews and the Arabs had to be given a chance to work together. If the final settlement was reached by conceding to the Jewish Agency, the problem would never be solved. In a Jewish State, either the Arabs would be a permanent minority or they would be driven out by the Jews. An independent Palestinian State must be created, composed of Jews and Arabs working together.31

The reaction in the House of Commons to Bevin's statement and the long awaited decision to refer the Palestinian problem to the United Nations was varied. It was almost unanimously agreed upon that the United Nations should have been consulted long ago, but as often happened, other criticisms were also directed against the government. Oliver Stanley led the Conservative party in condemning the amount of time which had passed after the situation was recognized

30 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1901-06.
31 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1913-20.
to be deadlocked before referring it to the United Nations. This delay increased the dangers to the British personnel in Palestine. It was unbelievable that the British were not telling the United Nations which solution they preferred after they had studied the problem for so long. The General Assembly should hear the British ideas since they would be deluged by Arab and Jewish propaganda.\(^2\) The United Nations could only come forward with a majority decision, and Stanley asked if Great Britain would be bound to uphold it. His solution was that Great Britain go to the United Nations recommending a certain policy and, if the British did not agree with the United Nations solution, they surrender the Mandate at once. Otherwise, the present situation in Palestine would continue.\(^3\)

Kenneth Pickthorn followed Stanley to speak in defense of the Arabs. He censured British support for a Jewish National Home, saying it could not be defended democratically, morally, or by Christian principles, but he offered no help in solving the immediate problem.\(^4\) General Sir George Jeffreys, never before as strong a supporter of the Arabs as Pickthorn, spoke in even more scathing terms. He suggested the British troops in Palestine be allowed no

\(^2\) Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1924-28.
\(^3\) Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1930-32.
\(^4\) Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1945-46.
fraternization with the Jews at all. A continuous offensive against terrorism was vital, regardless of any possible consequences to the Jews.  

Brigadier Austin Peto spoke in favor of partition for Palestine as an initial step towards Arab and Jew working together in peace.

Daniel Lipson, an Independent Conservative, disagreed with the majority of the House by saying that Great Britain should not pull out of Palestine and consequently allow the Jews and Arabs to fight it out because that would be unworthy of the British. In his view, partition would keep the Arabs and Jews apart, and the only solution was a unitary Palestinian State with the two communities working together.

Major Reginald Manningham-Buller, a Nationalist Conservative, claimed there should be no Jewish State. At the same time, there should be no Arab State either at present. The Mandate was ambiguous in its obligations to both the Jews and the Arabs which were impossible to reconcile. It had to be revised, along with the Zionist attitude, before the Palestinian problem could be solved.

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35 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1958-59.
36 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1975-76.
37 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1985-88.
38 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1993-96.
Clement Davies, a Liberal, had nothing constructive to offer the House. He claimed Great Britain had been more generous to the Jews than any other country. Since it was the treatment of the Jews by the other countries which created the problem in Palestine, they should help solve it.39

Sir Ralph Glyn, a Unionist, justified the British policy on Jewish refugee immigration into Palestine by saying the Jews did not really want to go there; but they just wanted to leave Europe. Glyn was the first member of the House to claim the Arabs had fought against Hitler, so Great Britain must help the Arab States.40

Most members of the Labor party continued to criticize British policy in Palestine. Barbara Ayrton Gould suggested Great Britain pull out of Palestine and let the Jews and Arabs form their own unitary State. Bevin's plan for Palestine was unfair in placing the Jewish immigration question before an Advisory Board composed primarily of Arabs. If Great Britain did not agree with any future decision of the United Nations, the Mandate should be immediately given up.41 A unitary State would never work, claimed Benn Levy, in opposition to Gould. It was unrealistic to expect the more advanced Jews to exist under Arab control. The Jewish

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39 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1943.
40 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1972-75.
41 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1936-40.
terrorist movement in Palestine would have long since lost its force had the Labor party carried out earlier pledges to the Jews.\textsuperscript{42}

Richard Stokes, also a Laborite, was becoming more and more pro-Arab. The Arabs had first been promised Palestine and had never accepted the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate. Stokes was the only member of the House to condemn the British appeal to the United Nations. The Jewish Agency should be declared illegal and its officials expelled from Palestine. Great Britain had repeatedly double-crossed the Arab population.\textsuperscript{43}

Richard Crossman did not swerve from his strong pro-Zionist stand. He argued there were two ways to end the problem of Palestine. One was partition, which would give the Jews a chance of survival. The other was continuation of the White Paper which would leave them at the mercy of the Arabs. The United Nations must understand the Mandate was unworkable, and Great Britain must liberate Palestine and let the Jews and Arabs fight it out. Crossman accused the British administration of only supporting the Arabs from fear they would move to Communism and Russia. In doing this, all morality and legality was set aside. An orderly

\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1953-55.

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1967-70.
partition of Palestine was the only possible solution. Flying Officer Norman Lever contradicted Crossman with the idealistic belief that partition would cause bloodshed, whereas a united Palestine would not. He seemed to think it was possible to let into Palestine all the displaced Jews and, at the same time, promise the Arabs there would be no more double-dealing.

Creech Jones concluded the speeches with the government's justification for their actions. They were not at fault in being unable to find a solution because all possibilities had been exhausted before the United Nations had been consulted. Great Britain would submit all their ideas for Palestine to the United Nations but would offer no favorite solution. Since the British were regarded with suspicion and told they were seeking self-interests in Palestine, let the United Nations find its own solution. Referral of the situation in Palestine to the United Nations did not mean Great Britain was surrendering the Mandate. They did want advice on how to administer it.

The decision to refer the Palestinian problem to the United Nations met with favor from the British public.

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44 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1980-85.
45 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 1989-92.
46 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 2000-01.
47 Debates (Commons), CDXXXIII (1947), 2004-07.
It was hoped the action would clear up any misconceptions relating to British actions in the Middle East and elicit proposals from the other nations of the world. Even so, Great Britain still had the main responsibility for the future policy in Palestine. Speculation arose that the Arabs would be favored by the United Nations which was bound to support small nations and had no responsibility for the Balfour Declaration. Some felt that British interests in the Middle East led to violations of the Mandate by "protecting" the Arabs against the Jews. The Arabs held strong economic and strategic interests for Great Britain, while the Jews were only supported for idealistic reasons. Great Britain allowed para-military groups of Arabs to form and drill openly in Palestine. These groups, the Arab answer to the Irgun, were headed by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and yet the British ignored their possession of arms.

Partition was almost unanimously accepted by unofficial spokesmen in Great Britain who concerned themselves with the Palestinian problem. All the Mandate had done was

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stimulate the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews, but
partition would force the two communities to negotiate. Bevin's actions made a solution to the problem more diffi-
cult with every passing day. He hoped to obtain American
assent to British rule in Palestine while disposing of all
Jewish aspirations to the country. The British had created
a police State devoid of civil liberties and composed of
arbitrary political rule. If the United Nations also
refused to help the Jews, they would be forced to form their
own State in part of Palestine and hold its frontiers mili-
tarily.

One Laborite in Parliament and a member of the Palestine
Partition Commission of 1938 was violently anti-Zionist,
but he ordinarily kept his views to himself and said little
during the debates in the House of Commons. Thomas Reid
may have been afraid of bringing his party's wrath down on
his head or there may have been a number of Jewish voters
in the Swindon Division of Wilts. Neither of these possible
factors prevented him from expressing himself outside the
House of Commons. He claimed the Jews had duped people
into believing Zionism was just and wise, even though a

53 "America and Palestine," *New Statesman and Nation*
54 "America and Palestine," *New Statesman and Nation*,
p. 308.
Jewish State in Palestine would be immoral and unjust. The only reason the Zionists claimed Palestine was because the Arabs, politically unorganized, could not resist Jewish aggression. Great Britain had never promised the Jews an official State in Palestine and should now be concerned with their pledges to the Arabs. The Zionists planned to exterminate the Arabs economically and quickly outnumber them. Only if the Jews abandoned this infamous policy could there be peace in the Middle East. Aside from the moral rights on the Arab side, it was strategically imperative that the British maintain their friendship. Great Britain would get nothing from a Jewish State in Palestine but war and appeals for help. A Jewish State could only be formed in iniquity, and it would quickly be destroyed by the Arab States. The only just solution was a Palestinian State formed along the lines of the White Paper of 1939. Ideally, a new state could be created, composed of Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan.

In March of 1947 martial law was imposed on the principal Jewish areas of Palestine due to increased terrorist

55 Thomas Reid, M. P., "Should a Jewish State be Established in Palestine?" Papers on Palestine II (New York, 1947), pp. 27-37. This periodical was published by the Institute of Arab Affairs with the primary purpose of educating the American public to the true state of affairs in Palestine, as seen by the Arabs.

56 Reid, "Should a Jewish State be Established in Palestine?", Papers on Palestine II, pp. 38-42.
attacks. This increased activity was caused by the British evicting more than 2,000 Jews, compared to about 80 Arabs, from their homes around British areas of Palestine. Civil government was withdrawn and military courts set up. All vehicles were forbidden entry or exit from Jewish areas, stores were closed, and postal and telephone facilities were cut off. Within two weeks, seventy-eight terrorists were captured in Palestine because of help received from the Jewish community. Martial law ended; but with the threat that if this help ceased, it would be reimposed. The British government announced it would impose collective measures on the Jewish community for their cooperation with the terrorists, quickly forgetting the help they had recently received from the Jews. The first such measure would be shared fines to pay for damage done by the terrorists.

In May, 1947, the United Nations appointed a committee to look into the situation in Palestine. The Arabs promptly condemned this because the committee planned to visit the displaced persons camps in Europe and because there was no direct reference to the independence of Palestine.

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urged the Arabs and Jews to cooperate with the United Nations instead of criticizing Great Britain. He said that while the United Nations was considering the problem nothing would be done to deprive the Arabs of their rights or land, as the Jews wanted, nor would Jewish immigration to Palestine be increased.\footnote{London Times, May 30, 1947, p. 4.} The Arab League refused to heed Bevin and demanded termination of the Mandate and recognition of an independent Palestine. They stated that since the United Nations had not stood by its principles, they would adopt any course of action necessary to achieve their end.\footnote{London Times, June 9, 1947, p. 3.} The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem appealed to Palestinian Arabs to unite in opposition to the tyranny of the Jews and make any sacrifices necessary to achieve an independent Arab Palestine.\footnote{London Times, June 17, 1947, p. 4.}

The British government told the United Nations Committee the full story of their actions since 1920 as the mandatory power for Palestine and every plan which had been considered. The Mandate had called for the development of Palestine in the interests of both the Arabs and Jews and for the creation of a Jewish National Home. It had not contained any suggestions for closing the gap between the variant Jewish and Arab outlooks, and it separated the Jews from all other
parties concerned with Palestine. The Jews ignored the existing conditions in the Middle East and tried to force the Arabs into the background in their own country. The Arabs also resented being compared to the Jews and did not necessarily see the changes in Palestine as progress with which they had to keep up.

In 1947, the Labor Party Conference called on Great Britain to remember their declarations and promises to the Jews when working with the United Nations. It was disgraceful that, two years after the end of the war, European Jews were still in camps. Great Britain should have long ago allowed free immigration into Palestine and convinced the Arabs that they should not exclude the Jews. If the Labor party did this now, the moderate Jews in Palestine would rally behind their leaders, and peace would be established. The main obstacle to this was the Arab fear of domination. The United Nations could promise them that Palestine would never be ruled by only the Jews.

With the passage of time, the Conservative party became more outspoken on the subject of Palestine. Brigadier Harry Mackeson stated Palestine might soon be run by a small Gestapo

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65 London Times, August 12, 1947, p. 5.
group of Jews with the rest of them frightened into silence. It was not only the terrorists who caused the deaths of British citizens in Palestine. The Labor party was also responsible for not living up to their promises to the Jews. Mackeson suggested the British troops be withdrawn from contact with the Jewish community in Palestine, the Jewish cities be cordoned off, and transport be restricted to convoys during certain hours. In addition, collective fines should be imposed and Jewish residences suspected of housing terrorists blown up.

Oliver Stanley carried Mackeson's argument much further. He insisted the situation in Palestine was now a military operation with the British troops occupying a hostile country until the United Nations made their decision. The main object was to prevent disorder, so the soldiers should be put on a war footing. Stanley condemned the Jewish Agency and the Haganah for continually cooperating with the terrorists and with the "illegal" immigration which operated, not for humanitarian reasons, but to strengthen the Jewish cause. Instead of only sending these immigrants back to displaced persons camps in Europe, they should be told that

67 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2307-08.
68 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2313-14.
by trying to enter Palestine "illegally," all right to ever enter would be forfeited. 69

Brigadier Christopher Peto spoke briefly in complete agreement with Stanley. He recommended passing an Act of Indemnity confirming the proclamation of martial law in Palestine. It would protect the British no matter what action they took against the population and confirm the sentences passed by military courts. The main objective was to establish British authority in Palestine and prove who was the master. 70 Major Reginald Manningham-Buller suggested refusing "illegal" immigrants entry permits, cessation of all Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the imposition of collective fines on the Jewish segment of the population. 71

Creech Jones spoke for the Labor party administration. He denied that the terms of the White Paper had ever been invoked, and he praised the Arabs for showing restraint in the face of Jewish aggression. All possibilities for the destruction of Jewish terrorism had been attempted by the British authorities. It continued only because the terrorists operated under the cover of the entire Jewish community. Large Jewish areas were now being controlled.

69 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2323-26.
70 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2338-40.
71 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2373-75.
by the British and Jewish buildings were being destroyed. The mayors and officials of Jewish areas had been arrested on suspicion of assisting terrorists. The present situation in Palestine would continue until the United Nations Special Committee concluded its investigation.\(^{72}\)

Backbench Labor M. P.'s refuted Jones' explanation and continued to criticize the government. Had it not been for political influences, Maurice Edelman claimed, a unitary state in Palestine would have already been achieved. Now a federal Palestine consisting of separate Arab and Jewish areas would probably be necessary. This would be better than partition because Great Britain could still maintain troops in Palestine.\(^{73}\)

Norman Lever demanded that the House deliver a public reprimand against the administration for the situation in Palestine. Instead of allowing the 100,000 immigrants recommended by the Anglo-American Commission into Palestine, 100,000 British troops had been sent in to enforce a military dictatorship. The British public had not been told the true facts of the situation in Palestine, and this led to anti-Semitism. Several newspapers were inciting the people to violence against the Jews. The Arabs and Jews

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\(^{72}\) *Debates* (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2316-21.

\(^{73}\) *Debates* (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2333.
hated the British, so there were no moral or legal grounds for remaining in Palestine. 74

Michael Foot advised making a firm statement of policy before the United Nations. By Great Britain's policy of doing nothing but sending back immigrant ships from Palestine, the deplorable situation had worsened. The United Nations must also be informed that as soon as their decision was reached, the British troops would pull out of Palestine. 75

Benn Levy discussed the possible ways of tackling terrorism. A police state already existed in Palestine, martial law had been imposed, and captured terrorists were hung. Nothing else could be done militarily except the use of Hitler's method of reprisal on the innocent. A radical change of policy by the British could help end terrorism. The Jewish community in Palestine had repeatedly condemned terrorism, even though the British government denied this. The Haganah was considered an illegal organization and could not carry out military action against the terrorists. Even so, several members of the Haganah had died protecting the British. 76

Ivor Thomas, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, vowed the British would not weaken in their policy

74 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2340-47.
75 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2358-63.
76 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2369-71.
on Palestine. The United Nations had been asked to find the solution which Great Britain had been unable to discover. The British would have been accused of trying to influence the United Nations had they gone to them supporting a particular policy. 77

Colonel Ralph Clarke, a Unionist, sarcastically commented that Great Britain would have been better off if they had left Palestine to the Turks. 78 Another Unionist, Major Tufton Beamish, stated the British had a duty to the United Nations to maintain law and order in Palestine. He contended that the displaced European Jews were unwilling to work and that was why they remained in the camps. All entry permits to Palestine should be halted until "illegal" immigration ceased. Beamish called for the execution of more Jews. During the 1938-39 Arab campaign of terror, 109 Arabs had been sentenced to death, but only 7 Jews had been executed in the last 18 months. Beamish reiterated his belief that most of the Jews in Palestine were Communists. He was certain the terrorists received political and diversionary activities training along with weapon and field training in Northern Caucasus with instructors who were senior Soviet officers. 79

77 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2382-87.
78 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2366.
79 Debates (Commons), CDXLI (1947), 2349-56.
None of these proposals for Palestine from members of the House of Commons could be put into effect until the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine completed its investigation. During August, 1947, the Committee prepared its report, and this was published on August 31. The Committee reviewed the three main proposals for Palestine: partition, a unitary state with an Arab majority, and a single state with a federal, cantonal, or bi-national structure. It also examined the various commissions which had been sent to Palestine and their recommendations. The Committee immediately rejected the bi-national and cantonal schemes and began to closely consider the partition and federal state plans.

The Committee unanimously recommended that the Mandate for Palestine be terminated at the earliest possible date. Following the end of the Mandate, independence should be granted Palestine as quickly as was practicable. This independence should be preceded by a short transitional period during which the Palestinian authorities would be responsible to the United Nations. The sacred character

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of the Holy Places must be preserved and access to them ensured. The United Nations should immediately undertake arrangements to solve the Jewish refugee problem as a prerequisite to the settlement of the Palestinian problem.

The primary recommendation of the United Nations Special Committee was partition with economic union. Partition was considered to be the most realistic settlement to end the differing national aspirations and remove Jewish immigration from the conflict. The economic unity stipulated must include a treaty between the two States allowing for common currency, transportation, and communication. During the two year transitional period, the mandatory power would administer Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations, prepare the country for partition, and admit 150,000 Jews to the proposed Jewish State. The primary objectives of partition were political division and economic unity. Included in this was territorial partition and continuation of unrestricted commercial relations between the two States. Each community's desire for statehood was thus satisfied, and each would have control over their

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Religious peace in Jerusalem must be guaranteed. Therefore, it should be demilitarized and its neutrality preserved. A Governor of Jerusalem, neither Arab nor Jew, should be appointed by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. A special police force of neither Arabs nor Jews and recruited from outside Palestine should be entrusted with the protection of the Holy Places.  

In addition to the majority plan for partition, a minority Federal State Plan was suggested by a few members of the United Nations Special Committee. Its objective was the well-being of Palestine as a whole instead of the aspirations of the Jews. A federal state would encourage cooperation between the Arabs and the Jews, whereas partition would only serve the interests of the Jews. Palestine would be composed of a federal government and the governments of the Jewish and Arab States. The constitution would be based on equality for all and on the maintenance of separate cultures and religions. Each State would carry out local self-government subject only to the provisions of the federal constitution. 

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would not be allowed. It would be subject to the absorptive capacity of the Jewish area.\(^{92}\)

The two recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee, the majority one for partition and the minority one for a federal state, were submitted to the United Nations for their consideration. In Great Britain, there were many and diverse reactions to the proposals. Many were surprised that the United Nations seemed to side with the Jews, and several felt the British should not be party to a solution which was unacceptable to the Arabs, as partition was certain to be. During the debates in the House of Commons which followed the publication of the United Nations Special Committee's recommendations, it soon became clear that most members believed Great Britain should terminate her Mandate for Palestine as soon as possible. It was unfair to ask the British to remain as the mandatory power during the two year transitional period when, as a nation, they could not agree with the United Nations' proposed solution.

CHAPTER IV

THE PALESTINE BILL AND THE FINAL TERMINATION
OF THE BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

The United Nations Special Committee's Report on Palestine immediately widened the gap between the three communities in that country, the British, the Jews, and the Arabs. Most Jews were satisfied at the recognition of their need for an independent state and for increased immigration. The Arab reaction was violent and hostile. The Arab Higher Committee vowed to fight to the last person to defend Palestinian rights and maintain Palestine as an Arab country. Haj el Husseini, a leading Arab spokesman, called the United Nations decision unjust and ridiculous. He was certain the Jews had no chance of maintaining part of Palestine for themselves because they would have to fight against 70,000,000 Arabs and 400,000,000 Moslems.

The British themselves were unwilling to remain the administrative authority during the two year transition period. They were reluctant to control Jewish immigration

1 london times, September 3, 1947, p. 3.
while other members of the United Nations broke the regulations concerning the European displaced Jews.\textsuperscript{4} Creech Jones told the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine that the British were only willing to help in a plan which was agreed upon by the Jews and the Arabs. They were not willing to enforce a policy militarily. Great Britain planned to lay down the Mandate and prepare for an early withdrawal of their forces and administration. The British would not continue to assume, unaided, the responsibility for Palestine which belonged to all nations.\textsuperscript{5} Jones urged the United Nations to establish an interim administration to which the British could effect an orderly transfer of authority. Withdrawal of British forces would be a prelude to disorder and disaster without a suitable interim administration.\textsuperscript{6}

By November, 1947, the first stages of the British withdrawal from Palestine had begun. More than one-half the British stores would probably be left behind, but everything of military value would be taken.\textsuperscript{7} While Great Britain continued to hold the Mandate for Palestine, they insisted on undivided control of the country. They refused to aid

\textsuperscript{4}\textit{London Times}, September 16, 1947, p. 4.  
\textsuperscript{5}\textit{London Times}, September 27, 1947, pp. 4-5.  
\textsuperscript{6}\textit{London Times}, October 17, 1947, p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{7}\textit{London Times}, November 17, 1947, p. 4.
in a gradual transfer of authority directly to the Jewish and Arab Councils of Government, with the excuse that this would be carrying out partition, which the British were opposed to. Great Britain would give Palestine to the United Nations Committee, and they would have the responsibility of transferring authority to the local governments. On December 11, 1947, Creech Jones explained the latest British policy towards Palestine at the beginning of a debate on the subject in the House of Commons. The General Assembly of the United Nations, on November 29, had voted to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab States and an international city of Jerusalem. With a vote of thirty-three to thirteen and ten abstentions, they also appointed a commission of five to implement their decision. Jones reiterated that British troops would not be used to enforce a policy which was against the wishes of the two communities in Palestine, although the Jews had officially announced acceptance of partition. It was essential that Great Britain maintain strict control over the country until their evacuation was almost completed. Jones expressed confidence that the Arabs would show restraint and would work with the United Nations in setting up Arab authorities and in enforcing their plan. Since the United Nations decision, there had been serious disturbances and loss of Jewish lives.

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8 London Times, November 21, 1947, p. 3.
due to Arab resentment. These disturbances only increased because of aggressive Jewish reaction to them which enflamed the situation. 9

The Conservative party criticized the Labor government's policy concerning the United Nations and Palestine. Indeed, Oliver Stanley blamed the government for a lack of policy in regard to Palestine. He recommended setting a definite date for termination of the Mandate because it would be impossible to impose an authority which would soon be over. If this was not done, the United Nations would continue to delay. Although the Mandate should be surrendered as soon as possible, the British should help the United Nations Commission in their difficult task of taking over authority in Palestine. 10

Brigadier Austin Low agreed with Stanley on setting a date for British withdrawal which should not be changed on any account. He urged the United Nations to hurry their arrangements and arrive in Palestine with power and authority. It was imperative that the Jews and Arabs realize that when the British withdrew, as good or better arrangements would arrive. 11

9Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) [henceforth cited as "Debates (Commons)"] (1947), CDXLV (1947), 1207-16.
10Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1222-27.
11Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1237-39.
Kenneth Pickthorn maintained his strong pro-Arab stand. He criticized the United Nations decision as a paradox in a time of worldwide democracy. The British Labor party was at fault for promising everything political Zionists wanted and for allowing the Jewish Agency and Haganah to grow out of control and become almost a state and army. Pickthorn insisted that the British withdraw from Palestine at once so the Arabs would see they were not assisting in partition.12

Major Edward Legge-Bourke rejected partition on the premise that it would lead to world war. He claimed that political Zionism was what Bolshevism had been in 1918. The main aim of the Jews was to get control of the economic resources of Palestine. Great Britain should immediately go to the United Nations and say partition was unacceptable. They should then impose a provisional elected government of two-thirds Arabs and one-third Jews. The important issue of maintaining law and order could be handled by giving the British Army in Palestine a completely free hand.13

Arthur Dodds-Parker suggested using British influence with the Arabs to localize the trouble in Palestine and to keep it from spreading to other Arab States. Great

12 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1259-61.
13 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1267-71.
Britain should leave Palestine as soon as possible and give the United Nations a guarantee that no advantage would be given to either side during the British withdrawal. It should be made clear that enfractions of the United Nations decision for partition would be tantamount to war.\textsuperscript{14}

Much of this discussion was useless, claimed Anthony Eden, because there was no alternative but to hand the Mandate for Palestine to the United Nations and conform to partition. It was now impossible to try and bring the Jews and Arabs together. It was up to the United Nations to assure the inviolability of the frontiers of the Jewish and Arab States. It would be best if the Arab States could absorb part of the Arab minority from the Jewish State. The British must enforce the final date for their withdrawal and not retain the Mandate until it suited the United Nations' convenience to take it over. The United Nations must be careful not to overdo their generosity to the Jews.\textsuperscript{15}

Edmund Cooper-Key insisted that, having given the problem to the United Nations, Great Britain had to accept their decision, although there had been sordid lobbying by the United States during the United Nations deliberations. It was important to protect the interests of the various

\textsuperscript{14}Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1361-64.
\textsuperscript{15}Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1382-88.
nationals in Palestine and continue the health, transport, and financial facilities during the transition.\textsuperscript{16} Beverley Baxter indignantly claimed that the British had been very generous to the Jews, and they should acknowledge their great debt to Great Britain.\textsuperscript{17}

Two Independent Conservatives spoke in strong terms against partition. Arab opposition would be strong, and partition would have to be imposed by force for a long time, claimed Daniel Lipson. All of the economic progress achieved in Palestine during the last twenty-five years would be lost because of the "... overweening ambition of Zionists engaged in a purely political gamble ... who have sacrificed progress for political power." The influence of the United Nations would be weakened because of its unjust decision.\textsuperscript{18}

Major Reginald Manningham-Buller emphatically deplored the way in which British rule in Palestine was ending and the consequences of this termination. It was solely because of the British that the Arabs enjoyed their present standard of living and that the Jewish National Home had grown and flourished. Since Great Britain had done so much for Palestine, they should not have to help carry out partition, but instead should evacuate the country at once. The

\textsuperscript{16} Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1401-03.
\textsuperscript{17} Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1409-10.
\textsuperscript{18} Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1247-50.
Zionists themselves had brought ruin and destruction to the Jewish National Home. 19

One Liberal, Clement Davies, spoke in support of the Jews. He commended the Jews for accepting partition, when it meant making sacrifices, and their Jewish State would be only 12.5 per cent of what both the Labor party and the Balfour Declaration had promised them. Davies recommended that the British forces evacuate Palestine, but do so in an orderly manner. 20

Harold Roberts, a Unionist, did not entirely agree with his party's belief that only the Arabs were in the right. He was still hopeful that a goodwill conference between the Arabs and the Jews could make a new start because a final solution would not be obtained by enforcing partition. The British could never leave Palestine in an orderly fashion, so their departure should be accelerated, and the responsibility returned to the Arabs and Jews, where it belonged. 21

Two other Unionists spoke against partition. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore advised withdrawing from Palestine at once because the British had no more responsibilities or obligations there. He was certain that

19 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1308-14.
20 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1289-90.
21 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1297-99.
it was still possible for the Jews and Arabs to form a federal structure with complementary economies and mutual interests. Leonard Gammans asserted that partition would only lead to war in Palestine, persecution of the Jews in the Arab States, and perhaps even world war. Russia might try to replace Great Britain's authority in Palestine, and this must be avoided.

Ivor Thomas began the criticisms and suggestions of the Labor party, most of which were from the Zionist viewpoint. Thomas feared the United Nations decision might mean the end of many Jewish communities in the Middle East and the submerging of the Jewish National Home in warfare. The Arabs were afraid the Jews would use their portion of Palestine to expand their State, and there was good reason for this fear. The only solution was that the Arabs accept partition, and the Jews give up their claim for unlimited immigration. Palestine could not possibly absorb all the European Jews.

Richard Crossman vehemently condemned the present situation in Palestine, saying Great Britain had spent 200,000,000 pounds, had never given a set policy, and was now evacuating the country. The British still had a

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22 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1343-44.
23 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1371.
24 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1230-33.
responsibility and could not be concerned only with getting out as soon as possible. The British should use their influence with the Arabs and be sure no arms went through Transjordan to Palestine, and that no "volunteers" from the Arab Legion went to Palestine. The United Nations Commission should be in Palestine from the moment the British withdrew, if their authority was to be effective.25 The Russians and Americans should be encouraged to stay out of Palestine because otherwise, it would become a battleground for the two Great Powers. The current situation consisted of partition without the armed forces necessary to impose it. If the Jews had to rely on partition by conquest of the Arabs, the economy in Palestine would break down, so partition should be enforced by international sanction. Since the Jews were wiser, more civilized, and more progressive than the Arabs, Crossman called on them to make the first move in conciliation.26

It must be made clear that Great Britain unequivocally accepted the United Nations decision, stated William Warbey. As the mandatory power, Great Britain should facilitate the work of the United Nations Commission and immediately set up a United Nations International Force to carry out partition. This would lead to greater respect for the

25 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1239-42.
26 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1243-46.
British and ensure their position as a world authority. As a Zionist, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Morris spoke briefly against partition on the grounds that all of Palestine should go to the Jews.

Barnett Janner suggested encouraging the Arab States to develop their education and culture instead of encouraging the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem to destroy the Jews. Since the United Nations tore the White Paper of 1939 to shreds, insisted that the Jews had a right to settle in Palestine, and claimed that Jewish Palestine should be open to immigration, many members of Parliament did not want to accept their decision. If the United Nations recommendation had been in favor of the Arabs, there would not be this opposition. The Arabs were encouraged because when they attacked the Jews, Great Britain refused to let the Jews defend themselves. The Palestinian government supplied the Arab Civil Guard with arms, but denied arms to the Jewish Civil Guard. Although more Jews had been killed by the Arabs than Arabs by the Jews, no Arabs had been arrested, while many members of the Haganah had been. Janner called on the British administration to put a halt to this assistance to and collaboration with the Arabs.

27 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1252-57.
28 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1264.
29 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1273-77.
Richard Stokes spoke as an Arab sympathizer and denied Janner's claim that the Arabs were being armed and the Jews disarmed. Actually, it was the Jewish police which could do as they liked and the Arab police which could not.\(^3\)

The Arab quarrel was with the European Jews who planned on kicking the Arabs out of their own country. Nazi persecution did not give the Jews the right to settle in Palestine because just as many Christians as Jews had died in the gas chambers. The Arabs had always tried to find a peaceful solution, but the "intransigent" Zionists made this impossible. Stokes displayed his anti-Zionism by saying that the Jews planned to get a foothold in Palestine and spread out by conquering all the surrounding areas.

The only reason partition was passed by the United Nations was because the United States put pressure on the smaller countries. The British way of handing over the Mandate for Palestine to the United Nations must be shown to be fair, and if unlimited Jewish immigration was allowed, it would not be impartial.\(^3\)

Thomas Reid carried Richard Stokes' anti-Zionist theme even further. The United Nations was planning to make Palestine into a Jewish State, contrary to the Mandate, British promises, and justice. Partition would give

\(^3\)Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1278-81.

\(^3\)Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1281-85.
60 per cent of Palestine to Jewish immigrants and leave the Arabs the useless hill country. If a Jewish State was set up, a viable Arab State could not exist economically or financially. Partition would turn the Middle East into a battlefield. The Arab States would not be allowed to help the Palestinian Arabs, but the Jews would get immigrant forces from overseas. Great Britain was not bound to carry out a policy they disapproved of because the United Nations had no authority over Palestine. The Jews were on the road to their ultimate and final destruction. Only "... if the Jews would drop this wretched Jewish State..." would there be peace in Palestine.32

Phillips Price joined the increasing number of Laborites who had begun to lean toward the Arab side in the Palestinian conflict. He opposed partition because it gave the Zionists all they wanted. Great Britain had the right to refuse to carry out the unjust United Nations decision. By doing so, British prestige had been raised in the Arab world. It was vital to maintain good relations with the Arabs and guide them out of the Middle Ages. The placement of one-half million Arabs under the Jewish State was an attempt to make it impossible for the Arab State to survive and to put Palestine under Jewish domination which would eventually extend to Transjordan and Syria. "Zionist imperialism

32 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1302-07.
will meet its Waterloo, and then, on its ruins, reason can reign supreme."  

The Zionist side was again taken up by Sydney Silverman. He condemned partition as a severe compromise for the Jews, but admitted he could recommend no better solution.  

Dr. Santo Jeger, who had contributed nothing to previous House debates on Palestine, now emerged as a strong supporter of the Jews. He condemned the pro-Arab members for their dramatics and expressed surprise that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion had not been mentioned. Partition was the only solution because the European Jews had to be allowed to go to their own people. Eventually, perhaps Jewish Palestine could become a British Dominion.

Several other Labor members, not previously heard from, now spoke in defense of Zionism. Henry Hynd supported partition as the best solution considering the circumstances. The British should recognize the rights of the Arab authorities and the Haganah to maintain order. Recognition of the Haganah would help curtail extremist Jewish forces in

33 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1345-53.
34 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1334-35.
35 Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1365-70. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was the invention of a group of Russian exiles who wanted to restore the czarist regime to Russia after World War I. A group of Jews supposedly met at the end of the nineteenth century and devised schemes for the destruction of the Christian world. The Bolshevist revolution was the first step in the Jewish plot to control the world.
Palestine. The Arab Transjordan Force should be withdrawn from Palestine. Hynd was optimistically certain that, to remain alive economically, the Arabs and Jews would have to get along together.36

Maurice Orbach criticized the references to restraining the Jews, while allowing the Arabs complete freedom. He welcomed the change in Palestine from one British police State to two democratic States.37 There was evidence of collusion between the Arabs and the British concerning the disarming of the Jews, claimed Hershel Austin. That should be looked into, along with allegations that the British planned to settle their score with the Jews before evacuating Palestine. The Haganah should be legally authorized to carry arms in defense against the Arabs.38

Ernest Bevin concluded the debate with his explanation for the situation in Palestine. Great Britain did not plan to change the Jewish immigration quota, and he urged the Jews to restrain from "illegal" immigration which would only hurt their cause. The Arab Legion would be withdrawn from Palestine when the British Forces returned home. No implements of war would be left behind. Bevin denied charges that the British needlessly delayed solving the Palestinian

36Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1378-81.
37Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1411-13.
38Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1416-17.
problem for two years. During that time, Great Britain had attempted to find an agreement between the Jews and the Arabs and to prevent a war in the Middle East. This could have been done had the other nations of the world stayed out of the situation. While the British would not actively oppose the United Nations decision, neither would they impose it by force. He suggested that other nations of the world immediately take in a number of displaced European Jews in a final effort to ease the situation in Palestine and prevent war. Bevin emphatically repudiated accusations that the British were arming the Arabs or the Jews.

Much of the British public was against the handling of the Palestinian situation since the United Nations decision. Great Britain had refused to let the United Nations Commission into Palestine until two weeks before the end of the Mandate, and this meant writing it off as a failure. If the Commission was allowed in sooner, it could not argue lack of time if partition failed. It was impossible for the British to remain aloof from Palestine. If they thought partition was a mistake, then the United Nations should be

39Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1391-94.
40Debates (Commons), CDXLV (1947), 1396-1400.
informed and given suggestions for abandoning the idea.\textsuperscript{42} The British had failed for years to find a solution on which both the Arabs and Jews agreed. It was ridiculous to now say they would take no part in a Palestinian settlement which was not formed by an understanding between the two parties. Unless Great Britain wanted to relinquish her position as one of the three principal members of the United Nations, a less detached attitude towards Palestine must be assumed.\textsuperscript{43}

Accusations continued that the British were actively helping the Arabs in their fight against the Jews. The Palestinian government told Great Britain that approximately 700 armed Arabs had entered Palestine from Transjordan and were residing near Nablus, but nothing was done about this.\textsuperscript{44} An absolute arms embargo was placed on both parties in Palestine, but the British still sent arms to the Arab States in fulfillment of treaty obligations.\textsuperscript{45} The Jewish Agency accused the British administration in Palestine of stationing the Arab Legion near roads used by Jews and of failing to


\textsuperscript{44}\textit{London Times}, January 26, 1948, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{London Times}, February 5, 1948, p. 4.
provide proper police or army convoy escorts. Three hundred Arabs came from outside Palestine and established themselves at Safad, Galilee. Seven hundred Syrians crossed the border armed with mechanized equipment and in battle uniform. More than 900 men of the Arab liberation army arrived in Palestine in 19 vehicles.

Lieutenant-Colonel David Rees-Williams, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, admitted that armed Arabs had infiltrated Palestine, but he claimed it was impossible to maintain continuous control over the entire border. On February 22 a Jewish shopping area, Ben Yehuda Street, was blown up, resulting in at least fifty dead and seventy injured. Rees-Williams said Abdul Kader Husseini, an Arab guerilla leader, distributed pamphlets admitting Arab responsibility for the explosion in retaliation for the Jewish bombing of Ramleh market-place. Although the British promised to investigate this incident, nothing more was heard concerning it.

The British did nothing to stop this increased activity by the Arabs. Four Jews were arrested in Jerusalem, released

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48 Debates (Commons), CDXLVI (1948), 330.
49 Debates (Commons), CDXLVII (1948), 1778; London Times, February 24, 1948, p. 4.
in the Arab quarter, and later found murdered. More than 700 armed Arabs crossed the Jordan bridges which were guarded by Arab troops. On March 11, 1948, the headquarters of the Jewish Agency was blown up, with twelve killed and eighty-nine injured. By that time, there were about 7,000 armed Arab incursionists from neighboring Arab States in Palestine. It soon became evident that the Arabs would make serious efforts to destroy what they regarded as Zionist aggression.

In March, 1948, the Palestine Bill was voted on in the House of Commons after several days of debates. Creech Jones explained exactly what the Palestine Bill would accomplish. The primary purpose was to state officially that the British Mandate for Palestine would be definitely terminated on May 15, 1948, and that Great Britain would have no further responsibility for Palestine. Immunity would be conferred on all acts done in the execution of duty for the protection and withdrawal of the British administration from Palestine. This was necessary because Great Britain was no longer administering a peaceful country. The United Nations Commission had been supplied with considerable

50 Debates (Commons), CDXLVII (1948), 368.
51 Debates (Commons), CDXLVII (1948), 310.
53 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1247.
information concerning the transfer of authority, but Great Britain had refrained from any actions involving implementation of the United Nations policy. Recruitment of armed forces from the Arab and Jewish communities would place two authorities in Palestine at the same time and increase the disturbances and so could not be allowed.\textsuperscript{54} The same would hold true if the United Nations Commission was allowed into Palestine before the termination of the Mandate. Municipal police forces had been formed in Arab towns, but Jones said nothing about the Jewish towns.\textsuperscript{55}

Few members of the Conservative party had anything to say concerning the Palestine Bill or Jones' speech. Most of those who did speak merely gave their opinion but had no constructive suggestions to offer. Richard Butler was afraid the administrative arrangements would not stand up to the disastrous situation. The British government should do everything possible to strengthen this before withdrawing.\textsuperscript{56} In no way should Great Britain implement partition or divide the responsibility of Palestine with the United Nations Commission before final termination of the Mandate. At the same time, Butler was against passing

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1252-53.
\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1254-55.
\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2517.
the Palestine Bill without definite knowledge of the arrange-
ments for the successor authority.57

Kenneth Pickthorn continued his usual diatribe against
the Mandate for Palestine. He disliked leaving a country
for which Great Britain had been responsible without being
sure there would be an effective successor, which the United
Nations certainly would not be. Even so, Great Britain was
no longer liable for the situation in Palestine; and it was
up to the United Nations to make a declaration of policy.
Pickthorn ended his speech by making a final denunciation
against the whole idea of Zionism.58

The Palestine Bill was solely to formalize the evacua-
tion of British forces from Palestine and did not mean that
Great Britain agreed with partition, stated Major Edward
Legge-Bourke. Zionism was a menace to world peace, and
the British were "bamboozled" into supporting it.59 The
"thugs [Jews] who have been shipped to Palestine, and
diverted to Cyprus . . ." should be removed and sent any-
where but to Palestine. Legge-Bourke recommended making
and maintaining treaties with the Arab States and selling
them weapons.60

57Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2814-15.
58Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2464-68.
59Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1327-28.
60Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2832.
A Nationalist Conservative, Major Reginald Manningham-Buller, criticized ending British authority in Palestine under the shadow of war. There was no alternative but to surrender the Mandate, but this should have been done when the United States refused to cooperate with British efforts in Palestine. No matter what this Bill said, it should be supported because it meant the termination of the Mandate. After May 15, in no circumstances should British troops interfere in Palestine to save the Arabs or the Jews.61 Any responsibility for a power vacuum in Palestine after the withdrawal of the British rested on the United Nations. It was inadvisable to allow the United Nations Commission into Palestine before May 1.62 Manningham-Buller recommended removing all Jewish terrorists currently in prison in Palestine to Great Britain or a British possession to serve the remainder of their sentences.63

Only two Unionists spoke briefly on Palestine. Sir Peter Macdonald blamed the Labor party for not carrying out their promises to solve the Palestine problem. Macdonald was still obsessed with the idea that trained Communist Jews of military age were in the displaced persons camps, were

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61 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1346-52.
62 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2471-72.
63 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2950.
en route to Palestine, and were there at the present time. They refused to admit they were Communists, but they were because they had served with the Russian Army during the war. The Russian Fifth Column would seize control in Palestine as soon as the British pulled out. Sir Patrick Hannon was primarily concerned with protecting the Holy Places. He hoped a Governor would be appointed for Jerusalem, and it would not just be left in chaos.

Kenneth Lindsay, an Independent Nationalist, claimed that the British government had prevented making a decision or setting a policy on Palestine by appointing Commission after Commission. Had it not been for this endless delay, the present situation would not have occurred. Instead of just clearing out at all costs, a fresh start should be tried before an endless Holy War broke out.

One of the two Communists in the House of Commons, William Gallacher, maintained that withdrawing troops from Palestine did not relieve Great Britain of the main responsibility of the Mandate, preparing the country for self-government. Even if the British could not leave Palestine in a settled condition, everything should be done to avoid trouble. If possible, a combination of Jewish and Arab

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64 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1291-96.
65 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2532.
66 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1334-35.
community leaders could be encouraged to emerge and recognized as responsible for keeping law and order.\textsuperscript{67}

It was the Labor party which contributed the most criticisms and suggestions in regard to the Palestine Bill. In addition to those who had steadfastly concerned themselves with the Palestine problem, several who had previously remained noncommittal now emerged as firm supporters of the Jews or the Arabs. Frederick Cocks suddenly spoke up as a staunch champion of the Zionist cause. He insisted the United Nations plan for partition gave far less to the Jews than the Labor party had promised them. On that ground, the decision should have been ignored. By accepting partition and withdrawing from Palestine, a lasting disgrace had been inflicted on Great Britain. Cocks called on the Jews to hold their own in the struggle with the Arabs.\textsuperscript{68}

Sir Richard Acland was another who suddenly emerged as a supporter of the Zionists. Great Britain had refused to carry out the Anglo-American Commission's recommendations, and this was tantamount to encouraging Arab violence to keep any policy they did not like from being carried out. Great Britain had again chosen the middle road by refusing to uphold international law on the issue, and at the same time, refusing to do anything to prevent partition.

\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2851-52.
\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2965-68.
from being carried out by force. Acland assured the House that the Arabs would never win. The Jews would be victorious because they were better disciplinarians and organizers.69

John McKay suggested levelling criticisms at the United Nations instead of the British government. It was now the responsibility of the United Nations to provide a new authority in Palestine, but they had not done so.70 Hopkin Morris added his voice to those who had criticized the Labor party's pledges to the Jews. He claimed those promises gave the Jews a legitimate right to expect British support.71 Stanley Evans disagreed with Morris, saying the Labor party had never been committed to a Jewish State, just to a Jewish National Home. It was now the United Nations responsibility, and Great Britain should remain neutral.72

Benn Levy blamed Ernest Bevin for refusing to carry out the Labor party's promises to the Jews. Bevin was the cause of the bloodshed and chaos which resulted from his policy. On the grounds of maintaining law and order and protecting the frontiers, none of which the British were actually doing, Great Britain had refused to cooperate with

69 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1276-77.
70 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1286.
71 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1287.
72 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1288-90.
the United Nations. The British were willing to share control of Palestine with Arab marauders, but not with the United Nations. This had considerably undermined the authority of that body. If Palestinian Jewry was exterminated, Great Britain would lose loyal friends because of their appeasement of open enemies and treacherous Allies.\(^7\)

As long as the British were in Palestine, the situation would continue to deteriorate, asserted William Warbey. The British government's policy had delayed and frustrated the United Nations Palestine Commission when it should have been facilitating their work. Arab threats had been condoned by the British administration. Five thousand armed Arabs had crossed the frontiers into Palestine, and Fawzi Kawukji had entered Palestine with arms and forces in a military convoy and set up his own civil administration. Great Britain encouraged the Arabs by making only one public protest against these incursions and by continuing to send arms to the Arab nations.\(^4\) By refusing to let the United Nations Commission into Palestine, and refusing to recognize their authority, Great Britain had created a power vacuum which could be filled by anyone seeking power by force.\(^5\) The Palestine Bill would create chaos out of order,

\(^7\)Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1296-1300.
\(^4\)Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1305-10.
\(^5\)Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1530.
end twenty years of Labor party pledges to the Jews, and take away part of the honor of Great Britain and the United Nations.76

Sydney Silverman agreed with Warbey that the Palestine Bill was set up so as to create anarchy. Either Great Britain should have accepted partition as workable or told the United Nations it was impractical and suggest they do anything but partition. The Bill was evidence that Ernest Bevin never wanted partition. The British were refusing to cooperate with the United Nations at the peril of world peace.77 Great Britain had repudiated all authority and moral responsibility by running away from Palestine. The administration could have been slowly handed to Jewish and Arab bodies, so when the Mandate ended, there would be something to take its place.78 Silverman condemned the Act of Indemnity for the British soldiers. British armed forces had driven into Tel Aviv and fired indiscriminately into the streets, killing innocent people. Men and women had been deported from Palestine because there was a possibility, by their associations, beliefs, or opinions, that they might have been involved in terrorist activities. No proof was offered, and they were often held without charge. The

76 *Debates* (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2973-74.
77 *Debates* (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1311-18.
78 *Debates* (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2521-24.
British in Palestine, therefore, had already been given too much power to act without limitations or controls.\(^7^9\)

Thomas Reid spoke with his usual fiery and dramatic denunciations of the Jews. He claimed the United Nations Charter stated they would refrain from the use of force against an independent State, yet they planned to commit the "immoral, illegal, and unjust" action of dividing Palestine. The United Nations, by this "wicked decision," would begin a war which might last fifty years. The Arabs would never submit to their independence being taken away. The Jews should use their influence to get partition rejected and establish a Palestinian State.\(^8^0\)

Ivor Thomas called the United Nations decision creating two bi-national States from Palestine absurd. Partition would never work because, although there were plenty of Jewish leaders, there were no Arabs able to accept responsibility.\(^8^1\) Captain Hugh Delargy agreed with Thomas that partition would never work, but only because Great Britain refused to cooperate with the United Nations. Considering the present situation, when the Mandate ended, there would be no authority to take its place.\(^8^2\)

\(^7^9\) Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2882-84; 2938-39.  
\(^8^0\) Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1331-33.  
\(^8^1\) Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1336-37.  
\(^8^2\) Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1339-40.
Richard Crossman reminded the House that ten years earlier the Palestine Commission had recommended partition. An Arab revolt had then resulted in concessions to Arab violence. Right after the war, when the Arabs were vulnerable because of their support for Germany, the Palestine problem could have been solved. There was another opportunity when the Anglo-American Commission put forward its recommendations. These opportunities were allowed to pass, and there was now no alternative to total withdrawal and ensuing chaos. Great Britain had now lost the friendship of both the Jews and the Arabs. Conditions in Palestine set up by the British administration made it impossible for the United Nations Commission to establish their authority. British influence with the Arab League should be used. Great Britain would not gain the respect of the Arabs by allowing the Jews to be slaughtered.\(^8^3\)

Barnett Janner insisted that by refusing to cooperate with the United Nations, the British were interfering with the creation of the Jewish National Home under the terms of the Mandate. Great Britain was leaving the Jews, who had built up Palestine, at the mercy of Arab bandits, who had been enemies of the Allies during the war.\(^8^4\) Great Britain had refused to allow the Jews to defend themselves, but they

\(^{83}\)Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1341-45.

\(^{84}\)Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2452-55.
had given arms to the Arab States and allowed Fawzi Kawukji and his armed followers to come into Palestine. These armed Arabs had been let into the country but the British refused to let in Jewish refugees from the displaced persons camps.\textsuperscript{85} Janner expressed no doubt that the Jews would establish a State in Palestine. The British administration should allow the Yishuv to work and prepare for independence instead of continually interfering with their actions.\textsuperscript{86}

Lieutenant-Colonel Marcus Lipton said the British government seemed to think they had proven their innocence and impartiality by alienating as many people as possible.\textsuperscript{87} Michael Foot claimed the Palestine Bill was a betrayal of the Jews by Great Britain. The House would never agree to leaving any country but Palestine in chaos. Foot suggested retaining the Mandate jointly with the United States in order to prevent a Middle Eastern war.\textsuperscript{88}

Ian Mikardo accused Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary, of paying lip service to the United Nations while refusing to let their Commission into Palestine. He wondered if Great Britain planned to accept the United Nations as the authority in Palestine or whoever happened to claim it by

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2821-23.\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2970-71.\textsuperscript{87}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2802.\textsuperscript{88}\textit{Debates} (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2977-79.
force. Mikardo felt the Indemnity Act should only include those who were subject to direct attack. Palestine was already a Police State with rigid censorship, arrests made without charges, and detentions without trials. The British steadfastly condemned such actions when carried out by other countries. Great Britain had become open to charges of totalitarian behavior and suppression of individual rights. Actions had taken place in Palestine that were against recognized government policy. The policy of the British home government was to deny recognition of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, but the administration in Palestine had protected him from criticism so he could easily return to Palestine.

Several members of the Labor party Cabinet attempted to answer some of the criticisms and questions which had been thrown at them. Hector McNeil, the Minister of State, explained that the Jewish prisoners in jail at the termination of the Mandate would be transferred to the Jewish State and the Arabs to the Arab State. After May 15, British troops would maintain law and order only as far as necessary to complete the final withdrawal. He denied that Great Britain was in any way impeding implementation of the United Nations plan for partition. The United Nations had known

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89 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2482-85.
90 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2869-71.
91 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2875-76.
from the beginning that the British would not impose a solution by force. Any attempt to do so would end in failure. It was to the Labor party's credit that they tried for two years to find an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem.92

The only contribution during the debate on the Palestine Bill from Ernest Bevin was his statement that Great Britain intended to remain neutral. The main policy was only to leave Palestine as soon as possible. The Palestine administration would be handed to any authority the United Nations appointed.93

Creech Jones insisted there was no doubt that the United Nations would assume control of Palestine when the Mandate ended. Even if this was not a certainty, it was no longer a British responsibility. Great Britain intended to work in full harmony with the United Nations.94 The United Nations Commission had been given a responsibility in Palestine which was impossible to fulfill without the means to discharge it. Prior to May 15, 1948, Great Britain had a heavy responsibility in Palestine which, for security reasons, could not be shared with the United Nations Commission. As far as possible, much of the administration

92 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1355-64.
93 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2816-18.
94 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2474-78.
of Palestine had been passed to local authorities. Great Britain had urged the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to quickly settle the future of Jerusalem, but the Arabs had refused to cooperate in safeguarding the Holy Places. In his final statement, Jones emphasized that in no way would the British troops interfere in the affairs of Palestine during any interim period.

The Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, who had remained silent during previous debates on Palestine, suddenly became a primary spokesman for the administration. He claimed Palestine would not be an independent State for quite some time, but it would be held in trust under the United Nations until the people were considered able to govern themselves. Great Britain was legally entitled to terminate the Mandate. When the Mandate ended on May 15, so did British responsibility for Palestine. No nation had any legal obligation to comply with the recommendations of the United Nations. Shawcross rejected all allegations that Palestine, even in the face of terrorism, had ever been a Police State. The Indemnity Act would only cover any action necessary to facilitate the withdrawal of British

95 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2805-08.
96 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2813.
97 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 1320.
98 Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2495-97.
forces and the protection of civilians and property. He was certain the indemnity would never be misused.99

The final vote for the termination of British jurisdiction in Palestine was 274 for and 88 against it.100 The British administration in Palestine was coming to an end. Little had been accomplished during the debate on the Palestine Bill. Old arguments had been rehashed, old criticisms repeated, and the same suggestions made. Again, no member of Parliament had come forward with a strong constructive policy to alter the situation they all deplored. After two and one-half years of delays and deliberations by the Labor party, Great Britain was pulling out of Palestine, leaving chaos and war behind them. All that remained during the next two months was the final withdrawal of the British troops. The next authority in Palestine would be secured by military force.

99Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2868.
100Debates (Commons), CDXLVIII (1948), 2862.
CHAPTER V

THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

AND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

After the Palestine Bill was passed terminating the British Mandate for Palestine on May 15, 1948, most of the discussions in the House of Commons concerned explanations of terrorist activities and the increasing warfare between the Jews and the Arabs. Emmanuel Shinwell, the Secretary of State for War, reported the precautions the British in Palestine were taking. All members of the military carried arms on and off duty. No one was allowed to leave the camps alone. The camps were defended by guards and sentries armed with anti-tank weapons and light machine guns.¹

Creech Jones explained that the situation was especially perilous for the Jews in Jerusalem. The Arabs in that city relied on local food supplies and so suffered no shortage, but the Jews depended on food brought along the Jaffa-Jerusalem road from the coastal plain. This road was subject to constant Arab attack, and Jones insisted it was very difficult to escort the Jewish convoys. Instead of

¹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) [hereafter cited as "Debates (Commons)"] CDLXIX (1948), 1616.
condemning the Arabs, Jones criticized the Jews for attempting to seize Arab villages along the Jaffa-Jerusalem road in an effort to eliminate the bases the Arabs used for their attacks.² Squadron Leader Dr. Samuel Segal, a Laborite, condemned Jones, saying that if the British could not maintain security on that two-mile stretch of road, they should give up all pretense of maintaining law and order in Palestine.³

Ernest Bevin continued to show his strong pro-Arab bias. He admitted that King Abdullah of Transjordan had announced he would invade Palestine and take military action against the Jews. Bevin still refused to withdraw the Arab Legion from Palestine until final termination of the British Mandate. It was the Jews who were well armed, claimed Bevin, ignoring the fact that the Arabs had been more than adequately armed by Great Britain. Furthermore, it was not the Arabs who had hung British officers, but the Jews.⁴ The Jews began indiscriminate attacks on Jaffa and the Arab section of Jerusalem. The British forces stepped in and threatened military action against the Jews unless their attacks on the Arabs ceased.⁵ Bevin seemed to see nothing

²Debates (Commons), CDXLIX (1948), 72.
³Debates (Commons), CDXLIX (1948), 1799.
⁴Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 373-76.
⁵Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 1117.
incongruous with his taking this military action and earlier repeated vows that the British would not interfere to help either side.

Several members of the Labor party added their comments on the Palestine situation. John Platts-Mills insisted that the British had refused to let the United Nations Commission into Palestine before May 1, had refused to arrange for an orderly transfer of authority, and were taking arbitrary financial and economic steps in Palestine. Barnett Janner complained to the British administration that the Arab Legion had been given surplus arms and military equipment left behind by the British. Members of the Arab Legion were actively engaged in smuggling Arab bands into Palestine from neighboring countries.

Two in the Conservative party spoke against the Jews. Brigadier Austin Low asserted that British and Arab interests were closely bound together. Jewish immigrants should not be allowed into Palestine because they would have to use the Haifa port which was needed for the British evacuation. Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan went even further than Low. He claimed that almost all the Jewish immigrants were carefully selected Russian partisans and trained Communists.

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6 Debates (Commons), CDXLIX (1948), 1798.
7 Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 26.
8 Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 2421-23.
As such they should never be allowed into Palestine. Major Tufton Beamish, a Unionist, dramatically gave the Jews two choices. They could live peacefully with the "generous and moderate" Arabs or be annihilated by them.

In May, 1948, prior to the final withdrawal of British forces from Palestine, Lieutenant-Colonel David Rees-Williams told Parliament that the High Commissioner of Palestine had put proposals for a truce in Jerusalem to the Jews and the Arabs. All hostilities there would cease, and no arms would be permitted to enter the city. Jews would have right of entry into the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, but they would evacuate the Arab quarter of Katamon. The Political Committee of the Arab League had accepted those terms. The Arabs and Jews also had agreed to the appointment of a Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem.

The Jewish Agency declared that a Jewish State would be formed on May 16, 1948. They were opposed to any kind of trusteeship by the United Nations and insisted on immediate recognition of a Jewish provisional Government Council. The Jews knew the main responsibility for implementing partition would rest on them. Great Britain in

9 Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 2431.
10 Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 1210.
11 Debates (Commons), CDL (1948), 2414.
no way had intervened to help save Jewish lives from Arab attacks or to allow the Jews to defend themselves. The British were convinced that the Arabs would take over much of Palestine allotted to the Jews and that another solution, more favorable to the Arabs, would have to be found.

Clement Attlee refuted these arguments, saying everything possible had been done to prevent the incursions of armed Arabs into Palestine. He insisted there was no basis for the claim that the arms which Great Britain had supplied the Arabs with would be used in Palestine. At no time could the British ever recognize the Jewish Haganah as a legal organization.

Creech Jones suggested establishing a neutral central authority to hold and keep Palestinian assets from being destroyed, to encourage mediation between the Arabs and the Jews, and to act as a central authority on behalf of the United Nations. Their program could include a truce to prevent open war, immediate action by the United Nations on the displaced European Jews, and the establishment of United Nations authority in Palestine.

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15London Times, April 19, 1948, p. 4.
On May 13, 1948, the British government issued a statement on the termination of the Palestine Mandate. They had tried for twenty-seven years to find a solution to the problem on which both the Jews and Arabs agreed and to prepare the country for self-government. They had been unable to do so because a force of 84,000 was insufficient to maintain law and order in the face of Jewish terrorism and non-cooperation from the Jewish community. Short of imposing a solution by military force, Great Britain was now willing to help Palestine and the United Nations in any possible way.17

On the eve of final British withdrawal, May 14, 1948, the Jewish State of Israel was proclaimed by the Jewish National Council. The Jews promised to safeguard all religious shrines, promised the Arabs full citizenship and representation, and made an offer of peace to the neighboring Arab States. They revoked the White Paper of 1939 and the legislation restricting land sales. Within hours, the United States recognized the provisional government of the State of Israel, quickly followed by Russia and several other nations.18 Great Britain refused to recognize Israel until they were certain the country had a functioning

administration, the ability to carry out international obligations, and permanently established frontiers.¹⁹

In addition to refusing to recognize the State of Israel, the British Labor Cabinet showed their pro-Arab bias by letting approximately forty British officers continue to serve with the Arab Legion. Many of these men were actually involved in Arab operations against the Jews. This was condemned by members of Parliament and much of the British public. They insisted that Great Britain should maintain strict neutrality.²⁰ King Abdullah should be asked to keep British officers within the boundaries of Transjordan. The important thing was to stop the fighting in Palestine without giving military advantage to either side.²¹

Despite the British government's support of the Arab States, many British politicians, primarily from within the Labor party, spoke up in firm support of the Jews. At the Labor Party's Annual Conference, the government's official policy was attacked. Arabs were denounced as former paid agents of Adolf Hitler who had now embarked on a war against the Jews to divert attention from the disease and starvation in their own countries. Great Britain had promised to withdraw the Arab Legion from Palestine at the

termination of the Mandate. Not only had this not been
done, this same Legion, commanded by British officers and
subsidized by the British government, was now attacking the
Jews. These officers should be withdrawn at once, along
with all aid ostensibly given the Arab States by Great
Britain because of treaty obligations. The treaty with
Transjordan stated that the country could not go to war
without consulting the British government. 22

Richard Crossman claimed the British in Palestine made
a deliberate effort to ensure that the Jews would be de-
stroyed by the Arabs. 23 They shrewdly staged their with-
drawal from Palestine in ways which would instigate Arab
disorders and make it impossible to transfer authority from
the British administration to the new Jewish State. By
doing this, the British planned to help the Arabs conquer
the whole of Palestine and impede Jewish defense of their
State. 24 Instead of cooperating in the United Nations plan
for partition, the British in Palestine, acting on orders
from London, made the United Nations decision inoperative.
Thousands of Arabs were encouraged by their leaders to
leave the areas of anticipated military operations while

22Great Britain, The Labor Party Report of the 47th
23Richard H. S. Crossman, M. P., A Nation Reborn
24Crossman, A Nation Reborn, p. 98.
the Jews were driven into the sea. Confident of indirect British support, the Arab leaders pronounced a certain swift victory over the Jews.25

Two Communists, William Gallacher and Philip Piratin, and one Laborite, John Platts-Mills, proposed a motion in support of Israel in the House of Commons. They asserted that the policy of the British government in support of the Arab States was mainly responsible for their invasion of Palestine. Great Britain should recognize the State of Israel at once, halt all arms supplies and subsidies to the Arab Legion, and withdraw British officers from that body.26 Piratin added his complaint that the radio station in Cyprus, run by the Foreign Office Information Department of Great Britain, encouraged the Arabs in their war with the Jews and told them to be ready to occupy Haifa.27

During 1948, Major Christopher Mayhew gave the House of Commons several brief statements on the situation in Palestine and British policy in the Middle East. He claimed that recognition by Great Britain of Israel at the present time would constitute a political act favorable for the Jewish side.28 Forty-five members of the British military

26Debates (Commons), CDLI (1948), 1241-42.
27Debates (Commons), CDLII (1948), 409.
28Debates (Commons), CDLI (1948), 2666.
were currently serving in Saudi Arabia. War in Palestine and the presence of Saudi Arabian troops there did not warrant interrupting British training of Arab troops, insisted Mayhew.29

The Palestinian economy deteriorated as the war went on. Reports about the events in the Middle East were primarily written from a strong pro-Arab slant. The Jews reportedly exploited the political and military mistakes of the Arabs and gained advantages the United Nations had not meant them to have. The Jews conquered much of Arab Palestine and called Arab attempts to recover their land aggression. It was obvious they planned to seize Jerusalem as part of the Jewish State. The Jews demanded that the Arabs heed international opinion, but they refused to show respect for it themselves.30 Israel was responsible for the more than 300,000 Arab refugees who fled Palestine because of Jewish attacks on Haifa and Jaffa. These refugees were not let back into Palestine because they could be replaced by Jews who would inherit their possessions and contribute to national solidarity. They could also be used as a bargaining counter to secure the release of the Jews on Cyprus.31

29 Debates (Commons), CDLIII (1948), 359.
31 London Times, August 9, 1948, p. 5.
David Ben Gurion, now the Prime Minister of Israel, announced that the boundaries set up by the United Nations for the Jewish State were no longer considered permanent due to Jewish military victories over Arab aggression. Many Britons immediately pointed to this as confirmation for their belief that the Jews had accepted partition only to give them a starting point for their wider ambitions. They planned to build a Jewish State in all of Palestine, regardless of the rights of the Arabs or of United Nations decisions.32

Ernest Bevin continued his pro-Arab speeches and policy. He explained his version of the situation in the Middle East to Parliament and spoke violently against the Jews. Without Arab help, not Jewish, the North African campaign of the Second World War would never have been won. The Jews had turned more than 500,000 Arabs away from Palestine and into homeless refugees without employment or resources to make way for their own immigrants. These Arab refugees certainly did not walk out voluntarily.33 Bevin denied that he had ever given the Arabs any encouragement to attack the Jews. It was the Jews who attacked the Egyptians and Lebanese in violation of the United Nations truce.

33 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 930-33.
King Abdullah had asked Great Britain for forces and arms to defend Transjordan against Jewish incursions, so British armed forces had been sent to Aquba. Bevin insisted that, since the Jews were receiving arms from Czechoslovakia, it was perfectly all right for Great Britain to send forces into the Middle East. The British government would not recognize Israel until the Jews stopped ignoring United Nations resolutions and showed they were willing to live peacefully with their neighbors.³⁴ None of these statements did much to back up Bevin's righteous claim that he certainly never took the Arab side in the struggle with the Jews in Palestine.

One Unionist, Major Tufton Beamish, agreed with Bevin. He insisted that, because of Zionist military aggression, one-half of the Arabs in Palestine were now homeless refugees.³⁵ Two other Unionists suddenly became among the first of their party to speak out openly in support of the Jews. Robert Boothby maintained that Bevin had staked everything on Arab victory without realizing that this would mean the destruction of thirty years of progress in Palestine. Boothby said the victory of the Jews was a miracle, and the State of Israel should be recognized by Great Britain

³⁴ Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 936-45.
³⁵ Debates (Commons), CDLVII (1948), 1513.
at once. William Teeling was certain that Israel would relegate the Communist element in the Middle East to the background. Great Britain should establish good relations with Israel for the trade potential between the two countries.

Clement Davies, a Liberal, spoke in extremely strong words for the Jewish cause. He criticized Ernest Bevin for blaming everyone but himself for the situation in Palestine. Despite the White Paper of 1939, the Jews had remained friends of Great Britain, but the Arabs had not. The British had prohibited Jewish immigration and kept them from getting arms, but they had armed and trained the Arabs. Seven armed Arab nations attacked Israel, but the British government made no protest. Seven hundred thousand Jews had to hold back forty million Arabs. The Arabs marched into the Negev and the Jews pursued them, so immediately the Jews were labelled the aggressors. Great Britain had quickly spread whatever rumor had come out against the Jews.

The Conservative party spoke almost unanimously for the Arabs and against the Jews. Major Edward Legge-Bourke

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36 Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 786-87.
37 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 1010-12.
38 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 962-65.
39 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 967-69.
theatrically claimed that recognition of Israel would "sound the death knell" of the Arab League. The United Nations had done nothing but increase the national sovereignty of the Soviet Union, serve the Zionist cause, and establish Israel against all good judgment.\textsuperscript{40} Baker White said responsibility for the Arab refugees rested on the Jews who were unwilling to let them return to their homes.\textsuperscript{41}

Daniel Lipson supported the belief that Great Britain's main obligation was to look after Arab interests. Bevin was not responsible for the situation in Palestine. It was the Jews who flouted the United Nations resolutions and refused to live in peace with the Arabs.\textsuperscript{42} Brigadier Austin Low called the Israelis inhumane for refusing to let the Arabs back into their territory. He agreed with the majority of his Conservative party that the Jews did their best to enlarge their State by ignoring the United Nations resolutions.\textsuperscript{43}

Oliver Stanley insisted there had been a Jewish State in Palestine for years. The British government had done their best to promote Communism in Palestine. Rather than giving a grudging recognition of Israel, it would be better

\textsuperscript{40} Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 758-62.
\textsuperscript{41} Debates (Commons), CDLX (1948), 1037-38.
\textsuperscript{42} Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 1511-12.
\textsuperscript{43} Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 997-1000.
not to give one at all. The British must decide exactly what support they were willing to give the Arabs. They should be guaranteed a new frontier that would not be encroached upon.\textsuperscript{44}

Winston Churchill condemned Great Britain for refusing to accept the United Nations decision for partition and for refusing to accept reality by not recognizing Israel. Ernest Bevin had never had the slightest understanding of the Palestine problem. Due to Bevin's biases and prejudices, Great Britain was now Israel's bitterest enemy.\textsuperscript{45} Churchill claimed he had always known the Arabs would never win against the fighting qualities and toughness of the Zionists. The Negeb should be offered to the Jews as a means of expansion because the Arabs never developed desert lands when they were in their control.\textsuperscript{46} The Arab refugees fled Palestine because of the invading Arab armies, not because of Zionist aggression. The Jews needed the Arabs to help them develop Israel.\textsuperscript{47}

Members of the Labor party were again the most outspoken in their opinions on the situation in the Middle East. Flying Officer Norman Lever urged Great Britain to

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 1048-51.} \textsuperscript{45}\textit{Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 948-52.} \textsuperscript{46}\textit{Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 953-55.} \textsuperscript{47}\textit{Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 960.}
recognize Israel and use her influence to see that Transjordan also recognized the Jewish State. If the Foreign Office wanted to help the Arabs, they should not be sending them guns and bombers. They should try to raise the Arab standard of living instead of giving them death and starvation through war. 48

Squadron Leader Dr. Samuel Segal considered Israel to be the most powerful and progressive country in the Middle East. Great Britain should help the Arabs face up to the reality of recognizing Israel. 49 Israel was willing to assist the Arab refugees, but not as long as the war continued. This should not even be necessary because the Arab countries should take in the refugees. 50 Ian Mikardo expanded on Segal's argument, saying that the Arab refugees had been displaced from Palestine as a result of the Arab invasion. The Arabs in Israel should be exchanged for the Jews in Arab countries who were currently being treated as Jews had been in Nazi Germany. 51

A. Edward Davies claimed that Israel now had all the attributes of a responsible government. Great Britain's attitude had been hostile to Israel and to the United

48 Debates (Commons), CDLI (1948), 2659-63.
49 Debates (Commons), CDLIV (1948), 1293.
50 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 1032-33.
51 Debates (Commons), CDLIV (1948), 1294-95.
States. Israel should be recognized by the British and admitted to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{52} Reginald Page asserted that it was unrealistic to expect Israel to accept thousands of her enemies back into the country. The Arabs' future conduct was questionable, and the Jews themselves were short of supplies. The Arabs, who set out to destroy Israel, should accept the blame for the refugee problem.\textsuperscript{53}

Ernest Bevin had set the Arabs at war against the Jews, and this met with richly deserved failure, claimed John Platts-Mills. The State of Israel was now a fact, and this could not be altered by Bevin. It was time Great Britain joined with the majority of the United Nations and recognized the State of Israel.\textsuperscript{54}

Norman Smith suddenly emerged as an avid anti-Zionist. He indignantly maintained that Zionism was only a belief by certain fanatical Jews that they were the Chosen People and should have a State in Palestine. Deceit and violence were always characteristics of Zionism. The English working class hated people who used methods which the Jews had used. Smith denied that this was anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{55} Jews were Zionists only because of fanatical religious aims and the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 608-11.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Debates (Commons), CDLVII (1948), 1515.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 1001-04.
\end{itemize}
tremendous desire for power of the American Jews. The Zionists were "aggressive and murderous," and the American Jews had deliberately used their influence and wealth to weaken the British position in the world. It was now too late to change the situation. Great Britain would have to recognize Israel because of "American wealth, Russian malice, and the Zionist weapon of illegal immigration."\

Frederick Cocks complained that, by supplying the Arabs with arms, the Labor party was going against more than twenty years of pledges to support the Zionist cause. The Israeli Army had defeated the Arab Army and occupied the Northern Negeb. Great Britain had demanded that Egypt, under United Nations protection, be allowed to return to the Negeb. The victorious Israelis should give up the land they won. That was absurd. Israel had the right to make her defensive lines as strong as possible. It was time for the British Foreign Office to abandon their "anti-Semitic" policy which did not represent the views of the people. The Zionist movement was one of the great achievements of the present day; and the Arabs, still living in the tenth century, should not be allowed to stop it.\

56 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 1005-07.
57 Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 637-41.
Great Britain was right to resist Zionist demands and help the weaker Arabs get a fair deal, insisted Phillips Price. The Arabs did not have American money behind them as the Jews did. The Zionists thought they could do anything they wished to the Arabs, but they must be shown that this would not be allowed.  

Sydney Silverman, always an ardent Zionist, violently disagreed with Price. The Arabs had gotten themselves into their situation, and the Jews should not be expected to help them get out of it. The Israelis had not created the Arab refugee problem. They had done everything possible to persuade the Arabs to stay, and those who had were well treated. The British representatives in the Middle East had done more than anyone to convince the Arabs to leave their homes.  

Richard Crossman reiterated his view that Ernest Bevin was hostile to the Jews and spoke from the Arab viewpoint. Both the British Empire and the United States had been made by going into someone else's country, and it was hypocritical to criticize the Jews. Great Britain had lost her integrity by refusing to face the real facts about the situation in Palestine. The Jews had not won the war by American money or superior equipment. They had won by... 

58 Debates (Commons), CDLIX (1948), 767.  
59 Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 933.
spirit of resistance that recognized that if they had not
won, it would have meant the end of everything. All that
Bevin had tried to prevent had come about, including a
Jewish State in Palestine. Only by the British government
admitting that they had been wrong could normal relations
be reestablished with the Jews. Many Arabs had left Jewish
Palestine to join one or another of the various Arab armies,
and Crossman added that others had left because they had
murdered Jews for months. The Arabs who had stayed in Israel
were well treated. The Jews had offered to give technical
assistance to Transjordan upon the conclusion of peace.
Great Britain had wasted money and lives in the Middle East
to stem the tide of progress and to keep the deserts de-
serted for their own strategic reasons. This prejudice
against the Jews had led the British to a great diplomatic
defeat.

Prime Minister Clement Attlee attempted to answer
these criticisms and defend his administration. He claimed
that Ernest Bevin had tried to bring the Jews and Arabs
together and to obtain United States support. The British
military advisers had certainly never encouraged the Arabs.
Israel had invaded Egypt during an armistice imposed by
the United Nations. Great Britain naturally had supported

60Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 984-88.
61Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 991-95.
Egypt because of treaty obligations. It would have been "ill-advised" to recognize Israel eight months ago, but now it might contribute to peace. Attlee ended his speech by asserting again that Bevin was a friend to the Jews and had often been thanked for his services to them.\(^6\)

After the War of Independence in 1948, the State of Israel was an established fact. In 1949, Great Britain felt compelled to recognize the Jewish State. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 had been made with the hope that it would lead to great strategic advantages for the Allies. It was the beginning of a policy by the British government to use the Jews to British advantage whenever possible, with the intent that they would not have to carry out their pledges to them. Of course, no one foresaw the Nazi Holocaust of the 1930's and 1940's which irrevocably altered the situation of the survivors of European Jewry and made Palestine the most reasonable solution to their homelessness. Nonetheless, the very desperation of the Jewish people gave them a moral right to call on the Labor party of Great Britain to carry out their numerous promises concerning the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine.

The Labor party came to power in the summer of 1945; and the Jews waited in vain for some sign that the Labor party had not forgotten them. Until Jewish terrorist

\(^{62}\)Debates (Commons), CDLX (1949), 1053-58.
activity accelerated in 1946, the Labor party certainly did their best to push the situation in Palestine into the background. When it became clear that the Jews were no longer willing to be ignored, Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin began their policy of endless delay. Commission after commission was appointed, only to have their recommendations ignored. As far back as 1938, partition had been put forth as the only acceptable solution to the problem, but Bevin refused to accept it because of his belief that it gave an advantage to the Jews. All the commissions agreed that Great Britain should give up the Mandate for Palestine and hand it over to the United Nations. Bevin also refused to do this because Great Britain needed a strategically secure base in the Middle East. He felt that the less progressive Arabs would be easier to maneuver than the Jews.

For three years the situation in Palestine was debated in the House of Commons. Men and women became known as strongly pro-Zionist or pro-Arab and rarely swerved from their stands. Richard Crossman, along with a few Jewish members of the Labor party, spoke with experience behind him and offered several constructive ideas which might have changed the situation had they been heeded. Many others, in all the parties, were not so helpful. Sydney Silverman and Barnett Janner continually supported the Zionists, but they admitted to having no specific policy which would
help the situation. A few in the Labor party, such as Thomas Reid, merely talked wildly about the evils of Zionism and the Jewish plot to overthrow the world.

Members of the Conservative party, on the whole, confined themselves to direct criticisms of the Labor party's handling of the situation. Winston Churchill continually maintained that his party was not anti-Zionist, although the White Paper of 1939 had been passed during their leadership. His solution all along had been to give up the Mandate for Palestine and return it to the United Nations. Others had no answer to the problem, but that did not keep them from contributing to the debates. Almost all of them were pro-Arab, especially Kenneth Pickthorn. They insisted that great wrongs had been done to the Arabs. They conveniently ignored Adolf Hitler's war on the Jews and the immigrant ships the British had turned away from Palestine and back to Germany and ultimate death for most of their occupants. Many in the Conservative party went so far as to take up Bevin's argument that the Arabs had helped the Allied cause during World War II more than the Jews. They could not cite specific instances, nor could they explain away the fact that many Arab leaders, including the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, had been trained by the Nazis and had worked directly with Hitler. Scarcely a member of the Conservative party supported the Jews verbally, although a few made half-hearted attempts at doing so.
The Unionists were not so much strong supporters of the Arabs as they were supporters of the myth that the Jews intended to take over the world, using Palestine as their starting point. Major Tufton Beamish, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Moore, and others were convinced that Jewish Russian soldiers waited in the displaced persons camps in Europe for a chance to get into Palestine and convert the entire Middle East to Communism. These men could be considered the originators of the Myth of the Six Million, the idea that the number of Jews who had died in Hitler's death camps had been grossly exaggerated. This fear of domination by Jewish Communists was in direct variance with the often quoted idea that Zionism existed solely because of the support of the United States, a country certainly far removed from Communism.

Two other minority parties in the House, the Liberal and the Communist, were usually firm supporters of Zionism. The Liberal party, with Clement Davies as the spokesman, emerged late in 1948 as strong defenders of the Jewish cause and critics of Bevin's basically pro-Arab stance. Members of the British Communist party kept their views to themselves until 1948. Then, William Gallacher led their campaign for the Jews and against the one-sided policy of the British government. The Communists had no hope of Jewish Palestine going over to the Russians because the
Zionists were firmly backed by the United States. They supported the Jews after their victory over the Arabs in 1948 because they regarded Israel as an established fact and welcomed Israeli freedom from British control.

More than two years after the end of the war, Ernest Bevin yielded to pressure by his party, other parties, and the British public and referred the Palestinian problem to the United Nations. He did so with the almost certain knowledge that the United Nations, pledged to support the small nations of the world, would decide in favor of the Arabs. When the United Nations recommendation for partition was announced, he was outraged and determined that the Jews would have a hard struggle ahead of them. The British in Palestine, under orders from London, armed the Arabs and refused to let the Jews defend themselves against attacks. All armed Jews were arrested; the Haganah was declared illegal; but the armed Arab League remained in Palestine. When the Arabs did attack the Jews in May, 1948, British officers led the attack on the State of Israel. The British, along with the Arab leaders, encouraged the Arabs to give up their homes and become refugees, until the Jews could be driven into the sea.

The Jews, by their superior ability, organization, and courage clearly won the war; but the British government continued to call them the aggressors and demanded
that the victors return to the Arabs the land they had won. The British finally realized that the Jewish State was firmly established and could not be destroyed. They reluctantly recognized the State of Israel, one of the last modern nations of the world to do so. The Jews had finally acquired their State and returned to Israel, due to their own hard work and determination, and in spite of the active opposition of the Labor party administration in Great Britain.
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